THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

SCHOOL  OF  LAW 


A  TREATISE 

OV   THE 

LAW  OF  LANDLOED 
AND  TENANT 

INCLUDING 

LEASES,  THEIR  EXECUTION,  SURRENDER,  AND  RENEWAL, 

THE    PARTIES    THERETO,    AND    THEIR    RECIPROCAL 

EIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS,  THE  VARIOUS  KINDS 

OF  TENANCY,  THE  USE  AND  POSSESSION   OF 

THE      PREMISES     THE     CHARACTER     OF 

RENT   AND  THE  REMEDIES   FOR   ITS 

RECOVERY,  THE  TENANT'S  RIGHT 

TO   FIXTURES,   &c.,   &c. 


FULL  REFERENCES  TO  THE  LATEST  AMERICAN 

AND  ENGLISH  CASES  AND  TO  RELEVANT 

AMERICAN  AND  ENGLISH  STATUTES, 

BOTH  ANCIENT  AND  MODERN 


BY 

H.  C.  UNDERHILL, 

OF  THE  New  York  Bar 

Author  of  a  "  Treatise  on  the  Law  'of  Evidence."  a  "Treatise 
on  the  Law  of  Criminal  Evidence,"  a  "  Treatise  on  the  Law  of 
Wills,"  and  of  the  article  "  Criminal  Law, " in  the  "Cyclopedia 
of  Law  and  Procedure." 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 

VOL.  1 


CHICAGO 

T.  H.  FLOOD  &  CO. 

1909 


T 

Un  V5  U 

19^9 


CJOPYRIGHT,   1909, 
BY 

HARRY  C.  UNDERBILL 


6TA.TE  JOURNAL  PRINTINQ  COMPANY, 

PwWTItRH   AND    StiCRKOTYPKRS, 
>IAi)LHON,    WLS. 


To  My  Wife 

MARGARET  UNDERHILL, 

THESE  VOLUMES 

ARE  AFFECTIONATELY  DEDICATED 

BY  THE  AUTHOR 


670834 


Preface. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  there  already  exist  many  text  books 
treating  more  or  less  elaborately  of  the  topic  of  the  reciprocal  re- 
lations and  rights  of  landlord  and  tenant,  it  appears  appropriate 
in  this  place  for  the  author  to  state  some  of  the  reasons  which  in 
liis  opinion  justify  the  publication  of  this  work.  This  is  the 
more  necessary  as  it  is  reasonably  certain  that  the  plan,  the  the- 
ory and  the  merits  of  this  work  will  be  placed  in  comparison  with 
the  manj^  treatises  on  the  subject  which  are  now  in  the  hands  of 
the  profession.  In  the  first  place  it  has  seemed,  to  the  writer  that 
an}^  treatment  of  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  which  lost 
sight  of  the  fact  that  the  relationship  was  of  a  contractual  char- 
acter, and  that  consequently  the  rules  of  the  modem  law  regu- 
lating the  subject  of  contract  were  applicable,  must  be  at  once 
insufficient  and  illogical.  Keeping  this  fact  in  view  constant 
reference  has  been  made  to  the  general  principles  of  the  law  of 
contracts  of  which  the  rules  regulating  the  relation  of  landlord 
and  tenant  are  a  part.  For  example,  a  full  discussion  is  at- 
tempted of  the  rules  of  the  construction  and  interpretation  of 
covenants  as  contained  in  the  instrument  of  lease.  Again,  such 
topics  as  consideration,  description  of  the  parties,  subject  mat- 
ter, etc.,  have  received  adequate  discussion;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  very  many  topics  which  anciently  were  regarded  bj'  the 
text-book  writers  as  of  great  importance,  but  which  have  become 
obsolete,  either  by  statutory  enactment  or  by  judicial  legislation, 
have,  in  the  interest  of  conciseness,  been  w^holly  or  partly  omit- 
ted. Thus  there  will  be  found  ver\'  little  in  these  volumes  of 
the  law  of  distress  for  rent  for  the  reason  that,  in  most  States  of 
the  Union  it  has  been  abolished.  On  the  other  hand  the  land- 
lord's lien  for  rent  or  advances  which  is  altogether  the  creation 


VI  PEEFACB. 

of  statutory  legislation  is  treated  at  considerable  length.  So, 
too,  the  feudal  tenures  and  their  incidents  of  various  sorts  re- 
ceive but  scanty  space  and  attention,  the  space  which  their  discus- 
sion would  have  occupied  being  employed  in  a  discussion  of  more 
timely  topics,  as  for  example,  the  negligence  of  the  landlord  in 
general  and  the  reciprocal  rights  and  obligations  of  the  parties 
to  leases  of  separate  flats  or  floors  in  dwelling  houses. 

The  author  has  in  general  endeavored  to  adhere  closely  to  the 
rules  and  principles  of  law  which  have  been  enunciated  by  the 
courts  of  last  resort,  preferring  rather  to  record  the  law  as  he 
has  found  it  to  exist  than  to  state  what  in  his  opinion  the  law 
ought  to  be.  Where  the  courts  have  differed  in  determining  the 
law,  he  has  not,  as  a  general  rule,  sought  to  reconcile  the  de- 
cisions, except  to  point  out,  when  necessary,  the  differing  cir- 
cumstances under  which  the  variant  decisions  were  rendered. 
While  the  most  recent  cases,  as  being  most  accessible,  have  been 
given  the  preference  in  citation,  the  early  American  decisions 
and  the  English  decisions,  particularly  those  which  are  recog- 
nized as  leading  <^ases,  have  neither  been  overlooked,  nor  inten- 
tionally omitted. 

An  attempt  has  been  made  to  have  the  citation  of  cases  as  com- 
plete and  exhaustive  as  possible.  M^my  thousand  cases  have 
been  examined,  analyzed  and  cited.  It  will  be  found  in  many 
instances  that  not  only  is  the  page  in  the  report  cited  upon  which 
the  case  cited  begins,  but  that  the  page  which  contains  or  af- 
firms the  rule  of  law  which  the  case  is  cited  to  support  is  also 
given.  Where  cases  have  been  cited  from  the  reports  of  the 
National  Reporter  system,  the  official  reports  have  also  been  cited 
so  far  as  the  cases  have  been  officially  reported  prior  to  going 
to  press.  H.  C.  Underiiill. 

Borough  of  Brooklyn,  New  York. 

April,  1909. 


Table  of  Contents. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  PARTIES  TO  THE  LEA&E. 

§  1.     The  general  rule i 

2.  Leases  by  life  tenants 2 

3.  Leases  by  life  tenants  under  a  power 3 

4.  The  termination  of  terms  created  by  a  life  tenant  as  a 

landlord   9 

5.  The  validity  of  lease  by  tenants  for  years 8 

6.  Guardianship  in  general 9 

7.  The  liability  of  an  intruder  as  guardian 11 

8.  The  power  of  a  guardian  in  socage 11 

9.  The  power  of  testamentary  guardians 12 

10.  The  power  to  lease  of  a  guardian  appointed  by  a  court 13 

11.  When  the  permission  of  the  court  to  the  making  of  the 

lease  is  required 14 

12.  Limitations  upon  the  power  of  a  guardian  to  lease 14 

13.  The  duty  of  the  guardian  to  lease 15 

14.  The  guardian's  duty  to  collect  rents 16 

15.  Formal  requisites  of  the  lease 16 

16.  Covenants  by  guardians 17 

17.  An  infant's  liability  for  rent 17 

18.  The  ratification  of  a  lease  made  by  an  infant 19 

19.  The  invalidity  of  a  lease  made  by  a  feme  sole 19 

20.  The  effect  of  her  marriage  upon  a  lease  made  by  a  feme  sole  20 

21.  The  invalidity  of  a  lease  made  by  a  feme  covert  at  the  com- 

mon law 21 

22.  The  husband's  power  at  common  law  to  lease  lands  of  the 

wife   22 

23.  The  right  of  a  married  woman  to  lease  under  the  modern 

statutes 24 

24.  The  eifect  of  the  death  of  the  husband  or  wife  upon  a  lease 

made  by  the  wife 24 

25.  The  control  of  the  husband  over  leases  held  by  the  wife  as 

executrix    25 

26.  The  disposition  of  a  term  by  the  husband  of  a  lessee  to  take 

effect  at  his  death 20 


VIU  TABLE    OP    CONTENTS. 

27.  Leases  of  communitj-  property 27 

28.  The  modern  rule  as  to  the  relation  of  mortgagor  and  mort- 

gagee    28 

29.  The  right  of  the  mortgagee  to  the  rent  at  the  common  law  29 

30.  The  appointment  and  powers  of  a  receiver  in  foreclosure. .  31 

31.  The  effect  of  a  foreclosure  upon  the  tenant's  rights 33 

32.  The  right  to  rents  of  the  purchaser  on  a  sale  under  fore- 

closure      34 

33.  The  power  of  the  Federal  government  to  lease  lands 35 

34.  The  validity  of  leases  of  lands  owned  by  Indians 37 

35.  Leases  by  aliens 41 

36.  Leases  to  aliens 41 

37.  The  effect  of  the  death  of  the  lessee  on  leases  for  terms 

of  years 41 

38.  The  expiration  of  a  lease  for  years  on  the  death  of  the 

lessee 43 

39.  The  liability  of  the  personal  representative  of  the  deceased 

lessee  of  a  term  of  years 44 

40.  The  remedies  of  the  personal  representative  of  the  lessee. .  47 

41.  The  rights  of  an  executor  of  a  lessor 48 

42.  The  liability  of  a  personal  representative  for  rents 51 

43.  The  power  of  an  administrator  to  lease  the  lands  of  his  in- 

testate    52 

44.  The  power  of  an  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  to 

lease    53 

45.  The  general  rule  as  to  the  power  of  executor  to  make  leases  54 

46.  A  lease  which  is  executed  by  one  of  several  executors  or  ad- 

ministrators      54 

47.  A  lease  by  an  executrix  being  a  feme  sole 55 

48.  The  equitable  jurisdictiton  over  leases  made  by  executors.  56 

48a.  The  power  of  trustees  to  grant  leases 5G 

48b.  The  proper  covenants  in  leases  by  trustees 58 

48c.  Signature  by  one  of  two  or  more  trustees 59 

48(i.  The  personal  liability  of  the  trustee 59 

CHAPTER  II. 

CORPORATION  LEASES. 

9  49.     The  common  law  power  of  corporations  to  grant  leases.  ...  61 

50.  'i'he  common  law  rule  as  to  the  power  of  a  coriwration  to 

become  a  lessee 62 

51.  The  form  of  corporation  leases 63 

52.  The  necessity  for  seal  on  a  corporation  lease 64 

53.  By  what  officer  a  corporation  lease  should  be  executed G.'j 

54.  The  period  for  which  a  corporation  lease  may  run 60 

55.  When  leases  are  ultra  vires 68 

56.  The  effect  of  the  dissolution  of  a  corporation  upon  an  exist- 

ing lease 70 


TABLE   OP    CONTENTS.  IX 

57.  The  power  of  municipal  corporation  to  grant  leases 71 

58.  A  municipal  corporation  as  a  tenant 73 

59.  Ultra  vires  leases  by  municipal  corporations 76 

60.  Leases  of  park  grounds  by  municipal  corporation 77 

CHAPTER  III. 
LEASES  BY  JOINT  OWNERS. 

§  01.     Leases  by  joint  tenants  and  tenants   in  common  distin- 
guished    80 

62.  Tenancy  in  common 81 

63.  The  relation  of  landlord  and  tenants  among  tenants  in  com- 

mon    82 

64.  Tenants  in  common  as  lessors 84 

65.  Actions  by  tenants  in  common  to  recover  rent 87 

C6.     Effect  of  a  lease  by  joint  owners 88 

67.  The  right  of  joint  tenants  to  the  rent 89 

68.  The  liability  of  joint  lessees  for  rent 91 

69.  The  liability  for  rent  of  co-partners  in  business 92 

CHAPTER  IV. 

LEASES  BY  AGENTS. 

^  70.     The  agent's  authority  to  lease  must  be  strictly  pursued. ...  94 

70.  The  apparent  authority  of  the  agent 90 

72.  Lease  under  seal  made  by  an  agent 97 

73.  An  agent's  authority  in  writing  under  the  statute  of  frauds  99 

74.  The  ratification  of  a  lease  executed  by  an  agent  without  au- 

thority from  the  principal 100 

75.  The  fraud  and  false  representations  by  an  agent 102 

76.  The  authority  of  an  agent  to  accept  possession  on  abandan- 

ment  by  the  tenant 102 

77.  The  power  of  an  agent  appointed  to  manage  property 103 

78.  Where  the  agent  renders  himself  personally  liable 105 

79.  Undisclosed  principal  where  a  lease  is  under  seal 108 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  CHARACTER  OF  THE  PROPERTY  WHICH  MAY  BE  LEASED. 

§  80.    What  may  be  leased 110 

81.  A  lease  of  land  held  adversely Ill 

82.  Leases  of  public  land 112 

S3.     The  lease  of  land  or  houses  with  chattels  to  be  used  there- 
with    113 


I  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

S4.  Lease  of  surplus  waters  of  canals 116 

85.  Leases  by  a  tenant  in  dower  or  curtesy 118 

86.  Agricultural-  leases  in  New  York 118 

87.  The  ix)wer  to  lease  a  homestead 121 

88.  The  lease  of  a  portion  of  a  homestead 123 

89.  The  mode  of  the  execution  of  a  lease  of  a  homestead 124 

CHAPTER  YI. 

TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR. 

§  90.     The  origin  of  tenancy  from  year  to  year 127 

91.  The  continuity  of  the  several  yearly  periods 128 

92.  The  use  of  express  language  in  creating  a  tenancy  from 

year  to  year 129 

93.  The  character  of  the  cultivation  of  the  land  as  determining 

the  period  of  the  tenancy 151 

94.  The  payment  of  a  yearly  rent  as  creating  a  tenancy  from 

year  to  year  133 

95.  The  effect  of  the  death  of  either  party  upon  a  tenancy  from 

year  to  year 136 

96.  The  rule  as  to  repairs  by  a  tenant  from  year  to  year 137 

97.  A  tenancy  from  year  to  year  created  by  a  tenant  holding 

over   139 

98.  Rebutting  the  presumption  which  arises  on  a  tenant  hold- 

ing over 141 

99.  The   modification   of   the   terms   of  the  original   lease   as 

against  a  tenant  holding  over 142 

100.  Holding  over  excused  when  it  is  caused  by  the  action  of  the 

board  of  health 14-5 

101.  Statutory   modification   of  the   rule   that   a  holding  over 

creates  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year 146 

102.  Tenancies  from  year  to  year  created  by  leases  void  under 

the  statute  of  frauds 146 

103.  Tenancies  from  year  to  year  arising  from  defective  and  un- 

executed   leases 148 

104.  The  necessary  incidents  of  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year. .     149 
10.5.     Tenancies  from  month  to  month.     How  created 150 

106.  Tenancy  from  month  to  month  by  holding  over 152 

107.  The  commencement  of  a  monthly  period 153 

108.  The  conversion  of  tenancies  from  month  to  month   into 

tenancies  from  year  to  year 153 

109.  The  statutory   rules   creating   a  tenancy   from   month   to 

month  by  holding  over 153 

1 10.  Tonanoies  from  week  to  week 154 

111.  The  necessity  of  notice  to  quit  at  common  law 155 

112.  The  length  of  time  required  by  the  notice  to  quit 158 

113.  The  length  of  the  notice  to  quit  in  weekly  and  monthly 

tenancies    160 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XI 

114.  Statutory  regulation  of  the  notice  to  quit 161 

115.  The  necessity  and  the  sufficiency  of  a  notice  to  quit  in  the 

case  of  tenancy  from  month  to  month 1C3 

116.  The  statutory  regulation  of  the  notice  to  quit  in  tenancies 

from  month  to  month 163 

117.  Notice  to  quit  when  required  by  the  express  terms  of  the 

lease    164 

118.  The  form  and  the  character  of  the  notice  to  quit 165 

119.  The  construction  of  the  language  of  the  notice  to  quit 167 

120.  To  whom  notice  must  be  given 168 

121.  By  whom  the  notice  to  quit  must  be  given 170 

122.  The  date  upon  which  the  period  stated  in  the  notice  must 

terminate     172 

123.  The  necessity  of  personal  service  of  the  notice  to  quit 173 

124.  A  notice  to  quit  given  by  an  agent 17& 

125.  Waiver  of  defects  in  the  notice  to  quit 176 

126.  Waiver  of  a  notice  to  quit  by  a  subsequent  notice 176: 

127.  The  effect  of  a  notice  to  quit 177 

128.  The  withdrawal  of  a  notice  to  quit 178 

129.  The  waiver  of  a  notice  to  quit  by  the  receipt  of  rent 178 

130.  When  a  notice  to  quit  may  be  dispensed  with  by  a  surren- 

der    ISO 

131.  A  disavowal  of  the  landlord's  title  by  the  tenant  may  dis- 

pense with  giving  a  notice  to  quit  by  the  landlord 182 


CHAPTER  VII. 

TENANCY  AT  WILL. 

133.  The  definition  of  an  estate  at  will 186 

134.  A  reservation  of  rent  is  not  necessary  to  create  a  tenancy 

at    will 186 

135.  The  liability  of  a  tenant  at  will  for  rent 187 

136.  Tenancy  at  will  by  express  agreement 188 

137.  The  mere  occupation  of  the  land  by  the  permission  of  the 

owner    189 

138.  Leases  of  an  uncertain  duration 190 

139.  Entry  under  an  agreement  for  a  lease 192 

140.  Tenancy  at  will  created  by  a  defective  or  unexecuted  lease.  194 

141.  Leases  void  under  the  statute  of  frauds 195 

142.  The  vendee  of  the  land  having  gone  into  possession  under 

a  contract  to  buy 197 

143.  Tenancy  at  will  by  holding  over 201 

144.  The  occupancy  of  the  premises  incident  to  the  employment 

of  the  occupant 202 

145.  The  judgment  debtor  holding  over  after  sale  under  execu- 

tion         204 

b 


Xll  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

146.  The  lessee  of  a  judgment  debtor  holding  over  after  the  sale 

under  the  execution  204 

147.  The  determination  of  the  will.     In  general 205 

148.  The  termination  of  a  tenancy  at  will  by  the  death  of  either 

party   to    it 206 

149.  The  partition  of  the  demised  premises  by  tenants  in  com- 

mon        207 

150.  Termination  of  the  tenancy  by  the  surrender  and  abandon- 

ment of  the  premises 208 

151.  The   termination  of  a  tenancy  at  will  by  the  landlord's 

alienation  of  the  premises 208 

152.  Denial  of  the  title  of  the  landlord  by  a  tenant  at  will 211 

153.  The  tenancy  at  will  may  be  determined  by  the  giving  of  a 

new    lease 213 

154.  The  entry  of  the  landlord  on  the  land  as  terminating  the 

tenancy 214 

155.  Notice  to  quit  when  required  in  tenancies  at  will  at  com- 

mon   law 216 

156.  Notice  to  quit  and  demand  of  possession  as  terminating  a 

tenancy  at  will 218 

157.  Statutory  notice  required  to  terminate  a  tenancy  at  will . . .  218 

158.  The  termination  of  the  period  of  notice 221 

159.  The  commission  of  waste  by  a  tenant  at  will 222 

160.  The  assignability  of  the  tenant's  interest  in  an  estate  at 

will    223 

161.  The  right  of  a  tenant  at  will  to  recover  damages  for  an  in- 

jury to  the  land 224 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

TENANCY  AT  SUFFERANCE. 

162.  The  definition  of  a  tenancy  at  sufferance 226 

163.  A  tenancy  at  sufferance  arising  on  the  termination  of  a 

tenancy  at  will 227 

164.  A  tenancy  at  sufferance  by  holding  over 228 

165.  The  grantor  in  possession  after  the  delivery  of  his  deed. .  230 

166.  A  servant  or  agent  in  the  possession  of  his  employer's  land 

after  the  contract  is  at  an  end 231 

167.  Mortgagor  in  possession  after  sale  or  condition  broken...  232 

168.  When  an  undertenant  becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance 233 

169.  Necessary  for  notice  to  quit 234 

170.  Right  of  a  tenant  at  sufferance  to  lease 235 

171.  The  liability  of  a  tenant  at  sufferance  to  pay  rent 235 

172.  Action  of  trespass  by  the  landlord  against  the  tenant  at 

sufferance    237 


T^VBLE   OF    CONTENTS.  Xlll 

CHAPTER  IX. 

WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES, 

§  173.     The  definition  of  a  lease 240 

174.  Leases  in  reversion.     Interesse  termini 241 

175.  Formal  and  technical  language  unnecessary 242 

176.  Words  proper  to  create  a  lease 244 

177.  Whether  a  writing  is  a  lease  or  an  agreement  to  make  a 

lease    246 

178.  Question  for  court  or  jury 250 

179.  The  intention  of  the  parties 2.jO 

180.  The  assent  of  the  parties  to  a  lease 251 

181.  The  consideration  for  the  lease 254 

182.  Some  circumstances  which  tend  to  show  an  instrument  is 

a  lease 255 

183.  No  presumption  of  tenancy  from  possession  alone 257 

184.  The  length  of  a  term  in  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease 258 

185.  The  term  as  stated  in  the  lease 260 

186.  Entry  into  possession  as  indicating  a  lease 2G1 

187.  The  presumption  of  an  existing  tenancy  from  the  payment 

of  money  by  the  occupant  to  the  owner 262 

188.  The  necessity  for  the  payment  of  rent 263 

189.  The  i)erformance  of  a  cont'.act  to  execute  and   deliver  a 

lease    264 

190.  The  specific  performance  of  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease. .  2G5 

191.  The  measure  of  damages  for  a  breach  of  an  agreement  to 

make  a  lease 267 

192.  Letters  constituting  agreement  to  make  a  lease 268 

193.  A  lease  distinguished  from  a  license 269 

194.  Agreement  permitting  the  cutting  of  timber 273 

195.  The  possession  of  a  tenant  under  a  void  lease 275 

196.  A  lease  with  an  agreement  to  sell  the  premises 276 

197.  Lease  or  mortgage 277 

198.  The  lease  of  space  in  a  department  store 280 

199.  A  lease  distinguished  from  a  contract  to  furnish  board  and 

lodging   281 

200.  Agreement  to  board  and  care  for  the  owner  of  land 2S3 

201.  An  entry  upon  land  of  another  under  an  option  to  purchase 

from  him 284 

201a.  The  mortgagee  of  the  tenant's  chattels  in  possession 284 

202.  Future  lease  of  an  unfinished  building 2SG 

203.  Mortgagor  or  his  tenant  and  a  purchaser  at  a  sale  under 

foreclosure 287 

204.  Contracts  for  advertisin-:?  space 288 

205.  A  purchaser  of  a  crop  on  an  execution  sale 290 

206.  The  judgment  debtor  holding  over  after  a  sale  on  an  exe- 

tion    291 


XIV  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

207.  Whether  an  instrument  is  a  lease  or  a  partnership  agree- 

ment      291 

208.  Contracts    for   steam    heating   and    for   steam    and   water 

power    293 

209.  Miscellaneous   cases 297 

210.  Whether  occupant  of  premises  is  servant  or  tenant 299 

211.  The  intention  of  the  parties 300 

212.  Illustrations   of  the   rule 302 

213.  The  character  of  the  posssession  of  the  premises  as  de- 

termining whether  an  occupant  is  a  servant  or  a  tenant  302 

214.  The  power  of  the  master  to  remove  his  servant  from  the 

premises    305 

215.  Contract  of  hiring  by  a  religious  society 305 

216.  A  public  officer  as  a  tenant  of  a  county 306 

217.  A  servant  holding  over  after  his  employment  is  at  an  end.  307 

218.  The    right   of   third    parties 307 

219.  The  distinction  between  cropers  and  tenants 308 

220.  The  ownership  of  the   crop 311 

221.  The  duties  and  the  rights  of  the  landlord  and  tenant. . . .  313 

222.  The  remedies  of  the  parties 315 

223.  Relation  of  landlord   and   tenant   not  presumed   between 

vendor   and   vendee 316 

224.  The  default  or  the  refusal  of  either  party  to  perform 318 

225.  An  express  agreement  of  the  vendee  to  pay  rent 319 

226.  The  entry  of  a  vendee  under  a  parol  agreement  to  purchase  322 

227.  The  vendor  of  land  continuing  in  possession  after  his  con- 

veyance of   the   title 322 

CHAPTER  X. 

THE  FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES. 

§  228.     The  scope  of  this  chapter 325 

229.  The   formal   requisites  of   a   lease 325 

230.  General  rules  of  the  law  of  contracts  as  to  signatures 326 

231.  The  signature  to  a  lease  by  the  tenant  only 327 

232.  The  signature  by  the  lessor  only 328 

233.  The  signature  to  a  lease  affixed  by  a  surety 330 

234.  The  necessity  for  and  the  form  of  seals 331 

235.  The   attestation  of   leases 3S2 

236.  The  necessity  for  an  acknowledgment 334 

237.  The  description  of  the  premises 336 

238.  The    description    of   the    parties 340 

239.  The   date   of   the  lease 342 

240.  The  date  of  the  commencement  of  the  term 343 

241.  The  necessity  of  the  delivery  of  the  lease 348 

242.  The  acceptance  of  a  lease 351 

243.  The  necessity  for  the  entry  of  the  tenant 354 


TABLE   OP    CONTENTS.  XV 

24^.     The  date  upon  which  the  lease  expires 355 

245.  The    reversion   in  the   lessor 357 

246.  The  approval  of  the  lease  by  the  attorneys  for  the  parties  357 

247.  The  responsibility  of  the  tenant 360 

248.  A  failure   to    read   the   lease 361 

249.  A  mistake  in  the  execution  of  a  lease 362 

250.  The  usual  and  customary  covenants  and  provisions 364 

251.  Leases  executed  in  duplicate  and  counterpart 366 

252.  The  mode  of  proving  a  written  lease 367 

253.  Term  expiring  on  the  happening  of  a  contingent  event. . , .  368 

254.  Leases  terminable  on  the  sale  of  the  premises 371 

255.  The  option  of  the  lessee  to  terminate  the  lease 373 

256.  Measure  of  the  damages  for  a  failure  to  execute  a  lease. .  377 

257.  The  effect  of  the  statute  of  frauds  on  leases 378 

258.  Contracts  concerning  an  interest  in  land 379 

259.  Extensions  and  renewals  of  leases 383 

260.  Leases  by  parol  which  are  void  under  the  statute 384 

261.  The    character    of   the    writing 386 

262.  Effect  of  performance  in  taking  the  lease  out  of  the  stat- 

ute    388 

263.  The  recording  of  leases 389 

264.  The  construction  of  the  statutes  requiring  the  record  of 

leases    391 

265.  The  effect  of  recording  a  lease  upon  the  rights  of  a  subse- 

quent   lessee 393 

266.  The  effect  of  the  record  as  notice 394 

267.  As  against  the  creditors  of  the  lessor  and  persons  claim- 

ing   under    him 394 

268.  The  effect  of  recording  a  lease  which  is  not  required  to  be 

recorded     395 

CHAPTER  XI. 
THE  PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE. 

270.  The  scope  of  this  chapter 396 

271.  Property   included 397 

272.  The  privileges  of  a  tenant  of  a  part  of  a  building 400 

273.  Description  of  leased  premises  by  street  number 402 

274.  Elxclusive  right  of  the  lessee  of  a  hotel  to  use  a  particular 

name   404 

275.  The  tenant's   right  to  light  and  air  coming  through  his 

front  and  rear   windows 405 

276.  Rights  as  to  the  use  of  light  and  air  as  between  the  pro- 

prietors of  adjoining  premises 409 

277.  The  right  of  a  tenant  to  use  outside  walls 412 

278.  The  use  of  roof  for  advertising  purposes 415 

279.  Tenant's  right  to  show  windows 415 


XVI  T/BLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

280.  Easements   of   egress   and   ingress 416 

281.  Tenant's  right  to  use  of  stairways  and  halls 419 

282.  The  right  to  use  an  elevator 424 

283.  Electric   light  as    an    appurtenant 426 

284.  Easement  of  water  supply 426 

285.  The  riparian  rights  of  the  lessee 430 

286.  Right  of  the  tenant  to  accretion 433 

287.  Ice  forming  on  land    demised 434 

288.  Lease  of  a  mill  or  of  a  mill  privilege 437 

289.  Action  for  damages  for  the  violation  of  an  easement 439 

290.  The  protection  of  the  tenant's  easements  by  an  injunction  440 

291.  Construction  of  the  word  "appurtenances."     The  general 

rule    442 

292.  Things   which   have   been   held   not   to    pass   as   appurte- 

nances       446 

293.  Meaning  of  the  word  "half." 451 

CHAPTER  XII. 

THE   CONSTRUCTION   OF  LEASES. 

§  294.     "What  law  governs 452 

295.  The  construction  of  the  language  of  written  leases 453 

296.  The  lease  construed  by  the  conduct  of  the  parties 455 

297.  Writings  shall  be  construed  together 457 

298.  Merger  in  lease  of  all  preliminary  conversations 457 

299.  The  meaning  of  technical  terms  in  a  lease 459 

300.  When  parol  evidence  is  received  in  the  case  of  leases 459 

301.  When  parol  evidence  is  not  received  in  the  case  of  leases. .  463 

302.  Parol  evidence  of  custom  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a 

lease    465 

303.  The  modification  of  the  lease  by  the  parties 466 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

FRAUD  AND  DURESS  IN  PROCURING  THE  LEASBL 

§  304.     General  rules  as  to  duress  and  fraud  in  relation  to  con- 
tracts       46S 

305.  The  effect  of  delay 409 

306.  Fraud  In  the  procurement  of  a  lease 470 

307.  The  cancellation  of  the  lease  for  duress  or  inadequacy  of 

the   consideration 472 

308.  Leases   between   persons   occupying  confidential    relations 

with    the    lessee 474 

309.  The  elements  which  must  co-exist  in  the  case  of  fraud. . .  475 

310.  The  fraud  of  the  tenant 479 

311.  The  tenant  who  has  been  defrauded  need  not  abandon  the 

premises     480 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  Xvii 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  ATTORNMENT  OF  THE  TENANT. 

312.  Attornment    defined 482 

313.  Payment  of  rent  as  constituting  attornment 483 

314.  The  necessity  for  the  landlord's  consent  to  the  attornment  484 

315.  The  effect  of  the  statute  of  Anne  upon  attornment 485 

316.  The  tenant's  attornment  to  a  mortgagee  or  purchaser  at 

foreclosure   486 

317.  The  statutory  rights  of  the  grantee  of  the  reversion 488 

318.  The  grantee's  right  to  collect  rent 491 

319.  The  extent  of  the  rights  of  the  grantor  after  his  convey- 

ance       494 

320.  The  obligations  of  a  grantee  to  tenants  in  possession 496 

321.  The  notice  to  the  tenant  of  the  sale  of  the  reversion 498 

322.  The  effect  of  a  sale  of  the  reversion  under  a  decree  or 

judgment   500 

CHAPTER  XV. 

THE  NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT. 

323.  Rent.     Definition  and  genei-al   characteristics 504 

324.  Various   kinds   of   rent   distinguished 506 

325.  Whether  rent  may  be  reserved  out  of  personal  property. .  509 

326.  The  payment  of  rent  as  evidence  of  tenancy 511 

327.  The  certainty  of  rent 512 

328.  Rent  to  become  due  on  the  happening  of  some  future  event  513 

329.  Rent  payable  in  services 514 

330.  Rent  payable   in  specific  articles 515 

331.  The  express  covenant  to  pay  rent 518 

332.  A  covenant  to  pay  rent  may  be  implied 518 

333.  When  rent  is  due 522 

334.  Rent  which  is  made  payable  in  advance 524 

335.  The  place  for  the  payment  of  the  rent 527 

336.  To  whom  rent  should  be  paid 529 

337.  Rent  made  payable  to  persons  other  than  the  landlord. , . .  532 

338.  Rent  payable  in  instalments 534 

339.  The  tender  of  the  rent  by  the  lessee 536 

340.  Apportionment  of  rent  between  successive  landlords 538 

341.  Apportionment  among  the  several  assignees  of  the  lessor.  541 

342.  Apportionment  among  the  assignees  of  the  lessee 543 

343.  The  liability  of  testamentary  trustees  for  rent 544 

344.  The  payment  of  rent  by  an  under-tenant  to  the  original 

lessor     544 

345.  Payment  of  rent  by  note,  check  or  draft 546 


XVlll  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

346.  Receipts  for  rent.     When  conclusive  and  presumption  of 

payment  therefrom 549 

347.  The  application  of  rental  payments 551 

348.  The  necessity  of  a  demand  for  the  payment  of  rent 553 

349.  The  reduction  of  the  rent  by  the  landlord  during  the  term  554 

350.  Increase  of  rent  on  re-hiring  or  during  the  term 558 

351     The  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  in  an  action  to  recover  rent  558 

352.  The  form  and  nature  of  the   lessor's   remedy  to   recover 

rent     559 

353.  Recovery  by  the  landlord  of  rent  where  the  tenant  has 

never    taken    possession 561 

354.  Joinder  of  cause  of  action  for  rent 562 

355.  Recoupment,  counterclaims  and  set  off,  by  a  lessee  in  an 

action  to  recover  the  rent 562 

356.  Notice  to  produce  the  lease  in  an  action  to  collect  rent. . .  566 

357.  Payment  of  rent  during  occupation.     The  meaning  of  the 

word    "occupy." 566 

358.  The  appraisal  of  the  rent  on  the  renewal  of  the  lease 567 

359.  The  manner  of  the  appraisal 568 

360.  The  result  of  a  failure  to  fix  the  rent 569 

361.  The  power  of  the  court  to  make  or  to  review  an  appraisal 

of    rent 570 

362.  The  basis  of  the  action  for  use  and  occupation 572 

363.  The  title  of  the  landlord 575 

364.  The   occupation   must   be   proved 578 

365.  Against  whom  action  for  use  and  occupation  can  be  main- 

tained      578 

366.  Parol  evidence  to  prove  use  and  occupation 5S0 

367.  Defenses  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation 582 

368.  Pleading  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation 582 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  SECURITY  FOR  THE  RENT. 

3C9.     Deposit  by  the  lessee  as  a  security  for  payment  of  rent. .  583 

370.  The  tenant's  right  to  the  return  of  his  deposit 585 

371.  Deposit  made  by  a  tenant  with  landlord  on  contract  to 

make  a  lease 587 

372.  The  general  rule  as  to  liquidated  damages 588 

373.  Chattel  mortgage  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  rent 589 

374.  Construction  of  an  agreement  to  give  security 5!)1 

375.  When  the  principal  and  surety  on  a  lease  may  be  sued 

jointly     591 

376.  General  rule  as  to  the  liability  of  the  grantor 592 

377.  Surety's  liability   upon   a  renewal   of  lease 593 

378.  The  discharge  or  release  of  the  surety 594 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XIX 

CHAPTER  XVII. 
THE  COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE. 

§  379.     Definitions  and  general  conditions 599 

380.  The  language  by  which,  a  covenant  is  created 6a2 

381.  The  construction  of  covenants  in  leases G04 

382.  What  are  the  usual  and  proper  covenants GOG 

383.  Whether  covenants  are  joint  or  several 608 

384.  Dependent  and  independent  covenants GIO 

385.  The  enforcements  of  negative  covenants 611 

386.  The  liability  of  the  i>arties  to  a  covenant  and  of  their  as- 

signee      GlU 

387.  Covenants  running  with  the  land 614 

388.  The  liability  of  the  personal  representatives  of  the  coven- 

antor       619 

389.  Covenants  and  conditions  distinguished 619 

390.  Whether  conditions  are  subsequent  or  precedent 623 

391.  The  construction  of  a  provision  for  a  forfeiture 625 

392.  The  enforcement  of  a  forfeiture  after  a  tenant  has  become 

a  vendee 627 

393.  The  necessity  for  the  notice  of  a  forfeiture 628 

394.  The  effect  of  a  forfeiture  upon  the,  lease 629 

395.  The  effect  in  general  of  failure  to  pay  rent 632 

396.  The  necessity  for  a  demand  by  the  lessor  in  order  to  work 

a    forfeiture 633 

397.  Waiver  of  demand  for  the  rent 635 

398.  The  entry  of  the  landlord  for  the  purpose  of  reletting. . . .  636 

399.  Demand  for  payment  of  the  rent;  when  and  how  made  by 

the   landlord G37 

400.  Who  may   exercise  the   right  to   re-enter 639 

401.  The  lessee  cannot  take  advantage  of  a  forfeiture 641 

402.  The  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  by  the  lessor 644 

403.  The  rent  received  after  a  forfeiture 646 

404.  The  payment  of  the  rent  to  a  landlord  after  an  action  of 

ejectment  or  other  action  by  a  landlord  for  the  posses- 
sion        650 

405.  Waiver  may  be  implied  from  other  facts  than  the  accep- 

tance of  the  rent 653 

406.  When  the  payment  of  subsequent  rent  does  not  waive  a 

forfeiture     655 

407.  Waiver  by  silence  and  delay 656 

408.  The  waiver  of  a  continuous  breach  of  a  condition 659 

409.  A  forfeiture  caused  by  a  breach  of  a  covenant  to  repair..  661 

410.  The  effect  of  a  tender  of  rent 663 

411.  Relief  against  forfeiture  at  common  law 664 

412.  Equitable    relief  against   forfeiture 665 


XX  T.VBLE   OF    CONTENTS, 

CHAPTER  XVin. 

THE   RIGHTS   OP   THE   TENANT    TO    POSSESSION- 

§  413.     The  tenant's  right  to  possession  of  the  premises 671 

414.  The  lease  of  an  unfinished  building 674 

415.  The  entry  of  the  tenant  before  the  commencement  of  the 

term    676 

416.  The  remedy  of  the  lessee  for  the  failure  of  the  lessor  to 

give  him  the  possession 676 

417.  Unlawful  detainer  against  the  occupant 677 

418.  The  rights  of  the  landlord  against  third  persons  during 

the    term 678 

419.  The  landlord's  remedy  for  the  diversion  of  natural  waters     6S3 

420.  The  right  of  the  landlord   to  timber  severed  during  the 

term    684 

421.  The  tenant's  right  to  bring  an  action  of  trespass  against  a 

stranger    685 

422.  The  right  of  a  lessor  at  will  to  maintain  trespass 688 

423.  The  delivery  of  the  possession  of  a  part  of  the  premises. .  691 

424.  Placing  "to  let"  signs  upon  the  premises 692 

425.  The  evidence  and  the  pleadings 69S 

426.  The  measure  of  the  tenant's  damages  for  a  failure  by  the 

landlord  to  deliver  possession 693 

427.  The  covenant  of  quiet  enjoyment,  when  implied 697 

428.  "What  constitutes  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of  quiet  enjoy- 

ment      699 

429.  Liability  on  the  covenant  for  the  acts  of  strangers 700 

430.  The  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  as  a  breach  of  the  covenant  701 

431.  Election  of  remedies  by  the  tenant 702 

.  432.     The  measure  of  damages  for  the  breach  of  a  covenant  of 

quiet    enjoyment 702 

433.     The  rights  of  the  parties  to  the  lease  as  against  one  who 

nxaintains  a  nuisance 704 

CHAPTER  XIX. 
THE  TENANT'S  WASTE. 

§  434.     Definition    of   "waste." 706 

435.  The  common-law  rule  as  to  waste  by  tenants 708 

436.  The  implied  covenant  by  a  lessee  not  to  commit  voluntary 

waste     709 

437.  The  opening  of  mines  by  a  tenant 710 

438.  Leases  made  without  impeachment  of  waste 711 

439.  Alterations  by  the  tenant  constituting  voluntary  waste...  712 

440.  Waste  by  a  tenant  of  farm  land 714 

441.  The  rule  in  Maryland  as  to  waste  by  a  tenant 719 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  Xxi 

442.  Persons  liable  for  waste 720 

443.  Tenant's   liability  for  waste  committed  by  others 721 

444.  Waste  committed  by  a  sub-tenant 722 

445.  The  landlord's  remedy  by  injunction 723 

446.  The  remedy  by  an  action  for  damages 725 

447.  The  waiver  of  the  right  of  the  landlord  to  sue  for  waste. .  726 

CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  USE  OF  THE  PREMISES  BY  THE  TENANT. 

§  448.     The  general   rule  as   to  the  use  of  the   premises  by  the 

tenant     729 

449.  A  covenant  restraining  use  to  one  purpose  does  not  prevent 

use  for  other  proper  purposes 732 

450.  A  covenant  restricting  the  premises  to  use  as  a  private 

dwelling  or  residence 736 

451.  Covenants  against  carrying  on  trade  or  business  in  the 

premises     738 

452.  Covenants  against  particular  trades 740 

453.  Covenants  by  the  lessor  against  carrjing  on   competing 

business    741 

454.  Covenants  forbidding  the  use  of  the  premises  for  offensive 

trades    746 

455.  Covenants  against  the  sale  of  liquors  on  the  premises....  748 

456.  The  use  of  the  premises  by  the  lessee  for  hotel  purposes..  749 

457.  Restrictions  as  to  the  exhibition  of  advertising  signs  by 

the  tenants 752 

458.  Leases  by  organizations  conducting  camp  meeting  grounds     753 

459.  The  restriction  of  the  occupancy  of  the  premises  to  partic- 

ular persons 755 

4C0.     Injunction  by  the  landlord  to  restrain  a  prohibited  use  of 

the  premises  by  the  tenant 756 

461.     The   implied   covenant  by   a   farm    tenant   for   good    hus- 
bandry         759 

462.-    Evidence  to  prove  what  is  good  husbandry 762 

463.  Covenants  regulating  the  use  and  cultivation  of  a  farm  by 

the  tenant - 762 

464.  A  covenant  In  a  lease  of  a  fann  to  consume  all  fodder  on 

the  land 763 

465.  An  injunction  to  restrain  the  breach  of  a  covenant  in  a 

lease  of  a   farm 764 

466.  Estoppel  on  the  landlord  to  recover  for  improper  use  of 

premises     765 

467.  The  obligation  of  the  assigns  and  sub-tenants  under  cove- 

nants of  the  lessee  restricting  the  use  of  the  premises. . .     767 

468.  Storage  of  combustibles   in  the  premises 771 

469.  The  lease  of  premises  for  use  as  a  house  of  prostitution..     771 


Xxii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

470.  Leases  of  premises  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 773 

471.  The  use  of  the  premises  as  a  gambling  house 775 

472.  The  knowledge  of  the  lessor  that  the  premises  are  to  he 

used  for  an  immoral  or  illegal  purpose 776 

473.  The  leasing  of  premises  for  immoral  purposes  a  crime..  777 

474.  Criminal  liability  of  the  landloi*d 779 

475.  The  construction  of  a  statute  providing  for  the  equitable 

jurisdiction  of  leases  for  gambling  purposes 779 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

THE    RESPECTIVE    RESPONSIBILITIES    AND    RIGHTS    OF    THE 
PARTIES  AS  TO  THE  CONDITION  OF  THE  PREMISES. 

§  477.     The  fitness  of  the  premises 782 

478.  The  distinction  between  unfurnished  and  furnished  dwel- 

lings and  rooms 784 

479.  Fraudulent  misrepresentations  and  concealment  of  defects  788 

480.  The  responsibility  of  the  landlord  for  a  nuisance 792 

481.  The  drainage  of  surface  water 794 

482.  Contagious   diseases 795 

483.  Defective  plumbing  and  water  supply 796 

484.  The  joint  liability  for  nuisance  of  the  lessor  and  lessee. . . .  798 

485.  The  repairs  of  that  portion  of  the  premises  which  is  in 

the  exclusive  control  of  the  lessor 799 

486.  The  negligence  of  the  landlord  in  making  repairs 801 

487.  The  landlord's  liability  in  the  case  of  apartment  buildings 

and   flats 803 

488.  Knowledge  or  notice  of  the  defects  by  the  landlord 804 

489.  The  liability  of  the  landlord  for  the  condition  of  the  out- 

side walls,  roofs  and  cornices 806 

490.  The  responsibility  for  injuries  caused  by  ice  and  snow  fall- 

ing from  the  roof 808 

491.  Falling  sign  under  the  control  of  the  landlord 809 

492.  The  landlord's  duty  to  light  halls  and  stairways 810 

493.  The  landlord's  liability  for  halls  and  stairways 812 

494.  The  landlord's  liability  for  the  condition  of  elevators  used 

by  the  tenants  and  others 817 

495.  Use  of  common  hallways  or  stairs  by  a  tenant  is  not  con- 

tributory   negligence 822 

490.     Snow  and  ice  accumulating  in  pas.sage  ways 822 

497.  The  common  use  by  the  tenants  of  a  yard  of  an  apartment 

house     823 

498.  Defective  coal  hole  covers  and  cellar  gratings 824 

499.  The  use  of  gas,  natural  or  artificial,  by  the  landlord 828 

500.  Negligence  in  the  care  of  steam   heating  apparatus  and 

chimneys    829 

501.  The  negligence  of  the  landlord  as  regards  falling  ceilings.  831 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  Xxiii 

502.  The  landlord's  liability  to  a  member  of  a  lodge  which  is  his 

tenant     832 

503.  The  contributory  negligence  of  the  tenant 833 

504.  Repairs  by  the  landlord  or  his  agent  before  or  after  the 

accident    835 

505.  The  liability  of  a  tenant  for  negligence 836 

506.  Liability  of  tenants  to  one  another  for  negligence 837 

507.  The  liability  for  damages  to  a  tenant  on  a  lower  floor  by 

the  overloading  of  an  upper  floor 839 

508.  Injuries  caused  by  overflow  of  water  on  upper  floor 839 

509.  The  tenant's  liability  for  fire 843 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  PARTIES  TO  REPAIR. 

5  510.     The  respective  duties  of  the  parties  to  the  lease  to  make 

repairs    846 

511.  No  implied  covenant  by  the  landlord  to  repair 847 

512.  Statutory  provisions  imposing  the  duty  to  repair  on  the 

landlord    851 

513.  Repairs  and  alterations  in  compliance  with  municipal  reg- 

ulations      853 

514.  The  landlord's  promise  to  repair  made  during  the  term 855 

515.  The  landlord's  liability  on  his  covenant  to  repair, 857 

516.  The  landlord's  right  to  notice  of  the  necessity  for  repairs  860 

517.  The  lessor's  right  of  entry  on  the  premises  to  make  re- 

pairs         862 

518.  The  negligence  of  the  landlord  in  voluntarily  making  re- 

pairs         804 

519.  Repairs  by  the  landlord  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  oc- 

cupation  of  the  premises  and  payment  of  rent  by  the 
tenant   867 

520.  A  covenant  by  the  landlord  to  repair  farm  fences 869 

521.  The  landlord's  covenant  to  keep  an  elevator  in  constant  re- 

pair   871 

522.  The  landlord's  covenant  to  rebuild 871 

523.  The  lessor's  liability  to  the  servants  of  a  lessee 872 

524.  The  landlord's  liability  to  the  tenant  for  repairs  made  by 

the     latter 873 

525.  The  remedies  of  a  tenant  for  the  failure  of  his  landlord  to 

repair    876 

526.  Measure  of  damages  on  breach  of  a  covenant  by  the  lessor 

to    repair 878 

527.  The   lessor's   defense 880 

528.  A  covenant  to  repair— What  is  includes SSI 

529.  Covenants  to  repair  run  with  the  land SS4 

530.  The  construction  of  a  covenant  to  keep  in  repair  by  a  ten- 

ant          885 


XXIV  TABLE   OP    CONTENTS. 

■    531.     Notice  by  the  landlord  to  the  tenant  to  repair 889 

532.  The  extent  of  the  tenant's  express  obligation  to  repair... .  891 

533.  The  tenant's  covenant  to  return  premises  in  condition  as 

he  received  them 892 

534.  When  an  action  on  a  covenant  to  surrender  in  good  condi- 

tion  or   good   repair  accrues 897 

535.  The  exception  of  ordinary  wear  and  tear 899 

536.  The  construction  of  the  phrase  "damages  by  the  elements."  900 

537.  Exception  in  covenant  of  accident  or  inevitable  accident.  .  902 

538.  The  tenant's  covenant  to  deliver  up  a  farm  in  good  condi- 

tion      905 

539.  The  making  of  alterations  by  a  tenant  may  be  a  breach  of 

of  a   covenant  to  repair 907 

540.  Repairs  to  be  approved  by  the  landlord 908 

541.  The  right  of  the  landlord  to  recover  from  a  tenant  who 

has  agreed   to  make   repairs 909 

542.  Covenants  by  the  lessee  to  erect  improvements 909 

543.  The  tenant's  conditional  covenants  to  repair 911 

544.  The  character  of  the  building  erected  by  the  lessee 912 

545.  The  rights  of  a  sub-tenant  under  a  covenant  to  repair  made 

by  the   original   lessor 913 

546.  The  measure  of  damages  for  the  lessee's  failure  to  repair 

or  leave  premises  in  good  condition 913 

547.  Evidence  in  actions  on  covenants  to  repair 914 

548.  Rules    of    pleadings 915 

549.  The  duty  of  the  landlord  to  build  and  repair  fire  escapes. .  915 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

THE  ESTOPPEL  TO  DENY  THE  TITLE. 

§  550.     The  general  rule  as  to  the  tenant's  estoppel 920 

551.  Necessity  for  the  surrender  of  the  possession  by  the  tenant  922 

552.  When  the  surrender  of  the  premises  by  the  tenant  is  un- 

necessary     923 

553.  The  tenant  not  having  received  possession  is  not  estopped  924 

554.  After  an  eviction  there  is  no  estoppel 926 

555.  A  lease  obtained  by  fraud  or  mistake 927 

556.  Misrepresentation  by  the  lessor  of  his  title 930 

557.  A  tenant  is  not  estopped  as  to  a  stranger 931 

558.  No  estoppel  where  leases  are  illegal  or  contrary  to  public 

policy    932 

559.  The  tenant  may  show  the  expiration  of  the  landlord's  title  934 

560.  In  what  action  the  estoppel  may  be  pleaded 937 

561.  To  what  matters  the  estoppel   extends 939 

562.  The  estoppel  is  applicable  to  a  tenancy  at  will 940 

563.  In  whose  favor  the  estoppel  will  operate 940 

564.  Upon  whom  the  estoppel  is  binding 943 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXV 

565.  The  rights  of  a  person  obtaining  the  possession  by  collu- 

sion      947 

566.  The  estoppel  as  to  sub-tenants 948 

567.  The  vendee,  in  possession  as  a  tenant  is  estopped 949 

568.  The  tenant  holding  over 950 

569.  The  tenant  not  estopped  as  to  land  of  his  landlord  not  in- 

cluded in  the  case 951 

570.  Leases   created   by   estoppel 952 

571.  The  general  rule  as  to  the  purchase  of  outstanding  encum- 

brances  by   the    tenant 953 

572.  The  purchase  by  a  tenant  of  a  tax  title  to  the  premises. .  954 

573.  The  general  rule  as  to  the  adverse  possession  of  the  land- 

lord   957 

574.  Tacking  possession  of  several  tenants 960 

575.  Encroachments  by  a  tenant  on  the  land  of  strangers  to  the 

lease    961 

576.  The  creation  of  easements  by  the  lessee 963 

577.  The  effect  of  a  disclaimer  by  the  tenant 964 

578.  The  attornment  of  a  tenant  to  a  stranger 967 

579.  What  constitutes  an  actual  ouster  by  the  tenant 968 

580.  What    constitutes    adverse    possession    by    the    tenant    as 

against  his  landlord 971 

581.  The  right  of  the  landlord  to  become  a  party  in  an  action 

of  ejectment  against  his  tenant -^973 

582.  When  a  landlord  of  a  tenant  who  is  a  defendant  in  eject- 

ment may  be  ousted 975 

582a.  The  operation  of  a  judgment  in  ejectment  upon  the  tenants 

of  the  defendant 976 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE  OPTION  OF  A  TENANT  TO  PURCHASE  THE  PREMISES. 

583.  The  tenant's  option  to  purchase — General  considerations..  977 

584.  The  irrevocable  character  of  an  option 980 

585.  The  mutuality  of  the  option 981 

586.  The  purchase  price  to  be  paid  by  the  lessee 983 

587.  The  option  to  purchase  in  the  tenant,  if  not  otherwise  dis- 

posed of,  or  at  price  offered  by  any  other  person 986 

588.  The  time  within  which  the  option  must  be  exercised 987 

589.  The  performance  of  conditions  precedent  by  the  lessee 991 

590.  The  necessity  for  notice  by  the  lessee  to  the  lessor 993 

591.  The  effect  of  the  exercise  of  the  option 994 

592.  TATien  the  lessee's  option  to  purchase  passes  to  his  assignee  996 

593.  The  passing  of  the  right  of  an  election  from  the  lessor 

to  the  lessee 999 

594.  The   disposition   of   the   insurance  money   when  premises 

are  destroyed  during  the  term 999 


XXvi  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

595.  Equitable  relief  in  the  cases  of  options  to  purchase — Rem- 
edy of  the  tenant  by  specific  performance 1000 

597.     Damage  for  the  breach  of  a  covenant  to  permit  the  lessee 

to  purchase  the  premises 1003 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

THE  TAXES  AND  INSURANCE. 

§  598.  The  liability  of  the  lessor  for  taxes 1005 

599.  The  taxation  increased  by  the  tenant's  improvements 1007 

COO.  The  landlord's  liability  for  water  rates 1008 

601.  The  construction  of  a  covenant  to  pay  taxes 1012 

C02.  Covenant  to  pay  taxes  not  one  of  indemnity 1013 

603.  The  time  of  the  levy,  assessment  or  payment 1014 

604.  The  time  for  the  payment  of  the  taxes 1016 

605.  Mode  of  the  payment  of  the  taxes  by  the  lessee 1017 

606.  The  validity  of  the  taxes 1017 

607.  The  exemption  of  the  premises  from  taxation 1018 

608.  The  aportionment  of  taxes  between  lessor  and  lessee 1019 

609.  The  liability  of  an  assignee  or  an  undertenant  to  pay  the 

taxes 1020 

610.  Extent  of  the  assignee's  liability  for  the  taxes 1021 

611.  Whether  a  covenant  to  pay  taxes  binds  the  lessee  to  pay 

assessments  for  local  improvements 1022 

612.  The  lessee's  covenant  to  pay  assessments 1026 

613.  The  payment  of  the  taxes  by  the  mortgagee  of  the  leasehold  1030 

614.  The  forfeiture  of  the  lease  for  a  breach  of  a  condition  or  a 

covenant  by  the  lessee  to  pay  the  taxes 1031 

615.  Equitable  relief  from  forfeiture  for  non-payment  of  taxes 

by    the   tenant 1033 

616.  The  landlord's  lien  for  unpaid  taxes 1033 

617.  The  measure  of  the  landlord's  damages  for  the  lessee's  de 

fault  in  paying  the  taxes 1034 

618.  Personal  liability  to  a  judgment  for  taxes 1034 

619.  The  tenant's  covenant  to  insure 1035 

620.  The  tenant's  covenant  to  pay  increased  insurance 1037 

621.  Forfeiture  in  case  of  a  breach  of  covenant  to  insure 1038 

622.  "When  the  covenant  to  insure  runs  with  the  land 1040 

623.  The  measure  of  the  damages  for  a  failure  to  insure 1041 

CIIArTER  XXVI. 

THE  ASSIGN  ' '  NT  OP  THE  IJ5ASE. 

§  624.     The  general  rule  as  to  tenant's  power  to  assign  or  sublet.  .   1044 
625.     Statutes  requiring  the  consent  of  the  landlord  to  the  ten- 
ant's assignment  or  subletting 104G 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXVii 

626.  Sublease  and  assignment  distinguished 1047 

627.  What  constitutes  an  assignment  or  a  sublease 1050 

628.  Whether  a  prohibition  of  assignment  or  subletting  is  a 

condition  or  a  covenant 1054 

629.  The  form  of  the  consent  of  the  lessor  to  an  assignment  or 

underletting    1056 

630.  A  waiver  of  a  breach  not  to  assign 1057 

631.  The  effect  of  an  assignment  by  the  lessee  for  the  benefit  of 

creditors    1060 

632.  Covenant  not  to  assign  except  to  a  person  of  responsibility 

and  respectability  1063 

633.  The  effect  of  an  involuntary  assignment 1065 

634.  Who  may  take  advantage  of  a  breach  of  a  covenant  not  to 

assign    106? 

635.  The  presumption  of  an  assignment  from  a  stranger  being 

in  possession  of  the  premises 1068 

636.  Agreements  to  assign  leases 1070 

637.  The  formal  requisites  of  an  assignment  of  a  lease 1072 

638.  The  validity  of  an  assignment 1074 

639.  The  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  the  lease  by  the  assignee  1074 

640.  The  implied  warranty  of  the  title  by  the  assignor  of  the 


lease 


1076 


641.  The  assignee's  rights  as  against  the  lessor 1078 

642.  The  assignee's  liability  upon  the  covenants  of  the  lease. . .   1079 

643.  The  rights  of  the  landlord  to  distrain  after  the  assignment 

by  the  tenant lOgg 

644.  The  liability  of  the  assignee  to  his  assignor 1084 

645.  The  assignee's  liability  to  the  lessor  for  the  rent 10S5 

646.  The  liability  of  the  assignee  not  In  possession  for  rent 1087 

647.  Express  covenants  in  the  assignment 1088 

648.  The  assignee's  covenants  to  indemnify  the  assignor 1089 

649.  The  effect  of  an  assignment  by  the  assignee 1090 

The  liability  of  the  assignor  for  the  rent  after  an  assign- 


650 


ment 


1092 


651.  The  liabilities  and  rights  of  an  undertenant  as  regards 

the  original  lessor 2095 

652.  The  knowledge  by  an  undertenant  of  the  covenants  and 

agreements  which  are  binding  on  his  lessor 1098 

653.  The  nature  and  operation  of  a  mortgage  of  the  lease 1099 

654.  The  assignment  of  a  lease  as  security 1103 

655.  The  renewal  of  a  lease  for  the  benefit  of  a  mortgagee 1103 

656.  The  liability  of  an  equitable  mortgagee  or  assignee  to  the 

lessor 1104 

657.  The  recording  assignments  of  leases 1107 

658.  The  recording  of  mortgages  of  leasholds 1108 

659.  The  assignment  of  subsequently  accruing  rents  as  distinct 

from  the  assignment  of  the  reversion 1111 

660.  The  rights  and  remedies  of  an  assignee  of  the  rents  against 

the  tenant  1114 


c 


XXVlll  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS, 

661.  The  f oiin  of  an  assignment  of  rents 1117 

662.  Priorities   between  the   assignee  of  the   rent  and   the   as- 

signee of  the  reversion 1118 

663.  The  duty  of  the  assignee  for  creditors  to   lease  the  real 

property  over  which  he  has  control 1118 

664.  The  liability  of  the  estate  of  a  bankrupt  lessee  for  the  rent  1119 

665.  The  acceptance  of  a  lease  by  a  trustee  in  bankruptcy 1120 

66G.     The  duties  of  a  receiver  as  a  tenant 1122 

667.  The  powers  and  duties  of  a  receiver  as  a  landlord 1123 

668.  The  rights  of  a  receiver  in  foreclosure  to  the  rent 1126 

CHAPTER  XXVII. 
THT  EVICTION  OP  THE  TENANT. 

§  669.  The  scope  of  this  chapter 1128 

670.  Eviction  defined  and  classified 1129 

671.  Trespass  and  eviction  distinguished 1131 

672.  The  necessity  of  a  legal  possession  in  the  tenant 1134 

673.  The  intention  of  the  landlord 1135 

674.  Actual    eviction 1137 

675.  An  action  by  the  landlord  to  recover  possession 1137 

676.  Constructive  eviction   arising  from  the  interference   with 

the  tenant's  beneficial  use  of  the  premises 1138 

677.  Illustrations  of  constructive  eviction 1140 

678.  The  lessor's  failure  to  heat  the  premises  properly 1142 

679.  The  deprivation  of  easements 1145 

680.  The  loss  of  the  use  of  an  elevator 1147 

681.  Shutting  off  water  supply 1148 

682.  Presence  of  vermin  and  noxious  smells 1149 

683.  The  failure  of  the  landlord  to  repair 1150 

684.  The  interference  by  the  landlord  with  sub-tenants 1154 

685.  The  entry  of  the  landlord  to  rebuild  or  to  repair 1154 

686.  Use  of  adjoining  lots 1117 

687.  The  acts  of  strangers  are  not  usually  an  eviction 1160 

688.  The  acts  of  the  municipal  or  public  authorities 1162 

689.  Whether  annoyances  caused  by  other  tenants  are  an  evic- 

tion       1165 

690.  Objectionable  occupancy  of  adjoining  premises  by  peimis- 

sion  of  the  landlord  1167 

691.  The  actions  of  a  servant  or  agent  of  the  landlord 1169 

692.  An  eviction  by  a  paramount  title 1171 

693.  The  leasing  ot  the  premises  to  a  stranger 1175 

694.  An  abandonment  of  the  premises  by  a  tenant 1175 

695.  The  eviction  of  a  tenant  from  a  part  of  the  premises....  1177 
69G.     The  demand  and  refusal  of  restoration  to  possession 1182 

697.  The  effect  of  an  eviction 1182 

698.  The  measure  of  the  damages  for  an  eviction 1184 

699.  Limitation  on  an  action  for  an  eviction 1187 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  Xxix 

700.  Equitable  jurisdiction  to  restrain  an  eviction 1188 

701.  The  right  of  the  landlord  to  a  bill  of  particulars 1189 

702.  The  landlord's  failure  to  deliver  possession 1190 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

THE  SURRENDER  OF  THE  LEASE. 

703.  Tlie  surrender  of  a  lease  defined ; 1192 

704.  The  surrender  of  a  written  lease;  when  required  to  be  in 

writing    1193 

705.  The  language  of  a  surrender  in  writing 119G 

706.  Surrender  by  implication  or  operation  of  law 1198 

707.  The  execution  of  a  new  lease  by  the  parties  to  the  old  lease 

as  a  surrender 1200 

708.  Setting  aside  a  surrender  in  writing  as  obtained  by  fraud. .   1204 

709.  The  effect  of  a  surrender  on  the  undertenant 120.5 

710.  The  delivery  of  the  keys  as  evidence  of  a  surrender 1206 

711.  The  surrender  of  a  portion  of  the  premises 1211 

712.  The  acceptance  of  an  assignee  of  the  lease  as  a  new  tenant  1211 

713.  The  effect  of  a  re-letting  by  a  landlord  to  a  stranger 1213 

714.  A  surrender  by  or  to  an  agent  of  the  landlord,  or  the  tenant  1218 

715.  A  surrender  by  a  tenant  becoming  a  vendee 1219 

716.  Payment  to  be  made  by  the  landlord  on  a  surrender 1220 

717.  A  new  lease  made  with  undertenants 1221 

718.  The  possession  of  the  premises  in  the  lessee  is  necessary 

for  a  valid  surrender 1221 

719.  The  assent  of  the  lessor  to  the  surrender 1222 

720.  The  tenant  in  possession  after  a  delivery  of  the  keys 1223 

721.  A  surrender  made  by  joint  lessees 1224 

722.  To  whom  a  surrender  must  be  made 1225 

723.  A  surrender  upon  a  condition 1226 

724.  The  consideration  for  an  agreement  in  writing  to  surren- 

der      1226 

725.  The  merger  of  the  term  with  the  reversion 1228 

726.  The  doctrine  of  merger  is  applicable  only  to  concurrent  es- 

tates    1232 

727.  When  a  merger  does  not  take  place 1233 

728.  The  resumption  of  the  possession  by  a  landlord  as  an  ac- 

ceptance of  a  surrender 1234 

729.  The  destruction  of  the  written  lease 1237 

730.  The  effect  of  a  surrender  upon  the  lease 1238 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 
THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  PARTIES  AS  REGARDS  FIXTURES. 

732.  The  topic  of  fixtures  generally 1242 

733.  Common  law  as  to  chattels  annexed 1243 

734.  General  rules  for  determining  what  are  fixtures 1245 


XXX  TABLE    OP    CONTENTS. 

735.  The  intention  of  the  parties  to  the  lease 1247 

736.  The  modem  rule  as  to  trade  fixtures 1249 

738.  Machinery  and  mechanical  apparatuses  as  trade  fixtures. .  1254 

739.  Domestic    fixtures 1256 

740.  Farming  fixtures  belonging  to  tenants 1258 

741.  Personal  property  which  is  held  by  a  tenant  under  a  condi- 

tional bill  of  sale 1261 

742.  Chattels  used  by  a  tenant  in  improving  or  repairing  the 

premises     1261 

743.  The  injury  to  the  premises  by  the  removal 1262 

744.  The  necessity  for  removing  fixtures  during  the  term 1264 

745.  Exception  to  the  rule  that  fixtures  must  be  removed  during 

the  term  1268 

746.  Appraisal  or  arbitration  to  determine  the  value  of  fixtures.   1271 

747.  Meaning  of  end  of  the  term 1275 

748.  The  lessor's  option  to  renew  or  pay  for  the  lessee's  improve- 

ments       1276 

749.  A  landlord's  agreement  to  pay  for  the  fixtures  and  improve- 

ments of  the  tenant 1277 

750.  Compensation  to  the  lessee  for  his  improvements  in  case  of 

the  sale  of  premises 1279 

751.  The  meaning  of  the  word  "improvements" 1280 

752.  The  lessor's  covenant  to  pay  for  improvements  runs  with 

the  land  1283 

753.  Conditions  precedent  to  the  right  of  the  tenant  to  remove 

structures  erected  by  him 1285 

754.  The  taking  of  a  new  lease  by  the  tenant 1286 

755.  Covenants  which  give  the  landlord  a  lien  for  his  rent  on 

biuldings  of  a  tenant 1290 

756.  The  lessee's  lien  for  the  value  of  his  improvements 1291 

757.  Improvements  by  the  landlord  prior  to  the  entry  of  the 

tenant  1293 

758.  The  rights  of  an  assignee  or  mortgagee  of  the  tenant 1293 

759.  The  tenant's  sale  of  his  fixtures  when  within  statute  of 

frauds   1295 

760.  The  rights  of  an  assignee  and  mortgagee  of  the  landlord. . .   1295 

761.  The  liability  of  a  landlord  for   personal   property  of  his 

tenant  left  on  the  premises  at  the  expiration  of  the  lease  ]299 

762.  The  remedies  of  the  parties 1299 

703.     The  measure  of  damages  to  the  tenant  for  the  conversion 

of  his  chattels  by  the  landlord 1301 

764.  The  measure  of  the  damages  for  tiie  breach  of  the  land- 

lord's covenant  to  make  improvements 1302 

765.  The  proof  of  a  custom  in  respect  to  fixtures 1303 

766.  The  right  of  a  tenant  who  has  covenanted  lo  surrender  in 

good  condition  to  remove  his  improvemnts 130?. 


TABLE   OP    CONTENTS.  XXXI 

CHAPTER  XXX. 

THE  TENANT'S  EMBLEMENTS. 

§  7C7.     Emblements  defined;  the  right  of  the  tenant  to  emblements  1305 
768.     The  determination  of  an  uncertain  term  by  the  act  of  the 

tenant   1308 

7G9.     The  tenant's  right  to  remove  crops  where  his  term  is  cer- 
tain      1311 

770.  The  proof  of  custom  in  relation  to  the  tenant's  crops 1313 

771.  The  distinction  between  emblements  and  the  cost  of  pre- 

paring the  land 1315 

772.  The  right  of  the  incoming  tenant  to  growing  crops 1315 

773.  The  tenant's  title  to  the  crops  during  the  term 1317 

774.  Title  to  crops  after  severance  during  the  term 1321 

775.  A  covenant  by  the  tenant  not  to  remove  crops 1321 

776.  The  rights  of  a  sub-tenant  to  emblements 1322 

777.  The  right  of  a  purchaser  of  a  growing  crop 1323 

778.  Title  to  crops  as  against  mortgagee  and  purchaser  at  a  fore- 

closure   sale 1324 

779.  The  knowledge  by  a  tenant  of  an  action  to  foreclose  his 

landlord's    title 1326 

780.  Title  to  crops  as  against  judgment  creditors 1327 

781.  The  tenant's  title  to  an  increase  of  live  stock  on  the  prem- 

ises       1329 

782.  The  effect  on  emblements  of  the  forfeiture  of  a  lease  by  the 

breach  of  a  condition 1330 

782o.  The  right  of  an  outgoing  tenant  to  the  manure  made  on  a 

farm    1331 

783.  The  right  to  manure  which  was  made  on  non-agricultural 

land 1334 

784.  The  tenant's  covenant  as  to  the  disposal  of  the  manure. . .  1334 

785.  Trees  growing  upon  the  soil  during  the  tenancy 1335 

786.  The  remedy  of  the  landlord 1337 

787.  The  criminal  element  in  the  tenant  removing  a  crop 1338 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  PREMISES  DURING  THE  TERM. 

§  788.     Effect  of  destruction  of  the  premises  by  fire  on  tenant's  lia- 
bility to  pay  rent 1339 

789.  The  destruction  of  the  premises  which  are  a  floor  or  apart- 

ment       1342 

790.  The  tenant's  right  to  equitable  relief 1344 

791.  The  surrender  of  the  premises  by  the  tenant 1346 

792.  The  construction  of  express  exceptions  to  the  common  law 

rule   1348 

793.  The  effect  of  a  covenant  by  the  landlord  to  repair  or  build  1349 


XXXll  TABLE    OP    CONTENTS. 

794.  The  destruction  of  the  premises  occurring  before  the  entry 

by  the  tenant 1351 

795.  Deprivation  of  use  of  the  premises  by  casualties  of  war 1352 

796.  General  rules  which  are  observed  in  construing  the  statute  135S 

797.  What  constitutes  unfitness  for  occupancy  under  the  New 

York  statute  1354 

798.  The  accrual  of  the  rents 1357 

799.  Negligence  or  fault  of  the  tenant 1358 

800.  The  destruotion  must  be  sudden  and  unexpected  to  bring 

the  case  under  the  statute 1359 

801.  Waiver  of  the  statutes  by  the  parties 1360 

CHAPTER  XXXII. 

THE  OPTION   TO   RENEW   THE  LEASE. 

802.  The  scope  of  the  chapter 1361 

803.  The  extension  of  a  lease  and  a  renewal  distinguished....   1362 

804.  The  unilateral  character  of  a  covenant  for  a  renewal 1365 

805.  Stipulations  to  renew.    When  they  are  void  for  uncertainty  1367 

806.  The  terms  and  covenants  necessary  to  be  inserted  in  the  re- 

newal   lease 1308 

807.  The  invalidity  of  a  clause  permitting  indefinite  renewals.  .   1373 

808.  Time  when  an  option  for  a  renewal  of  a  lease  must  be  exer- 

cised       1376 

809.  The  necessity  for  and  the  character  of  notice 1377 

810.  The  specific  performance  of  a  covenant  to  renew 1382 

811.  Waiver  by  the  lessee  of  his  privilege  to  renew 1385 

812.  Conditions  precedent  to  a  renewal 1388 

813.  Waiver  of  a  breach  of  a  covenant  in  the  old  lease 1389 

814.  The  rent  of  a  renewal  to  be  determined  by  appraisal 1389 

815.  The  covenant  to  renew  runs  with  the  land 1391 

815a.  The  tenant's  equitable  right  to  a  reversal 1892 

816.  The  right  of  the  personal  representative  of  the  lessee  to  a 

renewal    1393 

817.  The  exclusive  option  in  the  landlord  to  renew  the  lease.  . .  .   1393 

818.  Option  of  renewing  le^se  or  paying  for  tenant's  improve- 

ments       1394 

819.  A  renewal  by  an  endoisement  on  the  lease 1395 

CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

THE  LIEN  OF  THE  LANDLORD  FOR  RENT  AND  ADVANCES. 

820.  General  rules  as  to  liens  by  statute 1400 

821.  When   the   relationship   of  landlord   and   tenant   must   be 

proved    1402 

822.  Lien  for  rent  created  by  the  lease 1403 

823.  The  construction   of  liens   created    by   the  lease 1405 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  XXX ill 

824.  When  the  lien  first  attaches 1408 

825.  The   necessity   for  filing  or   recording 140!) 

826.  The  assignability  of  a  landlord's  lien 1410 

827.  The  nature  of  the  indebtedness 1413 

828.  What  will  constitute  an  adva-ncement  to  the  tenant  within 

the  statute   1415 

829.  To  what  property  the  statutory  lien  attaches 1419 

830.  The  inclusion  in  the  landlord's  lien  of  the  goods  of  sub- 

tenants      1423 

831.  The  ownership  and  possession  of  the  property  subject  to 

a  lien  1424 

832.  The  removal  and  sale  of  the  property  which  is  subject  to 

the  lien   1425 

833.  The  distinction   between   the  common   law   and   equitable 

doctrines  regarding  liens  on  after  acquired  property 1426 

834.  The  liability  of  bona  fide  purchasers  for  value  of  a  crop..  1429 

835.  Priorities  between  liens  of  the  landlord  and  liens  of  chat- 

tel mortgagees 1433 

836.  The  renewal  of  a  lease  giving  a  lien  which  is  prior  to  a 

mortgage     1436 

837.  The  priority  of  the  landlord's  lien  over  the  claims  of  third 

persons  for  supplies 1437 

838.  Priorities  as  between  the  landlord's  lien  and  the  lien  of  an 

attaching  creditor    1439 

839.  General  rule  as  to  the  landlord's  priority  over  an  execu- 

tion creditor 1440 

840.  The  extent  of  the  priority  of  the  landlord's  lien  over  that 

of  an  execution  creditor 1442 

841.  Priority  of  a  factor's  lien  over  that  of  a  landlord 1445 

842.  Exemption   from   execution 1446 

843.  The  subordination  of  mechanics'  liens  to  rent  liens 1447 

844.  The  subordination  of  the  title  of  a  vendor  on  condition 1448 

845.  The  taking  of  additional  security  for  the  rent  as  a  waiver 

of  the  lien 1449 

846.  The  waiver  of  lien  by  the  landlord  by"  conduct  generally.  .1450 

847.  The  waiver  of  the  lien  by  an  agent _,...1453 

848.  The   termination   of   the  lien 1454 

849.  The  remedy  of  the  landlord  against  one  purchasing  prop- 

erty subject  to  his  lien 1455 

850.  Action  by  the  landlord  in  conversion  or  assumpsit 1457 

851.  The  statutory  mode  of  enforcing  a  lien 1459 

852.  The   remedy  of  the  purchaser  of  chattels  subject  to  the 

lien,  against  the  tenant 1461 

853.  Injunction  to  protect  the  lien  of  the  landlord 1431 

854.  Grounds  for  granting  an  attachment 1464 

855.  The  effect  of  an  attachment 1466 

85B.     The  cumulative  character  of  the  remedy  by  attachment 1466 

857.     What  property  may  be  attached  by  the  landlord 1467 


Table  of  Cases  Cited. 


[EEFEEENCES   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Abadie    r.    Berges    (41    La.    Ann. 

281),  1165,  1378. 
Abby  V.  Billups  (35  Miss.  618),  63, 

882,892. 
Abby  V.  Shiner   (5  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

287), 578. 
Abbey,  etc.  Ass'n  v.  Welland   (48 

Cal.  614),  111. 
Abbott  V.   Boswortb    (36  Ohio  St. 

605), 335. 
Abbott    V.    Cromartie    (72    N.    C. 

292), 929. 
Abbott  V,  Parsons  (3  Burr.  1807), 

1201. 
Abbott  V.  Seventy-six  Land  &  Wa- 
ter Co.  (87  Cal.  323),  1370. 
Abercrombie  v.  Redpath   (1  Iowa, 

111),  nil. 
Abeel  v.  Radcliffe   (13  Johns.   (N. 

Y.)  297),  561,  1367. 
Aberdeen    Coal    Co.    v.    Evansville 

(14  Ind.  App.  621),  1235. 
Abingdon  v.  Butler   (2  Cox,  260), 

473. 
Abington    v.     Steinberg     (86    Mo. 

App.  639),  1460. 
Abraham  v.  Nicrosi  (87  Ala.  173), 

1422,1457. 
Abraham   v.   Tape    (60   Md.    317), 

1080. 
Abrams  v.  Sheehan   (40  Md.  446), 

1117,1434. 
Abrams    v,    Taylor    (24    111.    102), 

549. 
Abrams  v.  Watson    (59  Ala.  524), 

564,  666,  669,  687,  697,  700. 


Academy  of  Music  v.  Hackett   (2 

Hilt.   (N.  Y.)  217),  638. 
Accidental    D.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Mac- 

Kenzie  (5  L.  T.  20),  926. 
Accles  V.  Mills   (67  L.  J.  P.  C.  25 

[1898]  A.  C.  360),  617. 
Ackland    v.    Lutley    (9    Ad.    &    E. 

879), 347. 
Acocks  V.   Phillips    (5   Hon.   183), 

634. 
Acquackanonk  Water  Co.  v.  Wat- 
son (29  N.  J.  Eq.  366),  431. 
Acton  V.  Blundell  (12  M.  &  W.  348, 

349), 432. 
Adair  v.  Bogle  (20  Iowa,  238),  695. 
Adams,  In  re  (124  Fed.  Rep.  142), 

1120. 
Adams  v.  Adams    (4  Watts    (Pa.) 

160), 49. 
Adams  v.  Bigelow  (128  Mass.  365), 

539. 
Adams    v.    Brevieton    (3    H.    &    J. 

(Md.)   124),  717. 
Adams   v.   Burke    (21   R.    I.    126), 

1093. 
Adams   v.   Cairns    (85   L.   T.    10), 

155. 
Adams  v.  Clark  r2  W.  N.  C.  (Pa.) 

429), 748. 
Adams  v.  Cohoes  (127  N.  Y.  175), 

156,  158,  181. 
Adams  v.  Fletcher  (17  R.  I.  127), 

828. 
Adams  v.  Gibney  (4  M.  &  P.  491), 

606. 
Adams  v.  Goddard    (48  Me.  212), 

1040,  1205,  1294,  1301. 


XXXVl 


T.iBLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Adams  v.   Kensington  Vestry    (54 

L.  J.  Ch.  87),  996. 
Adams  v.  McKesson's  Ex.    (53  Pa. 

St.  81),  308. 
Adams  v.  Medsker  (25  W.  Va.  127), 

342. 
Adams   v.    Power    (52   Miss.    828), 

100. 
Adams    v.    Smith    (19    Nev.    259), 

1100,1306. 
Adams  v.  State   (87  Ala.  89),  311. 
Adams  v.  Werner  (120  Mich.  432), 

1131,1156. 
Aderholds  v.  Blumenthal   (95  Ala. 

66),  1432. 
Adler   v.   Lowenstein    (102    N.   Y. 

Supp.  492),  489. 
Adler  v.  Mendelson  (74  Wis.  464), 

1224. 
Adriance  v.   Hafkemeyer    (39  Mo. 

134), 558. 
Adsit  V.  Kaufman    (121  Fed.  Rep. 

355),  573. 
Agar  V.   Winslow    (123   Cal.    587), 

1136,1142. 
Agard    v.    King    (Cro.    Eliz.    775), 

130. 
Agate  V.  Lowenbein  (57  N.  Y.  604), 

712. 
Ahern  v.   Steele    (115  N.  Y.   203), 

792,  805. 
Aiken   v.   Blaisdell    (41   Vt.    655), 

776. 
Aikens    v.    Stadell    (9    Kan.    App. 

298),  1425. 
Aikin  v.  Perry  (119  Ga.  260),  847. 
Ainsworth    v.    Ritt    (38    Cal.    89), 

1342.    ■ 
Airey  v.  Weinstein   (54  Ark.  443), 

1435. 
Alabama,    etc.    Co.    v.    Oliver    (78 

Ala.  158),  386,  1118. 
Alabama  Land  Co.  v.  Kyle  (99  Ala. 

474),  960. 
Albans  v.  Battersby  (47  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

571), 749. 


Albert  v.  State  (66  Md.  337),  794,. 

805. 
Albin  V.  Lord  (39  N.  H.  196),  24. 
Albin  V.  Riegel   C40  Ohio  St.  339), 

1328. 
Albright   v.    Mills    (86   Ala.    324)," 

1317. 
Alcorn   v.   Morgan    (77   Ind.   184), 

156. 
Aklerson    v.    Marshall     (7    Mont. 

288),  920,  965. 
Alderson  v.  Miller  (15  Gratt.  (Va.) 

279), 924. 
Aldred's  Case  (9  Rep.  586),  409. 
Alexander    v.     Carew     (13    Allen 

(Mass.)  70),  678. 
Alexander     v.     Bailey      (2      Lea 

(Tenn.)  639),  904. 
Alexander  v.  Bland  (3  Tenn.  431)^ 

349. 
Alexander    v.    DeKernel     (81    Ky. 

345), 351. 
Alexander  v.  Dorsey   (12  Ga.  12), 

1155,1343. 
Alexander  v.   Gardner    (96   S.   W. 

Rep.  818),  274. 
Alexander   v.    Gibbon    (118    N.    C. 

796), 961. 
Alexander    v.    Jameson    (5    Binn. 

(Pa.)  238),  332. 
Alexander  v.  Zeigler  (36  So.  536), 

315. 
Alexandria  Canal  Co.  v.  Swann  (5 

How.  83),  63. 
Alfred  v.  Vickery  (Car.  &  M.  280), 

170, 174. 
Alger    V.    Kennedy    (49    Vt.    109), 

1142,1152. 
Alleman    v.    Vink    (28    Ind.    App. 

142), 139. 
Allen    V.    Anthony    (1    Mer.    287), 

497. 
Allen  V.  Bartlett   (20  W.  Va.  46), 

140. 
Allen   V.   Bates    (3  L.   J.   Ex.   39), 

524. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


XXXVU 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Allen   V.    Bryan    (5    Bar.    &   Cres. 

512),  560,  1112. 
Allen  V.  Calvert  (2  East,  376),  241. 
Allen  V.  Chatfield    (8  Minn.  435), 

920. 
Allen  V.  Culver  (3  Denio   (N.  Y.) 

290),  491,  867,  877,  882,  884,  1080. 
Allen  V.  Dent  (4  Lea  (Tenn.)  676), 

1014, 1032. 
Allen  V.  England   (3  F.  &  F.  49), 

301. 
Allen    V.    Fosgate    (11     How.    Pr. 

218), 331. 
Allen  V.  Gales  (74  Vt.  376),  1114. 
Allen  V.  Hall    (61  Neb.  256),  491, 

922,1111. 
Allen  V.  Hill  (Cro.  Eliz.  238),  229. 
Allen  V.  Hooker  (25  Vt.  137),  760. 
Allen   V.   Houston    Ice  &  Brewing 

Co.  (97  S.  W.  Rep.  1063),  1419. 
Allen  V.  Jaqulsh   (21  Wend.  628), 

156. 
Allen  V.  Kelly  (18  R.  I.  197),  774. 
Allen  V.  Macon,  D.  &  S.  R.  Co.  (33 

S.  E.  Rep.  696),  579. 
Allen  V.   Mansfield    (82   Mo.    68S), 

195. 
Allen  V.  Mooney   (130  Mass.  155), 

1249. 
Allen    V.    Paul     (24    Gratt.    (Va.) 

332),  958,  965,  966. 
Allen    V.    Pryor    (3   A.    K.   Marsh. 

(Ky.)   305),  519. 
Allen  V.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co. 

(137  Mo.  205),  434. 
Allen  V.   Scott    (21   Pick.    (Mass.) 

29), 1115. 
Allen  V.  Van  Houten   (19  N.  J.  L. 

47), 49. 
Allen  V.  Whetstone    (35  La.  Ann. 

846), 361. 
Allen  V.  Wooley  (1  Blackf.   (Ind.) 

148), 1115. 
Allison    Mfg.    Co.    v.    McCormick 

(118  Pa.  St.  519),  904. 
Almy  V.  Green  (13  R.  I.  350),  776, 

1093. 


Alschuler   v.    Schiff    (59    111.    App. 

51), 1222. 
Alsup  v.  Banks  (68  Miss.  664),  42, 

1214,1215. 
Alt  V.  Gray  (67  N.  Y.  Supp.  411), 

258,686. 
Althorpe  v.  Wolfe  (22  N.  Y.  355), 

843. 
Alton   V.    Railroad   Co.    (19    C.    B. 

(N.  S.)  213),  913. 
Alve    V.    Henderson    (16    B.    Mon. 

(Ky.)   131),  71. 
Alwood  V.  Mansfield   (33  111.  452), 

920. 
Alworth  V.  Gordon  (81  Minn.  445), 

150,  158,  174,  489. 
Amelung  v.  Seekamp   (9  Gill  &  J. 

(Md.)  474),  724. 
American   Bonding  Co.   v.   Pueblo 

Inv.    Co.     (150    Fed.    Rep.    17), 

1013.1238. 
American    Express    Co.    v.    Smith 

(33  Ohio  St.  511),  904. 
American    Ins.   Co.   v.   Chicago   R. 

Co.  (74  Mo.  App.  89),  1054,  1070. 
American    Mortg.    Co.    v.    Merrick 

Const.  Co.  (100  N.  Y.  Supp.  561), 

530. 
American  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Sire  (92 

N.  Y.  Supp.  182),  1126. 
American  Strawboard  Co.  v.  Halde- 

man  Paper  Co.  (27  C.  C.  A.  634), 

742. 
Ames  V.  Fletcher    (17  R.   I.  137), 

825. 
Ames  V.  Miller  (65  Neb.  204),  393. 
Ames  V.  Trenton  Brewing  Co.  (56 

N.  J.  Eq.  309),  1248. 
Amick  V.  Brubaker  (101  Mo.  473), 

182,  191,  220. 
Amory   v.    Kannofsky    (117    Mass. 

35),  1195,  1199,  1238. 
Amsden  v.   Atwood    (69  Vt.   527), 

140,  460,  1185. 
Amsden  v.  Floyd  (60  Vt.  386),  221. 
Amsley  v.   Woodward    (6  B.  &  C. 

579), 1058. 


xxxvm 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[REFEBENCES    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Anderson's  Appeal    (3  Barr.  218), 

1443. 
Anderson    v.    Ammonett     (9    Lea 

(Tenn.)  1),  1291. 
Anderson   v.    Anderson    (104    Ala. 

428),  938,  950. 
Anderson  v.  Brewster  (44  Ohio  St. 

576), 234. 
Anderson  v.  Brinser    (129  Pa.  St. 

376),  497. 
Anderson  v.  Chicago  Marine  &  Fire 

Ins.  Co.  (21  111.  601),  1180. 
Anderson    v.    Connor     (87    N.    Y. 

Supp.  449),  100. 
Anderson  v.  Critcher  (11  Gill  &  J. 

(Md.)   450),  335,  390. 
Anderson  v.  Darby  (1  Nott  &  Mc- 

Cord,  394),  10. 
Anderson  v.  Dickie    (26  How.  Pr. 

(N.  Y.)  105),  794. 
Anderson  v.  Hapler   (34  111.  436), 

685,  1300,  1336. 
Anderson    v.    Henry    (46    W.    Va. 

319), 1401. 
Anderson  v.   Midland  Ry.   Co.    (3 

E.  &  E.  614),  192. 
Anderson  v.  Miller  (96  Tenn.  35), 

771, 1098. 
Anderson     v.     Miller     (15     Gratt. 

(Va.)  279),  930. 
Anderson    v.    Nesmith    (7    N.    H. 

167), 685. 
Anderson  v.   Oppenheimer    (49   L. 

J.  Q.  B.  708),  1153. 
Anderson    v.    Prindle    (23    Wend. 

(N.  Y.)  616),  179. 
Anderson  v.  Robbins  (82  Me.  422), 

539. 
Anderson   v.   Steinrich    (74   N.   Y. 

Supp.  920),  302. 
Anderson  v.  Straub    (98  111.  485), 

1325. 
Anderson  v.  Swift   (106  Ga.  748), 

1277. 
Anderson     v.     Winton     (137     Ala. 

432),  457,  1180. 


Anderton  v.  Milner   (59  L.  J.  Ch. 

765), 608. 
Andrew  v.  Carlisle    (4  Colo.  App. 

336),  337,  470. 
Andrew    v.    Newcomb    (32    N.    Y. 

417), 1320. 
Andrew   v.    Stewart    (81    Ga.    o3), 

1423. 
Andrew   v.    Day   Button   Co.    (132 

N.  Y.  348),  1255. 
Andrews   v.   Erwin    (25   Ky.   Law 

Rep.  1791),  262. 
Andrews  v.  Hailes  (2  El.  &  Black, 

349),  961,  962. 
Andrews    v.     Marshall     Creamery 

Co.  (92  N.  W.  Rep.  706),  1378. 
Andrews  v.  Minter  (88  S.  W.  Rep. 

822), 694. 
Andrews  v.  Williamson  (193  Mass. 

92), 814. 
Andrews  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Porter    (112 

Ala.  381),  1425. 
Andrus    v.    Bradley-Alderson    Co. 

(117  Mo.  App.  322),  871. 
Angel  V.  Duke  (44  L.  J.  Q.  B.  78), 

382. 
Angell  V.  Randall   (16  L.  T.  489), 

526. 
Angres  Boom  Co.  v.  WTiitney   (26 

Mich.  52),  451. 
Anheuser-Busch     Brew.     Ass'n     v. 

Peterson  (41  Neb.  897),  40,  794. 
Anthony  v.  New  York  P.  &  B.  R. 

Co.  (162  Mass.  60),  391. 
Anthony     v.     Smith     (9     Humph. 

(Tenn.)  508),  105. 
Anton  i     v.     Belknap     (102     Mass. 

193),  210,  1253,  1269. 
Anzolone  v.  Paskusz  (96  App.  Div. 

188),  456,  597. 
Aperson  v.  Moore  (30  Ark.  56,  58), 

1426, 1428. 
Appleton  V.  Ames  (150  Mass.  34), 

212,  223,  1295,  1240. 
Api)leton  V.  Campbell  (2  Car.  &  P. 

347), 772. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


xxxix 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Appleton  V.  Marx  (102  N.  Y.  Supp. 

2), 894. 
Appleton  V.  O'Donnell    (173  Mass. 

398),  338,  519,  573. 
Applewhite    v.    Nelms     (71    Miss. 

482), 1423. 
Arbenz  v.  Exley  (52  W.  Va.  476), 

140,  848,  1340. 
Arbuckle    v.    State    (32    Ind.    34), 

1337. 
Arcade  Inv.  Co.  v.  Gierlet  (109  N. 

W.  Rep.  250),  178. 
Arcade  Realty  Co.  v.  Tunney  (101 

N.  Y.  Supp.)   593),  524. 
Arden  v.  Sullivan   (14  Q.  B.  g32), 

147, 196. 
Ardesco  Oil  Co.  v.  Richardson  (63 

Pa.  St.  162),  886. 
Arding    v.    Economic    Printing    & 

Publishing  Co.    (79  L.   T.   420), 

1030. 
Ards  V.  Watkins  (Cro.  Eliz.  637), 

541. 
Ardsley  Hall  Co.  v.  Sirrett  (86  N. 

Y.  Supp.  792),  1147. 
Arent  v.  Bone   (23  La.  Ann.  387), 

390. 
Argall  V.  Pitts  (78  N.  Y.  239),  32. 
Arguelles   v.   Wood    (1   Fed.   Cas. 

520), 547. 
Armsby  v.  Woodward   (6  Barn.  & 

C.  519),  642,  645,  647,  1068. 
Armstrong  v.   Maybee    (17   Wash. 

24), 883. 
Arkwright   v.   Colt    (2   Y.   &  Coll. 

C.  C.  4),  1041. 
Armiger    v.    Clark    (Bumb.    Ill), 

1382. 
Armory    Board,    In    re    (29    Misc. 

174), 57. 
Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  Des  Moines 

Pork  Co.   (116  Iowa,  723),  1235. 
Armstrong  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (38  N. 

J.  Law,  1),  116. 
Armstrong     v.     Walker     (9     Lea 

(Tenn.)  156),  1429. 


Armstrong    v.    Wheeler    (9    Cow. 

(N.  Y.)  88),  1093. 
Arnold   v.    Bennett    (92   Mo.   App. 

156), 679. 
Arnold  v.  Bidgood  (Cro.  Jac.  318), 

26,55. 
Arnold  v.  Clark   (45  N.  Y.  Super, 

Ct.  252),  860. 
Arnold   v.    Phillips    (59    111.    App. 

213), 1400. 
Arnold  v.  R.  Rothschild's  Sons  Co. 

(164  N.  Y.  562),  248. 
Arnold  v.  Skale  (Noy.  149),  688. 
Arnot  V.  Alexander    (44  Mo.   25), 

1368,  1382,  1391. 
Arnson  v.   Spawn    (2    S.   D.   269), 

682. 
Arques  v.   Wasson    (51   Cal.    620), 

1404. 
Arthur    v.    Bascon    (28    Leg.    Int. 

284), 349. 
Arthur  v.  Harty   (40  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1091), 1029. 
Artt  V.  New  York    (28  N.  Y.  Su- 
per. Ct.  248),  140. 
Ascarete  v.   PfafE    (78   S.  W.  Rep. 

974), 1046. 
Ashbrook    v.    Dale    (27    Mo.    App. 

649), 772. 
Ashby  V.  Ashby  (59  N.  J.  Eq.  536), 

1263. 
Ashby  V.  Wilson    (69  Law  J.  Ch. 

47), 744. 
Ashley  V.  Pease  (1§  Pick.  (Mass.) 

268), 439. 
Ashley  v.  Young  (79  Miss.  129),  52. 
Ashley      v.      Warner      (11      Gray 

(Mass.)  43),  192. 
Ashton  V.  Golden  Gate  Lumber  Co. 

(58  Pac.  Rep.  1),  937. 
Aslin  V.  Summersett  (1  B.  &  Aid. 

135), 171. 
Aspdin   V.   Austin    (5   Q.   B.   671), 

603. 
Astor  V.  L'Amoreux  (4  Sandf.  (N. 

Y.)  524),  1090. 


xl 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Astor  V.  Miller   (2  Paige   (N.  Y.) 

68), 1101. 
Astor  V.  Turner  Til  Paige  (N.  Y.) 

436), 28, 34. 
Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan  (42 

Kan.  23),  1247. 
Atherstone  v.  Bostock    (2  Man.  & 

G. 511), 135. 
Atkins  V.  Chilson  (7  Mete.  (Mass.) 

298),  723. 
Atkins     V.      Chilson      (11     Mete. 

(Mass.)    2),  663. 
Atkins  V.  Sleeper  (7  Allen  (Mass.) 

487), 348. 
Atkinson    v.    Coatsworth    (8    Mod. 

30),  953. 
Atkinson  v.  Dixon    (96  Mo.   588), 

1271. 
Atkinson    v.    Morrison     (3    Oreg. 

332),  946. 
Atlantic  Dock  Co.  v.  Leavitt   (54 

N.  Y.  25), 729. 
Atlantic  Product  Co.  v.  Dunn   (55 

S.  E.  Rep.  299),  1376. 
Attaway    v.    Hoskinson     (37    Mo. 

App.  132),  1405. 
Attersoll    v.     Stevens     (1     Taunt. 

183), 721. 
Attoe  V.  Hemmings  (2  Bulst.  281), 

641. 
Attorney   General   v.    Stephens    (6 

De  G.,  M.  &  G.  Ill),  511. 
Attorney  General  v.  Tomline    (43 

L.  T.  Rep.  486),  962. 
Atwood   V.    Norton    (31    Ga.    507), 

378. 
Aubuchon    v.    McKnight     (1    Mo. 

312), 343. 
Audenreid   v.    Hull    (45   Mo.    App. 

202), 1466. 
Auer   V.   Penn    (99    Pa.    St.    370), 

1214. 
Auer  V.  Vahl   (129  Wis.  635),  785. 
Auginbaugh    v.    Coppenheffer    (55 

I'a.  St.  347),  702. 
Aull  Savings  Bank  v.  Aull  (80  Mo. 

199),  573. 


Ault   Wooden-Ware   Co.   v.    Baker 

(26  Ind.  App.  374),  293. 
Austin  V.   Ahearne    (61  N.  Y.   6), 

80,482. 
Austin  V.  Field  (7  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S. 

29),  1342. 
Austin  V.  Harris  (10  Gray  (Mass.) 

296), 1078. 
Austin  V.  Hudson  R.  R.  R.  Co.  (25 

N.  Y.  340),  722. 
Austin  V.  Thomson  (45  N.  H.  113), 

223,  579,  1053,  1096. 
Austin  V.   Welch    (72    S.   W.   Rep. 

(Tex.)  881),  1435. 
Austin  V.  Whitlock  (1  Munf.  (Va.) 

487),  332. 
Austin  V.  Wilson    (46  Iowa,  362), 

965. 
Autrey  v.  Autrey  (94  Ga.  579),  51. 
Auworth  V.  Johnson  (5  Car.  &  P. 

239),  138,  851. 
Auxvasse    Milling    Co.    v.    Cornet 

(85  Mo.  App.  251),  1460. 
Avan  V.  Frey  (69  Ind.  91),  693. 
Averill  v.  Taylor  (8  N.  Y.  44),  244. 
Avery  v.  Cheslyn  (3  Ad.  &  El.  75), 

1256. 
Avery     v.     Dougherty     (102     Ind. 

443),  697,  699,  1132. 
Avery  v.  New  York  Central  &  H. 

R.  R.  Co.    (7  N.  Y.   Supp.  341), 

440. 
Avery  v.  Scott  (8  Exch.  500),  1271. 
Aydlett  v.  Neal  (114  N.  C.  7),  369. 
Aydlett  v.  Pendleton  (114  N.  C.  1), 

369. 
Aylet  V.  Dodd  (2  Atk.  239),  765. 


B. 


Babcock  v.  Kennedy   (1  Vt.  457), 

30. 
Babcock  v.  Scoville    (56   111.  461), 

543, 1087. 
Backenstoss  v.  Stahler's  Adm'r  (23 

Pa.  St.  251).  1316,  1329. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


Xli 


[REFERENCES   ARE   TO   PAGE^.] 


Backhouse   v.    Mohun    (3    Swanst. 

434), 982. 
Backus    V.    Sternberg     (59    Minn. 

403), 152. 
Bacon     v.      Bowdoin      (22     Pick. 
(Mass.)   401),  243,  244,  250,  397, 
1365. 
Bacon    v.    Brown    (9    Conn.    334), 

139. 
Bacon    v.    Carr    (112    Iowa,    193), 

1454. 
Bacon  v.   Howell    (60   Miss.   362), 

1403. 
Bacon    v.    Park    (19    Utah,    246), 

1032. 
Bacon  v.  Parker  (137  Mass.  309), 

379,382. 
Bacon  v.   Taylor    (Kirby    (Conn.) 

398),  15. 
Bacon    v.    Western    Furniture    Co. 

(53  Ind.  229),  632,  638. 
Badcock  v.  Hunt   (60  L.  T.  314), 

1009. 
Badger  Lumber  Co.  v.  Malone   (8 

Kan.  App.  121),  241. 
Badger  Lumber  Co.  v.  Marion  Wa- 
ter  Supply   Co.    (48   Kan.    182), 
442. 
Bagley  v.  Peddie   (16  N.  Y.  469), 

588. 
Bailey  v.  Campbell   (82  Ala.  342), 

258,  955. 
Bailey  v.  Delaplaine  (1  Sandf.  (N. 

Y.)   5),  1199. 
Bailey  v.  Dunlap    (138  Ala.   415), 

123. 
Bailey  v.  Foster  (3  C.  B.  215),  175. 
Bailey  v.  Schnitzius  (23  N.  J.  Eq. 

235), 441. 
Bailey  v.  Seigel,  etc.  Co.    (54  Mo. 

App.  50),  680. 
Bailey    v.    Snyder     (13    S.    &    R. 

(Pa.)  160),  457. 
Bailey  v.  Ward  (32  La.  Ann.  839), 

195. 
Bailey  v.  Wells  (8  Wis.  141),  1193. 


Bailey  v.   White    (41   N.   H.   337), 

336. 
Eailie  v.  Plant  (11  Misc.  Rep.  30), 

1379. 
Bailie  v.   Rodway    (27  Wis.   172), 

496. 
Bain  v.  Clark   (10  Johns.   (N.  Y.) 

424), 1309. 
Baines  v.  Burbridge  (15  La.  Ann. 

628),  100. 
Baird  v.  Evans  (^0  111.  29),  868. 
Baird  v.  Milford  Land,  etc.  Co.  (89 

Cal.   552),  274,  371. 
Bajus  V.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co.  (103 

N.  Y.  316),  915. 
Bakeman  v.  Pooler  (14  Wend.  (N. 

Y.)  637),  536. 
Baker  v.  Allen  (66  Ark.  271),  836. 
Baker  v.  Cotney  (38  So.  Rep.  (Ala. 

1905)  131). 1457. 
Baker  v.  Fessenden   (71  Me.  293), 

1248. 
Baker  v.  Hoag    (3  Barb.    (N.  Y.) 

208), 1299. 
Baker  v.  Hotzzaffel   (4  Taunt.  45), 

576,  1339,  1340. 
Baker   v   Jones    (38    Hun    (N   Y) 

625),  37. 
Baker  v.  Jordan   (3  Ohio  St.  438), 

1316. 
Baker  v.  Kenney  (69  N.  J.  L.  180), 

160,  163. 
Baker  v.  Kinney  (54  Atl.  Rep.  (N, 

J.)   526),  150,  163. 
Baker  v.  McInturfE    (49  Mo.  App. 

505), 1308. 
Baker    v.    McClurg    (96    111.    App. 

165), 1252. 
Baker  v.  Pratt  (15  111.  5681,1195. 
Baker    v.     Saunderson     (3     Pick. 

(Mass.)   348),  680,  683. 
Baker    v.    White    (2    Term.    Rep. 

159), 171. 
Baker    v.    Winfrey     (15    B.    Mon. 

(Ky.)  504),  10. 
Balch  V.  Patten   (45  Me.  41),  576. 


xlii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Baldwell  v.  Center   (30  Cal.  539), 

250. 
Baldwin    v.    McCarthern    (94    Ga. 

622), 1438. 
Baldwin  v.  Morgan   (43  Hun   (N. 

Y.)  355),  412,  752. 
Baldwin  v.  Thibaudeau   (17  N.  Y. 

Supp.  532),  585. 
Baldwin     v.     Walker     (21     Conn. 

168),  30,  486. 
Bales  V.  Gilbert  (84  Mo.  App.  675), 

1271,1274. 
Ball  V.  Allen  (15  Mass.  433),  340. 
Ball  V.   Cullimore    (2   C.   M.   &  R. 

120), 215. 
Ball  V.  Dunsterville  (4  T.  R.  313), 

332. 
Ball   V.   First   National   Bank    (SO 

Ky.  501),  49. 
Ball    V.    Lively    (2    J.    J.    Marsh, 

(Ky.)  181),  924. 
Ball  V.  Lively  (4  Dana  (Ky.)  369), 

471. 
Ball   V.   Montgomery    (2   Ves.   Jr. 

194), 22. 
Ballance  v.  City  of  Peoria  (180  111. 

29),  463,  948. 
Ballard    v.    Johnson    (114    N.    C. 

141), 1438. 
Ballard  v.  Mayfield  (107  Ala.  306), 

1411,1412. 
Ballard  v.  Stephen   (92  Ala.  616), 

1464. 
Ball   Brown  &   Co.  v.   Sledge    (82 

Miss.  749),  1420,  1446. 
Ballock  v.  Domitt   (6  T.  R.  650), 

1340. 
Bally    V.    Wells     (Wilmot,    344), 

1285. 
Balser  v.  Barcraft   (76  Ala.  414), 

960. 
Baltimore,  etc.  Co.  v.  McCutcheon 

(13  Pa.  St.  1),  61.  65. 
Baltimore  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Hack- 

ett  (87  Md.  224),  686. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  West  (57 

Ohio  St.  161),  146,  383. 


Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wins- 
low  (18  App.  D.  C.  438),  329. 
Baltimore  Dental   Ass'n  v.  Fuller 

(101  Va.  627),  140,  167. 
Bamman    v.    Binzen     (142    N.    Y. 

636),  999,  1397. 
Banbury  v.   Sherin   (4   S.  D.  88), 

163. 
Bandy    v.    Cartwright     (8    Exch. 

933),  698. 
Banergee  v.  Hevey   (5  Mass.  11), 

97. 
Bank  v.  Getchett   (59  N.  H.  281), 

520. 
Bank  v.   Warner    (22   Kan.    537), 

122. 
Bank    v.    Wise    (3    Watts     (Pa.) 

394), 539. 
Banker  v.   Braker    (9  Abb.  N.   C. 

(N.  Y.)   411),  1374. 
Bank,  etc.  v.  Trumbull    (35  How. 

Pr.  (N.  Y.)   8),  537. 
Bank  of  America   v.   Banks    (101 

U.  S.  240),  24. 
Bank    of    Commonwealth    v.    Mc- 

Chord  (4  Dana  (Ky.)   191),  343. 
Bank  of  Hamilton  v.  Dudleys  Les- 
see  (2  Pet.   (U.  S.)   492),  48,  53. 
Bank  of  Louisville  v.  Baumeister 

(87  Ky.  6),  978. 
Bank  of  Pennsylvania  v.  Wise   (3 

Watts  (Pa)  394),  495. 
Bank   of  Virginia   v.    Hedges    (38 

Tex.  614),  961. 
Bank  of  Virginia   v.    Poitiaux    (3 

Rand.  (Va.)   136),  65. 
Banner,  In  re  (149  Fed.  Rep.  936), 

586. 
Banning  v.  Fades    (6  Minn.  402), 

342. 
Baptist    Church    v.    Bigelow     (16 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  28),  382. 
Baragiano  v.  Villani  (117  111.  App. 

372), 328. 
Barbee    v.    Greenberg    (57    S.    B. 

Rep.  125),  1392. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


xliii 


Barbee   v.    Shannon    (1   Ind.   Ter. 

199), 679. 
Barber   v.    Clark    (4    N.    H.    380), 

447. 
Barber  v.    Stone    (104   Mich.   90), 

646,649. 
Barchman  v.  Byrne   {S3  Cal.  28), 

27. 
Barclay  v.  Morrison    (16   S.  &  R. 

(Pa.)   129),  549. 
Barclay     v.     Steamboat     Co.      (6 

Phila.  558),  616,  1391. 
Bardlet   v.    Walker    (93    111.    App. 

609), 1214. 
Barker  v.  Allen    (5  H.  &  N.  61), 

386. 
Barker    v.    Barker    (3    Car.    &    C. 

557), 862. 
Barker  v.  Bradley  (42  N.  Y.  316), 

232. 
Barker  v.  Clark  (4  N.  H.  380),  445. 
Barker     v.     Fitzgerald     (204     111. 

325), 470. 
Barker    v.    Hollis    (50    Ala.    411), 

139. 
Barkley  v.  Holt  (84  N.  Y.  S.  957), 

103. 
Barkley  v.  McCue   (25  Misc.  Rep. 

738),  103,  1213. 
Barkman    v.    Barkman     (107    111. 

App.  332),  922. 
Barlin  v.  Commonwealth  (110  Pa. 

St.  454),  1445. 
Barlow    v.    Dahm    (97    Ala.    414), 

964. 
Barlow    v.    Jones    (117    Ga.    412), 

1095. 
Barlow  v.  Rhodes  (1  C.  &  M.  439), 

416. 
Barlow  v.  St.  Nicholas  Nat.  Bank 

(63  N.  Y.  399),  1015. 
Barlow  v.  Wainwright  (22  Vt.  88), 

220,  1208,  1222,  1239. 
Barium  v.  Berger  T125  Mich.  504), 

219. 
Barnard  v.  Poor  (21  Pick.  (Mass.) 

378),  844. 

d 


[references  are  to  pages.] 

Barnes  v.  Northern  Trust  Co.  (169 

111.  112),  486,  1092,  1093. 
Barnes  v.  Strohecker  (17  Ga.  340), 

868. 
Barnett    v.    Barnes    (73    111.    216, 

217),  466,  555. 
Barnett  v.  Plummer  (19  W.  N.  C. 

(Pa.)  117),  980. 
Barnett  v.  Warren    (82  Ala.  557), 

1438. 
Barney  v.  Keith  (4  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

502), 698. 
Barneycastle  v.  Walker   (92  N.  C. 

198), 689. 
Barns  v.  Wilson  (116  Pa.  St.  303), 

1157,1158. 
Barnsdall  v.  Boley  (119  Fed.  Rep. 

191), 341. 
Barnum    v.    Fitzpatrick    (27    Abb. 

N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  334),  1132,  1152. 
Barnum  v.  Landon  (25  Conn.  137), 

390. 
Barr   v.    Chandler    (47   N.    J.   Eq. 

532), 550. 
Barr   v.    Glover    (10    Ir.    Com.    L. 

Rep.  113),  634. 
Barr   v.    Kimball    (43    Neb.    766), 

480. 
Barreth  v.   Trainer    (50   111.   App. 

420), 1072. 
Barrett  v.  Bell   (82  Mo.  110),  447. 
Barrett  v.  Blagrave   (5  Ves.  555), 

725,  757. 
Barrett  v.    Brodie    (158   111.    479), 

1129,  1131,  1142,  1152,  1340. 
Barrett     v.      Cocks      (12      Heisk. 

(Tenn.)  566),  17. 
Barrett   v.    Cox    (112    Mich.    220), 

195. 
Barrett    v.     Jefferson     (5     Houst. 

(Del.)   567),  262. 
Barrett  v.   Johnson    (2    Ind.   App. 

25), 320. 
Barrett  v.  Rolph  (14  M.  &  W.  348), 

1048. 
Barrett  v.  Warren  (3  Hill  (N.  Y.) 

348), 690. 


xliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Barroilhet  v.  Battelle  (7  Cal.  450), 

1075. 
Barron    v.    Liedlogg     (95     Minn. 

474), 862. 
Barrow  v.  Isaacs   (60  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

179),  669,  670. 
Barrow  v.  Richard  (8  Paige,  351), 

742. 
Barry   v.   Hamburg-Bremen   F.    I. 

Co.  (110  N.  Y.  1),  1051. 
Barry  v.  Hoffman  (6  Md.  78),  350. 
Barry  v.   Ryan    (4   Gray    (Mass.) 

523), 275. 
Barry  v.   Smith    (23   N.   Y.   129), 

275. 
Barry  v.  Stanton  (Cro.  Eliz.  331), 

1054. 
Bartel   v.   Brain    (13   Utah,    162), 

457. 
Bartlett  v.   Baker    (34   L.   J.   Ex. 

11), 128. 
Bartlett  v.  Farrington   (120  Mass. 

284),  565,  1131,  1132,  1136,  1137. 
Bartlett    v.    Greenleaf     (11    Gray 

(Mass.)  98),  632. 
Bartlett    v.    Haviland     (92    Mich. 

552), 1252. 
Bartlett  v.  Hitchcock  (10  111.  App. 

87), 288. 
Bartlett  v.   Perkins    (13   Me 

685. 

Robinson     (52 


Wright     (Cro.     Eliz. 


St. 


Bartlett    v. 

715), 937. 
Bartlett    v. 

299),  340. 
Bartley   v.    Phillips    (179    Pa. 

175), 645. 
Barton  v.  Banks   (2  F.  &  F.  213), 

1079. 
Barton  v.  Dawes   (10  C.  B.  261), 

4G5. 
Barton  v.  Learnard   (26  Vt.  192), 

941. 
Barwick   v.    Thompson    (7    T.    R. 

488), 922. 
Bascom    v.    Dempsey    (143    Mass. 

409), 685. 


[references    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 

Basham  v.  Commonwealth  (76  Ky. 

36),  326. 
Baskin    v.    Seechrist    (6    Pa.    St. 

497), 924. 
Bass    V.    Metropolitan    West    Side 
El.  R.   Co.    (82   Fed.  Rep.  587), 
712. 
Bass   T.    Rollins    (63    Minn.    226), 

1143. 
Bass  V.  West  (110  Ga.  698),  1185. 
Basserman   v.    Society   of   Trinity 

Church  (39  Conn.  137),  449. 
Bassett  v.  Hughes   (43  Wis.  319), 

533. 
Bass   Lake   Co.   v.    Hollenbeck    (5 

Ohio  Cir.  Dec.  242),  334. 
Bastin  v.  Bidwell  (18  Ch.  D.  238), 

1387. 
Bastow  V.  Cox  (11  Q.  B.  22),  187. 
Bateman  v.  Maddox  (86  Tex.  546), 

379. 
Bateman    v.     Murray     (1    Ridgw. 

170), 1383. 
Bates  V.  Bassett  (60  Vt.  530),  73. 
Bates  V.  Boston  &  N.  Y.  R.  R.  Co. 

(10  Allen  (Mass.)  251),  332. 
Bates  V.  Dunham    (58  Iowa,  308), 

14. 
Bates  V.  Hoski  (6  Ohio  Dec.  1064), 

1264. 
Bauer  v.  Taylor   (4  Neb.    (Unof.) 

701),  470,  477. 
Baugher    v.    Crane    (27    Md.    36), 

712. 
Baugher  v.  Wilkins    (16  Md.  35), 

697,  1158,  1160. 
Baughman  v.  Partman   (14  S.  W. 

Rep.  342),  292. 
Baughman  v.  Reed   (75  Cal.  319), 

315. 
Baum  V.  Bell  (2S  S.  C.  201),  1466. 
Bauman    v.    James    (L.    R.    3    Ch. 

508), 387. 
Baumgardner  v.   Copying  Co.    (44 

111.  App.  74),  1131. 
Baumier  v.  Antian  (65  Mich.  31), 
1142,1187. 


87), 


Neb. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


xlv 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Baxley  v.  Sechrest   (85  Ala.  183), 

1464. 
Baxter  v.  Brown   (2  W.  Bl.  973), 

244. 
Baxter  v.  Bush    (29  Vt.  465),  19, 

1425. 
Baxter  v.  Lansing  (7  Paige,  350), 

666. 
Baxter  v.  Providence  (40  Atl.  Rep. 

423), 623. 
Baxter  v.  Taylor  (4  B.  &  Ad.  72), 

679. 
Bayles  v.  Clark   (100  N.  Y.  Supp. 

586),  475. 
Bayley  v.  Bradley  (5  Com.  Bench, 

56),  236. 
Bayley    v.    Fitzmaurice    (9    H.    L. 

Cas.  78),  386. 
Baylies  v.  Ingram   (73  N.  E.  Rep. 

1119), 630. 
Baylis  v.  Jiggins    (67  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

793), 1030. 
Baylis  v.  Le  Gros   (4  Com.  Bench, 

N.  S.  537),  861. 
Bayis  v.  Prentice   (75  N.  Y.  604), 

103. 
Bayly  v.   Gaines    (12   "Va.   Law   J. 

78), 1125. 
Bayly  v.  Lawrence  (1  Bay.  (S.  C.) 

499), 1353. 
Baynes   v.    Lloyd    (2    Q.    B.    610), 

606. 
Baynham    v.    Guy's    Hospital     (3 

Ves.  295),  1372. 
Baynton  v.  Finnall  (12  Miss.  193), 

21. 
Bazin  v.  Segma  (5  La.  Ann,  718), 

1422. 
Beach  v.  Barons  C13  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

305), 1316. 
Beach  v.  Grain   (2  N.  Y.  86),  883. 
Beach  v.  Parish  (4  Cal.  339),  1340. 
Beach  v.  Gray    (2  Denio   (N.  Y.) 

84), 520. 
Beachey  v.  Somerset  (1  Stra.  447), 

667. 


Beakes    v.    Hass    (36    Misc.    Rep. 

796), 1164. 
Beakes  v.  Holzman  (94  N.  Y.  Supp. 

33),  856,  877. 
Beal  V.  Bass  (86  Me.  325),  620. 
Beal  V.  Boston  Car  Spring  Co.  (125 

Mass.  159),  491,  1096,  1112. 
Beale  v.  Sanders  (3  Bing.   (N.  C.) 

850),  196,  385. 
Beall  V.  James  Folmar  Sons  &  Co. 

(122  Ala.  414),  1435. 
Beall    V.    White    (94    U.    S.    382), 

1195,1422. 
Beals    V.    Providence   Rubber   Co. 

(11  R.  I.  381),  1023. 
Beamish  v.  Cox  (16  L.  R.  Ir.  270), 

161. 
Bean  v.  Coleman   (44  N.  H.  539), 

441. 
Bean  v.  Pettengill  (7  Rob.  (N.  Y.) 

7), 1188. 
Bear  v.   Bitner    (16   Pa.   St.   175), 

1316. 
Beardman  v.  Wilson  (L.  R.  4  C.  P. 

57), 1199. 
Beardsley    v.    Town    of    Nashville 

(64  Ark.  240),  575. 
Beasley  v.  Clarke   (102  Ala.  254), 

960. 
Seattle  v.   Parrott   Silver  &  Cop. 

Co.  (17  Pac.  Rep.  451),  123L 
Beaty   v.    Gibbon    (16   Bast,   116), 

1314. 
Beavan   v.   Dalahy    (1    H.    Bl.    5), 

1314. 
Bebb  V.  Crowe  (39  Kan.  342),  124. 
Becar  v.  Flues  (¥4  N.  Y.  518),  379. 
Beck  V.  Flournoy  Live  Stock  &  R. 

E.  Co.   (12  C.  C.  A.  497),  40. 
Beck    V.     Minnesota     &     Western 

Grain     Co.     (107     N.     W.     Rep. 

1032),  943. 
Beck  V.   Western   Grain   Co.    (131 

Iowa,  62),  1419. 
Beck  V.  Wisely  (52  Mo.  App.  242), 

1414. 


xlvi 


TiVBLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Becker  v.  Bullowa   (36  Misc.  Rep. 

524), 939. 
Becker  v.   Dalby    (86  N.   W.   Rep. 

314), 1420. 
Becker  v.  De  Forest   (1  Sweeney 

(N.  Y.)   528),  119,  267. 
Becker  v.  Walworth   (45  Ohio  St 

169),  45,  46. 
Beckham  v.  Newton  (21  Ga.  187), 

1188. 
Bechtel  v.  Carslake  (11  N.  J.  Eq. 

500), 441. 
Beckley   v.    Skroh    (19    Mo.    App. 

75)  794. 
Beckwith    v.    Bent     (10    B.    Mon. 

(Ky.)   95),  1436. 
Beckwith  v.    Boyce    (9    Mo.    500), 

1253. 
Beckwith  v.  Howard    (6  R.  L.  1), 

605. 
Bedell  v.  Constable  (Vaughn,  182), 

12. 
Bedford  v.  Kelly  (61  Pa.  St.  491), 

107. 
Bedford  v.  Terhune  (30  N.  Y.  453), 

1050,  1093,  1204,  1238. 
Bedford     v.     Winston     (3     Rand. 

(Va.)  148),  1465. 
Bedman  v.  Murphy   (35  Md.  154), 

1127. 
Beebe  v.  Coleman  (8  Page  (N.  Y.) 

392),  390,  497. 
Beecher  v.  Duffield  (97  Mich.  423), 

561,1176. 
Beekman   v.   VanDolsen    (63   Hun 

(N.  Y.)  487),  896. 
Beer  v.  Beer  (12  C.  B.  60),  86,  88. 
Beers  v.  St.  John   (16  Conn.  322), 

1264. 
Beeston  v.   Yale    (78   N.   Y.   Supp. 

158),  1207. 
Behrman  v.   Barto    (54   Cal.   131), 

1387. 
Beiler  v.  Devoll  (40  Mo.  App.  251), 

174. 
Belcher  v.  Mcintosh   (8  Car.  &  P. 

720), 887, 


Belchers    S.    R.    Co.    v.    Grain    El. 

(101  Mo.  192),  72. 
Belches  v.  Grimsley  (88  N.  C.  88), 

1430. 
Belding  v.  Flynn    (15  S.  W.  Rep. 

184),  395. 
Belding  v.  Texas  Produce  Co.  (61 

Ark.  377),  139. 
Belger  v.   Sanchez    (70   Pac.   Rep. 

738),  579. 
Belfour  v.  Weston   (1  T.  R.  310), 

1340. 
Belknap  v.  Belknap  (77  Iowa,  71), 

83. 
Bell    V.    Allen's    Adm'r    (2    Munf. 

(Va.)   118),  342. 
Bell  V.  Baker   (43  Minn.  86),  469, 

481. 
Bell    V.    Barchard    (16    Beav.    8), 

365. 
Bell   V.   Byerson    (11   Iowa,   233), 

327. 
Bell  V.  Ellis'  Heirs  (1  Stew.  &  P. 

(Ala.)   294),  318. 
Bell    V.    Matheny    (36    Ark.    572), 

1424. 
Bell  V.  Platteville   (70  Wis.  139), 

72. 
Bell  V.  Rinker  (30  111.  App.  300), 

174. 
Bellamy,  Elder  v.   Pearson,   In  re 

(53  L.  J.  Ch.  174),  20. 
Bellas  V.  Hays  15  S.  &  R.    (Pa.) 

427),  106. 
Bellases  v.  Burbrick  (1  Salk.  209), 

130. 
Belshe    v.    Batdorf    (98    Mo.    App. 

627),  1432,  1455. 
Belvin  v.  Raleigh  Paper  Co.    (123 

N.  Car.  138),  1250. 
Berais  v.  Wilder   (100  Mass.  446), 

1054. 
Benedict  v.  Barling  (79  Wis.  551), 

421. 
Benedict    v.    Everard     (73    Conn. 

157),   1085. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


xlvii 


[reb^erences  are  to  pages.] 


Benedict     v.      Morse      (10      Met. 

(Mass.)    223),   228,   941. 
Beneteau    v.    Stubler     (79    Minn. 

259),  847. 
Bendall  v.  Summersett   (2  W.  Bl. 

692),    48. 
Benfoy  v.  Congon   (40  Micli.  283), 

201. 
Benlow  v.  Dry  Dock  Co.    (112  N. 

Y.  263),  960. 
Bennet  v.  Farka.s    (126   Ga.   228), 

992. 
Bennett  v.  Bittle   (4  Rawle   (Pa.) 

339),  399,  1183. 
Bennett  v.  Herring   (3  C.  B.    (N. 

S.)  370),  490,  494. 
Bennett    v.    McKee    (38    So.    Rep. 

129)   1073. 
Bennett  v.  Judson  (21  N.  Y.  238), 

102. 
Bennett    v.    Robinson     (27    Mich. 

26)    230. 
Bennett     v.     Sullivan,     (100     Me. 

118)   782. 
Bennett   v.    Womack    (7    B.    &   C. 

627),   364,   508,   607. 
Bennett's  Case  (1  Stra.  7«7),  1442. 
Bennock  v.  Whipple  (12  Me.  346), 

201,  212. 
Benoist    v.    Rothschild    (145    Mo. 

399),    84,    484. 
Bensel    v.    Gray   180    N.    Y.    417), 

1071,  1077. 
Bensley   v.   Atwill    (12   Cal.    231), 

351. 
Benson   v.   Aitken    (17   Cal.    163), 

122. 
Benson     v.     Gottheimer     (75     Ga. 

642),  1411. 
Benson    v.    Hobbs    (4    Har.    &    J. 

(Md.)   285),  601,  604. 
Benson   v.    Suarez    (43    Barb.    (N. 

Y.)    408),  1057. 
Bentley  v.  Atlantic    (92  Ga.  623), 

704. 
Bentley  v.  Metcalf  (75  L.  J.  K.  B. 

891),   295. 


Bentley  v.  Sill  (35  111.  414),  1161. 
Bentley  v.  Taylor   (81  Iowa,  306), 

674,   782. 
Benton,  In  re  (92  Iowa,  262),  10. 
Berger   v.    Hoerner    (36    111.    App. 

360),   1253. 
Bergh  v.  Herring    (136  Fed.  Rep. 

368),   1288. 
Bergland    v.     Frawley     (72     Wis. 

559),  622,  1225,  1226. 
Bergman    v.    Guthrie     (89    Iowa, 

290),   1440. 
Bergner  v.  Palethrop   (2  W.  N.  C. 

(Pa.)   297),  327. 
Berkey-Gay  Furniture  Co.  v.  Sher- 
man   Hotel   Co.    (81   Tex.    135), 

1436. 
Berkley  v.  Smith  (27  Gratt.   (VL) 

299),  440. 
Berlin  v.  Belle  Isle  Scenic  Ry.  Co. 

(12   Det.   Leg.   N.   573),   66. 
Berliner  v.  Association    (32  Misc. 

Rep.  470),  1296. 
Bernal  v.  Gleim   (33  Cal.  668),  27. 
Bernal  v.   Hovious    (15  Cal.  544), 

311. 
Bernard   v.    Bonner    (Alleyn,    58), 

1200. 
Berner   v.    Bagnell    (20    Mo.    App. 

543),  327. 
Bernett  v.  Bittle   (4  Rawle   (Pa.) 

339),  1132. 
Bernham    v.    Hubbard    (36    Conn. 

539),  594. 
Bernhard  v.  Reeves  (6  Wash.  424), 

841. 
Bernheimer    v.    Adams    (70    App. 

Div.  114),  1265. 
Berni    v.    Boyer    (90    Minn.    469), 

772. 
Bernstein  v.  Heinemann  (23  Misc. 

Rep.   464),  521,   583,   1367. 
Berrian     v.     Olmsted     (4     E.     D. 

Smith    (N.  Y.),  1302. 
Berridge  v.   Glassey    (7  All.   Rep. 

749),  454,  928. 


xlviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[EEFEREXCES   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Berriman    v.    Peacock     (9    Bing. 

384),  715. 
Berrington  v.  Casey  (78  111.  317), 

677,  693. 
Berry  v.  Berry  (8  Kan.  App.  584), 

1459. 
Berry  v.   Carle   (4   Greenl.    (Me.) 

269),  434. 
B«rry   v.    Lindley    (3    Man.   &   G. 

496,  147. 
Berry  v.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  (2  Johns. 

Ch.  (N.  Y.)  603),  1108. 
Berry  v.  Potter  (62  N.  J.  Eq.  664), 

271. 
Berry  v.    Van   Winkle's   Ex'rs    (2 

N.  J.  Eq.   390),  874,  1292. 
Berry  v.  White   (Bridgeman,  82), 

530. 
Berryhill    v.    Healey     (89     Minn. 

444),  1056. 
Bertie  v.  Beaumont  (16  Est.  ), 

301. 
Bertie  v.   Flagg    (161  Mass.   504), 

782,  795,  796. 
Bertram  v.  Cook    (32  Mich.   518), 

920,  922,  947,  953,  955. 
Besley  v.  Besley    (9  Ch.  D.  103), 

1099. 
Bess  V.  Vernam  (6  App.  Div.  246), 

1127. 
Best   V.    Pold    (18   Wall.    (U.    S.) 

112),  38. 
Best   Mfg.   Co.   V.   Cohn    (86   Pac. 

Rep.  829),  1260. 
Betsinger    v.    Schuyler    (46    Hun 

(N.  y.)   349),  279,  1409. 
Bettesworth   v.    Dean,   etc.    of    St 

Paul  (3  Bro.  P.  C.  389),  1383. 
Bettinger    v.    Baker    (29    Pa.    St. 

66),  1306. 
Bettison   v.   Budd    (17   Ark.    546), 

956. 
Bettisworth's  Case   (2  Coke,  516), 

399,  447. 
Betts  V.  June  (51  N.  Y.  274),  1391. 
Betz   V.   Maxwell    (48   Kan.    142), 

208,  221. 


Betz  V.  Snyder  (48  Ohio  St.  492), 

326. 
Bevans   v.    Briscoe    (4   Har.   &   J. 

149),  3,  1323. 
Beverly  v.  Lincoln  Gas  Co.  (6  Ad. 

&  E.  839),  581. 
Beyer  v.  Fenstermacher  (2  Whart. 

(Pa.)  95),  1443. 
Bickford  v.   Parson    (5  C.  B.  920, 

930),  493,  639. 
Biddle  v.   Blackburn    (5  Pa.  Law. 

J.  419),  1005. 
Biddle  v.  Hussman   (23  Mo.  597), 

541,  1178. 
Biddle  v.  Reed  (33  Ind.  52^),  847. 
Biddulph  V.  Poole  (11  Q.  B.  713), 

1202,  1214. 
Bieler    v.    Devoll     (40    Mo.    App. 

251), 378. 
Bigelow    V.    Collamore     (5    Cush. 

(Mass.)    226),  882,  1351. 
Bigelow  V.   Shaw    (65  Mich.  341), 

435. 
Bigelow  Co.  V.  Heintze   (53  N.  J. 

69),  1302. 
Biggs  V.  Brown   (2  S.  &  R.    (Pa.) 

14),  68$,  1314. 
Biggs    V.    Piper    (86    Tenn.    589), 

1411. 
Biggs  V.  McCurley    (76  Md.   409), 

879,  880,  1152. 
Biggs    V.    Stueler    (93    Md.    110), 

1214,   1236. 
Bigler   v.   Furman    (58   Barb.    (N. 

Y.)   545),  927,  934. 
Biglow   V.    Biglow    (75    App.    Div. 

9S),   573. 
Biglow  V.  Biglow   (56  N.  Y.  Supp. 

794),   958. 
Biglow  V.  Biglow   (77  N.  Y.  Supp. 

716),   264,   685. 
Bilcher   v.    Parker    (40    Mo.    113), 

139. 
Billany  v.  Smilh  (4  Houst.  (Del.) 

113),  1142. 
Billings  v.   Starke    (15   Fla.  297), 

351. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


xlix 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Billings  V.  Tucker  (6  Gray  (Mass.) 

368),  1330. 
Binds  V.  Benbow  (11  Rich.  L.   (S. 

C.)  24),  690,  958. 
Binford    v.    Bruso    (22    Ind.    App. 

512),  361. 
Bingham   v.   Allport    (1   N.   &   M. 

398),  537. 
Bingham  v.  Honeyman   (32  Oreg. 

129),  336. 
Bingham    v.    Vandegriff    (93    Ala. 

283),  1448. 
Binney     v.     Chapman     (5     Pick. 

(Mass.)    124),  938. 
Binney's    Case    (2    Bland    (Md.) 

114),  437. 
Binns  v.   Hudson    (5  Binn.    (Pa.) 

505),    1415,    1443. 
Birch  V.  Dawson   (6  C.  &  P.  658), 

1257. 
Birch  V.  Ward  (111  111.  App.  336), 

694. 
Birch    V.    Wright    (1    T.   R.    378), 

128,  130,  223. 
Bircher  v.   Parker    (43   Mo.    443), 

1264,  1267,  1271. 
Bird  V.  Defonvielle   (2  Car.  &  K. 

415),  1239. 
Bird  V.  Earle  (15  Fla.  447),  82. 
Bird  V.  Elwes   (37  L.  J.  Ex.  91), 

859. 
Bird  V.  Lord  Treville   (1  C.  &  E. 

317),   785. 
Birkhead   v.   Cummins    (33   N.   J. 

Law,  44),  1134. 
Birmingham    Breweries    v.    Jame- 
son (67  L.  J.  Ch.  403),  750. 
Bischoff    V.    Trenholm    (36    S.    C. 

75),   1084. 
Bishop  V.  Blair  (36  Ala.  302),  22. 
Bishop  V.  Howard  (3  D.  &  R.  293), 

133,  140. 
Bishop    V.    Lalouette's    Heirs    (67 

Ala.   197),  941. 
Bishop  V.  Taylor    (60  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

556),  365. 


Bishop    V.    Trustees    of    Bedford 

Charity  (28  L.  J.  215),  638. 
Bissell  V.  Lloyd  (100  111.  214),  804, 

876. 
Bissell  V.  Erwin's  Heirs    (10  La. 

524),  321. 
Bittinger  v.  Baker  (29  Pa.  St.  66), 

204,  1316,  1328. 
Black  V.  Delaware  &  R.  Canal  Co. 

(22  N.  J.  Eq.  130),  62. 
Black  V.  Ebner  (54  Ind.  544),  877. 
Black    V.    Golden    (109    Mo.    App. 

37),  311,  315. 
Black    V.    Shreve    (13    N.    J.    Eq. 

455),  349. 
Blacker  v.  Mathers   (6  Bro.  P.  C. 

334),   607. 
Blackford    v.     Frenzer     (44    Neb. 

829),  1098. 
Blackman  v.  Welsh    (44  Mo.  41), 

638. 
Blackmore  v.  Boardman    (28   Mo. 

420),  616,  1081,  1391. 
Blackwell    v.    Baily    (1    Mo.    App. 

328),  1299. 
Blackwell  v.  Bowers  (67  Vt.  403), 

192. 
Blair  v.  Claxton    (18  N.  Y.   529), 

1178. 
Blair  v.   Macon    (64   N.   H.    487), 

164. 
Blair   v.    Ramkin    (11    Mo.    440), 

1077. 
Blake  v.  Baker   (115  Mass.   188), 

1023. 
Blake  v.  Chase,  Counselman  &  Co. 

(95  Iowa,  219),  1452. 
Blake  v.  Clarke   (6  Me.  436),  437, 

439. 
Blake    v.     Coats.    (3     G.     Greene 

(Iowa)   548),  689,  690,  1451. 
Blake    v.    Dick    (15    Mont.    236), 

103,  469,  476,  785,  787,  1152,  1210. 
Blake  v.  Foster  (8  T.  R.  496),  953. 
Blake  v.  Fox  (17  N.  Y.  Supp.  508), 

814, 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Blake  v.   Grammer    (3   Fed.    Cas. 

No.  1,496),  492. 
Blake  v.  Kurrus  (41  111.  App.  562), 

151. 
Blake  v.  Preston  (67  Vt.  613),  579. 
Blake  v.  Ranous  (25  111.  App.  486), 

789,  796. 
Blakeman  v.  Miller  (136  Cal.  138), 

1079. 
Blakeman  v.  Railroad  (8  El.  &  Bl. 

1053),  913. 
Blanchard  v.  Ames  (60  N.  H.  404), 

987. 
Blanchard  v.  Baker   (8  Me.  258), 

432. 
Blanchard  v.  Powers  (67  Vt.  403), 

196,  220. 
Blanchard  v.  Raines  (20  Fla.  467), 

1401. 
Blanchard    v.    Taylor     (12    Mich. 

339),  350. 
Blanchard   v.    Warner    (1   Blatch. 

(U.  S.)   258)   62. 
Bland  v.  Burdick   (Cro.  Eliz.  46), 

1323. 
Blantin  v.  Whitaker   (11  Humph. 

(Tenn.)   310),  941. 
Blarcom    v.    Kip    (26    N.    J.    Law, 

351),  960. 
Blasdell     v.     Souther     (6     Gray. 

(Mass.)    149),  467. 
Blauvelt  v.  Powell  (59  Hun,  179), 

1160. 
Blazier  v.  Johnson   (11  Neb.  404), 

334. 
Bledsoe  v.  Mitchell  (52  Ark.  158), 

1430. 
Bleecker  v.  Smith    (13  Wend.    (N. 

Y.)   530),  648. 
Bless   V.   Jenkins    (129   Mo.    647), 

100,  170,   173,  388. 
Blickley  v.  Luce  (148  Mich.  133), 

866. 
Blight  V.  Dennet  (13  Com.  Bench, 

178),  179. 
Blight    V.    Rochester     (7    Wheat. 

(U.  S.)   453),  317. 


Bliss   V.   Collins    (5    Barn.   &   Aid. 

876),  541. 
Block  V.  Ebner  (54  Ind.  544),  563, 

659. 
Block    V.    Katz    (68    N.    Y.    Supp. 

865),    1356. 
Block    V.    Smith    (61    Ark.    206), 

319,  1410. 
Blood  V.  Goodrich    (9   Wend.    (N. 

Y.)  68),  97. 
Bloodworth   v.    Stevens    (51   Miss. 

475),  49,  503,  563,  1112. 
Bloom  V.  West  (3  Colo.  App.  212), 

442.' 
Bloom   V.   Wolfe    (50   Iowa,    286), 

17. 
Bloomer  v.  Merrill    (1  Daly,  485), 

847,   1214. 
Bloomquist   v.    Johnson    (107    111. 

App.  154),  1195. 
Bloomsburgh    Land    Imp.    Co.    v. 

Boro  of  B.  (215  Pa.  St.  452),  76. 
Blore  V.  Sulton  (3  Mer.  237),  259. 
Blossom  V.  Knox  (3  Chand.  (Wis.) 

295),  703. 
Blount  V.  Connolly  (110  Mo.  App. 

602),  1391. 
Bludworth    v.    Lambeth     (9    Rob. 

(La.)    256),  1315. 
Blue  V.  Sayre  (2  Dana  (Ky.)  213), 

968. 
Bluestone  Coal  Co.  v.  Bell   (38  W. 

Va.  297),  363. 
Blum  V.  Robertson    (24  Cal.  127), 

1,98. 
Blumberg  v.  McNear  (1  Wash.  T. 

141),  575. 
Blumenberg  v.  Myers  (32  Cal.  93), 

150. 
Blumenthal  v.  Prescott    (75  N.  Y. 

Supp.  710),  802,  865. 
Blunden  v.  Baugh  (Cro.  Car.  304), 

20. 
Bly  V.  Edison  Electric  Illuminat- 
ing Co.  (172  N.  Y.  1),  704. 
Boardman    v.    Davidson    (7    Abb. 

Prac.  439),  647. 


TABLE   OP'    CASES    CITED. 


li 


[kefekences  are  to  pages.] 


Boardman    v.    Osborn     (23    Pick. 

Mass.  295),  522. 
Board  of  Directors  v.  Chicago  Ve- 
neer   Co.     (94     III.    App.     492), 

139. 
Bobb  V.  Syennite  Granite  Co.    (41 

Mo.  App.  642),  683. 
Boden  v.  Scholtz  (91  N.  Y.  Supp. 

437), 831. 
Boddie  v.   Brewer    (204    111.   352), 

780. 
Bodwell    V.     Crawford     (26    Kan. 

292), 757. 
Bodwell   Granite  Co.   v.  Lane    (83 

Me.  168),  212. 
Boefer  v.   Sheridan    (42  Mo.  App. 

226), 720. 
Bogendorfer   v.    Jacob    (89    N.    Y. 

Supp.  1051),  817. 
Bogert    V.    Dean    (1    Daly,    N.    Y. 

259), 1227. 
Bogg  V.  Midland  Ry.  (36  L.  J.  Ch. 

440), 1385. 
Boggs  V.  Price  (64  Ala.  514),  1431, 

1459. 
Bohannous  v.  Lewis  (3  T.  B.  Mon. 

Ky.  376),  332,  883. 
Boiler  V.  Robinson  (50  Mich.  264), 

1379. 
Boiling   V.    Stokes    (2    Leigh,    Va. 

178), 1024. 
Bolton  V.  Lambert  (72  Iowa,  483), 

285. 
Bolton   V.   Landers    (27  Cal.   104), 

182. 
Bolton  V.  Tomlin  (5  Ad.  &  E.  856), 

383. 
Bonaparte  v.  Thayer  (95  Md.  548), 

261. 
Bond  V.  Cartwright  (1  Vent.  136), 

80. 
Bond  V.   Chapman    (34  Wash.    St. 

606), 167. 
Bond   V.   Lockwood    (33    111.    212), 

708. 
Bond  V.  Rosling   (1  B.  &  S.  371), 

332. 


Bonds  V.   Smith    (106  N.  C.   553), 

922. 
Bondurant  v.  Thompson    (15  Ala. 

202), 52. 
Bonnecaze  v.   Beer    (37   La.   Ann. 

531), 862. 
Bonnell    v.    Allen    (53    Ind.    130), 

1331. 
Bonelli    v.    Blakemore    (66    Miss. 

136), 445. 
Bouetti    V.    Treat    (91    Cal.    223). 

1086,  1222. 
Bonoyan  v.  Palmer   (5  Mod.  171), 

90. 
Bonsail  v.  McKay   (1  Houst.  Del. 

520), 219. 
Booker    v.    Jones    (55    Ala.    266), 

1445. 
Boone  v.  Darden   (109  N.  C.  74), 

1432. 
Boone  v.  Stover  (66  Mo.  430),  243. 
Booraem  v.  Morris  (N.  H.  1906,  64 

Atl.  Rep.  953),  1353. 
Boorman    v.    Wisconsin    (36    Wis. 

207), 1292. 
Booth    V.    Gaither     (58    111.    App. 

263), 412. 
Booth   V.   Kehoe    (71   N.   Y.    341), 

1110. 
Booth  V.  Merriam  (155  Mass.  521), 

788,  804,  813. 
Booth    y.    Oliver    (67    Mich.    664), 

1407,1410. 
Boraston  v.  Green    (16  East,  71), 

1314,1337. 
Borden    v.    Croak    (131    111.    68), 

1428. 
Bordereaux  v.  Walker  (85  111.  App. 

86), 483. 
Borderre   v.   Den    (106    Cal.    594), 

95,99. 
Boreel  v.  Lawton   (90  N.  Y.  293), 

1176. 
Borgard  v.  Gale  (205  111.  511).  331, 

782,  788. 
Borjman    v.     Spellmire     (4    Ohio 

N.  P.  416),  616,  1026. 


lii 


TABLE   or    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Boston  y.  Binney  (11  Pick.  Mass. 

1).  573,  579. 
Boston  V.   Gray    (144  Mass.   531), 

826. 
Boston  &  Me.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bartlett 

(3  Cush.  Mass.  224),  981. 
Boston  &  Worcester  R.  R.  Corp.  t. 

Ripley    (13    Allen,    Mass.    421), 

541,1176. 
Boston-Block  Co.  v.  Buffington  (39 

Minn.  385),  1346. 
Boston  CIo.  Co.  v.  Solberg  (68  Pac. 

Rep.  715),  261. 
Boston  El.  R.  Y.  Co.  v.  Grace  (112 

Fed.  Rep.  279),  629,  659,  1082. 
Boston  Tailoring  Co.  v.  Fisher  (59 

111.  App.  400),  65. 
Boston  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Gray 

(6  Mete.  Mass.  131),  571. 
Bostwick  V.  Losey  (67  Mich.  554), 

875,1151. 
Bostwick  V.  Stiles  (35  Conn.  198), 

904. 
Botting  V.  Martin   (1  Camp.  318), 

380. 
Bourke  v.  Bourke  (I.  R.  8  C.  221), 

550. 
Bourland    v.    McKnight    (79    Ark. 

427), 312. 
Bourn  v.  Salmon   (95  L.  T.  139), 

1009. 
Bovet    V.    Holzgraf    (5    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  141),  1244. 
Bowdish    V.    Dubuque    (38    Iowa, 

341), 942. 
Bowditch  V.  Chickering  (139  Mass. 

283), 1014. 
Bowditch  V.  Heation  (22  La.  Ann. 

356), 1353. 
Bowditch  V.  Ra\Tnond   (146  Mass. 

109), 637. 
Bowe  V.  Hunking  (135  Mass.  580), 

782,  804,  813,  847. 
Bowen  v.  Anderson   (1  Q.  B.  164), 

161,792. 
Bowen  v.  Beck  (94  N.  Y.  86),  729. 


Bowen  v.   Clarke    (22   Oreg.   566), 

1207,  120S,  1215. 
Bowen  v.  Haskell  (53  Minn.  480), 

1199. 
Bowen   v.   Hatch    (Tex.   84   S.   W. 

Rep.  336),  479. 
Bowen  v.  Schackter  (72  N.  J.  Law, 

441), 1340. 
Bowen  v.  Wolff  (23  R.  I.  56),  475. 
Bower  v.  Highie  (9  Mo.  256),  933. 
Bower  v.  Hill  (1  Bing.  N.  C.  555), 

679. 
Bower  v.  Peate  (7  Q.  B.  321),  802. 
Bowers  v.  Graves    (8   S.  D.   385), 

309. 
Bowers    v.    Suffolk    Mfg.    Co.     (4 

Cush.  Mass.  332),  439. 
Bowes  v.   Croll    (6  E.   &  B.   264), 

138. 
Bowler  v.  Electric  Light  Co.    (10 

Dec.  Rep.  582),  266. 
Bowles  V.  Lyon   (6  Rob.  La.  262), 

154,  156,  164. 
Bowman  v.   Bradley    (151   Pa.   St. 

351),  300,  303.  304. 
Bowman  v.  Foot    (29  Conn.   331), 

635. 
Bowman  v.  Wright  (Neb.  91  N.  W. 

Rep.  580),  557,  1200. 
Bowser   v.    Colby    (1    Hare.    109), 

649,  666,  667,  1051. 
Boyce  v.  Bakewell    (37  Mo.   492),. 

1060. 
Boyce   v.   Graham    (91   Ind.   420), 

676. 
Boyce  v.  Guggenheim    (106  Mass. 

201),  847. 
Boyd    V.    Douglass    (72    Vt.    449), 

1244. 
Boyd  V.  Fraternity  Hall  Ass'n  (16 

111.  App.  574),  743,  1050. 
Boyd  V.  Hunter  (44  Ala.  705),  52. 
Boyd  V.  McCombs  (4  Pa.  St.  146). 

522. 
Boyd's  Lessee  v.  Talbot  (12  Ohio, 

212), 638. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


liii 


[befekexce:s  aee  to  pages.] 


Boyer     v.     Commercial     Building 

Inv.  Co.  (110  Iowa,  491),  479. 
Boyer  t.  Dickson    (1  Phila.  190), 

1350. 
Boyer  v.  Smith  (3  Watts,  Pa.  449), 

930. 
Boynton  v.  Peterborough  &  Shir- 
ley R.  Co.   (4  Cush.  Mass.  467), 

50. 
Bracebridge  v.  Bulkley    (2   Price, 

200),  667. 
Bracebridge  v.  Cook  (Plou-d.  418), 

20,27. 
Brackenridge  v.  Millen   (16  S.  W. 

620), 1435. 
Bracket  v.  Alvord    (5  Cow.  N.  Y. 

18), 559. 
Bradburne  v.  Botfield  (14  M.  &  W. 

567),  87. 
Bradfield  t.  McCormick  (3  Blackf. 

Ind.  161),  232. 
Bradford  v.  Fox    (38  N.  Y.  289), 

547. 
Bradford    v.    Patten     (108    Mass. 

153),  1377,  1378. 
Bradford  Oil  Co.  v.  Blair  (113  Pa. 

St.  83),  518,  615. 
Bradley  v.  Bailey  (36  Conn.  374), 

1322. 
Bradley   v.   Covel    (4    Cow.   N.   Y. 

349), 139. 
Bradley  v.  De  Goicouria  (12  Daly, 

393), 1149. 
Bradley  v.  Metropolitan  Music  Co. 

(89  Minn.  516),  244,  245. 
Bradley  v.  Ousterhoudt  (13  Johns. 

N.  Y.  404),  1260. 
Bradley  v.  United  States  (98  U.  S. 

104),  36. 
Bradley   v.   Walker    (93    111.    App. 

609),  1092,  1094. 
Bradstreet  v.  Huntington    (5  Pet. 

IT.  S.  402),  317. 
Brady   v.    Nagle    (29    S.    W.    Rep. 

943),  641. 
Brady  v.  City  of  Brooklyn  (1  Barb. 

N.  Y.  584),  65. 


Bragg  V.  Fessenden   (11  111.  544), 

97,  98,  100. 
Brain  t.  Mattison  (54  N.  Y.  663), 

53. 
Brainard    v.    Burton    (5    Vt.    97), 

1404. 
Braman  v.  Dodge   (100  Me.  143), 

329,  330. 
Bramhall    v.    Hutchinson    (7    Atl. 

Rep.  873),  391,  1110. 
Bramwell  v.  Lacey    (48  L.  J.  Ch. 

339),  739. 
Branahan  v.   Hotel   Co.    (39   Ohio 

St.  333),  405. 
Brancato  v.  Kors  (74  N.  Y.  Supp. 

891),  810. 
Brandagee  v.   Fernandez    (1   Rob. 

La.  260),  262. 
Brande  v.  Grace   (154  Mass.  210), 

406. 
Brand    v.    Trumveller    (32    Mich. 

215), 1398. 
Brandon    v.    Brandon     (5    Madd. 

473),  959,  1124. 
Branger  v.  Manciet  (30  Cal.  624), 

701. 
Brann    v.    Monroe    (11    Ky.    Law 

Rep.  324),  351. 
Branton  v.  O'Briant  (93  N.  C.  99), 

152. 
Bras   V.    Sheffield    (49    Kan.    702), 

978. 
Brasfield  v.   Brasfield    (12   Pickle, 

Tenn.  580),  22. 
Bratt   V.   Wooston    (74    Md.    609), 

1392. 
Bratton  v.  Clamson   (3  Strobh.  S. 

C.  135),  462. 
Braythwaite  v.  Hitchcock   (10  M. 

&  W.  494),  134,  135,  187,  193,  198. 
Brayton  v.  Boomer  (131  Iowa,  28), 

1057. 
Brayton  v.  Fall  River   (113  Mass. 

218), 405. 
Bream   v.    Dickenson    (2    Humph. 

Tenn.  126),  614,  1285,  1292. 


Uv 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


Breck,   In   re    (12   N.   B 

1122. 
Brecknock  v.   Pritchard    (6  T.   R. 

750), 883. 
Breeding   v.    Taylor    (13    B.    Mon. 

Ky.  477),  539. 
Breese   v.   Bank    (2   E.   D.    Smith, 

N.  Y.  474),  1108,  1231. 
Ereithaupt  v.  Thurmond   (3  Rich. 

S.  C.  216),  100. 
Brennan  v.  Jacobs    (15   Atl.   Rep. 

685), 677. 
Brennan   v.    Lachet    (5   N.   Y.    St. 

Rep.  882),  805,  814. 
Brenner  v.  Bigelow   (8  Kan.  496), 

941. 
Brent   v.   Chipley    (104   Mo.   App. 

645),  52,  53. 
Bressler's    Appeal     (2    York,    Pa. 

57), 573. 
Bret    V.    Cumberland     (Cro.    Jac. 

399), 602. " 
Brett  V.  Berger   (4  Cal.  App.  12), 

847. 
Brett  V.    Rogers    (1897,    I.    Q.    B. 

525),  1028,  1029.. 
Breuer  v.  Frank  (71  Ohio  St.  540), 

819. 
Brewer    v.    Chappell    (101    N.    C. 

251), 1438. 
Brewer   v.    Dyer    (7    Cush.    Mass. 

337), 1074. 
Brewer  v.   Knapp    (1  Pick.   Mass. 

332),  141,  158,  550. 
Brewer    v.    National    Union    Bldg. 

Ass'n  (166  111.  221),  1237. 
Brewer   v.    Palmer    (3   Esp.    213), 

581. 
Brewer  v.  Thorp   (35  Ala.  9),  597. 
Brewer,  etc.  Brewing  Co.  v.  Boddie 

(181  111.  622),  69. 
Brewster  v.  Fremery  (33  Cal.  341), 

782. 
Brewster  v.  Lanyon  Zinc  Co.    (72 

C.  C.  A.  212),  670. 
Brewster  v.  McNab  (36  S.  C.  274), 

1438. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 
R.   215). 


Parrot     (Cro.    Eliz. 


Brewster    v. 

264),  1201. 
Briar  v.  Robertson    (19   Mo.   App. 

56),  378. 
Brice  v.  Williams   (1  Mee.  &  Wei. 

6), 247. 
Brick  V.  Favilla   (103  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1117), 839. 
Brick  V.  Hornbeck  (43  N.  Y.  Supp. 

301), 1125. 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Side  (2  C.  &  P.  371), 

64. 
Bridges    v.    Longman     (24    Beav. 

27),  648,  664. 
Bridges  v.   Potts    (17  C.   B.  N.   S. 

314),  140,  158,  173. 
Bridgham  v.  Frontec  (3  Mod.  94), 

41. 
Bridwell  v.  Bancroft  (2  Ohio  Dec. 

697), 288. 
Brigg  V.   Thornton    (73   L.   J.   Ch. 

301), 744. 
Briggs  V.  Austin  (129  N.  Y.  208), 

1406,1456. 
Briggs    V.    Dyer    (7    Cush.    Mass. 

337), 1214. 
Briggs  V.  Hall   (4  Leigh,  Va.  484), 

1180. 
Briggs  V.  Partridge  (64  N.  Y.  357), 

109. 
Briggs    V.    Thompson    (9    Pa.    St. 

338), 1183. 
Brigham  v.  Rogers  (17  Mass.  571), 

459. 
Brigham  Young  Trust  Co.  v.  Wag- 

ener   (13  Utah,  236),  629. 
Bright  V.   McQuat    (40   Ind.   521), 

186,227. 
Briles  v.  Pace  (13  Ired.  N.  C.  579), 

384. 
Bringloe  v.  Goodson  (5  Bing.  N.  C. 

738),  942. 
Brinkley    v.    Wolcott     (10    Heislc. 

Tenn.  22),  144. 
Bristol,  In  re  (33  N.  W.  Rep.  852), 

1120, 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


Iv 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Bristol   Hotel   Co.   v.   Pegram    (98 

N.  Y.  Supp.  512),  464,  729. 
Bristor  r.  Burr    (120  N.  Y.  427), 

231. 
Brittain  v.   McKay    (35   Am.   Dec. 

738), 291. 
Britton  v.  Dierker    (46  Mo.   591), 

343. 
Broad   v.    Winsborough    (1    North 

Co.  Pa.  330),  876. 
Broadway  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Metz- 

ger  (27  Abb.  N.  C.  160),  1380. 
Brock  V.  Dole  (66  Wis.  142),  712. 
Brock  V.  Dwelling  House  Ins.  Co. 

(61  N.  W.  67),  572. 
Broekville,  etc.  Co.  v.   Butler    (91 

Ind.  134),  435. 
Brogan  v.   Hanan    (55  A.   D.   92), 

798,  799,  859. 
Broker  v.  Charters  (Cro.  Eliz.  92), 

48. 
Brolasky  v.  Ferguson    (48  Pa.   St 

434), 573. 
Bromley  v.  Hopewell    (14   Pa.  St. 

400),  1441,  1442. 
Bronner  v.  Walter  (44  N.  Y.  Supp. 

583),  855. 
Brookhaven  v.  Baggett    (61  Miss. 

383),  297,  698. 
Brooklyn    Bank   v.   De   Graw    (23 

Wend.  N.  Y.  342),  538. 
Brooks  V.  Allen    (146  Mass.  201), 

479. 
Brook  V.  Biggs  (2  Bing.  N.  C.  572), 

530,  545. 
Brooks    V.    Clifton    (22    Ark.    54), 

729. 
Brooks  V.  Cook   (Ala.  38  So.  Rep. 

641), 106, 109. 
Brooks  V.  Cunningham    (49  Miss. 

108), 512. 
Brooks  V.  Diaz  (35  Ala.  599),  759. 
Brooks  V.  Drysdale  (3  C.  P.  D.  52), 

599, 1070. 
Brooks     V.     Jackson     (125     Mass. 

307),  50,  51,  52. 


Brooks    V.   Olmstead    (17    Pa.    St. 

24),  690. 
Brooks    V.    Reynolds     (106    Mass. 

31),  411. 
Brooks  V.  Rogers   (101  Ala.  Ill), 

646,  685,  960,  1300,  1336. 
Brooks  V.  Stinson    (44  N.  C.  72), 

685. 
B.    Roth    Tool    Co.    V.    Champion 

Spring  Co.    (93   Mo.   App.   530), 

644. 
Broughton  v.  Smart  (59  111.  440), 

575. 
Brouwer  v.  Jones  (23  Barb.  N.  Y. 

143), 729. 
Brown   v.    Amyot    (3    Hare,    173), 

540. 
Brown  v.  Bates  (Brayton,  Vt.  230), 

225. 
Brown  v.  Bridges   (31  Iowa,  138), 

680. 
Brown  v.  Brown   (109  N.  C.  124), 

1418. 
Brown  v.  Burrington   (36  Vt.  40), 

874. 
Brown  v.  Cairns   (107  Iowa,  727), 

1200,  1215. 
Brown   v.   Cairns    (63   Kan.    584), 

557,  560. 
Brown  v.  Carkeek  (14  Wash.  443), 

448. 
Brown  v.  Chadbourne   (31  Me.  9), 

434. 
Brown  v.  Coats  (56  Ala.  439),  309. 
Brown  v.  Crump   (1  Marsh.  569), 

730,  760,  763. 
Brown  v.  Curren   (53  How.  Pr.  N. 

Y.  303),  1159. 
Brown  v.  Dysinger   (1  Rawle,  Pa. 

408), 927. 
Brown  v.  Eaton  (21  Minn.  409),  98. 
Brown  v.  Oilman   (13  Mass.  158), 

340. 
Brown    v.    Hamil    (76    Ala.    506), 

1438. 
Brown   v.    Hardin    (21   Ark.    325), 

451. 


Ivi 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


rEEFEBENCES    ARE   TO   PAGES.] 


Brown  v.  Harper   (54  Iowa,  546), 

572. 
Brown  v.  Hobson  (3  A.  K.  Marsh. 

Ky.  380),  53. 
Brown    v.    Jaquette    (94    Pa.    St. 

113), 310. 
Brown  v.  Kayser  (60  Wis.  1),  140, 

162,180. 
Brawn  v.  Keller  (33  111.  151),  182, 

924,964. 
Brown  v.   Lindsay    (2   Hill,   S.   C. 

542),  25. 
Brown  v.  Lyddy    (11  Hun,  N.  Y. 

451), 569, 1273. 
Brown  v.  Magorty  (156  Mass.  209), 

1335. 
Brown  v.   Matthews    (3   La.   Ann. 

198), 395. 
Brown  v.   Niles    (165   Mass.   276), 

758. 
Brown  v.  Noel    (21  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

648),  1425,  1467. 
Brown   v.   O'Connor    (2   Hog.    77), 

1124. 
Brown  v.  Parsons    (22  Mich.   24), 

317, 1369. 
Brown  v.  Quilter  (Amb.  619),  1344. 
Brown   v.    Reno   Electric   L.    &   P. 

Co.    (55    Fed.    Rep.    229),    1250, 

1254. 
Brown   v.   Roberts    (21   La.   Ann. 

508), 254. 
Brown  v.    Samuels    (24   Ky.   Law 

Rep.  1216),  1378. 
Brown     v.     Schiappacassee     (115 

Mich.  47),  454. 
Brown  v.  Schleier   (118  Fed.  Rep. 

981),  67. 
Brown  v.  Smith  (83  111.  291),  213, 

229. 
Brown  v.  Story   (1  M.  &  G.  114), 

30. 
Brown  v.  Straw  (6  Neb.  536),  343. 
Rrown   v.   Susquehana   Broom   Co. 

109  Pa.  St.  57),  904. 
Brown  v.  Tiiur.ston   (56  Me.  126), 

1306, 


Brown    v.    Wakeman     (16    N.    Y, 

Supp.  846),  1180. 
Brown    v.    Water    Co.    (152    Mass. 

463),  1142. 
Browne,  In  re  (3  Fed.  Cas.  1741), 

547. 
Browne   v.   Raban    (15   Ves.    528), 

365,607. 
Browne  v.  Tighe  (8  Bli.  N.  S.  272), 

1371,1374. 
Browne    v.    Turner    (60    Mo.    21), 

1306. 
Browne  v.  Warner   (14  Ves.  156), 

251. 
Brownell  v.  Fuller  (60  Neb.  558), 

1244. 
Brownell  v.  Tuzman   (68  111.  App. 

67), 1409. 
Brownell  v.   Walsh    (91   111.   523), 

155. 
Browning's    Case     (Plowd.     133), 

648. 
Browning  v.  Dalesme  (5  N.  Y.  Su- 
per. Ct.  13,  195),  420. 
Brown's  Adm'r  v.  Bragg  (22  Ind. 

122), 632. 
Brownson  v.  Roy  (10  Det.  Leg.  N. 

302),  1112,  1118. 
Brubaker  v.  Poage   (1  T.  B.  Mon. 

Ky.  123),  275. 
Bruce  v.  Bank  (79  N.  Y.  154),  1367, 

1373. 
Bruce  v.  Ruler  (2  M.  &  R.  3),  1205. 
Bruce    v.    Welch    (52    Hun,    524), 

130T. 
Bruce,   In   re    (4  Fed.   Cas.   2044), 

1119. 
Bruckman  v.   Hargadine,   etc.  Co. 

(91  Mo.  App.  454),  297. 
Bruer  v.  Hayes  (10  Ohio  Dec.  583), 

54. 
Brugher  v.  Buchtenkirch  (51  N.  Y. 

Supp.  465).  810.  ■ 
Brugman  v.  Noyes  (6  Wis.  1),  733, 

743,  757. 
Brunifield  v.  Carson  (33  Ind.  94), 

382. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ivii 


[eefebe:<;ces  aee  to  pages.] 


Brummell  v.  Macpherson  (14  Ves. 

173), 646. 
Brunker    v.    Cummins     (133    Ind. 

443), 804, 832. 
Brunson  v.  Morgan  (84  Ala.  578), 

957. 
Brunswick-Balke-Collender    Co.    v. 

Rees  (69  Wis.  442),  839. 
Brush  V.  Beecher  (110  Mich.  597), 

1373. 
Brush  V.  Young  (28  N.  J.  L.  237), 

53. 
Bryan  v.  Averett  (21  Ga.  401),  90. 
Bryan  v.  Bradley  (116  Conn.  474), 

354. 
Bryan   v.    Fisher    (3    Blackf.    Ind. 

316),  611,  867. 
Bryan  v.   Hanrick    (8   S.  W.  Rep. 

282),  920. 
Bryan  v.  Sanderson  (2  MacArthur, 

D.  C.  431),  1436. 
Bryan  v.  Weatherhead   (Cro.  Jac. 

17),  448. 
Bryant  v.  Carr  ^101  N.  Y.   Supp. 

646), 830. 
Bryant  v.  Hancock  (67  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

507),  751,  770. 
Bryant  v.  Logan  (56  W.  Va.  141), 

78. 
Bryant  v.  Pugh  ('86  Ga.  525).  310. 
Bryant  v.  Sparrow    (62  Me.  546), 

689. 
Bryant   v.    Tucker    (19    Me.    383), 

204. 
Bryant  v.  Vincent  (100  Mich.  426), 

148. 
Bryant  v.  Wells    (56  N.   H.   152), 

87,  109. 
Bryden  v.  Northrup    (58   III.   App. 

233),  748,  757. 
Brydges  v.   Lewis    (3  L.   J.  Q.   B. 

602),  489,  639. 
Bryson  v.   Boyce    (92   S.   W.   Rep. 

820), 957. 
Buchanan    v.     Larkin     (116    Ala. 

431), 941. 


Buchanan    v.     Munroe     (22     Tex. 

537),  28. 
Buchana,n  v.  Whitman   (151  N.  Y. 

253),  345. 
Buck  V.  Lee  (36  Ark.  525),  1436. 
Buck  V.  Lewis  (46  Mo.  App.  227), 

1192,  1207. 
Buck  V.  Marrow  (2  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

361), 703. 
Buck  V.   Midland  Tobacco   Works 

(62  Mo.  App.  775),  1467. 
Buck  V.  Pike  (27  Vt.  529),  878. 
Buck    V.    Rodgers    (39    In<L    322), 

877. 
Buckelew   v.    Snedeker    (27   N.   J. 

Eq.  82),  83. 
Bucker  v.  Warren   (41  Ark.  532), 

632. 
Buckingham    v.    Smith    (10    Ohio, 

288), 116. 
Buckland  v.   Butterfleld    (2   Brod. 

&  B.  54),  1256. 
Buckland    v.    Hall     (8    Ves.    92), 

1383. 
Buckland  v.  Papillon  (L.  R.  I.  Eq. 

477),  365,  607. 
Buckle  V.  Fredericks  (44  Ch.  Div. 

244), 741. 
Buckley  v.   Briggs    (30  Mo.   452), 

65. 
Buckley  v.  Clark  (47  N.  Y.  Supp. 

42), 870. 
Buckley  v.  Cunningham   (104  Ala. 

449), 441. 
Buckmaster  v.   Thompson    (37   N. 

Y.  558),  978. 
Buckner    v.    Chambliss     (30    Ga. 

652), 968. 
Buckworth  v.  Simpson  (1  C.  M.  & 

R.  834),  1199. 
Budd  V.  Marshall    (42  L.  T.  793), 

1026. 
Buddie  V.   Lines    (11   Q.   B.    402), 

173. 
Budd-Scott  V.  Daniel    (71  Law  J. 
K.  B.  706),  697. 


Iviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[refeeences  are  to  pages.] 


Budgmans  v.  Wells  (13  Ohio,  43), 

335. 
Buell  V.  Cook   (4  Conn.  238),  938. 
Buerger  v.   Boyd    (25   Ark.   441), 

1340. 
Buffalo  Co.  Nat.  Bank  v.   Hanson 

(34  Neb.  752),  1195,  1199. 
Buffalo  R.  &  P.  Co.  V.  Lavery  (75 

Hun,  396),  37. 
Buffalo  Stone  &  C.  Co.  v.  Radsky 

(14  N.  y.  St.  Rep.  82),  1182. 
Buffum   V.   Deane    (4   Gray,  Mass. 

385), 1233. 
Buiney  v.   Chesapeake,  etc.  Canal 

Co.  (8  Pet.  U.  S.  201),  117. 
Bulkley  v.  Devine    (127  111.   406), 

337. 
Bulkley  v.  Dolbeare  (7  Conn.  232), 

680. 
Bulkley  v.  Taylor    (2  T.  R.   600), 

524. 
Bull   V.   Ellis    (1    Stew.   &  P.   Ala. 

294,  317. 
Bull  V.  Follett  (5  Cow.  N.  Y.  170), 

599. 
Bull    V.    Griswold     (19    111.    631), 

1195. 
Bull  V.  Sibbs  (8  T.  R.  327),  577. 
Bullard  v.  Hudson  (54  S.  E.  Rep. 

132), 922. 
Bulles  V.  Noyes  (75  Tex.  540),  384. 
Bullitt  V.   Musgrave    (3   Gill,   Md. 

31), 762. 
Bullock  V.  Dommitt  (6  T.  R.  650), 

882. 
Bullock  V.  Grinstead  (95  Ky.  261), 

1276. 
Bullock    V.    Hayward     (10    Allen, 

Mass.  460),  90. 
Bullock  V.    Sneed    (13    Sm.    &   M. 

Miss.  293),  50. 
Bullofk-McCall-McDonnell  Elec.  Co. 

V.  Coleman    (136  Ala.  610),  842. 
Bulwer    v.    Bulwer    (2    B.    &    Ad. 

470),  224.  1309. 
Bulwer's  Case  (7  Rep.  1),  559. 
Bunker  v.  Pines  (86  Me.  140),  419. 


Bunner   v.    Storm    (1    Sandf.    Ch. 

N.  Y.  387),  54. 
Bunny  v.  Wright  (1  Leon.  59),  61. 
Bunton   v.   Richardson    (10  Allen^ 

Mass.  260),  236. 
Burbank  v.  Dyer  (52  Ind.  392),  53. 
Burch  V.  Harrell  (93  Ga.  719),  561. 
Burchell  v.  Clark   (46  L.  J.  C.  P- 

115),  344,  366. 
Burden  v.   Hal  ton    (4   Bing.  454), 

548. 
Burden  v.  Knight   (82  Iowa,  584), 

219. 
Burden  v.  Thayer   (3  Pick.  Mass. 

76),  30,  486,  496. 
Burdett    v.    Withers    (7    A.    &    E. 

136),  893. 
Burdick    v.    Cameron     (42    N.    Y. 

Supp.  78),  535. 
Burdick  v.   Cheadle    (26   Ohio   St. 

397),  913. 
Burdick  v.  Green  (15  Johns.  N.  Y. 

247), 547. 
Burdin  v.   Ordway    (88   Me.   375), 

573. 
Burdon   Cent.   Sugar  Refining  Co. 

V.    Payne    (81    Fed.    Rep.    663), 

1415. 
Burford  v.  Unwin  (1  C.  &  E.  494). 

1064. 
Burgess    v.    Kattleman     (41    Mo. 

480),  1405,  1456. 
Burgess  v.  Rice  (74  Cal.  590),  950, 

953. 
Burgess  v.  Thompson    (1  N.  &  P. 

215),  182. 
Burgett    V.     Taliaferro     (118     111. 

505), 955. 
Eurhans  v.  Monier   (38  App.  Div. 

466),  636. 
Burke  v.  Bragg  (89  Ala.  204),  368. 
Burke   v.    Hullett    (216    111.    545), 

813. 
Burke  v.  Tindale  (33  N.  Y.  S.  20), 

1162. 
Burket    v.    Bonde     (3    Dana,    Ky. 

208), 1442. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


lix 


[BEFEEENCES    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Burleigh  v.  Coffin   (22  N.  H.  118), 

22. 
Burn  V.  Phelps  (1  Stark.  94,  2  E. 

C.  L.  44),  1154. 
Burner    v.     Higman     (127     Iowa, 

580),  817,  Sl9,  820. 
Burnett  v.  Bealmear  (79  Md.  36), 

1429. 
Burnett  v.  Lynch  (5  B.  &  C.  589), 

1021,1082. 
Burnett  v.  Rlcli  (45  Ga.  211),  948. 
Burnham  v.  Ayer  (35  N.  H.  351), 

549. 
Burnham  v.  Best  (10  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

227), 561. 
Burnham    v.    Dunklee    (34    N.    H. 

334), 554. 
Burns  v.  Bryant   (31  N.  Y.  453), 

191,  218. 
Burns  v.  Cooper  (31  Pa.  St.  426), 

514. 
Burns  v.  Fuchs  (28  Mo.  App.  279), 

847,  874. 
Burns  v.  Luckett   (3  Weekly  Law 

Bui.  517),  848. 
Burns  v.  McCubbin   (3  Kan.  221), 

663, 1017. 
Burnslde  v.  Weightman  (9  Watts, 

Pa.  46),  1316. 
Buron  v.  Denman    (2  Exch.   188), 

175. 
Burr   V.    Mills    (21    Wend.    N.    Y. 

290),  410,  438. 
Burr  V.   Stenton    (52  Barb.   N.  Y. 

377), 501. 699. 
Burrell  v.  Bull  (3  Sandf.  Ch.  N.  Y. 

15). 92. 
Burrows  v.  Gradin   (1  Dowl.  &  L. 

213),  31,  149. 
Burt  V.  Hurlbut  (16  Vt.  292),  533. 
Burt  V.  Warne  (31  Mo.  296),  685. 
Burson  v.  Dow  (65  111.  146),  122. 
Burton  v.  Perry  (146  111.  71),  957. 
Burton   v.    Richardson    (10   Allen, 

Mass.  260).  491. 
Burton    v.    Rohrback     (30    Minn. 

393), 678. 


Burton    v.    Smith    (13    Pet.    483), 

1422. 
Burton  v.  Barclay   (7  Bing.  745), 

1228. 
Burton  v.  Brown   (Cro.  Jac.  643), 

400. 
Busbin    v.    Ware    (69    Ala.    279), 

1465. 
Busby  V.  Jones   (1  Scam.  111.  34), 

1115. 
Busch  V.  Huston  (75  111.  343),  955. 
Buschman  v.  Wilson  (29  Md.  553), 

1350. 
Bush  V.   Havird    (12   Idaho,   352), 

1264,1294. 
Buskin     v.     Edmond     (Cro.     Eliz. 

415), 638. 
Bussing  V.  Bushnell  (6  Hill,  N.  Y. 

382), 1444. 
Bussman   v.    Ganster    (72   Pa.    St. 

285),  92,  243,  1345. 
Buswell  V.  Marshall    (51  Vt.   87), 

334,  390,  391. 
Buswell  V.  Pioneer  (37  N.  Y.  312), 

549. 
Butler  V.  Carillo   (88  N.  Y.  Supp. 

941), 1176. 
Butler  V.  Gushing   (46  Hun.  521), 

863. 
Burke   v.    Hullett    (216    111.    545), 

803. 
Butler  V.   Kidder    (87   N.  Y.   98), 

1360. 
Butler    V.    Manny    (52    Mo.    497), 

1016. 
Butler  V.  Mulvihill  (1  Bligh,  137), 

471. 
Butler    V.    Newhouse     (85    N.    Y. 

Supp.  373),  1143. 
Butler  V.   Smith  Pharmacy   (5  N. 

Y.  St.  Rep.  885),  463. 
Butler    V.    Threlkeld     (117    Iowa, 

116),  384,  996. 
Butler  V.  Walker  (78  111.  622).  910. 
Butman  v.  James  (34  Minn.  547). 

716. 
Butt  V.  Ellet  (19  Wall.  544),  1428. 


Ix 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Butterfield  v.  Baker  (5  Pick.  Mass. 

522), 1427. 
Buxton  V.  Rust  (L.  R.  7  Exch.  1), 

386. 
Buzzard   v.   Capel    (6   Bing.    151), 

446. 
Byrd  v.  Chase  (TO  Ark.  802),  572. 
Byrnes  v.  Douglass   (23  Neb.  S3), 

951. 


C. 


Cable  V.  Cable  (146  Pa.  St.  451), 

334. 
Cadden  v.  Barge  Co.  (83  Wis.  413), 

803. 
Cade  V.   Brownlee    (15   Ind.   369), 

1072. 
Cady  V.  Quarterman  (12  Ga.  386), 

146. 
Cadwalder  v.  Loerce  (10  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  1),  174. 
Cadwallader  v.  United  States  Exp. 

Co.  (147  Pa.  St.  455),  457. 
Caeser  v.  Karutz    (50  N.  Y.  229), 

1150. 
Caeser    v.    Robinson    (174    N.    Y. 

492), 584. 
Caffin  V.   Scott   (7  Rob.  La.   205), 

731. 
Cahn  V.  State  (110  Ala.  56),  778. 
Cahoon    v.    Kinen     (42    Ohio    St. 

190), 83. 
Cain  V.  Gimon  (36  Ala.  168),  924. 
Cain    V.    Head    (1    Coldw.    Tenn. 

163), 97. 
Cairns  v.  Llewellyn   (2  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  599),  1379. 
Caldwell  v.  Evans   (2  Mill.  Const. 

S.  C.  348),  1201. 
Caldwell    v.    Fulton     (31    Pa.    St. 

483), 274. 
Caldwell  v.  Moore  (11  Pa.  St.  58), 

1006. 
Caldwell  v.   Smith    (77   Ala.   167), 

964. 


Caldwell  v.  Snow  (8  La.  Ann.  392), 

850. 
Caley    v.    Thornquist     (89    Minn. 

348), 1378. 
Calhoun  v.  Atchison  (4  Bush,  Ky. 

261),117S. 
Calhoun  v.  Perrin    (2  Bew.   S.  C. 

245), 966. 
California  Conf.  v.  Seitz   (74  Cal. 

287), 1284. 
California  Dry  Dock  Co.  v.  Arm- 
strong  (17  Fed.  Rep.  216),  722. 
Callaghan  v.   Hawkes    (121   Mass. 

298),  987. 
Callan  v.  McDaniel    (72  Ala.  96), 

615,1391. 
Callen  v.   Hilty    (14  Pa.   St.   286), 

271. 
Calvert  v.  Bradley  (16  How.  XJ.  S. 

580), 878. 
Calvert  v.   Frowd    (4    Bing.   557), 

184. 
Calvert   v.   Hobbs    (107   Mo.    App. 

7),  1078,  1097. 
Calvert  v.  Rice  (11  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

1001),  708,  716. 
Calvin's  Case  (7  Coke,  2b),  41. 
Cambridge   Lodge,    etc.    v.    Routh 

(163  Ind.  1),  573. 
Camden  v.  Batterbury  (5  C.  B.  N. 

S.  808),  134. 
Cameron   v.   Little    (62   Me.    550), 

539. 
Camley  v.  Stanfield  (10  Tex.  546), 

954. 
Cammack    v.    Rogers     (Tex.    Civ. 

App.  74  S.  W.  Rep.  945).  313. 
Camp  V.  Camp  (5  Conn.  291),  352, 

923. 
Camp  V.  Scott  (47  Conn.  366),  638, 

648. 
Camp  V.  Wood  "(76  N.  Y.  92),  814. 
Campau  v.  Lafferty  (43  Mich.  429), 

942. 
Campbell  v.  Arnold    (1  Johns.  N. 
Y.  511),  686. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ixi 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Campbell    v.    Babcock    (13    N.    Y. 

Supp.  843),  992. 
Campbell  v.  Fowler   (28  La.  Ann. 

234),  1424. 
Campbell  v.  Johnson  (44  Mo.  274), 

337,  462. 
Campbell  v.  Johnson  (1  Sandf.  Ch. 

N.  Y.  148),  52. 
Campbell  v.  Lord  Wenlock   (4  F. 

&  F.  716),  785. 
Campbell   v.    Luck    (25   Ohio   Civ. 

Ct.  Rep.  356),  1346. 
Campbell    v.    McFaddin    (71    Tex. 

28),  327. 
Campbell  v.  Porter   (46  App.  Div. 

628),  854. 
Campbell    v.    Portland    Sugar    Co. 

(62  Me.  555),  792. 
Campbell   v.   Proctor    (6   Me.   12), 

212,  213. 
Campbell  v.  Schrum  (3  Watts,  Pa. 

60), 599. 
Campbell's     Case     (1     Roll.     Abr. 

237,),  541. 
Canal  Co.  v.  Bretts   (25  Ind.  409), 

847. 
Canal  Co.  v.  Wilmot  (9  East,  360), 

64. 
Canale   v.    Copello    (137   Cal.    22), 

354. 
Canal  Elev.  &  W.  Co.  v.  Brown  (36 

Ohio  St.  660),  1378. 
Canandaigua  v.  Foster  (156  N.  Y. 

354),  825. 
Candler    v.    Mitchell     (119    Mich. 

564),  158,  174. 
Canfield  v.   Vacha    (3   Ohio  N.  P. 

158),  774. 
Canham   v.    Fisk    (3   Cromp.   &   J. 

126), 438. 
Cannan  v.  Hartley   (9  C.  B.  634), 

1208. 
Canning  v.  Fibush   (77  Cal.  196), 

155. 
Cannock  v.  Jones    (3   Exch.  233), 

911. 


Cannon  v.   Barry    (59   Miss.   289), 

712.' 
Cannon  v.  Demming  (3  S.  D.  421), 

326. 
Cannon  v.   Hatcher    (1  Hill  Law, 

S.  C.  260),  686. 
Cannon  v.  Wilbur    (30  Neb.  777), 

634.1184. 
Cantine  v.  Phillips'  Administrator 

(5  Par.  Del.  428),  18. 
Cantrell  v.  Fowler  (32  S.  C.  589), 

849,  874. 
Cantwell    v.    Moore    (44    111.   App. 

656),  939. 
Capal's  Heirs  v.  McMillan  (8  Port. 

Ala.  197),  10. 
Capen  v.  Hall   (21  R.  L  364),  810. 
Caperton   v.    Stege    (91   Ky.    351), 

1266. 
Capley  v.  Hepworth   (12  Mod.  1), 

245. 
Carby   v.    Spadden    (63    Mo.    App. 

648), 219. 
Cardwell    v.    Lucas    (2    M.    &    W. 

Ill), 953. 
Cardwell  v.  Martin   (9  East,  180), 

343. 
Carelton  v.  Cate    (56  N.  H.  130). 

439. 
Carey  v.  Kreizer   (57  N.  Y.  Supp. 

79),  459,  782. 
Carey   v.   Richards    (2    Ohio    Dec. 

630),  149,  270. 
Carger  v.  Fee  (140  111.  582),  258. 
Carithers  v.  Weaver  (7  Kan.  110), 

955. 
Carle  v.  Monkhouse  (47  N.  J.  Eq. 

73), 1306. 
Carleton  v.  Herbert  (14  W.  R.  772), 

166. 
Carley  v.  Lewis  (24  Ind.  23),  491, 

51S,  615. 
Carlin  v.  Ritter  (68  Md.  478),  212, 

1269,  1287,  1290. 
Carlisle  Cafe  Co.   v.   Muse    (67  L. 

J.  Ch.  53),  412. 


Ixii 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[eefebences  are  to  pages.] 


Carlisle's  Appeal  (38  Pa.  St.  259), 

52. 
Carlton  v.  Williams    (77  Cal.  89), 

335. 
Carman    v.    Alabama    Nat.    Bank 

(101  Ala.  189),  1459. 
Carman     v.     Mosler     (105     Iowa, 

307),  6. 
Carman  v.  Plass   (123  N.  Y.  286), 

591. 
Carmine  v.  Bowen  (104  Md.  198), 

1311. 
Carnahan  v.  Tousey  (93  Ind.  561), 

532. 
Carnegie    v.    Morrison     (2     Mete. 

Mass.  381),  532. 
Carnegie  Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  Phil- 
adelphia Co.    (158  Pa.  St.  317), 

327,1075. 
Carnell  v.  Lamb   (20  Johns.  N.  Y. 

207), 548. 
Carnell  v.  Vanartsdalen  (4  Pa.  St. 

364), 874. 
Carnes  v.  Hersey  (117  Mass.  269), 

1020. 
Carney  v.  Mosher  (97  Mich.  564), 

195,  384,  385,  1309,  1314. 
Carnhart  v.  Finney  (40  Mo.  449), 

646. 
Carondelt  v.  Wolfert  (39  Mo.  305), 

663. 
Carothers  v.  Covington  (Tex.  1894, 

27  S.  W.  Rep.  1040),  958. 
Carpenter   v.    Gillespie    (10   Iowa, 

592),  1425. 
Carpenter  v.   Jones    (63   111.   517), 

315, 1309. 
Carpenter  v.  Pocasset  Mfg.  Co.  (180 

Mass.  130),  647. 
Carpenter  v.   Shanklin    (7  Blackf. 

Ind.  308),  465,  1441. 
Carpenter    v.     Stillwell     (3     Abb. 

Prac.  Rep.  N.  Y.  459),  575. 
Carpenter  v.  Thompson    (3  N.   H. 

204),  923. 
Carpenter  v.  Thornburn   (76  Ark. 

578),  992. 


Carpenter    v.    United    States     (17 

Wall.   U.   S.   489),   198,  317,   519, 

573. 
Carpenter  v.  Wilson  (100  Md.  13), 

634,  666. 
Carr  v.   Allott    (3   H.   &  N.   964), 

1428. 
Carr  v.   Ellison    (24  Wend.   178), 

1363,1369. 
Carraher  v.  Bell  (7  Wash.  81),  648. 
Carre   Hotel    Co.    v.    Wells   Fargo 

Co.   (128  Fed.  Rep.  587),  498. 
Carrig    v.    Dee     (14    Gray,    Mass. 

583),  409. 
Carrigan  v.  Woods  (L.  R.  I.  C.  L. 

73).  198. 
Carroll    v.    Ballance    (26    111.    9), 

1228. 
Carroll  v.   Bancker   (43   La.   Ann. 

1078),  1438,  1446. 
Carroll  v.  Peake   (1  Peters,  U.  S. 

18),  693. 
Carson  v.  Arvantes  (10  Colo.  App. 

382),   583. 
Carson    v.    Blazer     (2    Binn.    Pa. 

475),  1314. 
Carson  v.   Broady    (56  Neb.   648), 

958. 
Carson  v.  Codley  (26  Pa.  St  117), 

IIGO. 
Carson   v.   Electric  Light  Co.    (85 
Iowa,  44),  14G2. 
Carson  v.  J.  C.  Ins.  Co.   (43  N.  J. 

Law,  300),  1051. 
Carstairs  v.  Taylor   (L.  R.   6  Ex. 

217),  848. 
Carstens   v.   Taylor    (40   L.   J.   4), 

840. 
Carter   v.    Andrews    (56    111.    App. 

646),   1432. 
Carter   v.    Burr    (39    Barb.    N.    Y. 

59),   1178. 
Carter    v.    Carter    (5    Bing.    406), 

545. 
Carter  v.  Carter   (109  Mass.  306), 

571. 
Carter  v.  Ely  (7  Sim.  211),  64. 


T^VBLE    OF    CASES    CITED, 


Lsiii 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Carter  v.  George    (30  Kans.  451), 

562. 
Carter  v.   Hammett    (18   Barb.  N. 

Y.  608),  1060,  1090. 
Carter  v.   Marshall    (72    111.   609), 

927,  942. 
Carter  v.  Thurston  (58  N.  H.  104), 

434. 
Carter!  v.  Roberts   (140  Cal.  164), 

192,  218. 
Carter  Publishing  Co.  v.   Dennett 

(11  S.  D.  956),  651. 
Cartwright    v.    Millar    (36    L.    T. 

398),   387. 
Carver  v.  Gough  (153  Pa.  St.  225), 

1244,  1304. 
Carver  v.  Hoffman  (109  Ind.  547), 

83. 
Carver  v.  Palmer   (33  Mich.  342), 

573,  579,  1096. 
Cary    v.    Daniels     (5    Met.    Mass. 

238),  684. 
Cary   v.    Edmonds    (71    Mo.    523), 

958. 
Case    V.    Davis    (15    Pa.    St.    80), 

1443. 
Case    V.    Minot    ri58    Mass.    557), 

408. 
Case  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Garven  (45  Ohio 

St.  290),  1256. 
Casey  v.  Gregory  (13  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

505),  934. 
Casey    v.    Hanrick    (69    Tex.    44), 

964. 
Casey    v.    King    (98    Mass.    303), 

678. 
Cassady    v.    Hammer     (62     Iowa, 

359),  1023. 
Cassard  v.  Thornton  (119  111.  App. 

397),  1163. 
Cass    Co.    Sup'rs    v.    Cowgill     (97 

Mich.  448),  573. 
Cassell  V.   Cooke    (8   S.   &  R.   Pa. 

268),  600. 
Cassily  V.  Rhodes  (12  Ohio  St.  88), 

1306,  1326. 


Castagnette   v.    Nichia    (78    N.   Y. 

Supp.    498),    847. 
Castleman  v.  DuVal  (89  Md.  657), 

522. 
Castleton  v.  Samuel  (5  Esp.  173), 

172. 
Castro  V.  Gaffey  (96  Cal.  421),  252. 
Catholic   Ins.   v.   Gibbons    (7   Dec. 

Re.  576,  3  Bull,  581),  69. 
Caton  V.  Caton  (56  L.  J.  Ch.  886), 

388. 
Cattley   v.   Arnold    (1   John  &   H. 

651),   128,   133. 
Caugham  v.  King  (Cro.  Car.  221), 

884. 
Cavalier  v.  Pope  (75  Law  J.  K.  B. 

609),  860. 
Cavanaugh  v.  Clinch  (88  Ga.  610), 

1224. 
Center  v.  Everard    (19  Misc.  Rep. 

156),  1247. 
Center  Creek  Min.  Co.  v.  Franken- 
stein  (179  Mo.  564),  190. 
Central   Bank  v.  Peterson    (24  N. 

J.  Law,  668),  1414. 
Central  Branch  R.  Co.  v.  Fritz  (20 

Kan.   430),    1265. 
Central    City   Bank    v.    Dana    (32 

Barb.  N.  Y.  296),  547. 
Central  Rd.  Co.  v.  WTiithead    (74 

Ga.  441),  368. 
Cesar  v.   Karutz    (60   N.  Y.   229), 

786,  795,  805. 
Chadbourn   v.   Rahilly    (34    Minn. 

346),   255. 
Chadwick  v.  Woodward  (1  City  Ct. 

R.  Supp.  94),  875,  1155. 
Chaffee  v.  Garrett    (6  Ohio,  421), 

37. 
Chaffin    V.    Brockmeyer     (33    Mo. 

App.  92),  934. 
Chalfin  V.  Malone   (9  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

496),  291. 
Chalifonk  v.  Potter  (113  Ala.  215), 

1265. 
Challoner  v.   Da  vies    (1   Ld.   Ray, 

404),  86. 


Ixiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[REn:RENCES    AKE   TO   PAGES.. 


Cbalmers    v.     Smith     (152    Mass. 

561),  222,  726. 
Chalmers     v.     Vignand's     Syndic 

(Mart.  N.  S.  189),  208. 
Chamberlain  v.   Donohue    (45   Vt. 

50),  212,  216,  220,  250. 
Chamberlain  v.  Dumcrier   (1  Bro. 

C.  C.  166),  711. 
Chamberlain  v.  Dunlop  (126  N.  Y. 

4),  619.  1201,  1202,  1378,  1380. 
Chamberlain    v.    Godfrey's    Adm'r 

(50  Ala.  530),  1340. 
Chamberlain    v.    Heard     (22    Mo. 

App.  416),  1464. 
Chamberlain    v.    Iba    (181    N.    Y. 

486),  467. 
Chamberlain    v.    Letson    (5   N.    J. 

Law,  152),  462. 
Chamberlain    v.    Pybas     (81    Tex. 

511),  958. 
Chamberlain    v.    Shaw    (18    Pick. 

Mass.   278),   1329,   1330. 
Chamberlaine's  Case  (4  Mod.  151), 

1196. 
Chambers  v.   Irish    (Iowa,   109  N. 

W.  Rep.  787).  320. 
Chambers  v.  Pleak    (6  Dana.   Ky. 

426),   920,   943. 
Chambers  v.  Ross   (25  N.  J.  Law, 

293),  258,  519,  573,  947. 
Chamblee   v.    McKenzie    (31    Ark. 

155),  586. 
Champion    v.    Plummer     (5    Esp. 

240),   387. 
Champ   Spring   Co.   v.   Roth   Tool 

Co.   (103  Mo.  App.  103),  714. 
Chancellor  v.  Poole  (2  Doug.  764), 

1090. 
Chandler    v.    McGinnins    (8    Kan. 

App.  421),  634. 
Chandler  v.  Oldham   (55  Mo.  App. 

139),  1280. 
Chandler    v.    Ryder     (102     Mass. 

268),  54. 
Chandler    v.    Thurston    (10    Pick. 
205),  315. 


Channel    v.    Merrifield     (106     111. 

App.  243),  110,  644,  861,  1210. 
Chapel    V.    Hull     (60    Mich.    167), 

714,  760,  7.61. 
Chapman  v.  Bluck  (4  Bing.  N.  C. 

187),   245,   256. 
Chapman  v.  Gray   (15  Mass.  439), 

390,  392. 
Chapman    v.    Hainey    (100    Mass. 

353),  638. 
Chapman   v.   Kirby    (49    111.   211), 

632,  663. 
Chapman  v.  Lee  r47  Ala.  143),  101. 
Chapman  v.   Long    (10   Ind.   465), 

1315. 
Chapman  v.  McGrew  (21  111.  201), 

1115. 
Chapman    v.    Plummer    (36    Wis. 

262),   1117. 
Chapman   v.   Robertson    (6   Paige, 

N.  Y.  627),  452. 
Chapman    v.    Towner    (6    Mee.    & 

Wei.  100),  134,  192. 
Chapman  v.  Veach  (32  Kan.  167), 

1315. 
Chapman  v.  Weiman    (4  Ohio,  N. 

S.  481),  1427. 
Chappell  V.   Brown    (1   Bailey,   S. 

Car.  528),  503. 
Charles  v.  Byrd   (29  S.  Car.  544), 

42,  44.  48,  1065. 
Charless  v.  Froebel    (47  Mo.  App. 

45),  1083. 
Charlton  v.  Columbia  Real  Estate 

Co.   (64  N.  J.  Eq.  631),  245,  248. 
Charter  v.  Cordwent  (6  T.  R.  219), 

179. 
Chase  v.  Dearborn    (21  Wis.   57), 

921. 
Chase  v.   Hall    (41   Mo.   App.   15), 

422. 
Chase  v.  Hazelton    (7  N.  H.  171), 

717. 
Chase  v.  Knickerbocker  (53  N.  Y. 

Supp.  220),  647. 
Chase    v.    Tacoma    Box    Co.     (11 

Wash.  377),  1254. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ixv 


[references   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Chase  v.  Turner  (10  La.  O.  S.  19), 

1165. 
Chatard    v.    O'Donovan    (80    Ind. 

20),  306. 
Chatauqua  Assembly  v.  Ailing  (46 

Hun,  N.  Y.  582),  734. 
Chatfield    v.    Parker    (2    M.    &   R. 

540),  683. 
Chatterton  v.  Fox  (12  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  Duer,  64),  1182. 
Chattle    V.    Pound    (1    Ld.    Raym. 

746),    940. 
Chauncey  v.  Strong  (2  Root,  Conn. 

369),  22. 
Cheairs  v.   Coats    (77  Miss.   846), 

541. 
Cheatham  v.  Kinl^e    (1  Tenn.  Ch. 

576),  1270. 
Cheeser  v.  Creed  '(2  M.  &  P.  648), 

182. 
Cheetham     v.     Hampson     (2     Ld. 

Raym.  304),  869. 
Cheever     v.     Pearson     (16     Pick. 

Mass.  266),  189,  190. 
Cheney  v.   Bonnell    (58    111.    268), 

1317. 
Cheney  v.  Pierce  (38  Vt.  515),  23. 
Cheney  v.  Newberry  (67  Cal.  125), 

281. 
Chenimant  v.  Thornton   (2  Car.  & 

P.  50),  538. 
Cherokee  Strip  Live   Stock  Ass'n 

V.    Cass   L.   &   C.    Co.    (138   Mo. 

394),  37. 
Cherry  v.  Arthur    (5  Wash.  787), 

1261. 
Cherry  v.  Stein  (11  Md.  1),  40. 
Chesebrough  v.  Pingree  (72  Mich. 

438),  99,  1343,  1352. 
Chesley  v.   Welsch    (37  Me.   106), 

156,  1318. 
Chesterman  v.  Gardner   (2  Johns. 

Ch.   N.  Y.  29),  497. 
Chestnut  v.  Tyson   (105  Ala.  149), 

17,  59. 
Chicago    V.    Peck    (196    111.    260), 

145. 


Chicago  Attachment  Co.  v.  Davis 

Sewing  Machine  Co.   (111.  25  N. 

E.  E.  Rep.  669),  385,  641,  1068. 
Chicago,  B.  &  D.  Ry.  v.  Kelly  (211 

111.  498),  118. 
Chicago,   etc.  Co.  ▼.  Keegan    (152 

111.  413),  925. 
Chicago,    etc.    Co.    v.    Linard    (94 

Ind.  319),  1317,  1318,  1319. 
Chicago,  S.  F.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward 
(128   111.  349),   445. 
Chicago   Theol.    Seminary   v.   Chi- 
cago  Veneer   Co.    (94   111.   App. 

492),  145. 
Chicago    Union    Bank    v.    Kansas 

City  Bank  (136  U.  S.  223),  1122. 
Chiera    v.    McDonald    (121    Mich. 

54),  652. 
Child    V.    Hurd    (32    W.    Va.    66), 

1265. 
Childers  v.  Lee   (5  N.  Mex.  576), 

192. 
Childers  v.  Smith  (10  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

235),  1112. 
Childs  v.  Clark  (3  Barb.  Ch.  N.  Y. 

52),  1090. 
Chills  V.  United  States  (16  Ct.  CI. 

79),  35. 
Chilton     V.     Niblett     (3     Humph. 

Tenn.  404),  322. 
Chipraan  v.  Emeric  (5  Cal.  49,  51), 

622,  638,  645,  910,  1059. 
Chipperfield   v.   Carter    (72   L.   T. 

487),  358. 
Chism  V.  Thomson  (73  Miss.  410), 

1445. 
Chisolm    V.    Kilbreth     (88    N.    Y. 

Supp.  364),  1166. 
Chisolm  V.  Toplitz    (82  App.  biv. 

346),  1394. 
Choate   v.    Arrington    (116    Mass. 

552),   52. 
Choctaw  Nation  v.  United  States 

(119  U.  S.  1),  39. 
Chretien  v.  Doney   (1  N.  Y.  419), 

369,  1114,  1364. 


livi 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Christian  Ch.  of  Wolcott  v.  John- 
son   (53   Ind.  273),  65. 
Christie  v.  Blakely  (Pa.  St.  15  Atl. 

Rep.  874),  471,  479. 
Christopher   v.   Austin    (11   N.   Y. 

216),  1180. 
Christy  v.  Casanave  (2  Mart.  N.  S. 

451),  1222. 
Christy   v.   Tancred    (7   M.   &   W. 

127),  236,  577. 
Church  V.  Bloom  (111  Iowa,  319), 

1457. 
Church   V.   Brown    (15   Ves.    265), 

1051. 
Church  V.   Gilman    (15  "Wend.   N. 

Y.  656),  343,  349. 
Church  V.  Walker  (124  Mass.  69), 

438. 
Churchill  v.  Lammers  (1  Mo.  App. 

Rep.  155),  1192,  1223. 
Chrystie,   Appeal    of    (85    Pa.    St. 

463),  318. 
Cilley   V.    Hawkins    (48    111.    308), 

694. 
Cincinnati  v.  Steinkamp  (54  Ohio 

St.  284),  917. 
Cincinnati,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hooker  (26 

Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  392),  267. 
City  V.  Leeds  (24  Ind.  App.  271), 

73. 
City  Council  of  Charleston  v.  Page 

(Speers,  S.  C.  Eq.  159).  390,  395. 
City   of   Clinton   v.    Franklin    (26 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  1053),  686. 
City  of  Lincoln  v.  Lincoln  St.  R. 

Co.    (Neb.   93  N.  W.  Rep.   766), 

442. 
City  of  New  Albany  v.  Enders  (143 

Ind.  192),  514. 
City  of  New  York  v.  Cashman  (10 

Johns.  N.  Y.  96),  1024. 
City  of  New   York   v.    Mabie    (13 

N.  Y.  151),  563. 
City  of  New  York  v.  Parker  Vein 

S.    S.   Co.    (21   N.   Y.   Super.   Ct. 

300),  565. 


City  of  New  York  v.  United  States 

Trust  Co.  (101  N.  Y.  Supp.  574), 

453. 
City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Reeves  (48 

Pa.  St.  472),  591. 
City    of    Richmond    v.    Duesberry 

(27  Grat.  Va.  210),  1437. 
Claflin    V.    Hoover    (20    Mo.    App. 

583),  326. 
Clancey   v.    Rice    (5   Wash.    571), 

934. 
Clanton   v.   Eaton    (92    Ala.   612), 

1414,  1418. 
Clapp  V.  Coble    (21  N.  Car.  177), 

926. 
Clapp  V.  Donaldson   (Mass.  80  N. 

B.  Rep.  486),  826. 
Clapp  V.  Paine  (18  Me.  264),  139, 

156,  158,  234. 
Clapp  V.  Stoughton  (10  Pick.  Mass, 

463),  22. 
Clarges  v.  Funucan  (2  Doug.  565), 

111. 
Claridge  v.  MacKenzie  (4  M.  &  G. 

143),  923. 
Clark  v.  Abbott   (1  Md.  Ch.  474), 

30. 
Clark  v.  Aldridge  (40  N.  Y.  Supp. 

440),  937,  1073. 
Clark  V.  Babcock   (23  Mich.  164), 

783. 
Clark    V.    Banks    (6    Houst.    Del. 

584),  1314. 
Clark  V.   Barnes    (76   N.   Y.   301), 

119. 
Clark  V.  Burnside  (15  111.  62),  15. 
Clark  V.  Butt   (26  Ind.  236),  672. 
Clark  V.  Charter  (128  Mass.  423), 

554. 
Clark  V.  Cobb  (121  Cal.  595),  491. 
Clark   V.    Coolidge    (8    Kan.    189). 

1018. 
Clark  V.   Devoe    (124   N.  Y.   120), 

604. 
Clark    V.    Dobbins    (52    Ga.    656), 

1445. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED, 


Ixvii 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Clarke  v.  Fuller    (16   C.  B.  N.   S. 

24),  259. 
Clark  V.  Gellison  (20  Me.  18),  334. 
Clark  V.  Greenfield  (34  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1),  644,  1058. 
Clark  V.  Harvey  (54  Pa.  St.  142), 

780,  1315. 
Clark   V.    HajTies    (57    Iowa,    96), 

1400,  1440. 
Clark  V.  Rowland  (85  N.  Y.  204), 

139. 
Clark  V.  Keliher  (107  Mass.  406), 

166. 
Clark  V.  Merrill    (51  N.  H.   415), 

1378. 
Clark    V.    Rhoads    (79    Ind.    342), 

369. 
Clark  V.  Royston  (13  Mee.  &  Wei. 

732),   1314. 
Clark  V.   Smith    (25  Pa.   St.   137), 

196. 
Clark  V.  Smarridge  (7  Q.  B.  957), 

131. 
Clark  V.  Spaulding  (20  N.  H.  213), 

675. 
Clark  V.  Stringfellow  (4  Ala.  353), 

974. 
Clark  V.  Wheelock   (99  Mass.  14), 

210. 
Clark  V.  Wilson   (103  Mass.  219), 

771. 
Clark   &    Stevens   v.    Gerke    (Md. 

65  Atl.  Rep.  326),  893. 
Clarke  v.  Cincinnati  (1  Ohio  Dec. 

10),  388. 
Clarke  v.  Cobb  (121  Cal.  595).  539. 
Clarke   v.   Crego    (51   N.   Y.   646). 

941. 
Clarke  v.   Cummings    (5  Barb.  N. 

Y.  339),  609. 
Clarke  v.  Rowland  (85  N.  Y.  204), 

1288. 
Clarke   v.   .Tones    (1   Denio,   N.   Y. 

516),  644. 
Clarke  v.  Mitchell  (51  N.  H.  415), 

393. 


Clarke  v.  Rawson  (2  Denio,  N.  Y. 

135),  342. 
Clarke    v.    Spaulding    (20    N.    H. 

313),  782,  868. 
Clarke  v.  Webb  (1  C.  M.  &  R.  29), 

576. 
Clarke  v.  Welsh   (87  N.  Y.  Supp. 

697),   834. 
Clarke's  Appeal    (79  Pa.  St.  376), 

21. 
Clarkson    v.    Skidmore    (4    N.    Y. 

297),  702. 
Clary  v.   O'Shea    (72   Minn.    105), 

924. 
Clason  V.  Bailey  (14  Johns.  N.  Y. 

484),  982. 
Clason  V.  Gorley   (5  Sandf.  N.  Y. 

447),  34. 
Clator    V.    Otto    (38    W.    Va.    89), 

1238. 
Claude  v.  Shepard  (122  N.  Y.  397), 

584. 
Clavering  v.  Clavering  (2  P.  Wms. 

388),  710. 
Clawson  v.   Primrose    (4  Del.  Ch. 

643),  441. 
Clayton  v.   Blahey    (8  Term  Rep. 

3),  147,  192. 
Clayton   v.    Greyson    (6    N.    &   M. 

694),   459. 
Clayton  v.  Leach  (41  Ch.  D.  103), 

1099. 
Clayton  v.  Souther  (1  Exch.  717), 

105. 
Cleighton  v.  Sanders  (89  111.  543), 

162. 
Clegg   V.    Hands    (62    L.    T.    502), 

750,  768. 
Clegg   v.    Rowland    (L.    R.    2    Eq. 

P.  Cas.  165),  710. 
Clemence  v.  Steere   (1  R.  I.  272), 

717. 
Clement    v.    Wheeler     (25    N.    H. 

361),  716. 
Clemm  v.  Wilcox    (15  Ark.   102), 

953. 


Ixviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[befebences  are  to  pages.] 
Broomfield     (19    Mo.      Cluett  v.  Sheppard   (131  111.  636), 


Clemens    v 

118),   1199,   1213. 
Clemens  v.  Murphy  (40  Mo.  121), 

1285. 
Clements  v.  Collins  (2  T.  R.  502), 

399. 
Clements  v.  Welles  (11  Jur.  N.  S. 

991),  740,  768,  1089. 
demons    v.    Knox    (31    Mo.    App. 

185),  478,  1014,  1023. 
Clendenning  v.  Currier   (6  Gill  & 

J.  Md.  420),  49. 
Clendenning  v.   Lindner    (9   Misc. 

Rep.  582),  1215,  1364. 
Clenighan  v.  McFarland  (11  N.  Y. 

Supp.  719),  460. 
Cleveland  v.  Crum    (33  Mo.  App. 

616),  1464. 
Cleveland    v.     Spencer     (73    Fed. 

Rep.  559),  1015. 
Cleves  V.  Willoughby   (7  Hill.  N. 

Y.  83),  459,  785. 
Cleveland  C.  C.  &  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Wood  (189  111.  352),  1095. 
Click  v.    Stewart    (36   Tex.    280), 

1463. 
Clifford   V.   Atlantic   Cotton   Mills 

(146  Mass.  147),  799. 
Clifford  V.  Cotton  Mills  (146  Mass. 

47),  809. 
Clifford    V.    Gresslinger     (96    Ga. 

789),  977. 
Clifford  V.  United  States    (34   Ct. 

CI.  223),  35. 
Clift  V.  Stockdon  (4  Litt.  Ky.  215), 

394. 
Clifton  V.  Montague   (40  W.  207), 

783,  848,  904. 
Clinan  v.  Cooke  (1  Sch.  &  Lef.  22), 

386,    1367. 
Clinton   Wire   Cloth   Co.   v.   Gard- 
ner (99  111.  1.'31).  139,  145. 
Cloney  v.  Richardson  (34  Mo.  370), 

552. 
Close  v.  Wilberforce  (1  Beav.  112). 
1105. 


401. 
Clun    V.    Clarke    (Peake,    Ad.    C. 

239),  182. 
Clun's  Case    (10  Coke,   127),  539. 
Clyne  v.   Holmes    (61  N.  J.  Law, 

358),  847,  859. 
Coale    V.    Hannibal,    etc.    Co.    (60 

Mo.  227),  722. 
Coan  V.  Mole  (39  Mich.  454),  146. 
Coats    V.    Darbey    (2    N.    Y.    517), 

690. 
Coatsworth  v.   Schoellkopf   (75  N. 

Y.  Supp.  753),  456,  616. 
Cobb  V.  Arnold  (8  Met.  Mass.  398), 

938. 
Cobb  V.   Kidd    (8  Fed.  Rep.   695), 

90,  519,  573. 
Cobb  V.  Lavalle  (89  111.  331),  434. 
Cobb  V.  Stokes  (8  East,  358),  155.. 
Ccburn  v.  Goodall    (72  Cal.  498), 

1080. 
Coburn  v.  Palmer   (8  Cush.  Mass. 

124),  948. 
Cochran   v.   Ocean   Dry   Dock   Co. 

(30  La.  Ann.  1365),  431. 
Cochran  v.  Pew  (159  Pa.  St.  184), 

641. 
Cochrane  v.  Justice  Min.  Co.    (16 

Colo.   415),  252,   465. 
Cochrane  v.  Mortgage  &  Trust  Co. 
(Neb.  96  N.  W.  Rep.  1051),  656. 
Cochrane  v.  Philadelphia  Co.    (96 

N.  W.  Rep.  1051),  657. 
Cockburn    v.    Watkins     (76    Ala 

486),  1416. 
Cockerline   v.    Fisher    (Mich.    lOa 

N.  W.  Rep.  522),  553. 
Cocking  V.    Ward    (1   C.    B.    868), 

380. 
Cockson  V.  Cock   (Cro.  Jac.  125), 

616. 
Coddington  v.  Dunham   (3  J.  &  S. 

N.  Y.  412),  851,  1148. 
Codman     v.     Freemen     (3     Cush- 
Mass.  306),  1427. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


Ixix 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Codman   v.    Hall    (9    Allen,   Mass. 

335),  85,  1019. 
Codman  v.  Jenkins  (14  Mass.  93), 

938. 
Codman    v.    Johnson    (104    Mass. 

491),  1023. 
Cody  V.  Quarterman  (12  Ga.  386), 

41,  206. 
Coe   V.    Clay    (5    Bing.    540),    671, 

698. 
Coe  V.  Hobby  (72  N.  Y.  141),  555, 

1196,  1199,  1201. 
Coe  V.  Wilson  (46  Me.  314),  1328. 
Coffin  V.  Lunt  (69  Mass.  80),  163. 
Coffin   V.   Yalman    (8   N.  Y.    465), 

1284. 
Coffman  v.   Hauck    (24  Mo.   496), 

318. 
Coffman    v.    Huck    (19    Mo.    435), 

317. 
Cofran     v.     Shepard     (148     Mass. 

582),  213,  237. 
Coggins  V.  Flythe  (113  N.  C.  102), 

16. 
Cohen    v.    Candler    (79    Ga.    427), 

1448. 
Cohn   V.    May    (210   Pa.    St.    615), 

814. 
Cohn   V.    Norton    (57    Conn.    480), 

672,  694,  695. 
Cohn  V.  Smith  (64  Wis.  816),  1432, 

1459. 
Cohen  v.  Dupont  (13  N.  Y.  Super. 

260),  1138,  1141,  1182. 
Cohen  v.  Kyler  (27  Mo.  122),  573. 
Coit  V.  Planer  (30  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 

413),  519. 
Coke    V.    Gutkie^e    (80    Ky.    598), 

789. 
Coker    v.    Britt     (78    Miss.    583), 

1412,  1467. 
Coker  v.  Pearsall  (6  Ala.  542),  30, 

485. 
Colburne    v.    Mixstone     (1    Leon, 

129),  1200. 
Colburn    v.     Morrill     (117    Mass. 

262),  1180.     • 


Colby   V.    lies    (11   A.   &   E.    335), 

578. 
Colclough    V.    Carpeles    (89    Wis. 

239),  245. 
Colcord    V.    Hall    (3    Head,    Tenn. 

625),  302. 
Cole  V.  Johnson   (120  Iowa,  667), 

634. 
Cole  V.  Lake  Co.    (54  N.  H.  242), 

432. 
Cole  V.   Manners    (Neb.   1906,   107 

N.  W.  Rep.  777),  720,  723,  1463. 
Cole  V.  Maxfield    (13  Minn.   235), 

931. 
Cole  V.  McKey  (66  Wis.  500),  814, 

848,  849,  1097. 
Cole  V.  Patterson  (25  Wend.  N.  Y. 

426),  1112. 
Cole  V.  Seeley  (25  Vt.  220),  18. 
Colebeck  v.  Girdler's  Co.  (45  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  225),  849. 
Colegrove  v.  Dios  Santos  (2  Barn. 

&  Cress.  76),  1264. 
Coleman  v.   Haight    (14  La.   Ann. 

564),  697. 
Coleman  v.  Reddick   (25  U.  C.  C. 

C.  579),  1145. 
Coleman    v.    Siler    (74    Ala.    435), 

1438,  1489. 
Colemore  v.  Whitroe   (1  D.  &  Ry. 

1),  945. 
Coles  V.   Courtier    (55    I.   T.    Rep. 

N.  S.  574),  544. 
Coles  V.  Marquand    (2  Hill,  N.  Y. 

47),  1095. 
Coles  V.  Peck   (96  Ind.  333),  984, 

999. 
Coles    V.    Treoothick    (9    Ves.    Sr. 

234),  98. 
Collender  v.  Smith  (20  Misc.  Rep. 

612),  551. 
Coller  V.  Gardner  (21  Beav.  151), 

97. 
Collett  V.  Curling   (10  Q.  B.  785), 

522. 
Collier   t.   Corbett    (15   Cal.    183), 

8L 


Ixx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Collier  v.   Pierce    (7   Gray,   Mass. 

18),  410. 
Collins   V.   Canty    (6   Cush.   Mass. 

415),  178,  646. 
Collins  V.  Collins   (26  Beav.  306), 

1273. 
Collins    V.    Harding     (Cro.     Eliz. 

607),  510. 
Collins    V.    Hasbrouck    (56    N.    Y. 

157),  1048. 
Collins    V.    Karatopsky    (36    Ark. 

316),  1178,  1180. 
Collins   V.    Lewis    (53    Minn.    78), 

702. 
Collins  V.  Pratt   (181  Mass.  345), 

390,  1085,  1093. 
Collins    V.     Sillye     (Styles,    265), 

639. 
Collins  V.  Weller  (7  T.  R.  478),  8. 
Collins   V.   Whildin    (3   Phila.    Pa. 

102),   544. 
Collins's  Appeal    (35   Pa.    St.   83), 

1441. 
Collis    V.    Alburtis    (9    Civ.    Pro. 

Rep.  N.  Y.  80),  554. 
Collyer  v.  Collyer  (113  N.  Y.  442), 

561,  573. 
Coin  V.  Coin  (24  S.  C.  596),  349. 
Colored,  etc.  Ass'n  v.  Harvey   (23 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  1009),  276. 
Colt  V.   Palmer    (30  N.  Y.   Super. 

Ca.  413),  1069. 
Colton  V.  Gorham   (72  Iowa,  324), 

644,  1057,  1212,  1213. 
Columbia    Brewing   Co.    v.    Miller 

(Mo.  App.  101  S.  W.  Rep.  711), 

558. 
Columbia,  etc.  Co.  v.  Braillard   (5 

Wash.  492),  934. 
Colville  V.  Miles  (127  N.  Y.  159), 

1320. 
Colwell    V.    Lawrence    (38    N.    Y. 

71),  586. 
Coman    v.    Thompson     (47    Mich. 

22),  1316. 
Combs    V.    Midland    Transfer    Co. 

(58  Mo.  App.  112),  327,  388. 


Comb's  Case   (9  Rep.  76),  106. 
Comegys  v.   Russell    (175   Pa.   St. 

■166),  1075. 
Commagere  v.  Brown  (27  La.  Ann. 

314),  775. 
Commercial     Bank     v.     Pritchard 

(126  Cal.  600),  392. 
Commercial  Bulletin  Co.,  In  re  (6 

Fed.  Cas.  3,060),  1119. 
Commissioners  v.  Brown   (2  Colo. 

App.  473),  1249. 
Commissioners   v.   Clark    (133   N. 

Y.  251),  139. 
Commissioner  v.  Younger  (29  Cal. 

177),  469. 
Commissioners     of    Rusk    Co.    v. 

Stubbs    (25  Kan.  322),  1265. 
Commonwealth  v.  Centner  (18  Pa. 

St.  439),  505. 
Commonwealth   v.   Harrington    (3 

Pick.  Mass.   26),  778. 
Commonwealth     v.      McNeile      (8 

Phila.  438),  454. 
Commonwealth  v.   Pa.  R.  Co.    (51 

Pa.  St.  351),  116. 
Commonwealth      v.      Sheriff      (3 

Brewst.  Pa.  537),  454. 
Compton     v.     Allen     (Style,     162, 

Dyer,  33a),  882. 
Compton  V.  Cassada  (32  Ga.  428), 

106. 
Compton  V.  Chelsea  (55  Hun,  609), 

243. 
Comstock   V.   Cavanagh    (17   R.    I. 

233),  164. 
Comstcok  V.  Oderman  (18  111.  App. 

326),  863. 
Comstock  V.  Scales   (7  Wis.  159), 

1426. 
Conant  v.  Bellows  Falls  Canal  Co. 

(29  Vt.  263),  64. 
Conde  v.  Lee   (55  App.  Div.  401), 

940,   1254. 
Coney  &  Parker  v.   Brunswick  & 

F.  S.  Co.  (116  Ga.  222).  680. 
Conger    v.    Atwood    (28    Ohio    St. 

134),  52. 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


Ixxi 


[references    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Conger  v.  Duryee   (90  N.  Y.  594), 

1031. 
Congregational  Society  v.  Fleming 

(11  Iowa,  533),  685,  1300. 
Congregational  Soc.  in  Newport  v. 

Walker  (18  Vt.  600),  938. 
Congregational   Soc.   of   Sharon  v. 

Rix  (Vt.  1889,  17  Atl.  Rep.  719), 

550,  1086. 
Congress  v.  Evetts  (10  Exch.  298), 

1428. 
Congreve  v.  Morgan  (81  N.  Y.  84), 

825. 
Conklin    v.    Carpenter    (12    N.   Y. 

St.  Rep.  632),  1329. 
Conklin    v.    Foster    (57    111.    105), 

1110. 
Conklin  v.  White    (17  Abb.  N.  Y. 

315),  526. 
Conley  v.  Schiller  (24  N.  Y.  Supp. 

473),  487,  698,  1171. 
Conn   V.    Conner    (86    Iowa,    577), 

998. 
Connell  v.  Female  Orphan  Asylum 

(18  La.  Ann.  513),  1005. 
Connock  v.  Jones    (3  Excb.  233), 

603. 
Connolly    v.     Giddings     (24    Neb. 

131),  29. 
Connor  v.  Bradley   (1  How.  U.  S. 

25),  633,  638. 
Connor  v.  Withers    (20  Ky.  Law. 

Rep.  1326),   1364,   1391. 
Connors  v.  Clark  (79  Conn.  100), 

1365. 
Conover  v.   Smith    (17   N.   J.    Eq. 

51),  1292. 
Conrad   v.    Mining   Co.    (54   Mich. 

249),  1249. 
Conrad  Seipp  Brewing  Co.  v.  Hart 

(62  111.  App.  212),  1161. 
Conro  V.  Port  Henry  Iron  Co.   (12 

Barb.  N.  Y.  27),  62. 
Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Peers  (15 

111.  344),  275,  457,  588. 
Consolidated  Coal  Co.  of  St.  Louis 

V.  Peers   (166  111.  361),  1092. 


Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Peers  (39 

111..  App.   453),   534. 
Consolidated    Coal    Co.    v.    Rainey 

(69  111.  App.  182),  1370. 
Conway    v.    Carpenter    (30    N.    Y. 

Supp.  315),  1224. 
Conway  v.   Starkweather   (1  Den. 

N.  Y.  113),  144. 
Conwell    V.    Mann     (100    N.    Car. 

234),  920. 
Coogan  V.  Parker  (2  S.  Car.  255), 

1353. 
Cook   V.    Anderson    (85    Ala.    99), 

1154,  1155.  1340. 
Cook    V.    Bisbee    (18    Pick.    Mass. 

527),  373,  454. 
Cook  V.  Guerra  (41  L.  J.  C.  P.  89), 

500. 
Cook  V.  Champion  (1  Denio  N.  Y. 

90),  722. 
Cook  V.  Cook  (Cro.  Car.  531),  718. 
Cook  V.  Cook  (28  Ala.  660),  215. 
Cook    V.    Folsom     (2    Lane.    Law 

Rev.  185),  1254. 
Cook  V.  Humber    (11  C.  B.  N.   S. 

33),  283. 
Cook  V.  Neilson    (10  Pa.   St.   41), 

180. 
Cook  V.  Jones  (96  Ky.  283),  1391. 
Cook  V.  San.  Dist.  of  Chicago  (67 

111.  App.  286),  1287. 
Cook    V.    Sanford    (3    Dana,    Ky. 

237),  106. 
Cook  V.  Soule  (45  How.  Pr.  N.  Y. 

340),  563,  702. 
Cocke  V.  Brogan  (5  Ark.  693).  333. 
Cooke    V.    England    (27    Md.    14), 

860,  884,  878,  914. 
Cooke  V.  Loxley  (5  T.  R.  4),  576, 

921. 
Cooke  V.   Wilson    (1   C.    B.   N.    S. 

153),  105. 
Cooley  V.  Cummings  (16  N.  Y.  St. 

Rep.  947).  429. 
Cooley  V.  Willard  (34  111.  68),  567. 
Coolidge  V.  Hagar  (43  Vt.  9),  447. 


Ixxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Coombe    v.    Greene    (2    D.    N.    S. 

1023),  891,  912. 
Coomber  v.  Hefner  (86  Ind.  108), 

155. 
Coomber  v.  Howard  (1  C.  B.  440), 

522. 
Coombs  V.   Jordan    (3   Bland,   Ch. 

Md.  284),  291. 
Cooper  V.  Adams   (6  Cush.  Mass. 

87),  223. 
Cooper  V.  Cole  (38  Vt.  385),  1427. 
Cooper  V.  Gambill   (146  Ala.  184), 

165. 
Cooper    V.    Johnson     (143     Mass. 

108),  1269. 
Cooper    V.    Joy    (105    Mich.    374), 

1378. 
Cooper   V.   Kimball    (123    N.   Car. 

120),  1435. 
Cooper  V.  Kollstadt  (67  N.  Y.  Supp. 

181),  1142. 
Cooper   V.   Lawson    (12    Det.   Leg. 

N.  34),  831. 
Cooper   V.   Randall    (59    111.   317), 

704. 
Cooper    V.    Rankin    (5    Binn.    Pa. 

612),  97. 
Cooper  V.  Robinson    (10  M.  &  W. 

694),  343. 
Cooper  V.  Williams   (4  Ohio  253), 

116. 
Cope   V.    Gilbert    (4   Denio,   N.   Y. 

347),   568. 
Copeland    v.    Luttgen    (40    N.    Y. 

Supp.   653),   1176,   1347. 
Copeland  v.   State    (60   Ind.   394), 

10. 
Copeland  v.  Watts  (1  Starkie,  95), 

1221. 
Copper  V.  Fretnaransky  (16  N.  Y. 

Supp.  866),  555. 
Copper   Mining  Co.   v.   Beach    (13 

Beav.   478),   1370,   1372. 
Coppinger    v.    Armstrong     (5    111. 

App.    637).   336. 
Corbett  v.  Norcross  (35  N.  H.  99), 

334. 


Corbett's    Case     (3    Dyer,     280a), 

1200. 
Corby  v.  Brill  Book,  etc.  Co.    (76 

Mo.  App.  506),  163. 
Corby  v.  MacSpadden  (2  Mo.  App. 

Rep.  950),  191. 
Cordes   v.   Miller    (39   Mich.   581), 

872. 
Coro    V.    Greenwald     (102    N.    Y. 

Supp.   752),  527. 
Corey  v.   Bishop    (48  N.   H.   146), 

1333. 
Corle  V.  Monkhouse   (47  N.  J.  Eq. 

73),  1313. 
Corn   V.  Rosenthal    (1  Misc.  Rep. 

168),  1190. 
Corneliss    v.    DriscoU     (89    Mich. 

34),  1171,  1186. 
Cornell    v.    Lamb    (2    Cow.    N.    Y. 

652),   504. 
Cornell  v.  Vanartsdalen  (4  Pa.  St. 

364),  848,  907. 
Cornish  v.  Cleife   (11  L.  T.   606), 

891. 
Cornish  v.  Searell  (8  B.  &  C.  471), 

483,  512,  923,  1226. 
Cornish  v.  Stubbs   (39  L.  J.  C.  P. 

202),  140,  155. 
Corrigan  v.  Riley  (26  N.  J.  L.  79), 

82,  83,  920,  931. 
Corrigan  v.  Stillwell  (97  Me.  247), 

917. 
Coryton    v.    Litherbye    (2    Saund. 

115),  610. 
Cosser   v.    Collinge    (3   Myl.   &   K. 

283),  1098. 
Cotheal  v.  Talmage  (9  N.  Y.  551), 

586. 
Cottee  V.  Richardson  (7  Ex.  143), 

1232. 
Cotton    Mfg.    Corporation    v.    Mel- 

ven  (15  Mass.  268),  522. 
Couch  V.   Burke    (2   Hill,   S.   Car. 

534),  190. 
Couch  V.  Davidson  (109  Ala.  313), 

1454. 


TABLE   OF    CzVSES    CITED, 


Ixxiii 


[references    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Couch  V.  steel  (77  Eng.  C.  L.  402), 

916. 
Coudert  v.  Ck)hn  (118  N.  Y.  309), 

147. 
Cougle  V.  Densmore   (57  111.  App. 

591), 1165. 
Coughlin    V.    Coughlin     (26    Kan. 

116), 124. 
Coulter  V.  Norton  (100  Mich.  389), 

1142,1145. 
Countess    ot    Cumberland's    Case 

(Moore's  Rep.  812),  718. 
Countess   of   Plymouth   v.    Throg- 

morton  (1  Salk.  65),  539. 
Coupe   V.    Piatt    (172    Mass.    458), 

814. 
Courtney  v.  Lyndon  (128  Cal.  35), 

312. 
Coward  v.  Gregory  (15  L.  T.  279), 

661. 
Cowan   V.    Henika    (19    Ind.    App. 

45), 522. 
Cowan   V.   Truefitt    (67   L.   J.   Ch. 

695), 419. 
Cowell   V.   Lumley    (39   Cal.   151), 

851,1340. 
Cowen  V.   Sunderland    (145  Mass. 

363),  788,  805. 
Cowper    V.    Fletcher    (6    B.    &    S. 

464), 89. 
Cox   V.    Bent    (5    Bing.    185),    133, 

187,192. 
Cox  V.  Bishop    (8  De  G.,  M.  &  G. 

815), 1106. 
Cox  V.  Daughtery   (62  Ark.   629), 

957. 
Cox  V.  Knight  (18  C.  B.  645),  511. 
Cox  V.    Sammis    (68   N.   Y.    Supp. 

203), 155. 
Cox  V.  Wayt  (26  W.  Va.  807),  336. 
Coy  V.  Downie  (14  Fla.  544),  1340. 
Coyle  V.   Franklin    (54   Fed.   Rep. 

644), 960. 
Coyne  v.  Feiner    (16  N.  Y.   Supp. 

203), 243. 
Cozens  v.  Stevenson  (5  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

421), 463, 672. 


Craddock     v.     Riddlesbarger     (2 

Dana,  Ky.  205),  291,  1306,  1452. 
Craddock  v.  Stewart   (6  Ala.  77), 

17. 
Craig  V.  Butler    (156  N.  Y.  672), 

1357. 
Craig  V.  Gray   (1  Cal.  App.  598), 

155. 
Craig  V.  Summers  (47  Minn.  189), 

1014. 
Grain    v.    Wright    (36    Hun,    74), 

351. 
Cram  v.  Dresden  (4  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  120),  1176. 
Cram  v.  Kroger  (22  111.  74),  920. 
Crane  v.  Guthrie   (47  Iowa,  542), 

49. 
Cram  v.  Munro  (1  Edw.  Ch.  N.  Y. 

123), 1026. 
Cramer  v.  Grosecloes  (53  Mo.  App. 

684), 680. 
Crampton    v.    Van    Ness    (6    Fed. 

Gas.  No.  3,348),  937. 
Crane    v.     Hardaman     (4     E.     D. 

Smith,  N.  Y.  339),  564. 
Crane  v.  Morris  (6  Pet.  U.  S.  .598), 

21. 
Crane  v.  O'Reiley    (8  Mich.   312), 

198. 
Crane  v.  Partland   (9  Mich.  493), 

366. 
Crane    v.    Patton    (57    Ark.    340), 

270. 
Cranston  v.  Rogers   (83  Ga.  750), 

1413. 
Crane  Elevator  Co.  v.  Lippert  (63 

Fed.  Rep.  942),  814,  815. 
Craske    v.    Christian    Union    Pub. 

Co.  (17  Hun,  N.  Y.  319),  146. 
Cratty    v.    Collins     (13    111.    567), 

1326. 
Crawford    v.    Armstrong    (58    Mo. 

App.  214),  563. 
Crawford  v.  Bertholf  (1  N.  J.  Eq. 

458), 349. 
Crawford    v.    Coil    (69    Mo.    588), 

1467 


Lxxiv 


TABLE   OP    CASES   CITED. 


[eeferences  are  to  pages.] 


Crawford  v.  Kastner  (63  How.  Pr. 

N.  Y.  90),  1382. 
Crawford  t.  Longstreet   (43  N.  J. 

Law,  325),  63,  65. 
Crawford  v.  Morris   (5  Gratt.  Va. 

90),  162,  462. 
Crawford    v.    Newton    (36    W.    R. 

54),  888. 
Crawford  v.  Redding  (8  Misc.  Rep. 

306), 1152. 
Crawford  v.  West  Side  Bank  (100 

N.  Y.  50),  343. 
Crawford    v.   Wick    (18    Ohio    St. 

190), 384. 
Crawley  v.  Price   (L.  R.  10  Q.  B. 

302),  622,  632,  1055. 
Creager  v.   Creager   (10  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  4240),  1119. 
Creagh  v.  Blood  (3  Jr.  &  Lat.  133), 

1199. 
Creech  v.  Crockett  (5  Cush.  Mass. 

133), 234. 
Creech    v.    Grainger     (106    N.    C. 

213), 54. 
Creighton   v.    Finlayson    (46   Neb. 

457), 103. 
Creighton  v.  Sanders  (89  111.  543), 

384. 
Crescent  City  WTiarf  &  Lighterage 

Co.  V.  Simpson  (77  Cal.  286),  61, 

331. 
Cressfield    v.    Morrison    (7    C.    B. 

286).  1089. 
Cressler  v.  Williams  (80  Ind.  366), 

262. 
Creveling   v.    De   Hart    (54    N.    J. 

Law,  338),  1093. 
Creveling  v.   West   End   Iron   Co. 

(51  N.  J.  Law,  34),  641. 
Crewes  v.  Burcham  (1  Black,  352), 

39. 
Crill    V.    Jeffrey    (95    Iowa,    634), 

1414. 
Crinkley  v.  Egerton  (11  N.  C.  444), 

318, 1435. 
Crippen  v.  Morrison  (13  Mich.  23), 

29,33. 


Cripps  V.  Blank   (9  D.  &  R.  480)^ 

925. 
Crisp  V.  Churchill   (4  R.  R.  822), 

772. 
Crisp  V.  Price  (5  Taunt.  548),  442. 
Critchfield    v.    Remsley    (21    Neb. 

1-8), 158. 
Croade    v.     Ingraham     (13    Pick. 

Mass.  33),  118,  518,  932. 
Crockett  v.  Althouse  (35  Mo.  App., 

404),  527,  924. 
Crockett    v.    Campbell    (21    Tenn. 

411),  333. 
Crockett  v.   Crockett    (2  Ohio  St. 

180), 717. 
Croft  V.  Lumley  (5  El.  &  Bl.  648)^ 

612,  736,  1067. 
Crofton  V.  Ormsby  (2  Sch.  &  Lef. 

583), 1003. 
Cromie   v.    Hoover    (40    Ind.    49), 

1264. 
Crommelin  v.  Thiess  (31  Ala.  412), 

195,  1044,  1176,  1180. 
Cromwell  v.  Andrews    (Cro.   Eliz. 

15),  531. 
Croney,  In  re  (6  Fed.  Cas.  3411), 

1120. 
Cronin    v.    Rogers    (1    Cob.    &   E. 

348), 890. 
Crook    V.    Crook    (20    Abb.    N.    C. 

249), 1391. 
Crook    V.    Hewit    (4    Wash.    749), 

430,  684. 
Crosby  v.  Brodbury    (20  Me.   61), 

437. 
Crosby  v.   Donnowsky    (69   S.   W. 

Rep.  612),  956. 
Crosby  v.  Home  &  Danz  Co.    (45 

Minn.  249),  258. 
Crosby  v.  Loop  (13  111.  625),  491, 

1112. 
Crosby    v.    Wadsworth     (6    East, 

602), 385. 
Cross  V.  Tome   (14  Md.  247),  505. 
Cross  V.  United   States   (81  U.   S. 

479),  560. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ixxv 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Cross  V.  Weare  Commission    (153 

111.  499),  1109. 
Crossman's    Sons,    J.    v.    Sanders 

(114  La.  958),  1112. 
Crotty  V.  Collins  (13  111.  567),  676. 
Crouch  V.   Briles    (7  J.  J.  Marsh. 

Ky.  255),  519,  573. 
Crouch  V.   Fowle    (9   N.   H.    219), 

698. 
Crouse  v.  Frothingham    (97  N.  Y. 

105), 1060. 
Crouse  v.  Mitchell  (9  Leg.  N.  74), 

lOSI. 
Crowder  v.  Shackelford   (35  Miss. 

320), 52. 
Crowe  V.   Riley    (63   Ohio    St.   1), 

1044. 
Crowe  V.  Wilson  (65  Md.  479),  720. 
Crowell  V.   Currier    (27  N.  J.   Eq. 

152), 533. 
Crowell  V.  Railroad  Co.    (61  Miss. 
631), 704. 
Crowley  v.  Vitty  (7  Ex.  319),  555, 

1199. 
Crowley    v.    Gormley    (69    N.    Y. 

Supp.  576),  1086. 
Crown   Mfg.   Co.   v.   Gay    (9   Ohio 

Dec.  420),  1178,  1183,  1214. 
Crune     v.     Prideaux      (10     East, 

187),  8. 
Crusoe  v.  Bugby    (2  W.  Bl.  776), 

743,1051. 
Crusselle   v.    Pugh    (67    Ga.    430), 

873. 
Crutchfield   v.   Remaley    (21   Neb. 

178),  139. 
Crystal    Springs   Distillery   Co.   v. 

Cox  (67  Fed.  Rep.  693),  905. 
Cubberly  v.  Cubberly  (33  N.  J.  Eq. 

82),53i 
Cubbins   v.    Ay  res    (4    Lea,   Tenn. 

329), 1250. 
Cudlip    V.    Rundle     (Carth.    263), 

223. 
Cudworth  v.  Scott  (41  N.  H.  456), 

1427. 

f 


Culton  V.  Gilchrist  (92  Iowa,  718), 

243,  252,  254. 
Culverhouse    v.    Worts     (32    Mo. 

App.  419),  33,  1112,  1228. 
Cummings   v.   Adam    (4   N.   J.   L. 

215), 1213. 
Cummings    v.    Ayer     (188     Mass. 

292), 861. 
Cummings  v.  Kilpatrick  (23  Miss. 

106),  920. 
Cummings  v.  Rosenberg   (6  Misc. 

Rep.  538),  34. 
Cummings  v.  Smith   (114  111.  App. 

35), 483. 
Cummings    v.    Perry    (169    Mass. 

150), 425. 
Cummings  v.  Watson    (149   Mass. 

262), 54. 
Cunning  v.  Tittabawasee  Boom  Co. 

(88  Mich.  237),  937. 
Cunningham  v.   Pattee    (98  Mass. 

248),  84,  1369. 
Cunningham  v.  Wathen    (14  App. 

Div.  553),  470,  1072. 
Cunningham    v.    Baxley    (96    Ind. 

367),  41,  47. 
Cunningham    v.    Holton    (55    Me. 

33),  213,  223,  689. 
Cunningham    v.    Horton    (57    Me. 

420),  690. 
Curds  V.  Forts  (9  Ky.  43),  326. 
Curling  v.   Mills    (7   Scott,   N.   R. 

709), 257. 
Curran    v.    Flammer     (62    N.    Y. 

Supp.  1061),  847. 
Currie  v.   White    (45   N.   Y.   822), 

536. 
Currier  v.  Earl   (13  Me.  216),  212. 

230. 
Currier    v.    Gale    (9    Allen,    Mass. 

522), 237. 
Currier  v.  Perley   (24  N.  H.  219), 

162,208. 
Curry  v.  Bank  (8  Port,  Ala.  360), 

65. 
Curtice    v.    Thompson    (19    N.    H. 

471),  794. 


Ixxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[EEFEEENCFS    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Curtis  V.  Blair  (26  Miss.  309),  98. 
Curtis   V.   Galvin    (1   Allen,   Mass. 

215), 209. 
Curtis  V.  Hollenbeck  (92  111.  App. 

34), 573. 
Curtis  V.  Pierce   (115  Mass.  186), 

1023. 
Curtis    V.    Smith    (35    Conn.    156, 

158), 437. 
Curtis   V.    Spitty    (1   Bing.   N.   C. 

17),  575. 
Curtis    V.    Sturgls    (64    Mo.    App. 

535), 1378. 
Curtis  V.  Treat  (21  Me.  525),  258. 
Curtiss  V.  Miller   (17  Barb.  N.  Y. 

477), 1238. 
Cusack   V.    Gunning   System    (109 

111.  App.  588),  1386. 
Cuschner  v.   Westlake    (43   Wash. 

690),  1096,  1099,  1240. 
Gushing  v.  Adams  (18  Pick.  Mass. 

110),  439,  440. 
Cushing     V.     Kenfield     (5     Allen, 

Mass.  307),  679,  680. 
Cuthbert  v.  Kuhn    (3  Whart.  Pa. 

357), 507. 
Cuthbertson  v.  Irving   (6  H.  &  N. 

135),  489,  923,  926,  941,  953. 
Cutter  V.  Hamlen  (Mass.  18  N.  E. 

Rep.  397),  796. 
Cutting  V.  Derby  (2  Black,  1075), 

87. 
Cutts   V.   York,    etc.    Co.    (18    Me. 

190), 343. 


Dahm    v.    Barlow    (93    Ala.    120), 

644. 
Dair  v.  Buffum  (51  Me.  160),  1264. 
Dakin   v.   Williams    (21  Wend.   N. 

Y.  457),  645,  1059. 
Dakota  Hot  Springs  Co.  v.  Young 

(9  S.  D.  577),  663. 
Dalay  v.  Rice  (145  Mass.  38),  827. 
Dalay  v.   Savage    (145   Mass.   33), 

792. 


Dale  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (132  N. 

C.  705),  686. 
Dale  V.  Wood  (2  Barn.  &  Ad.  724), 

274. 
Daley  v.  Quick   (99  Cal.  179),  96, 

788. 
Dallas  V.  Pool  (3  Mete.  Mass.  350), 

228. 
Dallemand  v.  Manon  (4  Colo.  App. 

262), 122. 
Dallman  v.   King    (4   Bing.   N.   C. 

105), 909. 
Dalton  V.   Gidson    (77  N.   E.  Rep. 

1035), 873. 
Dalton  V.  Laudahn  (27  Mich.  529), 

523. 
Daly  V.  Wise  (132  N.  Y.  306),  476, 

782,  785,  786,  1051,  1355. 
Dame  v.  Dame  (38  N.  H.  429),  189, 

209. 
Damery  v.  Ferguson   (48  111.  App. 

224),  1315. 
Damren    v.    Power    Co.     (91    Me. 

334),  495. 
Dana    v.    Burke    (62    N.    H.    627), 

1248. 
Dana  v.  Fiedler    (1  E.  D.   Smith, 

N.  Y.  463),  537. 
Dananberg  v.  Reinheimer    (53  N.' 

Y.  Supp,  794),  1081. 
Danby  v.  Hoffman  (3  E.  D.  Smith, 

N.  Y.  361),  1094. 
Dand  v.  Kingscote  (6  Mee.  &  Wei. 

197), 1115. 
Danforth   v.    Sargeant    (14    Mass. 

491),  156,  158. 
Daniels  v.   Bond    (21   Pick.   Mass. 

367), 222. 
Daniels  v.  Brown   (34  N.  H.  454), 

309. 
Daniels  v.  Davison  (16  Ves.  249), 

497,1075. 
Daniels  v.  Logan   (47   Iowa,  295), 

1136,1182. 
Daniels   v.   Pond    (21   Pick.   Mass. 

367),  679,  1331. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Lxxvii 


[referexces  are  to  pages.] 


Daniels    v.    Richardson    (22    Pick. 

Mass.  565),  20,  24,  543. 
Daniels    v.    Straw    (53    Fed.    Rep. 

327),  1382. 
Daniels  v.  Willis    (7  Minn.   295), 

571. 
Danielson    v.    Davidson    (16    Ves. 

253), 996. 
Dann   v.    Spurrier    (3    Bos.    N.   P. 

399),  374,  376. 
Danziger  v.  Falkenberg   (64  Hun, 

635),  1238,  1347,  1348. 
Danziger  v.  Hoyt  (46  Hun.  N.  Y. 

270), 549. 
Danziger  v.   Silberthau    (18  N.  Y. 

Supp.  350),  726. 
Danziger  v.  Williams    (91  Pa.  St. 

234), 535. 
D'Appuzo   V.    Albright    (76    N.    Y. 

Supp.  654),  583. 
Darby  v.  Anderson  (1  Nott.  &  Me. 

S.  C.  369),  920. 
Darby    v.    Jarndt     (85    Mo.    App. 

274), 1430. 
Darcey  v.  Steger   (50  N.  Y.  Supp. 

638), 1076. 
D'Arcy  v.  Martin   (63  Miph.  602), 

369. 
D'Arcy  v.  Miller  (86  111.  102),  870. 
Darity  v.  Darity    (71   S.  W.  Rep. 

950), 99. 
Dark  v.  Donelson's  Lessee  (2  Yerg. 

Tenn.  249),  223. 
Darke  v.  Bowditch   (8  Q.  B.  973), 

621. 
Darling  v.   Kelly    (113  Mass.   29), 

685. 
Darlington   v.   De  Wald    (194   Pa. 

St.  305),  896. 
Darmstaetter     v.     Hoffman      (120 

Mich.  48),  1086. 
Darnall  v.  Hill    (12  Gill  &  J.  Md. 

139), 22. 
Darrell  v.  Johnson  (17  Pick.  Mass. 

263), 156. 
Darrill  v.  Stevens  (4  McCord  S.  C. 

39), 141. 


Darse    v.    Fischer    (10    Ohio    Dec. 

163), 814. 
Dart  V.   Barbour    (32   Mich.   271), 

451. 
Dartford  Co.  v.  Till  (95  L.  T.  636), 

752. 
Dartnal  v.  Morgan  (Cro.  ifac.  598), 

560. 
Darwin  v.  Potter  (5  Denio,  N.  Y. 

306),  564,  879. 
Dasher  v.  Ellis  (102  Ga.  830),  957. 
Dashiell  v.  Washington  Market  Co. 

(10  App.  D.  C.  81),  818. 
Dassori  v.  Zarek  (75  N.  Y.  Supp. 

841),  1090. 
Dater  v.  Earl  (3  Gray,  Mass.  482), 

776. 
Dauchy  Iron  Works  v.  McKim  Cas- 
ket   &    Mfg.    Co.    (85    111.    App. 

584),    522. 
Dausch   v.    Crane    (109    Mo.    323), 

484,958. 
Davenport  v.  Magoon  (13  Oreg.  3), 

708. 
Davenport    v.    Regina    (47    L.    J. 

P.  C.  8),  642,  655. 
Davenport  v.  United  States  (26  Ct. 

CI.  338),  895. 
David    V.    Beelman    (5    La.    Ann. 

545), 1178. 
David  V.  Ryan  (47  Iowa,  642),  872,, 

883. 
David   Bradley  &  Co.   v.   Peabody 

Coal  Co.    (99   111.  App.  427),  35. 
Davidson  v.  Crump  (99  Mich.  501), 

1265,  1270,  1375. 
Davidson    v.     Davidson     (28     La. 

Ann.  269),  974. 
Davidson  v.  Ellmaker  (84  Cal.  21), 

923. 
Davidson    d.    Bromley   v.    Stanley 

(4  Burr.  2210),  1201,  1202,  1214. 
Davies  v.  Edwards  (3  M.  &  S.  3S0), 

559, 582. 
Davies  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York 

(83  N.  Y.  207),  73. 


Ixxviii 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Davies  v.  Oliver   (1  Ridgw.  P.  C. 

1),479. 
Davies  v.  Thomas    (6  Exch.  858), 

187. 
Davis    V.    Baldwin    (66    Mo.    App. 

577),  158,  388. 
Davis    v.*  Bridges    (2    Roll's   Abr. 

25),  112. 
Davis    V.    Brocklebank    (9    N.    H. 

73),  1306. 
Davis    V.    Buffum    (51    Me.    160), 

1296. 
Davis  V.   Burrill    (10   C.   B.   822), 

1032. 
Davis  V.  Caldwell  (12  Cush.  Mass. 

512),  18. 
Davis  V.   Cincinnati    (36   Ohio   St. 

24), 1034. 
Davis  V.  Clancey  (3  McCord,  S.  C. 

422), 686. 
Davis  V.  Days  (42  S.  C.  69),  1409. 
Davis   V.    Del.    &   Hud.    Canal    Co. 

(109  N.  Y.  47,  51),  932. 
Davis  V.   George    (67  N.   H.   393), 

782,  787,  905. 
Davis  V.  Hamilton   (71  Ind.  135), 

516. 
Davis  V.  Harkncss  (6  111.  173),  11. 
Davis    V.    Jewett    (13    N.    Y.    88), 

679. 
Davis   V.    McGrew    (82    Cal.    135), 

924. 
Davis  V.   Morris    (31   N.  Y.    569), 

1048,  1090,  1096. 
Davis   V.    Moss    (38   Pa.    St.   346), 

1250,  1288. 
Davis  V.  Murphy  (126  Mass.  143), 

208. 
Davis  V.  Nash    (32  Me.  411),  679, 

680. 
Davis   V.   Pacific   Power   Co.    (107 

Cal.  563),  801. 
Davis  V.  Porter  (10  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.  243),  1244. 
Davis  V.  Pou  (108  Ala.  443),  938. 
Davis  V.  Robert  (89  Ala.  402),  276. 


Davis   V.   Ross   138   Pa.    St.   346), 

1264. 
Davis  V.  Smith  (26  R.  I.  129),  790. 
Davis  V.  Thompson   (13  Me.  209), 

208,  216,  1306. 
Davis  V.  Young  (20  Ala.  151),  686. 
Davis  V.  "Washington  (18  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  67),  1422. 
Davis  V.  Watts  (90  Ind.  372),  22. 
Davis  V.  Wiley  (4  111.  234),  601. 
Davis  V.  Williams    (Ala.   1901,   30 

So.  Rep.  488),  922. 
Davis  V.  Wilson    (86  Tenn.   519), 

1430. 
Davis'    Adm'r   v.    Smith    (15    Mo. 

467), 1340. 
Davison  v.  Donadi  (2  E.  D.  Smith, 

N.  Y.  121),  1238. 
Davison  v.  Gent  (1  H.  &  N.  744), 

1213. 
Davison  v.  Stanley  (4  Burr.  2210), 

1200. 
Dawes  v.  Dowling   (31  L.  T.  65), 

194,576. 
Dawson    v.    Coffey    (48    Mo.    App. 

109), 1431. 
Dawson  v.  Coffman  (28  Ind.  220), 

708. 
Dawson   v.   Dyer    (5   Barn.   &  Ad. 

584), 1387. 
Dawson  v.  Sloan   (100  N.  Y.  620), 

814. 
Day  V.  Adams  (42  Vt.  510),  333. 
Day  V.  Austin  (Owen,  70),  1256. 
Day  V.  Bisbitch   (Cro.  Eliz.  374), 

1256. 
Day   V.    Cochran    (24   Miss.    261), 

234.     . 
Day  V.  Hammond   (57  N.  Y.  479), 

569, 1274. 
Day  V.  Watson  (8  Mich.  535),  1131, 

1182,1213. 
Dayton  v.  Cralk    (26  Minn.   133), 

1198. 
Dayton    v.    Vandoozer    (39    Mich, 

749),  1324,  1331. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


Ixxix 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Deamond  v.  Harris  (33  Tex.  634), 

1340. 
Dean  v.  De  Lezardi  (24  Miss.  424), 

342. 
Dean  v.  Murphy  (169  Mass.  413), 

810. 
Deane  v.  Caldwell  (127  Mass.  242), 

1120,1338. 
Deane  v.  Hutchinson  (40  N.  J.  Eq. 

83),  1110,  1244. 
Dearmond  v.   Dearmond    (10    Ind. 

191), 349. 
Deaton  v.  Taylor  (90  Va.  219),  654. 
De  Bardeleben  v.   Crosby    (5  Ala. 

363), 1465. 
Debow  V.   Colfax    (10   N.   J.   Law, 

128),  1309,  1310,  1331. 
Debozear  v.  Butler  (2  Grant  Cases, 

Pa.  417),  1228. 
Decliarms  v.  Harwood  (4  Maule  & 

Sel.  400),  90. 
Decker  v.  Adams    (12  N.  J.  Law, 

99),  142,  234. 
Decker   v.    Clarke    (26    N.    J.    Bq. 

163),  1111. 
Decker  v.  Gardner  (124  N.  Y.  334), 

1122. 
Decker  v.  Gaylord    (8  Hun,  N.  Y. 

310),  331,  591. 
Decker    v.     Hartshorn    (60    N.    J. 

Law,  548),  262,  1214,  1221. 
Decker  v.    Livingston    (15   Johns. 

N.  Y.  479),  87,  90,  550. 
Decker  v.  Sexton  (43  N.  Y.  Supp. 

167), 169. 
De    Clurq    v.    Barber    Paving    Co. 

(167  111.  215),  1023. 
De  Coursey  v.  De  Coursey   (64  S. 

W.  Rep.  912),  939. 
De  Coursey  v.   Guarantee   T.   Co. 

(81  Pa.  St.  217),  1112. 
Deer  v.  Doherty    (26  Pittsb.  Leg. 

J.  Pa.  104),  441. 
De  Forest  v.  Byrne  (1  Hilt.  N.  Y. 

43),  616,  757. 
De   Friest  v.   Bradley    (192   Mass. 

346), 1362. 


De  Frieze  v.  Quint   (94  Cal.  662), 

965. 
De  Giberville  v.  Stolle  (9  Mb.  App. 

185), 173. 
Degnario   v.    Sire    (34   Misc.   Rep. 

163),  597. 
De  Graffenreid  v.  Wallace   (53  S. 

W.  Rep.  452),  836. 
De  Jarnette  v.  McDaniel  (93  Ala. 

215), 968. 
Delamater  v.  Bush  (63  Barb.  168), 

460. 
De  Lancey  v.  Ganong  (9  N.  Y.  9), 

632,960. 
Delaney  v.  Flanagan  (41  Mo.  App. 

651),  139,  146,  151,  154. 
Delano  v.  Montague  (4  Cush.  Mass. 

42), 235. 
Delany  v.  Fox  (2  C.  B.  N.  S.  768), 

921,938. 
Delashman    v.    Berry     (20    Mich. 

292), 1378. 
Delaware  &  H.  C.  Co.  v.  Van  Storch 

5  Lack.  Leg.  N.  89),  1023. 
Deller    v.    Hofferberth    (127    Ind. 

414),  836,  873. 
Dellinger  v.   Gillespie    (118   N.   C. 

737), 361. 
Delmar    Inv.    Co.    v.    Blumenfeld 

(118  Mo.  App.  308),  1129,  1148. 
De  Loach  v.  Delk   (47  S.  E.  Rep. 

204),  311. 
De  Loge's  Adm'r  v.  Hall   (31  Mo. 

473),  33L 
Delph   V.   White    (12   N.    Y.    296), 

1080. 
Deluise  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.   (66 

N.  E.  Rep.  1106),  695. 
Demarest  v.  Willard  (8  Cow.  N.  Y. 

206),  615,  1112. 
Demi   v.    Hosier    (1    P.   &   W.    Pa. 

224), 1308. 
De  Morat  v.  Falkenhagen  (148  Pa. 

St.  393),  1218. 
Dempsey  v.  Kipp   (61  N.  Y.  462), 

962. 


K'xx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Den  V.  Drake  (14  N.  J.  Law,  523), 

191. 
Den    V.    Johnson    (15    N.    J.   Law, 

116), 331. 
Den  V.  Kinney    (5  N.  J.  L.  552), 

716. 
Den  V.  Post   (25  N.  J.  Law,  285), 

622. 
Den  V.  Quimby  (3  N.  J.  Law,  985), 

21. 
Den    V.    Rawlins    (10    East,    261), 

511. 
Den  ex  dem.  Bockover  v.  Post  (25 

N.  J.  Law,  285),  1052. 
Denechaud    v.    Trisconi     (26    La. 

Ann.  402),  712. 
Dengler    v.    Michelssen     (78    Cal. 

125),  1087,  1190. 
Denham  v.  Harris    (13  Ala.  465), 

1441. 
De  Nicols  t.    Saunders    (39   L.   J. 

C.  P.  297),  531. 

De  Nicholls  v.  Saunders  (22  L.  T. 

661),  500. 
Denike  v.  N.  Y.  &  Rosedale  Co.  (80 

N.  Y.  599),  61. 
Denman    v.    Lopez    (12    La.    Ann. 

823), 1347. 
Denn.    dem.    Jacklin   v.    Cartright 

(4  East,  29),  130. 
Denn.   d.   Peters  v.  Hopkinson    (3 

D.  &  R.  507),  466. 

Denn.  d.  Warren  v.  Fearnside   (1 

Wils.  176),  196. 
Dennick  v.  Elkdahl   (102  111.  App. 

199),  1131.  1136,  1176. 
Dennis  v.  Maynard    (15   111.  457), 

65. 
Dennis    v.    Miller     (53    Atl.    Rep. 

394), 1195. 
Dennison  v.  Grove  (53  N.  .1.  Law, 

144),  480,  782. 
Dennison    v.    Read    (3    Dana,    Ky. 

586),  622. 
Dennlson's   Ex'rs   v.    Wertz    (7    S. 

&  R.  Pa.  372),  1220. 


Dennistoun  r.  Hubbel   (10  Bos.  N. 

Y.  155),  1062. 
Denton    v.    Taylor    (90   Va.    219), 

645,  1058. 
Depard   v.   Wallbridge    (15   N.    Y. 

374), 1379. 
De   Pere  Co.  v.   Raynor    (65  Wis. 

271),  317,  943. 
Depuy  V.  Silver  (1  Clark,  Pa.  388), 

564. 
Derby  v.  Brandt   (90  N.  Y.  Supp. 

980), 1126. 
De    Ridder    v.    Schermerhorn    (10 

Barb.  N.  Y.  638),  331. 
Derrick    v.    Luddy    (64    Vt.    462), 

927,948. 
De    Rutte    v.    Muldrow     (16    Cal. 

505), 981. 
Desban    v.    Pickett    (16    La.    Ann. 

350),  1446. 
Descarlett  v.  Dennet  (9  Mod.  22), 

666. 
Desha  v.  Pope  (6  Ala.  691),  1445. 
De   Silva  v.   Flynn    (9   City  Prov. 

Rep.  N.  Y.  426),  291. 
Deslandes  v.  Gregory    (2  E.  &  E. 

602), 105. 
Des  Moines  Co.,  etc.  v.  Tubbessing 

(87  Iowa,  138),  277. 
Despard  v.  Wallbridge    (15  N.  Y. 

374), 935. 
De  Tarr   v.   Ferd.   Heim   Brewing 

Co.    (62  Kan.  188),  836. 
De  Taslet  v.  Croussellat  (1  Wash. 

C.  C.  504),  1042. 
Detwiler's  Appeal  (96  Pa.  St.  323), 

1119. 
Devacht's   Lessee    v.    Newsam    (3 

Ohio,  57),  920,  934. 
Devoe   v.    Railway   Co.    (63    N.    J. 

Law,  276),  836. 
Devlin  &  Co.,  In  re  (48  N.  Y.  Supp. 

950),  1062. 
Devonshire  (Duke)  v.  Brookshaw 

(81  L.  T.  83).  748. 
Doutsfh  v.  Chemical  Co.   (11  Ohio 

Dec.  495),  300. 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


]yxxi 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Dewey  v.  Lambier  (7  Cal.  347),  90. 
De  Witt  V.  Harvey  (4  Gray,  Mass. 

486), 84. 
De  Witt  V.  Pierson  (112  Mass.  8), 

1136,  1160,  1168,  1176. 
De  Witt  V.  Sullivan  (8  Cal.  592), 

936. 
De  Wolf  V.  Martin  (12  R.  I.  535), 

21,924. 
Dexter   v.    King    (8    N.    Y.    Supp. 

489), 863. 
Dexter   v.    Manly    (4   Cush.   Mass. 

14),  697,  1185. 
Dexter  v.  Phillips  (121  Mass.  178), 

539. 
Dexter  v.  Tree  (117  111.  532),  409. 
Dey  V.  Greenbaum  (152  N.  Y.  641), 

1069. 
Deyo  V.  Bleakley   (24  Barb.  N.  Y. 

9)  347. 
Dial  V.  Levy  (39  S.  C.  265),  1084. 
Diamond    Plate-Glass    Co.    v.    Ter- 
rell (22  Ind.  App.  346),  456. 
Dickerson   v.   Merriman    (100    111. 

342),  349. 
Dickinson  v.  Consolidated  Traction 

Co.   (119  Fed.  Rep.  817),  66. 
Dickinson    v.    Conway    (12    Allen, 

Mass.  487),  101. 
Dickinson  v.  Goodspeed    (8  Cush. 

Mass.  119),  f89,  690. 
Dickey  v.  Harper   (6  Yerg.  Tenn. 

280), 147. 
Dickson  v.  Hunt   (Ohio,  13  Wkly. 

Law  Bui.  13),  1173. 
Dickson    v.    Kempinsky    (96    Mo. 

252), 473. 
Diehl  V.  Lee  (Pa.  1887,  9  Atl.  Rep. 

865), 1207, 1209. 
Dierig  v.  Callahan  (70  N.  Y.  Supp. 

210), 1220. 
Dietz  v.  Kucks  (Cal.  45  Pac.  Rep. 

832), 1092. 
Dietz  V.  Winehill   (6  Wash.  109), 

28. 
Diffenderfer  v.  St.  L.  Pub.  School 

(120  Mo.  447),  1370. 


Digby  V.  Atkinson  (4  Camp.  275), 

140,  144,  883. 
Dill   V.    School   Board   of   City  of 

Camden  (47  N.  J.  Eq.  421),  441. 
Dillingham  v.  Jenkins  (7  S.  &  M. 

Miss.  479),  41. 
Dillon  V.  Brown    (11  Gray,  Mass. 

179),  228. 
Dillon  V.  Carrol  (2  Luz.  L.  R.  89), 

855. 
Dillon    V.    Wilson    (24    Mo.    278), 

1309. 
Dilworth  v.  Rice  (48  Mo.  124),  54. 
Dimmock    v.    Daly    (9    Mo.    App. 

354),  1131,  1145. 
Dinehart  v.  Wilson   (15  Barb.  N. 

Y.  595), 309. 
Ding   V.    Kennedy    (7   Colo.    App. 

72),  91. 
Dingley  v.  Buffum    (57  Me.  381), 

223,1264. 
Dingman  v.  Kelley   (7   Ind.  717), 

336. 
Dircks    v.    Brant    (56    Md.    500), 

1309. 
Dishman    v.    Huetter    (41    Wash. 

626), 741. 
Disselharst    v.    Cadogan     (21    111. 

App.  179),  491,  492. 
District   of   Columbia   v.    Johnson 

(1  Mackey,  D.  C.  51),  925. 
District    Township    of    Corwin    v. 

Morehead  (43  Iowa,  466),  382. 
Dix    V.    Atkins    (130    Mass.    171), 

1364. 
Dixon   V.   Ahearn    (19   Nev.    422), 

258,  573. 
Dixon  V.  Bradford  (73  L.  J.  K.  B. 

136), 165. 
Dixon  v.  Buell  (21  111.  App.  203), 

1117. 
Dixon  V.  Finnegan    (Mo.  1904,  81 

S.  W.  Rep.  576),  336,  920. 
Dixon  V.  Haley  (16  111.  145),  235. 
Dixon  V.  Nicolls   (39  111.  372),  49, 

522. 
Dixon  v.  Roe  (7  C.  B.  134),  634. 


Ixxxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Dixon  V.  Stewart  (113  N.  C.  410), 

920. 
Doane  V.  Garretson  (24  Iowa,  351), 

1409. 
Doane  v.  The  Broad  Street  Ass'n 

(6  Mass.  332),  448. 
Dobschuetz    v.    Halliday    (82    111. 

371), 1254. 
Dockham  v.  Parker   (9  Me.  137), 

1318. 
Dockrill  v.  Schenck  (37  111.  App. 

44),  176. 
Dockstader  v.  Young  Men's  C.  A. 

(109  N.  W.  Rep.  906),  272. 
Dodd  V.  Acklom  (6  Man.  &  G.  673), 

1199,  1207,  1210,  1226. 
Dodd  V.  Bartholomew  (44  Ohio  St. 

171),  341. 
Dodd  V.  Butler  (7  Mo.  App.  583). 

326. 
Dodd  V.  Rothschild  (31  Misc.  Rep. 

721),  836,  837. 
Dodge  V.  Lambert  (2  Bosw.  N.  Y. 

570),  758. 
Dodge  V.  Phelan  (2  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

441), 950. 
Doe  V.  Allen  (8  T.  R.  148),  401. 
Doe  V.  Amey  (12  Ad.  &  El.  476), 

147. 
Doe  V.  Ashburner    (5  T.  R.  163), 

240. 
Doe   V.   Ashman    (22   N.   J.    Law, 

261),  936. 
Doe  V.   Bancks    (4   B.   &  A.   401), 

642. 
Doe  V.  Benjamin  (9  Ad.  &  E.  644), 

244. 
Doe   V.    Bevan    (3    M.    &    S.    353), 

1054,1322. 
Doe  V.  Black  (8  C.  &  P.  464),  370. 
Doe  V.  Boulter  (6  Ad.  &  El.  675), 

483. 
Doe    V.    Brooks    (2    Campb.    257), 

172. 
Doe  V.  Brown  (5  IMackf.  Ind.  309), 

24. 
Doo  V.  Burt  (1  T.  R.  701),  456. 


Doe  V.  Butcher  (1  Doug.  50),  5. 
Doe  V.  Clayton  (73  Ala.  359),  485. 
Doe  V.  Clare  (2  T.  R.  739),  246. 
Doe    V.    Clifford    (4    Dowl.    &    Ry. 

248), 168. 
Doe  V.  Collings  (7  C.  B.  939),  147. 
Doe  V.  Dixon  (9  East,  15),  454. 
Doe  V.  Edwards  (5  Ad.  &  El.  95), 

483. 
Doe  V.  Elsom  (1  M.  &  M.  189),  770. 
Doe  V.  Fleming   (2  Ohio,  501),  84. 
Doe  V.  Giles  (5  Ring.  421),  232. 
Doe  V.   Godwin    C4  M.   &  S.   265), 

665,  770,  1055. 
Doe  V.   Gordan    (4   M.   &  S.   265), 

622. 
Doe  V.  Gladwin  (6  Q.  B.  953),  659. 
Doe  V.  Groves  (15  East,  244),  244. 
Doe  V.  Guy  (4  Esp.  154),  55. 
Doe  V.  Hall,  Benson   (4  B.  &  Aid. 

588), 466. 
Doe  V.  Hayes   (7  Taunt.  222),  55. 
Doe  V.  Hogg   (4  Dowl.  &  R.  226), 

665. 
Doe  V.   Jones  115   M.  &  W.   580), 

962. 
Doe  V.  Keeling   (1  M.  &  Sel.  95), 

770. 
Doe  V.  Lucas  (5  Esp.  155),  175. 
loe  V.  Lyde  (1  T.  R.  393),  43. 
Doe   V.    Maisey    (8    Bar.    &    Cres. 

767), 232. 
Doe  V.   Miles    (1    Stark.    181),   44, 

370. 
Doe  V.  Morse  (1  B.  &  Ad.  365),  515. 
Doe  V.  Palmer  (16  East,  36),  177. 
Doe  V.  Peck  (1  Barn.  &  Adol.  428), 

1038. 
Doe  V.  Porter  (3  T.  R.  13),  158. 
Doe  V.  Rees    (4  Bing.  N.  C.  384), 

647. 
Doe  V.  Rees  (6  Car.  &  P.  610),  962. 
Doe   V.   Sandham    (1   T.   R.   705), 

364, 1340. 
Doe  V.  Smith    (8  Ad.  &  El.   255), 

483. 
Doe  V.   Smith    (6  East,  530),  246. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ixxxiii 


r REFERENCES    ARE    TO    PAGES.] 


Doe  V.  Spiller  (6  Esp.  70),  166. 
Doe  V.  Spry  (1  Barn.  &  Ad.  617), 

770. 
Doe  V.  Stevens   (3  B.  &  Ad.  299), 

612,  663. 
Doe  V.  Turner    (7   M.  &  W.  226), 

228. 
Doe  V.  Weller    (7  T.  R.  478),  25, 

160. 
Doe  V.  Wilkinson   (3  Bar.  &  Cres. 

413), 511. 
Doe  V.  Withewick  (10  J.  B.  Moore, 

267), 1331. 
Doe  V.  Woodbridge   (9  Barn.  &  C. 

376), 659. 
Doe   V.   Woodman    (8    East,    228), 

174. 
Doe  V.  Wrightman  (4  Esp.  5),  174. 
Doe  d.  Agar  v.  Brown  (2  El.  &  Bl. 

331),  485. 
Doe  d.  Ambler  v.  Woodbridge   (4 

M.  &  Ry.  376),  659. 
Doe  d.  Aslin  v.  Summersett  (IB. 

&  Ad.  135),  89. 
Doe  d.  Baddeley  v.  Massey  (17  Q. 

B.  373),  962. 
Doe  d.  Bailey  v.  Foster   (3  C.  B. 

215), 135. 
Doe  d.  Baker  v.  Jones  (5  Ex.  498), 

659, 889. 
Doe  d.  Barker  v.  Goldsmith  (2  C. 

&  J.  674),  640. 
Doe  d.  Bennett  v.  Turner  (7  Mee. 

&  Wei.  226),  234. 
Doe  d.  Berkeley  v.  York   (6  East, 

86), 1214. 
Doe  d.  Bish  v.  Keeling  (1  M.  &  S. 

95), 739. 
Doe    d.    Bishop    of    Rochester    v. 

Bridges  (1  B.  &  Ad.  847),  1202. 
Doe  d.  Boscawen  v.  Bliss  (4  Taunt. 

735),  661. 
Doe    d.    Bradford    v.    Watkins    (7 

East,  551),  169. 
Doe  d.  Brammell  v.  Collinge  (7  C. 

B.  939),  388. 


Doe  d.  Bryan  v.  Bancks    (4  B.  & 

Aid.  401),  647. 
Doe   d.   Bute    (Marquis)    v.   Guest 

(15  Mee.  &  W.  160),  607. 
Doe  d.  Calvert  v.  Frowd  (4  Bing. 

557), 965. 
Doe  d.  Chadburn  v.  Green    (9  A. 

&  E.  658),  44,  130. 
Doe  d.  Cheney  v.  Batten    (Cowp. 

243), 647. 
Doe  d.  Clark  v.   Smarridge   (7  Q. 

B.  957), 140. 

Doe  d.  Colnaghi  v.  Bluck  (8  C.  & 

P.  464),  44. 
Doe  d.  Cornwell  v.  Matthews    (11 

C.  B.  675),  160. 

Doe  d.  Courtail  v.  Thomas  (4  M.  & 

Ry.  218),  1237. 
Doe  d.  Croft  v.  Tidbury  (14  C.  B. 

304), 961. 
Doe  d.  Dalton  v.  Jones  (1  N.  &  M. 

6), 908. 
Doe  d.  David  v.  Williams  (7  Car. 

&  P.  322),  184. 
Doe  d.  Davies  v.  Evans    (9  M.  & 

W.  48),  966,  967. 
Doe  d.  Mitchinson  v.  Carter  (3  T. 

R.  57),  1065. 
Doe  d.  Davies  v.  Thomas  (6  Exch. 

854),  210,  215. 
Doe    d.    Dillon    v.    Parker    (Gow. 

180), 967. 
Doe  d.  Earl  of  Egremont  v.  Cour- 

tenay  (11  Q.  B.  702),  1202. 
Doe  d.  Egremont  v.  Forwood  (3  Q. 

B.  627), 1202. 
Doe  d.  Ellerbrock  v.  Flynn    (1  C. 

M.  &  R.  137),  966. 
Doe   d.   Eyre   v.   Lambly    (2   Esp. 

635),  160. 
Doe   d.   Fisher  v.   Giles    (5   Bing. 

421),  233. 
Doe  d.  Flower  v.  Peck  (1  B.  &  Ad. 

428), 648. 
Doe  d.  Foster  v.  Wandlass  (7  T.  R. 

117), 634. 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


[REFEBENCES   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Doe  d.  Freeman  v.  Bateman  (2  B. 

&  Aid.  168),  640. 
Doe  d.  Fuller  (Tyr.  &  G.  17),  952. 
Doe   d.   Gaskell   v.   Spry    (1   B.   & 

Aid.  617),  741. 
Doe  d.  Godfrey  v.  Beardsley  (2  Mc- 

Clean  C.  C.  417),  38. 
Doe  d.  Graves  v.  Wells  (10  Ad.  & 

El.  427),  182. 
Doe  d.  Gray  v.  Stanlon  (1  M.  &  W. 

695),  183. 
Doe  d.  Green  v.  Baker   (2  Moore, 

189), 644. 
Doe  d.  Grubb  v.  Grubb  (10  B.  &  C. 

816),  183,  965.' 
Doe  d.  Henniker  v.  Watt   (8  B.  & 

C.  308),  620. 
Doe  d.  Hiatt  v.  Miller   (5  Car.  & 

P.  595),  198. 
Doe   d.   Hollingsworth  T.    Stennet 

(2  Esp.  717),  140. 
Doe  d.  Hughes  v.  Jones  (9  Mee.  & 

Wei.  372),  380. 
Doe  d.  Higginbotham  v.  Barton  (11 

Ad.  &  El.  307),  921. 
Doe    d.    Hindley    v.    Rickarby    (5 

Esp.  4),  1070. 
Doe  d.  Hull  V.  Wood  (14  M.  &  W. 

682),  136,  187,  190. 
Doe  d.   Jackson  v.  Ashbumer    (5 

Term.  Rep.  163),  257. 
Doe  d.  Joliffe  v.  Sybourn   (2  Esp. 

667), 7. 
Doe  d.  Jones  v.  Jones  (10  B.  &  C. 

718), 203. 
Doe  d.  Kensington  v.  Brindley  (12 

Moore,  37),  658. 
Doe  d.  Knight  v.  Rowe  (2  Car.  & 

P.  246),  657. 
Doe  d.  Lewis  v.  Rees  (6  C.  &  P. 

610). 961. 
Doe  d.  Lewis  v.  Cawder   (1  C.  M. 

&  R.  392).  183. 
Doe  d.  Lloyd  v.  Powell  (8  D.  &  R. 

35)  1066. 
Doe  d.  Lord  v.  Crago  (6  C.  B.  90), 

133.  141,  511. 


Doe  d.  McCartney  v.  Crick  (5  Esp. 

196),  166.  169. 
Doe  d.  Manton  v.  Austin  (2  M.  & 

S.  107),  368. 
Doe   d.   Marecraft  v.   Meux    (1   C. 

&  P.  346),  651. 
Doe  d.  Martin  v.  Watts   (7  Term 

Rep.  832),  3. 
Doe  d.  Mitchell  v.  Weller  (1  Jur. 

624), 522. 
Doe  d.  Mitchlnson  v.  Carter  (8  F. 

R.  57),  1322. 
Doe  d.  Moore  v.  Lawder  (1  Stark. 

308), 230, 234. 
Doe  d.  Morgan  v.  Powell  (8  Scott, 

N.  R.  687),  247. 
Doe  d.  Morris  v.  Williams   (6  B. 

&  C.  41),  169. 
Doe  d.  Mustin  v.  Gladwin  (6  Q.  B. 

953), 659. 
Doe  d.  Nash  v.  Birch   (1  Mee.  & 

Wei.  402),  644,  648. 
Doe    d.    Nicholl    v.    McKeagg    (10 

Bar.  &  C.  721),  203. 
Doe  d.  Parker  v.  Boulton   (6  M.  & 

S.  148),  198. 
Doe  d.  Parry  v.  Hazell  (1  Esp.  94), 

159,161. 
Doe  d.  Peacock  v.  Raffan   (6  Esp. 

4),  161. 
Doe   d.  Pearson  v.  Ries    (8  Bing. 

178), 257. 
Doe  d.  Pennington  v.  Taniere  (12 

Q.  B.  998),  133. 
Doe  d.  Phillips  v.  Benjamin  (9  A. 

&  E.  644),  245,  256,  257. 
Doe  d.  Pievin  v.  Brown  (7  A.  &  E. 

447). 925. 
Doe  d.  Pitt   V.  Hogg   (4   D.  &  R. 

226), 1051. 
Doe  d.  Pittman  v.  Sutton   (9  Car. 

&  P.  706),  897. 
Doe  d.  Polk  v.  Marchetti  (B.  &  Ad. 

715),  625,  626. 
Doe  d.  Poole  v.  Errington  (1  Ad,  & 

E.  750),  86. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


IXKXV 


[references    ABE    TO    PAGES.] 


Doe  (1.  Potter  v.  Archer  (1  Bos.  & 

P.  531),  8, 
Doe  d.  Price  v.  Price  (2  M.  &  Scott, 

464), 215. 
Doe  d.  Prior  v.  Ongley   (10  Com. 

Bench,  25),  952. 
Doe  d.  Pritchard  y.  Dodd  (2  N.  & 

M.  838),  193. 
Doe  d.  Rains  v.  Keller   (4  Car.  & 

P.  3),  519. 
Doe  d.  Rankin  v.  Brindley  (1  N.  & 

M.  1),  6. 
Doe  d.  Rawlings  v.  Walker   (5  B. 

&  C.  Ill),  1200. 
Doe  d.  Rigg  v.  Bell  (5  Term  Rep. 

471), 147. 
Doe  d.  Roberts  v.  Polgrean   (1  H. 

Black,  535),  20. 
Doe  d.  Roby  v.  Malsey  (6  B.  &  C. 

767), 234. 
Doe    d.    Rochester    v.    Pierce     (2 

Camp.  96),  166. 
Doe  d.  Rogers  v.  Pullen  (3  Scott, 

271), 147. 
Doe  d.  Rutzen  v.  Lewis  (5  A.  &  E. 

277), 662. 
Doe  d.  Sheppard  v.  Allen  (3  Taunt. 

78), 658. 
Doe  d.   Shore  v.   Porter    (3   Term 

Rep.  13),  42. 
Doe    d.    Simpson    y.    Bitcher     (1 

Doug.  50),  7. 
Doe  d.  Sore  v.  Eykins   (1  Car.  & 

P.  154),  658. 
Doe  d.   Stanway  v.  Rock   (6  Jui-. 

266),  198. 
Doe   d.    Strickland   v.    Spence    (6 

Bast,  120),  158. 
Doe  d.  Taylor  v.  Johnson  (1  Stark, 

411), 648. 
Doe  d.  Thompson  v.  Amey  (4  P.  & 

D.  177),  149. 
Doe  d.  Vaughan  v.  Meyler   (2  M, 

&  S.  276),  540. 
Doe  d.  Walker  v.  Groves  (15  East, 

244),  257. 


Doe  d.  Warner  v.  Brown  (8  East, 

165),  157. 
Doe  d.  West  Moreland  v.  Smith  (1 

M.  &  Ry.  137),  193. 
Doe  d.  Wetherill  v.  Bird   (4  N.  & 

M.  285),  747,  907. 
Doe  d.  Whitehead  v.  Pitman  (2  W. 

&  M.  672),  183. 
Doe  d.  Williams  v.  Cooper  (1  Man 

&  G.  135),  182,  183,  966. 
Doe  d.  Williams  v.  Pasquali  (3  R, 

R.  188),  182. 
Doe  d.  Wood  v.   Clarke    (7  Q.   B, 

211), 260. 
Doe  d.  Wood  v.  Morris    (12  East, 
■  237), 582. 
Doepfner   v.    Bowers    (102    N.   Y. 

Supp.  920),  1379. 
Doepfner   v.    Michaelis    (144    Fed. 

Rep.  1021),  799. 
Dolan  V.  Scott  (25  Wash.  214).  535. 
Dolby  V.  lies   (11  Ad.  &  El.  335), 

576,922. 
Dcld's  Trustee  v.  Geiger's  Adm'r 

(2  Gratt.  Va.  98),  22. 
Dole  V.  Thurlow    (53  Mass.   157), 

333. 
Dolese   v.    Barbreat    (9    La.    Ann. 

352), 154. 
Dollar  V.  Roddenbery  (97  Ga.  148), 

1329. 
Dollard  v.  Roberts  (130  N.  Y.  269), 

800,  804,  814. 
Dolling  V.  Evans   (15  W.  R.  394), 

259,  386. 
Dolph  V.  White  (12  N.  Y.  296),  518, 

1086. 
Dolton  V.    Sickel    (66   N.   J.   Law, 

492),  1175,  1180.  1214. 
Domestic  Tel.  Co.  v.  Met.  Tel.  Co. 

(39  N.  J.  Eq".  160),  984. 
Dominick  v.  Michael  (4  Sandf.  Ch. 

N.  Y.  374),  53. 
Donahoe  v.  Rich  (2  Ind  App.  540), 

1213. 
Donohue  v.  Chicago  Bank  Note  Co. 

(37  111.  App.  552),  163, 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Donald  v.  Elliott  (32  N.  Y.  S.  821), 

721. 
Donaldson  v.  Smith  (1  Ashm.  Pa. 

197), 522. 
Donate  v.  Morrison  (160  Mo.  581), 

1186. 
Donegal  (Marquis)  v.  Grey  (13  Ir. 

Eq.  R.  12),  479. 
Donellan  v.  Read  (3  B.  &  Ad.  899), 

265,381. 
Donlan  Mfg.   Co.  v.  Cannella   (89 

Hun,  21),  1126. 
Donnelly  v.  Eastes  (94  Wis.  390), 

666. 
Donnelly  v.  Frick  &  Lindsay  Co. 

(207  Pa.  St.  524),  1265. 
Donnewald    v.    Turner    R.    Estate 

Co.  (44  Mo.  App.  350),  1266. 
Donkersley  v.  Levy  (38  Mich.  54), 

1195. 
Donohue  v.  Chicago  Bank  Note  Co. 

(37  111.  App.  552),  148,  151. 
Donovan    v.    Schoenhaefer    Brew. 

Co.  (92  Mo.  App.  341),  247,  250. 
Doolan  v.  McCauley  (66  Cal.  476), 

960. 
Doolittle  V.  Eddy   (7  Barb.  N.  Y. 

78), 198. 
Doolittle    V.    Selkirk     (28    N.    Y. 

Supp.  43),  1207. 
Doran  v.  Chase    (2  W.  N.  C.  Pa. 

609),  1154. 
Doremus  v.  Howard  (23  N.  J.  Law, 

390),  1318. 
Dorman  v.  Ames   (12  Minn.  451), 

794. 
Dorman    v.    Plowman    (41    Wash. 

477).  335. 
Dorman  v.  Wilson   (39  N.  J.  Law, 

474),  549. 
Dorrace    v.    Bonesteel    (64    N.    Y. 

Supp.  307),  1207. 
Dorrance  v.  Jones    (27  Ala.  633), 

1061. 
Donill    v.    Stei)hens     (4    McCord, 

S.  C.  59),  950. 


Dorrill  v.   Stevens   (5  McCord,  S. 

C.  49),  144. 
Dorsett  v.  Gray  (98  Ind.  273),  49. 
Dorsey  v.   Eagle    (7   G.   &  J.   Md. 

321),  1314. 
D'Orval  v.  Hunt  (Dud.  Law  S.  C. 

180),  377. 
Dostal    v.    McCaddon     (35    Iowa, 

318),  1264. 
Doty  V.  Burdick  (83  111.  473),  843. 
Doty    V.    Gillett    (43    Mich.    203), 

1096. 
Doty  V.  Heth   (52  Miss.  530),  311, 

1095,  1096. 
Dougal   V.   McCarthy    (4   Reports, 

402),  140. 
Douglas  V.  Cheesebrough  Building 

Co.   (67  N.  Y.  Supp.  755),  566. 
Douglas  V.  Murphy  (16  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

113),  1041. 
Douglass  V.  Wiggins  (1  John.  Ch. 

N.  Y.  435),  712,  724. 
Dougherty   v.    Matthews    (35    Mo. 

520),  1059. 
Dougherty  v.    Seymour    (16   Colo. 

289),  771,  773. 
Dougherty  v.  Spencer  (23  in.  App. 

357),  1300. 
Dougherty  v.  Wagner  (2  W.  N.  C. 

291),  1158. 
Dougherty   v.    Wilson    (1    Blackf. 

Ind.  478),  672. 
Dowd  v.  Gilchrist  (46  N.  Car.  453), 

198,  940. 
Dowie  V.  Christen  (115  Iowa,  364), 

1435. 
Dowdney  v.  The  Mayor,  etc.  of  the 

City  of  New  York  (54  N.  Y.  186), 

1015. 
Dowling    V.    Nuebling     (97     Wis. 

350),   785. 
Downing  v.  Jones  (11  Daly,  N.  Y. 

245),  616,  1391. 
Downward  v.  Groff  (40  Iowa.  597), 

288,  1326. 
Dows  V.  Morse  (62  Iowa,  231),  327. 
Dowse  v.  Cole  1 2  Vent.  126),  892. 


TzVBLE   OP    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxvii 


[KEFEEETfCES   ARE   TO  PAGES.] 


Dowse  V.  Earle  (3  Lev.  253),  892. 
Doxey  Est.   v.    Service    (65   N.   E. 

Rep.  757),  329. 
Doyle  V.  Gibbs  (6  Lans.  N.  Y.  80), 

191,  218.. 
Doyle  V.  Lloyd  (64  N.  Y.  432),  406. 
Doyle  V.  Lord  (64  N.  Y.  432),  399, 

442. 
Doyle  V.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  (147 

U.  S.  413),  783. 
Doyly  V.  Capp  (99  Cal.  153),  1404. 
Drake    v.    Chicago,    etc.    Co.     (70 

Iowa,  59),  685. 
Drake  v.  Cockroft  (4  E.  D.  Smith, 

N.  Y.  34),  565. 
Drake  v.  Lacoe   (157  Pa.   St.  17), 

657. 
Drake  v.   Mitchell    (3   East,   251), 

549. 
Drake  v.  Newton   (23  N.  J.  Law), 

146. 
Drakford  v.  Turk    (75   Ala.   339), 

1403. 
Draper  v.  Salisbury  (11  Misc.  Rep. 

573),  1060,  1062. 
Draper    v.    Stouvenal     (35    N.    Y. 

512),  24. 
Drennan  v.  Grady  (167  Mass.  415), 

801. 
Dresser  v.  Dresser  (40  Barb.  N.  Y. 

300),  83. 
Drew    V.    Billings-Drew     (9    Det. 

Leg.  N.  513),  1195,  1213. 
Drey  v.  Doyle  (28  Mo.  App.  249), 

152,  164,  176. 
Dreyfus  v.  Hirt  ("82  Cal.  621),  486. 
Dreyfus  v.  W.  A.  Gage  &  Co.   (84 

Miss.  219),  1452. 
Driggs  V.  Dwight  (17  Wend.  N.  Y. 

71),  693. 
Driver  v.  Jenkins    (30  Ark.  120), 

1428. 
Driver   v.    Maxwell    (56    Ga.    11), 

852. 
Drohan  v.   Drohan    (1   Ball   &  B. 

185),  56. 


Drought  &  Co.  V.  Stallworth  (100 

S.  W.  Rep.  188),  122. 
Drucker  v.  Simon   (4  Daly,  N.  Y. 

53),  1177,  1182. 
Druhan  v.  Adam  (9  La.  Ann.  527), 

731. 
Drury  v.  Connor  (1  Har.  &  G.  Md. 

220),  11,  15. 
Drury  v.  Molins  (6  Ves.  328),  765. 
Duane  v.   Trustees    (39   111.   578), 

218. 
Dubois  V.  Del.  &  Hud.   Canal  Co. 

(4  Wend.  N.  Y.  290),  1227. 
Dubois  V.  Marshall    (3  Dana,  Ky. 

336),  949,  950. 
Dubuque  v.  Miller  (11  Iowa,  558), 

61,  141. 
Ducan    v.    Hartman    (143    Pa.    St. 

595),  100. 
Ducey   Lumber    Co.    v.    Lane    (59 

Mich.  521),  298. 
Duchane   v.   Goodtitle    (1   Blackf. 

Ind.  117),  47. 
Duckklee   v.    Webber    (151    Mass. 

408),  106. 
Dudley    v.    Estell    (6    Leigh,    Va. 

562),  1136. 
Dudley  v.  Kelly  (74  Me.  346),  195. 
Duer  v.  Allen  (96  Iowa,  36),  844. 
Duff   V.   Hart    (16   N.   Y.    S.   163), 

1169. 
Duff  V.  Wilson    (69   Pa.    St.   316), 

492. 
Duffiled  V.  Hue   (129  Pa.   St.  94), 

665. 
Duffield    V.    Rosensweig    (144    Pa. 

St.  520),  687. 
Duffitt   V.   Tuhan    (28    Kan.    292). 

957. 
Duffy  V.  Carman  (3  Ind.  App.  207), 

262. 
Duffy  V.  Day    (42  Mo.  App.  638), 

1235. 
Duffy  V.  Ogden    C64  Pa.   St   240), 

131. 
Duffus  V.  Bangs   (122  N.  Y.  423), 

1434. 


AXXXVIU 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[reitibexces  are  to  pages.] 


Duke   V.   Compton    (49    Mo.    App. 

304),  486. 
Duke   V.    Harper    (6   Yerg.   Tenn. 

280),  196,  965,  966. 
Duke  of  Chandos  v.  Talbot   (2  P. 

Wms.  606),  718. 
Duke   of   Leeds   v.   Amhurst    (14 

Sim.  357),  726. 
Duke  of  Somerset  v.  Fogwell  (5  B. 

&  C.  875),  110. 
Dulaney    v.    Dickerson     (12    Ala. 

601),  1432. 
Dulanty    v.     Pynchon     (6     Allen, 

Mass.  510),  122. 
Dumper  v.  Syms  (Cro.  Eliz.  816), 

1054. 
Dumpor's    Case    (4    Coke,    1191), 

645. 
Duncan   v.    Blake    (9    Lea,    Tenn. 

534),  465. 
Duncan  v.  Hartman    (143  Pa.  St. 

595),  105. 
Duncan  v.  Moloney  (115  111.  App. 

522),  1196. 
Duncklee   v.    Webber    (151    Mass. 

408),  245,  697,  1172. 
Dunklee  v.  Wilton  R.  Co.    (24  N. 

H.  489),  438. 
Dundy  v.  Chambers   (23  111.  369), 

333. 
Dunlap  V.  Bullard  (131  Mass.  161), 

1021. 
Dunlap  V.  Dunseath   (81  Mo.  App. 

17),  1409,  1435. 
Dunlap    V.    Steele    (80    Ala.    424), 

1434. 
Dunlop  V.  James  (174  N.  Y.  411), 

1031,  1080. 
Dunlop    V.    Mulry    (85    App.    Div. 

498),  1051. 
Dunn  V.  Barton  (16  Fla.  765),  769. 
Dunn    V.    Dinuovo    (3    Man.    &   G. 

105),  1176. 
Dunn  V.  Dunn  (3  Colo.  510),  604. 
Dunn    V.    Jeffery    (36    Kan.    408), 

372,  609. 
Dunn  V.  Kelly  (57  Miss.  825),  1432. 


Dunn  V.  Mellon   (147  Pa.  St.  11), 

1163. 
Dunn  V.  Robbins   (20  N.  Y.  Supp. 

341),  856. 
Dunn   V.   Rothermel    (112   Pa.   St. 

272),  133,  172,  197,  454. 
Dunn  V.   Spears    (5  Rich.   S.  Car. 

17),  1415. 
Dunne  v.   Trustees    (39    111.   578), 

192. 
Dunning  v.   Mauzy    (49    111.    368), 

1222. 
Dunning  v.  Ocean  Bank  (61  N.  Y. 

497),  53. 
Dunphy    v.    Goodlander    (12    Ind. 

App.  609),  158. 
Dunsdale  v.  Robertson  (2  Jones  & 

Lat.  58),  572. 
Dunshee    v.     Grundy     (15     Gray, 

Mass.  314),  944. 
Durand    v.    Curtis    (57    N.    Y.    7), 

1045,  1090,  1093. 
Durando  v.  Wyman  (4  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  Rep.  597),  1069. 
Durant  v.  Doe  (6  Bing.  574),  173. 
Durkee    v.    Carr    (38    Oreg.    189), 

634. 
Durrell  v.  Emery   (64  N.  H.  223), 

573. 
Duryee   v.    Turner    (20    Mo.    App. 

34),  522. 
Dussman  v.  Husband  (6  La.  Ann. 

279),  1347. 
Dutch  V.  Mead    (36  N.  Y.   Super. 

Ct.  427),  327. 
Dutcher  v.  Culver  (24  Minn.  584), 

505. 
Dutton  V.  Gerish    (9  Cush.  Mass. 

89),  464,  782,  7'85,  786,  847. 
Duxbury  v.  Sandiford  (80  Law  T. 

N.  S.  552),  269. 
Dwight  V.   Cutler    (3   Mich.    566), 

198,  319. 
Dwinell  v.  Bliss  (58  Vt.  363),  349. 
Dwyer    v.    Carroll    (86    Cal.    298), 
852,  8G4,  1185. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


IxKxix 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Dwyer  v.  Rich  (Ir.  R.  6  C.  L.  144), 

430. 
Dyer  v.  Bowley  (2  Ring.  94),  545. 
Dyer  t.  Robinson   (110  Fed.  Rep. 

99),  831. 
Dyett  V.  Pendleton  (8  Cow.  N.  Y. 

727),  700,  1167. 
Dymock  v.  Showell's  Brewery  Co. 

(79  Law  T.  N.  S.  329),  1045. 


R 


Eadie  v.  Addison  (62  L.  J.  Ch.  80), 

357. 
Ealiin  v.  Brown    (1  E.  D.  Smith, 

N.  Y.  36),  838. 
Earl  V.  Rogers  (2  Wils.  26),  1197. 
Earle   v.    Fiske    (103    Mass.    491), 

391. 
Earle  v.  Kingsbury  (3  Cush.  Mass. 

206),  539. 
Earle  v.  Washburn  (7  Allen  Mass. 

95),  1233. 
Earle's  Adm'r  v.  Hale's  Adm'r  (31 

Ark.  470),  948. 
Earll  V.  Earll   (60  Mich.  30),  122. 
Earl  of  Berkley  v.  Archbishop  of 

York  (6  East,  86),  1202. 
Earl  of  Egremont  v.  Courtnay  (11 

Q.  B.  702),  1201. 
Earl   of  Falmouth   v.  Thomas    (1 

Cr.  &M.  89),  1337. 
Earl  Orchard  Co.  v.  Fava  (138  Cal. 

76),  171. 
Earsfield  v.  Healy  (50  Barb.  N.  Y. 

289),  189. 
Eason  v.  Johnson   (69  Miss.  371), 

1430. 
Eastham  v.   Anderson    (119  Mass. 

526),  110,  920. 
Eastin  v.  Hatchitt  (15  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

780),  49. 
Eastlock    V.    West    Deptford     (52 

Atl.  Rep.  999),  793. 
Eastman    v.    Amoskeag    Mfg.    Co. 

(44  N.  H.  143),  794. 


Eastman  v.  Anderson    (119  Mass. 

226),  505. 
Eastman    v.    Perkins    (111    Mass. 

30),  243. 
Eastman  v.  Vetter  (57  Minn.  164), 

219. 
East  Norway,  etc.  Ch.  v.  Froislie 

(37  Minn.  447),  306. 
East  Norway  Lake  N.  E.  Lutheran 
Ch.  V.  Froislie   (37  Minn.  447), 
43. 
Eastern  Tel.  Co.  v.  Dent  (78  L.  T. 

713),  1052,  1064. 
Easton   v.   Mitchell    (21   111.   App. 

189),  369. 
Easton  v.  Pratt  (2  H.  &  C.  676), 

58,  889. 
East   River   Bank  v.   Kennedy    (9 

Bos.  N.  Y.  543),  547. 
East  Ten.  V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
istown     (35    S.    W.    Rep.    771), 
1006. 
Eaton  V.  Hunt   (20  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

860),  321. 
Eaton  V.  Jacques   (2  Dougl.  455), 

1106. 
Eaton  V.  Lyon    (3  Ves.  692),  455, 

667. 
Eaton    V.     Whittaker     (18    Conn. 

222),  382. 
Eberlein  v.  Abel  (10  111.  App.  626), 

163,  164,  344. 
Eberson    v.    Continental    Inv.    Co. 

(118  Mo.  App.  67),  834,  867. 
Eberts  v.  Fisher    (54   Mich.  294), 

1037. 
Eblin  V.  Miller  Bx'r  (78  Ky.  371), 

856,  865. 
Ebling    V.    Fuyleln     (2    Mo.    App. 

252),  1068. 
Eccleston  v.   Clipsham    (2   Saund. 

115),  610. 
Ecclesiastical  Comm'rs  v.  Merrall 

(38  L.  J.  Ex.  93),  138. 
Ecke  V.  Fetzer  ^65  Wis.  55),  1283, 
1285. 


xc 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Eckhart   v.    Irons    (128    111.    568), 

743. 
Ecldes    V.    Bocco    (11    Colo.    522), 

938. 
Eckstrom    v.    Hall    (90    Me.    186), 

1296. 
Eddy   V.    Coffin    (Ud   Mass.    463), 

563,  1172. 
Edelen   v.    Strong    (34   Mo.    App. 

287),  1435. 
Edelmuth   v.    McGarren    (4   Daly, 

467),  775. 
Edesheimer    v.    Quackenbush    (68 

Hun,  427),  609. 
Edgar  v.   Walker    (106   Ga.   454), 

794. 
Edge  V.   Stafford   (1  Tyrwh.  293), 

282. 
Edge    V.    Strafford    (1    Cromp.    & 

Jer.  391),  379,  382,  576. 
Edgerton  v.  Page,  1138,  1152,  1176. 
Edmisen  v.  Aslesen  (4  Dak.  145), 

852. 
Edmison  v.   Lowry    (3   S.   D.   77), 

406,  1142,  1180,  1129. 
Edmonds  v.  Mounsey  (15  Ind.  App. 

399),  84,  641. 
Edmonson  v.   Kite    (43  Mo.   176), 

258,  573. 
Edmundson  v.   Preville    (12   Colo. 

App.  73),  164. 
Edney  v.  Benham    (7  Q.  B.  796), 

514. 
Edson  V.  Colburn  (29  Vt.  632),  312. 
Edwards  v.   Anderson    (82   S.  W. 

Rep.  059),  1419. 
Edwards  v.  Barrington  (85  Law  T. 

650),  273,   1051. 
Edwards  v.  Candy  (14  Hun,  N.  Y. 

576),  1139. 
Edwards  v.  Countess  of  Warwick 

(2  P.  Wms.  176),  539. 
Edwards  v.  Derrickson   (28  N.  J. 

Law,  39),  547. 
Edwards    v.    McLean    (122    N.    Y. 

302),  780,  790,  795,  1356. 


Edwards  v.  Milbank  (29  L.  J.  Ch. 

45),  58. 
Edwards  v.  Perkins  (7  Oreg.  149), 

698,  1316. 
Edwards  v.  Railroad  Co.  (98  N.  Y. 

245),  789,  790,  848,  860. 
Edwards  v.  RissFer  (26  Ohio  Cur- 

Ct.  R.  428),  792. 
Edwards    v.    West    (47    L.    J.    Ch. 

463),  990. 
Edwards  &  Bradford  Lumb.  Co.  v. 

Rank  (57  Neb.  323),  1248. 
Effinger   v.    Henderson    (33    Miss. 

449),  552. 
Effinger  v.  Lewis  (32  Pa.  St.  367), 

373. 
Ege   V.   Ege    (5    Watts,    Pa.    134), 

1444. 
Egery   v.    Woodard    (56    Me.    45), 

349. 
Eggliston    V.    Bradford    (10    Ohio, 

312),  337,  462. 
Egler  V.   Marsden    (5   Taunt.   25), 

581. 
Ehrich  v.  Winter  &  Co.  (103  N.  Y. 

Supp.  1023),  280. 
Ehrman  v.   Mayer    (57   Md.    612), 

541,  551,  970. 
Ehrman  v.  Oates    (101  Ala.   604), 

1432,  1459. 
Eichengreen  v.  Appel  (44  111.  App. 

19),  231,  307. 
Eichenlaub  v.   Neil    (3   Ohio   Dec. 

365),  634. 
Eichuer  v.   Cohen    (48  Misc.  Rep. 

541),  1012. 
Eichorn  v.  Peterson    (16  111.  App. 

601),   615,   1382,   1391. 
Eimermann   v.   Nathan    (116   Wis. 

124),  181. 
Eisenhart  v.  Ordean  (3  Colo.  App. 

162),  1136,  1152,  1160,  1176. 
Ela  V.  Banks   (37  Wis.  39),  209. 
Ela  V.  Card  (2  N.  H.  175),  21. 
Ela  V.  French  (11  N.  H.  356),  1042. 
Elder  V.  Robinson  (19  Pa.  St.  364), 

996. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


XCl 


[BEI'ERENCES   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 

Eldred  v.  Heahey    (31  Wis.   546),      Elliott  v.  Royal  Exch.  Ins.  Co.  (L. 


697. 
Eldridge  v.  Hoefer  (45  Oreg.  239), 

288,  1265. 
Elfe  V.  Cole  (26  Ga.  197),  28. 
Elgar  V.  Watson  (Car.  &  M.  494), 

581. 
Elgutter    V.    Drischaus    (44    Neb. 

378),  176. 
Ellis  V.   Bradbury    (75   Cal.   234), 

1019. 
Ellis  V.  Culver  (2  Har.  Del.  129), 

90. 
Ellis  V.  Fitzpatrick  (64  S.  W.  Rep. 

567),  40. 
Ellis  V.  Jones  (70  Miss.  60),  1414, 

1417. 
Ellis  V.  Paige  (2  Pick.  Mass.  71), 

156. 
Ellis  V.  Paige  (1  Pick.  Mass.  43), 

195,  208,  210,  216. 
Ellis  V.  Rice  (195  Pa.  St.  42),  524. 
Ellis  V.  Rowbotbam  (1  Q.  B.  740), 

560. 
Ellis   V.   Rowbotbam    (69  Law.   J. 

Q.  B.  379),  526. 
Ellis  V.   Waldron    (19   R.   I.   369), 

817. 
Ellis  V.  Welcb  (6  Mass.  246),  700. 
Ellis   V.   Wrigbt    (76   L.    T.    522), 

1232. 
EUicott  V.  Coffin   (106  Mass.  365), 

571. 
Elliot  V.  Aiken  (45  N.  H.  30),  1199, 

1238. 
Elliot  V.  Gantt  (64  Mo.  App.  248), 

1014. 
Elliot  V.  Rogers  (4  Esp.  59),  581. 
Elliott    V.    Dycke    (78    Ala.    150), 

957. 
Elliott  V.  Hulme  (2  M.  &  Ry.  483), 

170.' 
Elliott  V.  Knight  (64  111.  App.  87), 

84. 
Elliott   V.    Pray    (10   Allen,   Mass. 

;;78),  813. 
.  g 


R.  2  Excb.  237),  572. 
Elliott  V.  Smitb  (213  Pa.  St  413), 

920. 
Elliott  V.  Smith  (23  Pa.  St.  131), 

954. 
Elliott  V.   Stone    (12   Cush.   Mass. 

174),  189. 
Elliott  V.  Stone  State  Bank  (4  Ind. 

App.  155),  155,  162. 
Elliott  V.   Turner    (13    Sim.    477), 

667. 
Ellsworth  V.  Hines   (5  Wis.   613), 

20. 
Elphinstone   v.    Iron    &    Coal    Co. 

(11  App.  Cas.  332),  1057. 
Elsas  V.  Meyer  (10  Ohio  Dec.  518), 

868,  1293. 
Elsey  V.  Metcalf    (1   Denio,   323), 

350. 
Elston  V.  Schilling  (42  N.  Y.  79), 

986,  1396. 
Elting   V.    Palen    (60    Hun,    306), 

1332. 
Elwes  V.  Mawe  (3  East,  38),  1256, 

1258. 
Elworthy  v.  Sandford   (3  H.  &  C. 

330),  367. 
Ely   V.    Scofield    135    Barb.    N.    Y. 

330),  54. 
Ely  V.  Spiero  (51  N.  Y.  Supp.  124), 

564. 
Emerick  v.  Tavener  (9  Gratt.  Va. 

220),  140,  938,  949,  964. 
Emerson    v.    Elmerson    (35    S.    W. 

Rep.  425),  227. 
Emerson  v.  Spicer  (55  Barb.  N.  Y. 

528),  11. 
Emery  v.  Boston  Terminal  Co.  (59 

N.  E.  Rep.  763),  379. 
Emery    v.    Emery    (87    Me.    281), 

579. 
Emery  v.   Fugina    (68   Wis.   505), 

1316,  1318.  1321. 
Imery  v.  Hill  (67  N.H.  330),  1052, 

1378. 


XCll 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Emmes  v.  Feeley  (132  Mass.  346), 

539. 
Emmitt  v.  Lee   (50  Ohio  St.  662), 

390. 
Emmons    v.    Scudder    (115    Mass. 

367),  192,  235. 
Emott   V.    Cole    (Cro.    Eliz.    257), 

510. 
Emrich  v.  Ireland  (55  Miss.  390), 

1259. 
Engle   V.   Engle    (3    W.   Va.    246), 

1316. 
Engle  V.   McKinley    (5   Cal.   153), 

1100. 
Engle  V.  Thorn  (3  Duer  N.  Y.  15), 

723. 
English  V.  Duncan   (14  Bush.  Ky 

377),  1454. 
English  V.  Key  (39  Ala.  113),  491. 

539. 
English  V.  Murtland   (214  Pa.  St. 

325),  1378. 
English  V.  Yates  (205  Pa.  St.  106), 

641,  644. 
Ennis   v.    Fourth    Street   Building 

Ass'n   (102  Ind.  520),  905. 
Enrich  v.  Stock  Yard  Co.   (86  Md. 

482),  262. 
Entelman  v.  Hapgood  (95  Ga.  390), 

690. 
Enyeart  v.   Davis    (17   Neb.    228), 

1203. 
Enys    V.    DonnitHorne     (2    Burr. 

1197),  346. 
Eppes'  Ex'rs  v.  Cole    (4  H.  &  M. 

168),  500. 
Epi)lnger  v.  Canepa  (20  Fla.  262), 

51. 
Equator  Min.  etc.  Co.  v.  Guanella 

(18  Colo.  548),  69. 
Equelina  v.  Provident  Realty  Co. 

of  N.  Y.    (84  N.  Y.  Supp.  1014), 

377. 
Erickson    v.    Peterson    (47    Minn. 

525),  1316.  1329. 
Erickson  v.  Wallace  (45  Kan.  430), 

252,  254. 


Ernst  V.  Crosby   (140  N.  Y.  364), 

772,  777. 
Ernst  V.  Strauss   (99  N.  Y.  Supp. 

597),  1155. 
Erwin  v.  Olmsted    (7  Cow.  N.  Y. 

227),  81. 
Esshom  V.  Hotel  Co.  (7  S.  D.  74), 

1405. 
Esling  V.   Zantzinger    (13   Pa.   St. 

50),  1103. 
Estabrook  v.  Hughes  (8  Neb.  496), 

1286. 
Estabrook  v.   Stevenson    (47   Neb. 

206),  1283. 
Estes  v.  Cook  (22  Pick.  Mass.  293), 

391. 
Estes  V.  Furlong  (59  111.  298),  982. 
Estep  V.  Estep  (23  Ind.  114),  847. 
Esty  V.  Baker  (48  Me.  495),  1073. 
Esty  V.  Baker   (50  Me.  325),  209, 

228,  686. 
Eten  V.   Luyster    (60   N.   Y.   252), 

1044,  1098,  1201,  1205. 
Etheridge    v.    Osborn     (12    Wend. 

N.  Y.  532),  1167. 
Etter   v.    Edwards    (4    Watts,    Pa. 

65),  434. 
Ettlinger  v.  Degnon-McLean  Cons. 

Co.  (42  Misc.  Rep.  215),  573. 
Eubank  v.    May   &  Thomas   Hdw. 

Co.    (105  Ala.  629),  369,  457. 
Evans  v.   Collins    (94   Iowa   432), 

1430. 
Evans  v.   Conklin    (71  Hun,  536), 

321,  328,  342. 
Evans  v.  Consumers'  Gas  Co.    (29 

N.  E.  Rep.  398),  641. 
Evans  v.  Davis  (48  L.  J.  Ch.  223), 

740,  767. 
Evans  v.   Elliot    (9   Ad.   El.   159), 

486. 
Evans  v.  Elliott  (9  Ad.  &  El.  342), 

31. 
Evans  v.  Enloe  (70  Wis.  345),  182, 

492. 
Evans  v.  Evans   (3  A.  &  E.  132), 

573. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


XClll 


[refekexces  are  to  pages.] 


Evans  v.  Hardy  (76  Ind.  527),  51. 
Evans  v.  Lincoln  Co.   (204  Pa.  St. 

448),  556. 
Evans  v.  Mathias  (7  El.  &  Bl.  590), 

1127. 
Evans  v.  McKanna  (89  Iowa,  362), 

1195. 
Evans    v.    Morris    (6    Mich.    369), 

516. 
Evans  v.  Reed  (5  Gray,  Mass.  308), 

233,  234. 
Evans  v.  Warren  (122  Mass.  303), 

1450. 
Evans   v.   Wyatt    (43   L.    T.    176), 

651. 
Eveleth  v.   Sawyer    (96   Me.  227), 

207. 
Everett  v.  Saltus  (15  Wend.  N.  Y. 

474),  537. 
Everett  v.  Williamson  (107  N.  Car. 

204),  1238. 
Everingham  v.  Braden    (58   Iowa, 

133),  1325. 
Evermann  v.  Robb  (52  Miss.  653), 

1434. 
Evers  v.  Shumacker  (59  Mo.  App. 

454),  313,  467. 
Evers  v.  Weil  (17  N.  Y.  Supp.  29), 

806. 
Ewart  V.  Street  (2  Bailey,  S.  Car. 

157),  900. 
Ewes  V.  Briggs  Gas  Co.   (55  L.  T. 

831),  400. 
Ewing  V.  Barnard  (84  N.  Y.  Supp. 

137),  1207. 
Ewing  V.  Cottman    (9   Pa.   Super. 

Ct.   444),  944,  1142. 
Ewing  V.  Miles  (12  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

19),  632,  1385. 
Ewing  V.  O'Malley  (82  S.  W.  Rep. 

1087),  179. 
Eyck  V.  Rector,  etc.  of  Protestant 

Episcopal    Church     (141    N.    Y. 

588),  1026. 
Eyre  v.  Jordan  (111  Mo.  424),  836. 


Fagan  v.  Vogt  (SO  S.  W.  Rep.  664), 

315. 
Fairbanks  v.  Meyers  (98  Ind.  92), 

327. 
Fairbanks    v.    Metcalf     (8     Mass. 

230),  350. 
Fairmount  v.  Tilton  (122  111.  App. 

626),  800. 
Falk  V.  Yarn    (9   Rich.  Eq.   S.   C. 

303),  352. 
Falkner  v.  Beers    (2  Doug.  Mich. 

117),  940,  950. 
Fall   V.   Hazelrigg    (45    Ind.    576), 

317. 
Fall  V.  Moore  (45  Minn.  515),  19.5, 

201. 
Falley  v.  Giles  (29  Ind.  114),  1371, 

1377,  1378. 
Fallis  V.  Gray  (115  Mo.  App.  253), 

858. 
Fallon  V.  Robbins    (16   Ir.   Ch.  R._ 

422),  374. 
Falls  V.  Carpenter   (1  Dev.  &  Bat. 

N.  C.  237),  985. 
Falls    County    v.    De    Lancey    (73 

Tex.  463),  72. 
Fanning  v.  Stinson  (13  Iowa,  42), 

520. 
Farewell  v.  Dickenson   (6  B.  &  C. 

251),  510. 
Farley   v.    Craig    (11    N.    J.    Law, 

262),  541. 
Farley  v.  McKeegan  (48  Neb.  237), 

148,  258. 
Farley  v.  Rogers   (1  A.  K.  Marsh. 

Ky.  245),  943. 
Farley  v.  Thompson  (15  Mass.  18), 

486,  498. 
Farlow   v.    Stevenson    (69   Law   J. 

Ch.  106),  1029. 
Farmer  v.  Pickens  (S3  N.  C.  549), 

964. 
Farmers'    Bank    v.    Cole    (5    Har. 

Del.  418),  1441. 


XCIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[referei^ces  are  to  pages.] 


Farmers'   Bank  v.   Mutual   Assur. 

Society  (4  Leigh,  Va.  69),  1079. 
Farmers'    Dep.    Nat.    Bank    v.    W. 

Pa.  Fuel  Co.    (215  Pa.  St.  115), 

70. 
Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Com- 
mercial Bank  (11  Wis.  207),  442. 
Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Minn.  E. 

&    M.    Works    (35    Minn.    543), 

1256. 
Farnum  v.  Hefner   (79  Cal.  575), 

1051,  1320. 
Faron  v.  Jones  (49  Misc.  Rep.  47), 

1348. 
Farrand   v.   Thompson    (5  Bar.  & 

Aid.  826),  685. 
Farrar   v.    Cooper    (34    Me.    394), 

437. 
Farrar  v.  Heinrich   (86  Mo.  521), 

958. 
Farrar  v.  Stackpole   (6  Me.  157), 

1254. 
Farrar  v.  Nightingal  (2  Esp.  639), 

1077. 
Farrington    v.    Forman     (26    Atl. 

Rep.  532),  1188. 
Farrington  v.  Kimball   (126  Mass. 

313),  1021,  1093. 
Farris  v.  Houston    (74  Ala.  162), 

923,  924. 
Farrow  v.  Woley  (36  So.  Rep.  384), 

311. 
Farrow's  Heirs  v.  Edmundson   (4 

B.  Mon.  Ky.  605),  212,  213. 
Farfcon  v.  Goodale  (8  Allen,  Mass. 

202),  208,  1238. 
Farwell   v.   Easton    (63   Mo.   446), 

659,  733,  767. 
Fash  V.  Blake  (44  III.  302),  342. 
Faull<ner  v.  Adams  (126  InS.  459), 

351. 
Faulkner  v.  Jones   (12  Ala.  105), 

974. 
Faulkner  v.  Morse   (3  T.  R.  371), 

953. 
Faver  v.  McRae  (56  Miss.  227),  42. 


Favrot   v,    Mettler    (21    La.    Ann. 

220),  860,  877. 
Fay  V.  Holloran    (35  Barb.  N.  Y. 

295),  49. 
Fay  V.  Muzzy  (13  Gray,  Mass.  53), 

1331. 
Fay  V.  Richardson   (24  Mass.  91), 

349. 
Faylor  v.  Brice  (7  Ind.  App.  551), 

32,  638. 
Featherstonhaugh  v.  Bradshaw  (1 

Wend.  N.  Y.  134),  576. 
Featherstonhaugh  v.  Lee  M.  P.  Co. 

L.  R.  1  Eq.  318),  6L 
Fechet    v.    Drake    (2    Ariz.    239), 

1244. 
Fegrelsen  v.  Sanchez  (90  111.  App. 

105),  345. 
Fehlhauser   v.    City   of    St.   Louis 

(178  Mo.  635),  793. 
Feilhauer   v.    St.   Louis    (178    Mo. 

635),  782. 
Feinstein  v.  Jacobs  (15  Misc.  Rep. 

474),  805,  814. 
Fejavary  v.  Broesch  (52  Iowa,  88), 

1447. 
Felch  V.  Harriman  (64  N.  H.  472), 

1318. 
Felch er   v.    McMillian    (103   Mich. 

494),  1261. 
Fell  V.  Dentzel  (42  Atl.  Rep.  439), 

629. 
Fellows  V.  Gilhuber  (82  Wis.  639), 

836. 
Felthous  V.  Bindley   (11  C.  B.  N. 

S.  869),  386. 
Felton  V.  Cincinnati  (95  Fed.  Rep. 

336),  783,  874. 
Felton   V.    Millard    (81    Cal.    540), 

176. 
Felton  V.  Strong  (37  111.  App.  58), 

653. 
Fenn   v.   Grafton    (2   Bing.   N.   C. 

617).  282. 
Fenn   v.   Harrison    (3   T.   R.    68), 

108. 


T.VBLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


XCV 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Fenn  v.  Smart  (12  East,  444),  490. 
Fennell  v.  Guffey  (139  Pa.  St.  341), 

518,  615. 
Fennell  v.  Guffey  (155  Pa.  St.  38), 

1087. 
Fen  ton  v.  Clegg   (9  Ex.   680),  55. 
Fera  v.  Child  (115  Mass.  32),  795. 
Ferebee  v.   Proctor   (2   Dev.  &  B. 

N.  C.  439),  53. 
Feret  v.  Hill  (15  C.  B.  307),  480. 
Ferguson  v.  Bartholemew  (67  Mo. 

212),  958. 
Ferguson     v.     Cornish.     (2     Burr. 

1032),  374. 
Ferguson  v.  Etter   (21  Ark.  160), 

955. 
Ferguson    v.    Murphy     (117    Cal. 

134),  1435. 
Ferguson's  Case  (2  Esp.  590),  851. 
Fernwood  Masonic   Hall   Ass'n   v. 

Jones  (102  Pa.  St.  307),  1032. 
Ferrin  v.  Kenney   (12  Met.  Mass. 

294),  206. 
Few  V.  Perkins  (36  L.  J.  Ex.  54), 

890. 
Field  V.  Harrick   (5  111.  App.  54), 

14. 
Field  V.  Herrick  (10  HI.  App.  591), 

697,  1182. 
Field  V.  Herrick  (108  111.  110),  19. 
Field  V.  Mills  (33  N.  J.  Law,  254), 

1052. 
Field  V.  Schieffelin   (7  Johns.  Ch. 

N.  Y.  150),  15,  16. 
Field  V.  Swan  (10  Met.  Mass.  112), 

31. 
Fielden    v.    Slater    (38    L.    J.    Ch. 

379),  740,  769. 
Fielden  v.  Tattersall  (7  L.  T.  718), 

764. 
Fielder   v.    Chiles    (73    Ala.    567), 

83,  227.    ■ 
Fielder  v.  Ray    (3  M.  &  P.   659), 

581. 
Fields    V.    Brown    (188    111.    Ill), 

329,  772. 


Fields  V.  Law  (2  Root,  Conn.  320), 

10. 
Fife   V.    Irving    (1    Rich.    Law,    S. 

Car.  226),  1441. 
Fifield  V.  Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  (148 

111.  163),  1248. 
Filkins  v.  Steele  (124  Iowa,  742), 

1143. 
Fillebrown    v.    Hoar     (124    Mass. 

580),  1178. 
Filley   v.    Christopher    (39    Wash. 

22),  1261. 
Filliter  v.  Phippard  (11  Q.  B.  347), 

843. 
Filton  V.  Hamilton  City    (6  Nev. 

196),  329. 
Finch    V.    Brook    (1    Bing.    N.    Y. 

259),  536. 
Finch   V.    Miller    (5   Com.    Bench, 

428),  140,  525,  537. 
Finch   V.    Moore    (50   Minn.    116), 

163. 
Finch  V.  Underwood  (45  L.  J.  Ch. 

522),  1387. 
Finch's  Case  (6  Coke,  67b),  48. 
Findlay  v.  Carson  (97  Iowa,  537), 

1079. 
Findlay    v.    Smith    (6    Munf.    Va. 

134),  717. 
Fine   Realty   Co.    v.   City   of   New 

York  (103  N.  Y.  Supp.  115),  165. 
Finkelmeier   v.    Bates    (92   N.   Y. 

172),  1275. 
Finkelstein    v.    Herson    (55    N.    J. 

Law,  217),  172. 
Finley  v.  Bristol  &  Ex.  Ry.  (17  Ex. 

409),  578. 
Finney  v.  Cist  (34  Mo.  304),  1391. 
Finney  v.  Harding   (136  111.  573), 

1425. 
Finney  v.  Louis  (39  Mo.  177),  139, 

1269. 
Finney  v.  Steele  (41  So.  Rep.  976), 

796. 
Finney  v.  Watkins   (13  Mo.   291), 

1254,  1301. 


XCVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


Finney's  Trustees  v.  St.  Louis  (39 

Mo.    177),   229. 
Finnigan  v.  Bielil    (30  Misc.  Rep. 

735),  826. 
Fiquet  v.  Allison   (12  Mich.  328), 

309. 
First  National  Bank  v.  Adam   (34 

111.  App.  159),  1136,  1295,  1404. 
First    National    Bank    v.    Consol. 

Elec.   Light   Co.    (97   Ala.    465), 

1422. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Lucas  (21  Neb. 

280),  1293. 
Fischer    v.    Johnson     (106    Iowa, 

181),  19L 
Fish  V.  Chapman  (2  Ga.  349),  901. 
Fishback    v.    Woodruff     (51    Ind. 

102),  116. 
Fishel  V.  Kerr   (45  N.  J.  L.  507), 

1441. 
Fisher  v.  Barrett   (4  Cush.  Mass. 

381),  296. 
Fisher  v.   Cuthell    (5   East,   491), 

171. 
Fisher    v.    Deering    (60    111.    114), 

482. 
Fisher   v.    Fisher    (1    Bradf.    Sur. 

N.  Y.  345),  45. 
Fisher  v.  Jansen  (30  111.  App.  91), 

SOO. 
Fisher    v.    Keane    (1    Watts,    Pa. 

278),  351. 
Fisher    v.    Lighthall    (4    Mackey, 

D.  C.  82),  785. 
Fisher  v.  Marsh    (6  B.  &  S.  411), 

573. 
Fi.sher  v.  Milliken  (8  Pa.  St.  121), 

1340. 
Fisher  v.  Nergararain   (112  Mich. 

327),  1381. 
Fisher  v.   Pforzheimer    (93   Mich. 

650),  285.  1096. 
Fisher  v.   Saffer    (1  B.   D.   Smith, 

N.  Y.   611),  1244. 
Fisher  v.  Smith  (48  111.  184),  635. 
Fisher   v.  Thirkell    (27   Mich.    1), 

792. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 

Fisher  v.  Thirkell    (21  Mich.  20), 

825. 
Fisk  V.  Brayman    (21  R.   I.   195), 

503),  1115. 
Fisk  V.  Moore   (11  Rob.  La.  279), 

258,  1402. 
Fiske   V.    Ernst    (62    N.   Y.    Supp. 

429),  244. 
Fiske  V.  Framingham  Mfg.  Co.  (14 

Pick.  491),  303. 
Fisks  V.  Eldredge  (12  Gray,  Mass. 

474),  106. 
Fitch   V.    Gosner    (7    Conn.    232), 

680. 
Fitch  V.  Gosser  (54  Mo.  267),  680. 
Fitch  V.   Sargeant   (1  Ohio,  352), 

1239. 
Fitchburg  Cotton  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mel- 

ven  (15  Mass.  268),  30,  498,  539, 

1178,  1182,  1183. 
Fitz  V.  lies  (62  L.  J.  Ch.  258),  741. 
Fitzgerald   v.    Anderson    (81   Wis. 

341),  1264. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Beebe   (7  Ark.  310), 

501. 
Fitzgerald    v.    Fowlkes    (60    Miss. 

270),  1425. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Jones   (96  Ky.  296), 

1391. 
Fitzgerald  v.  O'Connell   (6  Ir.  Eq. 

R.  455),  1387. 
Fitzgerald  v.   Timoney    (34  N.  Y. 

Supp.  460),  865. 
Fitzhugh  V.  Croghan  (25  Ky.  429), 

333. 
Fitzherbert  v.  Shaw   (1  H.  Black, 

358),   1287. 
Fitzpatrick   v.    Childs    (2    Brewst. 

Pa.  3G5),  179,  229. 
Flagg  V.  Geltmacher  (98  111.  293), 
"  262,  4S3. 
Flagler  v.  Hearst  (86  N.  Y.  Supp. 

398),  1302. 
Flaherty    v.    Nieman    (125    Iowa, 

546),  788. 
Flannery    v.    Hightower    (97    Ga. 

592),  957. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


XCVll 


[referexces  are  to  pages.] 


Flannery    v.    Simons     (93    N.    Y. 

Supp.  544),  782. 
Flarslieim    v.    Dullaghan    (58    111. 

App.  626),  466. 
Flaviell  v.  Gaskoin  (7  Exch.  273), 

1314. 
Fleck    V.    Fieldman     (104    N.    Y. 

Supp.  366),  595. 
Fleetwood  v.  Hull   (58  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

341), 768. 
Fleischman  v.  Toplitz   (134  N.  Y. 

349), 1348. 
Fleming  v.  Chunn  (57  N.  C.  422), 

49. 
Fleming    v.    Collins    (2    Del.    Ch. 

230), 716. 
Fleming  v.  Fleming  Hotel  Co.  (70 

N.  J.  Eq.  509),  634,  644. 
Fleming    v.     Gooding     (10     Bing. 

549), 576. 
Fleming   v.    Ting    (100    Ga.    449), 

1129,  1131,  1132. 
Fleming   v.    Mills    (182    111.    464), 

947. 
Fleming  v.   Snook    (5  Beav.  250), 

762. 
Fletcher  v.  Chamberlain  (61  N.  H. 

438), 599. 
Fletcher   v.   McFarlane    (12   Mass. 

43), 1093. 
Fletcher    v.    McKeon     (75    N.    Y. 

Supp.  817),  33,  1126. 
Fletcher  v.  Nokes   (76  L.  T.  Rep. 

107), 628. 
Flight  V.  Barton  (3  Myl.  &  K.  282), 

769, 1098. 
Flight   V.   Bentley    (7    Sim.    149), 

489. 
Flint  V.   Sheldon    (13   Mass.   443), 

354. 
Flommerfeldt  v.  Englander  (61  N. 

Y.  Supp.  187),  353. 
Flood    V.    Flood    (1    Allen,    Mass. 

217),  235. 
Florence    v.    Robinson    (24    L.    T. 
705), 133. 


Flournoy  v.  Wardlaw  (67  Ga.  378), 

1319. 
Flower    v.    Darby    (1    Term    Rep. 

159),  155,  172. 
Flower    v.    Pearce    (45    La.    Ann. 

853),  394. 
Floyd  V.  Floyd  (4  Rich.  S.  C.  23), 

172. 
Floyd  V.  Herring   (64  N.  C.  409), 

52. 
Floyd  V.  Lyons  (66  L.  J.  Ch.  350), 

1009. 
Floyd    V.    Maddox    (68    Ind.    124), 

1293. 
Floyd  V.   Ministry    (7  Rich.   Law, 

S.  C.  181),  964,  965,  966. 
Fludier    v.    Lombe     (Cas.    Temp. 

Hardw.  307),  283. 
Flynn  v.  Hatton   (43  How.  Pr.  N. 

Y.  333),  860,  879. 
Flynn   v.   Trask    (11   Allen,   Mass. 

550), 882. 
Fogal  V.  Pirro  (23  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 

100), 349. 
Fogarty  v.  Junction  City  (50  Kan. 

478),  705,  766. 
Fogarty  v.   Sparks    (22  Cal.   142), 

976. 
Fogg    V.    Price    (145    Mass.    513), 

985. 
Foley    V.    Addenbrooke    (4    Q.    B. 

197), 609. 
Foley    V.    Constantino     (43    Misc. 

Rep.  92),  1220. 
Foley    V.     McCarthy     (157     Mass. 

474)  828. 
Foley  V.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  (138 

N.  Y.  333), 11. 
Foley   V.    Southwestern   Land   Co. 

(94  Wis.  329),  310. 
Foley   V.    Wyeth    (2   Allen,    Mass. 

135),  224,  440,  686. 
Folker   v.    Richardson    (67   N.    H. 

509), 1222. 
Folkingham    v.    Croft     (3    Anstr. 
700),  305. 


XCVIH 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Follin  V.   Coogin    (12  Rich.   S,  C. 

Law,  44),   638. 
Folsom  V.  Harr  (218  111.  3G9),  985. 
Foltz  V.  Prouse  (17  111.  487),  49. 
Fonda   v.   Van   Home    (15    Wend. 

N.  Y.  631),  10. 
Fonner   v.   Diplock    (2   Bing.   10), 

925. 
Fontaine  v.   Schulenberg   Lumber 

Co.  (109  Mo.  55),  1014. 
Foot   V.    Calvin    (3    Johns.    N.    Y. 

750),  309,  1316.      ' 
Foote   V.   Manhattan   Ry.   Co.    (58 

Hun,  N.  Y.  478),  445. 
Foquet   v.   Moore    (7   Exch.    870), 

1214. 
Forbes    v.    Smiley    (56    Me.    174), 

193,208. 
Forbus  V.  Watkins  (62  S.  W.  Rep. 

36), 1264. 
Force  &  Hembling's  Case  (4  Coke, 

64a), 20. 
Ford   V.    Crewell    (9    Houst    Del. 

179),  1434,  1435,  1436. 
Ford  V.   Com.    (11  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

860), 778. 
Ford  V.  Doyle  (37  Cal.  346),  976. 
Ford   V.   Gregory's   Heirs    (49   Ky. 

175), 349, 350. 
Ford  V.  Hill  (92  Wis.  188),  65. 
Ford  V.  Phillips  (22  Rap.  Jud.  Que. 

C.  S.  296),  903. 
Fordyce  v.  Hathorn  (57  Mo.  120), 

528,  553. 
Fordyce  v.  Young   (39   Ark.  135), 

944. 
Forgy  V.   Harvey    (151    Ind.   507), 

942. 
Forgotson  v.  Becker  (81  N.  Y.  S. 

319),  480. 
Forrest  v.  Durnoll    (86  Tex.  647), 

1419,  1423.  1440. 
Forsalth  v.  Clark   (21  N.  H.  409), 

Forster    v.    Eborle    (7    Misc.    Rep. 
490), 1163. 


Forsythe  v.  Pogue  (25  Oreg.  481), 

219. 
Forsythe   v.   Price    (8   Watts,   Pa. 

282), 687. 
Fort  V.  McGrath  (7  111.  App.  302), 

155. 
Fort  V.  Orndorff   (7  Heisk.  Tenn. 

167), 880. 
Fortescue  v.  Bowler  (55  N.  J.  Bq. 

741),  724,  1244. 
Forward  v.  Pittard   (1  T.  R.  27), 

900. 
Foss  V.  Marr  (40  Neb.  559),  1326. 
Foss  V.  Stanton  (76  Vt.  365),  890. 
Foster  v.  Batt  (6  Mass.  63),  906. 
Foster  v.  Fletcher   (7  T.  B.  Mon. 

Ky.  534),  1315. 
Foster  v.  Goodwin   (82  Ala.  384), 

319,  1423. 
Foster   v.    Gorton    (5    Pick.    Mass. 

185), 1329. 
Foster  v.   Juniata  Bridge   Co.,   16 

Pa.  St.  393),  434. 
Foster  v.  Morris   (3  A.  K.  Marsh. 

Ky.  611),  486. 
Foster   v.    Oldham    (8   Misc.    Rep. 

331), 1069. 
Foster  v.  Peyser   (63  Mass.  242), 

785, 1151. 
Foster    v.    Reid    (78    Iowa,    205), 

1097,  1098,  1423. 
Foster    v.    Robinson    (6    Ohio    St. 

90),  1314,  1315. 
Foster   v.    Williams    (Cowp.    622), 

182. 
Foucher  v.  Choppin   (17  La.  Ann. 

322), 1347. 
Fougera  v.  Cohn    (43  Hun,  N.   V. 

454), 149, 331. 
Fculger  v.  Arding  (71  L.  J.  K.  B. 

499), 1029. 
Fountain  v.  Boatmen's  Sav.   Inst. 

(57  Mo.  553),  350. 
Fournier  v.  Cyr  (64  Me.  32),  342. 
Fowke   v.   Beck    (1   Speers,    S.   C. 
291), 319. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


XCIX 


[rki-fuexces  aee  to  pages.] 


Fowle  V.   Freeman    (9   Ves.   351), 

982. 
Fowler  v.  Atkinson  (6  Minn.  578), 

106. 
Fowler  v.  Bell  (35  S.  W.  Rep.  822), 

65. 
Fowler  v.  Bott  (6  Mass.  63),  882, 

1340,  1345,  1346. 
Fowler  Cycle  Works  &  Fraser  (110 

111.  App.  126),  855. 
Fowler  v.  Hawkins  (17  Ind.  211), 

1429. 
Fowler    v.    Payne    (49    Miss.    32), 

1340,  1346,  1350. 
Fowler  v.  Rapley   (15  Wall.  336), 

1422. 
Fowles  V.  Martin  (76  Vt.  ISO),  309. 
Fox   V.   Buffalo   Park    (163    N.   Y. 

559), 798. 
Fox  V.  City  of  Cincinnati   (104  U. 

S.  743),  116. 
Fox   V.    Jackson    (8    Barb.    N.    Y. 

355),  690. 
Fox  V.   Longley    (1  A.   K.  Marsh. 

Ky.  388),  321. 
Fox  V.  Lynch   (64  Atl.  Rep.  439), 

1304. 
Fox  V.   McKinney    (9   Oreg.   493), 

1320. 
Fox  V.   Nathans    (32   Conn.   348), 

160,  348. 
Fox  V.  Swan  (Styles,  483),  1054. 
Foxworth  V.  Brown  (120  Ala.  59), 

1429, 1432. 
Francis  v.  Cockrell  (L.  R.  5  Q.  B. 

184), 814. 
Francis  v.  Hayward  (52  L.  J.  Ch. 

291), 415. 
Francke  v.  Hewitt   (56  App.  Div. 

497),  248,  249. 
Frank  v.  Brunnemann   (8  W.  Va. 

462), 757. 
Frank  v.  McDonald    (86   111.  App. 

336), 775. 
Frank  v.  Nichols  (6  Mo.  App.  72), 

488. 


Frank  v.  Railroad  Co.   (122  N.  Y. 

197),  1069,  1086. 
Frank   v.   Stratford-Handcock    (13 

Wyom.  37),  991. 
Frank  v.   Taubman    (31    111.   App. 

592), 156. 
Frankfort  Bank  v.  Anderson  (3  A. 

K.  Marsh.  Ky.  1),  64. 
Franklin    v.    Brown     (118    N.    Y. 

110), 1355. 
Franklin  v.  Merida   (35  Cal.  558), 

922. 
Franklin    Land    M.    &    W.    Co.    v. 

Card  (84  Me.  528),  1266. 
Fraser  v.  State  (112  Ga.  13),  339. 
Fratcher  v.  Smith  (104  Mich.  537), 

163. 
Fratt  V.  Hunt  (103  Cal.  288),  898. 
Frazer  v.  Robinson  (42  Miss.  121), 

920. 
Frazier  v.  Caruthers  (44  111.  App. 

61),  646. 
Frazier  v.  Spear  (2  Bibb.  Ky.  385), 

90. 
Frazier  v.   Thomas    (6   Ala.   169), 

1440. 
Frederick   v.   Callahan    (40   Iowa, 

311), 616. 
Frederick    v.    Daniels     (74    Conn. 

710), 879. 
Fredrikan  v.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  (62  N. 

Y.  392),  57.1. 
Free    v.     Stuart     (39    Neb.     220), 

1264. 
Freeland  v.  Hyllested  (24  La.  Ann. 

450), 1424. 
Freeland  v.  Ritz   (154  Mass.  257), 

264. 
Freeman  v.  Hunnewell  (163  Mass. 

210),  813,  818,  873. 
Freeman  v.  Lynch    (8  Neb.   192), 

1249. 
Freeman  v.  Moffitt   (119  Mo.  280). 

482. 
Freeman    v.    Underwood    (66    Me. 

229), 298, 1319. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Freer  v.   Stotenbur    (34  How.  Pr. 

N.  Y.  440),  680,  710. 
Freetly   v.    Barnhart    (51    Pa.    St. 

281), 1002. 
French  v.  French    (3  N.  H.  234), 

333. 
French  v.  Fuller   (23  Pick.  Mass. 

104),  686,  679. 
French  v.  Gapen   (105  U.  S.  509), 

117. 
French   v.   Morse    (2   Gray,   Mass. 

Ill), 1120. 
French  v.  Mayor   (29  Barb.  N.  Y. 

363),  1281. 
French  v.  Reed  (6  Binn.  Pa.  308), 

1042. 
Frey  v.  Drahos  (6  Neb.  1),  447. 
Frey  v.  Johnson   (22  How.  Pr.  N. 

Y.  316),  710. 
Frey    v.    Zabinski    (40    Kulp,    Pa. 

36),  848,  849. 
Friar  v.  Grey  (5  Ex.  597),  376. 
Friary  Holroyd  &  Healey's  Brew. 

Co.  V.  Singleton   (68  Law  J.  Ch. 

622), 998. 
Friedhoff   v.    Smith    (13    Neb.    5), 

146. 
Friedland    v.    Myers    (139    N.    Y. 

432),  696,  875. 
Friedlander    v.    Ryder     (30    Neb. 

783),  496,  1244,  1263,  1296. 
Friend  v.  Oil  Well  Supply  Co.  (179 

Pa.  St.  290),  1162. 
Friesner  v.  Symonds  (46  N.  J.  Eq. 

521),  10. 
Frigeris  v.  Stillman  (17  La.  Ann. 

23),  456. 
Frink  v.  Pratt  (130  111.  327),  1424, 

1458. 
Frisbie  v.  McCarty  (1  Stew.  &  P. 

56),  348. 
Frischberg   v.   Hurter    (173   Mass. 

22),  823. 
Frissel    v.    Fickes    (27    Mo.    557), 

1274. 
Fritton  v.  Foot  (2  Bro.  C.  C.  630), 

1374. 


Frommer    v.    Roessler     (12    Misc. 

Rep.  152),  1182. 
Fromtin   v.    Small    (2   Ld.   Raym. 

1418), 532. 
Frontz  v.  Wood  (2  Hill  Law,  S.  C. 

367), 950. 
Frost  V.  Akron  Iron  Co.  (37  N.  Y. 

Supp.  374),  1210,  1218. 
Frost  V.  Deutsch   (13   S.  W.  Rep. 

981), 1445. 
Frost   V.    Earnest    (4    Whart.    Pa. 

86),  700. 
Frost  V.  Kellogg  (23  Vt.  30o),  311. 
Fry  V.  Day  (97  Ind.  348),  471. 
Fry  V.   Jones    (2   Rawle,   Pa.   12), 

308. 
Frye   v.   Hill    (14   Wash.    St.    83), 

1436. 
Fryska  v.  Prybeski    (11  Det.  Leg. 

N.  223),  1222. 
Fulkerson  v.   Lynn    (64  Mo.  App. 

649), 1452. 
Fuller  V.  Brownell   (48  Neb.  145), 

1264,  1294. 
Fuller  V.  Ferguson    (26  Cal.  546), 

27. 
Fuller  V.  Rose  (110  Mo.  App.  344), 

415. 
Fuller   V.   Ruby    (10    Gray,   Mass. 

285),  699,  1131. 
Fuller   V.    Sweet    (30' Mich.    237), 

924. 
Fuller  V.  Wilson  (3  Q.  B.  58),  102. 
Fuller  V.  Whitlock   (99  Ala.  411), 

122. 
Fuller  Co.  v.  Manhattan  Cons.  Co. 

(88  N.  Y.  Supp.  1049),  553. 
Fullington  v.  Goodwin  (7  Vt.  641), 

1259. 
Fulton    V.    Stuart    (2    Ohio,    215), 

1053,  1096. 
Fulwood's  Case  (4  Coke,  65a),  42. 
Funk    V.    Haldeman    (53    Pa.    St. 

229)  274. 
Funk's  Lessee  v.  Kincaid   (5  Md. 

404),  486,  941. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CI 


[references    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Furlong  v.  Leary   (8  Gush.  Mass. 

409), 678. 
Furnival   v.    Carew    (3    Atk.    83), 

1372, 1382. 
Fusselman  v.  Worthington  (14  111. 

135),  212,  947. 


G. 


Gable  v.  Brooks  (48  Md.  108),  326. 
Gable  v.  Wetherholt  (116  111.  313), 

958. 
Gaffield     v.     Hapgood     (17     Pick. 

Mass.  192),  1264. 
Gaffney   v.    Paul    (29    Misc.    Rep. 

642),  1213. 
Gage  V.  Acton  (1  Salk.  745),  1228. 
Gage  V.  Bates  (40  Cal.  384),  638. 
Gage  V.  Smith  (14  Me.  466),  560. 
Gaggiano  v.  Giallorenzi   (57  N.  Y. 

Supp.  2),  1378. 
Gaines  v.  Keeton    (68  Miss.  473), 

1453. 
Gaines   v.   McAdam    (79    111.   App. 

201),  1207,  1219. 
Gaither  v.   Hascall-Richards    (121 

N.  C.  384),  783. 
Gale  V.  Bates  (3  H.  &  C.  84),  764. 
Gale  V.  Edwards  (52  Me.  363),  491. 
Gale  V.  Heckman    (10   Misc.   Rep. 

376), 449. 
Gale    V.    Oil    Run    Petroleum    Co. 

(6  W.  Va.  200),  665. 
Galewski  v.  Appelbaum   (32  Misc. 

Rep.  203),  108. 
Gallagher  v.  Connell  (23  Neb.  391), 

968. 
Gallagher     v.     David     Stevenson 

Brewing  Co.  (13  Misc.  Rep.  40), 

11. 
Gallagher  v.  Shipley  (24  Md.  418), 

1331,  1333. 
Galley  v.  Kellerman    (123  Pa.   St. 

491), 644. 
Galloway,  Ex  parte   (21  Wend.  N. 

Y.  32),  44,  46. 


Gallup  V.  Albany  R.  R.  Co.  (65  N. 

Y.  1),  1163. 
Galvin  v.  Reals   (187  Mass.  250), 

850. 
Games  v.  Stiles  (14  Pet  U.  S.  322), 

341,  342. 
Gandy  v.   Dewey    (28   Neb.    175), 

1434. 
Gandy  v.  Jubber    (5  B.  &  S.  78), 

128. 
Gannett  v.  Albee  (103  Mass.  372), 

734,  757,  1382. 
Gano  V.  Prindle  (6  Kan.  App.  851), 

1044. 
Gano  V.  Vandeveer  (34  N.  J.  Law, 

293), 697. 
Gans  V.  Hughes    (14  N.  Y.   Supp. 

930),  429. 
Gansen  v.  Moarman   (5  Ohio  Dec. 

287),  42. 
Ganson  v.  Baldwin  (93  Mich.  217), 

515. 
Ganson  v.  Tifft  (71  N.  Y.  48),  880, 

1048. 
Ganter  v.  Atkinson   (35  Wis.  48), 

384,  686. 
Garber  v.  Gianella    (98  Cal.  527), 

392. 
Garcewich    v.    Woods    (7?    N.    Y. 

Supp.  154),  644,  1058. 
Garden  v.  Butler  (Hay  &  J.  112), 

765. 
Gardener    v.    Webber     (17     Pick. 

Mass.  407),  343. 
Gardiner  v.    Bair    (10   Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  Rep.  74),  1223. 
Gardner     v.     Commissioners      (21 

Minn.  33),  139. 
Gardner   v.    Hazleton    (121    Mass. 

494), 191. 
Gardner  v.  Keteltas  (3  Hill,  330), 

672,  676. 
Gardner    v.    McEwen     (19    N.    Y. 

125), 1427. 
Garlinghouse  v.  Mulvane  (40  Kan. 

428), 122. 


Cll 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Garner    v.    Byard    (23    Ga.    289), 

1190. 
Garner  v.  Cutting  (32  Iowa,  547), 

1409. 
Garner  v.  Hannah  (6  Duer,  N.  Y. 

262), 667. 
Garnett  v.  Albree  (103  Mass.  372), 

768. 
Garnhart  v.  Finney   (40  Mo.  449), 

1391. 
Garr  v.  Haskett  (86  Ind.  373),  18. 
Garranette  v.  White  (92  Mo.  237), 

1096. 
Garrard  v.  Frankel  (30  Beav.  445), 

474. 
Garred   v.    Macey    (10    Mo.    161), 

1273. 
Garrett    v.    Jennings    (19    Ky.    S. 

Rep.  1712),  314. 
Garrett  v.  Lister  (1  Ley.  25),  334. 
Garrett    v.    Somerville     (98    App. 

Div.  206),  823,  834. 
Garrett's  Appeal  (100  Pa.  St.  597), 

552. 
Garroute  v.  White   (92  Mo.   237), 

1465. 
Garth  v.  Cotton  (3  Atk.  756),  711. 
Garths  v.  Good  (50  Mo.  App.  149), 

1449.   ■ 
Gartlan   v.   Hickman    (56   W.   Va. 

75),  1247,  1265. 
Garton  v.  Gregory  (3  B.  &  S.  90), 

1284. 
Gartrell  v.  Clay  (81  Ga.  327),  1448. 
Garusch  v.  Rutledge  (79  Md.  272), 

351. 
Garvey  v.  Dobyns  (8  Mo.  213),  523. 
Garvin  v.  Jennerson  (20  Kan.  371), 

318,  319. 
Gaskill    V.   Trainer    (3    Cal.    334), 

638,  653. 
Gaskins  v.  Blake    (27  Miss.   675), 

956. 
Gassnick  v.  SteCfenson   (112  Iowa, 

688), 1437. 
Gaston  v.  Tunison   (10  N.  J.  Law 

J.  305),  1441. 


Gates  V.  Goodjoe   (101  U.  S.  612), 

1353. 
Gates  V.  Green  (4  Paige  Ch.  N.  Y. 

355),  1340,  1350. 
Gates   V.   Griffen    (4   Paige,   N.   Y. 

355), 1345. 
Gates  V.  Hendrick   (54  Hun,  92), 

910. 
Gates  V.  Home  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.    (4 

Am.  Law  Rev.  395),  65. 
Gates  V.  Max  (125  N.  C.  139),  1112. 
Gates  V.  Steele  (48  Ark.  539),  122. 
Cause    V.    Richardson     (4    Houst. 

Del.  222),  1443. 
Gavan  v.  Norcross   (117  Ga.  356), 

855,  857,  1349. 
Gay  V.  Davey   (47  Ohio  St.  396), 

1346. 
Gay  V.  Ihm  (3  Mo.  App.  588),  331. 
Gay  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hobbs  (128  N.  C. 

46), 274. 
Gayetty  v.  Bethune  (14  Mass.  49), 

445. 
Gaylord  v.  Soragen    (32  Vt.  110), 

776. 
Gaynor  v.  Blowett   (82  Wis.  313), 

1126. 
Gazzolo  V.  Chambers   (73  111.  75), 

672. 
Gear  v.  Barnum    (37   Conn.   229), 

397. 
Geddio  v.  Folliett  (16  S.  D.  610), 

1238. 
Gee   V.   Fleming    (110   Mass.   39), 

679. 
Gee  V.  Moss  (68  Iowa,  318),  478. 
Geer  v.  Traders'  Bank  (132  Mich. 

215), 56. 
Gehabee  v.  Stanly  (1  La.  Ann.  17), 

154. 
Geiger  v.   Braun    (6   Daly,   N.   Y. 

506),  384. 
Gelston  v.  Rullman   (15  Md.  260), 

1400. 
General  Assur.  Co.  v.  Woraley  (15 

Reports,  328),  167. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cm 


[references   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Genet  v.  Del.  &  Hudson  Canal  Co. 

(13  Misc.  409),  452. 
Geneva    Mineral    Springs    Co.    v. 

Coursey    (61    N.    Y.    Supp.    98), 

400. 
Genin  v.  Ingersoll  (2  W.  Va.  558), 

965,  966. 
Genter  v.  Morrison  (31  Barb.  N.  Y. 

125), 342. 
Geode  v.  Gaines   (145  U.  S.  141), 

932. 
George     Bauernschmidt     Brewing 

Co.  V.  McColgan    (89   Md.   135), 

1287. 
George  v.  Fisk  (32  N.  H.  32),  680, 

683. 
George  v.  Goldsby    (23  Ala.  326), 

336. 
George  v.  Mahoney  (62  Minn.  370), 

538. 
George  v.  Putney    (4  Cush.  Mass. 

351),  927,  1171. 
George's  Creek  Co.  v.  Detmold   (1 

Md.  Ch.  372),  723. 
Georgen  v.  Schmidt    (69  111.  App. 

538), 1094. 
Gerhardt  Realty  Co.  v.  Brecht  (84 

S.  W.  Rep.  217),  1378. 
Gerken  v.  Smith   (11  N.  Y.  Supp. 

685), 1093. 
Germain  v.  Pattison  (46  Barb.  9), 

1060. 
German     Bank     v.     Herron     (111 

Iowa,  25),  210,  219,  1435. 
Germania  Fire  Ins.   Co.  v.  Myers 

(8  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  349),  1141. 
German     Sav.     &     Loan     Soc.     v. 

Weber  (16  Wash.  St.  95),  1297. 
Gerry  v.  Siebrecht  (88  N.  Y.  1034), 

458,  675. 
Gervis  v.  Peade    (Cro.  Eliz.   615), 

606. 
Gerzebeck  v.  Lord   (33  N.  J.  Law, 

240), 861. 
Getz  V.  Phila.  &  Read.  Ry.  Co.  n05 

Pa.  St.  547),  705. 


Getzandaffer    v.    Caylor     (38    Md. 

280), 49. 
Ghegan  v.  Young  (23  Pa.  St.  18)^ 

1093,  1094. 
Gibbon  v.  Kirk  (1  Q.  B.  850),  561, 

581. 
Gibbons  v.  Daj'ton   (4  Hun,  N.  Y. 

45),  151,  156. 
Gibbons    v.    Dillingham    (10    Ark. 

9),  491,  1315,  1319. 
Gibbons  v.  Hamilton  (33  How.  Pr. 

N.  Y.  83),  533. 
Gibbs  V.  Ross  (2  Head,  Tenn.  437), 

437,  492,  522. 
Gibson  v.  Brockway  (8  N.  H.  4C5, 

471), 438. 
Gibson  v.  Carmthorpe   (1  Dowl.  & 

Ry.  205),  576. 
Gibson  v.  Doey    (2  H.  &  N.  615), 

490. 
Gibson  v.  Farley   (16  Mass.  280), 

29,  51,  52. 
Gibson  v.  Gautier  (1  Mackey,  D.  C. 

35),144L 
Gibson  v.  Hanna  (12  Mo.  162),  549. 
Gibson  v.  Holland  ^L.  T.  I.  C.  P. 

1),386. 
Gibson  v.  Kirk    (2  G.  &  D.  252),. 

577. 
Gibson  v.  Needham   (96  Ga.  172), 

248,  250. 
Gibson  v.  Oliver  (158  Pa.  St.  277), 

641. 
Gibson  v.  Pearsall  (1  E.  D.  Smith. 

N.  Y.  90),  775,  776. 
Gibson  v.  Perry  (29  Mo.  245),  1340. 
Gibson  v.  Wells    (1  B.  &  P.  290), 

720. 
Giddens  v.   Boiling    (93   Ala.   92), 

1467. 
Giddens   v.   Dodd    (3   Drew,   485), 

375,376. 
Giddings  v.  Felker   (70  Tex.  176), 

1096. 
Giergen  v.   Schmidt    (69   111.  App. 

538), 593. 


CIV 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


[keferexces  are  to  pages.] 


Gifford   V.    King    (54    Iowa,    525) 

252,  254. 
Gigger  v.  Nesbitt   (122  Mo.  675) 

991. 
Gilbert   v.    Greenbaum    (56    Iowa 

211), 1436. 
Gilbert  v.  Port  (28  Ohio  St.  276) 

978. 
Gilbert  v.  Wiman  Tl  N.  Y.  550) 

1013. 
Gilchrist  v.  Rea  (9  Paige  Ch.  N.  Y 

66), 53. 
Giles  V.  Bourne    (6  M.   &  S.   73) 

342. 
Giles  V.  Comstock   (4  N.  Y.  270) 

524,  1183. 
Giles  V.   Ebsworth    (10  Md.   333) 

920,934. 
Giles   V.    O'Toole    (4   Barb.   N.   Y 

261), 695. 
Gilhooley  v.  Washington   (4  N.  Y 

217),  1160,  1166. 
Gill  V.  Johnson   (1  Met.  Ky.  449) 

1116. 
Gill  V.  Middleton  (105  Mass.  477) 

801,  804,  865. 
Gillaspie  v.  Hagans    (90  Cal.  90) 

877. 
Gillespie   v.    Hendren    (73    S.    W 

Rep.  361),  578. 
Gillespie  v.   Jones    (26   Tex.   343) 

958. 
Gillespie  v.  Thomas  (15  Wend.  N 

Y.  464),  1178. 
Gillett  V.  Treganza   (6  Wis.  343) 

274. 
Gilliam  v.  Mither   (33  S.  W.  Rep 

984),  1451. 
Gilliam  v.  Moore   (44  N.  Car.  95) 

926. 
Gillick  V.  Jackson   (40  Misc.  Rei) 

627), 812. 
Gillilan  v.  Norton    (29   Super.  Ct 

Rep.  546),  757. 
Gilloon  V.  Reilly    (50  N.  J.  Law 

26),  487. 


Gilman    v.    Milwaukee     (31    Wis. 

563),  75. 
Gilman  v.  Wells  (66  Me.  273),  288. 
Gilpin  V.   Adams    (14   Colo.   512), 

514. 
Gilsey  v.   Keen    (185   N.   Y.   588), 

1093. 
Gimon    v.    Terrell    (38   Ala.    208), 

1170. 
Ginch  V.   Causey    (57   S.   E.   Rep. 

562), 469. 
Ginzburg  v.   Ecker    (28   Mo.   App. 

25S),1086. 
Girardy  v.  Richardson  (1  Esp.  13), 

772. 
Givens    v.    Easley    (17    Ala.    385), 

1423. 
Givens  v.  Mullinax  (4  Rich.  L.  S. 

C.  590),  920. 
Glascott  V.  Day  (5  Esp.  48),  537. 
Glasgow  V.  Ridgeley  (11  Mo.  34), 

1414. 
Glazebrook  v.  Woodrow    (8  T.   R. 

366), 601. 
Gleason  v.  Boehm   (58  N.  J.  Law, 

475),  804,  811,  816. 
Glein   v.   Rise    (6   Watts.   Pa.   44), 

924. 
Glen  V.  Dungey  r4  Ex.  61),  577. 
Glidden  v.  Bennett  (43  N.  H.  306), 

1259. 
Gluck  V.  Elkln  (36  Minn.  80,  81), 

640,  659. 
Goatley  v.   Paine    (2   Camp.   520), 

861. 
Gocio   V.   Day    (51   Ark.    46),    873, 

1244, 1278. 
Godard  v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co. 

(2  Rich.  Law,  S.  C.  346),  162. 

172. 
Goddard  v.  Hall  (55  Me.  579),  579. 
Goddard  v.  King   (40  Minn.  164), 

571. 
Goddard  v  Railroad  Co.    (2  Rich. 

S.  C.  346),  158. 
Goddard 's    Appeal    (1    Walk.    Pa. 

97),  1098. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


cv 


[EEFEBENCES    ABE   TO    PAGES.] 


Godfrey  v.  Black    (39   Kan.   193), 

757. 
Godfroy    v.    Disprow    (Walk.    Ch. 

260), 333. 
Godfrey  v.   India  Wharf  Brewing 

Co.  (87  App.  Div.  123),  880. 
Godfrey  v.   Walker    (42   Ga.   562), 

199,  227. 
Godley    v.    Haggerty    (26    Pa.    St. 

Ill),  805. 
Godwin  v.  Collins  (3  Del.  Ch.  189), 

1002. 
Godwin  v.  Harris   (98  N.  W.  Rep. 

439), 553. 
Goebel  v.  Hough    (26  Minn.  252), 

563,  702,  863,  1156. 
Goedecke  v.  Baker  (28  S.  W.  Rep. 

1039), 874. 
Goerges   v.    Hufsschmidt    (44   Mo. 

179), 976. 
Goldberg  v.  Wood  (60  N.  Y.  Supp. 

427), 261. 
Goldersleeve  v.  Overstolz   (90  Mo. 

App.  518),  1185. 
Golding    V.    Brennan     (183    Mass. 

286), 341, 1213. 
Goldman  v.  Corn   (97  N.  Y.  Supp. 

926), 1188. 
Goldsborough    v.     Gable     (36    111. 

App.  363),  139,  255,  466,  947. 
Goldsmith  v.   Schroeder    (93   App. 

Div.  206),  522,  1219. 
Goldsmith    v.    Wilson     (68    Iowa, 

685), 1044. 
Golob  V.  Pasinsky  (76  N.  Y.  Supp. 

388), 831. 
Gomber  v.   Hacket    (6   Wis.   323), 

645. 
Gomez  v.  Gomez   (147  N.  Y.  195), 

57,  1374. 
Gooch  V.  Clutterbuck   (68  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  808),  1090. 
Gooch    V.    Furman    (62    111.    App. 

340), 423. 
Goodall   V.   Gerke    (1    Ohio    N.    P. 
2S4),774. 


Goodbehere  v.  Bevan    (3  M.  &  S. 

353), 1051. 
Goodenow  v.  Allen    (68  Me.  308), 

191. 
Goode  V.  Howells  (4  M.  &  W.  199), 

158. 
Goode    V.    Ruehle    (23    Mich.    30), 

1017. 
Goode  V.  Webb  (52  Ala.  452),  348. 
Goodfellow  V.  Noble   (25  Mo.  60), 

146,  877. 
Goodhue  v.  Barnwell   (1  Rice  Ch. 

S.  C.  198),  11. 
Goodland  v.  Blewelt  (1  Camp.  477), 

531. 
Goodman  v.  Greenberg  (103  N.  Y. 

Supp.  779),  367. 
Goodman   v.   Hannibal   &   St.   Jos. 

Ry.  Co.  (45  Mo.  33),  1267. 
Goodman  v.  Jones  (26  Conn.  264), 

920. 
Goodman  v.  Malcolm  (5  Kan.  App. 

285),  965. 
Goodright  v.  Davids   (Cowp.  804), 

647. 
Goodrich  v.  Jones    (2  Hill,  N.  Y. 

142), 1259. 
Goodrich  v.   Sanderson    (55  N.   Y. 

Supp.  881),  701. 
Goodrich    v.    Thompson     (4    Day, 

Conn.  215),  51. 
Goodrich  v.  Walker  (1  John.  Cas. 

N.  Y.  250),  349,  350. 
Goodsell  V.  Rutland-Can.  R.  Co.  (75 

Vt.  375),  336,  338,  339. 
Goodtitle    v.    Flnucan    (12    Doug. 

575), 58. 
Goodtitle   d.   Galloway  v.   Herbert 

(4  T.  R.  680),  196. 
Goodtitle  v.  Morse   (3  T.  R.  371). 

952. 
Goodtitle  v.   Way    (1   T.   R.   735), 

246. 
Goodwin  v.  Clover  (91  Minn.  438), 

196. 
Goodwin  v.  Gilbert  (9  Mass.  olO), 
519. 


CVl 


TABLE   OP   CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Goodwin  v.  Holbrook  (4  Wend.  N. 

Y.  377),  601. 
Goodwin  v.  Noble  (8  E.  &  B.  587). 

1061. 
Goodwin  v.  Perkins  (134  Cal.  564), 

198. 
Goodwin   v.    Sliarlvey    (80   Pa.    St. 

149),  1426,  1444. 
Goodwine  v.  Barnett  (2  Ind.  App. 

16),  678. 
Goodwriglit  v.  Cordwent  (6  T.  R. 

219), 647. 
Gardeville  v.  Redon    (4  La.  Ann. 

40),  1068. 
Gordon  v.  Buckley  (14  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

331),  97. 
Gordon   v.    Cummings    (152   Mass. 

573),  801,  817,  819. 
Gordon  v.   George    (12   Ind.   408), 

884. 
Gordon  v.    Gilman    (48   Me.   473), 

162,  218. 
Gordon  v.  Harper  (7  T.  R.  9),  113. 
Gordon   v.   Miller    (63  N.  E.   Rep. 

774), 1293. 
Gordon    v.    Peltzer    (56   Mo.    App. 

599),  798,  799. 
Gordon  v.  Trevelyan  (1  Price,  64), 

387. 
Fore  V.  Lloyd   (12  M.  &  W.  463), 

257,  524. 
Gore  V.  Stevens  (1  Dana,  Ky.  201), 

1171. 
Goring  v.   Goring    (3   Swan,   661), 

765. 
Gorman  v.  White  (46  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1),810. 
Gormley's  Appeal  (27  Pa.  St.  49), 

1000. 
Gorst    V.    Timothy    (2    Car.    &    K. 

351),  172. 
Gosharn    v.    Stewart    (15    W.    Va. 

C57),91,  560,  561. 
Gosling  V.  Wolf    (5  Reports,  12), 

1098. 
Gossett  V.   Drydale    ^48   Mo.   App. 

430), 1311. 


Gott  V.  Gandy    (2  El.  &  BI.  845), 

138. 
Gottsberger  v.  Rajdway  (2  Hilt.  N. 

Y.  242),  855. 
Gould   V.    Bugby    (6    Gray,   Mass. 

371),  620,  632. 
Gould   V.    Eagle   Creek    (8    Minn. 

427), 1044. 
Gould  V.  Maring   (28  Barb.  N.  Y. 

— ),331. 
Gould   V.    Steenberg    (4    111.    App. 

439), 685. 
Gould  V.  Thompson  (4  Met.  Mass. 

224),  198,  200,  317. 
Gourlay  v.  Somerset  (19  Ves.  429), 

1390. 
Gove  V.   Watson   "(61   N.   H.   136), 

1302. 
Governors   of  Christ's  Hospital  v. 

Hattold  (2  M.  &  G.  712),  507. 
Grabenhurst  v.  Nicodemus  (42  Md. 

236), 1136. 
Grabf elder   v.    Gazetti    (26   S.   W. 

Rep.  436),  84. 
Grace  v.  Michaud  (50  Minn.  139), 

219. 
Grady  v.  Ibach  (94  Ala.  152),  574. 
Grady  v.  Warrell  (105  Mich.  310), 

54. 
Grady  v.   Wolsner    (46   Ala.   381), 

794. 
Gragg    v.    Brown     (44    Me.    157), 

1445. 
Graham  v.  Alsopp  (3  Ex.  186),  546. 
Graham  v.  Anderson  (3  Harr.  Del. 

364),  176,  1175. 
Graham  v.  Houghtaling  (30  N.  J. 

L.  552), 12. 
Graham  v.  James  (30  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  Rep.  435),  569. 
Graham  v.  Moore   (4  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

467), 923. 
Graham    v.    Seignious    (53    S.    C. 

132), 1432. 
Graham  v.  Way  (38  Vt.  19),  278. 
Graham  v.  Womack  (82  Mo.  App. 

618),  045. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cvn 


[references  are  to  pages. J 


Gramm  v.  Sterling  (8  Wyo.  527), 

252,  262. 
Grand   Rapids,   etc.   Co.   v.   South 

Grand    Rapids    Co.    (102    Mich. 

227), 436. 
Grand  Trunk,  etc.  Co.  v.  Chicago, 

etc.  Co.  (141  Fed.  Rep.  785),  265, 

457. 
Granite    Building    Corporation    v. 

Greene  (25  R.  I.  586),  616,  645, 

748. 
Grannis   v.    Clark    (8   Cow.   N.  Y. 

36),  701. 
Grant  v.  Chase  (17  Mass.  443),  445. 
Grant  v.  Ramsey  (7  Ohio  St.  157), 

388. 
Grant  v.  White  (42  Mo.  App.  285), 

141,  155,  920. 
Grant  v.  Whitwell    (9  Iowa,  152), 

1421,  1425,  1429. 
Graves  v.  Berdan   (26  N.  Y.  498), 

1158,  1340,  1342,  1343. 
Graves  v.   Graves    (6  Gray,  Mass. 

391),  336.  395. 
Graves  v.  Porter   (11  Barb.  N.  Y. 

592),  464,  546,  1080. 
Graves  v.  Walter  (101  N.  W.  Rep. 

297), 314. 
Graves  v.  White    (87  N.  Y.   465), 

1227. 
Gray  v.  Bompass    (11  C.  B.  N.  S. 

520), 577. 
Gray  v.  Bremer    (122  Iowa,  110), 

1462. 
Gray  v.   Chamberlain    (4   C.   &   P. 

260), 522. 
Gray   v.    Goff    (8    Mo.    App.    329), 

1165,1168. 
Gray  v.  Johnson    (14  N.  H.  414), 

88,  559. 
Gray  v.  Kaufman  Dairy  Ice  Cream 

Co.  (162  N.  Y.  388),  1199,  1213. 
Gray    v.    Kehoe    (90    Mich.    151), 

1261. 
Gray  v.  Murray  (2  John.  Ch.  N.  Y. 

167),  1042. 
h 


Gray  v.  Oyler   (2  Bush,  Ky.  256), 

1244. 
Gray   v.    Robinson    (33    Pac.   Rep. 

712), 312. 
Gray  v.  Rogers  (30  Mo.  258),  498. 
Gray  v.    Stanion    (1   Mee.   &  Wei. 

695), 192, 198. 
Gray  v.  Stevens  (28  Vt.  1),  688. 
Gray  v.  Worst  (129  Mo.  122),  1325. 
Gray  v.  Wilson  (4  Watts,  Pa.  39), 

572, 1443. 
Grayson  v.  Buie  (26  La.  Ann.  637), 

914. 
Greason    v.    Keteltas     (17    N.    Y. 

491), 983. 
Great  Nat.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harrison  (12 

Com.  Bench,  576),  614. 
Great   Western   Ry.   Co.   v.   Smith 

(45  L.  J.  Ch.  235),  630. 
Greaves  v.   Whitmarsh  Watson   & 

Co.  (75  L.  J.  K.  B.  633),  1027. 
Greber  v.  Kleckner  (2  Pa.  St.  289), 

686. 
Greeley  v.  Greeley   (73  Pac.  Rep. 

295), 1467. 
Greeley  v.  Winsor   (1  S.  D.  117), 

279, 1405. 
Green   v.   Austin    (3    Camp.    260), 

1459. 
Green   v.   Bell    (3   Mo.   App.   291), 

563,  882. 
Green  v.  Bridges  (4  Sim.  96),  667, 

1038. 
Green  v.   Deitrich    (114   111.   636), 

320. 
Green  v.  Dodge  (64  Atl.  Rep.  499), 

463. 
Green  v.  Eales  (2  Q.  B.  225),  882, 

888. 
Green   v.   Green    (2   Redfield   Sur. 

N.  Y.  408),  42. 
Green  v.  Keppe  (18  C.  B.  149),  105. 
Green  v.  Low  (22  Beav.  625),  979. 
Green  v.  Meter  (54  N.  J.  Eq.  270), 

410. 
Green   v.   Redding    (92   Cal.   548), 

862. 


CVlll 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Green  v.  Wilding   (59  Iowa,  679), 

17,  19. 
Green  v.  Wilson  (8  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

825),  948. 
Greene    v.    Cole    (2    Wm.    Saund. 

2590),  380,  720. 
Greene    v.    Hague    (10    111.    App. 

598), 840. 
Greene  v.   Klinger   (10  Fed.  Rep. 

689), 974. 
Greene  v.  Munson  (9  Vt.  37),  922. 
Greene  v.  Tyler  (39  Pa.  St.  368), 

552. 
Greene  v.  Williams    (45   111.  206), 

694. 
Greenewald    v.    Schales    (17    Mo. 

App.  324),  159. 
Greenland  v.  Waddell  (5  N.  Y.  St. 

Rep.  835),  49. 
Greenleaf     v.     Allen     (127     Mass. 

248),  560,  1093. 
Greenough's  Appeal  (9  Pa.  St.  18), 

298. 
Green's   Case    (Cro.   Eliz.   3),   647, 

654. 
Green's      Trustees      v.      Robinson 

(Wright,  Ohio,  436),  349. 
Greenup    v.    Verner    (16    111.    26), 

322. 
Greenwalt  v.   Horner    (6   S.   &  R. 

Pa.  70)  439. 
Green  way  v.  Hart  (14  C.  B.  348), 

530,  943. 
Greenwood    v.    Moore     (79    Miss. 

201),  965,  966,  971. 
Greenwood    v.    Tyber    (Cro.    Jac. 

563),  25. 
Greenwood  v.  Wetterau   (84  N.  Y. 

Supp.  740),  699. 
Gregg   V.    Boyd    (23    N.    Y.    Supp. 

918),  1330,  1331. 
Gregg    V.    Coates    (23    Beav.    33), 

1340. 
Gregor  v.  Cady  (82  Me.  131),  864. 
Gregory  v.  Doidge   (3  Blng.  474), 

923. 
Gregory  v.  Hay  (3  Cal.  332),  1462. 


Gregory   v.   Mighell    (18   Ves.   Jr. 

328), 1390. 
Gregory   v.   Rosenkrauz    (72   Wis. 

220), 435. 
Gregory  v.  Thompson  (68  Vt.  410), 

760. 
Gregory  v.  Wilson   (9  Hare.  683), 

663,  667,  1038. 
Gregory's  Heirs  v.  Crab's  Heirs  (2 

B.  Mon.  Ky.  234),  934. 
Greider's  Appeal    (5  Pa.  St.  422), 

1198,  1238. 
Grenier  v.  Cota  (92  Mich.  23),  1385. 
Greton  v.    Smith    (33   N.  Y.   245), 

193. 
Grey  v.  Cuthbertson  (2  Chit.  482), 

1080,1284. 
Gribble   v.    Toms    (71   N.   J.   Law, 

338),  486,  541. 
Gridley  v.  Einbigler  (98  App.  Div. 

160), 1012. 
Griffin  v.   Baust  "(50   N.  Y.   Supp. 

905), 395. 
Griffin  v.  Bristol    (39  Minn.  456), 

327. 
Griffin  v.   Dollins    (53   S.   B.   Rep. 

1004), 15. 
Griffin    v.    Knisely    (75    111.    411), 

250,  578. 
Griffin  v.  Manice  (174  N.  Y.  305), 

822. 
Griffin  v.  Marine  Co.  (52  111.  130), 

1110. 
Griffin  v.  Rochester  (96  Ind.  545), 

291. 
Griffin  v.  Sheffield   (38  Miss.  359), 

234,  940. 
Griffin  v.  Tomkins  (42  L.  T.  359), 

660. 
Griffith  V.  Burlingham    (18  Wash. 

429), 1112. 
Griffith    V.    Brackman    (97    1\nin. 

3S7),35. 
Griffith  V.  Chichester  (7  Exch.  95), 

548. 
Griffith    V.    Gillum    (31    Mo.    App. 

33), 1453. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED, 


cix 


[beferexces  are  to  pages. J 


Griffith    V.    Hodges    (1    Car.    &    P. 

419), 537. 
Griffith  V.  Parmley  (38  Ala.  393), 

920. 
Griffith  V.  Tombs  (7  C.  &  P.  810), 

1337. 
Griffiths  V.  Puleston   (13  M.  &  W. 

358), 1314. 
Grifhahn  v.  Kreizer  (62  App.  Div. 

413),  820. 
Grimman  v.  Legge  (8  B.  &  C.  324), 

1199,1239. 
Grimwood  v.  Moss  (27  L.  T.  268), 

651. 
Grissler  v.  Dudley  (58  N.  Y.  323), 

542. 
Griswold    v.    Chandler    (5    N .  W. 

492), 51. 
Grizzard  v.  Roberts   (110  Ga.  41), 

950. 
Groff  V.  Levan    C16   Pa.    St.   179), 

1328. 
Grogan  v.  Bway.  Foundry  Co.   (87 

Me.  321),  794. 
Grommes    v.    St.    Paul    Trust    Co. 

(147  111.  634),  147,  1092,  1214. 
Grore  v.  Portal  (71  L.  J.  C!i.  299), 

1051. 
Gross   V.   Hartley    (66  Miss.    116), 

1411,  1467. 
Gross  V.  Herkert   (124  Wis.  314), 

693. 
Grosvenor  v.  Flint   (20  R.   I.  31), 

571. 
Grosvenor  v.  Green  (32  L.  T.  Rep. 

252),  362,  1099. 
Grosvenor  v.  Vv'oodhouse   (1  Bing. 

38), 923. 
Groton  Mfg.   Co.   v.   Gardiner    (11 

R.  I.  626),  1440. 
Grove  v.  Hodges  (55  Pa.  St.  504), 

327. 
Groves  v.  Groves    (10  Q.  B.  486), 

187. 
Grubb  V.  Bayard  (2  Wall.  Jr.  U.  S. 

81),  274. 


Grubb  V.  Grubb  (10  B.  &  C.  816), 

182. 
Gruhn  v.  Gudebrod  Bros.  Co.    (21 

Misc.  Rep.  528),  554. 
Grummett  v.   Gingrass    (77   Mich. 

379), 665. 
Grund  v.  Van  Vleck  (69  111.  478), 

690. 
Grundin  v.  Carter   (99  Mass.  15), 

491,  1080,  1095,  1111. 
Grundy  v.  Martin  (143  Mass.  279), 

213. 
Grymes  v.  Boweren  (6  Bing.  437), 

1256. 
Grymes  v.  Sanders  (93  U.  S.  55), 

469. 
Guay   V.    Kehoo    (70   N.    H.    151), 

1277. 
Gude  Co.  V.  Farley  (28  Misc.  Rep. 

184),  290. 
Gudgen  v.  Besset  (6  L.  &  Bl.  986), 

581. 
Guest   V.   Opdyck    (31   N.   J.   Law, 

552), 309. 
Guffey  V.  Hukill    (34  W.  Va.  49), 

634. 
Gugel  V.  Isaacs  (21  App.  Div.  503), 

503. 
Guinzburg  v.  Claude  (28  Mo.  App. 

258), 1087. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith 

(3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  483),  1320. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dusen- 

berry  (86  Tex.  525),  1320. 
Gulf,  etc.  Co.  V.  Harmonson  (Tex. 

22  S.  W.  R.  764),  681. 
Gulick  V.  Conover  (15  N.  J.  Law, 

420), 549. 
Gulick  v.  Grover    (33  N.  J.  Law, 

463). 101. 
Gulliher  v.   Chicago,  etc.   Co.    (59 

Iowa,  516),  361. 
Gulliver  v.  Fowler  (64  Conn.  556), 

850,  855,  864,  879,  1358. 
Gullman  v.  Sharp   (81  Hun,  462), 

442. 


ex 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Gun   V.   McCarthy    (13   L.    R.    Ir. 

304), 474. 
Gunn  V.  Sinclair  (52  Mo.  327),  164, 

1228. 
Gunizburg  v.  Claude  (38  Mo.  App. 

258),  92. 
Gunsolus  V.  Lormer  (54  Wis.  630), 

1689. 
Gurney  v.   Ford    (2   Allen,   Mass. 

576), 438. 
Gushee  v.  City  of  New  York   (42 

App.  Div.  — ),  79. 
Guthman  v.  Vallery  (51  Neb.  824), 

229. 
Gutteridge  v.  Munyard   (7  Car.  & 

Payne,  129),  885. 
Guy  V.  Downs   (12  Neb.  532),  123. 
Gwin  V.   Melmoth    (1   Freem.   Ch. 

505), 441. 
Gwynn  v.   Jones    (2   G.   &  J.   Md. 

184), 970. 


K 


Haberdasher's  Co.  v.  Isaac  (3  Jur. 

N.  S.  611),  365. 
Haby  v.  Koenig   (2  Posey,  Unrep. 

Case,  439),  440. 
Hack  V.  Leonard  (9  Mod.  91),  663. 
Hacket  v.  Marmet   (52  Fed.  Rep. 

268),  341,  921. 
Hadden  v.  Knickerbocker   (70  111. 

677),  1429,  1432. 
Hadley  v.  Baxendale  (9  Ex.  341), 

695. 
Hadley  v.   Berners    (97   Mo.   App. 

314),  616. 
Haeussler   v.    Iloman    Paper    Box 

Co.    (49  Mo.  App.  631),  1112. 
Haflick    V.    Stober    (11    Ohio    St. 

482),  1264,  1269,  1270. 
Hagan  v.  Buck  (44  Vt.  285),  666. 
Hagar    v.    Wirkoff    (2    Okl.    580), 

922,  964. 
Haggerty  v.  Lee  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  1), 

441. 


Hague   V.   Ahrens    (53   Fed.   Rep. 

58),  620,   623,   1055. 
Hague   V.    Powers    (25    How,    Pr. 

N.  Y.  17),  537. 
Hahham   v.    Sherman    (114   Mass. 

19),  1238. 
Haig  V.   Homan    (4    Bligh,   N.    S. 

380),  1106. 
Haines  v.   Beach    (90  Mich.   563), 

191. 
Haines  v.  Burnett  (27  Beav.  500), 

365,  608. 
Haines   v.   Downey    (86   111.   App. 

373),  471,  475. 
Haizlip    V.    Rosenberg     (63    Ark. 

430),  839. 
Halben  v.  Runder   (1  C.  M.  &  R. 

264),  1243,  1295. 
Haldane  v.  Johnson   (8  Ex.  689), 

528. 
Hall  V.   Ball    (3  Man.  &  G.   242), 

367. 
Hall  V.  Benner   (1  Pen.  &  W.  Pa. 

403),  351. 
Hall    V.    Boston     (16    Misc.    Rep. 

528),  855. 
Hall  V.  Burgess    (5  B.  &  C.  333), 

1175,  1199. 
Hall  V.  Center   (40  Cal.   63),  982, 

996. 
Hall  V.  Dewey   (10  Vt.   593),   212. 
Hall  V.  Gerken  (96  App.  Div.  632), 

1190. 
Hall  V.  Gould  (13  N.  Y.  127),  629, 

1182. 
Hall  V.  Hoagland   (38  N.  J.  Law, 

450),  1071. 
Hall    V.    Horton    (79    Iowa,    352), 

456,  695. 
Hall  V.  Irvin   (78  App.  Div.  107), 

53,  420,  1156. 
Hall  V.  Jacobs  (7  Bush,  Ky.  595), 

258. 
Hall  V.  Myers   (43  Md.  581),  130, 

139,  158. 
Hall  V.  Paulson  Furniture  Co.   (4 

Wash.  644),  934. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXI 


[rei-eeexces  are  to  pages.] 


Hall  V.  Phillips  (164'  Pa.  St.  494), 

463. 
Hall    V.    Ryder    (152    Mass.    528), 

481. 
Hall  V.  Smith   (14  Ves.  426),  394. 
Hall    V.    Wallace     (88    Cal.    434), 

197,  199. 
Hall  V.   Westcott    (15   R.   I.   373). 

957. 
Hall    V.    Western    Trans.    Co.    (34 

N.  Y.  284),  576. 
Hall  V.  Wood  (10  N.  H.  237),  106. 
Halladay    v.    Underwood    (90    111. 

App.  130),  97. 
Hallenbeck  v.  Chapman  (73  N.  J. 

Law,   201),   858. 
Hallett  V.  Wylie    (3  Johns.  N.  Y. 

44),  244,  251,  599,  883,  892,  1340. 
Halligan  v.   Chicago,  etc.    (15   111. 

558)   685. 
Halligan    v.    Wade    (21    111.    470), 

1161,  1178,  IISO,  1182. 
Halloway  v.  Lacy  (23  Tenn.  468), 

604. 
Halo  V.   Schick   (57  Pa.   St.  319), 

278. 
Halpin   v.    Townsend    (107    N.    Y. 

683),  810. 
Halsey  v.   Lehigh  Valley  Co.    (45 

N.  J.  L.  26),  680,  682. 
Hamby  v.  Wall   (48  Ark.  135),  83. 
Hamer    v.    McCall     (121    N.    Car. 

196),  941,  1446,  1447. 
Hamerton    v.    Stead    (3    B.    &    C. 

478),  192,  1201. 
Hamilton  v.  Ames  (74  Mich.  298), 

1018. 
Hamilton    v.    Clanricard    (5    Bro. 

P.  C.  547),  108. 
Hamilton   v.   Dennison    (56   Conn. 

359),  440. 
Hamilton   v.    Feary    (8    Ind.   App. 

615),   788. 
Hamilton    v.    Graybill     (19    Misc. 

Rep.  521),  420.  1146. 
Hamilton  v.  Maas    (77  Ala.  283), 

1434. 


Hamilton  v.  Pittock   (158  Pa.  St. 

457),  939,  942. 
Hamilton  v.  Wood   (70  Ind.  306), 

343. 
Hamilton   v.   Wright's  Adm'r    (38 

Mo.  199),  698. 
Hamilton's  Lessee  v.  Marsden    (6 

Binn.  Pa.  45),  920.  927. 
Hamit    v.     Lawrence     (2     A.     K. 

Marsh.   Ky.   366),   156. 
Hammel   v.   Beardsley    (31   Minn. 

314),  1094. 
Hammell    v.    Hammell    (19    Ohio, 

17),  349. 
Hammill  v.  Jelonick  (3  Okl.  223), 

920. 
Hammond    v.     Barton     (93     Wis. 

183),  260,  344,  348,  514. 
Hammond  v.  Blue  (132  Ala.  337), 

934. 
Hammond    v.    Hannin    (21    Mich. 

374).   101. 
Hammond  v.  Winchester   (82  Ala. 

470),  99,  252,  384. 
Hammond    v.    Woodman    (41    Me. 

177),  437,  439. 
Hammons   v.   McClure    (85    Tenn. 

65),  924. 
Hampshire  v.   Wickens    (47   L.   J. 

Ch.  243),  365,  607. 
Hanauer  v.  Doane  (12  Wall.  U.  S. 

342),  777. 
Hanbury    v.    Litchfield    (2    N.    Y. 

629).  497. 
Hanchett  v.  Whitney  (1  Vt.  315), 

130,  158. 
Hancock  v.  Austin  (14  C.  B.  N.  S. 

634).  272. 
Hancock  v.  Boggus  (11  Ga.  884), 

1402. 
Hancock  v.  Caffyn   (1  M.  &  Scott, 

521),  257. 
Hancock  v.  Morgan  (17  Tex.  582), 

122. 
Hand   v.   Hall    (L.   R.    2   Ex.   DIr. 

355),  244. 
Hand  v.  Liles   (56  Ala.  143),  491. 


exn 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Hand   v.   Newton    (92   N.   Y.    88), 

72. 
Hand   v.   Osgood    (107   Mich.    65), 

384. 
Hand    v.    Suravitz     (148    Pa.    St. 

202),  1031. 
Handrahan  v.  O'Regan   (45  Iowa, 

298),  419. 
Handschy  v.  Sutton  (28  Ind.  159), 

910. 
Handyside  v.   Powers    (145   Mass. 

123),  820,  828. 
Hanerton  v.  Stead  (3  B.  &  C.  478), 

256. 
Hanford  v.  McNair    (9  Wend.   N. 

Y.  54),  97. 
Hankins  v.  Kimball   (57  Ind.  42), 

54. 
Hankinson  v.  Blair  (15  N.  J.  Law, 

181),  219. 
Hanks  v.   Virtue    (5   Adol.   &  Ell. 

367),  1135. 
Hanley  v.  Banks  (6  Old.  79),  702, 

874. 
Hannan  v.  Towers  (3  H.  &  J.  Md. 

147),  267. 
Hannigan    v.    Ingersoll    (20    Hun, 

N.  Y.  316),   489. 
Hanrahan  v.   O'Reilly    (102  Mass. 

201),  1250,  1252. 
Hanson  v.   Johnson    (62   Md.   25), 

227. 
Hanson  v.  Kirtley  (11  Iowa,  565), 

110. 
Hanson    v.    Meyer    (81    111.    321), 

614,  1284. 
Hanson  v.   Cruse    (155   Ind.   176), 

881. 
Hanson    v.    Hellen    (6    Atl.    Rep. 

837),  466,  555. 
Hanson  v.   Stevenson   (1   B.   &  A. 

305),  1061. 
Harveck   v.    Sylvester    (13   Wend. 

N.  Y.  608),  490. 
Harburg  v.  May  (153  Pa.  St.  210), 

1136. 


Harcourt  v.  Lyman  (3  Exch.  817), 

609. 
Hard  v.  Brown  (18  Vt.  87),  59L 
Hardaman  v.   Shumate   (19  Tenn. 

398),  1425,  1457. 
Harden  v.  Hesketh    (28  L.  J.  Ex. 

137),  511. 
Hardin  v.   Bailey    (79   Ala.    381), 

258. 
Harding  v.  Austin    (93  App.  Div. 

564),  629. 
Harding  v.  Coburn  (12  Met.  Mass. 

333),  1406. 
Harding  v.  Crethorn    (1  Esp.  57), 

236. 
Harding    v.    Seeley    (148    Pa.    St. 

20),   1364. 
Harding    v.    Wilson    (3    D.    &    R. 

506),   417,   442. 
Hardy  v.  Ackerly  (15  Barb.  N.  Y. 

148),   920. 
Hardy  v.  Briggs    (14  Allen  Mass. 

473),   512. 
Hardy  v.  Matthews  (101  Mo.  App. 

708),  1461. 
Hardy   v.    Williams    (31    N.    Car. 

177),  109. 
Hardy   v.    Winter    (38    Mo.    106), 

197. 
Hare  v.   Burgess    (4  K.  &  J.  45), 

1370,  1374,  1375. 
Hare   v.    Groves    (3    Anstr.    6S7), 

1345. 
Harger  v.  Edmonds  (4  Barb.  N.  Y. 

256),   562,   868. 
Hargous   v.   Lahens    (3    Sandf.   N. 

Y.  313),  537. 
Hargrave    v.    King     (40    N.    Car. 

430),  1052. 
Hargroves    v.    Hartop    (74    K.    B. 

233),  804. 
Harker  v.  Smith   (7  Ga.  461),  53. 
Harlan    v.    Coal    Co.    (35    Pa.    St. 

287),  275. 
Harlan  v.  Harlan  (15  Pa.  St.  507), 

685,  1300,  1336. 


TABLE    OP    OASES    CITED. 


CXlll 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Harlan  v.  Navigation  Co.   (35  Pa. 

St.  287),  783. 
Harley    v.    Deewitt    (2    Hill,    Eq. 

S.  C.  367),  15. 
Harlow  v.  Lake  Superior  Iron  Co. 

(36  Mich.  105),  453. 
Harman  v.  Ainslie  (73  Law  J.  K. 

B.  539),  611. 
Harnan  v.  Allen  (11  Ga.  45),  1100. 
Harman  v.  Cargill   (73  S.  W.  Rep. 

1101),  1317. 
Harman    v.    Judge     (6    La.    Ann. 

768),  1439. 
Harmon  v.  Payton    (68  Kan.   67), 

316,  1465. 
Harmony  v.   Rauch    (62   111.   App. 

97),   563,   877. 
Harmony  Lodge  v.  White  (30  Ohio 

St.   569),   1093,   1094. 
Harms    v.    McCormick     (132     111. 

104),  84,  85. 
Harner  v.  Leeds    (25   N.   J.   Law, 

106),  373. 
Harnett   v.    Maitland    (16   Mee.    & 

Wei.   256),   222,   720. 
Harper  v.   Gustin    (12  N.  J.  Law, 

42),  943. 
Harrap    v.    Green     (4    Esp.    198), 

173. 
Harrel    v.    Fall     (63    Minn.    520), 

782. 
Harrell    v.    Fagan    (43    Ga.    339), 

1446,  1447. 
Harrington    v.    Watson    (11    Oreg. 

143),  1342. 
Harrington    v.    Wise     (Cro.    Eliz. 

486),  620. 
Harris    v.    Boardman     (73    N.    Y. 

Supp.  963),  839. 
Harris    v.    Boots    Cash    Chemists 

(73  L.  J.  Ch.  70S),  1090. 
Harris    v.    Carson    (7    Leigh,    Va. 

632),  1311. 
Harris  v.  Cleghorn  (121  Ga.  314), 

1186. 
Harris   v.   Cohen    (50  Mich.   324), 

793. 


Harris  v.  Corlies   (40  Minn.  106), 

847,  902,  1359. 
Harris    v.    Dammann    (3    Mackey, 

D.  C.  90),  1441. 
Harris  v.  Elliot  (10  Pet.  U.  S.  25), 

442. 
Harris   v.    Frink    (2    Lans.    N.   Y. 

35),  258,  1306. 
Harris  v.  Gillingham  (6  N.  H.  11), 

1298. 
Harris  v.  Goslin  (3  Har.  Del.  340), 

615,  777,   885,  1336. 
Harris    v.    Greenberger    (50    App, 

Div.  439),  673,  674. 
Harris    v.    Heackman     (62    Iowa, 

411),  892,  1340,  1342. 
Harris  v.  Hickman  (73  L.  J.  K.  B. 

31),  1028. 
Harris  v.  Hiscock  (91  N.  Y.  340), 

1227. 
Harris  v.  Jones  (1  Moo.  &  R.  173), 

889,  893. 
Harris  v.  Kelly  (13  Atl.  Rep.  523), 

1282. 
Harris  v.   Mantle    (3   T.   R.   307), 

720. 
Harris  v.  McDonald    (79  111.  App. 

638),  775. 
Harris   v.    Morrice    (10    M.    &    W. 

260),  110. 
Harris   v.   Oil    City    (57    Ohio    St. 

118),  622. 
Harrison  v.  Barnby  (5  T.  R.  246), 

87. 
Harrison  v.  Barry  (7  Price,  690), 

524. 
Harrison    v.    Barrow    In    Furness 

(63  L.  T.  834),  1064. 
Harrison  v.  Blackburn    (17  C.  B. 

N.  S.  678),  355,  683. 
Harrison  v.  Jackson  (7  T.  R.  207), 

97. 
Harrison    v.    Jordan     (194    Mass. 

496),  1187. 
Harrison  v.  Marshall  (4  Bibb.  Ky. 

524),    950. 


CXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Harrison  v.  Middleton   (11  Gratt. 

Va.   527),   162,   191. 
Harrison  v.  Palmer  (76  Ala.  157), 

246,  247. 
Harrison  v.  Phillips'  Academy  (12 

Mass.  426),  343,  350. 
Harrison  v.  Ricks  (71  N.  Car.  11), 

308. 
Harrison     v.     Taylor     (3     A.     K. 

Marsh.  Ky.  168),  600. 
Harrison  v.   Wyse    (24   Conn.   1), 

30. 
narrower  v.  Heath    (19   Barb.  N. 

Y.  331),  309,  311. 
Harry  v.  Windsor   (12  Mee.  &  W. 

68),  848. 
Hart  V.  Cole  (156  Mass.  475),  813. 
Hart  V.  Evans  "(8  Pa.  St.  14),  684. 
Hart  V.  Hart  (117  Wis.  639),  1006, 

1277. 
Hart  V.  Hart  (22  Barb.  N.  Y.  606), 

119. 
Hart    V.    Lindley    (50    Mich.    20), 

163,  172. 
Hart  Mfg.  Co.,  In  re  (17  N.  B.  R. 

459),  1122. 
Hart    V.    Pratt    (19    Wash.    560), 

1195,  1218. 
Hart   V.   Robinson    (21   Cal.    346), 

81. 
Hart  V.  Stockton  (12  N.  J.  L.  322), 

148. 
Hart  V.  Windsor  (12  M.  &  W.  85), 

698,  785. 
Harter  v.   City  of   San   Jose    (141 

Cal.  659),  78. 
Hartford   Iron   Mfg.    Co.   v.    Cam- 
bria   Min.    Co.    (80   Mich.    491), 

66,  451. 
Harthill   v.   Cooke's  Ex'r    (19   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1524),  1367. 
Hartley    v.    Meyer    (2    Misc.    Rep. 

56),  33. 
Hartman  v.  McAllister  (5  N.  Car. 

207),  991,  992. 
Hartman   v.   Thompson    (104   Md. 

339),  1092. 


Hartsell  v.  Myers   (57  Misc.  135), 

460. 
Hartshorne    v.    Watson     (4    Bing. 

N.  C.  178),  629,  642,  1070. 
Hartwell  v.  Bissell    (17  Johns.  N, 

Y.  128),  291. 
Hartz   V.   Eddy    (12   Det.   Leg.    N. 

251),  1214. 
Hartzog    v.    Hubbard     (19    N.    C. 

241),  960. 
Harvey  v.  Grabham   (6  Ad.  &  El. 

61),  1337. 
Harvey  v.  Hampton  (108  111.  App. 

501),   1420,   1432,   1456. 
Harvey  v.   Harvey    (2   Stra.   114), 

1256. 
Harvey  v.  McGrew   (44  Tex.  412), 

1080. 
Harvin    v.     Blackman     (108     La. 

426),  927. 
Harvin  v.  Riggs  (1  Rich.  Eq.  S.  C. 

287),  15. 
Hasbrook  v.  Paddock   (1  Barb.  N. 

Y.  635),  456,  733. 
Hasbrouck  v.   Winkler    (48   N.   J. 

Law,  431),  525. 
Haskell  v.  Putnam   (42  Me.  244), 

955. 
Haskell  v.  Sutton  (53  W.  Va.  206). 

14. 
Haskill  V.   Sevier    (25  Ark.   152), 

325. 
Haslage  v.  Krugh  (25  Pa.  St.  97), 

49. 
Haslem    v.    Lockwood    (37    Conn. 

500),   1331,    1332. 
Hasler     v.     Lemoyne      (5     Com. 

Bench,  N.  S.),  175. 
Hasting    v.    Livermore    (7    Gray, 

Mass.  194),  440. 
Hastings  v.   Bangor   House   Prop. 

(18  Me.   436),   101. 
Hastings  v.  Belknap   (1  Denio,  N. 

Y.  190).,  1084. 
Hastings    v.    Lovejoy    (140    Mass. 

260),  467,  557. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXV 


[referexces  are  to  pages.] 


Hastings  v.  Vaughn   (5  Cal.  315), 

351. 
Hasty  V.    Wheeler    (12   Me.    434), 

714. 
Hatch    V.    Hatch    (9    Mass.    307), 

352,   1237. 
Hatch  V.  Stamper   (42  Conn.  28), 

1358. 
Hatch  V.  Van  Dervoort   (54  N.  J. 

Eq.  511),  285,  578. 
Hately  v.  Myers  (96  111.  App.  217), 

158,  164. 
Hatfield  v.  Fullerton  (24  111.  278), 

691. 
Hatfield  v.  Lawton  (108  App.  Div. 

113),  131,  1312. 
Hatton  V.  Gray  (2  Ch.  Cases,  164), 

982. 
Hausauer    v.    Dahlman    (72    Hun, 

607),  1364. 
Hauxhurst     v.     Lobree     (37     Cal. 

563),  229,  234. 
Havelock    v.     Geddes     (10    East, 

559),  601. 
Haven  v.  Wakefield   (39  111.  509), 

286. 
Havens  v.  W.  S.  Electric  Light  Co. 

(143  N.  Y.   632),  1254. 
Haverstick    v.    Sipe    (33    Pa.    St. 

368),  409. 
Hawaralty   v.    Warren    (IS   N.   J. 

Eq.  124),  982. 
Hawes  v.   Shaw    (100  Mass.   187), 

930. 
Hawkins  v.  Coulthurst  (5  Best  & 

S.   342),   1042. 
Hawkins  v.  Giles   (45  Hun,  N.  Y. 

318),  1320. 
Hawkins    v.    Gill     (6    Ala.    620), 

1467. 
Hawkins  v.   Kelley    (8  Ves.   308), 

539. 
Hawkins  v.  Sherman  (3  Car.  &  P. 

459),   1082. 
Hay  V.  Cumberland    (25  Barb.  N. 

Y.  594),  336,  400,  1191. 


Haycock    v.    Johnson    (83    N.    W. 

Rep.  494),  457. 
Hayden  v.  Bradley  (6  Gray,  Mass. 

425),  860. 
Hayden   v.   Collins    (81   Pac.   Rep. 

1120),  189. 
Hayden  v.  Butcher   (31  N.  J.  Eq. 

217),  409. 
Hayden  v.  Mining  &  Dredging  Co. 

(84  Pac.  Rep.  422),  979. 
Hayden   v.   Patterson    (51   Pa.   St. 

261),  84. 
Haj^es  V.  Arrington  (68  S.  W.  Rep. 

44),  384. 
Hayes  v.  Goldman   (71  Ark.  251), 

1194,  1195,  1210,  1236,  1247,1378. 
Hayes    v.    Kyle     (8    Allen,    Mass. 

300),  593. 
Hayes    v.    Lawyer    (83    111.    182), 

483,  351. 
Hayes  v.  New  York  Gold  Mining 

Co.   (2  Colo.  273),  615. 
Hayes   v.    O'Brien    (149    111.    403), 

982,  985. 
Hayes   v.    Shaw    (100   Mass.    187), 

942. 
Hayes  v.  Sturges   (7  Taunt.  217), 

55. 
Hayes  v.  Tindall   (1  B.  &  S.  296), 

105. 
Hayford    v.    Wentworth     (97    Me. 

347),   1247. 
Hayne  v.  Gumming  (16  C.  B.  N.  S. 

421),  332,  635. 
Hayner    v.    Smith    (63    111.    430), 

1129,  1133,  1142,  1180. 
Haynes    v.    Aldrich     (133    N.    Y. 

287),  139,  145,  1224,  1236. 
Haynes  v.  Sanborn  (45  N.  H.  429), 

1450,  1460. 
Haynes    v.    Seachrest    (13    Iowa, 

455),  101. 
Haynes    v.    Synnott    (160    Pa.    St. 

180),  1034. 
Haynes  v.  Union  Inv.  Co.  (30  Neb. 

766),  634,  638,  1188. 


CXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


[REFERENCES   ARE   TO   PAGES.] 


Hays  V.  Garee  (4  Stew.  &  P.  Ala. 

170),  275. 
Hays   V.    Gerry    (104    Iowa,    455), 

1432. 
Hays   V.   Moody    (2    N.    Y.    Supp. 

385),  109,  847. 
Hays  V.   Schultz    (68  N.  Y.  Supp. 

340),  1287. 
Hayt  V.  Parks  (39  Conn.  357),  22. 
Hayward  v.  Parke  (16  C.  B.  295), 

607. 
Hayward  v.  Ramge  (33  Neb.  836), 

729,  1136. 
Hayward  v.  Sedgly   (31  Am.  Dec. 

64),  225,  685. 
Haywood    v.    Fulmar    (32    N.    E. 

Rep.  574),  270. 
Haywood  v.  Miller   (3  Hill,  N.  Y. 

90),  302. 
Haywood    v.    O'Brien     (52     Iowa, 

537),  1116. 
Hazeltine  v.   Ausherman    (87  Mo. 

410),  1425. 
Hazeltine  v.    Smith    (3   Vt.    535), 

571. 
Hazelwood  v.  Pennybacker   (50  S. 

W.  Rep.  199),  1283. 
Hazlett  V.  Powell  (30  Pa.  St.  293), 

411,  783,  1145,  1146,  1158,  1160, 

1340. 
Hazwood    V.    Fulmer    (32    N.    B. 

Rep.  574),  275. 
Head  v.   Goodwin    (2  Gush.  Mass. 

294), 1427. 
Head    v.    Sutton    (31    Kan.    616), 

49,  51. 
Healy   v.   Traut    (15   Gray,   Mass. 

312), 770. 
Heap  V.   Barton    (12  Com.   Bench, 

274), 1287. 
Heard  v.  Fairbanks  (5  Met.  Mass. 

Ill), 1329. 
Heard    v.    Russell     (59    Ga.    25), 

1445. 
Hearle  v,  Greenbank  (3  Atk.  695)- 

2L 


Hearn  v.  Gray  (2  Houst.  Del.  135), 

368. 
Hearne   v.    Lewis    (78    Tex.    276), 

10,492. 
Heath  v.  Williams    (25   Me.   209), 

920. 
Heatherly  d.  Worthington  v.  Wes- 
ton (2  Wils.  232),  86. 
Heathman    v.     Holmes     (94     Cal. 

291), 123. 
Heavillon   v.   Farmers'   Bank    (81 

Ind.  249),  1317,  1325. 
Heavilon    v.    Heavilon     (29    Ind. 

509), 1315. 
Hebbert  v.  Thomas   (1  C.  M.  &  R. 

861), 399. 
Hecht  V.  Dettman   (56  Iowa,  679), 

1321,  1325,  1326. 
Hechtman  V.  Sharp   (3  MacArthur, 

D.  C.  90),  1436. 
Heckart  v.   McKee    (5  Watts.   Pa. 

385), 920. 
Hecklan  v.  Hauser  (71  N.  J.  Law, 

478),  586. 
Hedderick     v.     Smith     (103     Ind. 

203),  873,  1264,  1287. 
Heddleston  v.   Stoner    (128   Iowa, 

525), 258. 
Hedekin     v.     Gillespie     (33     Ind. 

App.  650),  788. 
Hedge    v.    Drew    (12    Pick.    Mass. 

141), 352. 
Hedwig   V.    Jordan    (53    Ind.    21), 

792. 
Heelan  v.  Hoagland  (10  Neb.  511), 

336. 
Heerdt    v.    Hahne     (91    111.    App. 

514), 1092. 
Heeter  v.  Eckstein    (50   How.   Pr. 

N.  Y.  445),  644,  1057. 
Hefflin   v.    Campbell    (5   Tex.    Civ. 

App.  106),  567. 
Heffner   v.    Wenrich    (32    Pa.    St. 

432), 343. 
Heffron  v.  Treber  (110  N.  W.  Rep. 

781),  597. 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


cxvu 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Hegan  v.  Johnson  (2  Taunt.  148), 

192. 
liegeman    v.    McArthur    (1    E.    D. 

Smith,   N.   Y.    147),    1178,    1182, 

1210. 
Heidelbach    v.    Slader    (1    Handy, 

Ohio,  456),  519,  561,  573. 
Heidenreich    v.    Raggio     (88     111. 

App.  521),  775. 
Heights  Land  Co.  v.  Randell    (82 

Iowa,  89),  957. 
Heilbron    v.    Last    Chance    Water 

Co.    (75  Cal.   117),   684. 
Heine  v.   Morrison    (13  Mo.   App. 

590), 1183. 
Heintze  v.    Bently    (34   N.   J.   Eq. 

562), 874. 
Heiple    v.     Reinhart     (100     Iowa, 

525), 455. 
Heisen   v.    Heisen    (145    111.    648), 

946. 
Heise  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.    (62 

Pa.  St.  67),  732. 
Heldon   v.    Wright    (6   Ohio    Dec. 

315),  614,  769. 
Hele  V.  Stewart  (19  W.  N.  C.  Pa. 

129), 412. 
Hellams  v.  Patton   (44  S.  C.  454), 

133,146. 
Heller   v.   Dailey    (63   N.   E.   Rep. 

490), 1093. 
Heller  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.    (151  Pa. 

St.  101),  1155. 
Hemmenway    v.    Hemmenway     (5 

Pick.  Mass.  389),  105. 
Hemphill  v.  Flynn  (2  Pa.  St.  144), 

140. 
Hendershott    v.    Calhoun    (17    111. 

App.  163),  1103. 
Henderson   v.   Carbondale   Coal   & 

Coke   Co.    (140   U.    S.    25),    554, 

634. 
Henderson    v.    Cardwell     (9    Bax. 

Tenn.  389),  1307. 
Henderson  v.  Fox  (5  Ind.  489),  18. 
Henderson   v.   Hay    (3   Bro.   C.  C. 

632), 607. 


Henderson    v.    Miller     (53    Mich. 

590),  930,  949. 
Henderson   v.    Simmons    (33    Ala. 

291),  51. 
Henderson  v.  State  (109  Ala.  40), 

1412. 
Henderson  v.  Virden  Coal  Co.  (78 

111.  App.  327),  329. 
Henderson's    Succession     (24    La 

Ann.  435),  51. 
Hendrick    v.    Lindsay    (93    U.    S. 

143), 532. 
Hendricks  v.  Huffmeyer  (27  S.  W. 

777), 333. 
Hendrickson   v.    Beeson    (21    Neb. 

61),  486,  491. 
Hendrix  v.  Dickson    (69  Mo.  App. 

197), 1021. 
Hendrix  v.  Hendrix  (65  Ind.  329), 

51. 
Henley  v.  Branch  Bank  of  Mobile 

(16  Ala.   552),  941. 
Henley     v.     Brockman     (124     Ga. 

1059), 860. 
Hennessey    v.     Farrell     (20    Wis. 

42),  487. 
Henning    v.    Savage    (100    N.    Y. 

Supp.  1015),  1183. 
Henning    v.    Warner    (109    N.    C. 

406),  964. 
Henry    v.    Allen     (49    Ark.    122), 

326. 
Henry    v.    Davis    (60    Miss.    212), 

1425. 
Henry    v.    Henry    (11    Ind.    236), 

549. 
Henry    v.    Perry    (110    Ga.    630), 

284. 
Henry    v.    Tupper    (29    Vt.    358), 

666. 
Henson  v.  Cooper  (3  Scott's  N.  R. 

48), 465. 
Henstead's  Case  (5  Coke,  10b),  20, 

88,207. 
Hentig  v.   Pipher    (58  Kan.    788),. 

944. 


CXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[eefekences  are  to  pages.] 


Henwood  v.   Cheeseman    (3   Serg. 

&  R.  Pa.  500),  559. 
Hepburn  v.  Auld  (1  Cranch,  U.  S. 

321), 538. 
Herbert    v.    Gallatin    (163    N.    Y. 

575),  261. 
Herlakin's  Case  (4  Coke,  64),  1256. 
Herman  v.  Roberts  (119  N.  Y.  37), 

441,  442. 
Herman    v.    Winter    (105    N.    W, 

Rep.  457),  990. 
Hermitage    v.    Tompkins     (1    Ld. 

Rayd.  729),  952. 
Herandez  v.  Aaron  (73  Miss.  434), 

1445. 
Herndon  v.  Kimball   (7  Ga.  432), 

335. 
Herpolsheimer    v.    Funke    (95    N. 

W.    Rep.    688),    416,    743,    1141, 

1181. 
Herrel   v.    Sizelaiid    (81   HI.   447), 

187,  191,  284. 
Herrick  v.  Graves   (16  Wis.  157), 

123. 
Herrmann  v.  Hydeman   (74  N.  Y. 

S.  862),  384. 
Herron  v.  Gill  (112  111.  247),  1400. 
Hersey  v.  Chapin  (162  Mass.  176), 

679,  685,  731. 
Hersey  v.  Giblett   (18  Beav.  174), 

375, 1376. 
Herter    v.    Mullen    (9    App.    Div. 

593), 145. 
Hertzberg  v.  Witte   (22  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  320),  1297. 
Hertzler  v.  Worman    (1  W.  N.  C. 

Pa.  153),  463. 
Hess   V.   Newcomer    (7   Md.    325), 

895. 
Hess   V.   Weingartner    (12    Montg. 

Co.  Law,  Pa.  105),  848. 
Hessel    v.    Johnson    (129    Pa.    St. 

173), 1205. 
Hes.'^eltine  v.  Seavey  (10  Me.  212), 

1193,1199. 
Hessher  v.   Moss    (50   Miss.   208), 

172. 


Hessler  v.  Schafer  (46  N.  Y.  1076), 

864. 
Hester  v.  Hester   (2  Ired.  Eq.  N. 

C.  330),  54. 
Hetrick  v.  Deutschler    (6   Pa.   St. 

32),  431. 
Hevenor,   In  re    (144  N.  Y.   271), 

629. 
Hewitt    V.    General    Electric    Co. 

(164  111.  420),  1294. 
Hewitt  V.   Watertown   St.   Engine 

Co.   (65  111.  App.  153),  1252. 
Hexter   v.   Knox    (63   N.   Y.   561), 

857,  875. 
Heydon's  Case  (11  Coke,  5a),  798. 
Heyer  v.  Lee  (40  Mich.  353),  451. 
Hey  ward    v.    Wilmarth    (87    App. 

Div.  125),  460,  982. 
Hey  wood    v.     Hey  wood     (42     Mo. 

299), 516. 
Hicks  V.  Doty  (4  Bush,  Ky.  420), 

1115. 
Hicks  V.  Downing  (1  Lord  Raym. 

99),  357,  1079. 
Hicks    V.    Martin     (25    Mo.    App. 

359), 1096. 
Hickman   v.   Rayl    (55    Ind.    551), 

1190. 
Higginbotham  v.   Barton    (11  Ad. 

&  El.  307),  31. 
Higgins  v.  Halligan   (46  III.  173), 

578. 
Higgins    V.    Kusterer     (41    Mich. 

318), 435. 
Higgins  V.  Rosse  (3  Bligh,  113),  7. 
Higgins  V.  Senior  (8  Mee.  &  Wei. 

844),  107. 
Higgins  V.  Turner    (61   Mo.   249), 

920,  954,  956,  1228. 
Higgon    V.    Mortimer    (6    C.    &   P. 

616), 710. 
Higher    v.    Rice     (5    Mass.    344), 

354. 
Highland  Co.  v.  Rhoads    (26  Ohio 

St.  411),  253. 
Hikill  y.  Myers   (36  W.  Va.  689), 

006. 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


CXIX 


[REn;j:i:.\cES  abe  to  pages.] 


Hill  V.  Allen   (18S  Mass.  25),  991, 

995. 
Hill   V.   Atlantic   &   N.   C.   R.   Co. 

(143  N.  C.  539),  67. 
Hill  V.  Barclay  (18  Ves.  56),  667, 

1384. 
Hill  V.   Barry    (Hayes  &  J.   688), 

110. 
Hill  V.  Bishop  (2  Ala.  320),  867. 
Hill  V.  Boutell  (3  N.  H.  502),  262, 

575. 
Hill  V.  Carr  (1  Ch.  Cas.  294),  602. 
Hill  V.  Coal  Valley  Min.  Co.    (103 

111.  App.   46),  253,   264,   573. 
Hill  V.  Coates  (109  111.  App.  266), 

1408. 
Hill  V.  De  Rochemont    (48  N.  H. 

87), 1331, 1333. 
Hill  V.  Gibbs    (5  Hill,  N.  Y.  56), 

87,  90. 
Hill  V.  Hill   (43  Pa.  St.  528),  299. 
Hill  V.  Moore  (40  Me.  515),  572. 
Hill   V.   Rudd    (18   Ky.   Law   Rep. 

55), 479. 
Hill  V.  Saunders  (4  B.  &  C.  536), 

12,  25,  953. 
Hill   V.   Sewald    (53   Pa.    St.   271), 

1248. 
Hill  V.  Shultz   (40  N.  J.  Bq.  164), 

401. 
Hill  V.  Sidie  (116  Wis.  602),  319. 
Hill  V.  Spear  (50  N.  H.  253),  777. 
Hill  V.  Taylor  (22  Cal.  191),  710. 
Hill  V.  Taylor  (15  Wis.  190),  1274. 
Hill   V.   Wentworth    (28   Vt.    429), 

1248,1256. 
Hill  V.  Woodman  (14  Me.  38),  255. 
Hillard  v.  N.  Y.  &  C.  Gas  Co.   (41 

Ohio  St.  662),  411,  1158. 
Hillard's    Estate     (8    Luzon    Leg. 

Reg.  Pa.  237),  54. 
Hillary  v.  Gray  (6  Gar.  &  P.  284), 

237. 
Hilburn   v.    Fogg    (99    Mass.    11), 

224. 
Hildreth  v.  Conant  (10  Met.  Mass. 

298),  213,  228,  678. 


Hillman    v.    Hore     (Carth.    247), 

952. 
Hill's  Case    (Plowden,   16Sa),  446. 
Hills  V.  Rowland   (4  De  G.,  M.  & 

G.  430),  763. 
Hilsenbeck  v.  Guhring  (131  N.  Y. 

674),  810,  816. 
Hilsendegen  v.  Scherck  (55  Mich. 

468), 522. 
Hilton  V.  Bender   (4  Thomp.  &  C. 

N.  Y.  270),  956. 
Hilton's  Appeal   (116  Pa.  St.  351), 

1108. 
Himesworth   v.   Edwards    (5   Har. 

Del.  376),  382. 
Hinchcliffe  v.  Earl  of  Kinnoul   (5 

Bing.  N.  C.  1),  416. 
Hinckley    v.    Beckwith     (13    Wis. 

31), 880. 
Hinckley    v.    Guyon     (172    Mass. 

412), 108. 
Hinde   v.   Vince    (2    Campb.    256), 

172. 
Hindle  v.  Politt  (6  M.  &  W.  529), 

1334. 
Hindley   v.   Emery    (L.    R.    1    Eq. 

52), 725. 
Hines    v.    Duncan    (79    Ala.    112), 

122. 
Hines   v.   Nelson    (Tex.    24    S.    W. 

Rep.  541),  123. 
Hines  v.  Willcox  (12  Pickle,  Tenn. 

148), 805. 
Hingham   v.    Inhabitants  of  Spra- 

gue  (15  Pick.  Mass.  102),  195. 
Hinks  V.  Hinks  (46  Me.  423),  439. 
Hinsaman  v.  Hinsaman  (52  N.  C. 

510),  326. 
Hinter  v.  Le  Conte  (6  Cow.  N.  Y. 

728), 528. 
Hinton  v.  Fox    (3  Litt.  Ky.  380), 

368,1336. 
Hintze   v.    Thomas    (7    Md.    346), 

1090. 
Hirsch    v.    Olmesdahl  ,(78    N.    Y. 

Supp.  832),  564 


cxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Hirschfield   v.   Alsberg    (93   N.   Y. 

Supp.  617),  836. 
Hirschfield  v.   Franks    (112   Mich. 

448), 1175. 
Hirtenstein   v.   Farrell    (69   N.  Y. 

Supp.  886),  804. 
Hitchcock   V.   Bacon    (118   Pa.    St. 

272), 1163. 
Hitchcock     V.     Hassett     (71     Cal. 

331),  1400,  1427. 
Hite  V.  Parks   (2  Tenn.  Ch.  373), 

1292. 
Hitner   v.    Ege    (23    Pa.    St.    305), 

848,  849,  874. 
Hixon  V.  Bridges    (38  S.  W.  Rep. 

1046), 83. 
Hixon   V.   George    (18   Kan.   253), 

122. 
H.  L.  Judd  &  Co.  V.  Bennett   (59 

N.  Y.  Supp.  624),  1060. 
Hoadley's  Adm'rs  v.  San  Francisco 

(124  U.  S.  639),  71. 
Hoag  V.  Hoag  (35  N.  Y.  469),  934. 
Hoagland  v.  Crum  (113  111.  365),  6. 
Hoaglund  v.  N.  Y.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 

Co.  (Ill  Ind.  443),  116. 
Hobart  v.   Murray    (54   Mo.   App. 

249), 344. 
Hobson  V.  McArthur  (16  Pet.  U.  S. 

182), 568. 
Hobson    V.    Sherwood     (19    Beav. 

575), 1124. 
Hobson  V.  Tulloch    (67  L.   J.   Ch. 

502), 736. 
Hoby  V.  Roebuck  (2  Marsh.  433), 

382. 
Hochenauer    v.     Hilderbrandt     (6 

Colo.  App.  199),  937,  1172. 
Hockenbury  v.   Snyder    (2   Watts. 

&  S.  Pa.  240),  947,  930. 
Hodge  V.   Sloan    (107  N.  Y.  244), 

729. 
Hodges  V.  Fries  (34  Fla.  63),  695. 
Hodges  V.  Gates   (9  Vt.  178),  322. 
Hodges  V.  Shields  (IS  B.  Mon.  Ky. 
828), 920, 964. 


Hodges  v.  Waters    (124  Ga.  229), 

532. 
Hodginson  v.  Crowe  (44  L.  J.  Ch. 

680),  365,  608. 
Hodgkin  v.  McVeigh  (86  Va.  751), 

960. 
Hodgkins  v.  Price  (137  Mass.  13), 

663. 
Hodgkins  v.  Robson  (1  Vent.  276), 

1180. 
Hodson  V.  Coppard   (7  Jur.  N.  S. 

11),  740,  769. 
Hodson  V.   Gascoigne    (5  Barn.  & 

Aid.  88),  1331. 
Hoerdt    v.    Hanne     (91    111.    App. 

514), 1213.  • 

Hoeveler  v.   Fleming    (91   Pa.   St. 

322),-  1142,   1156. 
HofE  V.  Royal  Metal  Furn.  Co.  (103 

N.  Y.  Supp.  371),  1368. 
Hoffman  v.  Clark   (63  Mich.  175), 

201,  202,  220. 
Hoffman    v.    McCallum     (93    Ind. 

326), 369. 
Hogsett   V.   Ellis    (17   Mich.    351), 

172,  221,  258,  483,  973. 
Hoisington      v.      Hoisington       (2 

Aiken,  Vt.  235),  336. 
Holbrook     v.     Chamberlain      (116 

Mass.  155),  1264. 
Holbrook    v.    Young     (108    Mass. 

83), 563. 
Holdane  v.  Sumner  (82  U.  S.  600), 

1425. 
Holden  B.  &  L.  Ass'n  v.  Wann  (43 

Mo.  App.  640),  487,  488. 
Holden    v.    Boring     (52     W.     Va. 

37),  7. 
Holden    v.    Cox     (60    Iowa,    449), 

1425,   1457. 
Holden    v.    .loy    (17    Wall.    U.    S. 

211), 38. 
Holder    v.    Taylor    (Brownl.    23), 

602. 
Holderbaum's    Estate     (82     Iowa, 
69),  51. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXl 


FeEFEBENCES    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Holderman  v.  Smith  (3  Kan.  App 

423), 1318. 
Holding  V.   Pigott    (7   Bing.   465), 

1314. 
Holdridge   v.    Gillespie    (2    Johns. 

Ch.  N.  Y.  30),  1104. 
Holey  V.  Hews   (3  La.  Ann.  704), 

1425. 
Holford    V.    Dunnett    (7    Mees.    & 

W.  352),  710,  730. 
Holgate  V.  Kay  (1  Car.  &  K.  341), 

1178. 
Holladay  v.  Chicago  Arc.  L.  &  P. 

Co.   (55  111.  App.  463),  269. 
Holladay    v.    Rutledge    (145    Ala. 

656), 1416. 
Holland  v.  Townsend  (136  Pa.  St. 

392),  1136. 
Hollenbeck  v.  Donnell    (94   N.  Y. 

342), 33. 
Holler  V.  Hedges   (2  Ir.  Ch.  N.  S. 

370),  1124. 
Holley    V.    Young    (66    Me.    520), 

1364,1365. 
Holliday  v.  Marshall  (7  Johns.  N. 

Y.  211), 1072. 
Hollingsworth  v.   Atkins    (46   La. 

Ann.  515),  847,  874. 
Hollingsworth    v.    Hill    (69    Miss. 

73), 1411, 1423. 
Hollingsworth  v.  Stennett  (2  Esp 

717), 155. 
Hollinsworth  v.  Johnson  (48  Mich. 

140), 599. 
Hollis  V.  Brown  (159  Pa.  St.  3G0), 

785. 
Hollis  V.  Burns  (100  Pa.  St.  206), 

151,  153,  159. 
Hollis  V.  Carr  (2  Mod.  87),  602. 
Hollis  V.  Pool  (3  Mete.  Mass.  350), 

234. 
Holloway  v.  Hill  (1902,  2  Ch.  712), 

743. 
Holly   V.    Brown    (14    Conn.    255), 

1131. 
Hollywood    V.    First    Parish    (192 

Mass.  269),  616. 


Holman  v.  Bonner  (63  Miss.  131), 

964,  965. 
Holman  v.  De  Lin  River  Co.    (30 

Oreg.  428),  644,  1096,  1195. 
Holmes  v.  De  Camp   (1  Johns.  N. 

Y.  33),  547. 
Holmes  v.  Drew   (151  Mass.  579), 

813. 
Holmes  v.  Field  (12  111.  424),  26. 
Holmes    v.    Ginon    (44    Mo.    164), 

663. 
Holmes  v.  Seeley  (17  Wend.  N.  Y. 

71),  12. 
Holmes  v.  Seeley  (19  Wend.  N.  Y. 

507), 685. 
Holmes  v.  Tremper  (20  Johns.  N. 

Y.  29),  1252,  1260. 
Holmes    v.    W^illiams     (16    Minn. 

164), 83. 
Holmes  v.  Wood    (88   Mich.   435), 

219,  805. 
Holsman  v.   Abrams    (2   Duer.   N. 

Y.  435),  1267,  1271,  1276. 
Holsman    v.    Abrahams    (9    N.    Y. 

Super.  Ct.  Rep.  435),  569. 
Holston  V.  Noble   (83  Cal.  7),  480. 
Holt  V.  Collyer  (50  L.  J.  Ch.  311), 

749. 
Holt  V.  Nixon    (73  C.  C.   A.   268), 

523,1381. 
Holton  V.  Waller   (95   Iowa,  545), 

810. 
Holtzapfel   v.   Baker    (18   Ves.   Jr. 

115), 1345. 
Holroyd    v.    Marshall     (10    H.    L. 

Cases,  191),  1428. 
Holroyd  v.  Sheridan  (53  App.  Div. 

14),  798. 
Holywood  V.  First  Parish    (78  N. 

E.  Rep.  124),  72. 
Home   Life    Ins.    Co.    v.    Sherman 

(46  N.  Y.  370),  1171,  1181. 
Hong  Sing  v.  Wolf  Fein  (33  Misc. 

Rep.  60S),  1187. 
Honnemeyer    v.    Fisher    (27    Ohio 

C.  C.  8),  802. 


cxsn 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Hood    V.    Hartshorn     (100    Mass. 

117),  1271,  1275. 
Hood   V.    McDonald    (1    W.    N.    C. 

Pa.  299),  463. 
Hooker  v.  Eagle  Bank  of  Roches- 
ter (30  N.  Y.  83),  1117. 
Hooks   V.   Bellamy    (1   Keb.    530), 

952. 
Hooks  V.  Farst  (165  Pa.  St.  239), 

1195, 1224. 
Hooper  v.  Farnsworth   (128  Mass. 

487),  397,  431. 
Hoopes    V.    Bried    (80    Pac.    Rep. 

327), 1401. 
Hoops  V.  Fitzgerald  (204  111.  325), 

481. 
Hooton    V.    Holt    (139    Mass.    54), 

288,  234. 
Hoover    v.    Pennsylvania    Oil    Co. 

(41  Mo.  App.  317),  99,  194. 
Hopcroft  V.   Keys    (9   Bing.    202), 

923. 
Hope  V.  Atkins-  (1  Price,  143),  465. 
Hoping  V.  Burnam   (2  G.  Greene, 

Iowa,  39),  391. 
Hopkins  v.  Oilman   (22  Wis.  476), 

983, 1390. 
Hopkins   v.    Helmore    (3   N.    &  P. 

453),  525. 
Hopkins  v.  Holland    (84  Md.  84), 

652. 
Hopkins  v.  Organ    (15   Ind.   188), 

1115. 
Hopkins  v.  Ratliff  (115  Ind.  213), 

873. 
Hopper  V.  Wilson  (12  Vt.  695),  29. 
Hoppock   V.   United  N.   J.   R.   etc. 

Co.   (27  N.  J.  Eq.  286),  116. 
Horberg  v.  May  (153  Pa.  St.  216), 

1176. 
Horgan    v.    Krumweide    (25    Hun, 

116),  467. 
Hornby  v.   Cramer    (12   How.   Pr. 

N.  y.  490),  536. 
Horner  v.   Leeds    (25   N.   J.   Law, 

106),  156,  369,  934. 


Hornridgo  v.  Wilson    (3   P.  &  D. 

641), 46. 
Horry  v.  Frost  (10  Rich.  S.  C.  Eq. 

109), 602. 
Horsefall  v.  Mather   (Holt.   N.  P. 

7),  138,  730. 
Horsefall  v.  Tester  (7  Taunt.  385), 

861,  891. 
Horsey  v.  Graham  (39  L.  J.  C.  P. 

58),  380. 
Horton   v.    Miller    (84   Ala.    537), 

564,1409. 
Horton  v.  N.  Y.  Cen.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.    (12  Abb.  N.   C.   N.   Y.   30), 

663. 
Horton's  Appeal   (38  Pa.  St.  294), 

549. 
Horwitz   v.   Davis    (16   Md.   313), 

1060, 1061. 
Hosher    v.    Hostermann     (58    111. 

App.  265),  403. 
Hoskins   v.    Paul    (9    N.    J.    Law, 

110), 1084. 
Hosli  v.  Y^okel  (57  Mo.  App.  622), 

146,  155,  384,  397,  1316. 
Hosteller  v.  Eddy  (128  Iowa,  401), 

124. 
Hotley  V.  Scot  (Lofft,  316),  530. 
Hottenstein  v.  Lerch   (104  Pa.  St. 

454), 496. 
Houck  v.  Williams  (34  Colo.  138), 

950. 
Hough  V.  Birge  (11  Vt.  190),  318. 
Hough  V.  Brown  (104  Mich.  109), 

314. 
Hough  V.  Dumas    (4  Dev.  &  Bat. 

L.  N.  C.  388),  322. 
Houghton  V.  Bauer   (70  Iowa,  314), 

1423. 
Houghton   V.    Cooper    (6    B.    Mon. 

Ky.  281),  717. 
Houghton,  Ex  parte  (12  Fed.  Cas. 

No.  6,725),  1120. 
Houghton  V.  Koenig  (18  C.  B.  235), 

367. 
Houghton    V.    Moore     (141    Mass. 

437), 403. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXIU 


[refeeexces  are  to  pages.] 


House   V.    Burr    (24    Barb.    N.   Y. 

525),  1378, 1380. 
House  V.   Jackson    (24   Oreg.   85), 

337,  339. 
House  V.  Metcalf   (27  Conn.  631), 

792,  799. 
Houston  V.  Farris    (71  Ala.   570), 

485,964. 
Houston  V.  Keenan  (88  S.  W.  Rep. 

197), 775. 
Houston  V.  Spruance  (4  Harr.  Del. 

117), 601. 
Houts  V.   Showalter   (10  Ohio   St 

125), 1326. 
Hovendin   v.   Annesley    (3    Sch.  & 

Lef.  624),  965. 
Hovey  v.  Walker   (90  Mich.  527), 

497,  563,  873,  899. 
How  V.  Kennet   (3  A.  &  E.   659), 

576,582. 
How  V.  Norton   (1  Lev.  598),  560 
Howard    v.    Carpenter     (11     Md. 

259),  5,  94,  349. 
Howard  v.  Carpenter  (22  Md.  10), 

234,  250. 
Howard    v.    Deens    (39    So.    Rep. 

346),  1450. 
Howard  v.  Doolittle    (3  Duer.  N. 

Y.  464),  729.  847,  1346. 
Howard  v.  Ellis    (6  N.  Y.   Super. 

Ct.  Rep.  369),  757,  1069. 
Howard   v.   Heinerschit    (16   Hun, 

177),  44. 
Howard    v.    Henriques    (3    Sandf. 

N.  Y.  725),  404. 
Howard  v.  Jones    (123  Ala.   488), 

275. 
Howard     v.     Merriam     (5     Cush. 

Mass.  563),  198,  209,  228. 
Howard  v.  Patrick  (38  Mich.  795), 

54. 
Howard  v.  Shaw    (8  Mee.  &  Wei. 

118), 198. 
Howard  v.   Thomas    (12   Ohio   St. 

201), 459. 
Howard    v.    Tomicich     (81    Miss. 

703),  261, 


Howard    v.     Wadsworth     (3    Me. 

471),  437. 
Howard  v.  Wemsley   (6  Esp.  53), 

173. 
Howard  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Water-lot  Co. 

(39  Ga.  574),  604. 
Howe  V.  Clark  (23  111.  App.  345), 

1429. 
Howe    V.    Gregory    (2    Ind.    App. 

477), 944. 
Howe   V.   Larkin    (119    Fed.   Rep. 

1005), 1369. 
Howell  V.  Ashmore  (22  N.  J.  Law, 

261), 934. 
Howell  V.  Behler  (41  W.  Va.  610), 

959. 
Howell  V.  Denton   (68  S.  W.  Rep. 

1002),  496. 
Howell  V.  Howell    (29  N.  C.  496), 

209,  215,  218,  223. 
Howell   V.   McCoy    (3    Rawle,    Pa. 

256), 450. 
Howell  V.  Ripley  (10  Paige,  N.  Y. 

43),  32. 
Howell   V.    Schenck    (24   N.    J.   L. 

89),  1306,  1308,  1325. 
Howell  V.   Schneider    (24  App.  D. 

C.  532),  782,  789. 
Howell    V.    Webb     (2    Ark.    360), 

548. 
Howe's  Cave  Ass'n  v.  Houck  (141 

N.  Y.  606),  1290. 
Howeth     V.     Anderson     (25     Tex. 

557),  895. 
Howland  v.  Coffin    (9  Pick.  Mass. 

559),  . 

Howland    v.    Forlaw     (108    N.  C. 

567), 1400. 
Howland    v.    White    (48    111.    App. 

236),  486,  634. 
Hoy  V.  Holt   (91  Pa.  St.  88),  883, 

892. 
Hoyleman    v.    Kanawho    &    O.    R. 

Co.    (23   W.   Va.   489),   869. 
Hoyle  V.  Bush  (14  Mo.  App.  408), 

337. 


CXXIV 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Hoystradt,  In  re   (45  N.  Y.  Supp. 

841),  59. 
Hoyt  V.  Stoddard   (2  Allen,  Mass. 

442), 1122. 
Hubbard    v.    City    of    Toledo    (21 

Ohio  St.  379),  116. 
Hubbard    v.    Moss    (65    Mo.    647), 

1467. 
Hubbard  v.  Russell    (25  Barb.  N. 

Y.  404),  794. 
Hubbard  v.  Shaw  (12  Allen,  Mass. 

120),  1336. 
Hubbard    v.    Shepard    (117    Mich. 

25), 949. 
Hubbard   v.    Town    (33   Vt.    283), 

409. 
Hubble  V.   Cole    (85  Va.   87),   716, 

761,  762. 
Hubble  V.  Cole   (88  Va.  236),  702. 
Huber    v.    Ryan     (26    Misc.    Rep. 

428),  879,  1131,  1142,  1356. 
Hudleston  v.  Johnston  (McClel.  & 

Y.  140), 180. 
Hudson  V.  Cripps  (1  Ch.  265),  738, 

757. 
Hudson  V.  Puller   (35  S.  W.  Rep. 

575),  503. 
Hudson  V.  Hudson    (1  Ark.   400), 

48. 
Hudson  V.   Porter    (13   Conn.   59), 

760. 
Hudson  V.  Stewart  (110  Ga.  337), 

1096. 
Hudson  V.  White    (17  R.   I.   519), 

263. 
Hudson  V.  Williams  (39  L.  T.  632), 

891. 
Huerstel  v.   Lorillard    (6   Rob.   N. 

Y.  260),  1113. 
Huff  V.  Latimar  (33  S.  C.  255),  49. 
Huff  V.   Nickerson    (27   Me.    106), 

602. 
Huff  V.  Walker  (1  Ind.  193),  13, 14. 
Huff  V.  Watkins  (15  S.  C.  83),  308. 
Huffell  V.  Arniistead   (7  Car.  &  P. 
56),  159,  160. 


Huffman    v.    Hill    (47    Kan.    613), 

124. 
Huffman  v.    Stark    (31    Ind.   474), 

378. 
Hufnagel,  In  re  (12  Fed.  Cas.  No. 

6,837),  1119. 
Hugh  V.  Lillibridge    (8  D.  R.  Pa. 

358), 528. 
Hughes  V.  Bucknell   (8  Car.  &  P. 

566),  31. 
Hughes  V.  Edisto  Cypress  Shingle 

Co.   (51  S.  C.  1),  1255. 
Hughes    V.    Ford    (15    Colo.    330), 

1264. 
Hughes    V.    Hood     (50    Mo.    350), 

672. 
Hughes    V.    Metropolitan    Ry.    Co. 

(46  L.  J.  C.   P.   583),   890. 
Hughes  V.  Par"ker  (8  Mee.  &  Wei. 

244), 387. 
Hughes  V.  Railroad  Co.    (39  Ohio 

St.  476),  803. 
Hughes   V.    Robotham    (Cro.   Eliz. 

302), 1229. 
Hughes  V.  Vanstone   (24  Mo.  App. 

637),  847. 
Hughes    V.    Wait    (28    Ark.    153). 

922,953. 
Hughes   V.   Windpfennig    (10    Ind. 

App.  122),  1369,  1374. 
Hughes    V.    Whitaker     (4    Heisk. 

Tenn.  399),  1400. 
Hughes  V.  Young   (5  G.  &  J.  Md. 

67), 1006. 
Hughes'  Appeal    (53  Pa.  St.  500), 

15. 
Huglish    V.    Marvin     (128    N.    Y. 

380), 148. 
Huiest  V.  Marx  (67  Mo.  App.  418), 

1184. 
Hukill  V.  Myers   (36  W.  Va.  639), 

647,  665. 
Hulett  V.  Stockwoll    (27  Mo.  App. 

32S),109C. 
Huling  V.  Roll   (43  Mo.  App.  234), 
1192. 


TABLE   OF    CxVSES    CITED. 


CXXV 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Hull  V.  Peters  (7  Barb.  N.  Y.  331), 

537. 
Hull    V.    Stevenson    (13    Abb.    Pr. 

N.  S.  196),  1090. 
Hull  V.   Stogdeel    (67   Iowa,   251), 

516. 
Hull   V.   Vaughan    (6   Price,   157), 

575. 
Hull  V.  Wood    (14  M.  &  W.   682), 

134,  136. 
Hullen  V.   Runder    (1  C.  M.  &  R. 

266), 380. 
Hulme  V.  Brown   (3  Heisk.  Tenn. 

679), 565. 
Hultz  V.  Wright   (16  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

345), 459. 
Humble    v.    Langston    (7    Mee.    & 

Wei.  517),  1085. 
Hume  V.  Kent  (1  Ball  &  B.  554), 

647,  658. 
Hume    V.    McClurken    (10    Watts. 

Pa.  380),  560. 
Hume    V.    Riggs    (12    App.    D.    C. 

355), 1410. 
Hume  Bros.  v.  Taylor  (63  111.  43), 

555. 
Humes  v.  Gardner  (49  N.  Y.  Supp. 

147), 1170. 
Humiston,      Keeling     &      Co.      v. 

Wheeler     (175    111.    514),    1135, 

1342. 
Humphrey  V.  Dale  (7  E.  &  B.  266), 

107. 
Humphrey    v.    Herrick     (5     Neb. 

unof.  524),  146. 
Humphrey  v.  Wait  (22  U.  C.  C.  P. 

5S0),814. 
Humphreys  v.  McKissock   (140  U. 

S.  304),  442. 
Humphreville  v.  Billinger   (62  111. 

App.  125),  1176. 
Humphries   v.   Humphries    (25   N. 

C.  362),  187,  190. 
Hungerford    v.    Wagner    (5    App. 

Div.  590),  150,  159.  163. 
Hunt  V.   Allgood    (10  C.   B.   N.   S. 

253),  965,  967. 


Hunt  V.  Bailey  (39  Mo.  257),  143, 

145,  558. 
Hunt    V.    Bishop    (8    Exch.    675), 

912. 
Hunt  V.   Comstock    (15   Wend.   N. 

Y.  665),  244,  263,  278,  369. 
Hunt  V,  Cope  (Cowp.  242),  1132. 
Hunt   V.    Danforth    (12    Fed.    Cas. 

No.  6,887),  1081,  1283,  1284. 
Hunt  V.  Gardner  (39  N.  J.  L.  530), 

1093,  1094. 
Hunt    V.    Potter    (47    Mich.    197), 

1263,1304. 
Hunt    V.    Renout    (9    Exch.    635), 

912. 
Hunt  V.  Thompson  (2  Allen,  Mass. 

341), 1115. 
Hunter  v.  Frost  (47  Minn.  1),  139, 

162, 219. 
Hunter    v.    Hopetown     (13    L.    T. 

130), 1385. 
Hunter  v.  Hunt  (1  C.  B.  300),  546. 
Hunter   v.    Jones    (2    Brewst.    Pa. 

370), 1331. 
Hunter    v.    Osterhoudt    (11    Barb. 

N.  Y.  33),  552. 
Hunter  v.  Porter    (10   Idaho,   72), 

783. 
Hunter  v.  Reiley    (43  N.  J.   Law, 

480),  563,  564,  1180. 
Hunter  v.  Whitfield   (89  111.  229), 

1429,1431. 
Huntington      v.      Parkhurst      (87 

Mich.  38),  146,  180. 
Huntley's  Case  (3  Dyer,  326a),  87. 
Hunstock  V.  Palmer   (4  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  459),  772. 
Hurd  V.   Gushing    (7    Pick.   Mass. 

169), 373. 
Hurd    V.    Whitsett    (4    Colo.    77), 

150. 
Hurlburt  v.  Post    (1  Bosw.  N.  Y. 

28), 1191. 
Hurlburt    v.    Wheeler    (40    N.    H. 

73), 351. 
Hurley    v.    Hanrahan    (15    W.    R. 

990),  134,  511. 


CXXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Hurley  v.  Sehring  (62  Hun,  621), 

1195. 
Hurliman  v.  Seckendorf  (18  N.  Y. 

Supp.  756),  471. 
Hurst   V.   Dunlany    (84   Va.    701), 

941. 
Hurtzberg  v.  Witte   (22  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  320),  1298. 
Hussey  v.  Peebles   (53  Ala.  432), 

1432, 1458. 
Hutcheson  v.  Bennefleld  (42  S.  E. 

Rep.  422),  56. 
Hutcbins    v.    Martin    (Cro.    Efliz. 

605), 1222. 
Hutchinson     v.     Cummings     (156 

Mass.  329),  806,  813. 
Hutchinson  v.  Jones  (79  Mo.  496), 

1213. 
Hutchinson    v.    Ulrich     (145     111. 

336), 743. 
Hutsell  V.  Deposit  Bank  (102  Ky. 

410), 1411. 
Hutton  V.  Warren  (1  M.  &  W.  466), 

1314. 
Huxley  v.  Harrold    (62  Mo.  516), 

343. 
Huyser   v.    Chase    (13    Mich.    98), 

195,  219,  275. 
Hyatt    V.    Wood    (4    Johns.    150), 

686. 
Hyde  v.  Moakes  (5  Car.  &  P.  42), 

578. 
Hyde  v.    Skinner    (2   P.   W.   197), 

1363,  1374,  1391. 
Hyde    v.    Warden    (47    L.    J.    Ex. 

121),    365,    495,    608,   1071,   1099, 

1234. 
Hyler   v.    Humble    (101    Ind.    38), 

467. 
Hyman   v.    Boston    Chair   Co.    (13 

N.  Y.  Supp.  609),  702. 
Hyman  v.  Jockey  Club  Wine,  etc. 

Co.     (9     Colo.     App.     299),     563, 

1129,  1136. 
Hynes  v.  Ecker  (34  Mo.  App.  650), 

644.  1058,  1080. 


Ibbs    V.    Richardson    (1    P.    &   D. 

618),    236,    577. 
Iggulden  V.  May  (9  Ves.  325),  455, 

1374. 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Ross    (26 

Ky.  Law  R.  1251),  573. 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson 

ri61  111.  159),  578. 
Illinois  Starch  Co.  v.  Ottawa  Hy- 
draulic Co.    (125  111.  237),  1053, 

1456. 
Imbert  v.  Haloock  (23  How.  Prac. 

N.  Y.  456),  678. 
Imler   v.    Baenish    (74   Wis.    567), 

1113,1238. 
Inches    v.     Dickinson     (7     Allen, 

Mass.  71),  45,  48. 
Independent     Brewing     Ass'n     v. 

Powers    (80   111.  App.  471),  873. 
Independent  Co.  v.  Richland  Lodge 

(70  S.  C.  572),  731. 
Independent  Abattoir  Co.  v.  Tem- 

perly  (159  Ind.  651),  829. 
Indiana  I.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Patchette 

(59  111.  App.  251),  679. 
Indianapolis  D.   &  W.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

First  Nat.  Bank  (33  N.  E.  Rep. 

679),  522,  582. 
Indianapolis  Mfg.  Co.  &  Car.  Union 

V.  Cleveland  C.  C.  &  I.  Ry.  Co. 

(45  Ind.  281),  1048,  1059. 
Indianapolis  National   Gas   Co.   v. 

Pierce   (25  Ind.  App.  116),  491, 

1111. 
Ingalls  V.  Bissot  (Ind.  App.  57  N. 

E.  Rep.  723),  554. 
Ingalls  V.  Hobbs   (156  Mass.  348), 

785,786. 
IngersoU    v.    Sargent    (1    Whart. 

Pa.  337),  507. 
Inglish  V.  Breneman  (5  Ark.  377), 

343. 
Ingraham    v.    Baldwin     (9    N.    Y. 

45),  927,  941. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXVll 


[EEFEEEXCES    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Inman  v.   Stamp   (1  Stark.  N.  P. 

126), 282, 379. 
Insteed    v.    Stonley    (1    Ind.    82), 

1391. 
Insurance  &  Law  Bldg.  v.  National 

Bank  of  Missouri    (5   Mo.  App. 

333), 1364. 
International      Press      Ass'n      v. 

Brooks    (30  111.  App.  114),  864. 
International    Trust   Co.   v.    Schu- 
mann  (158  Mass.  287),  1131. 
International    Tr.    Co.    v.    Weeks 

(203  U.  S.  364), 1216. 
Investment  Co.  of  Philadelphia  v. 

Ohio  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.    (41  Fed. 

Rep.  387),  442. 
Ireland  v.  Bircham  (2  Bing.  N.  C. 

90), 1134. 
Ireland  v.  Gauley  (95  N.  Y.  Supp. 

521), 1145. 
Ireland  v.  Hyde    (69  N.  Y.  Supp. 

889),  556. 
Ireland  v.  United  States  Mort.  & 

T.   Co.    (72  App.  Div.  95),  1239. 
Irick   V.    Fulton's   Ex'r    (3    Gratt. 

Va.  193),  363. 
Irons  V.  Reyburn    (11  Ark.   378), 

100. 
Irvin    V.    Fowler    (5    Rob.    N.    Y. 

482), 826. 
Irvine   v.   Wood    (51    N.   Y.    224), 

792. 
Irving   V.   Thomas    (18    Me.    418), 

481. 
Irwin  v.  Mattox  (138  Pa.  St.  466), 

760,  761. 
Irwin  V.  Nolde   (164  Pa.  St.  205), 

1185. 
Isaac  V.  Minkofsky  (29  Misc.  Rep. 

347),  573. 
Isaacs  V.   Holland    (4  Wash.   54), 

28. 
Isaac's  Lessee  v.   Clarke    (2   Gill. 

Md.  1),  927. 
Isabella   Gold   Min.   Co.    v.   Glenn 

(37  Colo.  165),  1129. 


Isheham    v.    Morrice     (Cro.    Car. 

109), 111, 952. 
Ish  V.  McRae   (48  Ark.  413),  319. 
Isherwood  v.  Oldknow  (3  M.  &  S. 

382),  58,  530,  641. 
Island   Coal   Co.   v.   Coombs    (152 

Ind.  379),  490,  640,  657. 
Isler  V.  Foy  (66  N.  C.  547),  974. 
Isman  v.  Hanscom    (66  Atl.  Rep. 

329), 1271. 
Isom   V.   Rex  Crude  Oil  Co.    (147 

Cal.  659),  710,  1076. 
Israel  v.  Israel  (30  Md.  120),  83. 
Israel  v.  Simmons  (2  Stark,  356), 

574. 
Ittner  v.  Robinson   (35  Neb.  133), 

1023,  1024. 
Ive's  Case  (5  Coke,  11),  1200. 
Ives    v.    Sams     (Cro.    Eliz.    521), 

1222. 
Izard  V.  Bodine  (11  N.  J.  Eq.  403), 

83. 
Izon  v.  Gorton  (^  Bing.  N.  C.  501), 

576,1338. 


J. 


Jack   V.    Mclntyre    (12    CI.    &   F. 

151),  400. 
Jackman  v.  Arlington  Mills    (137 

Mass.  277),  792. 
Jackson   v.   Allen    (30   Ark.   110), 

333,  974. 
Jackson   v.   Allen    (3    Cow.   N.    Y. 

220),  620. 
Jackson  v.  Andrews  (18  Johns.  N. 

Y.  434),  712. 
Jackson    v.    Bodle    (20    Johns.    N. 

Y.    198),   352. 
Jackson  v.  Bradt  (2  Caines,  N.  Y. 

169), 191. 
Jackson    v.    Brownson    (7    Johns. 

N.  Y.  227),  609,  646,  714. 
Jackson  v.  Bryan   (1  Johns.  N.  Y, 

322), 155. 
Jackson  v.   Cairns    (20   Johns.   N. 

Y.  301),  227. 


CXXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


[kefebences  ake  to  pages.] 


Jackson  v.  Corliss  (7  Johns.  531), 

1065. 
Jackson  v.   Crysler    (1   John   Cas. 

N.  Y.  125),  657. 
Jackson   v.   Davis    (5   Cow.   N.   Y. 

123),  934,  958,  969,  971,  1096. 
Jackson  v.  Delacroix  (2  Wend.  N. 

Y.  433),  245,  250. 
Jackson  v.  De  Walts  (7  Johns.  N. 

Y.  157),  11. 
Jackson    v.    Doll     (109    La.    Ann. 

230), 1376. 
Jackson  v.  Dunbar  (68  Miss.  288), 

88,  90. 
Jackson  v.  Dunlap   (1  Johns.  Cas. 

N.  Y.  114),  352. 
Jackson    v.    Eddy    (12    Mo.    209), 

1140,  1182. 
Jackson  v.  Farmer  (9  Wend.  N.  Y. 

20), 237. 
Jackson  v.   Farrell    (6  Pa.   Super. 

Ct.  Rep.  31),  880. 
Jackson  v.  French  (3  Wend.  N.  Y. 

337),  182,  220. 
Jackson  v.  Green   (4  Johns.  N.  Y. 

186), 1100. 
Jackson  v.  Harper  (5  Wend.  N.  Y. 

246), 924. 
Jackson    v.    Harrison     (17    Johns. 

N.  Y.  66),  635,  638. 
Jackson   v.   Hathaway    (15   Johns. 

N.  Y.  447),  447. 
Jackson  v.  Hughes  (1  Blackf.  Ind. 

421),  243,  1044. 
Jackson    v.    Jackson    (19   E.   L.   & 

Eg.  546),  984. 
Jackson    v.    King    (82    Ala.    432), 

955. 
Jackson    v.    Kingsley    (17    Johns. 

N.  Y.  158),  198. 
Jackson  v.  Kisselbrack  (10  Johns. 

N.  Y.  336),  244. 
Jackson  v.  Livingston   (7  Cow.  N. 

Y.  285),  996. 
Jackson    v.    Lodge    (36    Cal.    28), 
28,  29. 


Jackson  v.  McLeod   (12  Johns.  N. 

Y.  182),  229. 
Jackson   v.  Miller    (6   Cow.   N.  Y. 

751), 968. 
Jackson  v.   Miller    (7   Cow.   N.   Y, 

747), 198. 
Jackson  v.  Moncrief   (5  Wend.  N. 

Y.  29),  198. 
Jackson   v.    Mowry    (30   Ga.    143), 

519. 
Jackson    v.    Niven    (10    Johns.    N. 

Y.  335),  236,  320.. 
Jackson    v.    O'Rorke     (98    N.    W. 

Rep.  1068),  15,  52,  84. 
Jackson  v.  Pesked  (1  M.  &  S.  234), 

679,   683. 
Jackson    v.    Rode    (7    Misc.    Rep. 

680), 252. 
Jackson  v.  Rowland    (6  Wend.  N. 

Y.  666),  288,  934,  956. 
Jackson   v.    Salmon    (4    Wend.    N. 

Y.  327),  139,  155. 
Jackson  v.  Schoonmaker  (2  Johns. 

N.  Y.  230),  342. 
Jackson  v.   Scissam    (3   Johns.   N. 

Y.  499),  969. 
Jackson  v.  Sheldon   (22  Me.  569), 

349. 
Jackson   v.    Silvernail    (15   Johns. 

N.  Y.   278),  1052. 
Jackson   v.    Sternbergh    (1    Johns. 

Cas.  N.  Y.  153),  204. 
Jackson   v.   Stiles    (1   Cow.   N.   Y. 

575),  950,  959. 
Jackson     v.     Strieker     (1     Johns. 

Cases,  N.  Y.  284),  447. 
Jackson  v.  Tibbitt    (23  Wend.  N. 

Y.  341),  713. 
Jackson  v.  Vosburgh   (7  Johns.  N. 

Y.  186),  250. 
Jackson    v.    Warren    (32    111.    31), 

232. 
Jackson   Brewing   Co.    v.    Wagner 

117  La.  875),  1378. 
.Ta(!ksonville  M.  P.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co. 
V.  Hooper  (160  U.  S.  514),  1036, 
1042. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


CXXIX 


fKEKEREXCKS    ARE    TO    PACES.] 


Jacob   V.    Down    (69    Law    J.   Ch. 

493),  647,  661. 
Jaques    v.    Millar    (47    L.    J.    Ch. 

544),  259. 
Jackues  v.  Short   (20  Barb.  N.  Y. 

269),   1080,   1090. 
Jaffe  V.   Harteau    (56  N.   Y.   398), 

782,  847. 
Jaffray   v.    Greenbaum    (64    Iowa, 

492),  557. 
Jalageas  v.  Winton   (119  III.  App. 

139),  748,  757. 
.Jam-es   v.    Adams    (64    Tex.    193), 

604. 
James  v.  Jenkins  (34  Md.  1),  410. 
James  v.  Dean    (11  Ves.  382),  42, 

43,  206. 


Jayne  v.  Gregg   (42  111.  413),  350. 
Jaynes    v.    Hughes    (10   Ex.    430), 

343. 
Jennings    v.    Sparkman     (39    Mo. 

App.    663),   1108. 
Jefcoat  V.    Gunter    (73   Miss.    14), 

1186. 
Jefferies  v.  Whittick    (Gow.   195), 

182. 
Jeffers  v.  Bantley  (47  Hun,  N.  Y. 

90),   564. 
Jeffers  v.   Easton  Eldridge  &  Co. 

(113  Cal.   345),  1077,  1095. 
Jeffry  v.  Underwood  (1  Ark.  108), 

326. 
Jegon  V.  Vivan   (6  Ch.  App.  742), 

726. 


James  v.   Emery    (8  Taunt.   245),   {   jei^g    y.    Barrett    (52    Miss.    315), 


88,  609. 


349. 


James  v.  Jenkins  (Bull.  N.  96),  7.   I   Jenckes  v.  Cook  (9  R.  I.  520),  927. 
James  v.  Plant  (4  Ad.  &  El.  749), 

417. 
James  v.  Russell  (92  N.  Car.  194), 

920. 
James   v.    Smith    (58    S.    W.    Rep. 

714),  941. 
Jamesin    v.    Thomen     (24    Wkly. 

Law  Bui.  Ohio,  314),  1009. 
Jamison  v.  Acker   (14  S.  W.  Rep. 

691),    1414. 
Janouch  v.  Pence  (93  N.  W.  Rep. 

217),  573. 
Jaques    v.    Gould    (4    Cush.    Mass 

384),  48. 
Jacques    v.    Miller    (47    L.    J.    Ch. 

544),  259,  696. 
Jarman   v.   Hale    (68   L.   J.   Q.   B. 

681),  210. 
Jarrell    v.    Daniel     (114    N.    Car. 

212),  1452. 
Jarrett  v.  State   (5  Gill  &  J.  Md. 

27),  10. 
Jarvis  v.  Henwood    (25  N.  J.  Eq. 

460),  875,  878. 
Jarvis   v.    Seele   Milling   Co.    (173 

111.   192),  442. 
Jay  V.  Stein  (49  Ala.  514),  960. 


Jenkins  v.   Calvert    (3  Cranch,  C. 

C.   216),  550. 
Jenkins  v.  Church  (Cowper,  482), 

5. 
Jenkins    v.    Clyde    Coal    Co.     (82 

Iowa,  618),  550,  1204. 
Jenkins     v.     Eldridge     (13     Fed. 

Cases,  7,268),  261. 
Jenkins  v.  Green   (27  Beav.  437), 

339. 
Jenkins  v.  Jenkins   (63  Ind.  415), 

638. 
Jenkins  v.  Portman  (1  Keen.  435), 

1105. 
Jenkins  d.  Yates  v.  Church  (Cowp. 

482),   7. 
Jenkinson   v.    Winans    (109    Mich. 

504),   488. 
Jenks  v.  Partman   (1  Keene,  436), 

1041. 
Jenner  v.  Clegg  (1  M.  &  Rob.  213), 

179. 
Jenner    v.    Morgan     (1    P.    Wms. 

392),  539. 
Jennings  v.  Alexander  (1  Hilt.  N. 

Y.  154),  1095. 


exxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[aEB'EEENCES    AKK   TO   PAGES.] 


Jennings   v.    Bond    (14    Ind.    App. 

282),   629,  1137,   1182. 
Jennings     v.     Bragg     (Cro.     Eliz. 

447),  21,  112. 
Jennings  v.   Magor    (6   Car.   &   P. 

237),  538. 
Jennings  v.  McComb   (112  Pa.  St. 

518),  194,  327. 
Jennings  v.  Van  Schaick   (108  N. 

Y.  530),  827. 
Jersey  Co.  v.  United  Co.   (46  Fed. 

Rep.  264),  1012. 
Jesus  College  v.  Gibbs  (1  Y.  &  C. 

145),  62. 
Jesson  V.  Gosford   (4  Burr.  2144), 

679. 
Jetter  v.  Railroad  Co.  (2  Abb.  App. 

458),  916. 
June  V.  Baring  (62  L.  J.  Ch.  50), 

544. 
Jevan  v.   Harridge    (1   Sid.    308), 

41. 
Jewell    V.    Jewell     (11    Rich.    Eq. 

S.  C.  296),  52. 
Jewel's  Case   (5  Co.  3),  509. 
Jewett   V.    Berry    (20    N.    H.    36), 

638. 
Jinks    V.   Edwards    (11   Ex.    775), 

671. 
Job  V.  Bannister  (2  Kay  &  J.  374), 

1038,   1387. 
John  V.  Jenkins  (1  Cr.  &  M.  227), 

251,   1201,   1214. 
Johns    V.    Eichelbarger    (109    III. 

App.  35),  800. 
Johns    V.     McDaniels     (60     Miss. 

486),  150. 
Johnson    v.    Albertson    (51    Minn. 

333),   385. 
Johnson  v.  Aldridge  (93  Ala.  77), 

565. 
Johnson    v.    Barg    (8    Misc.    Rep. 

307),  1183. 
Johnson  v.  Bryant  (61  Ark.  312), 

314. 
Johnson    v.    Camp    (61    111.    220), 

1324,  1325. 


Johnson  v.   Crofoot    (53   Barb.  N. 

Y.  574),  279,  1320,  1405. 
Johnson    v.    Donaldson    (17    R.    I. 

107),  232,  233,  234. 
Johnson  v.  Douglass  (73  Mo.  168), 

653. 
Johnson  v.  Emanuel  (50  Ga.  590), 

1400. 
Johnson  v.  Garland   (9  Leigh,  Va, 

149),  1464. 
Johnson    v.    Grantham     (104    Ga. 

558),  6. 
Johnson  v.  Hartshorne   (52  N.  Y. 

173),  44,  370. 
Johnson  v.  Hoffman  (53  Mo.  504), 

310. 
Johnson     v.     Johnson     (7     Allen, 

Mass.  196),  1233. 
Johnson  v.  Johnson   (2  Hill's  Eq. 

S.  C.  277),  714. 
Johnson  v.  Johnson  (13  R.  I.  467), 

190. 
Johnson  v.  Jones  (87  Ga.  85),  333. 
Johnson  v.  Jones  (1  P.  &  D.  651), 

545. 
Johnson  v.  Jordan    (2  Met.   Mass. 

234),  439. 
Johnson    v.    Kindred    State   Bank 

96  N.  W.  Rep.  588,  589),  453. 
Johnson    v.    Mason    (1    Esp.    89), 

945. 
Johnson    v.    Mcintosh    (8    Wheat. 

453),  38. 
Johnson  v.  McMillan   (1  Strob.  S. 

C.  143),  961. 
Johnson    v.    McMillan     (69    Mich. 

36),  828,  847. 
Johnson  v.  Mosher   (82  Iowa,  29), 

1250. 
Johnson  v.  Nasworthy  (Tex.  16  S. 

W.  Rep.  758),  442. 
Johnson  v.  Oppenheim    (55  N.  Y. 

280,  12   Abb.   Pr.   454),  459,  847, 

1157,  1178,  1182,  1348. 
Johnson  v.  Phoenix  Life  Ins.  Co. 

(46  Conn.  92),  250,  390. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXXl 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Johnson    v.    Samuelson    (69    Kan. 

2G3),  125. 
Johnson   v.    Shelter   Island    Grove 

Camp  Meeting  Ass'n  (122  N.  Y. 

330),  440. 
Johnson  v.  Sherman  (15  Cal.  287), 

29,  1045,  1090,  1101. 
Johnson  v.  Stagg   (2  Johns.  N.  Y. 

510),  1108. 
Johnson  v.  Tacwean  (23  La.  Ann. 

453),  1409. 
Johnson     v.     Thrower     (117     Ga. 

1007),  924. 
Johnson    v.    Warwick    (17    C.    B. 

516),  55. 
Johnson  v.  Weed   (9  Johns.  N.  Y. 

310),  549. 
Johnson  v.  Wilkinson    (139  Mass. 

3),  380. 
Johnson    v.    Woodbury     (63    Kan. 

880),  934. 
Johnson's    Lessee    v.    Haines     (2 

Ohio,   55),   335. 
Johnstone  v.  Huddleston   (4  B.  & 

Cres.  922),  1200. 
Jokinsky  v.  Miller  (88  N.  Y.  Supp. 

928),  390. 
Joliffe    V.    Syburn    (2    Esp.    677), 

171. 
Jolly  V.   Bryan    (86  N.  Car.   245), 

492. 
Jones'  Appeal  (3  Grant  Cases,  Pa. 

250),  51. 
Jones    V.    Barnes     (45    Mo.    App. 

590),   331.  559,   1093. 
Jones    V.    Bridgeman     (39    L.    T. 

500),   537. 
Jones  V.   Carter    (15  Mee.  &  Wei. 

718),  631.  651,  1238. 
Jones  V.   Clark    (20  Johns.   N.   Y. 

51),   487. 
Jones  V.  Cowper   (Willes,  169),  5. 
Jones    V.    Daly    (175    N.    Y.    529), 

644,  1057. 
Jones  V.  Dove   (7  Oreg.  467),  943. 
Jones  V.  Durrer  (96  Cal.  95),  311 


Jones   V.   Eubanks    (86    Ga.    616 )> 

1418,  1464. 
Jones    V.    Felker    (72    Ark.    405), 

849. 
.Jones  V.   Fox    (23   Fla.   454,   461), 

1401,  1403. 
Jones  V.  Hamm  (98  Mo.  App.  433), 

1047. 
Jones  V.  Hoard  (59  Ark.  42),  873. 
Jones  V.  Jones   (10  B.  &  C.  718), 

198,  607. 
Jones  V.  Jones    (2  Rich.  Law.   S. 

C.  542),  198. 
.Jones  V.  Jones   (117  N.  Car.  254), 

1403. 
Jones    V.    Marcy    (49    Iowa,    188), 

378. 
Jones  V.  Marks  (47  Cal.  242),  390, 

392. 
Jones  V.  Marsh  (4  T.  R.  464),  174, 

175. 
Jones  V.  Meehan  (20  S.  Ct.  1),  37, 

39. 
Jones  V.  Mills  (10  C.  B.  N.  S.  788), 

160,  182,  966. 
Jones  V.   Millsaps    (71   Miss.    10), 

849. 
Jones  V.  Park  (10  Phila.  Pa.  165), 

439. 
.Tones  v.   Pashby    (62   Mich.   614), 

451. 
Jones  v.  Phipps   (9  B.  &  S.  761), 

171. 
Jones  V.  Reed   (15  N.  H.  68),  663. 
Jones    V.    Reilly    (174   N.    Y.    97), 

550. 
Jones  V.  Reynolds  (4  A.  &  E.  805), 

574,  578. 
Jones     V.     Richardson     (10     Met. 

Mass.  488),  1427. 
.Jones    V.    Ricketts    (7    Md.    108), 

549. 
Jones    V.    Rigby    (41    Minn.    530), 

486. 
Jones  V.  Shay   (50  Cal.  508),  187, 
189,  19L 


cxxXii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[refekences  are  to  pages.] 


Jones  V.  Shears  ("4  Ad.  &  El.  832), 

356. 
.Jones  V.  Shefflin   (45  W.  Va.  729), 

6. 
Jones  V.   Spartanburg  Herald  Co. 

(44  S.  Car.  526),  159. 
Jones  V.  Thomas    (8  Blackf.   Ind. 

428),  288,  1325. 
Jones  V.  Thorne  (3  Dow  &  R.  152), 

747. 
Jones  V.  Tipton  (2  Dana,  Ky.  295), 

318. 
Jones   V.   Webster    (48   Ala.    109), 

590. 
Joaes    V.    Western    Pennsylvania 

Gas  Co.    (146  Pa.   St.  204),  641, 

643,  644. 
Jones  V.  Whitehead   (4  Clark,  Pa. 

330),  717. 
Jones  V.  Willis   (63  N.  Car.  430), 

153. 
Jones  V.  Wingfield  (3  M.  &  S.  846), 

510. 
Jordan  v.  Bryan  (103  N.  Car.  59), 

312. 
Jordan   v.    Benwood    (42    W.    Va. 

312),  683. 
Jordan    v.    Davis    (108    111.    336), 

351. 
Jordan   v.    Helwig    (1    Wils.    Ind. 

447),  794. 
Jordan  v.  Indianapolis  Water  Co. 

(159   Ind.  337),  1093. 
Jordan  v.  Katz  (89  Va.  628),  949. 
Jordan  v.  Mead  (19  La.  Ann.  101), 

258. 
Jordan    v.     Sullivan     (181    Mass. 

348),  833. 
Jordan  v.  Ward   (1  H.  Bl.  97),  8. 
Jordan  v.  Wilkes  (Cro.  Jac.  332), 

25. 
.Toslin  V.  McLean    (99  Mich.  480), 

1210. 
Joslyn  V.   Spellman    (9  Ohio  Dec. 

258),  1006. 
Josse    V.    Schultz    (13    Fed.    Cas. 
7,551),    547. 


Joules    V.    Joules    (1    Brown,    39),. 

86. 
Jourdain  v.   Wilson    (4   B.  &  Aid. 

266)    617. 
Journeay  v.  Brackley    (1  Hilt.  N. 

Y.  447),  1080. 
Journe's  Succession   (21  La.  Ann. 

391),  41. 
Joy  V.  McKay   (70  Cal.  445),  206, 

234. 
Joyce   V.    Martin    (15    R.    I.    558), 

792,  798,  825. 
Joyner   v.    Weeks    (1891,    2    Q.    B. 

31),  895. 
Jojmes  V.    Statham    (3   Ark.   388), 

1002. 
Jucht  V.  Behrens    (7  N.  Y.   Supp. 

195),  810. 
Jud    V.    Arnold     (31    Minn.    340), 

378. 
Judge    V.    Curtis    (72    Ark.    132), 

1456. 
Judson  V.    Gurley    (52   Tex.    226), 

632. 
Juergen  v.  Allegheny  Co.  (204  Pa. 

St.  501),  1135. 
Julicher    v.    Connelly    (102    N.    Y. 

Supp.  620),  341. 
Junction    Min.    Co.    v.    Springfield 

Junction  Coal  Co.   (122  111.  App. 

574),  888. 
Jungerman  v.  Bovee  (19  Cal.  354), 

1287. 
Jurdain  v.   Steere    (Cro.  Jac.   83), 

80. 
Juress  V.  Railroad  Co.    (61   N.  J. 

Law.  314),  836. 


as'  Estate  (5  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

55),  198. 
Kabley     v.     Worcester     Co.     (102 
Mass.   392),  244,  245,   519,   1364. 
Kabus  V.  Frost   (50  N.  Y.  Super. 
I       Ct.  74)   860. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXiXlH 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Kahler  v.  Hanson   (53  Iowa,  398), 

553. 
Kahn    v.    Rosenheim     (68    N.    Y. 

Supp.   856),  526. 
Kahn    v.    Tobias    (16    Misc.    Rep. 

83),  584,  595. 
Kain  v.  Hoxie   (2  Hilt.  311,  316), 

1069,   1095. 
Kaiser    v.    New    Orleans    (17    La. 

Ann.  178),  697. 
Kalis   V.    Shattuck    (69   Cal.    593), 

793,  828,  836. 
Kalkhoff    V.     Nelson     (60     Minn. 

284),  71. 
Kamerick    v.    Castleman    (23    Mo. 

App.   481),   309,   314. 
Kane  v.  Metropolitan  El.  Ry.  Co. 

(15  Daly,  294),  368. 
Kane  v.  Mink   (64  Iowa,  84),  204. 
Kankakee  Coal   Co.  v.   Crane    (28 

111.  App.  371)   1110. 
Kankauna    Water    Power    Co.    v. 

Green  Bay,  etc.  C.  Co.  (142  U.  S. 

254),  116. 
Kansas  City  El.  Co.  v.  Union  Pac. 

Ry.  Co.   (17  Fed.  Rep.  200),  634, 

668. 
Kansas    Indians    (5    Wall.    U.    S. 

737),  39. 
Karbach  v.   Fogel    (63   Neb.   601), 

1185. 
Karlson    v.    Healy    (38   App.    Div. 

486),  822. 
Kash   V.    Huncheon    (1    Ind.    App. 

361),  1288. 
Kassel  v.  Snead  (21  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

777),   1464. 
Kastner  v.  Campbell  (53  Pac.  Rep. 

586),  1222,  1239. 
Kathman  v.  Walters  (22  La.  Ann. 

54),  772. 
Kauer   v.    Leahy    (15    Pa.    Co.   Ct. 

Rep.   243),  328. 
Kaufman   v.    Clark    (7   D.    C.    1), 

847,  862,  863. 
Kaufman    v.    Underwood    (102    S. 

W.  Rep.  718),  1414. 


Kaufmann  v.  Liggett  (209  Pa.  St. 

97),  1390,  1397. 
Kay  V.  Curd  (6  B.  Mon.  Ky.  100), 

322. 
Kean    v.    Kolkschneider    (21    Mo. 

App.    538),   1190. 
Kearings    v.     Cullen     (183     Mass. 

298),  835,  847. 
Kearney  v.   Post    ("1   Sandf.  N.  Y. 

105),  1101. 
Keates  v.  Cadogan  (10  C.  B.  591), 

477. 
Keating  v.  Keating   (Temp.  Sugd. 

613),  56. 
Keating    v.    Mott    (92    App.    Div. 

156),  835. 
Keating  v.  Mott    (86  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1021),  834. 
Keating  v.  Springer  (146  111.  481), 

410,   1129,  1136,   1176. 
Keats   V.    Hugo    (115    Mass.    204), 

410. 
Keay   v.    Goodwin    (16   Mass.    1), 

86,  209,  228,  486,  541. 
Keech   v.    Hall    (Doug.    Eng.    21), 

1325. 
Keeler  v.  Eastman    (11   Vt.   293), 

708. 
Keeler    v.    Keeler    (31    N.    J.    Eq. 

181),  1256. 
Keeley  Brewing  Co.  v.  Mason  (102 

111.  App.  381),  1074,  1411. 
Keeley  Brewing  Co.  v.  Mason  (116 

111.  App.  603),  69. 
Keith  V.  Granite  Mills  (126  Mass. 

90),  915. 
Keith  V.  Nat.  Teleph.  Co.  (63  L.  J. 

Ch.  373),  179. 
Kelley  v.  Kelley  (23  Me.  192),  942. 
Kelley    v.    Oil    Co.     (57    Ohio    St. 

317),  454. 
Kelly  V.  Austin  (46  111.  156),  1297. 
Kelly    V.    Bowerman     (113    Mich. 

446),  1113. 
Kelly  V.  Duffy  (11  Atl.  Rep.  244), 

905. 


•cxxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Kelly   V.    Eyster    (102    Ala.    325), 

262,  939,  1431. 
Kelly    V.    Noxon    (64    Hun,    281), 

1195,  1207. 
Kelly   V.    O'Connor    (106    Pa.    St. 

321),  917. 
Kelly  V.  Partridge  (23  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1027),  1348. 
Kelly  V.  Patterson   (43  L.  J.  C.  P. 

320),  140. 
Kelly  V.  Rochelle   (93  S.  W.  Rep. 

164),   1457. 
Kelly   V.   Rummerfield    (117   Wis. 

620),  308. 
Kelly  V.  Varnes   (64  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1040),  1378. 
Kelly    V.    Waite    (12    Met.    Mass. 

300),  195,  213,  685. 
Kellenberger  v.  Foresman  (13  Ind. 

475),  847,  1154. 
Keller   v.   Klopfer    (3   Colo.   132), 

21. 
Kellogg  V.  Kellogg  (6  Barb.  116), 

227. 
Kellogg  V.  Lavendar  (9  Neb.  418), 

992. 
Kellogg  V.  Lowe   (38  Wash.  293), 

1162. 
Kellogg    V.    Rockwell    (19    Conn. 

446),  30. 
Kellogg   Newspaper  Co.   v.   Peter- 
son (162  111.  158),  1400. 
Kelsey  v.  Tourtelotte   (59  Pa.  St. 

184),  349. 
Kelsey   v.    Ward    (16    Abb.    Prac. 

N.  Y.  98),  563.  877. 
Kelso  V.  Kelly  (1  Daly,  N.  Y.  419), 

1276. 
Kemp  V.  Derritt    (3   Camp.   510), 

160,  346. 
Kemp  V.  Sober  (1  Sim.  N.  S.  517), 

740. 
Kempf's  Estate  (34  Pittsb.  Leg.  J. 

82),  45. 
Kempton  v.  Walker    (9   Vt.   191), 

520. 


Kenada  v.  Gardner  (3  Barb.  N.  Y. 

589),  317. 
Kendal    v.    Talbot    (2    Bibb.    Ky. 

614),  599. 
Kendall  B.  &  S.   Co.  v.   Bain    (55 

Mo.  App.   264),   395,  1409. 
Kendall  v.  Carland  (5  Cush.  Mass. 

74),   91,   1115. 
Kendall   v.    Hill    (64   N.    H.    553), 

1222. 
Kendall    v.   Kendall    (7   Me.   171), 

342. 
Kendall    v.    Kingsley    (120    Mass. 

94),  348. 
Kendall  v.  Miller  (9  Cal.  591),  10. 
Kendall   v.   Moore    (30   Me.    327), 

201. 
Kendig  v.   Kendig    (3   Pitts.   Rep. 

Pa.  287),  547. 
Keneage   v.   Elliot    (9   Watts,   Pa. 

258),  504. 
Kenin  v.  Guvernator  (48  Atl.  Rep. 

1023),  216. 
Kennard  v.  Harvey   (SO  Ind.  37), 

1432. 
Kennedy  v.  Baltimore  Ins.  Co.   (3 

Har.  &  J.  Md.  367),  65. 
Kennedy  v.  Campbell   (3  Brev.  S. 

C.  553),  974. 
Kennedy  v.   Fay   (65  N.  Y.   Supp. 

202),   831,   847. 
Kennedy  v.  Kennedy  (66  111.  190), 

49L 
Kennelly,   In  re    (92   N.  Y.   Supp. 

182),    1126. 
Kenney  v.  Rhinelander  (163  N.  Y. 

576),   816,  822,  834. 
Kenny  v.   Barns    (67   Mich.   336), 

839,  840. 
Kenny    v.    Collier    (79    Ga.    743), 

694. 
Kensie  v.  Farrell  (17  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  192),  1239. 
Kenyon  v.  Nichols   (1  R.  I.  411), 

445. 
Keogh  V.  Daniell    (12   Wis.   163), 

1303. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


CXXXV 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Keppler  v.  Heinrichsdorf  (26  Ohio 

C.  C.  16),  1383,  1387. 
Kerley  v.  Mayer   (155  N.  Y.  636), 

733,  755,  1164. 
Kern  v.  Myll   (80  Mich.  525),  792. 
Kernochan   v.   Manhattan  Ry.   Co. 

(161  N.  Y.  239),  679. 
Kernochan  v.  Wilkins  (3  App.  Div. 

596),  149. 
Kerper  v.  Booth  (10  W.  N.  C.  Pa. 

79),  547. 
Kerr  v.  Clark    (19  Mo.  132),  146, 

1207,  1213. 
Kerr  v.  Dey  (14  Pa.  St.  112),  996. 
Kerr  v.  Hunt  (1  W.  N.  C.  Pa.  115), 

463. 
Kerr  v.  Kingsbury  (39  Mich.  150), 

1271,  1288. 
Kerr  v.  Merchants'  Exchange  Co. 

(3  Edw.  Ch.  N.  Y.  315),  1342. 
Kerr  v.  Merrill   (4  Mo.  App.  592), 

782. 
Kerrains  v.  People  (60  N.  Y.  221), 

300. 
Kershaw  v.  Supplee  (1  Rawle,  Pa. 

131),  885,  1228. 
Kerslake  v.  White   (2  Stark.  508), 

448,  463. 
Kessler  v.   McConachy    (1   Rawle, 

Pa.  435),  1183. 
Kessler  v.  Pearson  (55  S.  E.  Rep. 

963),   777. 
Kessler   v.    State    (119    Ga.    301), 

778. 
Ketaltas    v.    Coleman     (2    E.    D. 

Smith,  N.  Y.  408),  1052. 
Ketcham  v.  Ochs   (70  N.  Y.  Supp. 

268),  1210. 
Ketcham  v.  Ochs   (77  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1130),  139. 
Kew   V.   Merchant's  Exch.   Co.    (3 

Ed.  Ch.  N.  Y.  315),  1158. 
Kew  V.  Trainor  (150  111.  150),  620, 

1055. 
Keyes  v.  Dearborn   (12  N.  H.  52), 

343,  346. 


Keyes  v.    Slate   Co.    (34   Vt.    81), 

760. 
Keyport  Brick  &  Tile  Mfg.  Co.  v. 

Lorillard     (19    Atl.    Rep.    391), 

990. 
Keys  V.  Forrest  (90  Md.  132),  956. 
Kidd  V.  Dennison   (6  Barb.  N.  Y. 

9),  712. 
Kidd  V.  Temple  (22  Cal.  255),  29, 

33. 
Kidder  v.  West  (3  Lev.  167),  399. 
Kidney  v.  Rohrback   (3  N.  Y.  St. 

Rep.  574),  544. 
Kidwell   V.    Brummagim    (32    Cal. 

436),  54. 
Kidwell  V.  Kidwell   (84  Ind.  224), 

49. 
Kidwelly    v.    Brand     (Plow,    71), 

641. 
Kieley  v.   Kahn    (98   N.  Y.    Supp. 

774),  535. 
Kiernan    v.     Germain     (61    Miss. 

498),   563,  868,  1238. 
Kiernan   v.   Linnehan    (151   Mass. 

543),  198. 
Kiernan  v.  Terry   (26  Oreg.  494), 

481,  922,  937. 
Kiersted  v.  O.  &  A.  R.  Co.   (69  N. 

Y.  343),  106,  560. 
Kieth  V.  Kerr   (17  Ind.  284),  326. 
Kieth    V.    Paulk    (55    Iowa,    260), 

573. 
Kile  V.  Geihner  (114  Pa.  St.  381), 

1250. 
Kilgour   V.    Ashcomb    (5    H.    &   J. 

82),  438. 
Killoren   v.    Murtaugh    (64   N.    H. 

51),  927. 
Kimball  v.  Cross    (136  Mass.  30), 

1364. 
Kimball  v.   Doggett    (62   111.  App. 

528),  879,  1302. 
Kimball    v.    Lockwood     (6    R.    I. 

138),  486. 
Kimball  v.  Sumner   (62  Me.  305) 

50,  52. 


■CXXXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Kime  v.  Brooks   (9  Ired.  N.  Car. 

Law,  218),  97,  98. 
Kimpton  v.  Eve  (2  Ves.  &  B.  349), 

725,   1304. 
Kimpton   v.    Walker    (9   Vt.    191), 

520. 
Kindersley  v.   Hughes    (7   Mee.   & 

Wei.  139),  170. 
Kinear   v.    Shands    (36    Mo.    379), 

1465. 
King    V.    Bird     (148    Mass.    578), 

699. 
King    V.    Boiling    (77    Ala.    594), 

950. 
King  V.  Bosserman  (13  Super.  Ct. 

480),  310,  523. 
King   V.    Connolly    (51    Cal.    181), 

218. 
King  V.   Creekmore    (25   Ky.  Law 

Rep.  1292),   782,   836. 
King  V.  Davis  (137  Fed.  Rep.  198), 

974. 
King     V.     Dickerman     (11     Gray, 

Mass.  480),  86. 
King   V.    Enterprise    Ins.    Co.    (45 

Ind.  43),  457. 
King  V.  Fraser  (6  East,  348),  559, 

581. 
King  V.  Grant  (43  La.  Ann.  817), 

700. 
King  V.  Hamilton   (29  U.  S.  311), 

1002. 
King   V.    Johnson    (7   Gray,   Mass. 

239),  198. 
King  V.  Jones   (5  Taunt.  518),  51. 
King   V.    Kaiser    (23    N.   Y.    Supp. 

21),  381. 
King  V.  Large  (7  Phila.  Pa.  282), 

409. 
King  V.   Lawson    (98   Mass.    309), 

223. 
King  V.  Pedley  (1  Ad.  &  El.  822), 

792. 
King  V.  Raab  (123  Iowa,  632),  982, 

985,  1000. 
King  V.   Reynolds    (67   Ala.   229), 

672. 


King  V.   Sharp    (6  Humph.  Tenn. 

55),  2. 
King  V.   Wilcomb    (7  Barb.   N.  Y. 

263),   132,   1260,   1264. 
King  V.  Wilson   (98  Va.  259),  140, 

1290,  1374. 
King  V.  Woodruff    (23  Conn.   56), 

875. 
King  V.   Woodward*  (3   B.  &  Aid. 

689),  171. 
Kingdon   v.   Nottle    (1   M.   &   Sel. 

355),  51,  884. 
Kingsbury    v.     Collins     (4     Bing. 

202),  1306. 
Kingsbury  v.   Westfall    (61   N.   Y. 

359),  596. 
Kingsland  v.   Clark    (24   Mo.   24), 

1178. 
Kingsland   v.    Ryckman    (5   Daly, 

N.  Y.  13),  80. 
Kingsmill  v.  Millard  (11  Ex.  313), 

961. 
Kinney  v.  Lamon    (8  Blackf.   Ind. 

350),  934. 
Kinney  v.  Watts  (14  Wend.  N.  Y. 

38),   698. 
Kinsley    v.    Ames    (2    Met.    Mass. 

29),    232,    234. 
Kinsman    v.     Kinsman     (1    Root, 

Conn.  180),  1315. 
Kiplinger  v.  Green  (61  Mich.  340), 

315. 
Kirby     v.     Associates     (14     Gray, 

Mass.  249),  808. 
Kirchner    v.    Smith    (207    Pa.    St. 

431),  828. 
Kirk  V.  Taylor's  Heirs  (8  B.  Mon. 

Ky.  62),  317. 
Kirkland   v.   Wolf    (3   Wkly.  Law 

Bui.  Ohio,  114),  1214,  1293. 
Kirkpatrick  v.  Peshine   (24  N.  J. 

Eq.  206),  756. 
Kirsley    v.    Duck    (2    Vern.    684), 

343. 
Kirtland    v.    Pounsett    (2    Taunt. 

145),  201. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXXVll 


[references  are  to  pages. 1 


Kirtland    v.    Pounsett    (1    Taunt. 

570),   559. 
Kirton  v.  Braithwaite   (1  Mee.  & 

Wei.  310),  537. 
Kissam    v.    Barclay    (17    Abb.    Pr. 

N.  Y.  360),  1244. 
Kistler  v.  McBride  (65  N.  J.  Law, 

553),  522. 
Kistler    v.    Wilson    (77    111.    App. 

149),  1176. 
Kitchen  v.  Lee    (11  Paige  Ch.   N. 

Y.  107),  15. 
Kitchen  Bros.  Hotel  Co.  v.  Philbin 

(2    Neb.    Unof.    340),    400,    416, 

697,   1142. 
Kites  V.  Church    (142  Mass.  589), 

510. 
Kittle    V.    St.    John    (7    Neb.    73), 

1195. 
Klay  V.  Godwin  (16  Mass.  1),  215. 
Kleckner  v.  Klapp   (2  Watts  &  S. 

44),    106. 
Kleespies    v.    McKenzie    (12    Ind. 

App.  404),  139. 
Klein  v.   Gehrung    (24  Tex.   232), 

409. 
Klein    v.    Vinyard    (38    Mo.    447), 

1465. 
Klie  V.  Von  Broock  (56  N.  J.  Eq. 

18),  713,  725. 
Kline  v.  Beebe  (6  Conn.  494),  10. 
Kline  v.  Chase  (17  Cal.  596),  204. 
Kline  v.   Jacobs    (68   Pa.   St.    87), 

561,  848,  874. 
Kline  v.  McLain    (33  W.  Va.  32), 

848,  904. 
Klingenstein  v.  Goldwasser  (58  N. 

Y.   Supp.  342),  163. 
Klingle    v.    Ritter    (58    111.    140), 

454. 
Kloke   V.    W^olf    (111    N.    W.   Rep. 

134),  124. 
Knapp    V.    Jones     (143    111.    375), 

1110. 
Knapp  V.   Marlboro    (29  Vt.   282), 

697. 


Knapp  V.    Smith    (27  N.  Y.   277), 

24. 
Kneeland  v.  Beare  (11  N.  D.  233), 

839. 
Kneeland    v.     Schmidt     (78    Wis. 

345),  1195,  1198,   1235. 
Knefel  v.  Daly  (91  111.  App.  321), 

466. 
Knevett  v.  Poole   (Cro.  Eliz.  463), 

1307. 
Knickerbocker  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pat- 

erson    (75  N.  Y.  589),   44. 
Knickerbocker     v.     Killmore      (9 

Johns.  N.  Y.  106),  1088. 
Knickerbocker  Tr.  Co.  v.  Pa.  Cord- 
age Co.  (62  N.  J.  Eq.  624),  1248. 
Knight  V.  Bennett   (4  Bing.  364), 

192,   1314. 
Knight  V.  Coal  Co.    (47  Ind.  105), 

186. 
Knight   V.   Orchard    (92   Mo.   App. 

466),   1279. 
Knight   V.    Mory    (Cro.    Eliz.    60), 

1054. 
Knight  V.  Quigley  (2  Camp.  505), 

216,   228. 
?*night's  Case   (Moore,  199),  86. 
Knoepfel  v.   Fire  Ins.   Co.    (68   N. 

Y.  639),  414,  753. 
Knoepker  v.  Redel   (116  Mo.  App. 

62),  362. 
Knolle's  Case   (Dyer,  5b),  1114. 
Knott  V.  Giles  (27  App.  D.  C.  581), 

1416. 
Knowles  v.   Hull    (99   Mass.  .562), 

236. 
Knowles  v.  Inman  (16  Colo.  385), 

938. 
Knowles  v.  Murphy  (107  Cal.  107), 

334,  920,  945. 
Knowles  v.  Nichols   (14  Fed.  Cas. 

No.  7,897),  445. 
Knowles  v.    Sells    (41    Kan.    171), 

1465. 
Knowles  v.  Steele  (59  Minn.  452), 

377. 


cxxxvin 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Knox  V.  Bailey  (4  Mo.  App.  581), 

519,  573. 
Knox  V.   Hexter  "(Tl   N.  Y.   461), 

691. 
Knox  V.  Hunt  (18  Mo.  243),  1402, 

1441. 
Knutsen  v.  Clinque  (99  N.  Y.  Supp. 

910),  898. 
Kobbi  V.  Underbill    (3   Sand.   Ch, 

N.  Y.  277),  547. 
Koebler  v.  Brady  (144  N.  Y.  135), 

647. 
Koehler  &  Co.  v.  Kennedy  (72  N. 

Y.  Supp.  595),  1393. 
Koenig   v.    Miller    Bros.    Brewing 

Co.   (38  Mo.  App.  182),  1213. 
Kobne  v.  White    (12  Wasb.   199), 

880. 
Koken  Iron  Works  v.  Kinealy  (86 

Mo.  App.  199),  164. 
Kolasky    v.    Micbels     (120    N.    Y. 

635),  1391,  1393,  1394. 
Kollock  V.  Kaiser   (98  Wis.  104), 

1363,  1374. 
Kollock  V.  Scribner  (98  Wis.  104), 

1373. 
Koons  V.  Steele   (19  Pa.  St.  203), 

964. 
Kooystra  v.  Lucas  (1  D.  &  R.  506), 

417,   442. 
Koplitz  V.  Gustanes   (48  Wis.  48), 

275. 
Kopp,  In  re   (2  N.  Y.  Supp.  495), 

15. 
Korn  V.  N.  Y.  Elevated  R.  R.  Co. 

(60  Hun,  N.  Y.  583),  680,  681. 
Kornegay  v.   Collier    (65   N.   Car. 

69,  72),  492. 
Kower  v.  Gluck  (33  Cal.  40),  1212, 

1231. 
Kramer   v.   Cook    (7   Gray,   Mass. 

550),  1378,  1379,  1364. 
Kratemeyer     v.     Brink     (17     Ind. 

509),  317. 
Krause    v.    Krause    (58    111.    App. 

559),  1077. 


Krause  v.  Stein  (173  Pa.  St.  221), 

361. 
Krebs  v.  Dodge  (9  Wis.  1),  958. 
Kreiss  v.  Seligman  (8  Barb.  N.  Y. 

439),  776. 
Kretzer  v.  Wysong   (5  Gratt.  Va. 

9),  685. 
Kribbs  v.  Alford   (120  N.  Y.  519), 

1080,  1102. 
Krouse   v.   Ross    (14    Fed.    Cases, 

7,939),  1264. 
Kruegel   v.   Berry    (75   Tex.    230), 

987. 
Kruger  v.  Ferrant  (29  Minn.  395), 

782,  849. 
Krumdieck    v.    Ebbs     (84    N.    Y. 

Supp.  825),  1219. 
Krumweide  v.  Schroeder  (58  Iowa, 

160),  678. 
Kugel  V.  Painter  (166  Pa.  St.  592), 

370. 
Kuhlman    v.    Meier    (7    Mo.    App. 

260),  1265. 
Kuhn  V.  Heavenrich  Co.  (115  Wis. 

147),  848. 
Kuhn    V.    Kuhn    (70    Iowa,    682), 

219. 
Kuhn  V.  Smith  (125  Cal.  615),  218. 
Kuschell    V.    Campau     (49    Mich. 

34),  1408. 
Kuttar   V.    Smith    (2   Wall.   U.   S. 

491),  874. 
Kuttner  v.  Haines    (135  111.  382), 

1456. 


L. 


Lacey  v.  Davis  (4  Mich.  140),  957. 
Lachman   v.    Deisch    (71    111.    59), 

681,  704. 
Lack    V.    Wyckoff    (11    N.    Y.    St. 

Rep.  678),  1153. 
Ladd   V.    Brown    (94    Mich.    136), 

1313. 
Ladd   V.    Shattock    (90   Ala.   134), 

718,  1336. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXXIX 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Ladly    v.    Creighton    (70    Pa.    St. 

490),  llOS. 
Ladner  v.  Balsey  (103  Iowa,  674), 

478,  1449. 
Ladnier  v.   Stewart    (38   So.   Rep. 

748),  391. 
La  Farge  v.   Mansfield    (31  Barb. 

N.  Y.  345),  561,  564,  674,  868. 
Laffan  v.  Naglee  (9  Cal.  662),  996, 

1081. 
Lafferty  v.  Hawes   (63  Minn.  13), 

1209. 
Lafferty  v.    Schuykill   River   East 

S.  R.  Co.  (124  Pa.  St.  297),  1320. 
Lageman  v.  Kloppenburg  (2  E.  D. 

Smith,  N.  Y.  126),  544. 
Lagerfelt  v.  McKie  (100  Ala.  430), 

107,  328. 
Laguerenne  v.  Dougherty   (35  Pa. 

St.  45),  139. 
Laimbeer    v.    Tailer    (125    N.    Y. 

725),  141. 
Laird  v.  McGeorge  (37  N.  Y.  Supp. 

631),  847. 
Lake   v.    Campbell    (18    111.    106), 

331,   334,   391. 
Lake  v.  Gaines  (75  Ala.  143),  1438. 
Lake    Erie    Gas    Co.    v.    Patterson 

(184  Pa.  St.  364),  8. 
Lake  Superior  Ship  Canal  Ry.  & 

Iron   Co.   V.   McCann    (86   Mich. 

106),  1409,  1410. 
Lakin  v.  Dolly  (53  Fed.  Rep.  333), 

927,  929. 
Lamar  v.   Dixon    (L.   R.    6   H.    L. 

514),  192. 
Lamar   v.   McNamee    (10   G.    &   J. 

Md.  126),  1193. 
Lamar  M.  &  Elev.  Co.  v.  Craddock 

(5  Colo.  App.  203),  366. 
Lamb  v.   Lamb    (146   N.   Y.   317), 

573. 
Lamb   v.    Swain    (3    Jones,    N.    C. 

370),  951. 
Lambert  v.  Hoke  (14  Johns.  N.  Y. 

383),  439. 


Lambert  v.  Huber  (50  N.  Y.  Supp. 

793),  937,  958. 
Lambert  v.  Huskell  (80  Cal.  611), 

1185. 
Lambert    v.    Norris    (2    M.    &    W. 

333),  580. 
Lambeth  v.  Ponder  (33  Ark.  707), 

1436. 
Lambeth  v.  Warner    (2  Jones,  N. 

C.   165),  717. 
Lametti  v.   Anderson    (6   Cow.   N. 

Y.  302),  1283. 
Lamme  v.  Dodson   (4  Mont.  560), 

960. 
Lampher  v.   Glenn    (37  Minn.   4), 

1340. 
Lamphere  v.  Lowe    (3  Neb.   131), 

1244. 
Lamson    v.    Clarkson    (113    Mass. 

348),  934,  935,  936. 
Lancashier  v.  Mason   (75  N.  Car. 

455),  492. 
Lancaster  v.  De  Trafford  (31  L.  J. 

Ch.  554),  386. 
Lancaster    v.    Roberts     (144     111. 

213),  342. 
Lancaster  v.   Whiteside    (108   Ga. 

801),  1429. 
Land   Co.   v.   Manning    (Mo.   App. 

71  S.  W.  Rep.  696),  490. 
Landau  v.  O.  J.  Gude  Co.    (84  N. 

Y.  Supp.  672),  110. 
Lander   v.    Bagley's    Contract    (61 

L.  J.  Ch.   707),  387,  607. 
Lander's    Contract,    In    re     (1892, 

3  Ch.  41),  345. 
Landsberg  v.  Tivoli  Brew.  Co.  (10 

Det.  Leg.  N.  63),  202. 
Landsell  v.  Grover  (17  Q.  B.  589), 

182. 
Landt    v.     McCullough     (121     111. 

App.  328),  1182. 
Landt  v.  Schneider  (31  Mont.  15), 

847,  853,  1209. 
Lane  v.  Cox  (1  Q.  B.  415),  785. 
Lane   v.   Crockett    (7   Price,   566), 

1459. 


J 


cxl 


TABLE    OF    CxVSES    CITED, 


[refebexces  are  to  pages.] 


Lane  v.  King  (8  Wend.  N.  Y.  584), 

288,  1326. 
J.ane's  Lessee  v.  Osment   (9  Yerg. 

Tenn.  86),  945. 
Lane  v.  Nelson   (167  Pa.  St.  602), 

156. 
Lane  v.  Nelson  (31  Atl.  Rep.  864), 

567. 
Lane  v.  Pollard  (88  Mo.  App.  326), 

1435. 
Lane  v.  Young  (66  Hun,  563),  934. 
Lane   v.    Loung    (21    N.   Y".    Supp. 

838),  936. 
Laney's  Estate   (14   Pa.   C.  C.   4), 

15,  848. 
Lang  V.  Crothers    (51   S.  W.  Rep. 

271),  956. 
Lang  V.  Henry  (54  N.  H.  57),  387. 
Langan    v.    Schief    (55    Mo.    App. 

213),  173. 
Langford  v.  United  States   (12  Ct. 

CI.  338),  35. 
Langraede  v.  Weaver  (65  Ohio  St. 

17),  333,  1111. 
Langsdorf   v.    LeGardeur    (27    La. 

Ann.  364),  1215. 
Langton  v.  Horton   (1  Hare,  549), 

1428. 
Lankin  v.  Terwillinger    (22  Oreg. 

97),  446. 
Lanning  v.  Howell    (2  N.  J.  Law, 

256),   560. 
Lansdale  v.  Richardson   (1  W.  N. 

C.  Pa.  413),  459. 
Lansing    v.     Thompson     (8     App. 

Div.  54),  840,  1347. 
Lapere  v.  Luckey   (23  Kan.  534), 

409. 
Laphani   v.    Norton    (71   Me.    83), 

317. 
La  Plant  v.  LaZear  (31    Iiul.  Api). 

433),  813. 
Larkin  v.  Avery    (23   Conn.   304), 

162. 
Larman  v.   Benson    (8   Mich.   18), 

430. 


Larned  v.  Hudson  (60  N.  Y.  102), 

189,  191,  218. 
Larousini  v.  Werlien  (52  La.  Ann. 

424),   248. 
Larrabee  v.  Lumbert  (34  Me.  79), 

322. 
Lash  V.  Ames  (50  N.  E.  Rep.  996), 

209,  210. 
Lasher    v.    Graves    (124    111.    App. 

646),   539. 
Lassell  v.  Reed  (6  Me.  222),  1331. 
Last  V.  Dinn  (28  L.  J.  Ex.  — ),  87. 
Lataillade   v.    Santa   Barbara   Gas 

Co.    (58  Cal.  4),  937. 
Latham  v.  Atwood  (Cro.  Car.  515), 

1305. 
Lathers  v.  Coates  (41  N.  Y.  Supp. 

373),  1149. 
Lathers  v.  Hunt   (13  N.  Y.  Supp. 

813),  590. 
Lathrop   v.    Commercial    Bank    (8 

Dana,  Ky.  114),  65. 
Lathrop   v.    Standard   Oil   Co.    (83 

Ga.  307),  573. 
Latta  V.  Weis  (131  Mo.  230),  1093. 
Lattimer  v.  Livermore    (72  N.  Y. 

174),  441. 
Laugher     v.     Williams     (1     Salk. 

310),  884. 
Laughran  v.  Smith  (75  N.  Y.  206), 

197,  275. 
Law  V.  Haley   (9  Ohio  Dec.  785), 

412,  414. 
Lawrence  v.  Brown  (5  N.  Y.  394), 

1204. 
Lawrence  v.  Burrell    (17  Abb.   N. 

C.  N.  Y.  313),  1143. 
Lawrence  v.  Conlan  (28  Misc.  Rep. 

44),   28. 
Lawrence  v.  Edwards  (7  Ohio  St. 

194),  1406. 
Lawrence  v.  Fox    (20  N.  Y.  268), 

532. 
Lawrence    v.    French     (25    Wend. 

443),  1134. 
Lawrence    v.    Haramett    (3    J.    J. 

Marsh,  Ky.  287),'  559. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


cxii 


[referk.vces  are  to  pages.] 


Lawrence  V.  Mycenian  Marble  Co. 

(20  N.  Y.  Supp.  698),  1147. 
Lawrence    v.    Wardwell     (6    Barb. 

N.  Y.  623),  696. 
Lawrence     v.     Webster     (44     Cal. 

385),  957. 
Lawson  v.  Mowry   (52  Wis.  219), 

921. 
Lawton    v.    Lawton    (3    Atk.    13), 

1251,   1269. 
Lawton    v.    Salmon    (1    H.    Black. 

259),   1250,   1252. 
Lay  V.  Bennett  (4  Colo.  App.  252), 

1167. 
Lazarus  v.   Hellman    (11  Abb.   N. 

C.  N.  Y.  93),  497. 
Lazarus  v.  Phelps   (152  U.  S.  81), 

573. 
Ld.  Grey  de  Wilton  v.  Saxton    (6 

Ves.  106),  725. 
Lea  V.  Netherton    (9   Yerg.  Tenn. 

315),  966. 
Lea  V.  Polk,  etc.  Co.   (21  How.  U. 

S.  493),  343. 
Leacester  v.  Biggs  (1  Taunt.  367), 

23. 
Leach  v.  Beattie  (33  Vt.  195),  311. 
Leach    v.    Thomas    (7    Car.    &    P. 

328),  138. 
Leache    v.    Goode    (19    Mo.    501), 

1005,  1006. 
Leadbeater  v.  Roth    (25   111.   587), 

1136,  1141,   1154,   1182. 
Leahy  v.   Liebman    (67   Mo.   App. 

191),  163. 
Learned    v.    Tlllotson    (97    N.    Y. 

12),  1218. 
Learned  v.  Wannemacher  (9  Allen, 

Mass.  416),  385. 
Leary  v.  Hutton   (129  N.  Y.  649), 

1371. 
Leary  v.  Hutton    (58   Hun,  N.   Y. 

610),  1375. 
Leatherman  v.  Oliver  (151  Pa.  St. 

646),  644. 
Leaux  v.  City  of  N.  Y.    (87  App. 

Div.  405),  71. 


Leavitt     v.     Fletcher     (10     Allen, 

Mass.   119),   883,  1351. 
Leavitt  v.  Murray   (Wright,  Ohio. 

707),  338. 
Leavitt  v.  Stern  (55  111.  App.  416), 

384. 
Lebanon   School   Dist.   v.  Lebanon 

Seminary  (Pa.  12  Atl.  Rep.  S57), 

922. 
Lecatt   V.    Stewart    (2    Stew.    Ala. 

474),  957. 
Ledbetter    v.    Quick    (90    N.    Car. 

276),  1418. 
Ledger  v.  Stanton    (2  John.  &  H. 

689),  534. 
Lee  v.  Adkins  (1  Minor,  Ala.  187), 

232. 
Lee  V.  Gaskell  (1  Q.  B.  Div.  700), 

380,   1295. 
Lee  V.   Hernandez    (10  Tex.   137), 

19L 
Lee  V.  Ingraham    (94  N.  Y.  Supp. 

284),  834. 
Lee  V.  Kirby  (10  Weekly  Law  Bui. 

449),  917. 
Lee  V.  Lee  (83  Iowa,  565),  931. 
Lee  V.  Livingston  (143  Mich.  203), 

84. 
Lee    V.    Mass.    Ins.    Co.    (6    Mass. 

208),  342. 
Lee  V.  McDaniel    (1  A.  K.  Marsh, 

Ky.   234),   958. 
Lee  V.  McLaughlin    (86  Me.  410), 

809. 
Lee  V.  Meeker   (2  Wis.  487),  6S2. 
Lee  V.  Mosley  (1  You.  &  C.  607), 

604. 
Lee  V.  Payne  (4  Mich.  106),  1080, 

1095. 
Lee  V.   Quan   Wo  Chong    (91   Cal. 

593),  234. 
Lee    V.    Risdon     (7    Taunt.    18S), 

1256,  1257.  1264. 
Lee    V.    Smith    (9    Ex.    662),    147, 

525. 
Lee  V.    Smith    (42   Ohio   St.   458), 
917. 


cxlii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Leeds   v.    Burrows    (12    East,    1), 

1337. 
Leeds  v.   Chatham    (1   Sim.   146), 

883,  1345. 
Legg  V.  Strudwick   (2  Salk.  414), 

385. 
Leggett  V.  La.   Purchase  Ex.    (97 

S.  W.  Rep.  976),  1207. 
Legh  V.  Hewitt  (4  East,  154),  763. 
Lehman  v.  Howze    (73  Ala.   302), 

1423. 
Lehmann  v.  M'Arthur  (L.  R.  3  Eq. 

746),  1072. 
Lehman  v.  Nolting    (56  Mo.  App. 

549),  99,  150,  194,  195. 
Lehman  v.  Stone   (16  S.  W.  Rep. 

784),  1431. 
Lehmaier  v.  Jones  (91  N.  Y.  Supp. 

687),   615,   893,  1021. 
Lehmayer    v.    Moses    (174    N.    Y. 

518),  1360. 
Leick  V.  Tritz  (94  Iowa,  322),  880. 
Leiferman  v.  Osten   (64   111.   App. 

578),  804. 
Leigh  V.  Dickson   (L.  R.  12  Q.  B. 

Div.  194),  82,  84,  91. 
Leinenkugel  v.  Kehl  (73  Wis.  238), 

Leischmann    v.    White    (1    Allen, 

Mass.  489),  1180. 
Leitch   V.    Simpson    (Ir.   R.   5   Eq. 

613),  1071. 
Leiter  v.  Day    (35   111.  App.  248), 

1186. 
Leiter  v.  Pike   (127  111.  387),  352. 

1178. 
Leithan  v.  Vaught   (115  La.  249), 

808. 
Lemar  v.  Miles  (4  Watts,  Pa.  330), 

1250. 
LeMay  v.  Williams  (32  Ark.  166), 

343. 
Lembeck   Co.    v.    Kelly    (63   N.    J. 

Eq.  402),  390. 
Lemington  v.  Stevens  (48  Vt.  38), 

334. 


Lemon   v.    Wolff    (121    Cal.    272), 

1404. 
Lenderking  v.  Rosenthal   (63  Md. 

28),  265,  1447. 
Lendle  v.  Robinson  (65  N.  Y.  894), 

812,  834. 
Lennon  v.  Napper   (2  Sch.  &  Let. 

684), 1386. 
Lennon  v.  Palmer   (5  L.  R.  5  Jr. 

100),  941. 
Lent  V.  Curtis  (24  Ohio  C.  C.  592), 

988. 
Lenz  V.  Aldrich    (26  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1022), 824. 
Leonard  v.   Armstrong    (73  Mich. 

577),  1145,  1153. 
Leonard  v.  Burgess  (16  Wis.  41), 

492,1113. 
Leonard    v.    Gunther    (62    N.    Y. 

Supp.  99),  839. 
Leonard  v.  Hornelsville  (58  N.  Y. 

Supp.  266),  793. 
Leonard    v.    Kingman    (136    Mass. 

123), 258. 
Leonard  v.  Storer  (115  Mass.  86), 

828. 
Leonard    v.    White    (7    Mass.    6), 

447. 
Leo    Wolf    V.    Merritt    (21    Wend. 

N.  Y.  331),  523. 
Leppla  V.  Mackey   (31  Minn.  75), 

1391,  1392. 
Lerch    v.    Times    Co.     (91    Iowa, 

750), 855. 
Leroy    v.    Piatt    (4    Paige,    N.    Y. 

77), 438. 
Lesley  v.  Randolph  (4  Rawle,  Pa. 

123),  131,  172. 
Leslie    v.    Hinson    (83    Ala.    266), 

1411,  1434. 
Leslie    v.    Smith    (32    Mich.    65), 

1277. 
Lespini    v.    Porta    (89    Cal.    464), 

1215. 
Lettick  V.  Honnold    (63   111.   335), 

1177, 119L 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


C'xliii 


[BEFEUEXCES    ABE    TO    PAGES.] 


Lever  v.   Koffler    (70   Law  J.   Ch. 

395),  252. 
Levering    v.     Langley     (8     Minn. 

107), 1213. 
Levey    v.    Dyess    (51    Miss.    501), 

896. 
Levi  v.  Lewis  (6  C.  B.  N.  S.  766), 

574. 
Levick  v.  Coppin   (2  W.  Bl.  801), 

25,  56. 
Levine  v.  Baldwin    (87  App.  Div. 

150),  841,  886. 
Levitsky  v.  Canning  (33  Cal.  299), 

699,703. 
Levy  V.  Bend   (1  E.  D.  Smith,  N. 

Y.  169),  565. 
Levy    V.    Korn    (61    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1109), 840. 
Lewis  V.  Adams  (61  Ga.  559),  945. 
Lewis    V.    Angermiller    (89    Hun, 

65), 1199,  1220,  1228. 
Lewis    V.    Arnold    (13    Gratt.    Va. 

454),  1432. 
Lewis  V.  Baker  (75  Law  J.  K.  B. 

848),  131. 
Lewis   V.    Beard    (13    East,    210), 

198. 
Lewis  V.  Brandle    (107  Mich.   7), 

111. 
Lewis  V.  Burr  (8  Bos.  N.  Y.  140), 

1062. 
Lewis    V.    Carson     (16    Mo.    App. 

342),  51. 
Lewis    V.    Chisolm     (68    Ga.    40), 

563,  852,  867,  875. 
Lewis  V.  Christian   (40  Ga.  187), 

1463. 
Lewis  V.  Clark  (86  Md.  326),  427. 
Lewis  V.   Culbertson    (11   S.  &  R. 

Pa.  59),  564. 
Lewis  V.  Effinger  (30  Pa.  St.  281), 

874, 1278. 
Lewis  V.   Hughes    (12   Colo.   208), 

554, 1349. 
Lewis  V.  Jones    (17  Pa.  St.   262), 

760, 133L 


Lewis  V.  Klotz  (39  La.  Ann.  259), 

1318, 1327. 
Lewis  V.  Lyman    (22   Pick.  Mass. 

437), 1331. 
Lewis  V.   North    (87   N.   W.   312), 

389. 
Lewis  V.   Ocean   Nav.   &  Pier   Co. 
(125    N.    Y.    341),     1265,     1269, 

1287. 
Lewin  v.  Pauli   (19  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

447), 814. 
Lewis    V.    Payn    (4    Wend.    N.    Y. 

423), 1154, 1180. 
Lewis    V.    Perry     (149    Mo.    257), 

1289,  1378,  1379. 
Lewis  V.  Ringo    (3   A.   K.   Marsh. 

Ky.  247),  41,  55. 
Lewis  V.  St  Louis    (69  Mo.  695), 

663. 
Lewis    V.    Stake     (18    Miss.    20), 

1233. 
Lewis  V.    Stephenson    (67  Law  J. 

Q.  B.  296),  962,  1075,  1370,  1373, 

1382. 
Lewis  V.  Wilkins   (62  N.  C.  303), 

492. 
Lewiston    &    A.    R.    Co.    v.    Grand 

Trunk  R.  R.  Co.    (97  Me.  261), 

1017. 
Leydecker  v.  Brintnall   (158  Mass. 

292),  805,  813,  828. 
Leyman  v.  Abeel  (16  Johns.  N.  Y, 

30), 1195. 
L'Hussler  v.   Zallee    (24   Mo.   13), 

672. 
Libbey  v.   Staples    (39    Me.    161), 

329,330. 
Libbey   v.    Tilford    (48    Me.    316), 

782,855. 
Libby  v.   Cushman    (29  Me.   429), 

1450. 
Lichtenthaler  v.  Thompson  (13  S. 

&  R.  Pa.  158),  1443. 
Lichtig  V.  Poundt  (52  N.  Y.  Supp. 

136). 836. 
Liebe   v.   Nicolai   .(30   Oreg.    364), 

522. 


cxliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Lieberthal     v.     Montgomery     (129 

Mich.  369),  1340. 
Liebmann's     Sons     Brew.     Co.     v. 

Lauter    (76    N.    Y.    Siipp.    748), 

1058. 
Lienow  v.  Ritchie   (8  Pick.  Mass. 

235),  679,  682. 
Liebschutz  v.  Moore  (70  Ind.  142), 

1228. 
Life  V.  Sechrest  (1  Ind.  512),  937. 
Liggett  V.  Shira  (159  Pa.  St.  350), 

641. 
Lightbody  v.   Truelson    (39   Minn. 

310,301. 
Lightfoot  V.  Tenant  (1  Bos.  &  Pul. 

555),  461,  777. 
Lightner  v.  Brooks    (15  Fed.  Cas. 

No.  8,344),  690. 
Lile  V.  Barnett  (2  Bibb.  Ky.  166), 

1274. 
Lilley    v.    Associates     (101    Mass. 

532), 517. 
Lincoln  Trust  Co.  v.  Nathan   (175 

Mo.    32),    610,    872,    1042,    1340, 

1341,  1351. 
Lindblom   v.   Berkman    (43  Wash. 

356), 421. 
Lindeke  v.   Associates  Realty   Co. 

(77  C.  C.  A.  56),  170,  605. 
Lindemayer    v.    Ganst     (70    Miss. 

693),  958. 
Lindenbower   v.   Bentley    (86   Mo. 

515),  685. 
Lindley   v.    Dakin    (13    Ind.    388), 

4S2. 
Lindley  v.  Hoffman   (22  Ind.  App. 

237),  361,  362. 
Lindley    v.    Miller    (67    111.    244), 

564. 
Lindley  v.  Tibbal   (40  Conn.  522), 

386. 
Lindsay    v.    Leighton    (150    Mass. 

285),  804,  813,  828. 
Lindsay  v.  Lindsay    (11  Vt.  621), 

351. 
Lindsey  v.   First  Nat.   Bank    (115 

N.  C.  553),  411 


Lindsey  v.  Lindsey  (45  Ind.  552), 

657. 
Lindsley   v.    Schnaider   Brew.    Co. 

(59  Mo.  App.  271),  1057,  1080. 
Lindstrom     v.     Pennsylvania     Co. 

(212  Pa.  St.  391),  826,  836. 
Line  v.  Stephenson  (6  Scott,  447), 

6^8. 
Lingles  v.   Phelps    (20  Wis.   398), 

1427. 
Linke    v.    Walcutt     (69    Ohio    Ct. 

531), 848. 
Linn  v.  Ross  (10  Ohio,  412),  1158, 

1340,1345. 
Linton  v.   Hart    (25   Pa.   St.   193), 

541. 
Linwood   Park  Co.   v.   Van   Dusen 

(63  Ohio  St.  183),  729. 
Liquid  Carbonic  Acid  Mfg.  Co.  v. 

Lewis   (32  Tex.  Civ.  App.  481), 

1435. 
Lisburne  v.  Davies   (L.  R.  1  C.  P. 

260), 962. 
Lisle  V.   Rogers    (18   B.  Mon.   Ky. 

528), 343. 
Lister  v.  Lane  (62  L.  J.  Q.  B.  583), 

887. 
Lister  Ag.  Chem.  Works  v.  Selby 

(68  N.  J.  Eq.  271),  984. 
Litchfield  v.  Flint  (104  N.  Y.  543), 

532. 
Little   V.    Banks    (85    N.    Y.    258), 

532,586. 
Little  V.   Dyer    (35   111.   App.   85), 

469. 
Little  Falls  v.  Hausdorf  (127  Fed. 

Rep.  442),  1294. 
Little  V.  McAdaras    (38  Mo.   App. 

187), 847. 
Little  Miami  Elev.  Co.  v.  City  of 

Cincinnati    (30    Ohio    St.    629), 

116. 
Little  V.  Palister  (4  Me.  209),  212. 
Little  V.  Pallister   (3  Me.  6),  688. 
Little   V.   Pearson    (7   Pick.    Mass. 

198),  317,  318. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


cxlv 


[references  are  to  paces.] 


Littleton  v.  Clayton   (77  Ala.  571), 

920,923. 
Littleton   v.    Wynn    (31   Ga.    583), 

258,  519,  572. 
Lively  v.  Ball  (2  B.  Mon.  Ky.  53), 

920. 
Livermore  v.  Eddy   (33  Mo.  547), 

1207. 
Livingston  v.  Miller  (8  N.  Y.  283), 

528. 
Livingston  v.   Potts    (16  John.   N. 

Y.  28),  1204. 
Livingston  v.   State   (96  Ala.  44), 

1248. 
Livingston  v.  Stickles   (7  Hill,  N. 

Y.  253),  743. 
Livingston  v.  Sulzer   (19  Hun,  N. 

Y.  375),  1250,  1252,  1283. 
Livingstone      v.      Reynolds       (26 

Wend.  N.  Y.  122),  708. 
Livingstone  v.   Tanner    (14   N.  Y. 

480),  218,  229,  234. 
Livingstone      v.       Tonapkins       (4 

Johns  Ch.  415),  665. 
Lloyd  V.   Capps    (    29   S.   W.   Rep. 

505), 1184. 
Lloyd  V.  Cozens  12  Ash.  Pa.  131), 

172,1093. 
Lloyd   V.    Crispe    (5   Taunt.    249), 

1071. 
Lloyd  V.  Gregory  (Cro.  Car.  502), 

1201. 
Lloyd  V.   Langford    (2  Mod.   17G), 

1199,  1226. 
Lloyd  V.  Powers  (4  Dak.  62),  312. 
Loan  &  Discount  Co.  v.  Drake   (6 

C.  B.  796),  1294. 
Lobdell  V.  Hayes   (12  Gray,  Mass. 

236),  49,  50. 
Lobdell  V.  Mason    (71  Miss.  936), 

98. 
Locke  V.  Coleman    (2  T.   B.   Mon. 

Ky.  12),  156. 
Locke  V.  Coleman    (4  T.  B.  Mon. 

Ky.  315),  389. 
Locke    V.    Frasher    (79    Va.    409), 

471,  930,  949. 


Locke    V.    Rowell    (47    N.    H.    46), 

122,123. 
Lockwood  V.  Lockwood   (22  Conn. 

425),    146,    192,    196,    582,    877, 

1222,  1340. 
Lockwood  V.  Stradley   (1  Del.  Ch. 

298), 53. 
Lockwood  V.  Thunder  Bay  R.  Boom 

Co.  (42  Mich.  536),  258. 
Lockwood  V.   Walker    (3   McLean, 

N.  O.  431),  943. 
Lodge  V.  White  (30  Ohio  St.  569), 

1057. 
Loeser    v.    Liebman     (137    N.    Y. 

163),  1282,  1300. 
Lofft  V.  Dennis    (1  E.  &  E.   474), 

851. 
Loftus  Case  (Cro.  Eliz.  279),  27. 
Loftus   V.    Maxey    (73    Tex.    242), 

691. 
Logan  V.  Anderson  (2  Doug.  Mich. 

101),  1199.1238. 
Logan  V.  Barr  (4  Harr.  Del.  546), 

1193. 
Logan   V.    Green    (39    N.    C.    370), 

1228,1233. 
Logan  V.   Herron    (8   S.  &  R.   Pa. 

459),  139,  156. 
Logan  V.  Simmons  (3  Ired.  Eq.  N. 

C.  487),  21. 
Loggins  V.  Buck's  Adm'rs  (33  Tex. 

113), 1353. 
Lohmiller  v.  Water  Power  Co.  (51 

Wis.  683),  794. 
Loley  V.   Heller    (1   W.   N.   C.   Pa. 

613), 463. 
Lomax  v.  Le  Grand  (60  Ala.  537), 

1425,  1431,  1454. 
Lombardi   v.   Shero    (14  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  594),  1316. 
Lomis    V.    Ruetter    (9    Watts.    Pa. 

516), 876. 
London   v.   Milford    (14   Ves.    58). 

1383. 
London  v.  Warfield  (5  J.  J.  Marsh. 

Ky.  196),  1336. 


cxlvi 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


[refebences  aee  to  pages.] 


London  City  v.   Mitford    (14  Ves. 

42), 1385. 
London    City    v.    Richmond    (Pre. 

Ch.  156),  1105. 
London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gar- 

nett  (21  L.  T.  352),  749. 
Long  V.  Fitzsimmons   (1  W.  &  S. 

Pa.  530),  848. 
Long  V.  Fletcher   (2  Eq.  Abr.  5), 

479. 
Long   V.    Gieriet    (57    Minn.    278), 

563,877. 
Long  V.  Madison  &  Flax  Co.  (1  A. 

K.  Marsh.  105),  64. 
Long   V.    Noe    (49    Mo.    App.    19), 

678. 
Long    V.    Poth    (37    N.    Y.    Supp. 

670), 101. 
Long  V.  Ramsay  (1  Serg.  &  Pl.  Pa. 

72),  333,  334. 
Long  V.  Stafford   (103  N.  Y.  274), 

1207,  1208,  1378.  1379. 
Long  Bros.  v.  Bolen  Coal  Co.   (56 

Mo.  App.  605),  170. 
Longendyke  v.  Anderson   (101  N. 

Y.  625),  446. 
Longfellow  v.  Longfellow   (54  Me. 

240), 923. 
Longmore    v.    Tierman    (3    Pitts. 

Pa.  62),  1023. 
Longobardi  v.   Yuliano    (33   Misc. 

Rep.  472),  584,  597. 
Loomer  v.  Dawson  (Cheeves,  S.  C. 

68),  386. 
Loomis   V.   Lincoln    (24   Vt.    153), 

1400. 
Loomis  V.  O'Neal    (73  Mich.  522), 

309,311. 
Loomis  V.   Pingree    (43   Me.   299), 

350. 
Looney  v.  McLean  (129  Mass.  33), 

804,813. 
Lopper  V.  Bouve  (9  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

452),  1215,  1379. 
Lord    V.    Johnson     (120    111.    App. 

55), 1456. 


Lord    D'Arcy    v.    Askwith     (Hob. 

234), 706. 
Lord  Chesterfield  v.  Bolton  (Conn. 

Rep.  627),  1340. 
Lord   St.   John   v.  Lady  St.   Joha 

(11  Ves.  Jr.  526),  21. 
Lorenzen  v.  Wood  (1  McGloin,  La. 

373), 852. 
Lore's  Heirs   v.   Truman    (1   Ohio 

Dec.  510),  349. 
Loring   v.    Cooke    (3    Pick.    Mass. 

48),  538. 
Loring  v.  Harmon    (84  Mo.   123), 

920. 
Loring  v.  Taylor  (50  Mo.  App.  81), 

258. 
Losee  v.  Buchanan  (51  N.  Y.  476), 

904. 
Loth  V.  Carty  (85  Ky.  591),  1084. 
Lothrop    V.     Thayer     (138     Mass. 

466), 843. 
Loughran  v.  Ross  (45  N.  Y.  792), 

1265,  1269,  1287. 
Loughran   v.    Smith    (11   Hun,   N. 

Y.  311),  146,  148. 
Louisville  v.  Terminal  Co.    (72  S. 

W.  Rep.  945),  836. 
Louisville   &  N.   R.   Co.   v.    Smith 

(143  Ala.  335),  686. 
Loupe   V.    Genin    (45    N.   Y.    119), 

782,  847. 
Loupe  V.  Wood  (56  Cal.  586),  847. 
Lounsbery    v.    Snyder    (31    N.    Y. 

514),  148,   1131,   1132,  1136. 
Love  V.  Bdmonston  (23  N.  C.  152), 

198,  199,  212,  218. 
Love  V.  Edmonston   (1  Ired.  N.  C. 

152), 949. 
Love  v.  Law  (57  Miss.  596),  1402. 
Love   v.    Teter    (24    W.    Va.    741), 

472. 
Lovejoy  v.  McCarty  (94  Wis.  341), 

1093,1218. 
Lovelock    V.    Franklyn    (8    Q.    B. 

371), 344. 
Lovering   v.    Lovering    (13    N.    H. 

513), 599. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


cxlvii 


Treferexces  are  to  pages.] 


Lovett      V.       German       Reformed 

Church  (9  How.  Pr.  N.  Y.  220), 

488. 
Lovett  V.  United  States   (9  Ct.  CI. 

479), 882. 
Lowber  v.   Bangs    (2  Wall.   U.    S. 

728),  601,  604. 
Lowe  V.  Adams  (70  L.  J.  Ch.  783), 

273. 
Lowe    V.    Brown    (22    Ohio,    463), 

568.  570. 
Lowe    V.    Emerson    (48    111.    150), 

924,964. 
Lowe  V.  L.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.    (18 

Q.  B.  632),  578. 
Lowe    V.    London    R.    R.    Co.    (14 

Bng.  L.  &  E.  R.  19),  62. 
Lowell  V.  Hilton    (11  Gray,  Mass. 

407), 602. 
Lowell  V.  Strahan   (145  Mass.  1), 

290,  402,  412,  1050. 
Lowenstien  v.  Keller  (3  Kulp.  Pa. 

361), 1188. 
Lowery  v.  Peterson  (75  Ala.  109), 

1117. 
Lowndes    v.    Fountaine     (11    Ex. 

487), 764. 
Lowrey     v.     Reef     (1     Ind.     App. 

244), 5. 
Lowther   v.    Caril    (1   Vern.    221), 

386. 
Lowther  v.  Troy  (1  Jr.  T.  R.  162), 

1201. 
Lucas  V.   Brooks    (85  U.   S.   436), 

178,942. 
Lucas  V.  Comerford   (3  Bro.  C.  C. 

166), 1105. 
L-ucas   V.    Coulter    (104    Ind.    81), 

782,785. 
Lucas   V.    Daniels    (34    Ala.    188), 

968. 
Lucas  V.  How  (Sir  T.  Raym.  250) 

639. 
Lucas,   Ex    parte    (3    Deac.    &   C. 

144), 607. 
Lucas   V.    McCann    (50    Mo.    App. 

638), 1023. 


Lucas  V.  Price  (4  Ala.  672),  53. 
Lucas  V.  Rickerich   (1  Lea,  Tenn. 

726), 22. 
Lucas  V.  Sunbury,  etc.  R.  Co.   (32 

Pa.  St.  458),  393. 
Lucente  v.   Davis    (101  Md.   526), 

745. 
Luchs  V.  Jones   (1  MacArthur,  D. 

C.  345),  232. 
Luckenbill,   In  re    (127  Fed.  Rep. 

984), 1121. 
Lucy  v.  Lucy  (55  N.  H.  9),  51. 
Lucy  V.  Wilkins    (33  Minn.   441), 

592,  1094,  1207.  1223. 
Ludford    v.    Barber    (1    Term    R. 

86),  3,  5. 
Ludington    v.    Garlock    (55    Hun, 

612), 176. 
Ludington    v.    Seaton    (66    N.    Y. 

Supp.  497)v  1155. 
Ludlow  V.  McCarthy  (5  App.  Div. 

517), 564. 
Luff    V.    Burrows     (12    East,    1), 

1273. 
Lukens  v.  Hedley  (1  W.  N.  C.  Pa. 

266), 855. 
Lumley  v.  Backus    (73  Fed.   Rep. 

767), 822. 
Lumley  v.  Gilruth   (65  Miss.  23), 

1417. 
Lumley  v.  Hodgson  (16  East,  99), 

575. 
Luna  V.  Gage  (37  111.  27),  601. 
Lund    V.    Ozanne    (84    Pac.    Rep. 

710), 553. 
Lundin  SchoefEel  (167  Mass.  465), 

668. 
Lunn  V.  Gage  (37  111.  19),  563. 
Lunsford  v.   Alexander    (20  N.  C. 

166), 948. 
Lunt  V.  Brown   (13  Me.  236),  686. 
Lunt  V.  Norris  (1  Burr.  290),  602. 
Luney  v.  Brown   (Lutch.  99),  110. 
Lunsford  v.  Turner  (5  J.  J.  Marsh. 

Ky.  104),  927. 
Lush    V.    Druse    (4    Wend.    N.    Y. 

313),  337,  528. 


cxlviii 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Lushington   v.    Baldero    (15   Beav. 

1),726. 
Lutz  V.   Wainwright    (193   Pa.   St. 

541), 465. 
Lux  V.  Haggin   (69  Cal.  390),  684. 
Luxmore  v.  Robinson  (1  B.  &  Aid. 

584),  884,  897. 
Lybbe  v.  Hart  '(54  L.  J.  Ch.  860), 

764. 
Lyde  v.   Russell    (1  Barn.   &  Aid. 

394), 1264. 
Lyford  v.  Toothacher  (39  Me.  28), 

685. 
Lyles  V.  Murphy  (38  Tex.  75),  964. 
Lyman  v.  Townsend  (24  La.  Ann. 

625),  772. 
Lynch    v.    Baldwin    (69    111.    210), 

564,  1131,  1133,  1142. 
Lynch,    In    re    (15    Fed.    Cas.    No. 

8,634), 1119. 
Lynch  v.  Lynch    (6  Ir.  7  R.  131), 

1194. 
Lynch  v.   Onondaga  Salt  Co.    (64 

Barb.  N.  Y.  558),  519,  573,  698. 
Lynch   v.    Ortlieb    (87    Tex.    590), 

802. 
Lynch  v.  Sauer  (16  Misc.  Rep.  1), 

471,  480,  699,  1173. 
Lynch    v.    Speed    (15    Daly,    207), 

782. 
Lynde  v.  Hough   (27  Barb.  N.  Y 

415),  1052. 
Lynn  v.  Reed    (13  M.  &  W.  285), 

1194,  1199. 
Lynn  v.  Ross   (10  Ohio,  412),  883. 
Lynn  v.  Waldron    (36  Wash.   82), 

1263,  1289. 
Lyon    V.    Buerman    (57    Atl.    Rep. 

100), 847. 
Lyon   V.    Cunningham    (136   Mass. 

532),  193,  198. 
Lyon  V.  Kain   (36  111.  363),  341. 
Lyon  V.  La  Master  (103  Mo.  612), 

182, 183. 
Lyon   V.   Miller    (24   Pa.    St.   392), 
464. 


Lyon  V.  Woshburn    (3  Colo.  201), 

920. 
Lyons    v.    Deppen    (90    Ky.    305), 

1437. 
Lyons   v.   Gavin    (88   N.  Y.    Supp. 

252), 783. 
Lyons  v.  Kain  (36  111.  362),  342. 
Lyons   v.    Osborn    (45    Kan.    650),. 

1369,1378. 
Lyons  v.  Tedder  (7  S.  C.  69),  1409. 
Lysaght  v.  Callinan   (Hayes,  141), 

1387. 
Lysle  V.  Williams  (15  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

136), 346. 
Lyster  v.  Goldwin  (1  G.  &  D.  463), 

175. 


M. 


Mabry    v.    Harp     (53    Kan.    398), 

1329.1432. 
Macbean    v.    Irvine    (4    Bibb.    Ky. 

17),  64. 
Macdonough  v.  Starbird   (105  Cal. 

15),  1251. 
Machen   v.   Hooper    (73   Md.   342), 

783,899. 
Macher  v.   Foundling  Hospital    (1 

Ves.  &  B.  187),  733. 
Machinery  Co.  v.  Flower    (12  De- 
troit Leg.  N.  214,  103  N.  W.  Rep. 

873),  1055. 
Mack  V.  Burt   (5  Hun,  N.  Y.  28). 

527. 
Mack  V.  Dailey    (67  Vt.   90),   645, 

647,  978. 
Mack  V.   Patchin    (42  N.  Y.  167), 

702,1184. 
Mackay    v.    Mackreth     (4    Dougl. 

213),  42, 137. 
Mackin    v.    Havin    (187    111.    484), 

484,  923,  969. 
Mackubin  v.  Whitecroft  (4  Har.  & 

McH.  Md.  135),  629. 
Maclary  v.  Turner   (9  Houst.  Del. 

281), 1309. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


cxlix 


[rkfeuences  ark  to  pages.] 


Macon  v.   Dasher    (16   S.   E.    Rep. 

75), 71. 
Mactier     v.     Osborn     (146     Mass. 

399),  634,  666,  667. 
Macy   V.   Elevated    R.    R.    Co.    (59 

Hun,  365),  680. 
Madden    v.    McKensie     (144    Fed. 

Rep.  64),  463. 
Maddox  v.  Gray  (75  Ga.  452),  349. 
Maddox  v.  White  (4  Md.  72),  721, 

757. 
Madigan  v.  McCarthy    (108  Mass. 

376), 1244. 
Madison   Female    Sem.    v.   United 

States  (23  Ct.  CI.  188),  37. 
Maelzer   v.    Swan    (75   Kan.   496), 

1431. 
Magam    v.    Lambert     (3    Pa.     St. 

444),  1183,  1340. 
Maggort  V.  Hansbarger   (8  Leigh, 

Va.  532),  895. 
Magill  V.  Hinsdale  (6  Conn.  464), 

106. 
Magoon  v.  Minnesota  Transfer  Pg. 

Co.   (34  Minn.  434),  326. 
Magruder    v.    Peter    (4    Gill    &   J. 

Md.  323),    13. 
Mahler,  In  re  (105  Fed.  Rep.  428), 

1175. 
Mahon    v.     Columbus     (58     Miss. 

310),  71. 
Mahoney  v.  Alirso    (51  Cal.  440), 

491. 
Main    v.    Davis    (32    Barb.    N.    Y. 

461),  543. 
Main  v.  Feathers   (21  Barb.  N.  Y. 

646), 518. 
Main    v.    Green    (32    Barb.    N.    Y. 

253), 1060. 
Main  v.  Schwartzwaelder  (4  E.  D. 

Smith,  N.  Y.  273),  1257. 
Maitland  v.  McKinnon  (1  H.  &  C. 

607), 444. 
Majestic    Hotel    Co.    v.    Eyre    (53 

App.  Div.  273),  1143,  1359. 
Majors  v.  Goodrich  (54  S.  W.  Rep. 

919), 252. 


Makin  v.  Watkinson  (40  L.  J.  Ex. 

33),  860. 
Makin  v.  "Wilkinson  (23  L.  T.  Rep. 

N.  S.  473),  860. 
Mallam  v.  Arden    (10  Bing.  299), 

522. 
Mallan   v.    May    (13    Mee.   &   Wei. 

511), 604. 
Mallett  V.  Hillyard  (43  S.  E.  Rep. 

779), 1185. 
Mallett  V.  Page   (8  Ind.  364),  349. 
Malloy  V.   Real   Estate   Ass'n    (34 

N.  Y.  Supp.  679),  817. 
Mammock  v.  Creekmore   (48  Ark. 

264),  311. 
Man  V.  Katz   (40  Misc.  Rep.  645), 
■     1063. 

Manby  v.  Scott  (1  Mod.  124),  21. 
Manchester  v.   Doddridge    (3   Ind. 

360),  198',  206. 
Manchester,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ander- 
son  (67  L.  J.  Ch.  568),  699. 
Manchester  Bonded  Whse.  v.  Carr 

(49  L.  J.  C.  P.  809),  860. 
Mancuso  v.   Kansas  City    (74  Mo. 

App.  138),  828. 
Manett  v.  Simpson  (61  Hun,  620), 

109. 
Maney   v.    Lamphere    (11    Detroit 

Leg.  N.  872),  690. 
Man.  Stamping  Works  v.  Koehler 

(45  Hun,  150).  295. 
Manle    v.    Ashmead     (20    Pa.    St. 

483),  701. 
Mann  v.  Antenrieth    (17   Hun,  N. 

Y.  162),  1358. 
Mann  v.  Lovejoy    (R.  &  M.   355), 

134. 
Mann  v.  Nunn  (43  L.  J.  C.  P.  241), 

381,856. 
Mann  v.   Tonner    (86    Iowa,   581), 

1100. 
Mann  v.  Watters  (10  B.  &  C.  626), 

175. 
Manning  v.  West    (6  Cush.  Mass. 

463),  265. 


<d 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references    are   to   PAGES.l 


Mansel  v.   Norton    (L.   R.   22   Ch. 

Div.  769),  1285. 
Mansfield    v.    Sherman     (17    Atl. 

Rep.  300),  1002. 
Mantooth  v.  Burke  (35  Ark.  540), 

920. 
Mantz   V.   Garing    (4   Bing.   N.    C. 

451), 857, 889. 
Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Porter  (112 

Ala.  381),  1429. 
Mansony  v.  United  States  Bank  (4 

Ala.  746),  30. 
Manuel  v.  Campbell   (3  Ark.  324), 

600. 
Manvers  v.  Mizem   (2  M.  &  Rob. 

56), 175. 
Manville    v.    Gay    (1    Wis.    250), 

1160. 
Mapp  V.  Phillips  (32  Ga.  72),  101. 
Marcum  v.  Hereford  (8  Dana,  Ky. 

1),1116. 
Marcy  v.  Pierce  (14  111.  App.  91), 

481. 
Marden  v.  Jordan  (65  Me.  9),  689. 
Margart  v.  Swift  (3  McCord,  S.  C. 

378), 1445. 
Margolius  v.  Muldberg   (88  N.  Y. 

Supp.  1048),  833,  848. 
Margrave    v.    Archibold    (1    Dow. 

P.  C.  107),  56. 
Marine  I.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.   (41 

Fed.  Rep.  643),  71. 
Mariner   v.   Burton    (4   Har.   Del. 

G9).318. 
Mariner  v.  Chamberlain   (21  Wis. 

251), 1174, 1183. 
Maring  v.   Ward    (50   N.   C.   272), 

no. 

Marje    v.    Dyche    (42    Miss.    347), 

1429. 
Mark  v.  Noyes  (1  Car.  &  P.  265), 

887. 
Mark  v.  Witzler  (39  Cal.  247),  28. 
Marltham      v.      David      Stevenson 

Brew.  Co.  (64  N.  Y.  Supp.  017), 

854,1155. 


Markin    v.    Crumble     (35    N.    Y. 

Supp.  1027),  800. 
Markin  v.  Whitaker  (26  Ind.  App. 

211), 1114. 
Markle's   Estate    (17    Pa.    Co.    Ct 

Rep.  337),  44. 
Markley  V.  Swartzlander  (8  Watts. 

&  S.  172),  333. 
Markowitz    v.     Greenwall    Theat- 
rical Circuit  Co.  (75  S.  W.  Rep. 

74), 1046. 
Marks  v.  Delaglio  (59  N.  Y.  Supp. 

707), 1149. 
Marks    v.    Gartside    (16    111.    App. 

177),  862,  863. 
Marks  v.  Ryan  (63  Cal.  107),  1264. 
Marks  v.  Ryan   (4  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

842), 1287. 
Marley  v.  Wheelwright  (172  Mass. 

530), 836. 
Marlowe  v.  Rogers  (102  Ala.  510), 

315. 
Marmiche  v.  Roumieu  (11  La.  Ann. 

477), 154. 
Marney  v.  Byrd  (11  Humph.  Tenn. 

95),  495. 
Maroney   Hdwe.   Co.   v.   Connelles 

(25  S.  W.  Rep.  448),  123. 
Maroney    v.     Hellings     (110    Cal. 

219),  852,  877. 
Marquam  v.  Sengfelder   (24  Oreg. 

2),  1406. 
Marr  v.  Ray  (151  111.  340),  151. 
Marr   v.    Sheffner    (2    East,    523), 

1422. 
Marrs  v.   Lumpkin    (22  Tex.   Civ. 

App.  448),  1419. 
Marsack   v.   Read    (12   East,   57), 

175. 
Marsalis  v.  Pitman  (68  Tex.  624), 

1432. 
Marseilles  v.  Kerr   (6  Whart.  Pa. 

500),  1207,  1216. 
Marsh   v.    Brace    (Cro.    Jac.    334), 

520. 
Marsh  v.   Bristol    (65  Mich.   378), 

739. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


ClL 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Marsh    v.    Butterworth    (4    Mich. 

575),  1171,  1173,  1182. 
Marsh  v.  Masterson  (3  N.  Y.  Supp. 

414), 356. 
Marsh  v.  McNider  (88  Iowa,  390), 

435. 
Marsh  v.  Reed   (184  111.  263),  58. 
Marshall  v.  Berridge  (51  L.  J.  Ch. 

329),  259,  387. 
Marshall  v.  John  Grosse  Clo.  Co. 

(184  111.  421),  1217. 
Marshall  v.   Llnz    (115   Cal.   622), 

1404,  1435. 
Marshall  v.  Lippman   (16  Hun,  N. 

Y.  110),  1096. 
Marshall  v.  Mosely  (21  N.  Y.  280), 

539. 
Marshall   v.   Rugg    (6   Wyo.   270), 

727,  898. 
Marshall    v.    Scofield     (47    L.    T. 

406), 1344. 
Marshall   v.  Vickshurg    (82   U.    S. 

146), 665. 
Marshall    v.    White    (Harp.    122), 

439. 
Marshall  v.  White's  Co.    (7  Cold. 

Tenn.  252),  342. 
Marsh,  Merwin  &  Lemmon  v.  City 
of    Bridgeport    (75    Conn.    495), 
74. 
Marske  v.  Willard    (169  111.  276), 

983. 
Marsters  v.  Cling  (163  Mass.  477), 

228,  677,  688. 
Martens    v.    O'Connor    (101    Wis. 

18),  7,  84,  88. 
Martin    v.    Allen    (67    Kan.    758), 

237. 
Martin   v.   Black    (9   Paige,   N.   Y. 

644), 1061. 
Martin    v.    Bliss    (5    Blackf.    35), 

439. 
Martin  v.  Crompe  (1  L.  Ray.  340), 

87,  610. 
Martin   v.   Davis    (96    Iowa,   718), 
248,  471. 


Martin    v.    Gilham    (7    Ad.    &   El. 

540),  720. 
Martin  v.  Gilham  (2  N.  &  P.  568), 

13S. 
Martin  v.  Judd   (81  111.  488),  957. 
Martin    v.    Kepner    (1    Ohio    Dec. 

57), 1214. 
Martin  v.  Knapp    (57  Iowa,  336), 

191, 1316. 
Martin    v.    Martin    (7    Ind.    368), 

1176. 
Martin  v.  Martin   (94  N.  W.  Rep. 

493),  531,  958. 
Martin     v.     O'Connor     (43     Barb. 

514), 1048. 
Martin  v.  Rector  (118  N.  Y.  476), 

554. 
Martin    v.    Richards     (155    Mass. 
•  381), 813. 
Martin   v.   Roe    (7   E.   &  B.   236), 

1259. 
Martin    v.    Searcy    (3    Stew.    Ala. 

50), 1228. 
Martin   v.    Sexton    (112    111.    App. 

199),  1044. 
Martin  v.  Stearns   (52  Iowa,  345), 

1193,1198. 
Martin   v.   Surman    (116   111.  App. 

262),  833,  847. 
Martin   v.   Tobin    (123   Mass.    85), 

1073. 
Martin  v.  Watts   (7  T.  R.   85),  8, 

128,  147,  155,  158. 
Martinez    v.    Thompson    (80    Tex. 

568), 885. 
Martin's    Appeal    (5    Watts.    &    S. 

Pa.  220),  1441. 
Martyn  v.  Clue  (18  Q.  B.  661),  617, 

912, 1080. 
Martyn   v.    Williams    (1    H.    &   N. 

817), 493. 
Marvin    v.    Stone    (2    Cow.    N.   Y. 

781), 604. 
Marwedel     v.     Cook     (154     Mass. 

235). 800. 
Marwood  v.  Waters  (13  C.  B.  820), 
187. 


clii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages. J 


Marye   v.    Dyche    (42    Miss.    347) 

1400. 
Marys    v.    Anderson     (24    Pa.    St 

272), 346. 
Mason    v.    Clifford     (4    Fed.    Rep 

177), 243. 
Mason  v.  Corder    (2   Marsh.   332) 

1071. 
Mason  v.  Fenn   (3  Peclv.  111.  525) 

12G7. 
Mason  v.  Gray  (36  Vt.  308),  483. 
Mason  v.  Hill  (5  B.  &  Aid.  1,  24) 

431. 
Mason  v.  Howes   (122  Mich.  329) 

832. 
Mason    v.    Lenderoth     (84    N.    Y 

Supp.  740),  28,  34,  699,  1171. 
Mason   v.   Mason    (F.   &   K.   429) 

1124. 
Mason  v.  Moyers  (2  Rob.  Va.  606) 

1311. 
Mason  v.  Payne  r47  Mo.  517),  993 
Mason  v.   Smith    (131  Mass.   510) 

1020. 
Mason  v.  Stiles  (21  Mo.  374),  722. 

844. 
Mason  v.  Treadway   (1  Lev.  145) 

1197. 
Massachusetts  Hosp.  Life  Ins.  Co 

V.  Wilson   (10  Met.  Mass.  126) 

31. 
Massie  v.  Long  (2  Ohio,  287),  84 
Massie    v.    State    Nat.    Bank     (11 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  280),  377. 
Massy  v.  Mead  (27  So.  Rep.  837) 

616,  1391. 
Master   v.    Miller    (4    T.    R.    320) 

343. 
Masterson    v.    Girard's    Heirs    (10 

Ala.  60),  49. 
Mastin  v.  Metzinger   (99  Mo.  App. 

C13),156. 
Masury  v.  Southworth  (9  Ohio  St. 

340),   488,   614,  1040,   1080,   1284. 
Math    v.    Levy     (74    Miss.    450), 

1254. 


Mather  v.  Trinity  Church   (3  S.  & 

R.  Pa.  509),  685,  1300,  1331. 
Mathes    v.    Staed     (67    Mo.    App. 

399), 1427. 
Mathews  v.  Burke   (32  Tex.  419), 

1432. 
Mathews    v.    City    of    New    York 

(78  App.  Div.  422),  828. 
Mathews    Slate    Co.    v.    New    Em- 
pire S.  Co.  (122  Fed.  Rep.  972), 

989. 
Mathewson  v.  Wrightman  (4  Esp. 

5), 172. 
Mathinet    v.    Giddings     (10    Ohio, 

364), 1285. 
Mathis  V.  McCord   (Wright,  Ohio, 

647), 877. 
Matthews  v.  Hipp   (66  S.  C.  162), 

146,201. 
Matthews  v.  His  Creditors  (10  La. 

Ann.  718),  1422. 
Matthews  v.  Mayor,  etc.    (14  Abb. 

Pr.  N.  Y.  209),  61. 
Matthews    v.    Matthews    (49    Hun. 

346), 284. 
Matthews    v.    New    Empire    Slate 

Co.   (122  Fed.  Rep.  972),  980. 
Matthews  v.  People's  Nat.  Gas.  Co. 

(179  Pa.  St.  165),  641. 
Matthews  v.  Tobener  (39  Mo.  115), 

1199,  1207. 
Matthews  v.  Usher  (68  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

988), 628. 
Matthews  v.  Ward  (10  G.  &  J.  Md. 

),354. 

Matthews   v.    Whetton    (Cro.    Car. 

233),  647. 
Matthews  v.  Whitaker    (23   S.  W. 

Rep.  528),  1046. 
Matthew's    Ai)peal     (104     Pa.     St. 

444),  954. 
Mattice  v.   Lord    (30   Baii).    N.   Y. 

382), 629. 
Mattis    v.    Robinson    (1    Neb.    3), 

922. 
Mattison  v.  Oliver  (2  Leg.  Op.  Pa. 

48), 1006 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clii'i 


[referexces  are  to  pages.] 


Mattoon  v.  Munroe  (21  Hun,  N.  Y. 

74), 117, 1173. 
Mattox  V.  Helm  (5  Litt.  Ky.  186), 

191. 
Matts  V.  Robinson  (7  M.  &  G.  701), 

953. 
Maughlin  v.  Perry    (35  Md.  352), 

617,982. 
Maul    V.    Rider    (59    Pa.    St.    167), 

496. 
Mauldin  v.  Cox  (07  Cal.  387),  965. 
Mauley  v.  Zeighler    (23  Tex.  88), 

333. 
Maunsell  v.  Hart  (1  L.  R.  Jr.  88), 

740,  769. 
Maus  V.  Worthing   (4  111.  26),  97. 
Mausert   v.    Christian    Feigenspan 

(68  N.  J.  Eq.  671),  381. 
Maverick  v.  Lewis    (3  McCord,  S. 

C.   211),  243. 
Mavor  v.  Northern  Trust  Co.    (93 

111.  App.  314),  32. 
Maxwell   v.    Habon    (22   Tex.   Civ. 

App.  565),  10. 
Maxwell  v.  Higgins  (38  Neb.  671), 

958. 
Maxwell  v.   Stewart    (22  Wall.  U 

S.  77),  1466. 
Maxwell   v.   Urban    (22    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  565),  492,  697,  1075,  1112. 
Maxwell  v.  Ward  (13  Price,  674), 

1387. 
May,   In   re    (47    How.    Prac.    87), 

1119. 
May  V.  Calder  (2  Mass.  55),  10. 
May    V.    Ennis    (79    N.    Y.    Supp. 

896),  801. 
May    V.    Gillis    (169    N.    Y.    330), 

1360. 
May  V.  McGaughey  (60  Ark.  357), 

1425. 
May  V.  Rice  (108  Mass.  150),  208. 
May    V.    Smith    (3    Mackey,    55), 

446. 
May  V.  Thomson   (20  Ch.  D.  805), 

259. 


May  V.   Thompson    (51   L.   J.   Ch. 

917), 2SS. 
Mayer   v.   Laux    (43    N.    Y.    Supp. 

743), 918. 
Mayer  v.  Lyon   (69  Ga.  577),  679. 
Mayer   v.    MoUer    (1    Hilt.    N.    Y. 

491),  328,  782. 
Mayer  v.  Schrumpf  (141  Mo.  App. 

54),  837,  847. 
Mayer    v.    Waters    (45    Kan.    78), 

1165. 
Mayfield   v.    Wadsley    (3    B.    &   C. 

357),  1337. 
Mayhew  v.  Hardesty  (8  Md.  479), 

1101,1107. 
Mayhew  v.  Suttle  (4  E.  &  E.  347), 

301. 
Mayhew's  Case    (1   Coke,   147),   5. 
Mayn    v.    Beak    (Cro.    Eliz.    515), 

347. 
Maynard    v.    Maynard    (10    Mass. 

457),  349,  1074. 
Mayne    v.    Jones     (34    Cal.    483), 

976. 
Mayo  V.  Chenoweth  (1  III.  Breese, 

200),  340. 
Mayo  V.  Fletcher   (14  Pick.  Mass. 

525), 29. 
Mayor  of  New   York  v.   Ketchum 

(67  How.  Pr.  N.  Y.  166),  539. 
Mayor  of  New  York  v.  Mabie  (13 

N.  Y.  151),  697. 
Mayor  of  Thetford  v.  Tyler   (8  Q. 

B.  95),  141. 
Mayor,  etc.  Poole  v.  Whitt  (18  M. 

&  W.  571),  921. 
Maywood  v.  Logan  (78  Mich.  135), 

791,805. 
McAdoo  V.  Galium  (86  N.  C.  419). 

136S. 
McAfee   v.    Ferguson    (9    B.    Mon. 

Ky.  475),  21. 
McAlester  v.  Landers   (70  Cal.  79, 

82),  563,  699. 
McAlister  v.  Clark  (33  Conn.  91), 

777. 


cliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[eefekences  aee  to  pages.] 


McAllister  T.   Reel    (53   Mo.   App. 

81),  1280. 
McAlpin  V.  Powell  (70  N.  Y.  126), 

848,918. 
McArthur  v.   Sears    (21  Wend.  N. 

Y.  190),  901. 
McAuliff    V.     Parker     (10     Wash. 

141), 961. 
McAusland  v.  Pundt  (1  Neb.  211), 

934. 
McAvoy    V.     Wright     (137    Mass. 

207), 798. 
McBee  v.  Sampson   (66  Fed.  Rep. 

416), 1094. 
McBride  v.  Bank   (28  Barb.  N.  Y. 

476), 1466. 
McBride   v.    Daniels    (92    Pa.    St. 

332), 907. 
McBrien  v.  Marshall    (126  Pa.  St. 

290), 1364. 
McBrier  v.  Marshall    (126  Pa.   St. 

390), 877. 
McCaffrey,    In   re    (50    Hun,    371), 

57. 
McCaffrey   v.    Woodin    (65    N.   Y. 

459),  279,  1404,  1405,  1428. 
McCall    V.    Walter    (71    Ga.    287), 

1295. 
McCampbell     v.     McCampbell      (5 

Litt.  Ky.  92),  2. 
McCardell  v.  Miller   (22  R.  I.  96), 

575. 
McCardell   v.   Williams    (19    R.    I. 

701),  483,  876. 
McCarthy  v.  Bank   (74  Me.   415), 

828. 
McCarthy  v.  Brown  (113  Cal.  15), 

212. 
McCarthy    v.    Foster     (156    Mass. 

511  ).818. 
McCarthy      v.      Humphrey      (105 

Iowa,  545),  428,  1009. 
McCarthy  v.  Noble   (5  N.  Y.  380), 

341. 
McCarthy     v.     Truemacher     (108 

Iowa,  384),  1289. 


McCarthy  v.  York  Co.  Sav.  Bank 

(74  Me.  315),  840. 
McCartney  v.  Auer   (50  Mo.  395), 

484. 
McCaskle    v.    Amerine     (12     Ala. 

17), 974. 
McCaw  V.  Barker   (115  Ala.  543), 

83. 
McCarty  v.   Ely    (4   E.   D.    Smith, 

N.  Y.  375),  874. 
McCarty  v.  New  York,  etc.  R.  Co. 

(30  Pa.  St.  251),  903. 
McClain  v.  Abshire   (72  Mo.  App. 

390). 1428. 
McClellan  v.  Krall  (43  Kan.  216), 

291. 
McClellan     v.     Whitney     (65     Vt. 

510),  310. 
McClelland   v.   Rush    (150   Pa.   St. 

57),  383,  385,  1379,  1380. 
McClenahan  v.  City  of  New  York 

(102  N.  Y.  75),  1154. 
McClenahan   v.    Gwynn    (3   Munf. 

Va.  556),  1081. 
McClintock   v.    JojTier    (77    Miss. 

678),  616,  1391,  1376,  1382. 
McClosky    V.    Miller    (72    Pa.    St. 

151),  573. 
McClowry  v.  Croghan's  Adm'r  (31 

Pa.  St.  22),  606. 
McClung  V.  Condict  (6  N.  W.  Rep. 

399), 535. 
McClung  V.  McPherson    (47  Oreg. 

73),  168,  617. 
McClure  v.  Colelough  (17  Ala.  89), 

349. 
McClure  v.  McClure  (74  Ind.  108), 

156. 
McClurg  V.  Price  (59  Pa.  St.  420), 

1134,1190. 
McColgan  v.  Katz  (GO  N.  Y.  Supp. 

291),  106,  109. 
McComb's  Appeal  (43  Pa.  St.  435), 

1423. 
McCombs  V.  Becker   (5  Thomp.  & 

C.  550),  1320. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clv 


[references   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


McConnell  v.  East  Point  Land  Co. 

(100  Ga.  129),  1096. 
McCormick  v.  Anastaki   (66  N.  J. 

Law,  211),  836. 
McCormick  v.  Stephany   (61  N.  J. 

Eq.  208),  980,  987. 
McCord    Rubber    Co.    v.    St.    Jos. 

Water  Co.  (181  Mo.  678),  797. 
McCoull  v.  Herzberg  (33  111.  App. 

542), 1149. 
McCourt  V.   Singers-Bigger   (76  C. 

C.  A.  73),  1393. 
McCoy  V.  Hill    (2  Lltt.  Ky.  372), 

867. 
McCoy  V.  Scott  (2  Rawle,  Pa.  222), 

52. 
McCracken    v.    Hall    (7    Ind.    30), 

1256. 
McCready  v.  Lindenborn    (172  N. 

Y.  400),  629. 
McCreery    v.    Everding     (54    Cal. 

168), 974. 
McCrelish      v.      Churchman       (4 

Rawle,  Pa.  26),  601. 
McCroy  v.  Toney   (66  Miss.  233), 

384. 
McCullough  V.  Fox  (6  Barb.  N.  Y. 

386), 601. 
McCutcheon    v.    Crenshaw    (40    S. 

C.  511),  303. 
McDermott  v.  Dwyer  (91  Mo.  App. 

185), 1464. 
McDevitt    V.     Lambert     (80     Ala. 

536),  150,  151,  159,  163. 
McDewitt  V.  Sullivan  (8  Cal.  592), 

934. 
McDonald    v.    Bromley    (6    Phila. 

Pa.  302),  409. 
McDonald  v.  Flamme  (13  Abb.  N. 

Y.  356),  842. 
McDonald     v.     Hanlon     (79     Cal. 

442), 485. 
McDonald  v.  May   (69  S.  W.  Rep. 

1059), 1096. 
McDonald    v.    Schneider    (27    Mo. 

405), 72. 

k 


McDonnel  v.  White  (11  H.  L.  Cas. 

271), 1124. 
McDonnell     v.     Cambridge      (151 

Mass.  159),  686. 
McDonough  v.  Starbird   (105  Cal. 

15), 164. 
McDowell    V.    Hendrix     (67     Ind. 

513),  49. 
McDowell   V.    Simpson    (3    Watts. 

Pa.  135),  98,  133,  196,  197,  389. 
McElheny  v.  Musick  (63  111.  328), 

16. 
McElvaney    v.     Smith     (76     Ark. 

468), 1184. 
McEowen  v.  Drake  (14  N.  J.  Law, 

523), 219. 
McFadden   v.    McCann    (25    Iowa, 

252),  1378,  1387. 
McFadin  v.   Rippey    (8   Mo.   738), 

1131,  1136,  1178. 
McFall  V.  McFall    (35  S.  C.   559), 

137. 
McFarlan    v.    Watson     (3    N.    Y. 

286). 1096. 
McFarland     v.     Chase     (7     Gray, 

Mass.  462),  208. 
McFarland  v.  Heim  (127  Mo.  327), 

1073. 
McFarland    R.    E.    Co.    v.    Joseph 

Gerardi  Co.  (202  Mo.  597),  33. 
McFarlane  v.  Pierson  (21  111.  App. 

566)  1152. 
McFarlane   v.    Williams    (107    III. 

33),  329,  505,  522,  1016. 
INIcGee  v.  Gibson    (1  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

105). 203. 
:\IcGinley    v.    Alliance    Trust    Co. 

(168  Mo.  257),  800,  804. 
McGinnis    v.    Fernandes     (32    111. 

App.  424),  1327. 
McGinnis    v.    Porter    (20    Pa.    St. 

80),  958,  966. 
McGlanflin    v.    Holman    (1    Wash. 

St.  239),  334,  496. 
McGlashan  v.  Tallmadge  (37  Barb. 

N.  Y.  313),  783. 


clvi 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


McGlynn  v.  Brock  (11  Mass.  219), 

518. 
McGlynn  v.  Moore    (25  Cal.  384), 

348,638. 
McGrath    v.     Boston     (103     Mass. 

369),  246. 
McGreary  v.  Osborne  (9  Cal.  119), 

1254. 
McGregor   v.    Board  of  Education 

(107  N.  Y.  511),  897. 
McGregor    v.    Brown     (10    N.    Y 

114), 716. 
McGuffie  V.  Carter  (42  Mich.  497), 

934. 
McGuire  v.  Spencer   (91  III.  303), 

825. 
McGunnagle  v.  Thornton  (10  S.  & 

R.  Pa.  251),  98,  561. 
McHenry   v.    Maar    (39    Md.    510), 

865. 
Mclntire    v.    Patton     (9     Humph. 

Tenn.  447),  920. 
Mcintosh    V.    Hodges    (70    N.    W. 

Rep.  550),  195. 
Mcintosh    V.    Hodges    (110    Mich. 

319), 201. 
Mcintosh  V.  Lown  (49  Barb.  N.  Y. 

550), 883. 
Mcintosh  V.  Rector  (120  N.  Y.  7), 

1388. 
Mcintosh    V.    St.    Phillips    Church 

(120  N.  Y.  7),  912. 
Mclntyre    v.     Strong     (48    N.    Y. 

127),  350. 
McKanna  v.  Merry    (61   111.   177), 

18. 
McKay  v.  Bloodgood   (9  Johns.  N. 

Y.  285),  332. 
McKay    v.    McNally    (4    L.    R.    Ir. 

438), 1051. 
McKay  v.  Mumford   (10   Weiul,  N. 

Y.  351),  83. 
McKean  v.  Smoyer  (37  Neb.  694), 

1319. 
McKean  &  Elk  L.  Co.  v.  Mitchell 

(35  Pa.  St.  269),  336. 


McKee  v.  Angelrodt  (16  Mo.  283), 

1101. 
McKee  v.  Howe  (17  Colo.  538),  42. 
McKelby  v.   Webster    (170  Pa.   St. 

624), 1328. 
McKenzie    v.    Cheetham    (83    Me. 

543), 785. 
McKenzie  v.  Harrison   (120  N.  Y. 

260),  460,  556. 
McKenzie  v.  Hatton  (141  N.  Y.  6), 

1132,  1164,  1176. 
McKenzie  v.  Hesketh  (47  L.  J.  Ch. 

231). 266. 
McKenzie  v.   Lexington    (4   Dana, 

Ky.  129),  1195,  1240. 
McKenzie    v.    McLeod     (10    Bing. 

385), 844. 
McKenzie  v.  Sykes  (47  Mich.  294), 

250. 
McKeon  v.  Cutler  (156  Mass.  296), 

428. 
McKeon  v.  Cutter  (156  Mass.  296), 

785,  835,  839. 
McKeon  v.   Wendelken    (55  N.   Y. 

Supp.   626),  1080. 
McKeon  v.  Wliitney    (3  Denio,  N. 

Y.  452),  560. 
McKensie   v.    Farrel    (4   Bosw.   N. 

Y.  192),  595. 
McKesson    v.    Mendenhall    (64   N. 

C.  286),  564. 
McKiernan  v.  Lenzen  (56  Cal.  61), 

65. 
McKinney    v.    Herrick    (66    Iowa, 

414), 361. 
McKinney  v.  Reeder  (7  Watts,  Pa. 

123),  1072. 
McKinnis      v.      Scottish-American 

Mortg.  Co.  (55  Kan.  259),  930. 
McKircher  v.   Hawley    (16   .Johns. 

N.  Y.  289),  31,  288. 
McKissack  v.  Bullington  (37  Miss. 

535),   263. 
McKissick  v.  Ashby  (98  Cal.  422), 

922,  950. 
McKlewey  v.  Canty  (95  Ala.  295), 

1422. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


clvii 


[rekkrkxcss  are  to  pages.] 


McLain    Inv.    Co.    v.    Cunningham 

(87  S.  W.  Rep.  605),  1250. 
McLarren    v.    Spaulding    (2    Cal. 

510),  1162. 
McLaughlin  v.  Armfield   (58  Hun, 

376),  916. 
McLaughlin   v.    Bishop    (35   N.    J. 

Law,   512),   462. 
McLaughlin  v.  Dunn  (45  Mo.  App. 

645),   573. 
McLaughlin  v.  Longan   (4  Ir.  Eq. 

325),   1124. 
McLaughlin      v.      McGovern      (34 

Barb.  N.  Y.  208),  91. 
McLean   v.   Bovee    (24   Wis.    295), 

1325. 
McLean    v.    Caldwell     (107    Tenn. 

138),  1086,  1093. 
McLean  v.  Carroll  (6  Rob.  La.  43), 

1188. 
McLean  v.  McLean  (10  Bush.  Ky. 

167),  1465. 
McLean  v.  Nichol  (43  Minn.  169). 

459. 
McLean   v.    Palmer    (2    Kulp.    Pa. 

349),   1247. 
McLean   v.    Spratt    (20   Fla.    515), 

938. 
McLellan  v.  Whitney  (65  Vt.  510), 

1318. 
McLennan  v.  Grant  (8  Wash.  603), 

943,  944. 
McLeran  v.  Benton  (73  Cal.  329), 

209,  234,  235. 
McLott  V.  Savery  (11  Iowa,  323), 

591. 
McMahan    v.    Jacoway    (105    Ala. 

585),   1228. 
McMann   v.    Autenrieth    (17    Hun, 

163),  1152,  1355. 
McManus  v.  Fair  Co.  (60  Mo.  App. 

216),  1015. 
McMaster    v.    Kohner    (44    N.    Y. 

Supp.  Ct.  253),  555. 
McMillan    v.    N.    Y.    Water    Proof 

Paper   Co.    (29   X.   J.    Eq.    610), 

124S. 


McMillan    v.     Solomon     (42    Ala. 

356),   397,    1342. 
McMullen  v.  Erwin   (58  Ga.  427), 

957. 
McMurphy  v.  Minot  (4  N.  H.  251), 

554. 
McMurray   v.    Harway    (56   N.    Y. 

337),  644. 
McNair  v.   Schwartz    (16   111.   24), 

318. 
McNally  v.  Connolly    (70  Cal.  3), 

1244. 
McNamara    v.    O'Brien     (2    Wyo. 

447),   229. 
McNeal  v.  Ryder   (79  Minn.  152), 

309,  311. 
McNeeley  v.  Hunter  (30  Mo.  332), 

690. 
McNeely  v.   Hart    (10    Ired   N.   C. 

Law,  63),  308. 
McNeil     V.     Kendall     (138     Mass. 

245),  2049. 
McNulty  V.  Duffy  (59  N.  Y.  Supp. 

592),   526. 
McQuade    v.    Emmons    (38    N.    J. 

Law,  397),  303. 
McQuestion  v.  Morgan    (34  N.  H. 

400),    638. 
McQuire  v.  Gerstley  (26  App.  Div. 

193),  463. 
McRickard    v.    Flint    (114    N.    Y. 

222),  916. 
McVicker   Gaillard    Realty   Co.    v. 

Garth     (97    N.    Y.    Supp.    640), 

1023. 
McWilliams  v.  Hagan   (4  Rob.  La. 

374),   874. 
Mc  Willie    v.     Hudson     (1    Tread. 

Const.  S.  C.  119),  1441. 
Mead    v.    Madden    (85    App.    Div. 

10),  1086. 
Mead  v.  Thompson    (67   111.   395), 

1439. 
Meader  v.  Brown  (5  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

839),   1265. 
Meadows  v.  Cozart  (76  N.  C.  450), 

343. 


clviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Meath    v.    Watson    (76    111.    App. 

516),    1059. 
Median  v.  Grifflng  (3  Pick.  Mass. 

149),  497. 
Medary   v.    Gathers    (161    Pa.    St. 

87),  848. 
Medinah    Temple    Co.    v.    Currey, 

647,  1050. 
Medway  Cotton  Co.  v.  Adams   (10 

Mass.  360),  341. 
Medwin   v.    Sandham    (3    Swanst. 

685),  364. 
Meehan    v.    Forrester    (52    N.    Y. 

277),  101. 
Meek  v.  Breckinridge  (29  Ohio  St. 

642),  442. 
Meeker    v.    Spalsbury    (66    N.    J. 

Law,  60),  1131. 
Meeks  v.   Bowerman    (1  Daly,  N. 

Y.  99),  783,  1160. 
Meeks    v.    Ring    (4    N.    Y.    Supp. 

117),  345. 
Mees  V.  Ansell  (3  Wils.  275),  465. 
Meffert    v.    Dyer    (107    Mo.    App. 

462),  1319,  1321. 
Megan  v.  Johnson  (2  Taunt.  148), 

198. 
Megarge  v.  Tanner   (1  Clark,  Pa. 

331),  1443. 
Mehr  v.   Krewzberg    (187   Pa.   St. 

53),  922. 
Meier  v.  Thiemann    (15  Mo.  App 

207),  206,  233. 
Meig's    Appeal     (62    Pa.    St.    28). 

1247. 
Melhop    V.    Meinhart     (70    Iowa, 

685),  211. 
Melling  v.  Leake  (16  Com.  Bench, 

N.   S.   652),   223. 
Mellor  V.  Watkins   (L.  R.  9  Q.  B. 

400),  1206. 
Mem  ford  v.  Brown  (1  Wend.  N.  Y. 

53),  83. 
Memphis   v.    Miller    (78    Mo.    App. 

67),  825. 
Mendel  v.  Delano  (48  Mass.  176), 

445. 


Mengelle  v.  Abadle   (48  La.  Ann. 

669),  689. 
Menger   v.    Ward    (87    Tex.    622), 

997,   1046,   1100,   1251. 
Meni  v.   Rathbone    (21  Ind.   454), 

638. 
Menk    v.    Cooper    (2    Ld.    Raym. 

147),  1340. 
Menough's  Appeal    (5  Watts  &  S. 

Pa.  432),  522. 
Merc.  Loan  &  T.  Co.  (115  111.  App. 

101),  803,  813. 
Mercer  v.  Cross  (79  Ga.  432),  1411. 
Merceron  v.   Dawson    (5   B.   &  C. 

479),    543,   1080. 
Merchants'    Ins.    Co.    v.    Mazange 

(22  Ala.  168),  1041. 
Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v.   Stanton 

(55  Minn.  211),  212. 
Merchants'    &    Planters'    Bank    v, 

Meyer  (56  Ark.  499),  1449. 
Merchants'   State   Bank   of   Fargo 

V.  Ruettel  (12  N.  D.  519),  389. 
Meridith  Machanic  Ass'n  v.  Amer- 
ican Twist-Drill   Co.    (66   N.   H. 

267),  877. 
Meriwether  v.  Booker  (5  Litt.  Ky. 

256).  20. 
Meriwether  v.  Garrett   (102  U.  S. 

472),  71. 
Merriam  v.  Cunningham  (11  Cush. 

Mass.   40),  18. 
Merriam    v.    Ridpath     (16    Wash. 

104),  1266. 
Merrill  v.  Bullock  (105  Mass.  486), 

235,  236. 
Merrill  v.  Ressler   (37  Minn.  82), 

1404. 
Merrill    v.    Willis    (51    Neb.    162), 

1215. 
Merritt  v.  Brinkerhoff   (17  Johns. 

N.  Y.  306),  431. 
Merritt  v.  Dufur    (99   Iowa,  211), 

478. 
Merritt  v.  Fisher   (19  Iowa,  354),. 

1400,  1464. 
Merritt  v.  Judd  (14  Cal.  59),  1277. 


TABLE   OP    OASES    CITED. 


clix 


[REB'ERE-NCES    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Merrill  v.  Ressler   (37  Minn.  82), 

279. 
Mershom  v-.  Williams  (62  N.  L.  J. 

779),  1378. 
Merwin    v.    Camp    (3    Conn.    35), 

923,  931,  946. 
Meserole  v.  Hoyt   (161  N.  Y.  59), 

1355. 
Messenger  v.  Armstrong   (1  T.  R. 

54),  155. 
Messenger  v.  Pate  (42  Iowa,  444), 

916. 
Messent   v.   Reynolds    (3    B.    &  C. 

201),  698. 
Metcalf  V.    Fosdlck    (23    Ohio    St. 

114),  1410.  1440. 
Metcalf  V.   Smith    (106  Ala.   301), 

122. 
Metoyer   v.    Larenandier    (6    Rob. 

La.  139),  964. 
Met.  Concert  Co.  v.  Sperry   (9  N. 

Y.  St.  Rep.  342),  1281. 
Metropolitan    Land    Co.    v.    Man- 
ning   (98    Mo.    App.    248),    628, 

1036. 
Meyer  v.  Henderson    (16   S.  Rep. 

729),  1347. 
Meyer  v.  Huneke   (55  N.  Y.  412), 

547. 
Meyer  v.   Livesley   (78   Pac.   Rep. 

670),  313. 
Meyer  v.  O'dell  (18  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

210),  1423. 
Meyer  v.  Rothschild,  (46  La.  Ann. 

1174),  1056. 
Meyer    v.    Smith    (33    Ark.    627), 

1214,  1215. 
Meyer  v.  Thomas    (131   Ala.   65), 

32. 
Meyers  v.  Burns   (33  Barb.  N.  Y. 

401),  615. 
Meyers  v.  Sea  Beach  Ry.  Co.  (167 

N.  Y.  581),  1185. 
Michael  v.  Curtis   (60  Conn.  363), 

200. 
Michaels  v.  Fishel  (169  N.  Y.  381), 

459,  630. 


Michael  v.  O'Brien   (6  Misc.  Rep. 

408),   647. 
Michau  v.  Walsh  (6  Mo.  346),  672. 
Michigan   Central   R.   Co.    v.    Bul- 

lard    (120  Mich.  416),  924. 
Mickle  V.  Douglas    (75  Iowa,  78), 

211,  1286. 
Mickle  V.  Lawrence   (5  Rand.  Va. 

571),  243. 
Mickle  V.   Miles    (31   Pa.    St.   20), 

505. 
Midgett  V.  Brooks  (12  Ired.  L.  N. 

C.  145),  599. 
Middlebrook  v.  Corwin   (15  Wend. 

N.  Y.  169),  763.  1331,  1332. 
Middlekauf  v.  Smith  (1  Md.  329), 

879. 
Middleton's  Ex'rs  v.  Middleton   (35 

N.  J.  Eq.  141),  520. 
Miland  v.  Meiswinkel  (82  111.  App. 

522).  905. 
Miles  V.  Elkin   (10  Ind.  329),  317. 
Miles  V.  Murphy,  Jr.    (R.  5  C.  L. 

382),  171. 
Miles    Co.    V.    Gordon     (8    Wash. 

442),  292. 
Milford     V.     Holbrook     (9     Allen, 

Mass.  17),  813. 
Mill  Dam  Foundry  v.   Hovey    (21 

Pick.  Mass.  417),  467. 
Millard  v.  Baldwin  (3  Gray,  Mass. 

484),  533. 
Millard  v.  Robinson  (4  Hill,  N.  Y. 

604),  1444. 
Miller,    Ex   parte    (2    Hill,    N.    Y. 

418),  117. 
Miller  v.  Baker  (1  Met.  Mass.  27), 

132,  1260. 
Miller  v.  Bider   (105  N.  W.  Rep. 

594),  1426. 
Miller  v.  Bonsadon    (9  Ala.   317), 

923. 
Miller  v.   Bristol    (29   Mass.   550), 

445. 
Miller  v.  Fitzgerald  Dry  Goods  Co. 

(62  Neb.  270),  414,  419. 


clx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


[ FJiFEREK  CES    ARE    TO    PAGES.] 


Miller  v.   Hancock    (4   Rep.   478), 

814,  816. 
Miller  v.  Havens    (51  Mich.   482), 

1324. 
Miller  v.  Havens   (51  Mich.  999), 

665. 
Miller  v.  Hawes  (58  111.  App.  667), 

1094. 
Miller  v.  Hennessy  (94  N.  Y.  Supp. 

563),  1300. 
Miller  v.  Hine   (13  Ohio,  565),  24. 
Miller  v.  Johnson  (12  Wend.  N.  Y. 

197),  1444. 
Miller  v.  Lampson  (66  Conn.  432), 

168. 
Miller  v.  Lang  (99  Mass.  12),  964. 
Miller  v.  Maguire   (18  R.  I.  770), 

776,  1129,  1132,  1136,  1164. 
Miller   v.    Mainwaring    (Cro.    Car. 

397),  5,  229. 
Miller  v.  McArdell   (19  R.  I.  304), 

857,  879. 
Miller  v.  McBaier  (14  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

385),  243,  927. 
Miller   v.    Mitchell    (13    Ind.    App. 

190),  1161,  1175,  1180. 
Miller   v.    Morris    (55    Tex.    412), 

896. 
Miller  v.  Prescott  (163  Mass.  12), 

655,    723,   770. 
Miller  v.  Rinaldo   (47  N.  Y.  Supp. 

336), 859. 
Miller  v.  Sharp  (68  L.  J.  Ch.  322), 

389,  1384. 
Miller   v.   Turney    (13    Ark.    385), 

951. 
Miller    v.    Waddingham     (25    Pac. 

Rep.   689),  1243. 
Miller  v.  Warren  (182  N.  Y.  539), 

957,  1100. 
Millers  v.   Augusta    (63   Ga.   772), 

117. 
Millett    V.    Lagomarsino    (39    Pac. 

Rep.  308),  965. 
Millhouse  v.  Patrick  (0  Rich.  Law, 
S.  C.  350),  922,  948.  964. 


Milliken  v.  Faulk   (111  Ala.  658), 

392,  395. 
Milliken  v.  Thorndike   (103  Mass. 

382),   477. 
Milling  V.  Becker  (96  Pa.  St.  182), 

1207,  1208. 
Millot   V.    Conrad    (112    La.    928), 

1425. 
Mills  V.  Goff  (14  Mee.  &  Wei.  72), 

160. 
Mills  V.  Hamilton   (49  Iowa,  105), 

487. 
Mills   V.    Hoaton    (52    Iowa,    215), 

487. 
Mills    V.    Matthews    (7    Md.    315), 

1447. 
Mills   V.    Merryman    (49    Me.    65), 

49. 
Milltown  V.  Goodman,   Jr.    (R.   10 

C.  L.  27),  351. 
Milner  v.  Cooper   (65  Iowa,  190), 

1463. 
Milnes  v.  Branch  (5  M.  &  S.  411), 

488. 
Milnes    v.    Gerry    (14    Ves.    407), 

983,  1293. 
Milton    V.    Hayden    (32    Ala.    30), 

933. 
Minard   v.    Burtis    (83   Wis.    267), 

234. 
Miner  v.  Beekman   (11  Abb.  Prac. 

N.  Y.   147),   28. 
Miner    v.    Taggart    (3    Binn.    Pa. 

205),  1042. 
Minneapolis   Ry.   Co.   v.   Columbia 

R.  Mill  Co.   (119  U.  S.  149),  991. 
Minn.    Co-op.    Co.    v.    Williamson 

(51  Minn.  53),  1147,  1358. 
Minor  v.  Sharon   (112  Mass.  477), 

477,   795,  796,   1150. 
Minot  V.  Joy  (118  Mass.  308,  310), 

1020. 
Minshull  v.  Oakes  (2  H.  &  N.  793), 

1080. 
Minton  V.  Geiger    (28  L.  T.   449), 

398. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


clxi 


[P.p:rEREXCES    ARE    TO    PA(;ES.] 


Mirick  v.   Bashford    (38   Barb.  N. 

Y.  191),  878. 
Mirick  v.  Hoppin  (118  Mass.  582), 

30,  1136. 
Misamore's  Estate    (90  Cal.   169), 

51. 
Mississenewa    M.    Co.    v.    Andrew 

(22  Ind.  App.  523),  514. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Fullmore 

(26  S.  W.  Rep.  238),  682. 
Missouri,    Ky.    &    T.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Keahey    (S3    S.   W.   Rep.    1102), 

1098. 
Missouri    Pac.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Moffitt 

(94  Mo.  56),  443. 
Mitchell  V.  Badgett  (33  Ark.  387), 

279,1404. 
Mitchell  V.  Bartlett  (51  N.  Y.  447), 

34. 
Mitchell    V.    Billingsley    (17    Ala. 

391), 1259. 
l\Iitchell  V.  Blossom   (24  Mo.  App. 

48),  1198,  1223. 
Mitchell  V.  Commonwealth  (37  Pa. 

St.  187),  264. 
Mitchell  V.  Ball   (2  Har.  &  G.  Md. 

159),  552. 
Mitchell  V.  Hazen    (4  Conn.  495), 

599. 
Mitchell  V.  McNeal    (4  Colo.  App. 

136),  884. 
Mitchell  V.  Nelson  (13  S.  C.  105), 

907. 
Mitchell  V.  Pendleton  (21  Ohio  St. 

664),   573. 
Mitchell    V.    Plaut    (31    111.    App. 

148),  563,  877. 
Mitchell  V.  Printup   (48  Ga.  455), 

1291. 
Mitchell  V.  Read    (61  N.  Y.  123), 

1104. 
Mitchell  Y.  Ryan  (3  Ohio  St.  377), 

352. 
Mitchell  V.  Scott    (62  N.  H.  596), 

774. 
Mitchell  V.  State  (34  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

311),  778. 


Mitchell   V.    Stewart    (13    S.   &   R. 

Pa.  295),  1444. 
Mitchell  V.  United  States    (9  Fet- 
ters, U.  S.  711),  38. 
Mitchell    V.     Winslow     (2     Story, 

644),  1428. 
Mittelstadt    v.    Wulfers    (1    Misc. 

Rep.  215),  1157. 
Mixon  V.  Coffield    (24  N.  C.  301), 

1230. 
Mizner  v.  Moore   (10  Gray,  Mass. 

290),  213. 
Mobley  v.  Bruner  (59  Pa.  St.  481), 

90. 
Moderwell  v.  Mullison   (21  Pa.  St, 

257),  93. 
Moen  V.   Lillestal    (5  N.   D.   327), 

321. 
Moffat    V.    Henderson    (50    N.    Y. 

Super.  Ct.  R.  211),  1010. 
Moffatt  V.    Smith    (4   N.   Y.    126), 

877,  1113. 
Moffatt  V.  Strong  (22  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  Rep.  57),  564,  1178. 
Molineux   v.    Molineux    (Cro.    Jac. 

144),  634. 
Molitor  V.  Sheldon   (37  Kan.  246), 

445. 
:\Iolony  V.  Kernan   (2  Dr.  &  War. 

31),  474. 
Momrich   v.    Schwartz    (96   N.   W. 

Rep.  636),  1457. 
Montague  v.  Gay   (17  Mass.  439), 

491,  541. 
Montague    v.    Mial     (89    N.    Car. 

137),  1424. 
Montague  v.  Sewell   (57  Md.  412), 

277. 
Montanye    v.    Wallahan     (84     111. 

355),  341,  1171,  1182. 
Monck    V.    Geekle    (9    Ad.    &    EI. 

841),  130,  144. 
Monks  V.  Dykes  (4  M.  &  W.  507), 

282. 
Monroe  v.  Carlisle  (57  N.  E.  Rep. 

332),  798. 


clxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[refebences  are  to  pages.] 


Montecon  v.   Faures    (3  La.  Ann. 

43),  1068. 
j*Tontgomery   v.    Hamilton   County 

(76  Ind.  362),  1302. 
Montgomery  v.  Milliken    (9  Miss. 

495),  53. 
Montgomery    v.    Willis    (45    Neb. 

434),  141,  176. 
Moodle  v.  Garance  (3  Bulst.  153), 

541. 
Moody    V.    Cummiskey     (9    Pick. 

Mass.  104),  679. 
Moody  V.  Garnon    (3  Bulst.  153), 

541. 
Moody  V.  King  (74  Me.  497),  688. 
Moody  V.  Mathews   (7  Ves.  183), 

20. 
Moody  V.   Vandyke    (4   Binn.   Pa. 

31),  53. 
Moody  V.   Wright    (13   Met.  Mass. 

17),  1427. 
Moody's     Lessee     v.     Filmer     (3 

Grant  Cas.  Pa.  17),  53. 
Mooers   v.   Wait    (3   Wend.   N.   Y. 

104),  685,  717,  1300,  1336. 
Moore   v.   Beasley    (3   Ohio,   294), 

139,  141,  388,  950. 
Moore  v.  Boyd  (24  Me.  243),  214, 

216. 
Moore  v.  Chartiers  Water  Co.  (216 

Pa.  St.  467),  62. 
Moore  v.  Choat  (8  Sim.  508),  1107. 
Moore  v.  Faison  (97  N.  Car.  322), 

1439. 
Moore    v.    Fletcher    (16    Me.    63), 

437. 
Moore  v.  Foley  (6  Ves.  232),  1363, 

1372,  1374. 
Moore  v.  Fursden   (1  Show,  342), 

86. 
Moore  v.  Ferguson    (2   Munf.  Va. 

421),  22. 
Moore  v.  Gholson    (34  Miss.  372), 

105. 
Moore  v.  Goedell   (34  N.  Y.  527), 

838. 


Moore    v.    Goodwin    (161    Pa.    St. 

175),   1144. 
Moore  v.  Grey   (2  Ph.  717),  1107. 
Moore    v.    Guardian    Trust    Com. 

(173  Mo.  218),  1046. 
Moore  v,  Harter  (67  Ohio  St.  250), 

143. 
Moore  v.  Lawder   (1  Stark.  308), 

155. 
Moore   v.    Levert    (24    Ala.    310), 

870. 
Moore  v.  Mahney    (1  Mich.  N.  P. 

143),  1329. 
Moore  v.   Miller    (8   Pa.    St.   272), 

243. 
Moore  V.   Moore    (89   N.   W.   Rep. 

629),  1244. 
Moore    v.    Parker    (63    Kan.    62), 

789,  79L 
Moore    v.    Rawson    (3    Bar.    &    C. 

332),  409. 
Moore   v.    Smith    (56   N.   J.   Law, 

446),  230,  234. 
Moore  v.  Smith  (24  111.  512),  1254, 

1293. 
Moore    v.    Steljes    (69    Fed.    Rep. 

518),  831. 
Moore  v.  Titman  (44  111.  367),  30. 
Moore  v.  Weber   (71  Pa.  St.  429), 

848,  850,  874,  1157. 
Morecraft  v.   Menx    (1   Car.   &   P. 

346),   861. 
Morehouse   v.    Cotheal    (22    N.    J. 

Law,  521),  716. 
Moreland  v.  Myall   (14  Bush.  Ky. 

474),  22. 
Moreland    v.    Strong     (115    Mich. 

211),  84,  85. 
Morey    v.    Hoyt    (62    Conn.    542), 

1285. 
Moran    v.    Bergin    (111    111.    App. 

313),  1340. 
Morgan  v.   Blrnle    (9   Bing.    672), 

909. 
Morgan  v.  Bissell    (3  Taunt.   65), 

247. 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


clxiii 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


"Morgan  v.  Goldberg  (9  Misc.  Rep. 

N.  Y.  156),  1380. 
Morgan  v.  Griffiths  (23  L.  T.  783), 

382. 
Morgan   v.   Griffith    (40  L.   J.  Ex. 

46),  460. 
Morgan  v.  Moody   (6  Watts  &  S. 

Pa.  333),  1443. 
Morgan  v.  Morgan    (65  Ga.  493), 

1306. 
Morgan  v.  Powell    (7  Mann.  &  G. 

989),  64. 
Morgan    v.    Powers    (31    N.   Y.    S. 

954),  177. 
Morgan  v.   Slaughter    (1  Esp.   8), 

365,  607. 
Morgan  v.  Smith   (70  N.  Y.  537), 

1094,  1207,  1208,  1209,  1215. 
Morgan   v.   Yims    (97    S.    E.   Rep. 

832),   869. 
Moritz  V.  Miller  T87  Ala.  331).  32. 
Morrell    v.    Mackman    (24    Mich. 

279),  297. 
Morris  v.  Apperson  (13  S.  W.  Rep. 

441),  955. 
Morris  v.  Barry   (Wils.  1),  80. 
Morris  v.  Dayton   (84  N.  Y.  Supp. 

392),  1207. 
Morris  v.  Dayton   (86  N.  Y.  Supp. 

172),  1219. 
Morris  v.  De  Wolf    (11  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  701),  641. 
Morris  v.  Edington  (3  Taunt.  24), 

417,  422. 
Morris    v.    Kettle    (56    N.    J.    Eq. 

826),  404. 
Morris   v.   Kettle    (57  N.   J.  Law, 

218),  1176,  1177,  1180. 
Morris   v.   Manufacturing  Co.    (83 

Ala.  565),  742. 
Morris    v.    McKee    (96    Ga.    611), 

365. 
Morris  v.  Morris   (3  De  Gex  &  J. 

323),  726. 
Morris  v.  Niles  (12  Abb.  Pr.  N.  Y. 
103).  1113. 


Morris  v.  Palmer  (44  S.  Car.  462), 

186,  190,  193. 
Morris    v.    Parker    (1    Ashm.    Pa. 

187),  1084. 
Morris  v.  Summerl  (2  Wash.  C.  C. 

203),  1042. 
Morris    v.    Tillson    (81    111.    607), 

1131,  1136,  1137. 
Morris  v.   Wheat    (11   App.  D.   C. 

201),  948,  971. 
Morris    Canal    &    Banking    Co.    v. 

Mitchell     (31    N.    J.    Law,    99), 

204. 
Morrison    v.     Bassett     (26    Minn. 

235),  920. 
Morrison    v.    Chadwick    (7    C.    B. 

266),  1179,  1180. 
Morrison  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.    (117  Iowa.  587),  687. 
Morrison  v.  Galloway    (2  Har.  & 

J.  Md.  461),  601. 
Morrison  v.  Marquardt   (24   Iowa, 

35),  410. 
Morrison    v.    Rossingnol     (5    Cal. 

64),  1367,  1373. 
Morrison   v.    Smith    (90   Md.    76), 

641,  642,  644,  646. 
Morrison    v.    Sohn    (90    Mo.    App. 

76),   1205,   1240. 
Morrish,  Ex  parte  (22  Ch.  D.  410), 

650. 
Morrow,  Ex  parte  (17  Fed.  Cases, 

No.  9,850).  1407. 
Morrow  v.  Brady   (12  R.  I.  131), 

567. 
Morrow    v.    Williams    (14    N.    C 

264),  349. 
Morse  v.  Goddard   (13  Met.  Mass. 

177),   1171,   1182. 
Morse    v.    Merest    (6    Madd.    25), 

1293. 
Mortimer  v.  Brunner  (6  Bosw.  N. 

Y.  653),  1177. 
Mortimer  v.   Orchard    (2  Ves.   Jr. 

242),  1384. 
Morton  v.  Pinckney  (8  Bos.  N.  Y. 
135),  106L 


clxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED, 


[references    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Morton   V.    Weir    (70   N.   Y.    247), 

1280. 
Morton  v.   Woods    (L  R.    4   Q.   B. 

306),  207. 
Moser  v.  Lower  (48  Mo.  504),  310. 
Moses    V.    Loomis    (156    111.    892), 

654,  655. 
Mosher  v.   Yost    (33    Barb.   N.   Y. 

277),  47. 
Moshier  v.  Reding    (12  Me.   478), 

139,  155,  243,  920,  964. 
Moskowitz  V.   Diringen    (48   Misc. 

Rep.  543),  1240. 
Moss  Appeal  (35  Pa.  St.  162),  1441. 
Moss   V.    Barton    (35    Beav.    197), 

1375,  1377. 
Moss  V.  Gallimore   (1  Doug.  269), 

29. 
Moss  Point  Lumber  Co.  v.  Harri- 
son Co.   (89  Miss.  899),  718. 
Mostyn     (Lord)     v.     Fitzsimmons 

(71  L.  J.  K.  B.  89),  1389. 
Mott    V.    Palmer    (1    N.    Y.    564), 

1259. 
Mound    V.    Barker    (71    Vt.    253), 

772. 
Moule  V.  Garrett  (L.  R.  5  Ex.  132), 

1021,  1085. 
Moulton    V.    Robinson    (27    N.    H. 

550),  312,  763. 
Mcuntnoy   v.    Collier    (1   E.    &   B. 

630),  925. 
Mounts    V.    Goranson    (29    Wash. 

261),  156. 
Mowry    v.    Providence    (16    R.    L 

422),  71. 
Mowry   v.    AVhite    (21    Wis.    421), 

1427. 
Moyer  v.  Gordon    (113   Ind.   282), 
.  690. 
Moyer  v.   Mitchell    (53   Md.    171), 

848. 
Moynihan     v.     Allyn     (162    Mass. 

270),  788,  813,  815. 
Mudd's    Ex'rs    v.    Reed     (11    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  998),  15. 


Muernberger  v.  Von  Der  Heldt  (33 

111.  App.  404),  312. 
Mugford  V.   Richardson    (6   Allen, 

Mass.  76),  1298. 
Muhlenbrlnck  v.  Pooler   (40  Hun, 

526),   1371,   1373,   1375. 
Mulcahy  v.  Dry  Dock  Co.  (8  Daly, 

N.  Y.  93),  873. 
Mulhaupt  V.  Enders   (38  La.  Ann. 

744),  1464. 
Mulheisen   v.    Lane    (82    111.    117), 

1458. 
Mull  V.  Graham  (7  Ind.  App.  561), 

873. 
Mullen  V.  Pugh  (16  Ind.  App.  337), 

1276. 
Mullen  V.  Rainier   (45  N.  J.  Law, 

520),  782. 
Mullen    V.    Strieker    (19    Ohio    St. 

135).  409. 
Muller   V.    Brumer    (69    111.    108), 

15. 
Muller   V.    Kerler    (115    La.    783), 

852. 
Muller   V.    Minken    (5    Misc.    Rep. 

44),  810. 
Mulligan     v.     Hollingsworth     (99 

Fed.  Rep.  216),  649. 
Mumford  v.  Brown  (6  Cow.  N.  Y. 

475),  847,  874. 
Mumford  v.  Walker    (71  L.   J.  K. 

B.  19),  751. 
Muncey  v.  Dennis  (1  H.  &  N.  216), 

1314. 
Munday  v.  O'Neill    (44  Neb.  724), 

1325. 
Municipality   No.   2   v.   Curell    (13 

La.  318),  1023. 
Munroe  v.  Armstrong    (179  Mass. 

165),  1248.      • 
Munroe    v.     Carlisle     (176     Mass. 

199),  837. 
Munroe  v.  Perkins   (9  Pick.  Mass. 

298),  467. 
Munsell  v.  Carew    (2  Cush.  Mass.. 

50),  1427. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxv 


[EEFERENCES    ABE    TO    PAGES.] 


Munson    v.    Plummer     (59     Iowa, 

120),  204,  291. 
Munson    v.    Ray     (7    Black.    Ind. 

403),  243. 
Murdock  v.  Ratcliff  (7  Ohio  St.  1), 

42. 
Murphej^  v.   Illinois  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank   (58  Neb.  428),  874. 
Murphy  v.  Century  Bldg.  Co.    (90 

Mo.  App.   621),   633,   1185. 
Murphy  v.  Hopcraft  (142  Cal.  43), 

572. 
Murphy   v.    Hubbs    (8    Colo.    17), 

1301. 
Murphy  v.  Insurance  Co.    (61  Mo. 

App.  323),  1271. 
Murphy  v.   Marshall    (179   Pa.   St. 

516),  675,  1132. 
Murphy  v.  St.  Louis  Type  Foundry 

(29  Mo.  App.  541),  766. 
Murray    v.    Albertson     (50    N.    J. 

Law,  167),  782. 
Murray    v.    Armstrong    (11    Miss. 

209),  106,  159. 
Murray   v.    Cazier    (23    Ind.    App. 

600),  534. 
Murray  v.  Cherrington    (99  Mass. 

229),  191. 
Murray  v.  Emmons  (19  N.  H.  483), 

21. 
Murray  v.  Harway  (56  N.  Y.  337), 

1058. 
Murray  v.  Moross  (27  Mich.  203). 

1261,  1304. 
Murray    v.    Pennington     (3    Grat. 

Va.  91),  1173. 
Murrell  v.   Jackson    (33   La.   Ann. 

1342),  731. 
Murrell    v.    Lyon     (30    La.    Ann. 

255),  356. 
Musgrave    v.    Horner     (31    L.    T. 

632),  763. 
Mussey  v.  Holt  (24  N.  H.  248),  84. 
Mussey  v.  Scott   (32  Vt.  82),  237. 
Myer  Bros.'  Assignee  v.  Gaertner 

(21  Ky.  L.  R.  53),  1091. 


Myers   v.    Bolton    (89    Hun,    342), 

437. 
Myers  v.    Burns    (35   N.   Y.   269), 

536,  857,  876. 
Myers    v.    Estell    (48    Miss.    372), 

30,  32. 
Myers  v.  Gemmell  (10  Barb.  N.  Y. 

537),  411. 
Myers  v.  Hunt   (8  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

338),  1060. 
Myers  v.   Kingston  Coal  Co.    (126 

Pa.  St.  582),  373. 
Myers    v.    Merrell    (57    Ga.    516), 

883,  892. 
Myers  v.  Reade    (98   N.  Y.   Supp. 

620),  1012. 
Myer    v.    Roberts    (89    Pac.    Rep. 

1051),  296,  1331. 
Myers    v.    Rosenback     (25    N.    Y. 

Supp.  521),  477. 
Myers  v.  Smith  (29  Md.  91),  1461. 
Myer   v.    Whitaker    (55   How.    Pr. 

N.  Y.   376),  435. 
Myers    v.    White     (1    Rawle,    Pa. 

355),  31. 
Myerson  v.  Neff  (5  Ind.  523),  156. 
Myhre    v.     Schleuder     (98    Minn. 

234),  865. 


N. 


Nachbour  v.  Wiener   (34  111.  App. 

237),  382,  1195. 
Nadel    v.    Fichten    (34    App.    Div. 

188),  806. 
Nagel    V.    League     (70    Mo.    App. 

487),  653.  663. 
Naglee  v.  Ingersoll  (7  Pa.  St.  185), 

1160. 
Nahm   v.   Register    (27   Ky.    SS7), 

802. 
Naish    V.    Tatlock     (2    H.    Black, 

319),  576. 
Nail    V.    Cazenove    (4    East,    477), 

343. 
Nance  t.  Alexander  (49  Ind.  516), 

573. 


clxvi 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[eefebences 

Nash  V.  Beckman    (83   Ind.   536), 

146. 
Nash  V.  Grey  (2  P.  &  F.  391),  545. 
Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Heikens    (112  Tenn.  378),  1340. 
Nashville,  O.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Heik- 
ens   (79   S.  W.  Rep.   1038),  683, 

705,  721. 
Natelson  v.  Reich  (99  N.  Y.  Supp. 

327),  556. 
Nation   v.    Tozer    (1    C.    M.    &   R. 

172),  576. 
National  Lumber  Co.  v.  Bowman 

(77  Iowa,  706),  1448. 
National  Mahaiwe  Bank  v.  Hand 

(80  Hun,  584),  1042. 
National    Union    Bldg.    Ass'n    v. 

Brewer   (41  111.  App.  233),  195, 

1227. 
Naundorf  v.   Schuman    (41   N.   J. 

Eq.  14),  53. 
Nave  v.  Berry   (22  Ala.  382),  730, 

892,  1044. 
Neal  V.   Swind  or  Sweeney   (2  C. 

&  J.  377),  574. 
Neale   v.   Mackenzie    (1   M.   &  W. 

747),  1178,  1180. 
Neale  v.  Radcliffe  (15  Q.  B.  916), 

911. 
Neale  v.  Wyllie   (5  D.  &  R.  442), 

1080,  1097. 
Nedvidek  v.  Meyer   (46  Mo.  600), 

561. 
Neeb  v.  McMillan  (98  Iowa,  718), 

1432. 
Needy    v.    MiddlekaufE    (102    Md. 

181),   429,   454. 
Needham    v.    Allison     (24    N.    H. 

355),  1333. 
Needham    Piano   Co.    v.    Hollings- 

worth  (Tex.  40  S.  W.  Rep.  750), 

1440. 
Neeley  v.   Phillips    (70   Ark.   90), 

1453. 
Neglia  v.  Lielouka  (65  N.  Y.  Supp. 
500),  856. 


ABE   TO   PAGES.] 

Neidelet  v.   Wales    (16   Mo.   214), 

1340. 
Neiderstein   v.   Cusick    (81   N.   Y. 

Supp.  1058),  1395. 
Neifert   v.   Ames    (26   Kan.    515), 

1431. 
Neill  V.  Chessen  (15  111.  App.  266), 

491. 
Neiner  v.  Altemeyer  (68  Mo.  App. 

243),  554. 
Neiswanger    v.     Squier     (73     Mo. 

192),  1269,  1301. 
Nellis  V.  Lathrop  (22  Wend.  N.  Y. 

121),   541,  937. 
Nelson   v.   Brown    (140   Mo.    580), 

388. 
Nelson  v.  Goree's  Adm'r   (34  Ala. 

565),  10. 
Nelson    y.    Thompson    (23    Minn. 

508),  1198,  1199,  1210. 
Nelson    v.    Ware    (57    Kan.    670), 

155. 
Nelson's  Heirs  v.  Clay's  Heirs  (1 

J.  J.  Marsh.  Ky.  138),  91. 
Nesbit    V.    Godfrey    (155    Pa.    St. 

251),  346,  348. 
Nesbitt  V.  Bartlett  (14  Iowa,  485), 

1421,  1429. 
Nesham    v.    Selby    (41    L.    J.    Ch. 

173),  268. 
Nessley  v.  Ladd  (29  Or.  354),  971. 
Nestal  V.  Schmid    (39  N.  J.  Law, 

686),  320. 
Nestell  V.  Hewitt   (19  Abb.  N.  C. 

282),  279. 
Newall  V.  Wright   (3  Mass.  138), 

30,  541. 
Newberg  v.  Cowan  (62  Miss.  570), 

582. 
Newby  v.  Jackson  (1  B.  &  C.  448), 

198. 
Newby  v.  Sharpe  (8  Ch.  Div.  39), 

858,  1132. 
Newcomb    v.     Presbrey     (9     Met. 

Mass.  406),  599. 
Newcomb   v.    Stebbins    (99    Mass. 
616),  52. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxvii 


[references    ABE    TO   PAGES.] 


Newcome  v.  Emery  (Ky.  42  S.  W. 

Rep.  105),  471. 
Newell  V.  Gibbs  (1  Watts  &  S.  Pa. 

491),  920. 
NewhofE   V.    Mayo    (48    N.    J.    Eq. 

619),  963. 
Newman  v.  Anderson  (5  Bos.  &  P. 

224),  505. 
Newman    v.    Anderton    (2    W.   R. 

224),  282,  510. 
Newman  v.  Bank   (66  Miss.  323), 

1411,  1425,  1454. 
Newman  v.  French  (45  Hun,  N.  Y. 

65),  877,  867. 
Newman  v.  Keffer   (18  Fed.  Rep. 

695),  90. 
Newman  v.  Mackin  (21  Miss.  383), 

920,  943. 
Newman    v.    Metropolitan    El.    R. 

Co.   (10  N.  Y.  gt.  Rep.  12),  431. 
Newman  v.  Tolmie  (SO  N.  Y.  Supp. 

990),  454. 
Newman  v.  Tolmie   (81  App.  Div. 

Ill),  1369. 
Newman  v.  Ward   (46  S.  W.  Rep. 

868),  1457. 
Newmarch       v.       Brandling       (3 

Swanst.  99),  110. 
Newport   Illuminating   Co.    v.    As- 
sessors, etc.   (19  R.  I.  632),  442. 
Newron  v.  Calhoun  (68  Tex.  451), 

122. 
News  Co.  V.  Browne  (103  111.  317), 

562. 
Newstedt  v.  Scarborough  (13  Ohio 

Dec.  327),  335. 
Newton  v.  Allin    (1  G.  &  D.  44), 

1178. 
Newton   v.    Harland    (1   M.   &   G. 

644),  237. 
Newton  v.  Musen  (61  N.  Y.  Supp. 

61),  378. 
Newton  v.  Roe   (33  Ga.  163),  964. 
Newton    v.    Spearce    Laundry    Co. 

(19  R.  I.  546),  1207. 
New  York  v.  Kent  (5  N.  Y.  Supp. 

567),  72. 


New  York  v.  Mason   (9  N.  Y.  St. 

Rep.  282),  458. 
New  York  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Randall    (102  Ind.  453),  243. 
New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  B.  N. 

Y.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.   (49  Barb.  N. 

Y  501),  447. 
New  York  El.  R.  Co.  v.  Manhattan 

Ry.  Co.  (63  How.  Pr.  N.  Y.  14), 

70. 
New    York,    etc.    Co.    v.    Randall 

(102  Ind.  453),  243. 
New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.    (8 

Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  593),  361. 
New  York  Life  Ins.  &  Tr.  Co.  v. 

Rector   Ch.    (6i   How.    Pr.   Rep. 

511),  1387. 
New  York   R.   Est.   &   Bldg.    Imp. 

Co.   V.   Motley    (143   N.   Y.   156), 

1356. 
New  York  &  T,  Land  Co.  v.  Cru- 

ger    (Tex.   27   S.   W.   Rep.   212), 

564. 
New  Era  Mfg.  Co.  v.  O'Reilly  (197 

Mo.  466),  1144. 
New  Hampshire  Trust  Co.  v.  Tag- 

gart   (68  N.  H.  557),  1063. 
New    Ipswich    Factory    v.    Batch- 
elder  (3  N.  H.  190),  439. 
New     Jersey,     etc.     Co.     v.     Van 

Syckle  (37  N.  J.  Law,  495),  686. 
New    Orleans    v.    Darns     (39    La. 

Ann.  766),  731. 
New  Orleans  v.  Guillotte    (14  La. 

Ann.  875),  61. 
Niagara    Fire     Insurance    Co.     v. 

Bishop    (154   111.  9),  572. 
Nicholas     v.     Chamberlain     (Cro. 

Jac.  131),  446. 
Nicholes  v.   Smith   (118  Ga.  922), 

195. 
Nicholes  v.   Swift    (118   Ga.   922), 

523. 
Nicholl   V.   McKaeg    (10   B.   &   Cr. 

721),  186. 
Nicholls  V.  Atherstone    (10  Q.  B. 

944),  1213. 


clxviii 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED, 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Nicholls  V.  Barnes   (32  Neb.  195), 

194,  1405. 
Nicholls  V.  Barnes   (39  Neb.  103), 

328. 
Nicholls   V.    Byrne    (11   La.   O.    S. 

170),  1165. 
Nichols    V.    Dusenbury    (2    N.    Y. 

283),  563,  878. 
Nichols   V.    Luce    (24    Pick.   Mass. 

102),  439. 
Nichols  V.  Sargent   (125  111.  309), 

17. 
Nichols  V.  Williams  (8  Cow.  N.  Y. 

137),  204. 
Nicholson  v.  Smith    (52  L.  J.  Ch. 

191),   1382. 
Nicoll    V.    Burke    (78    N.   Y.    581), 

555,  857. 
Nicoll    V.    New   York   Cent.    R.   R. 

Co.  (12  N.  Y.  121).  61. 
ISTickells   v.   Atherstone    (10  Q.   B. 

944),  1199. 
Nicrosi  v.  Phillippi   (91  Ala.  299), 

928,  938. 
Nieland  v.  Mahnken   (85  N.  Y.  S. 

809),  1287. 
Nigro  V.  Hatch  (11  Pac.  Rep.  177), 

1249. 
Niles   V.    Gonzales    (82    Pac.   Rep. 

212),  940. 
Nimo  V.  Harway   (50  N.  Y.  Supp. 

686),  1347. 
Nimmo  v.  Harway   (23  Misc.  Rep. 

126),  852. 
Nindle  v.  Bank  (13  Neb.  245),  356. 
Nitroglycerine  Case    (15  Wall.   U. 

S.  524),  709,  73L 
Nixon   V.    Quinn    (Ir.    R.    2    C.    L. 

247),  579. 
Noble  V.  Becker   (3  Brewster,  Pa. 

550),  1051. 
Noble  V.  Tyler  (61  Ohio  St.  432),  5. 
Nobles  V.  McCarty  (61  Mi.ss.  456), 

277,  320,  1436. 
Nodine  v.  Richmond    (Oreg.  1906, 
87  Pac.  Rep.  775),  954. 


Noe    V.    Hodges    (22    Tenn.    162), 

326. 
Noe    V.    Layton    (89    S.    W.    Rep. 

1065),  1451. 
Noel  V.  Herman  Bencke  Lith.  Co. 

(134  N.  Y.  617),  1037. 
Noel  V.  McCrary   (7  Coldw.  Tenn. 

623),  140. 
Noke   V.   Awder   "(Cro.   Eliz.    373), 

618. 
Nokes   V.    Gibbons    (3    Derw.    68), 

667.  1038. 
Nonotuck    Silk    Co.    v.    Shay    (37 

111.   App.   542),   1154,  1155,  1344. 
Noonan   v.    Orton    (31   Wis.    265), 

617. 
Noonan    v.    Orton    (27   Wis.    300), 

617. 
Noonan    v.    Orton    (21    Wis.    283), 

617. 
Norcross   v.    Norcross    (105    Mass. 

265),  28. 
Norfleet    v.    Cromwell    (64    N.    C. 

1),915. 
Norman  v.  Wells  (17  Wend.  N.  Y. 

136),  615,  616. 
Norris  v.  Morrill    (43  N.  H.  213), 

178,  635. 
North    American    Tr.    Co.    v.    Bur- 
row  (68  Ark.  584),  35. 
North    Chicago    S.    R.    Co.    v.    Le 

Grand    Co.    (95    111.    App.    435), 

377.  646.  663,  1102,  1391. 
North  Haverhill  Water  Co.  v.  Met- 

calf  (63  N.  H.  427),  575. 
Northeastern  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schet- 

ter  (38  111.  166),  65. 
Northern  Trust  Co.  v.  Snyder  (76 

Fed.  Rep.  34),  1041. 
Northern  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bastian 

(15  Md.  494),  65. 
Northness  v.   Ilillstead    (87  Minn. 

304), 315. 
Northwestern  Gas  Co.  v.  Tiffin  (59 

Ohio  St.  420),  393,  1111. 
Norton  v.  Gale   (95  111.  533),  383. 

569.  1272. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cLxix 


[references  are  to  pages. 7 


Norton   v.    Herron    (1    Car.    &    P. 

648), 105. 
Norton   v.    Sanders    (1   Dana,   Ky. 

14), 953. 
Norton  v.   Snyder    (2   Hun,  N.  Y. 

82),  1392. 
Norton  v.  Vultee   (1  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  Rep.  427),  560. 
Norton  v.  Webster    (12  Ad.  &  El. 

442), 465. 
Norway    v.    Rowe    (19    Ves.    144), 

723, 1278. 
Norwood  V.   Byrd    (1   Rich.    S.   C. 

135), 462. 
Norwood  V.  Kirby   (70  Ala.  397), 

964. 
Noyaille  v.  Flight   (7  Beav.  521), 

892. 
Noyes  v.  Longhead  (9  Wash.  325), 

286,  347. 
Noyes  v.  Stillman    (24  Conn.  15), 

679,  683,  689. 
Nugent    V.    Riley     (1    Met.    Mass. 

117), 280. 
Nunn  V.  Fabian  (35  L.  J.  Ch.  140), 

389.1384. 
Nute  V.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co.  (6  Gray, 

Mass.   182),  572. 
Nye  V.  Patterson   (35  Mich.  413), 

1324. 
Nyquist    v.    Martin    (35    111.    App. 

623),  261. 


Oakes   v.    Aldridge    (46   Mo.    App. 

11),  33,  501,  976. 
Oakes  v.  Oakes  (16  111.  106),  519, 

573. 
Oakford  v.  Nirdlinger  (196  Pa.  St. 

162), 289. 
Oakford  v.  Nixon  (177  Pa.  St.  76). 

1129,1157. 
Oakley  v.  Monck  (3  H.  &  C.  706), 

7,141. 
Oakley  v.  Stanley  (5  Wend.  N.  Y. 

523),  446. 


Oastler  v.  Henderson   (46  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  607),  1207. 
Oates    V.    Frithe    (2    Rolle's    Abr. 

447), 529. 
Ober  V.   Brooks    (162   Mass.   102), 

630,999. 
Obermeyer  v.  Nichols  (6  Binn.  Pa. 

159), 601, 867. 
O'Brien   v.   Capwell    (59   Barb.   N. 

Y.  497),  782. 
O'Brien   v.    Cavanaugh    (61    Mich. 

368), 689. 
O'Brien    v.    Greenbaum    (4    N.    Y. 

Supp.  852),  826. 
O'Brien  v.   Smith    (59   Hun,   624), 

331,  674,  691,  1183,  1190. 
O'Brien  v.  Troxel   (76  Iowa,  760), 

146. 
Ocean  Grove  C.   M.  Ass'n  v.   San- 
ders    (54    Atl.    Rep.    448),    505, 

632. 
Ocean  Grove  Land  Ass'n  v.  Bert- 
hall  (62  N.  J.  Law,  88),  645. 
Ocean  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Hamilton   (112 

Ga.  901),  847. 
O'Connell   v.    McGrath    (14    Allen, 

Mass.  289),  770. 
O'Connor    v.    Andrews     (31    Tex. 

28), 800, 807. 
O'Connor    v.    Delaney    (53    Minn. 

247),  83. 
O'Connor     v.     IMemphis     (7     Lea, 

Tenn.  219),  699. 
O'Connor  v.   O'Connor    (19   W.   R. 

90), 541. 
O'Connor   v.    Schnepel    (33    X.    Y. 

Supp.  562).  865. 
Odd   Fellows'    Sav.    Bank   v.    Ban- 
ton   (46  Cal.  603),  390. 
Odell   v.   Durant    (62   N.   Y.    524), 

119, 120. 
Odell  V.  Solomon    (99  N.  Y.  635), 

859. 
O'Donnell  v.  Hitchcock  (118  Mass. 

401), 1253. 
O'Donnell  v.  Mclntyre   (US  N.  Y. 

156),4S4.v 


clxx 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[reierences  are  to  pages.] 


O'Donnell   v.    Rosenthal    (110    111. 

App.  225),  830. 
O'Dougherty  v.  Felt   (65  Barb.  N. 

Y.  220),  28. 
O'Dwyer  v.  O'Brien  (13  App.  Div. 

570), 802. 
Oehme  v.  Shotland  (90  N.  Y.  Supp. 

958), 753. 
Oetgen  v.  Ross  (47  111.  142),  975. 
Oettinger  v.  Levy  (4  E.  D.  Smith, 

N.  Y.  288),  856. 
Offterdinger  v.  Ford  (92  Va.  636), 

1465. 
Ofschlager  v.    Sinbeck    (50   N.  Y. 

Supp.  862),  302. 
Ogden   V.   Gety    (91   N.   Y.    Supp. 

664), 1014. 
Ogden  V.  Hater  (145  Pa.  St.  640), 

641,  643,  644. 
Ogden   V.    Jennings    (66   Barb.    N. 

Y.  301).  442,  446. 
Ogden   V.   Rowe    (3   E.   D.    Smith, 

N.  Y.  312),  595. 
Ogden  V.    Sanderson    (3   E.   D.   S. 

N.  Y.  166),  1130,  1177. 
Ogden  V.  Smith  (2  Paige  Ch.  N.  Y. 

195),  55. 
Ogilvie  V.  Hall  (5  Hill,  N.  Y.  84), 

1167. 
Ogilvie  V.  Foljambe  (17  R.  R.  13), 

386,387. 
Ogle  V.  Hubbel   (1  Cal.  App.  375), 

1003. 
O'Gorman    v.    Harby     (18     Misc. 

Rep.  228),  1143. 
O'Hara  v.  Jones  (46  111.  288),  1083. 
Ohio  V.  Shutt  (78  Tex.  375),  1439. 
Ohio  Oil  Co.  V.  Kelley  (6  Ohio  Ct. 

Dec.  470),  454. 
Ohl  V.  May  (5  Neb.  157),  391. 
Oil  Co.  V.  Wilson   (142  U.  S.  313), 

1122. 
O'Keefe     v.     Kennedy     (3     Cush. 

Mass.  325),  644,  1057. 
O'Kelly  V.  Ferguson   (49  La.  Ann. 

1230), 1454. 


Okie    V.    Person    (33    App.    D.    C- 

170),  1180,  1238. 
Okolona    Sav.    Inst.    v.    Trice    (60 

Miss.  202),  1441. 
Oland    V.     Burdwick     (Cro.    Eliz. 

461), 1310. 
Oloott  V.    Frazier    (5    Hill,   N.   Y. 

562), 1444. 
Oloott  V.   Rathbone    (5   Wend.   N. 

Y.  490),  547. 
Olden  V.   Sassman    (67   N.   J.   Eq. 

239),  1120,  1383,  1384,  1389. 
Oldewurtel  v.  Wiesenfeld   (97  Md. 

165),  1214,  1236. 
O'Leary  v.  Delaney   (63  Me.  584), 

847. 
Olin   v.   Rhoads    (61   N.   Y.   Supp. 

817), 839. 
Oliphant  v.  Richman  (67  N.  J.  Eq. 

286), 436. 
Oliver    v.    Dickinson     (100    Mass. 

114), 431. 
Oliver  v.  Gary  (42  Kan.  623),  944. 
Oliver  v.  Hook  (47  Md.  301),  445, 

446. 
Oliver  v.  Moore   (12  Heisk.  Tenn. 

482),  1445. 
Oliver   v.    Moore    (53    Hun,    472)^ 

283. 
Oliver    v.    Olmstead     (112     Mich. 

483), 436. 
Olmstead    v.    Dauphiny    (104    Cal. 

635), 562. 
Olsen  V.  Ausdal  (13  S.  D.  23),  315. 
Olson    V.    Schevlovitz    (86    N.    T. 

Supp.  834),  1155,  1176. 
Olson  V.   Schultz    (67  Minn.   494), 

871. 
Olson  V.  Upsahl   (69  Til.  273),  863. 
Ombony  v.  Jones    (19  N.  Y.  234), 

1244,   1264,   1269. 
Onderdonk  v.  Gray   (19  N.  J.  Eq. 

65),  30. 
Oneal   v.   Orr    (5   Bush.   Ky.    649), 

1278. 
O'Neil   V.   Flanagan    (2   Mo.   App. 

Rep.  884),  1340,  1354. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxi 


[REFERE^-CES    ARE    TO   PAGES.] 


O'Neill    V.    Manget    (44    Mo.    App. 

279),  1140,  1142. 
O'Neill  V.   Morris    (28  Misc.  Rep. 

613),  34. 
Oneto    V.    Restano    (89    Cal.    63), 

348. 
Onslow  V.   Carrie    (2   Madd.   330), 

518. 
Oppenheimer  v.   Clunie    (142   Cal. 

313), 469. 
Oriental    Investment    Co.    v.    Bar- 
clay   (Tex.   Civ.   App.   64    b.    W. 

Rep.  80),  932. 
Orleans   Theatre   Co.   v.   Lafferan- 

diere  (12  Rob.  La.  472),  1182. 
Ormer  v.  Harley  (102  Iowa,  150), 

83. 
Ormond  v.  Anderson   (2  Ball  &  B. 

370), 982. 
Orne,   In   re    (12   Fed.   Rep.    779), 

1121. 
Orphan  Asylum  Society  v.  Water- 
bury  (8  Daly,  N.  Y.  35),  453. 
Orrell  v.  Bay  Mfg.  Co.    (Miss.   40 

So.  Rep.  429),  113. 
Orthwein    v.    Thomas    (13    N.    E. 

Rep.  564),  975. 
Orton   V.   Noonan    (27    "Wis.    272), 

1363,  1373. 
Osborne  v.  Butcher  (26  N.  J.  Law, 

308), 439. 
Osborn    v.    Carden    (Plowd.    293), 

12. 
Osborn  v.  Etheridge  (13  Wend.  N. 

Y.  339),  877. 
Osborn  v.  Nicholson   (13  Wall.  U. 

S.  657),  700. 
Osborn  v.  Wise    (7  C.  &  P.  761), 

110. 
Osgood  V.  Dewey  (13  Johns.  N.  Y. 

240),  561,  950,  951. 
Osgood   V.    Howard    (6    Me.    452), 

1244. 
Oshinsky  v.   Greenberg    (39   Misc. 

Rep.  342),  1205. 
O'Sillivan  v.  Norwood  (8  N.  Y.  St. 

Rep.  3S8),  814. 

1 


Osmers  v.  Furey   (32  Mont.  581), 

1157. 
Ostner  v.  Lynn  (57  Mo.  App.  187), 

522. 
Ostrander  v.  Livingston    (3  Barb. 

Ch.  N.  Y.  416),  999. 
Oswald  V.  Fratenburgh   (36  Minn. 

270), 1094. 
Oswald   V.    Gilbert    (11    Johns.   N. 

Y.  443),  1024. 
Oswald  V.  Godbold   (20  Ala.  811), 

560. 
Otis,  In  re   (101  N.  Y.  580),  1123. 
Otis    V.    McMillan     (70    Ala.    46), 

485,  491,  934,  1195,  1228,  1231. 
Otis    V.    Northrop     (2    Miles,    Pa. 

350), 1274. 
Otis  V.   Sill    (8  Barb.  N.  Y.  162), 

1427. 
Ottens  V.  Fred  Krug  Brew.  Co.  (58 

Neb.  331),  550. 
Ottinger    v.    New    York    Elevated 

Co.   (60  Hun,  5^3),  680. 
Otto  V.  Kreiter  (110  Pa.  St.  370), 

438. 
Ottumwa  Woolen  Mill  Co.  v.  Haw- 
ley  (44  Iowa,  57),  442,  1244. 
Outhwaite    v.    Luntley    (4    Camp. 

179), 343. 
Outtoun    V.    Dulin    (72    Md.    536), 

939. 
Overbach    v.    Heermance     (Hopk. 

Ch.  N.  Y.  337),  15. 
Overby   v.    Overby    (18    La.    Ann. 

546).  100. 
Overdeen  v.  Lewis  "(1  Watts.  &  S. 

Pa.  90).  201. 
Overmann    v.    Sasser    (107    N.    C. 

432).  1250. 
Overton    v.    Alpha    (13    La.    Ann. 

558), 1274. 
Overton    v.    Matthews     (35     Ark. 

147). 343. 
Owen   v.   Brookport    (208   111.   35), 

943. 
Owen   V.   Herzikoff    (84  Pac.   Rep. 

274), 538. 


cLxxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[referexces  are  to  pages.] 


Owen   V.    Iglanor    (4   Cold.    Tenn. 

15), 1445. 
Owens  V.   Cowan    (7  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

152), 53. 
Owens    V.    Lewis     (46    Ind.    488), 

1306. 
Owens    V.    Shovlen    (116    Pa.    St. 

371), 1444. 
Owens    V.    Wight    (18    Fed.    Rep. 

865), 697. 
Owings    V.    Emery     (6    Gill.    Md. 

260), 710. 
Owings  V.  Jones  T9  Md.  108),  825. 
Oxford  V.  Ford   (67  Ga.  362),  319. 
Oxford    Corporation    v.    Crow    (3 

Ch.  535),  259. 
Oxley  V.  James  (13  Mee.  &  W.  209), 

129 


Pabst   V.    Rochester   L.aunary   Co. 

(171  N.  Y.  584),  1080. 
Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  Thorley  (127 

Fed.  Rep.  439),  700. 
Pace  V.    Goodson    (56    S.    E.    Rep. 

363), 515. 
Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Kimball 

(114  Cal.  414),  72. 
Pacific  Express  Co.  v.  Haven    (41 

La.  Ann.  811),  697. 
Packard  v.  Chicago  Title  &  Trust 

Co.   (67  111.  App.  598),  1409. 
Packard  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  Co.  (46 

111.  App.  244),  195,  197,  223. 
Packard    v.    Corporation    of   Prot. 

Ch.   (77  Md.  240),  277. 
Packer  v.  Cockayne   (3  G.  Greene, 

Iowa,  111),  554,  1222. 
Packington's    Case    (3    Atk.    215), 

711. 
Padalford    v.    Padalford    (7    Pick. 

Mass.  152),  716. 
Page  V.  Culver  (55  Mo.  App.  606), 

491,  1111,  1112. 
Page   v.   Esty    (54   Me.    319),   490, 

1373. 


Page  V.    Hughes    (2    B.   Mon.   Ky. 

439),  990,  1382. 
Page  v.  Kinsman   (43  N.  H.  328), 

923. 
Page    V.    Lashley    (15    Ind.    152), 

491. 
Page  V.  Mann  (6  L.  J.  O.  S.  K.  B. 

63),  1213,  1214. 
Page   V.    McGlinch    (63    Me.    472), 

258. 
Page  V.   Street   (Speers,  S.  C.  Eq. 

159), 303. 
Paget  V.  Gee   (Ambl.  198),  539. 
Paige  V.  Perno   (10  Vt.  491),  549. 
Paige    V.    Scott's    Heirs    (12    La. 

490),  258. 
Paige  V.  Wright    (14  Allen,  Mass. 

182), 206. 
Paine  v.  Mason   (7  Ohio  St.  198), 

1108. 
Paine   v.    McDowell    (71    Vt.    28), 

1297. 
Paine  v.  Rector  (7  Hun,  N.  Y.  89), 

1276. 
Paine    v.    Sykes    (72    Miss.    351), 

1083. 
Palethorp  v.   Bergner    (52   Pa.   St. 

149),  897. 
Palethorpe      v.      Home      Brewery, 

Lim.   (75  L.  J.  K.  B.  55),  752. 
Palmer    v.    Cheseboro     (55    Conn. 

114), 14. 
Palmer    v.    City    Livery    Co.     (98 

Wis.  33),  652. 
Palmer    v.    Elkins    (2    Ld.    Rayd. 

1550), 953. 
Palmer  v.  Fletcher   (1  Lev.  132), 

409. 
Palmer  v.  Ford   (70  111.  269),  665. 
Palmer  v.  Marquette,  etc.  Co.    (32 

Mich.  274),  386. 
Palmer    v.    Myers     (79     111.    App. 

409), 1213. 
Palmer   v.    Nelson    (76    Ga.    803), 

938. 
Palmer  v.  Palmer  (13  Gray,  Mass. 

326),  52.  ' 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxiii 


[beferexces  are  to  pages.] 


Palmer  v.  Sanders   (49  Fed.  Rep. 

144),  461. 
Palmer  v.   Steiner    (68   Ala.   400), 

.53,  54. 
Palmer  v.  Wetmore   (2   Sandf.  N. 

Y.  316),  411,  1140,  1160. 
Palmer   v.    Young    (108    111.    App. 

252),  672,  723. 
Pamphere  v.  Lowe    (3   Neb.   131), 

1434. 
Panton    v.    Isham     (1    Salk.    19), 

223. 
Panton   v.   Jones    (3    Camp.    372), 

578. 
Pappe  V.  Trout   (3  Okl.  J60),  152. 
Paradine  v.  Jane  (Aleyn,  27),  882. 
Parish    v.    Rogers    (20    App.    Div. 

279), 119. 
Parish  v.  Stryker   (41  N.  Y.  480), 

120. 
Parish  v.  Vance  (110  111.  App.  50), 

442,426. 
Parker  v.  Brown   (136  N.  C.  280), 

311,315. 
Parker  v.   Gibbins    (1  Q.  B.  421), 

1344. 
Parker   v.    Hale    (78    S.    W.    Rep. 

555),  315. 
Parker    v.    Mollis    (50    Ala.    411), 

378. 
Parker  v.  McLaughlin  (1  Jr.  L.  R. 
.     N.  S.  186), 941. 
Parker     v.     Meadows     (86     Tenn. 

181),  869,  880. 
Parker  v.  Mott  (43  App.  Div.  338), 

312,314. 
Parker  v.  Raymond   (14  Mo.  535), 

723. 
Parker    v.     Shackelford     (61    Mo. 

68),  680. 
Parker  v.  Taswell    (2  De  G.  &  J. 

559), 332. 
Parker  v.  Whyte  (1  H.  &  M.  167), 

740,  758,  767. 
Parker   v.    Winslow    (7    El.    &    B. 

492),  105. 


Parker  v.  Wulstein    (48  N.  J.  Eq. 

94),  1281. 
Parker's  Appeal    (5   Pa.   St.   390), 

1444. 
Parkhurst    v.    Van    Cortlandt    (14 

.Johns.  N.  Y.  15),  386. 
Parkman  v.  Aicardi  (34  Ala.  393), 

757. 
Parks  V.  City  of  Boston   (15  Pick. 

Mass.  198),  681. 
Parks    V.    Hays    (92    Tenn.    161), 

634. 
Parks  V.   Simpson    (124   Ga.   523), 

1420. 
Parrot  v.  Anderson   (7  Exch.  93), 

548. 
Parrott  v.  Barney   (Fed.  Gas.  No. 

10,773),  709,  721. 
Parrott  v.  Hungelburger  (9  Mont. 

52H).  924,  942. 
Parry    v.     Harbett     (Dyer,     45b), 

1054. 
Parry  v.   Hodgson    (2   Wils.   129), 

13. 
Parsell  v.  Stryker  (41  N.  Y.  480), 

503. 
Parsons  v.  Johnson  (68  N.  Y.  62), 

445. 
Partington   v.   Woodcock    (5    Nev, 

&  Man.  672),  31. 
Parton    v.    Smith    f66    Iowa,    75), 

321. 
Pascieszeuy  v.  Boydell   (146  Mich. 

223),  820. 
Pastor  V.  Jones  (3  N.  C.  215),  884. 
Patchin's  Ex'rs  v.   Dickerson    (31 

Vt.  666),  1238. 
Pate   V.    Oliver    (104    N.    C.    458), 

1234. 
Pate  V.  Turner  (94  N.  C.  47),  922. 
Patten  v.  Deshon    (1  Gray,  Mass. 

325),  494,  1021,  1049,  1085. 
Patterson    v.    Ackerson     (1    Edw. 

Ch.  N.  Y.  96),  892,  1340,  1345. 
Patterson    v.     Emerick     (21     Ind. 

App.  614),  1215. 


clxxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Patterson    v.     Graham     (140     111. 

531),  403,  416,  442,  1129,  1130. 
Patterson  v.  Hansel   (4  Bush,  Ky. 

654), 965. 
Patterson  v.  Pease   (5  Ohio,  190), 

333. 
Patterson    v.    O'Hara     (2    E.    D. 

Smith,  N.  Y.  58),  463,  550. 
Patterson    v.    Stoddard     (47    Me. 

355),  198,  199,  319,  561. 
Pattison   v.   Hull    (9    Cow.   N.   Y. 

747), 336. 
Paul    V.    Chickering     (117    Mass. 

265), 1020. 
Pauley  v.   Steam   Gauge  Co.    (131 

N.  Y.  90),  915. 
Pawley  v.  Walker   (5  T.  R.  373), 

760. 
Paxson   V.   Potter    (30   Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  615),  1342. 
Paxton  V.  Kennedy  (70  Miss.  865), 

1414. 
Paxton  V.   Meyer    (58   Miss.   445), 

1439. 
Payne  v.  Burridge    (13  L.  J.  Ex. 

119), 1028. 
Payne  v.  Haine  (16  M.  &  W.  541), 

889, 893. 
Payne  v.  Harris  (3  Strobh.  Eq.  S. 

C.  39),  42. 
Payne  v.  Irvin  (144  111.  482),  810. 
Payne  v.  James  (45  La.  Ann.  381), 

878, 1359. 
Payne  v.  Still  (10  Wash.  433),  28. 
Payton    v.    Sherburne     (15    R.    I. 

215), 219, 233. 
Payton  v.  Stath   (Pet.  U.  S.  485), 

182. 
Peacock  v.  Dickenson  (2  Car.  &  P. 

51), 538. 
Peacock  v.  Ruffun  (6  Esp.  4),  159. 
Peale's  Adm'r  v.  Thurman  (77  Va. 

753), 15. 
Pearce  v.  Cheslyn  (5  N.  &  M.  {\r>2), 

257. 
Pearce  v.  Golden    (8  Barb.   N.  Y. 

522), 1276. 


Pearce  v.  Nix    (34  Ala.  183),  924. 
Pearce   v.   Pearce    (184   111.    289), 

315. 
Pearce  v.  Shard  (6  L.  J.  O.  S.  K. 

B.  354),  1097. 
Pearce   v.   Turner    (150   111.    116), 

1374. 
Pearcy  v.   Henley    (82    Ind.    129), 

24. 
Pearse  v.  Boultor  (2  F.  &  P.  133), 

175. 
Pearson  v.  Davis    (41   Neb.   608), 

333. 
Pearson  v.  Friedensville  Zinc  Co. 

(1  Pa.  Ct.  Ct.  Rep.  660),  1331. 
Pearson    v,    Sanderson     (128    111. 

88), 1272. 
Pease   v.    Christ    (31    N.    Y.    141), 

1089. 
Pease  v.  Coats  (12  Jur.  N.  S.  684), 

749. 
Peck   V.    Christman    (94    111.   App. 

435), 1020. 
Peck   V.    Hiller    (31    Barb.    N.   Y. 

117), 1132, 1138. 
Peck  V.   Ingersoll    (7  N.  Y.   528), 

544,1205. 
Peck  V.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  (18 

Hun,  183),  34,  1222. 
Peck   V.   Ledwidge    (25    111.    109), 

1340. 
Peck  V.  Lloyd  (38  Conn.  566),  445. 
Peck  V.  Northrop   (17  Conn.  217), 

491,  499,  1112. 
Peck  V.  Scoville  (43  111.  App.  360), 

903. 
Peck  V.  Ward  (18  Pa.  St.  5061,24. 
Pedderick  v.  Searle  (5  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

236), 951. 
Peddicord  v.  Berk   (74  Kan.  236), 

95. 
Peehl  V.  Bumtialek   (99  Wis.  62), 

158,  162,  172. 
Peer  v.  O'Leary  (28  N.  Y.  S.  687), 

216,219. 
Peer  v.  Wadsworth    (67  N.  J.  Eq. 

191),712,  756, 1098. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxv 


[befekences 

Peers  v.  Sneyd  (17  Beav.  151),  97. 
Pegg   V.    Wisden    (16    Beav.    243), 

978. 
Peil  V.  Reinhart  (127  N.  Y.  381), 

814,  817. 
Pelan  v.  De  Bevard  (13  Iowa,  53), 

1283. 
Pelican   Co.,   In   re    (47   La.   Ann. 

935), 341. 
Pellew    V.    Wonford     (9    Barn.    & 

Cress.  134),  348. 
Pelton  V.  Draper  (61  Vt.  364),  313. 
Pelton  V.  Place  (71  Vt.  430),  1213. 
Pemberton  v.  King  (2  Dev.  N.  C. 

376), 1250. 
Pence  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  R.  Co. 

(28  Minn.  488),  1050. 
Pence  v.  Williams    (14   Ind.  App. 

86), 922. 
Pendill    v.    Fells   "(67   Mich.    657), 

496.  1113,  1141. 
Pendill   v.    Maas    (97   Mich.    215), 

454,1408. 
Pendill    v.    Neuberger    (67    Mich. 

562), 345. 
Pendill  v.  Union  Mining  Co.    (64 

Mich.  172),  554,  634. 
Penfold  V.  Abbott   (32  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

67),  6,  1171. 
Pengra    v.    Munz    (29    Fed.    Rep. 

830), 921. 
Penn   v.    Brashear    (65   Mo.   App. 

24),  361. 
Penn    v.    Kearney    (21    La.    Ann. 

23),  1346,  134^7. 
Penn  v.  Preston  (2  Rawle,  Pa.  14), 

602. 
Pennant's  Case   (3  Coke,  64),  639. 
Pennewell,   In   re    (119   Fed.   Rep. 

139),  623,  1055. 
Penniall    v.    Harborne    (11    Q.    B. 

368), 1038. 
Pennington     v.     Baehr     (48     Cal. 

565), 826. 
Pennington   v.   Taniere    (12   Q.   B. 

998),  8,  147. 


AKE    TO    PAGES.] 

I   Pennoch   v.    Coe    123    How.   U.    S. 

117), 1428. 
I   Pennock  v.  Lyons   (118  Mass.  92), 

645, 1059. 
Pennoyer  v.  Neff   (95  U.   S.   714), 

1401. 
Pennsylvania    Iron    Co.    v.    Deller 

(113  Pa.  St.  635),  294. 
Pennsylvania    R.    R.    Co.    v.    St. 

Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (118 

U.  S.  290),  71. 
Penruddock  v.  Newman    (1  Leon, 

279), 1197. 
Penton  v.  Barnett   (67  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

11), 662. 
Penton    v.    Hobart    (2    East,    88), 

1260,  1265,  1269. 
Pentz    V.    Keuster    (41    Mo.    447), 

934. 
People  V.  Annis    (45  Barb.   N.  Y. 

304),  303,  307. 
People  V.  Ainslie   (76  N.  Y.  574), 

927. 
People  V.  Darling  (47  N.  Y.  666), 

159. 
People  V.  Erwin    (4  Denio,  N.  Y. 

126), 778. 
People  V.  Freeman  (110  App.  Div. 

605), 658. 
People  V.  Gillis    (24  Wend.  N.  Y. 

201), 246. 
People  V.  Haskins  (7  Wend.  N.  Y. 

43), 507. 
People  V.  Kelsey   (38  Barb.  N.  Y. 

269), 245. 
People  V.  Kerrains  (60  N.  Y.  221), 

305. 
People  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.    (57 

111.  436),  449. 
People  V.  National  Tr.  Co.   (82  N. 

Y.  283),  70. 
People  V.  O'Melia    (67  Hun,  653), 

778. 
People  V.  Robertson  (Barb.  N.  Y. 

9),  356. 
People    V.    St.    Nicholas    Bank    (3 

App.  Div.  544),  244,  246. 


clxxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


People's    St.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Spencer 

(156  Pa.  St.  85),  1000. 
People's  Loan  &  Building  Ass'n  v. 

Whitmore  (75  Me.  117),  927. 
Pepper   v.    Rowley    (73    111.    262), 

563,1183. 
Pepper's  Adm'r  v.  Harper  (20  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  837),  329. 
Peralta  v.  Ginochio  (47  Cal.  459), 

923. 
Pere  Marquette  R.  Co.  v.  Wabash 
R.    Co.    (104    N.    W.    Rep.    650), 
454. 
Perez   v.   Rabaud    (76   Tex.    191), 

848. 
Perkerson  v.   Snodgrass    (85   Ala. 

137), 491. 
Perkins  v.   Carr    (44   N.   H.   118), 

1331. 
Perkins  v.   Giles    (50  N.  Y.   228), 

571. 
Perkins  v.  Governor   (Minor,  Ala. 

352),  938. 
Perkins  v.   Hadsell    (50   111.   216), 

981. 
Perkins   v.    Perkins    (5    Atl.    Rep. 

373), 189. 190. 
Perkins    v.     Perkins     (Cro.     Eliz. 

269), 1194. 
Perkins   v.    Potts    (52    Neb.    110), 

484,  922,  964. 
Perkins  v.  Swank   (43  Miss.  349), 

1250,  1260. 
Perkins  v.  Washington  Ins.  Co.  (4 

Cow.  N.  Y.  645),  1042. 
Perniciaro   v.    Veniero    (90    N.   Y. 

Supp.  369),  1180. 
Perrett  v.  Dupre  (3  Rob.  La.  52), 

875. 
Perrin  v.  Repper    (34  Mich.  292), 

1112. 
Perrin    &    Smith    Printing   Co.    v. 
Cook,   etc.   Co.    (93    S.    W.    Rep. 
337), 1123. 
Perring  v.  Brooke  (1  Mood.  &  Ry. 
510),  251. 


Perrott  v.  Shearer   (17  Mich.  48), 

771. 
Perry  v.  Bailey   (94  Me.  50),  679, 

680. 
Perry  v.  Davis  (3  C.  B.  N.  S.  769), 

658. 
Perry  v.  Hamilton  (138  Ind.  271), 

1317. 
Perry    v.    Perry    (127    N.    C.    23), 

1435. 
Perry  v.  Rockland  &  R.  Lime  Co. 

(94  Me.  325),  1377,  138L 
Perry  v.  Waggoner   (68  Iowa,  403), 

1421,1434. 
Perry  v.  Wall    (68   Ga.   70),  1130. 
Pesant    v.    Heartt    (23    La.    Ann. 

292), 852. 
Peter  v.  Kendall   (6  B.  &  C.  703), 

110,1208. 
Peters    v.    Barnes    (16    Ind.    210), 

1193. 
Peters  v.  Blake  (170  111.  304),  216. 
Peters   v.   Elkins    (14   Ohio,    344), 

31,288. 
Peters  v.  Grubb   (21  Pa.  St.  455), 

438,  442. 
Peters  v.  Newkirk   (6  Cow.  N.  Y. 

103), 1199. 
Peters  -v.    Stone    (193   Mass.    179), 

1282.1283. 
Peterson    v.    Edmonson     (5    Har. 

Del.  378),  1155,  1340. 
Peterson  v.  Kinkead  (92  Cal.  372), 

938. 
Peterson    v.    Smart    (70    Mo.    38), 

913. 
Peticolas  v.  Thomas    (9   Tex.  Civ. 

App.  442),  856. 
Petre  v.   Ferrers    (61  Law  J.  Ch. 

426), 1299. 
Petrie  v.   Wright    (14   Miss.    647), 

65. 
Petsch   V.    Biggs    (31   Minn.    392), 

172. 
Pettee  v.   Hawes    (13   Pick.   Mass. 
323),  438. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxvii 


[REI  EKKXCES    ARE    TO    PAGES.] 


Pettengill  v.  Evans  (5  N.  H.  54), 

212,222. 
Petterson   v.   Sweet    (13    111.    App. 

255), 924. 
Pettibone  v.  Moore  (73  Hun,  461), 

253. 
Pettibone   v.    Smith    (150    Pa.    St. 

US),  1023. 
Pettigrew   v.   Mills    (36   Kan.   745, 

147),  920. 
Petty  V.  Kennon  (49  Ga.  468),  195. 
Petty  V.    Maier    (10   B.   Mon.    Ky. 

591), 234. 
Pettygrove  v.  Rothschild  (2  Wash. 

St.  6),  647. 
Petz  V.  Voight  Brewing  Co.    (116 

Mich.   418),  873. 
Pevey  v.  Skinner  (116  Mass.  129), 

413. 
Pewaukee    Milling    Co.    v.    Howitt 

(86  Wis.  270),  295,  1302. 
Peyton  v.  Stith  (5  Pet.  U.  S.  484), 

953,958.970. 
Pfanner  v.  Sturmer   (40  How.  Pr. 

N.  Y.  401),  191,  1306. 
Phalen  v.  Dinger   (4  E.  D.  Smith, 

N.  Y.  379),  592. 
Pharis    v.    Jones    (122    Mo.    125), 

958. 
Phelan  v.   Boylan    (25   Wis.   679), 

712. 
Phelan    v.    Fitzpatrick    (74    N.    E. 

Rep.  326),  835,  847. 
Phelan  v.  Tedcastle   (15  L.  R.   Ir. 

169),  259,  387. 
Phelps  V.  City  of  New  York    (61 

Hun,  521),  1369. 
Phelps  V.  Randolph  (147  111.  335), 

690. 
Phelps    V.    Taylor     (23    La.    Ann. 

585), 958. 
Phene  v.  Popplewell    (12  C.  B.  N. 

S.  334),  1207. 
Philadelphia  v.  Reeves  (48  Pa.  St. 

472). 609. 
Philadelphia,  etc.  Co.  v.  Baltimore 

City   (50  Md.  397),  1019. 


Phillbrook    v.    Emswiler    (92    Ind. 

590), 458. 
Phillips    V.    Aurora    Lodge,    I.    O. 

G.  T.   (87  Ind.  505),  62. 
Philips    V.    Butler    (2    Esp.    589), 

172. 
Phillips  T.   Burrows    (2   Mo.   App. 

Rep.  1001),  1096,  1423. 
Phillips  V.  Castley   (40  Ala.  486), 

462. 
Phillips  V.  Covert  (7  Johns.  N.  Y. 

1),222. 
Phillips  V.  Eastern  Railway   (138 

Mass.  122),  61. 
Phillips  V.  Everard   (5  Sim.  102), 

1395. 
Phillips    V.    Fearnside     (4    Hayw. 

Tenn.  158),  196. 
Phillips  &  Butorff  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Whit- 
ney (109  Ala.  645),  66. 
Phillips  V.  Library  Co.    (55  N.  J. 

Law,  307),  836,  816. 
Phillips     V.     Maxwell      (1     Baxt. 

Tenn.  25),  1430. 
Phillips  V.  Monges   (4  Whart.  Pa. 

226),  140,  564,  855. 
Phillips    V.    Mosely    (1    Car.    &   P. 

262), 511. 
Phillips  V.  Rathwell   (4  Bibb.  Ky. 

33), 945. 
Phillips   V.    Robertson    (65    Hayw. 

Tenn.  101),  922. 
Phillips    V.    Smith    (14    M.    &    W. 

590), 710. 
Phillips  V.  Stevens  (16  Mass.  238), 

882,  892,   1346,   1351. 
Phillips   V.   Tucker    (3    Ind.    132), 

621,  638,  665,  1322. 
Phillips    V.    Vandergrift    (146    Pa. 

St.  347),  641. 
Philpot    V.    Hoare    (2    Atk.    219), 

1067. 
Phinney     v.     Foster     (189     Mass. 

182), 1008. 
Phipps     V.     Ingraham     (41     Miss. 

256), 384. 


clxxviii 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Phipps  V.  ScultKorpe  (1  B.  &  Aid. 

50),  188,  576,  578. 
Phoenixville  v.    Walters    (147    Pa. 

St.  501),  172. 
Phyfe  V.  Warden   (5  Paige,  N.  Y. 

279), 1104. 
Pickens  v.   Bozell    (11    Ind.   275), 

5G3. 
Pickens  v.   Reed    (1   Swan.  Tenn. 

86), 1316. 
Pickens  v.  Webster   (31  La.  Ann. 

870), 1318. 
Pickerel  v.  Carson   (8  Iowa,  544), 

1243. 
Pickering  v.  Moore  (67  N.  H.  532), 

1333. 
Pickering  v.  O'Brien  (23  Pa.  Supr. 

Rep.  125),  213. 
Pickering  v.  Pickering    (11  N.  H. 

141),  90. 
Pickett  V.  Ferguson  (45  Ark.  177), 

697,1139. 
Pickle    V.    Byers     (16    Ind.    383), 

798. 
Pidgeon  v.  Richards  (4  Ind.  374), 

191. 
.  Pier    V.    Carr    (6'9    Pa.    St.    326), 

1207, 1208. 
Pierce    v.    Brown    (24    Vt.    165), 

1228. 
Pierce    v.    Cleland    (133    Pa.    St. 

189), 424. 
Pierce  v.   Hedden    (105   La.   294), 

789. 
Pierce    v.    Joklersma     (91    Mich. 

463), 876, 1151. 
Pierce   v.    Minturn    (1    Cal.    470), 

337. 
Pierce    v.    Richardson    (37    N.    H. 

306), 342. 
Pierce    v.    Rollins    (60    Mo.    A  pp. 

497),  484. 
Pierce   v.    Scott   T4   W.    &   S.    Pa. 

344), 1443. 
Pierce  v.   Sellick    (18  C.   B.  321). 
446. 


Pierce  v.  Shaw   (2  M.  &  R.  418), 

140. 
Pierce  Cequin  Co.  v.  Meadows  (86 

S.  W.  Rep.  1127),  1044. 
Pierson    v.    Hughes     (102    N.    Y. 

Supp.  528),  536. 
Pierson  v.  Hughes  (78  N.  Y.  Supp. 

223), 1378. 
Plgot  V.  Garnish   (Cro.  Eliz.  678), 

10. 
Piggot  V.  Mason    (1  Paige,  N.   Y. 

412),  570,  616,  1363. 
Piggott  V.   Stratton    (1  De  G.,  F. 

&  .L  33),  1098. 
Pike    V.    Brown     (7    Cush.    Mass. 

133), 519. 
Pike  V.  Eyre  (9  B.  &  Cr.  909),  128, 

953. 
Pike  V.  Leiter   (26  111.  App.  530), 

349. 
Pilgrim    v.    Beck    (69    Fed.    Rep. 

895),  40. 
Pilkington     v.     Peach     (2     Show. 

135),  41. 
Pilkington    v.    Shaller     (2    Vern. 

374), 1106. 
Pilling  V.  Armitage   (12  Ves.  85), 

874.. 
Pillow    V.    Love     (6    Tenn.    109), 

1254. 
Pinero  v.  Judson  (3  M.  &  P.  497), 

257,576. 
Pingry  v.   Watkins    (17   Vt.   379), 

1087. 
Pingrey  v.  Watkins   (15  Vt.  479), 

543. 
Pinhorn  v.  Souster  (S  Exch.  763), 

223. 
Pinner  v.   Arnold    (2   C.   M.   &  R. 

613), 380. 
Pintard  v.   Irwin    (20  N.   J.   Law. 

497),  1272,  1280. 
Pinto    V.    Rintleman     (02     S.     W. 

Rep.  1033),  378. 
Pioneer    Savings    &    Loan    Co.    v. 
Fuller   (57  Minn.  60).  1296. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxix 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Piper  V.  Cashnell    (122   Fed.  Rep. 

614),  939,  942. 
Piper  V.  Fletcher  (115  Iowa,  263), 

784,1152. 
Piper  V.  Levy  (114  La.  544),  1371. 
Pistor  V.  Cator   (9  M.  &  W.  315), 

888. 
Pitcher  v.  Daniel    (12  Rich.  S.  C. 

Eq.  349),  60. 
Pitcher    v.    Donovan     (2    Campb. 

78),  158,  172. 
Pitcher  v.  Tovey  (4  Mod.  71),  520. 
Pitman  v.  Woodbury  (3  Exch.  11), 

330. 
Pitney  v.  Eldridge  (58  Kan.  215), 

122. 
Pitt  v.  Hogg   (4  Dowl.  &  R.  226), 

1051. 
Pitt    V.    Snowden     (3    Atk.    750), 

1124. 
Pittsburg  Amusement  Co.  v.   Fer- 
guson  (100  App.  Div.  453),  358. 
Pittsburg  Mfg.   Co.  v.  Fidelity  T. 

&  Tr.  Co.    (207  Pa.  St.  223),  95, 

1398. 
Pittsburgh,     etc.     Co.     v.     Thorn- 
burgh  (98  Ind.  201),  243. 
Planters'  Compress  Co.  v.  Howard 

(80  S.  W.  Rep.  119),  1452. 
Planters'    Ins.    Co.    v.    Diggs     (8 

Baxt.  Tenn.  563),  663,  1032. 
Piatt  V.  Johnson  (168  Pa.  St.  47), 

525,  1240,  1444. 
Playter   v.    Cunningham    (21    Cal. 

229),  700. 
Pleadall's  Case   (2  Leon.  259),  89. 
Ploen  V.   Staff    (9   Mo.  App.   309), 

861. 
Plumer  v.   Harper    (3   N.   H.   88), 

679,794. 
Plumer  v.  Plumer  (30  N.  H.  558), 

920. 
Pocher   v.    Hall    (^8   N.   Y.    Supp. 

754),  289,   290. 
Poer  V.  Peebles  (1  B.  Mon.  Ky.  1), 

1464. 


Poertner  v.  Russell  (33  Wis.  193), 

724. 
Polack    v.    Pioche    (35    Cal.    416), 

882,  900. 
Polland  V.  Fertilizer  Co.  (122  Ala. 

409), 32. 
Pollard   V.    Schaefer    (1   Dall.    Pa. 

210),  615,  1080,  1340,  1352. 
Pollen  V.  Brewer   (7  Com.  Bench, 

N.  S.  371),  192,  215. 
Polley  V.  Johnson   (52  Kan.  478), 

1329. 
Pollman  v.  Morgester   (99  Pa.  St. 

611), 911. 
Pollock  V.  Cronise  (12  How.  Prac. 

N.  Y.  363),  492. 
Pollock  V.   Farmers'   L.   &  T.   Co. 

(157  U.  S.  429),  504. 
Pollock  V.  Kitrell    (4  N.   C.   585), 

197. 
Pollock   V.    Stacy    (9    Q.    B.    103), 

574. 
Pomeroy  v.    Taylor    (9    N.   Y.    St. 

Rep.  514),  1149. 
Pomfret     v.     Ricroft     (1     Saund. 

323a),  222. 
Pond  &  Hasey  Co.  v.  O'Connor  (70 

Minn.  266),  1244,  1257. 
Ponder  v.  Cheaves  (104  Ala.  306), 

965. 
Ponder    v.    Rhea    (32    Ark.    435), 

309. 
Pontalba    v.    Domington     (11    La. 

192),  862,  1178. 
Pool  V.  Hennessey  (39  Iowa,  192), 

568. 
Poole   V.   Bentley    (12   East,   168), 

63,  256. 
Poole  v.   Engelecke    (61   N.   J.   L. 

124),  235,  237. 
Poole's  Case  (1  Salk.  369),  1256. 
Poor    V.    Sears    T154    Mass.    539), 

813. 
Pope    v.    Harkins    (16    Ala.    321), 

491. 
Pope  V.  WTiitehead  (68  N.  C.  101), 

81. 


elxxx 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED, 


[references   ABE   TO   PAGES.T 


Poposkey   v.    Munkwitz    (68    Wis. 

322),  672,  695. 
Porch  V.  Fries  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  204), 

19, 118. 
Porche    v.    Bodin     (28    La.    Ann. 

761),  1315,  1318. 
Pordage   v.   Cole    (1    Saund.    320), 

600. 
Porter  v.  Bleiler    (17  Barb.  N.  Y. 

149),  87,  90. 
Porter  v.   Groden    (5   Yerg.   Tenn. 

100),  384. 
Porter  v.    Johnson    (96    Ga.    145), 

1185,1187. 
Porter    v.    Mayfield     (21    Pa.    St. 

264),  922,  964. 
Porter  v.  Merrill   (124  Mass.  534), 

283,  644,  1057. 
Porter  v.  Sheppard   (6  T.  R.  665), 

601,  625. 
Porter  v.  Sweeney   (61  Tex.  213), 

10. 
Portman  v.  Home  Hospitals  Ass'n 

(27  Ch.  D.  81,  n),  739. 
Post   V.    Kearney    (2    N.    Y.    394), 

1016,  1021,  1048. 
Post  V.  Post  (14  Barb.  N.  Y.  253), 

191,  218. 
Post  V.  Vetter   (2  E.  D.  Smith,  N. 

Y.  248),  782. 
Post  V.  West  Shore  R.  R.  Co.   (123 

N.  Y.  580),  729. 
Postal     Telegraph     Cable     Co.     v. 
Western    Union    Telegraph    Co. 
(155  ni.  335),   612. 
Poston  V.  Jones  (2  Ired.  Eq.  N.  C. 

350),  1138,  1183. 
Poston   V.    Jones    (37   N.    C.    350), 

1178. 
Pott  V.  Lesher  (1  Yeates,  Pa.  57C), 

573. 
Potter    V.    Bassetl    (35    Mo.    Ai)p. 

417),  106. 
Potter    V.    Cunningham     (44    Me. 

192), 1328. 
Potter  V.  Gilbert  (177  Pa.  St.  159), 
1265. 


Potter  V.  Greenleaf  (21  R.  I.  483), 

1455,  1460. 
Potter  V.  Gronbeck   (117  111.  404), 

1116. 
Potter    V.    Mercer    (53    Cal.    667), 

250,  256,  261. 
Potter   V.    New   York    Infant   Asy- 
lum  (44  Hun,  N.  Y.  367),  65. 
Potter  V.  Truitt  (3  Har.  Del.  331), 

582. 
Potts  V.  Hendrix  (6  Ga.  452),  1315. 
rough    V.     Cerimedo     (88    N.     Y. 

Supp.  1054),  674. 
Poulter  V.  Killingbrick   (1  Bos.  & 

P.  397),  380. 
Powell  V.  Beckley    (38  Neb.  157), 

874. 
Powell    V.    Bergner    (47    111.    App. 

33), 1250. 
Powell    V.    Dailey    (163    111.    646), 

1400,  1428. 
Powell   V.   Dayton    (16   Oreg.    33), 

721. 
Powell  V.  D.  S.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.  (12 

Oreg.  488),  600,  710. 
Powell  V.  Gossom  (18  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

179),  100. 
Powell  V.  Hadden's  Ex'rs  (21  Ala. 

745), 319, 1402. 
Powell    V.    Lynde    Co.    (64    N.    Y. 
Supp.   153),   362,   471,   478,   1075. 
Powell  V.  Rich  (41  111.  466),  1315, 

1327. 
Powell    V.    Simms    (5    W.    Va.    1), 

409. 
Powell    V.    Smith    (11    L.    J.    Ch. 

734), 374. 
Powell    V.    State     (84    Ala.    444), 

1416. 
Powers  V.  Cope  T93  Ga.  248),  S33, 

849. 
Powers    V.    Schoeltens    (79    Mich. 

290), 975. 
Powis  V.   Smith    (1  D.  &  R.   490), 

87. 
Prahar   v.    Tousey    (93   App.   Div. 
507),  476,  785. 


T^VBLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


:li.xxi 


[Ri:ir:uENCES  are  to  pai-es;.] 


Pratt  V.  Brett   (2  Madd.  62),  725. 
Pratt  V.   Farrar    (10  Allen,  Mass. 

519),  210,  213. 
Pratt  V.  Foote  (9  N.  Y.  463),  547. 
Pratt  V.  Grafton  Electric  Co.   (182 

Mass.  180)^  847. 
Pratt  V.  Keith   (33  L.  J.  Ch.  592), 

529. 
Pratt  V.  Levan  (1  Miles,  Pa.  358), 

1060. 
Pratt  V.  Lewis   (39  Mich.  7),  405. 
Pratt  V.   Taller    (186   N.   Y.   417), 

808,  861. 
Pray  v.  Stebbins   (141  Mass.  219). 

213,214. 
Preble  v.  Hay   (32  Me.  456),  156 
Preece  v.  Corrie   (2  M.  &  P.  57), 

1048. 
Prendergast  v.  Y'oung    (21   N.   H. 

274), 672. 
Prentiss   v.   Kingsley    (70   Pa.    St. 

120), 1120. 
Prentiss  v.  Warne   (10  Mo.   601), 

1207,  1222. 
Presby    v.    Benjamin    (169    N.    Y. 

377),  737,  1066. 
Presbyterian     Church     v.     Pichet 

(Wright,  Ohio,  57),  454. 
Prescott    V.    Otterstatter    (79    Pa. 

St.  462),  564,  876,  1302. 
Prescott  V.  White   (21  Pick.  Mass. 

341),  437,  438. 
Preston    v.    Hawley     (130    N.    Y. 

296), 573. 
Preston  v.  Neale   (12  Gray,  Mass. 

222), 1299. 
Pretley  v.  Bickmore  (L.  R.  &  C.  B. 

401,  402),  792. 
Pretty  v.  Bickmore  (L.  R.  8  C.  P. 

401),  826. 
Prettyman  v.  Unland  (77  111.  206), 

1420,1429. 
Prettyman    v.     Walston     (34     111. 

175), 1073. 
Prevost    V.    Lawrence    (51    N.    Y. 
219), 24. 


Price   V.    Assheton    (1   Y.    &   Coll. 

441),  1370,  1384. 
Price  V.  Dyer  (17  Ves.  363),  374. 
Price  V.   Haynes    (37   Mich.    487), 

333. 
Price    V.    Pickett    (21    Ala.    741), 

1306,  1310,  1315. 
Price  V.  Sanders  (60  Ind.  310),  IS. 
Price  V.  Warwood  (4  H.  &  N.  512), 

648. 
Price  V.  Williams   (1  Mee.  &  Wei. 

6),  249. 
Prichard   v.   Tabor    (104    Ga.    64), 

322. 
Prickett   v.    Reed    (31   Ark.    131), 

1429. 

Prickett  v.  Ritter  (16  111.  96),  159. 

Pridgeon   v.   Excelsior   Boat   Club 

(66  Mich.  326),  431,  1142,  1145, 

1182. 

Priest  V.  Wheelock  (29  Ind.  497), 

28. 
Prince  v.  Flynn    (2  Litt.  Ky.  40), 

690. 
Prindle  v.  Anderson  (19  Wend.  N. 

Y.  391),  159,  179. 
Prior   V.   Kizo    (81   Mo.   241),   467, 

691,  1191,  1195. 
Pritchard    v.    Dodd    (5    B.    &    Ad. 

689), 245. 
Probst   V.    Roch    St.    Laundry   Co. 

(171  N.  Y.  584),  1379. 
Proctor    V.    Benson    (149    Pa.    St. 

254), 249. 
Proctor  V.  Keith   (12  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

252),  641,  856,  1340. 
Proctor  V.  Pool  (4  Dev.  N.  C.  370), 

336. 
Proffltt  V.  Henderson  (29  Mo.  325), 

707. 
Promer  v.   Railroad  Co.    (90  Wis. 

220), 803. 
Propert  v.  Parker   (3  Mylne  &  K. 

280),  388,  607. 
Proprietors  of  Township  No.  6  v. 
McFarland   (12  Mass.  325),  198. 


clxxxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Proprietors,  etc.  v.  Wood   (3  Esp. 

127), 900. 
Proskey  v.  Cumberland  Realty  Co. 

(70  N.  Y.  Supp.  1125),  1189. 
Prospect  V.  Parker  (3  Mylne  &  K. 

280), 364. 
Proudfoot  V.  Hart  (59  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

D.  43),  886. 
Prout    V.    Roby    (15    Wall.    U.    S. 

476), 989. 
Prouty  V.  Prouty   (5  How.  Pr.  N. 

Y.  81),  172. 
Providence  v.  St.  John's  Lodge  (2 

R.  I.  40),  1293. 
Providence     Christian     Union     v. 

Eliot  (13  R.  I.  74),  519. 
Provost    V.    Lawrence    (51    N.    Y. 

219),  920. 
Prufrock  v.  Joseph  (27  S.  W.  Rep. 

264), 123. 
Pryer  v.   Coulter   (1  Bailey  Law, 

S.  C.  517),  106. 
Pryor  v.  Foster   (130  N.  Y.  171), 

4S1,  1144. 
Fugh  V.  Duke  (Cowper,  714),  347. 
Pugh    Printing   Co.    v.    Dexter    (8 

Ohio  Dec.  557),  267. 
Pugsley  V.  Aikin    (11  N.  Y.  494), 

130. 
Pulford  V.  Whicher  (76  Wis.  555), 

958. 
Pulliam   V.    Sells    (99   S.   W.   Rep. 

289),  161. 
Pulteney  v.  Shelton   (5  Ves.  147), 

765. 
Purcell   V.   English    (86    Ind.    34), 

782,  814,  816.  822,  849. 
Purdy'B   Appeal    (23   Pa.    St.   97), 

552,  1441,  1443. 
Pursel    V.    Teller    "(10    Colo.    App. 

488),  471,  478. 
Purssell   V.  Mayor  of  the  City  of 

New  York  (85  N.  Y.  330),  1018. 
Purton  V.  Watson    (2  N.  Y.  Supp. 

661), 727. 
Putnam  v.  Bond    (100  Mass.   58), 

337. 


Putnam  v.  Lewis   (8  Johns.  N.  Y. 

389), 547. 
Putnam  v.   Ritchie    (6   Paige   Ch. 

N.  Y.  390),  15. 
Putnam  v.  Stewart  (97  N.  Y.  411), 

457,  1073,  1108. 
Putnam    v.    Wise    (37    Am.    Dec. 

309), 31L 
Pynchon  v.  Stearns  (11  Met.  Mass. 

304),  708. 


Q. 


Quackenboss  v.  Clarke   (12  Wend. 

N.  Y.  555),  1069. 
Quackenboss  v.  Lansing  (6  Johns. 

N.  Y.  49),  604. 
Quade  v.  Fitzloff   (93  Minn.  115), 

1378. 
Quarman  v.  Burnett  (1  Q.  B.  Div. 

321), 803. 
Quay  V.   Lucas    (25  Mo.   App.   4), 

913. 
Quay  V.  Westcott  (60  Pa.  St.  163), 

568. 
Quetermous  v.   Hatfield    (54    Ark. 

16),  320. 
Quick  V.  Ludborrow    (3  Bulst.  3), 

619. 
Quidort  v.  Bullitt   (60  N.  J.  Law, 

119), 1371. 
Quiggle   V.   Vining    (125    Ga.    98). 

1318. 
Quigley  v.  H.  W.  Johns  Mfg.  Co. 

(26  App.  Div.  434),  838. 
Quiniby    v.     Shearer     (56     Minn. 

534), 361. 
Quincey,   Ex   parte    (1  Atk.   477), 

1256. 
Quincy   v.    Carpenter    (135    Mass. 

102), 1038. 
Quincy  M.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hum- 
phreys  (145  U.  S.  82).  1122. 
Quincy  Parish  v.  Spear   (15  Pick. 

Mass.  144),  198. 
Quinlan    v.    Bonte    (24    III.    App. 

240), 139. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxxiii 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Quinn  v.  Crowe  (88  111.  App.  191), 

847. 
Quinn  v.  Perham  (151  Mass.  162), 

813. 
Qainnette    v.    Carpenter    (35    Mo. 

502),  139,  141,  559,  1222. 
Quinney  v.  Denny   (18  Wis.  485), 

333. 


R. 


Race  V.  Groves  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  280), 

991. 
RacklefE  v.  Norton   (19  Me.  274), 

343. 
Rae  V.  Lewis  (2  W.  Bl.  1173),  191. 
Rafferty  v.  Schofield  (66  L.  J.  Ch. 

448),  628. 
Ragar  v.  McKay  (44  111.  App.  79), 

922,947. 
Ragsdale  v.  Lander   (80  Ky.  61), 

384. 
Ragsdale  v.   McKinney    (119   Ala. 

454),  1464. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  West  (57  Ohio  St. 

161),  140. 
Railton  v.  Taylor   (20  R.  I.  279), 

783,  830. 
Raines  v.   Keller    (4   C.   &   P.   3), 

621. 
Raines  v.  Walker  (77  Va.  92),  351. 
Rainey  v.  Caps  (22  Ala.  288),  262, 

457. 
Ralph  V.  Lomer  (3  Wash.  St.  401), 

538. 
Ralston    v.    Boady    (20    Ga.    449), 

772. 
Ramsay  v.  Wilkie  (13  N.  Y.  Supp. 

554),  701,  1219. 
Ramsey   v.    Henderson    (10   West. 

Rep.  33),  212,  182. 
Ranalli    v.    Zeppetelli    (94    N.    Y. 

Supp.  561),  458. 
Rand   v.   Barrett    (66    Iowa,   731), 

1432. 
Rand    v.    Francis     (67    111.    App. 
225), 1060. 


Randall  v.  Alburtis  (1  Hilt.  N.  Y. 

285),  1154. 
Randall  v.  Ditch    (123   Iowa,  58), 

309, 1451. 
Randall  v.   Rich    (11   Mass.   494), 

1238. 
Randall    v.   Rosenthal    (31    S.    W. 

Rep.  822),  1135. 
Randall  v.  Sanderson    (111  Mass. 

114), 410. 
Randel  v.  Alburtis  (1  Hilt.  N.  Y. 

285), 1132. 
Randel  v.  Chesapeake  &  D.  Canal 

Co.  (1  Har.  Del.  233),  599. 
Randolph  v.  Carlton  (8  Ala.  606), 

934,936. 
Randolph  v.  Feist   (23  Misc.  Rep. 

650), 802. 
Randol    v.    Scott    (110    Cal.    590), 

665,1066. 
Randol    v.   Tatum    (98    Cal.    390), 

644, 1057. 
Ranelagh   v.    Melton    (2   Drew.    & 

Sm.  278),  992. 
Ranger   v.    Bacon    (3    Misc.    Rep. 

95), 1093. 
Ranken  v.  Hunt  (10  R.  249),  749. 
Rankin    v.    Kinsey    (7    Brad.    111. 

215), 1325. 
Rankin  v.  Rankin    (216  111.   132), 

988. 
Rankin    v.    Simpson    (19    Pa.    St. 

471), 950. 
Ranlet  v.    Cook    (44   N.    H.    512), 

1387. 
Rappe  V.  Front  (3  Okl.  260),  920. 
RatclifE  V.  Belfont  Iron  Works  (87 

Ky.  559),  484. 
Raubitscheck  v.   Semken    (4   Abb. 

New  Cas.  N.  Y.  205),  1205. 
Raventas  v.  Green   (57  Cal.   254), 

291. 
Rawle  V.  Balfour  (16  W.  N.  C.  Pa. 

194), 848. 
Rawlings  v.  Briggs   (2  C.  P.  Div. 

368),102S. 


clxxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


Rawlings  v.   Walker    (5  B.   &  Cr. 

Ill), 1233. 
Rawlin's  Case   (4  Coke,  53a),  952. 
Rawls  V.  Moye  (98  Ga.  564),  1411. 
Rawson     v.     Babcock     (40     Mich. 

330), 198. 
Rawstarne  v.  Bentley   (4  Bro.  Ch. 

417), 1383. 
Ray  V.  Gas  Co.   (138  Pa.  St.  576), 

641,643. 
Raylyn's  Case  (4  Coke,  53a),  953. 
Raymond  v.  Fitch    (2  C.  M.  &  R. 

588),  51. 
Raymond  v.  Krauskopf   (87  Iowa, 

602),  555. 
Raymond    v.    Mercliant     (3    Cow. 

N.  Y.  147),  547. 
Raymond   v.    Striclvland    (124    Ga. 

504),    1257. 
Raymond    v.     Thomas     (24     Ind. 

476),  522. 
Raymond  v.  White   (7  Cow.  N.  Y. 

319),  1250. 
Rayne  v.  Irvin  (144  III.  482),  804. 
Rayner    v.    Drew    (72    Cal.    307), 

385,  957. 
Rayner  v.  Lee  (20  Mich.  384),  368. 
Read   v.   Bolger    (70   N.   Y.    Supp. 

757),   848. 
Readey  v.  American  Brewing  Co. 

(60  111.  App.  501),  1090. 
Readfield  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Cyr    (95 

Me.    287),    1248. 
Readman    v.    Conway    (126    Mass. 

374),  804,  813. 
Reasoner   v.    Edmundson    (5    Ind. 

393),  1129. 
Reckhow    v.    Schank     (43    N.    Y. 

448),  223. 
Rector  v.  Harford  Deposit  Co.  (190 

111.  380),  10G4,  1092. 
Rector,  etc.  Trinity  Church  v.  Hig- 

gins  (48  N.  Y.  533),  1013. 
Redden    v.    Barker    (4    Har.    Del. 

179),  317. 
Reddick    v.     HuLchlnson     (94    Ga. 

675),  322. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 

Redding  v.  Hall  (1  Bibb.  Ky.  536), 


Rede  v.  Farr  (6  Maule  &  S.  121), 

642,  645,  1068. 
Redpath  v.  Roberts   (3  Esp.  225), 

1216. 
Reed  v.  Bartlett  (9  111.  App.  267), 

288. 
Reed   v.    Campbell    (43   N.   J.   Eq. 

406),  1367,  1368. 
Reed   v.   Deere    (7   B.   &   C.    266), 

582. 
Reed    v.    Harrison     (196    Pa.    St. 

337),  896,  899. 
Reed  v.  Lewis   (74  Ind.  433),  336, 

733,  757. 
Reed  v.  Munn  (148  Fed.  Rep.  737), 

954,   1228. 
Reed  v.   Reed    (48   Me.   388),   206, 

228,  234. 
Reed  v.  Reynolds  (37  Conn.  469), 

692,   1190. 
Reed  v.  Shepley  (6  Vt.  602),  964 
Reed  v.  Swan  (133  Mo.  100),  1325. 
Reed  v.   Todd    (1   Har.   Del.   138), 

920. 
Reed  v.  Van   Nostrand    (1   Wend. 

N.  Y.  424),  547. 
Reed   v.    Ward    (22    Pa.    St.    144), 

541,  552. 
Reeder  v.  Anderson   (4  Dana,  Ky. 

193),  1299. 
Reeder  v.    Say  re    (70  N.  Y.   180), 

133,  146,  197. 
Reeder  v.   Sayre    (80  N.   Y.    190), 

147. 
Reedy    v.    Smith     (42    Cal.    245), 

327. 
Rees  V.   Perrot    (4   Car.   &  Payne, 

230),  43. 
Reese  v.  Caffee  (133  Ind.  14),  920. 
Reese   v.    Cochran    (10    Ind.    195), 

24. 
Reese    v.    Rugely    (82    Ala.    267). 

1417. 
Rpovo  V.  Berridge  (20  Q.  B.  523), 

1075. 


TABLE   OP   CASES    CITED. 


cixiLKV 


[references 

Reeve  v.  Bird   (1  C.  M.  &  R.  37), 

1199. 
Reeves  v.  Cattell   (24  W.  R.  485), 

737. 
Reeves  v.  Hyde  (14  111.  App.  233), 

855. 
Reeves   v.    McComeskey    (168    Pa. 

St.  571),  785. 
Reffel  V.  Reffel    (1  L.  R.  P.  &  D. 

139),  343. 
Regan  v.  Walsh  (11  Ohio  Dec.  61), 

1214. 
Regan  v.   Luthy    (16   Daly,   N.   Y. 

413),   721. 
Regina  v.  Ponsonby   (3  Ad.  &  El. 

N.  S.  14),  301. 
Regina    v.    St.    Giles    (4    B.    &    S. 

509),  131. 
Regina  v.  St.  Nicholas  (5  Barn.  & 

Adol.  227),  566. 
Regina    v.    Slawstone    (18    Q.    B. 

388),  174. 
Rehler   v.    Railway   Co.    (8   N.    Y. 

Supp.  286),  870. 
Reich   v.   McCrea    (59    Hun,   625), 

1215. 
Reichstetter   v.    Reese    (39    S.    W. 

Rep.  597),   958. 
Reid  V.  Hibbard  (6  Wis.  175),  101. 
Reid    V.    Parsons     (2    Chit.    247), 

644. 
Reid  V.   Town   of  Long  Lake    (89 

N.  Y.   Supp.  983),  394. 
Reid    V.    Weissner    (88    Md.    234), 

644. 
Reinhardt    v.    Blanchard    (78    111. 

App.  96),  1432. 
Reinhart  v.   Miller    (22   Ga.   402), 

333. 
Reitanbaugh   v.   Ludwick    (31    Pa. 

St.  131),  30. 
Reithman  v.  Brandenburg  (7  Colo. 

480),  155. 
Relph    V.    Gist    (4    McCord.    S.    C. 

267)     332. 
Remnant  v.  Brembridge  (2  Moore, 

94),  45. 


ARE    TO    PAGES.] 

Remsen  v.  Conklin   (18  Johns.  N. 

Y.   447),   528,  554,  638. 
Renard  v.  Sampson  (12  N.  Y.  561), 

459. 
Rendall  v.  Andreae  (61  Law  J.  Q. 

B.  630),  45. 
Renney  v.  Sweeney  (14  R.  I.  581), 

233. 
Rennie    v.     Robinson     (7    Moore, 

539),   575. 
Reno  V.  Mendenhall    (58  111.  App. 

87),  563,   565,  868,  877,   881. 
Renoud  v.  Daskam  (34  Conn.  512), 

1368,   1378. 
Renton  v.  Baraett   (77  L.  T.  Rep. 

645),  628. 
Repplier  v.  Buck   (5  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

96),   1434. 
Requa  v.  Domestic  Pub.  (32  N.  Y. 

Supp.   125),   1236. 
Respell    V.    Carwin    (72    111.    App. 

623),   481. 
Retchie    v.     Atkinson     (10     East, 

295),   601. 
Reusens  v.  Lawson    (91  Va.  226), 

972. 
Reuss  V.  Picksley   (L.  T.  I.  Exch. 

342),   386. 
Rex  V.  Bardwell  (6  Ad.  &  El.  278), 

301. 
Rex  V.  Chestnut   (1  Barn.  &  Aid. 

473),  300. 
Rex  V.  Chipping  Norton    (5  East, 

239),  64. 
Rex  V.  Collett  (R.  &  R.  498),  186, 

190. 
Rex   V.  Eatington    (4  T.   R.   181), 

566. 
Rex  V.   Fillongley    (1  Term.   Rep. 

458),   187,   190. 
Rex  V.   Flintshire    (3  Dowl.   &  L. 

537),  343. 
Rex  V.  Inhabitants   (5  Mod.  331), 

10. 
Rex    V.    .Jobling    (R.    &    R.    525), 

186,   190. 


clxxxvi 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references  ake  to  pages.] 


Rex  V.  Manners  (3  Ad.  &  El.  597), 

11. 
Rex  V.  Northwin^eld  (1  B.  «S;  Ad. 

912),  461. 
Rex  V.  Oakley   (10  East,  494),  11, 
Rex  V.  Rawdon   (3  M.  &  Ry.  426), 

581. 
Rex  V.  Sutton   (3  Ad.  &  El.  597), 

12. 
Rex  V.  Tynemouth   (12  East,  46), 

301. 
Reynolds  v.   Black    (91   Iowa,   1), 

1439. 
Reynolds    v.    Davidson     (31    Md. 

662),   102. 
Reynolds  v.  Ellis  (103  N.  Y.  115), 

279,  1404,  1405. 
Reynolds  v.   Fuller    (64   111.   App. 

134),  1060. 
Reynolds    v.    Greenbaum    (80    111. 

416),  349. 
Reynolds     v.     Hindman     (88     Ga. 

314),    1415. 
Reynolds    v.     Lawton     (55     Hun, 

603),  1069. 
Reynolds    v.    Pitt    (19    Ves.    134), 

667,  1038. 
Reynolds  v.  Rej^nolds  (48  Hun,  N. 

Y.  142),  310,  314. 
Reynolds  v.  Shuler   (5  Cow.  N.  Y. 

323),  1254. 
Reynolds  v.   Swain    (13  La.   193), 

1222. 
Reynolds  v.  Van  Buren  (155  N.  Y. 

120),  290,  837. 
Reynolds   v.    Welsh    (8    N.   Y.    St. 

Rep.  404),  327. 
Reynolds  v.  Williams  (1  Tex.  311), 

685. 
Reysen    v.    Roate    (92    Wis.    543), 

435. 
Rhoades   v.    Seidel    (12   Det.    Leg. 

N.  Rep.  1),  797,  855. 
Rhode  V.  Loiithain    (8  Black.  Ind. 

413),  97,  99. 
Rhodes  v.  Com.   (7  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

520),  778. 


'  Rhodes  v.  Robinson  (3  Bing.  N.  C. 

677),  175. 
Rhodius  V.  Johnson   (24  Ind.  App. 

401),  819. 
Rhone  v.  Gale  (12  Minn.  54),  349, 

1036, 
Rhyme  v.  Guevara  (67  Miss.  139), 

934,  936. 
Ricardi    v,    Gaboury    (115    Tenn. 

484),  14. 
Rice  V.   Brown    (81  Me.   56),   329, 

330. 
Rice  V.  Dudley  (55  Ala.  68),  1131, 

1175,  1213. 
Rice    V.    Pacific    Realty    Co.     (35 

Wash.  535),  1137, 
Rice  V.   Whitmore    (74   Cal.   619), 

111,  672, 
Rich  V.  Basterfield   (4  C.  B.  783), 

793,  825. 
Rich  V.   Bolton    r46   Vt.   84),   187, 

216. 
Rich   V.   Doyenn    (85   Hun,   N,   Y. 

510),  1207,  1214. 
Richards  v.  Bluck    (6  C.  B.   437), 

1335. 
Richardson  v.   Bates    (8   Ohio   St. 

257),   334. 
Richardson  v.   Bigelow    (15   Gray, 

Mass.  154),  437. 
Richardson  v.  Callahan    (73  Miss. 

4),  1184. 
Richardson     v,     Coddington      (49 

Mich.  1),  552. 
Richards    v,    Gauffret    (145    Mass. 

486),  435,  685. 
Richardson  v.  Gifford   (3  N.  &  M. 

325),  385. 
Richardson    v.    Gifford    (1    Ad.    & 

El,  52),  139,  147,  196,  889. 
Richardson  v,  Gordon    (188  Mass. 

279),   1013,   1216. 
Richard.son  v.  Hall  (1  B.  &  B.  50), 

570,  582. 
Richardson    v,     Harvey     (37     Ga. 

224),  923. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxxvii 


[refebexces  aee  to  pages.] 


Richards  v.  Knight  (78  Iowa,  G9), 

1325. 
Richardson      v.       Langridge       (4 

Taunt.  128),  133,  134,  190,  191. 
Richardson  v.  McLaurin  (69  Miss. 

70),  1429. 
Richardson  v.  Peterson   (58  Iowa, 

724),  1425. 
Richardson  v.  Pond  (81  Mass.  387, 

389),  409. 
Richardson  v.  Richardson  (49  Mo. 

29),  13. 
Richardson  v.  Richardson  (9  Gray, 

Mass.  213),  732. 
Richardson  v.  Thornton  (52  N.  C. 

458),  198. 
Richie  v.  McCauley  (4  Pa.  St.  471), 

1444. 
Richmond   Ice  Co.   v.   Crystal   Ice 

Co.   (99  Va.  239),  1340. 
Rickards  v.  Dana  (75  Vt.  74),  335, 

1044. 
Rickert  v.  Snyder  (9  Wend.  N.  Y. 

415),  497. 
Ricketson    v.    Galligan     (89    "Wis. 

394),  921. 
Ricketts  v.  Garrett  (11  Ala.  806), 

1171. 
Ricketts  v.  Weaver    (12  M.  &  W. 

718),  51. 
Riddle   v.    Brown    (20    Ala.    412), 

274. 
Riddle    v.    Littlefield     (53    N.    H. 

503),  412,  442. 
Rider  v.   Bagley    (84  N.   Y.   461), 

32. 
Ridge    V.    Railroad    Transfer    Co. 

(56  Mo.  App.  50),  680. 
Ridgley  v.  Stillwell   (27  Mo.  128), 

522. 
Ridgley  v.  Stillwell    (28  Mo.  40), 

146. 
Ridgely  v.  Stillwell   (25  Mo.  570), 

1G2. 
Ridgeway    v.    Hannum    (129    Ind. 

App.  124),  139. 
m 


Ridgway  v.  Wharton  (6  H.  L.  Cas. 

288),  249,  360. 
Rigge  V.  Bell  (5  Term.  Rep.  471), 

172. 
Riggin  V.  Maguire  (15  Wall.  U.  S. 

549), 1120. 
Riggs  V.  Gray  (72  S.  W.  Rep.  101), 

848. 
Riggs  V.   Pursell    (66   N.  Y.   193), 

738,  910,  1051. 
Right   V.    Bawden    (3    East,    460), 

511. 
Right  V.  Cuthell   (5  Esp.  149),  89. 
Right  V.  Darby  (1  T.  R.  159),  156, 

158,  217. 
Right  d.  Lewis  v.  Beard  (13  East, 

210),  236. 
Riker  v.   Bagley    (84   N.  Y.   461), 

1125. 
Riley    v.    Hale    (158    Mass.    240), 

703. 
Riley  v.  Jordan    C122  Mass.   231), 

1074. 
Riley   v.    Lally    (172    Mass.    244), 

1136,  1176. 
Riley  v.  Peltis  Co.    (96  Mo.  318), 

858. 
Ring  V.  Johnson  County   (6  Iowa, 

265),  65. 
Ringle    v.    Quigg    (87    Pac.    Rep. 

724),  471. 
Ripley  v.  Page  (12  Vt.  353),  1259. 
Riseley  v.  Ryle    (11  M.  &  W.   6), 

193. 
Rising  V.  Stannard  (17  Mass.  282), 

206,  208,  209,  215,  217,  228,  1306. 
Rittmaster  v.   Brisbane    (19   Colo. 

371),  349. 
Rives  v.   Dudley    (3   Jones,   N.   C. 

Law,  126),  61. 
Rivett  V.  Brown   (6  "\;VT<ly.  L.  Bui. 

Ohio,  378),  163. 
Rivis  V.  Watson   (5  M.  &  W.  255), 

541,  1112. 
Roach  V.  Peterson  (47  Minn.  291), 

868,  1346,  1358. 


cixxxvm 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEEE?rCES    ARE   TO   PAGES.] 


Robb    V.    Antonio    St    Rep.     (83 

Tex.  392),  385. 
Robb's  Appeal  (41  Pa.  St.  45),  51. 
Robbins  v.  Atkins  (168  Mass.  45), 

802. 
Robbins  v.   Conway    (92   111.   App. 

173),  646. 
Robbins  v.  Jones  (15  Com.  Bench, 

N.  S.  238),  913. 
Robbins  v.  Mount  (27  N.  Y.  Super. 

553),  782,  783. 
Roberts  v.  Barker  (1  C.  &  M.  808), 

1214,  1335. 
Roberts  v.  Brett   (11  H.  L.  Cases, 

354),  625. 
Roberts  v.  Daver  (4  B.  &  A.  664), 

642. 
Roberts  v.  Hay  ward   (3  Car.  &  P. 

432),  143. 
Roberts  v.  Holland  (62  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

621),  88. 
Roberts   v.    Jacks    (31    Ark.    597), 

1410,  1428. 
Roberts  v.  Jones  (71  S.  Car.  404), 

1331. 
Roberts   v.   MePherson    (63   N.   J. 

Law,  352),  490. 
Roberts  v.    Sims    (64   Miss.   597), 

1032. 
Robertson  v.  Banks  (9  Miss.  666), 

106. 
Robertson  v.  Bid^ell  (32  Fla.  304), 

934. 
Robertson  v.  French  (4  East,  130), 

604. 
Robertson  v.  Hayes  (83  Ala.  290), 

119. 
Robertson  v.  Pope    (1  Rich.  Law, 

S.  C.  501),  106. 
Robertson  v.  St.  John   (2  Bro.  P. 

C.  140),  1366. 
Robertson     v.     Simons     (109     Ga. 

360),  139,  158. 
Robery  v.  Jervoise   (1  Term.  Rep. 

229),  1385. 
Robeson  v.  Pittenger  (2  N.  J.  Eq. 
57),   44L 


Robey  v.  Prout  (7  D.  C.  81),  633. 
Robie  V.  Smith  (21  Me.  114),  206, 

207,  234. 
Robins  v.  Cox  (1  Lev.  22),  1112. 
Robinson  v.  Beard  (140  N.  Y.  107), 

1391. 
Robinson  v.  Clapp  (65  Conn.  365), 

410. 
Robinson  v.  Deering  (56  Me.  357), 

539. 
Robinson  v.   Glass    (94   Ind.   211), 

361. 
Robinson  v.  Gould  (26  Iowa,  89), 

350,  352. 
Robinson    v.     Henaghan     (92    111. 

App.  620),  1155. 
Robinson  v.   Hoffman    (1  M.  &  P. 

474),  90. 
Robinson   v.   .Tarvis    (25   Mo.   App. 

421),  361. 
Robinson  v.  Kline  (70  N.  Y.  147), 

716. 
Robinson  v.  Kruse  (29  Ark.  575), 

1317. 
Robinson  v.  Lehman  (72  Ala.  401), 

1096. 
Robinson  v.  L'Engle  (13  Fla.  482), 

1340,   1345.   1352. 
Robinson  v.  Noel    (49  Miss.  253), 

349. 
Robinson   v.    Perry    (21   Ga.    183), 

1044. 
Robinson    v.    Robinson     (116    III. 

250),  349. 
Robinson    v.    Robinson    (1    N.    H. 

161),  30. 
Robinson   v.   Root    (90    Ala.    115), 

964. 
Robinson  v.  Troupe  Min.  Co.    (55 

Mo.  App.  662),  934,  936. 
Robinson    v.    Wheeler    (25    N.    Y. 

252),  351. 
Robinson  v.  Wright  (2  MacArthur, 

D.  C.  54),  1253. 
Robrecht  v.   Marling's  Adm'r    (29 

29  W.  Va.  765),  696. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


clxxxix 


[referexces  are  to  pages.] 
Robson  V.  Flight  (4  De  G.,  J.  &  S.   i   Roehrs  v.  Timmons  (63  N.  E.  Rep. 


608),  19. 


481),   847. 


Roby  V.  Cossitt  (78  111.  638),  101.  I   Rogan   v.    Dockery    (23   Mo.   App. 


Rochester  v.  Pierce  (1  Camp.  466), 

64. 
Rockingham  v.  Penrice  (IP.  Wm. 

179),  632,  540. 
Rockport  V.  Rockport  Granite  Co. 

(177  Mass.  246),  274. 
Rodgers  v.  Bell    (53  Ga.  94),  976. 
Rodgers  v.  Pitcher  (6  Taunt.  208), 

512. 
Rodwell    V.    Phillips     (9    Mee.    & 

Well.   501),   1306. 
.Roe    V.    Archbishop    of    York     (6 

East,  86),  1201. 
Roe  d.   Berkeley  v.   Tax    (6  East, 

86),  1202. 
Roe  V.  Charnock  (Peake,  N.  P.  C. 

4),  158. 
Roe    d.    West   v.    Davis    (7    East, 

363),  367. 
Roe  V.  Galliers  (2  T.  R.  133),  1065. 
Roe  d.  Gregson  v.  Harrison   (2  T. 

R.   425),   647. 
Roe,  Lessee  of  Bramford,  v.  Hay- 
ley   (12  East,  464),  375. 
Roe  d.  V.  Lees    (2   W.   Bl.    1173), 

192. 
Roe  d.  Goatley  v.  Paine  (2  Camp, 

520),  890. 
Roe  d.   Shore  v.   Porter    (3   T.  R. 

13),  43. 
Roe  d.  Dingley  v.  Sales    (1  M.  & 

S.  297),  1053. 
Roe  d.  Blair  v.  Street   (4  N.  &  M. 

42),  215. 
Roe   V.    Harrison    (2    T.    R.    133), 

1065. 
Roe   V.    Street    (2   A.    &   EI.    329), 

198. 
Roe  V.  Summerset  (2  W.  BI.  692), 

53. 
Roe  V.  Ward    (1   H.   Bl.   96),  137, 

160,  229. 
Roe  V.  Wiggs   (2  Bos.  &  P.  N.  S. 

330),  169. 


313),  847. 
Rogers  v.  Bemus  (69  Pa.  St.  432), 

880. 
Rogers  v.  Boynton   (57  Ala.  501), 

922. 
Rogers  v.   Brokaw    (25   N.  J.   Eq. 

497),  1255. 
Rogers  v.  Brown    (57  Minn.  223), 

150. 
Rogers  v.  Dansworth  (9  N.  J.  Eq. 

289),   604. 
Rogers   v.    Gosnell    (51    Mo.    466), 

533. 
Rogers  v.   Grigg    (29    S.   W.   Rep. 

654),  1436. 
Rogers    v.    Herron    (92    111.    582), 

1100. 
Rogers  v.  Humphreys  (4  Ad.  &  El. 

299),  31,  288. 
Rogers  v.  McGuffey  (74  S.  W.  Rep. 

753),   696. 
Rogers   v.   McKenzie    (65   N.    Car. 

218),  492. 
Rogers  v.  Ostrom   (35  Barb.  N.  Y. 

523),   1138. 
Rogers  v.  Pitcher  (6  Taunt.  202), 

134,   923. 
Rogers  v.   Pullen    (2   Bing.   N.   C. 

749).   193. 
Rogers  v.  Snow    (118  IMass.   118), 

397. 
Rogers   v.    S.   E.    Grote   Paint   Co. 

(94  S.  W.  Rep.  548),  1350. 
Rogers  v.  Waller   (4  Hayw.  Tenn. 

205),  920. 
Rohrer  v.  Babcock   (126  111.  222), 

309,  311. 
Rohrheimer  v.   Hoffman    (103   Pa. 

St.  409),  555. 
Rolfe   V.   Harris    (2    Price,   206n), 

667,  1038. 
Rollins    V.    Moody    (72    Me.    135), 

1222. 


cxc 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Rollins   V.    Movers    (25   Me.    192), 

1298. 
Rollins  V.  Proctor  (56  Iowa,  326), 

1437,  1449. 
Rolls  V.  Miller  (53  L.  J.  Ch.  682), 

739. 
Rolt    V.    Somerville    (2    Eq.    Cas. 

Abr.  739),  725. 
Roman   v.   Taylor    (93   App.   Div. 

449),   1360. 
Ronaldson  v.  Tabor  (43  Ga.  230), 

941. 
Roney  v,  Aldrich    (44  Hun,  320), 

870. 
Rook  V.  Warth   (1  Ves.  Sr.  462), 

844. 
Rooney  v.  Crary  "(S  111.  App.  329), 

1282,  1291. 
Rooney  v.  Gillispie   (6  Allen,  74), 

209. 
Roosevelt  v.  Bull's  Head  Bank  (45 

Barb.  N.  Y.  579),  537. 
Roosevelt   v.    Hopkins    (33   N.   Y. 

81),  1044,  1050. 
Roosevelt    v.    Hungate     (110    111. 

595),  182. 
Ropps  V.   Barker    (4   Pick.    Mass. 

239), 1259. 
Rorbach  v.  Crossett  (64  Hun,  637), 

180,   1224. 
Rose  V.  Davis   (11  Cal.  133),  943. 
Rose  V.   King    (49   Ohio   St.   213), 

916. 
Rose  V.  Wynn   (42  Ark.  42),  694. 
Rosen  v.  Rose  (2  Ann.  Cases,  194), 

385. 
Rosenan  v.  Syring  (25  Oreg.  386), 

1301. 
Rosenbaum    v.    Gunter    (3    E.    D. 

Smith,  N.  Y.  203),  481,  1077. 
Rosenberg  v.   Schoolherr    (101   N. 

Y.  Supp.  505),  819. 
Rosenberg    v.    Sharper    (51    Tex. 

134),  1084. 
Rosenberg  v.  Sprechie  (103  N.  W. 

Rep.  1045),  573. 


Rosenblat    v.    Perkins     (18    Oreg. 

156),  146,  162. 
Rosenbloom    v.    Pinch    (37    Misc. 

Rep.  318),  898,  1155. 
Rosenfield   v.   Newman    (59   Minn. 

159),  839,  841. 
Rosenquist   v.    Canary    (15    Misc. 

Rep.  148),  585. 
Rosenstein    v.    Cohen     (96    Minn. 

336),  784. 
Ross   V.   Campbell    (9    Colo.    App. 

38),  1249. 
Ross    V.    Cobb     (9    Yerger,    Tenn. 

363),   10. 
Ross  V.  Com.  (2  B.  Mon.  Ky.  417), 

778. 
Ross  V.   Dysart    (33   Pa.   St.   452), 

697,  1171. 
Ross  V.  Gill   (1  Wash.  Va.  7),  13. 
Ross  V.  Gill-  (4  Call.  Va.  250),  15. 
Ross    V.    Jackson    (123    Ga.    607), 

801. 
Ross    V.    Kernan    (31    Hun,    164),. 

485. 
Ross  V.  Schneider    (30  Ind.  423), 

1072. 
Roth  V.   Adams    C185  Mass.   341), 

592,  782. 
Roth   V.   Collins    (109   Iowa,   501), 

1250. 
Rothermel   v.   Dunn    (119   Pa.   St. 

637),  250. 
Rothman    v.    Kosover     (48    Misc. 

Rep.  538),  1190. 
Rothstein  v.    Steinbugler    (102   N. 

Y.  Supp.  470),  536. 
Rofh  Tool  Co.  V.  Champion  Spring 

Co.  (93  Mo.  App.  530),  1047. 
RothwelFs  Case  (Hut.  91),  952. 
Roumage  v.  Blatrier   (11  Rob.  La. 

101),  1222. 
Round  Lake  Ass'n  v.  Kellogg  (141 

N.  Y.  348),  329,  729. 
Rousey  v.  Mattox    (111   Ga.   883), 

1439. 
Rowan  v.  Anderson  (33  Kan.  264),. 

1259. 


T.VBLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXCl 


[keferexces  aee  to  pages.] 


Rowan  v.  Little   (11  Wend.  N.  Y. 

616),  227,  1193,  1204. 
Rowan  v.  Riley  (65  Tenn.  67),  49. 
Rowbothara    v.    Pearce    (5    Houst. 

Del.  135),  1154,  1167. 
Rowe  V.  Baber  (93  Ala.  422),  877. 
Rowe   V.    Hayley    (12    East,    464), 

1391. 
Rowe  V.  Huntington   (1  Vaughan, 

73),  346. 
Rowe  V.  Ream   (105  Pa.  St.  453), 

496. 
Rowe  V.  Ware  (30  Ga.  278),  97. 
Rowe  V.  Williams  (97  Mass.  163), 

524,    572. 
Rowell    V.    Klein    (44    Ind.    290), 

1327. 
Rowlands  v.  Voechting    (115  Wis. 

352),  310,  1318,   1319. 
Roxbury  v.  Huston    (39  Me.  312), 

579. 
Royal  Bank  v.  Railroad  Co.    (100 

Mass.  444),  332. 
Royce  v.  Guggenheim    (106  Mass. 

201),  1129,  1131,  1140,  1167,1176. 
Royce  v.   Latshaw    (62   Pac.   Rep. 

627),  1297. 
Royston  v.  Royston    (29   Ga.   82), 

16. 
Rubens  v.  Hill  (213  Hi.  523),  456. 
Rubery    v.    Stevens    (4    Barn.    & 

Adol.   241),  46. 
Ruckman   v.   Astor    (3    Edw.    Ch. 

N.  Y.  373),  492. 
Rudd    V.    Golding    (6    Mov.    231), 

621. 
Ruggles  V.  Washington  Co.  (3  Mo. 

496),  101. 
Rummel  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W. 

Ry.    Co.    (9    N.    Y.    Supp.    404), 

503. 
Ruse  V.   Mutual   B.   Life    Ins.   Co. 

(223  N.  Y.  516).  457,  459. 
Russell  V.  Allard   (18  N.  H.  222), 

934. 
Russell   V.   Allen    (2   Allen,   Mass. 
42),  30. 


Russell   V.   Darwin    (2    Bro.    638), 

1374. 
Russell    V.    Doty    (4    Cow.    N.    Y. 

576),  526. 
Russell    V.    Erwin    (38    Ala.    44), 

924. 
Russell  V.  Fabyan  (28  N.  H.  543), 

523),  539. 
Russell  V.  Fabyan  (27  N.  H.  529), 

922,  1171. 
Russell  V.  Fabyan  (34  N.  H.  218), 

229. 
Russell  V.  Giblin    (16  Daly,  258), 

295. 
Russell  V.  Irwin's  Adm'r   (38  Ala. 

44),  922,  943. 
Rundell    v.    La    Fleur    (88    Mass. 

480),   326. 
Russell  V.  McCartney  (21  Mo.  App. 

544),  160,  369. 
Russell  V.  Rush  (2  Pitts.  Pa.  134), 

848,  876. 
Rutgers  v.  Hunter    (6  Johns.   Ch. 

N.    Y.    215),    1363,    1368,    1369, 

1382. 
Rutherford   v.   Wabash  R.   R.   Co. 

(147  Mo.  441),  442,  445. 
Rutherford's     Heirs     v.      Clark's 

Heirs   (4  Bush.  Ky.  27),  54. 
Rutledge  v.  Walton  (4  Yerg.  Tenn. 

458),  1423. 
Rutter    V.    Smith    (2    Wall    U.    S. 

491),  1264. 
Rutz  V.  Kehn    (143  111.  558),  434. 
Ryan  v.  Clark  (14  Q.  B.  65),  355. 
Ryan   v.    Jones    (20    N.    Y.    Supp. 

842),  103. 
Ryan  v.  Jones   (49  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

140),  1144. 
Ryan   v.    Kirchberg    (17    111.    App. 

132),  1195. 
Ryan  v.  Potwin  ('62  111.  App.  134), 

775,   776. 
Ryan   v.   Wilson    (87   N.   Y.    471), 

873. 
Ryerson  v.  Eldre'd   (18  Mich.  12), 

920,  922,  964. 


excii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[befeeences  ake  to  pages.] 


Ryerson  v.  Quackenbusli  (26  N.  J. 

Law,   236),  541,   559. 
Ryley  v.  Hicks   U  Str.  651),  385. 


Sachererell  v.   Frogott    (2   Saund. 

367),  48,  90,  530. 
Sackett  v.  Barnum    (22  Wend.  N. 

Y.   605),  321. 
Sadler  v.  Jefferson  (143  Ala.  669), 

278,  934. 
Saffer   v    Levy    (88    N.   Y.    Supp. 

144),  880. 
Sage  V.  Halverson  (72  Minn.  294), 

924. 
Sage  V.  Wilcox   (6  Conn.  81),  519. 
St.  Albins  v.  Ellis  (16  East,  352), 

602. 
St.    Anthony   Falls   Water   Co.    v. 

Morrison  (12  Minn.  249),  934. 
St.  Bernard  v.  Kemper   (60  Ohio 

St.  244),  1373. 
St.  .John  V.  Quitzow   (72  111.  334), 

934. 
St,  Joseph  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.   St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.    (135  Mo.   173),   243, 
885. 
St.  Joseph  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.   St. 
Louis   J.  M.  &  S.  Ry.   Co.    (102 
Mo.  173),  1095. 
St.  Louis  V.  Merton    (6  Mo.  476), 

72. 
St.  Louis  A.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Trigg  (63 

Ark.  536),  686. 
St.  Louis  Brewing  Ass'n  v.  Kalten- 

bach   (108  Mo.  App.  637),  592. 
St.   Louis   Brew.    Ass'n  v.   Nieder- 
leucke  (76  S.  W.  Rep.  645),  245, 
249. 
St.  Louis  Public  Schools  v.  Boat- 
men's Ins.   &  Trust  Co.    (5  Mo. 
App.  91),  543. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall    (71 

Ark.  302),  191,  225,  686. 
St.  Louis  Type  Foundry  v.  Taylor 
(35  S.  W.  Rep.  691),  1446. 


St.  Mich.  P.  E.  Ch.  v.  Behrens  (10 

N.  Y.  Civ.  Pro.  Rep.  181),  1151. 

St.  Paul  Title  Ins.  Co.  v.  Diagonal 

Coal  Co.   (95  Iowa,  551),  1439. 
Salina  State  Bank  v.  Burr  (7  Kan. 

App.  197),  1435. 
Salisbury  v.   Marshal    (4   C.   &  P. 

65),  784. 
Salisbury  v.  Shirley  (66  Cal.  223), 

90.  518,   615,  1020,  1079. 
Sallade  v.  James   (6  Pa.  St.  144), 

1026.  1328. 
Salmon    v.    Matthews    (8    Mee.    & 

Wei.  825),  510,  541. 
Salmon  v.  Smith   (1  Saund.  204), 

1180. 
Salmon  v.   Swan    (Cro.   Jac.   619), 

1228. 
Salomon    v.    O'Donnell     (5    Colo. 

App.  35),  164. 
Salomon    v.    Weisberg    (61    N.    Y. 

Supp.  60),  250. 
Saloy  V.    Bloch    ri36   U.    S.    338), 

1438. 
Salter   v.    Burt    (20    Wend.    N.   Y. 

205),  356. 
Sammis   v.    Poole    (188    111.    396), 

1452. 
Sampson  v.  Camperdown  (64  Fed. 

Rep.  939),  1265,  1294. 
Sampson  v.   Easterby    (9   B.   &  C. 

505),  602. 
Sampson  v.  Grimes  (7  Blackf.  Ind. 

173),  491.  498. 
Sampson   v.   Grimes    (3   Har.   Del. 

82),  539. 
Sampson  v.  Henry  (11  Pick.  Mass. 

379),  237. 
Sampson  v.  Schaefer  (3  Cal.  196), 

212,  575. 
Samson  v.   Rose    (65   N.  Y.   411), 

1323,  1327. 
Samuelson     v.     Mining     Co.     (49 

Mich.  164),  793. 
San   Antonio  v.   French    (80   Tex. 

575),  74. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cxcni 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


San    Antonio    Brewing    Ass'n    v. 
Brentz    (Vt.   1905,   61   Atl.   Rep. 
368),  734. 
Sanborn    v.    Cree    (3    Colo.    149), 

1077. 
Sanborn    v.    Randall     (62    N.    H. 

620),  88,  90. 
Sanborn    v.    Sanborn    (104    Mich. 

180),  361. 
Sanborn  v.  "Van  Duyne   (90  Minn. 

215),  71. 
Sandel  v.  Douglass    (27  La.  Ann. 

629),  1318,  1325. 
Sanders  v.  Benson   (4  Beav.  350), 

1105. 
Sanders  v.  Bryer  (152  Mass.  141), 

717. 
Sanders  v.  Ellington    (77  N.  Car. 

255),  1306,   1311,  1334. 
Sanders  v.  Lord  Annesley  (2  Sch. 

&  Lef.  106),  969. 
Sanders   v.    Partridge    (108   Mass. 

556),  1045. 
Sanders   v.    Pope    (12    Ves.    282), 

663,  666. 
Sanders   v.   Richardson    (14   Pick. 

Mass.  522),  200. 
Sanders  v.  Smith   (23  N.  Y.  Supp. 

125),  860. 
Sanderson  v.  Berwick-upon-Tweed 

Cor.    (53  L.  J.  Q.  B.  559),  1131, 

1160. 
Sanderson    v.    Dobson     (1    Exch. 

145),  604. 
Sandhill  v.  Franklin   (L.  R.  10  C. 

B.  342),  512. 
Sandifer   v.    Grantham    (62   Miss. 

412),  54. 
Sandill  v.  Franklin  (44  L.  J.  C.  P. 

216), 173. 
Sandford  v.  Clarke  (57  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

507), 160. 
Sands  v.  Hughes    (53  N.  Y.  293), 

958. 
Sandwith  v.  De  Silver  (1  Browne, 

Pa.  221),  518,  1025. 


San  Filippo  v.  Posting  Co.   (98  N. 

Y.  Supp.  661),  837. 
Sanford     v.     Johnson     (24     Minn. 

172),  24,  191. 
Sanford  v.  Modine   (51  Neb.  728), 

312. 
Saner  v.  Bilton  (47  L.  J.  Ch.  267), 

858,  862,  904. 
San   Francisco   v.   Itzell    (80   Cal. 

57), 71. 
Sang  Shing  v.  Sire  (15  Misc.  Rep. 

139), 585. 
Santa  Rosa  Irr.  Co.  v.  Pecos  R.  I. 

Co.  (92  S.  W.  Rep.  1014),  338. 
Sapsford  v.  Fletcher  (1  T.  R.  511), 

545. 
Sargent  v.  Adams   (3  Gray,  Mass. 

72),  398,  456,  462. 
Sargent     v.     Parsons     (12     Mass. 

149), 83. 
Sargent  v.  Pray    (117  Mass.  267), 

1014. 
Sartwell     v.     Young     (126     Mich. 

304), 946. 
Saterfield  v.  Moore  (110  Ga.  514), 

1402. 
Sauer  v.  Meyer  (87  Cal.  34),  633. 
Saunder's  Case   (5  Coke,  12),  710. 
Saunders  v.   Blythe    (112   Mo.   1), 

351. 
Saunders  v.  Moore   (14  Bush,  Ky. 

97), 922, 1411. 
Saunders  v.  Musgrave   (6  B.  &  C. 

524),  134,  321. 
Sausser  v.   Steinmetz    (88  Pa.   St. 

324),  268,  377,  384,  562. 
Savage  v.   Mason    (3   Cush.   Mass. 

500), 614. 
Savings  Bank  of  Cinn.  v.  Benton 

(2  Mete.  Ky.  240),  65. 
Saving  Fund  v.   Marks    (3   Phila. 

Pa.  278),  550. 
Sawyer   v.    McGillicuddy    (81    Me. 

318), 813. 
Sawyer   v.    Sargent    (7    Pac.    Rep. 

120), 964. 


CXCIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[EEFEFSNCES    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Sawyer  v.  Twiss    (26  N.  H.  345), 

1331. 
Sawyers     v.     Zachery     (1     Head, 

Tenn.  21),  16. 
Savory  v.  Stocking  (4  Ciish.  Mass. 

607), 1120. 
Saxton    V.    Storage    Co.    (129    111. 

318).  615. 
Say  V.  Mattram   (19  Com.  Bench, 

N.  S.  479),  602. 
Say  V.  Stoddard  (27  Ohio  St.  478), 

206. 
Sayles  v.  Kerr  (4  App.  Div.  150), 

1086. 
Scaife    v.    Argall     (74    Ala.    473), 

122. 
Scaife   v.    Stovall    (67    Ala.    237), 

1424,1429. 
Scaltock  V.  Heuston  (1  L.  R.  C.  P. 

Div.  106),  489,  494. 
Sehaeffer    v.    Henkel     (75    N.    Y. 

378),  109. 
Schaidt    v.    Blaul    (66    Md.    141), 

441. 
Schanda  v.   Sulzberger    (40  N.  Y. 

Supp.  116),  831. 
Schee  v.  Wiseman    (79   Ind.  389), 

41,47. 
Scheel    v.    Alhambra    Mining    Co. 

(79  Fed.  Rep.  821),  442. 
Scheelky  v.  Koch   (119  N.  C.  80), 

1214. 
Scheldt  V.  Belz   (4  111.  App.  431), 

442,446. 
Schenck    v.    Mundorf    (2    Brown, 

Pa.  106),  689. 
Schenck  v.  Vannest  (4  N.  J.  Law, 

329), 523. 
Schenkel  v.  Lischinsky   (90  N.  Y. 

Supp.  300),  1044. 
Schermerhorn   v.   Gouge    (13   Abb. 

Prac.  N.  Y.  Rep.  313),  477,  783. 
Schieffelin  v.  Carpenter  (15  Wend. 

N.  Y.  400),  878,  898,  1193,  1201, 

1204. 
Schiff    V.    Potzlitzer    (101    N.    Y. 

Sui)p.  249),  831. 


Schilling  v.  Holmes  (23  Cal.  227), 

169. 
Schlavone  v.  Callahan   (102  N.  Y. 

Supp.  538),  848. 
Schlemmer  v.  North  (32  Mo.  206), 

1244. 
Schlitz    Brewery    Co.    r.    Nielson 

(110  N.  W.  Rep.  746),  750. 
Schloss   V.    Schloss    (11   Det.    Leg. 

N.  249),  1340. 
Schlumpf    V.    Sasake    (38    Wash. 

278), 587. 
Schmalzried   v.   White    (97    Tenn. 

36),  783,  915. 
Schmidt  v.   Cook    (12   Misc.   Rep. 

449), 824. 
Schmidt  v.  Pettit   (8  D.  C.   179), 

883,  892. 
Schmitt  v.  Cassilius  (31  Minn.  7), 

1463. 
Schneider  v.  Lord  (62  Mich.  141), 

133,146. 
Schneider     v.     White     (12     Oreg. 

503), 533. 
Schofield  V.  Hincks  (58  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

147), 764. 
Scholtz  V.  Dankert  (69  Wis.  416), 

464. 
School  Dist.  V.  Batsche  (106  Mich. 

330),  232,  300,  307. 
School    District   v.   Long    (10   Atl. 

Rep.  709),  927. 
Schott    V.    Harvey    (105    Pa.    St. 

222), 917. 
Schreiber  v.  Goldsmith   (70  N.  Y. 

Supp.  236),  284. 
Schroder   v.    Gemeinder    (10    Nev. 

355), 989. 
Schroeder  v.  King   (38  Conn.  78). 

756. 
Scbuck  V.  Schaub  (84  N.  Y.  Supp. 

896). 1379. 
Schuetz  v.  Bailey  (40  Me.  69),  97. 
Schuisler   v.    Ames    (16    Ala.    73), 

1223. 
Schulte  V.  Schoring   (2  Wash.  St. 

127),334,  341,  496. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


CXCV 


Freferexces  are  to  pages.] 


Schumacher  v.  Pabst  Brewing  Co. 

(78  Minn.  50),  94. 
Schurz    V.    McMenamy    (82    Iowa, 

432), 1467. 
Schutz  V.  Corn    (5  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

191),  862. 
Schuykill,    etc.    Co.     (58    Pa.    St. 

304), 958. 
Schuyler  v.  Coach  Co.    (29  W.  N. 

C.  343),  1444. 
Schuyler  v.  Leggatt  (4  Cow.  N.  Y. 

60),  146,  152,  196. 
Schuylkill,    etc.    Co.    v.    Schmoele 

(57  Pa.  St.  271),  697,  701. 
Schwandt  v.  Metzger  Lindseed  Oil 

Co.    (93  111.  App.  365),  804,  859. 
Schwarze    v.    Mahoney     (97    Cal. 

131), 947. 
Schwartz'  Estate   (14  Pa.  St.  42), 

51. 
Schwartz    v.    Monday    (98    N.    Y. 

Supp.  978),  807. 
Schwartz  v.   Salter   (40  La.   Ann. 

264), 844. 
Schwoerer  v.   Connelly    (88  N.  Y. 

Supp.  818),  7'36. 
Scobey  v.  Walker   (114  Ind.  254), 

351. 
Scoten    V.    Brown     (4    Har.    Del. 

324), 382. 
Scott  V.   Beecher    (91  Mich.   590), 

1210,  1214,  1215. 
Scott  V.  Bourdillion  (5  Bos.  &  Pul. 

213), 604. 
Scott    V.    Brown     (69    J.    P.    89), 

1027, 1030. 
Scott   V.    Elkins    (83    N.    C.    424), 

951. 
Scott  V.  Fisher  (4  T.  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

387), 552. 
Scott  V.  Fox  Optical  Co.  (38  Pitts. 

L.  J.  368).  412. 
Scott  V.  Gallagher  (14  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

333), 497. 
Scott   V.    Haversfraw    (135    N.    Y. 

141),  895,  914. 


Scott   V.   Hawsman    (21   Fed.   Cas. 

No.  12,532),  1195. 
Scott  V.  Levy  (6  Lea,  Tenn.  662), 

948. 
Scott  V.  Liverpool  (3  De  Gex  &  J. 

334), 572. 
Scott  V.  Montells    (109   N.  Y.   1), 

584. 
Scott   V.    Renfro    (106   Ala.    611), 

1432. 
Scott  V.   Simons    (54   N.   H.   426), 

847,  1142,  1176. 
Scott  V.    Slaughter    (35   Tex.    Civ. 

App.  524),  1046. 
Scott  v.  State  (29  Ga.  263),  778. 
Scott  V.  Willis   (122   Ind.  1),  156, 

369. 
Scott  Bros.  V.  Flood's  Trustee  (99 

S.  W.  Rep.  967),  1354. 
Scottish  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Taylor   (74 

S.  W.  Rep.  564),  252. 
Scrantin  v.  Booth  (29  Barb.  N.  Y. 

171), 519. 
Scruggs  v.  Railroad  Co.  (108  U.  S. 

368),  1267,  1271. 
Sculley  v.   Porter    (57   Kan.   322), 

1402,1429. 
Seaboard  Rl.  Co.  v.  Fuller  (67  N. 

Y.   Supp.  146),  1142,   1176. 
Seabrook    v.    Moyer    (88    Pa.    St. 

417), 1178. 
Seagram   v.   Knight    (1867,    2    Ch. 

App.  628),  726. 
Sealey   v.    Maris    (29    S.    W.    Rep. 

828), 960. 
Seaman  v.   Aschermann    (51   Wis. 

678), 266. 
Seaman  v.  Civill   (45  Barb.  N.  Y. 

267). 453. 
Seaman  v.  Ward  (1  Hilt.  N.  Y.  9). 

519. 
Sear  v.   House   Society    (50   L.   J. 

Ch.  77),  1045. 
Searle  v.   Powell    (89  Minn.   278), 

160.163. 
Sears  v.  Smith  "(3  Colo.  287),  378. 


excvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Seaver  v.  Thompson  (189  111.  158), 

455. 
Seavey  v.   Jones    (43   N.  H.   441), 

447. 
Sebastian    v.    Hill     (51    111.    App. 

272),  150,  151. 
Sec.ar,   In  re   (18  Fed.  Rep.  319), 

1122. 
Secar  v.  Pestana  (37  111.  525),  141. 
Second   Nat.   Bank  v.   Druiger    (2 

N.  J.  Law  J.  115),  1441. 
Second  Nat.   Bank  v.   Merrill    (69 

Wis.  501),  133,  1268,  1288. 
Security     Trust     Co.     v.     Liberty 
Building    Co.    (89    N.    Y.    Supp. 
340),  1013. 
Seddon   v.    Senate   "(13   East,   63), 

698. 
Seeley  v.   Alden    (6   Pa.    St.   352), 

686. 
Seem  v.  McLees  (24  111.  192),  159, 

163. 
Seers   v.    Hind    (1   Ves.   Jr.   294), 

1065. 
Seftbn  V.  Juillard  (71  N.  Y.  Supp. 

348), 1162. 
Segal    V.    Ensler    (16    Misc.    Rep. 

43), 562. 
Seiber  v.  Blanc  (76  Cal.  173),  782, 

861. 
Seidel   v.    Bloesser    (77   Mo.   App. 

172),  397,  416,  442. 
Seidenberg  v.  Jones  (63  Ga.  612), 

840. 
Seigel   V.   Neary    (77  N.  Y.   Supp. 

854),  1131,  1145,  1156. 
Seisel  v.  Folmar    (103   Ala.   491), 

1408, 1435. 
Seitzinger    v.    Alspach    (42    L.    I. 

68), 573. 
Selby  V.  Graves  (h.  R.  3  C.  P.  50), 

272,1340. 
Selby  V.  Selby  (3  Mer.  2),  388. 
Selden    v.    Camp     (95    Va.    527), 

1386. 
Seld'onridge  v.  Connoble   (32   Ind. 
375), 342. 


Semple    v.    Goehringer    (52    Minn. 

428), 1273. 
Semmes  v.  United  States    (26   Ct. 

CI.  119),  36. 
Senae   v.    Pritchard    (5    La.    480), 

1358. 
Serio  v.  Murphy  (99  Md.  545),  854. 
Settle    V.    Henson    (Morris,    Iowa, 

111), 938. 
Setton  V.  Slade   (7  Ves.  265),  982. 
Seudly   v.    Murray    (34    Mo.    420), 

146. 
Severn's  Case    (1  Leon,  122),  603. 
Sevier    v.    Shaw     (25    Ark.    417), 

1439. 
Sevier  v.  Shaw  (50  Ga.  213),  1409. 
Sewell  V.  Moore  [166  Pa.  St.  570), 

917. 
Sexton  V.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Coa- 
homa (86  Miss.  380),  112. 
Sexton    V.    Carley    (147    111.    269). 

948. 
Sexton    V.    Chicago    Storage    Co. 

(129  111.  318),  1048. 
Seyfert  v.  Bean    (83  Pa.  St.  450), 

108. 
Seymour  v.  Delancy  (6  Johns.  Ch. 

N.  Y.  223),  1002. 
Seymour    v.    Wyckoff    (10    N.    Y. 

213), 101. 
Shafer  v.  Smith  (7  Har.  &  J.  67), 

439. 
Shaffer  v.  State  Nat.  Bank  (37  La 

Ann.  242),  440. 
Shaft    V.    Carey    (107    Wis.    273), 

421,  697. 
Shahan  v.  Herzberg  (73  Ala.  59), 

1199,1309. 
Shakel  v.  Hennessey  (57  111.  App. 

332), 106. 
Shallies  v.  Wilcox  (4  Thomp.  &  C. 

N.  Y.  591),  564. 
Shand   v.   McCloskey    (27   Pa.    Su- 
per. Ct.  Rep.  260),  1222. 
Shanfelter     v.     Horner     (81     Md. 

621), 554. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXCVll 


[reiekences  aee  to  pages.] 


Shanks    v.    Greenville    (57    Miss. 

168), 1441. 
Shannon   v.   Burr    (1   Hilt.   N.   Y. 

39),  689. 
Shannon  v.  Grindstaff   (11  Wash. 

St.  536),  1053,  1096. 
Share  v.  Porter  (3  T.  R.  13),  128, 

216. 
Shares    v.    Brooks    (81    Ga.    468), 

691. 
Sharp  V.  Kinsman   (18  S.  C.  108), 

1311. 
Sharp  V.  Milligan   (23  Beav.  419), 

365. 
Sharp   V.   Palmer    (31   S.   C.   444), 

1466. 
Sharp   V.   Sharp    (Cro.   Eliz.   483), 

112. 
Sharps  v.  Kelly    (5  Denio,  N.  Y. 

431), 973. 
Sharpless'    Estate    (8    Lane.    Bar. 

Pa.  125),  523. 
Sharpless  v.  Murphy    (7  Del.  Co. 

Pa.  22),  583. 
Shattuck     V.     Lovejoy     (8     Gray, 

Mass.  204),  644. 
Shaw  V.  Bowman  (91  Pa.  St.  414), 

1324. 
Shaw    V.    Coffin    (14    C.    B.    N.    S. 

372),  622,  1055. 
Shaw     V.     Cummiskey     (7     Pick. 

Mass.  576),  689. 
Shaw    V.    Cunningham    (16    S.    C. 

631), 351. 
Shaw   V.    Foster    (27    L.    T.    281), 

628. 
Shaw  V.  Hall    (79  Mich.  86),  514. 
Shaw  V.  Hoffman   (25  Mich.  162), 

172,  220,  1185. 
Shaw   V.   Partridge    (17   Vt.    626), 

22,  492,  615. 
Shaw    V.    Shaw    (Vern.    &    Scrir. 

606), 13. 
Shawhan  v.  Long   (26  Iowa,  488), 

49. 
Shawmut    Nat.    Bank    v.    Boston 

(118  Mass.  125),  1343. 


Sheaff  V.    Husted    (60   Kan.   770), 

488. 
Shealey   v,   Clark    (117    Ga.    794), 

1453. 
Shear  v.  Fisher  (27  111.  App.  464), 

731. 
Shearer     v.     Winston     (33     Miss. 

149),  931,  946. 
Sheary  v.  Adams   (18  Hun,  N.  Y. 

181), 876. 
Sheble    v.    Curdt     (56    Mo.    437), 

1425,  1457. 
Shedlinsky  v.  Budweiser  Brewing 

Co.  (163  N.  Y.  137),  774. 
Sheen  v.  Ritchie  (5  M.  &  W.  175), 

1243. 
Sheets    v.    Jozner    (11    Ind.    App. 

209), 605. 
Sheets   v.    Selden    (7   Wail.   U.    S. 

423), 848. 
Shelby   v.    Heme    (6   Yerg.    Tenn. 

513),  489,  615,  884. 
Sheldon  v.  Connor    (48  Me.   584), 

1434. 
Sheldon    v.    Davey    (42    Vt.    637), 

141. 
Sheldon    v.    Edwards    (35    N.    Y. 

279), 1233. 
Sheldon    v.    Hamilton     (22    R.    I. 

230),  427,  428,  823. 
Sheldon    v.    Sherman     (42    N.    Y. 

484), 434. 
Shellar    v.    Shivers    (171    Pa.    St. 

569),  1252,  1265. 
Shelton  v.  Codman  (3  Cush.  Mass. 

318), 1081. 
Shelton  v.  Durham    (76  Mo.  434), 

353. 
Shelton    v.   Esluva    (6    Ala.    230), 

923. 
Sheo  V.  Seeling  (89  Mo.  App.  146), 

99. 
Shepard  v.  Martin    (31  Mo.   492), 

920. 
Shepard  v.  Rosenkranz   (109  Wis. 

58),  383,  1265,  1380. 


€XCV1U 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  ake  to  pages.] 


Shepard    v.    Spaulding     (4    Mete. 

Mass.  416),  1231,  1265. 
Shepardson    v.    Elmore    (19    Wis. 

424),  955,  1015. 
Shepherd     v.     Taylor     (105     Ala. 

507), 1435. 
Sherbourne  v.  Jones   (20  Me.  70), 

218,  322,  1306. 
Sheridan  v.  Farsee  (106  Mo.  App. 

495),  840. 
Sherlock  v.  Thayer  (4  Mich.  355), 

523. 
Sherman  v.  Ballon   (8  Cow.  N.  Y. 

304),  90. 
Sherman  v.  Fall  R.  I.  Works   (2 

Allen,  Mass.  524),  705. 
Sherman    v.    Fisher    (11    Detroit, 

Mich.  Leg.  N.  589),  934. 
Sherman  v.  Ludin    (79  App.  Div. 

37), 782. 
Sherman    v.    Wilder     (106    Mass. 

537), 774, 776. 
Sherman   v.   Williams    (113   Mass. 

481), 397. 
Shermer  v.   Paciells    (161  Pa.   St. 

69),  585. 
Sherwood  v.  Gardner   (2  City  Ct. 

Rep.  N.  Y.  88),  576. 
Sherwood    v.     Harral     (39     Conn. 

333),  1035,  1040. 
Sherwood  v.  Seaman  (15  N.  Y.  Su- 
per. Ct.  Rep.  127),  847. 
Shields   v.   Atkins    (2    Atk.    560), 

229. 
Shields  v.  Horback  (49  Neb.  262), 

964. 
Shields  v.  Lozear   (34  N.  J.  Law, 

496), 936. 
Shields  v.  Ohio  (95  U.  S.  319),  70. 
Shiff  V.  Ezekiel  (23  La.  Ann.  383), 

1464. 
Shindelback  v.  Moon   (32  Ohio  St. 

264), 822. 
Shine  V.   CxOugh    (1    Ball   &   Beat, 

d36),1278. 
Shinkle    v.    Blrney    (68    Ohio    St. 

328), 476, 783. 


Shinn   v.    Guyton    (109   Mo.    App. 

557), 493. 
Shinn  v.  Holmes  (25  Pa.  St.  142), 

24. 
Shipley   v.  Associates    (101  Mass. 

251),  808,  813. 
Shipley   v.   Caples    (17   Md.   179), 

440. 
Shipley  v.  Smith   (162  Ind.   526), 

19,  24. 
Shipman  v.  Beers    (2  Abb.   N.   C. 

435), 410. 
Shipman     v.     Mitchell     (64     Tex, 

174),  142,  152. 
Shippey  v.  Derision    (5  Esp.   10), 

385. 
Shirack  v.  Shirack  (44  Kan.  563), 

122. 
Shirk   V.    Adams    (130   Fed.    Rep. 

441), 1036. 
Shirk  V.  Hoffman  (57  Minn.  230), 

150,164. 
Shirley  v.  Newman   (1  Esp.  266), 

159, 176. 
Shirling  v.  Kennon    (Ga.  46  S.  E. 

Rep.  630),  1446,  1447. 
Shoemaker   v.    Crawford    (82    Mo. 

App.  487),  30g,  677,  696. 
Shoenberger's    Ex'rs   v.    Hay    (40 

Pa.  St.  132),  604. 
Shoninger  v.  Mann  (219  111.  242), 

812,  818,  819. 
Shouse    V.    Krusor    (24    Mo.    App. 

279),  49,  284. 
Shrewsbury  v.  Gould  (2  B.  &  Aid. 

487), 603. 
Shroder  v.  Brenneman  (23  Pa.  St. 

348), 439. 
Shropshire   v.    Behrens    (77    Tex. 

275), 65. 
Shuffler  v.  Turner  (111  N.  C.  297), 

51. 
Shughart    T.    Moore    (78    Pa.    St. 

469),  460. 
Shult  V.  Barker    (12   S.  &  R.  Pa. 

272), 717. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXCiX 


[references  ake  to  pages.] 


Shuman  v.   Smith    (100  Ga.   415), 

1184. 
Shumway     v.     Collins     (6     Gray, 

Mass.  227),   733,   1180. 
ShurtlefE  v.  Rile   (140  Mass.  213), 

15. 
Shuster  v.  Robinson   (3  Har.  Del. 

50), 1441. 
Shute   V.    Bills    (191    Mass.    433), 

465,  807. 
Shy  V.   Brackhouse    (7   Okl.    35), 

942. 
Sibbald's  Case  (83  N.  Y.  384),  358. 
Sibley     v.     Lawrence     (46     Iowa, 

563), 122. 
Sickles  V.   Shaw    (76  N.  Y.   Supp. 

319), 525. 
Sldebotham  v.   Holland    (64  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  200),  172. 
Siefke  v.  Koch  (31  How.  Pr.  N.  Y. 

383),  645,  1059. 
Siegel  V.  Colby  (61  111.  App.  315), 

456. 
Siggins    V.    McGill    (72    N.    J.    L. 

263),  804,  813. 
Slglar  V.  Malone  (3  Humph.  Tenn. 

16),  291,  944. 
Sigmund  v.  Howard  Bank  (29  Md. 

324),  672,  1158,  1160. 
Sigmund    v.    Newspaper    Co.     (82 

111.  ),  867. 

Sigur  V.  Lloyd   (1  La.  Ann.  421), 

874. 
Silbar    v.    Ryder    (63    Wis.    106), 

362,  877. 
Silber    v.    Larkin     (94    Wis.    9), 

1132, 1142. 
Sillers   v.   Lester    (48   Miss.    524), 

1428. 
Silsby  V.  Allen   (43  Vt.  172),  133. 
Silsendeger  v.   Scheich    (55  Mich. 

468), 220. 
Silva  V.  Bair  (141  Cal.  599),  1194, 

1238. 
Silva   V.   Campbell    (84   Cal.   420), 

646. 


Silvermann    v.    Lurie     (32    Misc. 

Rep.  734),  1176. 
Silvey   v.    Sumner    (61   Mo.   253), 

956,1228. 
Sigmund  v.  Newspaper  Co.  (82  111. 

App.  178),  151. 
Simanek  v.  Nemetz  (120  Wis.  42), 

1317. 
Simers  v.  Saltus   (3  Denio,  N.  Y. 

214),  956,  123?. 
Slmkin  v.  Ashurst  (1  Cr.  M.  &  R. 

261),  229,  233. 
Simmons    v.    Jarman    (122    N.    C. 

195),  140,  172. 
Simmons     v.     McAdaras     (6     Mo. 

App.  297),  1233,  1234. 
Simmons  v.  Pope  (84  N.  Y.  Supp. 

973), 262. 
Simmons    v.    Simmons     (46    Ala. 

304), 1096. 
Simmons    v.    Trumbo    (9    W.    Va. 

358), 342. 
Simon  v.  Seward  (54  N.  Y.  super. 

Ct.  405),  840. 
Simons  v.  Detroit  Twist  Drill  Co. 

(11  Detroit  Leg.  N.  141),  219. 
Simonson  v.  Burr   (121  Cal.  582), 

122. 
Simonton  v.  Loring  (68  Me.  164), 

808,838. 
Simpkins  v.  Cardele  Compress  Co. 

(113  Ga.  1050),  887. 
Simpkins  v.  Rogers   (15  111.  397), 

1326. 
Simpson    v.    Applegate     (75    Cal. 

342), 212. 
Simpson   v.   Biffle    (63   Ark.    289), 

122. 
Simpson     v.     Butcher     (1     Doug. 

50),  8. 
Simpson   v.    Gutteridge    (1   Madd. 

609),  55. 
Simpson   v.   Moorhead    (65   N.    J. 

Eq.  623),  1044,  1079. 
Simpson  v.  Mundee  (3  Kan.  172), 

334. 


cc 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Sims  V.  Eastland   (3  Head,  Tenn. 

368),  961. 
Sinclair  v.   Baggley    (4   M.   &   W. 

312), 343. 
Sinclair  v.  Jackson  (8  Cow.  N.  Y. 

543), 108. 
Singer    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Malean    (105 

Ala.  316),  66. 
Sinley   v.    Brown    (4    Pick.    Mass. 

137), 561. 
Sioux  Bank  v.  Honnold   (85  Iowa, 

352), 1447. 
Sipe   V.    Bartlett    (12   Ohio   C.    D. 

226), 296. 
Sire    V.    Long   Acre    Square    Bldg. 

Co.  (50  Misc.  Rep.  29),  544. 
Sire  V.  Rumbold  (39  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

85), 460. 
Sisson  V.   Kaper   "(75   N.   W.   Rep. 

),480. 

Sittel    V.    Wright    (122    Fed.    Rep. 

434),  177,  950. 
Skally  V.   Shute    (132  Mass.   367), 

1131,  1136,  1180. 
Skidmore  v.  Hay   (13  Hun,  N.  Y. 

441), 1015. 
Skinner  v.  Skinner  (38  Neb.  756), 

258,573. 
Skull  V.  Glenister  (11  W.  R.  368), 

416. 
Slater   v.    Stone    (Cro.   Jac.    645), 

861. 
Slattery    v.    Slattery     (120    Iowa, 

717), 958. 
Slaughter  v.  Mallet  Land  &  Cattle 

Co.   (72  C.  C.  A.  436),  986. 
Slee  V.   Manhattan   Co.    (1   Paige, 

N.  Y.  48),  1104. 
Sleigh     V.     Bateman     (Cro.     Eliz. 

487), 1197. 
Slingsby's  Case  (5  Rep.  18b),  610. 
Slingerland  v.  Morse  (7  Johns.  N. 

Y.   474),  537. 
Sloan  V.  Cantwell    (5  Cold.  Tenn. 

(571), 623. 
Sloan    V.    Hudson    (119    Ala.    27), 

1432. 


Slocum    V.    Brown    (22    Fed.    Cas. 

No.  12,934),  878. 
Slocum  V.  Seymour  (36  N.  J.  Law, 

138),  1306,  1336. 
Sloper  V.  Saunders  (29  L.  J.  N.  S. 

Ex.  275),  193. 
Small  V.  Clark   (97  Me.  304),  490. 
Smallman  v.  Agbarow    (Cro.  Jac. 

417), 25. 
Smart  v.  Allegaret  (14  Phila.  Pa. 

179), 1191. 
Smiley  v.  McLauthlin   (138  Mass. 

363),  560. 
Smiley    v.    Van    Winkle    (6    Cal. 

605), 1048, 1231. 
Smith  V.  Ankrim  (13  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

39),  557. 
Smith  V.  Atkins  (18  Vt.  461),  1404. 
Smith  V.  Aude  (46  Mo.  App.  631), 

500. 
Smith  V.  Barber   (89  N.  Y.  Supp. 

317),  673,  691. 
Smith  V.  Bell  (44  Minn.  524),  139, 

1381. 
Smith   V.   Berndt    (1   N.  Y.   Supp. 

108), 62. 
Smith  V.  Blake  (88  Me.  241),  513. 
Smith  V.  Boston    (36  N.  H.  458), 

1273. 
Smith    V.    Boyle     (66    Neb.    192), 

1301. 
Smith    V.    Brinker    (17    Mo.    148), 

1087. 
Smith  V.  Brown  (5  Rich.  Eq.  S.  C. 

291),  874. 
Smith  &  Bustard's  Case   (1  Leon, 

141),r.34. 
Smith  V.  Caldwell   (78  Ark.  333), 

1286. 
Smith  V.  Caputo  (14  Misc.  Rep.  9), 

252. 
Smith  V.  Carroll   (4  Greene,  Iowa, 

146), 1259. 
Smyth  V.  Carter  (8  Beav.  78),  713. 
Smith  V.  Chance  (2  B.  &  Aid.  753), 

1335. 
Smith  V.  Clark  (9  Dowl.  202),  175. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


CCl 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Smith  V.  Clark  (97  Me.  304),  629, 

645. 
Smith  V.   Colby    (136   Mass.    532), 

253. 
Smith  V.  Collins  (41  So.  Rep.  825), 

471. 
Smith   V.    Cooper    (39    Kan.    446), 

934. 
Smith    V.    Crosland    (106    Pa.    St. 

413), 920. 
Smith   V.   Day    (2   M.   &  W.   684), 

111,  241. 
Smith  V.  Dayton    C94   Iowa,  102), 

548,  1405,  1434,  1449. 
Smith  V.  Dodds  (35  Ind.  452),  47. 
Smith  V.  Donnelly  (87  N.  Y.  Supp. 

893), 785. 
Smith  V.  Dunn  (75  Mo.  559),  122. 
Smith  V.  Egginton  (43  L.  J.  C.  P. 

140),  489. 
Smith     V.      Eldridge      (15      Com. 

Bench,  236),  194,  577. 
Smith  V.  Faust  (2  Man.  &  G.  84), 

577. 
Smith  V.  Faxon    (156  Mass.   589), 

795. 
Smith  V.  Fortiscue  (48  N.  C.  65), 

685. 
Smith  V.  Fyler  (2  Hill,  N.  Y.  648), 

505. 
Smith  V.  Gayle  (58  Ala.  600).  976. 
Smith    V.    Gibson    (25    Neb.    511), 

992. 
Smith  V.   Goodman    (149    111.   75), 

1060,  1061. 
Smith  V.  Gummere    (39  N.  J.  Eq. 

17), 15. 
Smith   V.   Hall    (19   111.   App.    17), 

567. 
Smith  V.  Hall  (11  Me.  295),  563. 
Smith    V.    Harrison    (42    Ohio    St. 

ISO), 615. 
Smith    V.    Hart    (68    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1127), 1400. 
Smith  V.  Hartogg   (15  Rep.   641), 

557. 


Smith  V.  Heldman    (93   Md.  343), 

551. 
Smythe  v.    Henry    (41    Fed.   Rep. 

705),  933. 
Smith    V.    Hess    (48    N.    E.    Rep. 

1030), 1282. 
Smith  V.   Houston    (16  Ala.    Ill), 

235. 
Smith    V.    Huddleston     (103    Ala. 

223), 1440. 
Smith  V.  Humble   (15  C.  B.  321), 

1007. 
Smith   V.    Ingram    (90    Ala.    529), 

252,  253,  1060. 
Smith  V.  Kerr  (108  N.  Y.  31),  556, 

1199,1347. 
Smith  V.  Kerr  (33  Hun,  567),  555. 
Smith  V.  Kincaid  (1  111.  App.  620), 

873. 
Smith  V.  King   (22  Ala.  558),  51, 

52. 
Smith  V.  Leighton   (38  Kan.  544), 

1315. 
Smith  V.  Low  (1  Atk.  489),  10,  15, 

952. 
Smith  V.  Maberry   (61  Ark.  515), 

318.  320,  1402. 
Smith  V.  Mapleback  (1  T.  R.  441), 

1197. 
Smith  V.  Marrable  (11  M.  &  W.  5), 

784,  785,  1149. 
Smith  V.  Martin    (3   Saund.   400), 

446. 
Smith  V.  Mattingly   (96  Kj'.  228), 

726. 
Smith  V.  McGowan   (3  Barb.  N.  Y. 

404), 1237. 
Smith    V.    McLean     (22    111.    App. 
451).  864.  1136.  1155,  1340,  1344. 
Smith    V.    Meyer    (25    Ark.    609), 

1436. 
Smith    V.    Miller    (49    X.    J.    Law, 

521), 641, 642. 
Smith  V.  Morse  (20  La.  Ann.  220), 

326. 
Smith    V.    Mundy    (IS    Ala.    182), 
923. 


ceil 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Smith   V.    Neale    (2    Com.    Bench, 

N.  S.  67),  386. 
Smith  V.  Newman   (62  Kan.  318), 

956. 
Smith  V.  Niles   (20  Vt.  315),  115. 
Smith   V.    Niver    (2    Barb.    N.    Y. 

180),  1195,  1213. 
Smith  V.  Ogg  (16  Cal.  88),  182. 
Smith  V.  Park   (31  Minn.  70),  53, 

1264,  1265. 
Smith    V.    Pendergast    (26    Minn. 

318), 1198, 1199. 
Smith  V.  Perry    (29  N.  J.  L.  74), 

97. 
Smith    V.    Phillips    (43    Atl.    Rep. 

183),  380. 
Smith  V.  Phillips   (29  S.  W.  Rep. 

358),  696. 
Smith  V.  Phillips  Church   (107  N. 

Y.  610),  913. 
Smith  V.   Porter   (10  Gray,  Mass. 

66),  343,  351. 
Smith  V.   Putnam    (3   Pick.   Mass. 

221),  1054,  1065,  1322. 
Smith  V.  Raleigh   (3  Camp.  513), 

1178, 1180. 
Smith  V.  Rice   (56  Ala.  417),  309. 
Smith    V.    Robinson     (5    Reports, 

469),  1029. 
Smith  V.  Rowe  (31  Me.  312),  221. 
Smith  V.   St.  Michael    (3  E.  &  E. 

383), 283. 
Smith  V.  Scanlon  (21  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

169),  934. 
Smith    V.    Schulenberg    (34    Wis. 

41), 549. 
Smith    V.    Schultz    (89    Cal.    526), 

809. 
Smith   V.    Sharpe    (Busbee,   N.    C. 

91),  714. 
Smith  V.  Shepard  (15  Pick.  Mass. 

147),  1170,  1182,  1183. 
Smith   V.    Simons    (1   Root,   318), 

270. 
Smith   V.    Singleton    (71   Ga.    68), 

199,236. 


Smith  V.  Smith  (62  Mo.  App.  556), 

152, 164. 
Smith  V.  Smith  181  Tex.  45),  920. 
Smith  V.  Snyder  (168  Pa.  St.  514), 

165,176. 
Smith  V.  State   (6  Gill.  Md.  425), 

778. 
Smith  V.   Stewart    (6   Johns.   Ky. 

46),  317,  318. 
Smith   V.    Tabor    (46   Hun,    N.    Y, 

313), 1404. 
Smith  V.  Tankersfey  (20  Ala.  212), 

309. 
Smith  V.  Taylor  (9  Ala.  633),  31. 
Smith   V.   Thayer    (56   Minn.    93), 

1199. 
Smith  V.  Thomas   (82  Tenn.  324), 

49. 
Smith  V.   Thurston    (10   Mo.   App. 

48),  1184. 
Smith    V.    Towart    (2    Man.    &    G. 

841), 577. 
Smith  V.  Tritt  (1  Dev.  &  B.  N.  C. 

241),  291,  1329. 
Smith    V.    Wagner    (9    Misc.    Rep. 

122), 1060. 
Smith    V.     Werwenz     (185     Mass. 

229), 297. 
Smith  V.  Wheeler    (8  Daly,  N.  Y. 

135), 1213. 
Smith  V.   Whitbeck    (13   Ohio   St. 

471), 638. 
Smith     V.     Whitney     (147     Mass. 

479), 1252. 
Smith  V.  Wiggln    (48  N.  H.  105), 

439. 
Smith    V.    Wiley    (1    Baxt.    Tenn. 

418), 867. 
Smith  V.  Wise  (58  111.  141),  1175, 

1180. 
Smith's  Appeal    (69  Pa.   St.  474), 

716. 
Smithwick  v.  Ellison  (2  Ired.  N.  C. 

326), 1333. 
Smoot  V.  United  States  (38  Ct.  CI. 

418),  36. 
Smoot  V.  Wathen  (8  Mo.  522),  90. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCIH 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Smoyer  v.  Roth  (13  Atl.  Rep.  191), 

978. 
Smucker  v.  Grinberg   (27  Pa.  Su- 
per Ct.  Rep.  531),  1222. 
Smusch   V.   Kohn    (22    Misc.   Rep. 

344),  1250. 
Smythe  v.  Sprague  (149  Mass.  10), 

391. 
Snead   v.    Tietjen    (24    Pac.    Rep. 

324), 463. 
Snedaker  v.  Powell  (32  Kan.  395), 

302. 
Snedeker    v.    Warring    (12    N.    Y. 

170), 1256. 
Snell   V.   Rickette    (28   Neb.    616), 

1400, 1403. 
Snideman  v.  Snideman    (118  Ind. 

162), 156. 
Snodgrass   v.    Chestnut    (105   Ala. 

149), 694. 
Snodgrass    v.    Reynolds    (79    Ala. 

452),  673,  694. 
Snook  &  Austin  Fur  Co.  v.  Steiner 

(113  Ga.  363),  416,  442. 
Snook  V.    Steiner    (117    Ga.    363), 

369. 
Snook  V.   Sutton    (10  N.    J.   Law, 

133),  15. 
Snow  V.  Perkins    (60  N.  H.  493), 

1334. 
Snow  V.  Pulitzer  (142  N.  Y.  263), 

1146,1185. 
Snowhill    V.    Diamond    (77    N.    E. 

Rep.  412),  535. 
Snowhill  V.  Reed  (49  N.  J.  L.  292), 

463,  897,  898. 
Snowhill  V.  Snowhill   (23  N.  J.  L. 

447), 162. 
Snyder  v.  Gordon   r46  Hun,  N.  Y. 

538),  795,  796. 
Snyder     v.     Harding     (34     Wash. 

236),  28. 
Snyder  v.  Hersberg  (33  Leg.  Int. 

158), 413. 
Snyder  v.   May    (19   Pa.   St.   235), 

92. 


Snyder    v.    Parker    (75    Mo.    App. 

529), 1213. 
Snyder  v.  Webb  (3  Cal.  83),  21. 
Soames  v.  Nicholson    (71  Law  J. 

K.  B.  24),  165,  173. 
Sohier  v.   Coffin  "(101  Mass.  179), 

111. 
Sohier    v.    Eldredge     (103     Mass. 

345), 49. 
Soloman  v.  Evans    (3   McCord,   S. 

C.  274),  342. 
Solomon    v.    Fantozzi     (43    Misc. 

Rep.  61),  1132. 
Sontag   V.    O'Hare    (73    111.    App. 

432), 859. 
Sorsbie  v.  Park    (12  Mee.  &  Wei. 

146), 609. 
Souders  v.  Vansickle  (8  N.  J.  Law, 

313), 482. 
Soulard    v.    Peck     (49    Mo.   477), 

1018. 
Soule   V.    Union   Bank    (45    Barb. 

N.  Y.  Ill),  1042. 
Souter  V.  Drake   (5  Barn.  &  Adol. 

992), 1077. 
South  Baltimore  Co.  v.  Muhlbach 

(69  Md.  395),  380. 
South  V.  Marcum    (22  S.  W.  Rep. 

844), 958. 
South    Cong.    Meeting    House    v. 

Hilton     (11    Gray,    Mass.    407). 

624. 
South's  Adm'x  v.  Marcum  (15  Ky. 

Law,  339),  481. 
Southard  v.  Railroad  Co.  (26  N.  J. 

Law,  21),  640. 
Southern  Development  Co.  v.  Sil- 
ver (125  U.  S.  250),  475. 
Southern   Oil   Co.   v.   Colquitt    (69 

S.  W.  Rep.  169),  124. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Horine   (Ky. 

1904,  49  S.  E.  Rep.  285),  686. 
Southwick    V.     Ellison     (2     Ired. 

Law,  N.  C.  326),  1332. 
Soux  Bank  v.  Honnold   (85  Iowa, 

352),  1404. 


CCIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED, 


[rrferexces  are  to  pages.] 


Soward   v.  Leggett    (7   Car.   &  P. 

613), S88. 
Sowles  V.  Can-  (69  Vt.  414),  1224. 
Sowles    V.    Martin    (76    Vt.    180), 

311,316. 
Spafford  v.  Meagley  (1  Ohio  Dec. 

364), 885. 
Spaine    v.    Stiner    (81    App.    Div. 

481), 828. 
Spalding  v.    Hall    (6    D.    C.    123), 

158,678. 
Spalding   v.    Humford    (Mo.    App. 

281), 1349. 
Spalding  Hotel  Co.  v.  Emerson  (69 

Minn.  292),  758. 
Span  V.  Ely  (8  Hun,  258),  795. 
Spann    v.    Eagle    Machine    Works 

(87  Ind.  474),  571. 
Spangler    v.    Rogers     (123     Iowa, 

724), 1377. 
Sparks  v.  Bassett  (49  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  270),  876. 
Sparks    v.    Smith    (2    Vern.    275), 

1106. 
Sparrow  v.  Pond   (49  Minn.  412), 

1306. 
Spaulding    v.    Abbott    (55    N.    H. 

423),  446,  447. 
Spear  v.  Fuller  (8  N.  H.  174),  622. 
Speckman     v.     Boehm     (36     App. 

Div.  262),  788. 
Speckles  v.    Sax    (1   E.  D.   Smith, 

N.  Y.  253),  459,  856,  1152. 
Speed    V.    Brooks     (30    Ky.    119), 

349. 
Speers    v.    Black     (34    Mo.    101), 

1279. 
Spellman  v.  Banigan   (36  Hun,  N. 

Y.  174),  804,  860. 
Spencer  v.  Burton  (5  Blackf.  Ind. 

57).  672,  1190. 
Spencer  v.  Campbell    (9   W.  &  S. 

Pa.  32),  904. 
Spencer's   Case    (5   Rep.    16),    510, 

614. 
Spencer    v.    Commercial    Co.     (39 

Wash.  22),  1287. 


Spencer    v.    Hamilton    (113    N.   C. 

49), 879. 
Spencer  v.  Stevens  (IS  Misc.  Rep. 

112), 616. 
Spendlomes   v.   Burkitt    (Hob.    7), 

61. 
Spero  V.  Levy  (43  Misc.  Rep.  24), 

859. 
Sperry   v.    Miller    (8    N.    Y.    336), 

1239. 
Sperry  v.   Sperry    (8  N.   H.   477), 

638,1230. 
Spicer  v.  Lea   (1  East,  312),  172. 
Spielman   v.   Kilest    (36  N.   J.  Eq. 

199),  392,  1111. 
Spies  V.  Voss  (16  Daly,  171),  1207, 

1210,  1215. 
Spofford  V.  United  States    (32  Ct. 

CI.  452),"  35,  164. 
Sposato  V.  City  of  New  York   (75 

App.  Div.  304),  684. 
Sprague  v.  Quinn"(108  Mass.  553), 

189. 
Sprague  v.  Rooney  (104  Mo.  347), 

773. 
Sprague  N.  Bank  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(48  N.  Y.  Supp.  65),  288,  1297. 
Spratt   V.    Early    (69    S.    W.    Rep. 

13),  122. 
Spratt  V.  Jeffry   (10  B.  &  C.  249), 

1076. 
Spring   Brook    Ry.   Co.    v.   Lehigh 

Co.  (181  Pa.  St.  294),  518. 
Springer   v.    Chicago   R.    E.    Loan 

Co.   (202  III.  17),  644.  1080. 
Springer  v.  Citizens'  Natural  Gas 

Co.    (145  Pa.  St.  430),  1076. 
Si)ringer   v.   Cooper    (11    III.   App. 

267), 254. 
Springer  v.  De  Wolf  (194  111.  218), 

1092. 
Springer    v.    Ford     (88    111.    App. 

529), 818. 
Springstein   v.    Schermerhorn    (12 

.lohns.  N.  Y.  357),  1195,  1226. 
Sl)yvy   V.   Topham    (3   East,   115), 

367. 


T.VBLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCV 


[references  aee  to  pages.] 


Squire  v.  Ferd.  Heim  Brewing  Co. 

(90  Mo.  App.  462),  262,  1213. 
Squier  v.  Mayer    (2  Freem.   249), 

1256. 
Squire  v.  Leonard   (81  N.  E.  Rep. 

880), 1054. 
Squires  v.   Huff    (3  A.   K.   Marsh. 

Ky.  18),  189. 
Staber  v.  Collins  "(124  Iowa,  543), 

1432,  1457,  1459. 
Stables  v.  Ashley  (1  Bos.  &  P.  49), 

798. 
Stack  V.  Harris  (111  Ga.  149),  805. 
Stackberger   v.    Mosteller    (4    Ind. 

461), 378. 
Stackpole  v.  Curtis   (32  Me.  383), 

437. 
Stackpoole   v.    Parkinson,   Jr.    (R. 

8  C.  L.  561),  171. 
Stacy   V.    Bostwick    (48   Vt.    192), 

965,966. 
Stacy  V.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co.  (32 

Vt.  551),  318. 
Stadel    V.    Aikins    (65    Kan.    82), 

1431. 
Stafford  v.  Adair  (57  Vt.  63),  192. 
Stafford  v.   Pearson    (26  La.  Ann. 

658), 1418. 
StaiTord  v.  Staunton  (88  Ga.  298), 

464, 1340. 
Stafford     Corporation     v.     Til     (4 

Bing.  75),  579. 
Stagg  V.  Eureka  T.  &  Cr.  Co.   (56 

Mo.  317),  934. 
Stagg  V.   Jackson    (1   N.   Y.   206), 

51. 
Staines  v.  Morris   (1  V.  &  B.  11), 

520. 
Siallard  v.  Gushing  (76  Gal.  472), 

440. 
Stamford    Bank    v.    Benedict    (15 

Conn.  437),  552. 
Stamps  V.  Gilman   (43  Miss.  456), 

1400,1465. 
Standard    Brewery   v.    Kelley    (66 

111.  App.  267),  592. 


Standen  v.  Christmas  (10  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  135),  639,  489,  576. 
Standley  v.  Stevens  (66  Gal.  541), 

947. 
Stanley  v.    Towgood    (3    Bing.   N. 

C.  4),  893,  857,  889. 

Stanley   v.    Turner    (68    Vt.    315), 

527,  554. 
Stannard    v.    Forbes    (6    A.    &    E. 

572), 698. 
Stanton  v.  Allen    (32   S.  C.   587), 

756. 
Stanton  v.  Willson   (3  Day,  Conn. 

37),  18. 
Stantz  V.  Protzman    (84   111.  App. 

434), 388. 
Staples  V.  Emery   (7  Greene,  Me. 

201), 1332. 
Staples  V.  Wheeler   (38  Me.   372), 

342. 
Starke  v.  J.  M.  Guffey  Pet.  Co.  (86 

S.  W.  Rep.  1),  69. 
Starkey  v.  Horton   (65  Mich.  96), 

1396. 
Starkweather  V.  Maginnis   (196  111. 

274), 1175. 
Starr  v.  Jackson    (11  Mass.   519), 

679,  680,  689. 
State  V.  Abraham    (6   Iowa,   117), 

778. 
State   V.    Board   of   Public    Works 

(42  Ohio  St.  607),  117. 
State  V.  Boyce  '(73  Md.  469),  805. 
State   V.    Boyce    (109    N.   C.    739), 

951. 
State  V.  Curtis  (4  Dev.  &  B.  N.  C. 

222), 300. 
State   V.    Elmore    (68    S.    C.    140), 

1402, 1410. 
State   V.    Flavell    (24    N.    J.    Law, 

370). 61. 
State   V.    Forsythe    (89    Mo.    667), 

454. 
State  V.  Frazier  (79  Me.  95).  778. 
State   V.   Gemmill    (1   Houst.   Del. 

9),  1306. 
State  V.  Hayes  (59  N.  H.  450),  24. 


CCVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


state  V.  Idler  (54  N.  J.  Law,  467), 

486. 
State   V.    Martin    (14    Lea,    Tenn. 

92), 1021. 
State  V.  McClay  (1  Har.  Del.  520), 

676. 
State  V.  Page  (1  Speers,  S.  C.  408), 

303. 
State  V.  Pottmeyer  (33  Ind.  402), 

434. 
State   V.   Reeder    (36    S.   C.   497), 

1419. 
State  ex  rel.  Attorney  General  v. 

Schweickart   (109  Mo.  346),  78. 
State   V.    Sheppard    (33   La.    Ann. 

1216), 1338. 
State  V.   Shertinger    (51  N.  J.  L. 

452), 150. 
State  V.  Skith    (15  R.  L  24),  778. 
State  V.  Turner   (106  N.  C.  691), 

1338. 
State   V.   Vandever    (2    Har.    Del. 

397), 1441. 
State  Trust  Co.  v.  Casino  Co.   (46 

N.  Y.  Supp.  292),  1110. 
Stautz  V.   Protzman    (84  111.  App. 

434), 527. 
Stavely  v.  Alcock   (16  Q.  B.  636), 

91. 
Stead   V.    Dowher    (10    Ad.    &   El. 

57), 387. 
Stearns  v.  Godfrey   (16  Me.  158), 

968. 
Stearns  v.  Sampson   (59  Me.  568), 

1298. 
Steams  v.  Stearns   (1  Pick.  Mass. 

157),  51,  52. 
Stedraan  v.   Bates    (1  Ld.   Raym. 

640),  90. 
Stedraan  v.  Gassett   (18  Vt.  346), 

232. 
Stedraan    v.    Mcintosh    (27    N.    C. 

571), 179. 
Stedraan  v.  Paxton    (18  Vt.  346), 

141. 
Steed    V.    Hinson    (76    Ala.    298), 

491. 


Steefel  v.   Rothschild    (179   N.  Y, 

273),  788,  789,  1240. 
Steel   V.    Frick    (56   Pa.    St.    172), 

310,  697. 
Steele  v.  Bond  (32  Minn.  14),  988. 
Steele  v.  Buck   (61  111.  343),  901. 
Steen    v.    Scheel     (46    Neb.    252),. 

258,  1378,  1383. 
Steen  v.  Wardsworth  (17  Vt.  297), 

941. 
Stees     V.     Bergmeier     (90     Minn. 

513),138L 
Stees   V.    Kranz    (32    Minn.    313), 

757,  1098. 
Staff  ens  v.  Earl  (40  N.  J.  L.  128^, 

150,  156,  159,  163,  172. 
Stein  V.  Hauck   (56  Ind.  65),  409. 
Stein  V.  Rice  (51  N.  Y.  Supp.  320), 

1347. 
Steinweg   v.    Biel    (16    Misc.    Rep. 

47), 839. 
Steketee  v.  Pratt   (122  Mich.  80), 

1207. 
Stele  V.  Martin    (4  B.  &  C.  273), 

343. 
Stenberg    v.    Willcox    (12    Pickle, 

Tenn.  163),  792,  805. 
Stephens  v.  Adams  (93  Ala.  117), 

1411,  1449,  1450. 
Stephen  v.  Bridges   (6  Madd.  66), 

1230. 
Stephens  v.   Brown    (56   Mo.   23), 

155,182. 
Stephens  v.  Eliot  (Cro.  Eliz.  4S4), 

112. 
Stephens  v.   Ely    (162   N.  Y.   79), 

1287. 
Stephens  v.  Graham  (7  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

505), 343. 
Stephens  v.  Hotham    (1  Kay  &  J. 

571),  1395. 
Stephens    v.    Reynolds    (6    N.    Y. 

454),   120,  503. 
Stephens    v.    Taylor     (36    S.    W. 

Rep.  1083),  83. 
Stephenson  v.  Elliott  (2  Ind.  App. 

233),  676. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCVll 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Sterger  v.  Van  Slclen    (132  N.  Y. 

499),  837,  859. 
Stern  v.  Murphy  (102  N.  Y.  Supp. 

797),  526,  1213. 
Stern  v.  Sawyer  (78  Vt.  5),  596. 
Sternberg    v.    Burke     (84    N.    Y. 

Supp.  862),  804. 
Sterne,  Ex  parte  (6  Ves.  156),  43. 
Sterrett    v.    Wright     (27    Pa.    St. 

259),  519,  575. 
Stetson  V.  Briggs    (114  Cal.  511), 

348. 
Stetson  V.  Day   (51  Me.  434),  712. 
Steuber  v.   Huber   (107  App.  Div. 

599),  3,  945. 
Stevens    v.    Lessa    (50    App.    Div. 

547), 1112, 1118. 
Stevens    v.    "Pantlind     (87     Mich. 

476), 1222. 
Stevens  v.  Peirce  (151  Mass.  207), 

463,  782,  785. 
Stevens  v.  Pinney  (8  Taunt.  327), 

582, 
Stevens  v.  Raab  (9  Mo.  App.  573), 

1183. 
Stevens  v.   Rose    (69   Mich.   259), 

711. 
Stevens    v.     Salamon     (31     Misc. 

Rep.  19),  406. 
Stevens  v.  Taylor  (97  N.  Y.  Supp. 

925),  442,  444. 
Stevenson    v.    Hancock     (72    Mo. 

612),  491,  1228. 
Stevenson    v.    Lambard    (2    East, 

575), 1178. 
Steward  v.  Keener  (131  N.  C.  486), 

944. 
Stewart    v.    Apel    (5    Houst.    Del. 

189), 146. 
Stewart  v.  Brand   (23  Iowa,  477), 

122. 
Stewart  v.  Doughty   (9  Johns.  N. 

Y.  108),  1306,  1310,  1315. 
Stewart  v.  Finch    (31  N.  J.  Law, 

17),  258. 
Stewart  v.   Garter    (70   Md.    242). 

121. 


Stewart  v.  Lanier  House   (75  Ga. 

582),  563,  857. 
Stewart  v.  L.  L  R.  Co.   (102  N.  Y, 

601),  1080. 
Stewart  v.  Murrell   (65  Ark.  471), 

163. 
Stewart  v.  Perkins  (3  Oreg.  508), 

539. 
Stewart    v.    Pier    (58    Iowa,    15), 

1279. 
Stewart  v.   Roderick    (4   Watts   & 

S.  Pa.  188),  948. 
Stewart  v.  Sprague  (71  Mich.  50), 

1175,  1215. 
Stewart  v.  Winters  (4  Sandf.  Ch. 

N.  Y.   587),  729,  735,   757. 
Stickney  v.  Burlce  (64  N.  H.  377), 

221. 
Stickney    v.    Stickney    (77    Iowa, 

699),  312. 
Stiefol    V.    Rothschild    (72    N.    Y, 

Supp.  171),  1239. 
Stiger   V.   Monroe    (109    Ga.    457), 

1134. 
Stiles  V.  Brown   (16  Vt.  564),  349. 
Stillman  v.  Harvey  (47  Conn.  26), 

1057. 
Still's    Estate    (2    Pa.    Dist.    Rep. 

105),  54. 
Stines    v.    Dorman    (25    Ohio    St. 

580),   742. 
Stinson  v.   Stinson    (38  Me.   593), 

49. 
Stirn  V.  Nash   (19  Civ.  Pro.  R.  N. 

Y.   184),  413. 
Stobie  V.  Dills   (62  111.  432),  60. 
Stockdale  v.  Ascherberg  (73  L.  J. 

K.  B.  206),  1028. 
Stocker  v.  Planet  Building  Society 

(27  W.  R.  877),  862. 
Stockett  V.  Howard   (34  Md.  121), 

616. 
Stockton    V.     Stockton     (40     Ind. 

225),  1195. 
Stockton   Savings  &  Loan  Soc.  v. 

Purvis    (112  Cal.  236),  1404. 


ceviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[keferences  are  to  pages.] 


Stockwell     V.     Hunter     (11     Met. 

Mass.   448),   1342. 
Stockwell  V.  Marks   (17  Me.  455), 

156,  234,  1264. 
Stockwell  V.  Sargent   (37  Vt.  16), 

52. 
Stoddard    v.    Whiting    (46    N.    Y. 

627),  331. 
Stoepel    V.   Union   Trust   Co.    (121 

Mich.  282),  1062. 
Stokes    V.    Burney     (3    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  219),  1423,  1446. 
Stokes  V.   Cooper    (3  Camp.   513), 

1176.  • 
Stokes  V.  Hoffman  House  (167  N. 

Y.  544),  1122. 
Stokes  V.  Moore  (1  Cox.  219),  388. 
Stoker  v.  Wilson,  377. 
Stokoe    V.    Upton    (40    Mich.    58), 

1264. 
Stoltz    V.    Kretschmar     (24    Wis. 

283),  686. 
Stomfil    V.    Hicks    (2    Salk.    413), 

130. 
Stone   V.    Ashley    (13    N.    H.    38), 

333. 
Stone  V.  Bohm  (79  Ky.  141),  1425. 
Stone  V.  Evans  (Peake,  Ad.  C.  94), 

1106. 
Stone  V.  Harmon   (31  Minn.  512), 

989. 
Stone  V.  Knight  (3  Met.  Mass.  76), 

1112. 
Stone    V.    Oconomowoe    (71    Wis. 

155),  72. 
Stone  V.  Patterson  (19  Pick.  Mass. 

476),  35,  531. 
Stone  V.   St.   Louis   Stamping  Co. 

(155  Mass.  267),  1379. 
Stone   V.    Snell    (109   N.   W.   Rei). 

750),  496. 
Stone  V.  Sprague   (20  Barb.  N.  Y. 

509),  317,  537. 
Stone  V.  Stone   (1  R.  I.  425),  334. 
Stone's    Succession    (31   La.   Ann. 

311),  1422. 
Stone  V.  Talbot  (4  Wis.  442),  552. 


Stone  V.  Whiting   (2  Stark.  235), 

181. 
Stoney    v.    Winterhalter    (11    Atl. 

Rep.  Pa.  611),  351. 
Stoppelkamp  v.  Mangeot    (42  Cal. 

316),  139,  151. 
Storch    v.    Harvey    (45    Kan.    39 )„ 

1378. 
Story  v.  Epps   (105  Ga.  504),  284. 
Story  V.  Odin  (12  Mass.  157),  1146. 
Story  V.  Ulman  (88  Md.  244),  1229. 
Stose    V.    Heisler    (120    111.    436), 

527,  1272. 
Stotesburg  v.   Vail    (13   N.  J.   Eq. 

390),  1195,  1238. 
Stoughton's    Appeal     (88    Pa.    St. 

198),  13. 
Stout    V.    Folger    (34    Iowa,    71), 

1014. 
Stout    V.    Merrill     (35    Iowa,    47), 

954. 
Stover    V.    Chasse    (6    Misc.    Rep. 

394),  1048. 
Stover    v.    Hazelbaker     (42    Neb. 

393),  646. 
Stowman  v.  Landis    (5  Ind.  430), 

522. 
Strafford    v.    Wentworth    (9    Mod. 

21,  Pre.  Ch.  555),  540. 
Strahan    v.    Smith    (4    Bing.    96), 

511. 
Strain   v.  Gardner   (61  Wis.   174), 

310,  921,  1319. 
Strangeway  v.  Eiseman  (68  Minn. 

395),  809. 
Strauss  v.   Baley    (58   Miss.    131), 

1418,  1438. 
Strauss  v.  Hammersley   (13  N.  Y. 

Supp.  816),  796. 
Strautz  v.  Protzman   (84  111.  App. 

434),  1340. 
Street    v.    Nelson    (80    Ala.    230), 

685,  1300,  1336. 
Street  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Morrison    (IGO 

111.  280),  46G. 
Streeter   v.    Ward    (12    N.    Y.    St. 

Rep.  333),  1404,  1456. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCIX 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Strehl  V.  D'Evers  (66  111.  77),  382. 
Strickland    v.    Hudson    (55    Miss. 

235),  573. 
Strickland  v.  ParkQr  (54  Me.  263), 

1247. 
Strickland  v.  Stiles  (107  Ga.  308), 

1413,  1417. 
Strohecker  v.  Barnes  (21  Ga.  430), 

868. 
Strohmeyer  v.  Zeppenfeld  (28  Mo. 

App.  268),  601. 
Strong  V.  Crosby   (21  Conn.  498), 

146,  196. 
Strong  V.   Doyle    (110   Mass.   92), 

1333. 
Strong  V.  Schmidt   (8  Ohio  C.  D. 

551),  1214. 
Strong  V.  Stringer   (61  L.  T.  410), 

655. 
Stroud,   In  re   (8  C.  B.  502),  133, 

466. 
Stuart   V.   Diplock    (59   L.    J.    Ch. 

142),  741. 
Stuart  V.  Twining  (112  Iowa,  154), 

1439. 
Stule  V.  Mart  (6  D.  &  R.  392),  348. 
Stultz  V.  Dickey  (5  Binn.  Pa.  285), 

687. 
Stultz  V.  Locke  (47  Md.  562),  885, 

915. 
Sturgeon  v.  Wingfield  (15  M.  &  W. 

224),  941,  952. 
Sturges  V.  Van   Orden    (75  N.  Y. 

Supp.  1007),  939. 
Sturm wald  v.  Schrieber  (74  N.  Y. 

Supp.  995),  825. 
Stuyvesant  v.  Davis  (9  Paige,  Ch. 

N.  Y.  427),  644. 
Stuyvesant  v.  Woodruff   (21  N.  J. 

Law,  133),  445. 
Suddarth   v.    Robertson    (118   Mo. 

286),  927. 
Suffern  v.  Townsend   (9  Johns.  N. 

Y.  35).  222. 
Sugg  V.  Parrar  (107  N.  Car.  123), 

1453. 


Sulphine  v.  Dunbar  (55  Miss.  255), 

946. 
Sullivan  v.  Carberry  (67  Me.  531), 

1269. 
Sullivan    v.    Cleveland    (62    Tex. 

677),  1439. 
Sullivan  v.   Enders    (3  Dana,  Ky. 

66),  189. 
Sullivan    v.    Jones    (3    Car.    &    P. 

579),  577. 
Sullivan  v.   Lueck    (105  Mo.  App. 

199),  500. 
Sullivan  v.  Schmitt  (93  App.  Div. 

469),  672,  673. 
Sullivan's    Estate    (23    L.    R.    Jr. 

255),  386. 
Sully  v.  Schmitt   (147  N.  Y.  248), 

1142,  1150,  1207,  1355. 
Sulzbacher  v.  Dickie  (51  How.  Pr. 

N.  Y.  500),  802,  863. 
Summer    v.    Clark    (30    La.    Ann. 

436),  392. 
Summer    v.     Williams     (8     Mass. 

163),  17. 
Summerville  v.  Kelliher  (144  Cal. 

155),  1120. 
Summerville   v.    Stockton    Milling 

Co.  (142  Cal.  529),  312,  1409. 
Sunasack  v.  Mory    (196   111.  519), 

678,   797. 
Sunday  Coal  Co.  v.  Dikeman    (84 

111.  App.  379),  1386. 
Sunday  Lake  Mining  Co.  v.  Wake- 
field (72  Wis.  204),  668,  669. 
Sunderland    v.    Newton     (3    Sim. 

450),  1304. 
Sunrlerlin    v.    Hollister     (4    App. 

Div.  478),  811. 
Sun  Ins.  Co.  v.  Varble  (20  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  556),  847,  883,  1354. 
Sup.  Conn.  v.  F.  &  C.  Co.  (63  Fed. 

Rep.  48),  342. 
Supplee  v.   Timothy    (124   Pa.   St. 

375),  178. 
Surget  V.  Arighi  (11  S.  &  M.  Miss. 
87),  701. 


ccx 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Surplice  v.  Farnsworth  (7.  M.  &  G. 

576),  785. 
Sury  V.  Brown   (Lutch,  99),  48. 
Sutcliffe   V.    Wardle    (63    Law    T. 

329),  992. 
Sutherland  v.   Goodnow    (108   III. 

528),   615,  1383,  1391. 
Sutliff    V.    Atwood    (15    Ohio    St. 

186),  547,  616. 
Sutphen  v.   Seebas    (14  Abb.  67), 

1152. 
Sutter   V.   Lackman    (39   Mo.   41), 

42,  47. 
Sutton   V.   Foulke    (2   Pa.   Co.   Ct. 

529),  1129. 
Sutton  V.   Hawkins    (8  Car.   &  P. 

259),  537. 
Sutton   V.    Hiram   Lodge    (83    Ga. 

770),  229,  370. 
Sutton  V.  Temple  (12  Mees.  &  W. 

52),  785,  787,  848. 
Suydam  v.  Jackson  (54  N.  Y.  450), 

1355. 
Swain   v.   Mizner    (8   Gray,   Mass. 

182),   282. 
Swaine    v.    Homan     (Hob.    203), 

1200. 
Swan  V.  Busby   (5  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

63),  946,  947,  948. 
Swan  V.  Castleman  (4  Baxt.  Tenn. 

257),   951. 
Sv.-an  V.  Clark   (80  Ind.  57),  146. 
Swan  V.  Inderlied  (187  N.  Y.  372), 

1113. 
Swan  V.  Kemp   (97  Md.  686),  121, 

453. 
Swansey  v.  Brooks    (34  Vt.   451), 

446,  447. 
Swart  V.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.   (12 

Det.  Leg.  N.  609),  192,  271. 
Swartz  V.  Swartz  (4  Pa.  St.  353), 

438. 
Swayze   v.   Monroo    (40    So.    Rep. 

926),  299. 
Sweeney  v.  St.  John   (28  Hun,  N. 

Y.  634),  409. 


Sweet   V.    Meyers    (3    S.    D.    324), 

1250. 
Sweet  V.  Titus  (4  Hun,  N.  Y.  639), 

547. 
Sweetser  v.  Lowell    (33  Me.  446), 

350,  351. 
Sweetser    v.    McKenney     (65    Me. 

225),  373,  1364. 
Sweesey  v.  Durnall  (23  Neb.  531), 

519,  573. 
Swem  V.  Sharretts    (48  Md.  408), 

561. 
Swibill   V.   Brown    (1   Pa.   Co.   Ct. 

Rep.  359),  783. 
Swift  V.  Bennett   (10  Cush.  Mass. 

436),  18. 
Swift  V.  Coker   (83  Ga.  789),  440, 

441. 
Swift  V.  Dean  (11  Vt.  323),  924. 
Swift  V.  East  Waterloo  Hotel  Co. 

(40  Iowa,  322),  674. 
Swift  V.   Goodrich    (70   Cal.   103), 

931,  946. 
Swift  V.  New  Durham  Lumber  Co. 

(64  N.  H.  53),  579. 
Swift  V.  Occidental  Mining  &  Pet. 

Co.   (141  Cal.  161),  1387. 
Swift    V.    Sheehy    (88    Fed.    Rep. 

924),  1292. 
Swift  V.  Thompson   (9  Conn.  63), 

1245. 
Swinburne   v.    Milburn    (54    L.   J. 

Q.  B.  6),  1372. 
Swire  v.  Bell  (5  T.  R.  371),  334. 
Swords  T.   Edgar    (59   N.   Y.    28), 

792. 
Sykes  v.  Benton   (90  Ga.  402),  5. 
Sylvester  v.  Ralston   (31  Barb.  N. 

Y.  386),  11,  317,  318. 
Syms  V.  City  of  New  York  (105  N. 

Y.  153),  1374. 


T. 


Taggard    v.    Roosevelt    (2    E.    D. 
Smith,  N.  Y.  100),  196. 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


CCXl 


[references  aee  to  pages.] 


Tait's  Ex'r  v.  Central  Lunatic  Asy- 
lum  (84  Va.  271),  463. 
Talamo  v.  Spitzmiller   (120  N.  Y. 

37),  195,197. 
Talbot  V.  Cruger   (151  N.  Y.  117), 

1283. 
Talbot  V.  English   (156  Ind.  299), 

1132,  1139,  1142,  1161,  1176. 
Talbot  V.  Hill  (68  111.  106),  1315. 
Talbot  V.  Whipple  (14  Allen,  Mass. 

177), 1195. 
Talbot's   Case    (8   Co.   Rep.   102b), 

543. 
Taliaferro    v.    Pry    (41    Ga.    622), 

1446,  1447. 
Talley  v.  Alexander   (10  La.  Ann. 

627), 392. 
Tallmadge  v.  East  River  Bank  (26 

N.  Y.  105),  729. 
Tallman  v.  Bresler  (56  N.  Y.  635), 

1101. 
Tallman  v.  Coffin    (4  N.  Y.   134), 

1284,1397. 
Tallman  v.  Ely  (6  Wis.  244),  487. 
Tallman    v.    Franklyn    (14    N.    Y. 

584), 386. 
Tallman    v.    Murphy    (120    N.    Y. 

345),  1142,  1355. 
Talman  v.  Earle   (17  N.  Y.  Supp. 

7),  1195. 
Talman  v.  Gashwiler  (1  N.  Y.  St. 

Rep.  270),  1356. 
Tanton    v.    Boomgaarden    (89    111. 

App.  500),  1413. 
Tanton    v.    Van    Alstine    (24    111. 

App.  405),  139. 
Tapia  v.  Demartini   (77  Cal.  383), 

1404. 
Tarlotting  v.  Bokern  (95  Mo.  541), 

219. 
Tarry  v.  Tarry  (14  N.  Y.  430),  229. 
Tarte  v.  Darby  (15  M.  &  W.  601), 

257. 
Tate  V.  Field    (56  N.   J.  Eq.  35), 

726. 
Tate   V.   McClure    (25   Ark.    168), 

910 


Tate  V.  McCormick  (23  Hun,  221), 

1087. 
Tate  V.  Neary  (65  N.  Y.  Supp.  40), 

67,  1087. 
Tatem  v.  Chaplin    (2  H.  B.  133), 

617,  768. 
Tatham  v.  Lewis   (65  Pa.  St.  65), 

327. 
Tatum  V.  Thompson  (86  Cal.  203), 

862,  1350. 
Taunton  v.  Caspar   (7  T.  R.  431), 

237. 
Tax   Court   of   Baltimore    City   v. 

West  Md.  R.  R.  Co.  (50  Md.  274), 

453. 
Taylor  v.  Boulware   (35  La.  Ann. 

469), 410. 
Taylor  v.  Caldwell    (113  E.  L.  L. 

824),  251,  1342. 
Taylor  v.   Calvert    (138    Ind.    67), 

16. 
Taylor  v.  Carondelet  (22  Mo.  105), 

61,72. 
Taylor  v.  Chapman  (4  R.  R.  884), 

181. 
Taylor  v.  Cole  (3  T.  R.  292),  237. 
Taylor    v.    Coney    (101    Ga.    655), 

310. 
Taylor  v.  Cooper   (104  Mich.  72), 

696,  1185. 
Taylor    v.    Donohue    (103    N.    W. 

Rep.  1099),  312. 
Taylor  v.  Felder   (23   S.  W.  Rep. 

480), 1466. 
Taylor    v.    Finnegan    (189    Mass. 

568),  423,  733,  854,  856.  1176. 
Taylor  v.  Coding   (65  N.  E.  Rep. 

64), 463. 
Taylor  v.  Hibbert  (2  Ves.  Jr.  437), 

497. 
Taylor   v.   Kelly    (56    N.   C.    240), 

960. 
Taylor    v.    Kincaid    (4    Ky.    Law 

Rep.  837),  378. 
Taylor  v.   Nelson    (54  Miss.   524), 

1411. 


ecxu 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Taylor    v.    Newcomb     (123    Mich. 

637), 1333. 
Taylor  v.  O'Brien    (19  R.  I.  429), 

233. 
Taylor  v.  Preston  (79  Pa.  St.  436), 

599. 
Taylor  v.  Sandford    (7  Wheat.  U. 

S.  207),  552. 
Taylor  v.  Shum   (1  Bos.  &  P.  21), 

518,  1091. 
Taylor   v.    Stibbert    (2   Ves.    439), 

394,  1003,  1075. 
Taylor  v.  White  (86  Mo.  App.  526), 

941. 
Taylor  v.  Winters   (6  Phila.  126), 

555. 
Taylor   v.    Wright    (51    App.    Div. 

97),  679,  682. 
Taylor  v.  Zamira   (6  Taunt.  524), 

54-5, 1008. 
TeafE  v.  Hewitt   (1  Ohio  St.  511), 

1245. 
Teagarden    v.    Laughlin    (86    Ind 

476),    689. 
Tean  v.  Pline,  (60  Mich.  385).  100 
Teater  v.    King    (35    Wash.    138), 

159,  163. 
Tebb  V.  Cave,   (69  L.  J.  Ch.  282). 

1140. 
Teft  V.  Hinchman,  (76  Mich.  672), 

158. 
Teitig  V.  Boesman  (12  Mont.  404), 

65. 
Teller  v.   Boyle    (132  Pa.   St.   56), 

1222. 
Templeman  v.  Biddle  (1  Har.  Del. 

522),  130C,  1314. 
Templeman  v.  Gresham    (61  Tex. 

50),  1400. 
Ten   Eyck   v.    Sleeper    (65    Minn. 

413),  555. 
Tenner   v.   Diplock    (2   Bing.    10), 

923. 
Terhune  v.  Elberan   (3  N.  J.  Law 

297),  1316. 
Terrell    v.    Cunningham,    (70    Ala. 

100),  83. 


Territory   v.   Stone    (2  Dak.   155), 

778. 
Terstegge  v.    First   German   M.    & 

B.    S.    Co.     (92    Ind.    82),    1210, 

1364. 
Teufel    V.    Rowan     (179    Pa.    St. 

408),  1240. 
Tew   V.    Jones    (13    M.   &  W.    12), 

322. 
Tewksbury   v.    Magraff     (33     Cal. 

237),  923,  926,  954. 
Texas  &  P.  Coal  Co.  v.  Lawson  (10 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  491),  621. 
Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Magnum 

(68  Tex.  342),  836. 
Texas    Loan   Agency   v.    Fleming, 

(92  Tex.  458),  828. 
Thacker   v.    Henderson    (63   Barb. 

N.  Y.  271),  11,  13. 
Thalheimer  v.  Lempert   (17  N.  Y. 

St.  Rep.  348),   1150,  1153. 
Tharn   v.   De  Breteuil    (83    N.   Y. 

Supp.  849),  503. 
Thatcher  v.    St.   Andrew's  Church 

(37  Mich.   263),   349. 
Thayer  v.  Brackett  (12  Mass.  450, 

452),  538. 
Thayer  v.  Cramer   (McCord,  S.  C. 

Ch.  395),  28. 
Thayer  v.  Society  (20  Pa.  St.  60), 

927. 
Thayer    v.    United    Brethren,     (20 

Pa.  St.  62),  959. 
Thetford  Corporation  v.  Tyler    (8 

Q.   B.   95),   194,   580. 
Theriat    v.    Hart    (2    Hill,    N.    Y. 

380),  1441. 
Thew    V.    Porcelain    Mfg.    Co.     (5 

Rich,  S.  C.  415),  65. 
Thiebaud  v.   First  Nat.   Bank    (42 

Ind.    212),    139,   1362. 
Thier  v.  Barton  (Moore,  94),  1206. 
Thigpen    v.    Maget    (107    N.    Car. 

39).  1432. 
Thomas  v.  Bacon    (34  Hun.  N.  Y. 

88),  1434. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


CCXlll 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Thomas  v.   Black    (8   Houst.    Del. 

507J,  155. 
Thomas    v.    Blackmore     (5    Yerg. 

Tenn.  113),  391,  1107. 
Thomas    v.    Cadwallader    (Willes, 

496),  911. 
Thomas  v.  Cook  (3  B.  &  Aid.  119), 

1199,  1213. 
Thomas   v.    Conrad    (24    Ky.   Law 

Rep.  1630),  474,  848,  1078. 
Thomas  v.   Dundas    (31   La.   Ann. 

184), 1464. 
Thomas    v.    Grant    (5    Bush,    Ky. 

142),  1264. 
Thomas  v.  Hay  ward   (20  L.  T.  N. 

S.   814),  771. 
Thomas  v.   Hooker-Calville  Pump 

Co.    (22  Mo.  App.  8),  1023. 
Thomas-Houston    Electric    Co.    v. 

Durant  Land   Improvement   Co. 

(144  N.  Y.  34),  881. 
Thomas  v.  Jenning  (66  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

5),  1295. 
Thomas  v.  Johnson  (95  S.  W.  Rep 

468),    276. 
Thomas  v.  Kingsland  (108  N.  Y.), 

860. 
Thomas  v.  Meader    (6  Ohio  N.  P. 

242),  1063. 
Thomas    v.    McManus    (64    S.    W. 

Rep.  446),  378. 
Thomas  v.  Nelson   (69  N.  Y.  118), 

103,  1207,  1208. 
Thomas  v.  Railway  (10  Ohio  Fed. 

Dec.    544),    466. 
Thomas   v.    Roberts,   16   M.    &   W. 

780),  136,  137. 
Thomas  v.  Sanford    (71  Me.  548), 

195,   218. 
Thomas  v.  Sorrell   (Vaughn,  351), 

272. 
Thomas    v.    Strauss    Brewing    Co. 

102  Md.  417),  988. 
Thomas  v.  Thomas  (F.  &  K.  621), 

1124. 
Thomas  v.  Tucker  (89  S.  W.  Rep. 

802),  1416. 


Thomas  v.  Walmer  (18  Ind.  App.), 

156. 
Thomas  v.  West  Jersey  R.  R.  Co. 

101  U.  S.  70),  71. 
Thomas  v.  Wiggins    (41   111.  470), 

294,  450,  1369. 
Thomas  v.  Wright   (9  Serg.   &  R. 

Pa.  87),  155. 
Thomas    v.     Zumbalen     (43     Mo. 

471),    1097. 
Thomasson    v.    Wilson     (146    111. 

384),  486. 
Thompson  v.  Anderson   (86  Iowa, 

703),  1421. 
Thompson    v.    Banks     (43    N.    H. 

540).  438. 
Thompson    v.    Chapman     (57    Ga. 

16),   482. 
Thompson  v.  Christie   (138  Pa.  St. 

230),    393,    1076. 
Thompson    v.    Clemens     (96    Md. 

196),   877. 
Thompson  v.   Cummings    (39   Mo. 

App,  537),  906. 
Thompson    v.    Dearborn    (107    111. 

87),  532. 
Thompson    Houston    Elec.    Co.    v. 

Durant  L.   Co.    (144  N.   Y'.   34), 

601,   867. 
Thompson  v.  Elliott  (73  111.  221), 

567. 
Thompson    v.    Flathers     (45     La. 

Ann.  120),  33. 
Thompson  v.  Fox   (45  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1046),  582. 
Thompson  v.  Goble    (15  Pac.  Rep. 

713),  342.    . 
Thompson   v.   Guano   Co.    (93    Ga. 

282),   546,  1095,   1423. 
Thompson  v.  Guyon    (5  Sim.   65), 

667,   1038. 
Thompson  v.   Hakewell    (19  C.   B. 

N.   S.   713),  494. 
Thompson  y.  Lapworth  (L.  Rep.  S 

C.  P.  149),  1030. 
Thompson  v.   Maberly    (2   Campb. 

573),    172. 


CCilV 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED, 


[BEFERE>fCES    ARE   TO   PAGES.] 


Thompson  v.  Matthews   (61  N.  C. 

15),  368. 
Thompson  v.  Mead    (67   111.   395), 

1439. 
Thompson  v.  Rose   (8  Cow.  N.  Y. 

263),   614. 
Thompson   v.    Sanborn    (62    Mich. 

141),   143. 
Thompson   v.    Stewart    (60    Iowa, 

223),  453. 
Thompson    v.    Thompson    (9    Ind. 

323),    342. 
Thomson  v.  Baltimore  &  S.  Steam 

Co.   (33  Md.  312),  1441. 
Thompson   v.   Williams    (30   Kan. 

414),  549. 
Thompson's    Estate    (1   Kulp    Pa. 

235),   575. 
Thomson    v.    Ludlum     (74    N.    Y 

Supp.  875),  1112. 
Thomson    v.    Smith     (111     Iowa, 

713),   1244. 
Thomson   v.   Tilton    (22   Ky.   Law 

Rep.   784),  1419. 
Thorn   v.    Sutherland    (123   N.   Y. 

236),  1114. 
Thorndell  v.  Morrison   (25  Pa.  St. 

326),  24. 
Thorndike  v.  Burrage    (111  Mass. 

531),  884. 
Thornton  v.  Carver   (80  Ga.  397), 

1430,  1446. 
Thornton   v.   Payne    (5  Johns.   N. 

Y.  74),  250,  348. 
Thorsgood  v.  Richardson   (7  Bing. 

420),  1442. 
Thousand    Island    Park    Ass'n    v. 

Tucker   (173  N.  Y.  203),  405. 
Thrall  v.  Omaha  Hotel  Co.  (5  Neb. 

295),   953,   954. 
Thresher    v.    E.    London    Water- 
works  (2  B.  &  C.  609),  1287. 
Thropp  V.  Field  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  82). 

294,    664,    665. 
Thrnston  v.  Minke   (32  Md.  487), 

723.  758. 


Thum   V.   Rhodes    (12   Colo.   App. 

245),  804. 
Thunder  v.  Belcher  (3  East,  450), 

147,  234. 
Thurber  v.  Dwyer  (10  R.  I.  355), 

146. 
Thurlough    v.    Dresser     (98     Me. 

161),   395. 
Thursby  v.  Eccles   (70  Law  J.  Q. 

B.  91),  379. 
Thursby  v.  Plant  (1  Saund.  240), 

494,  560. 
Thurston  v.  Minke    (32  Md.  487), 

612. 
Tibbals  v.  Iffland  (10  Wash.  451), 

390,  1045,  1090. 
Tibbits  V.  Moore   (19  N.  H.  369). 

96. 
Tibbits  V.  Percy    (24  Barb.  N.  Y. 

39),  877. 
Tice  V.  Cowenhoven   (63  N.  J.  L- 

24),  169. 
Tichborne  v.  Weir  (4  Reports,  26), 

1069. 
Tidey  v.   Mollett    (16  C.   B.   N.   S. 

298).  332,  868. 
Tidrick   v.    Rice    (13    Iowa,    214), 

101. 
Tidswell   v.    Whitworth    (L.    Rep. 

2  C.  P.  320),  1028. 
Tiefenbrine     v.     Tiefenbrine     (68 

Mo.  App.  253),  388. 
Tiernan  v.  Miller    (69  Neb.   764), 

112. 
Tiley  v.  Moyers    (43  Pa.  St.  404), 

1132,  1183. 
Tilford    V.    Fleming    (64    Pa.    St. 

301).  483,  486. 
Tilghman  v.  Cruson   (4  Har.  Del. 

341),  685. 
Tilghman  v.  Little    (13   111.   239), 

922,  924,  954. 
Tilleny    v.    Knoblauch    (73    Minn. 

108),   942. 
Tillotson  V.  Boyd  (6  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  516).  1081. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


ccxv 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Tillotson  V.  Kennedy  (5  Ala.  407), 

212. 
Tilney    v.    Norris     (1    Ld.    Raym. 

553),   619. 
Tilt  V.  Stratton  (4  Bing.  46),  155. 
Tilton  V.  Emery    (17  N.  H.   536), 

958. 
Tilton    V.    Sterling    Coal    &    Coke 

Co.   (28  Utah,  173),  980,  991. 
Tilyou    V.    Reynolds     (108    N.    Y. 

558),  951. 
Timbrell    v.    Bullock    (Sty.    446), 

1200. 
Timlin    v.    Standard   Oil   Co.    (126 

N.  Y.  514),  805,  836. 
Timmes  v.  Metz  (156  Pa.  St.  384), 

1445. 
Timmins    v.    Rowlinson    (3    Burr. 

1603),    166,    217. 
Timms  v.  Baker    (49   L.  T.  106), 

626. 
Tinder  v.  Davis  (88  Ind.  99),  573, 

579. 
Tinman  v.  McMeekin    (42   S.  Car. 

311),  1455. 
Tippet  V.  Jett   (10  La.  O.  S.  359), 

958. 
Tischer    v.    Rutledge     (35    Wash. 

285),  1374. 
Tison  V.  Yawn   (15  Ga.  491),  923. 
Title  V.  Kennedy    (71  S.   Car.   1), 

1327. 
Titsworth  v.  Frauenthal    (52  Ark 

254),    1435. 
Toan  V.  Pine   (80  Mich.  385),  532. 
Tobey    v.    County    of    Bristol    (3 

Story,  U.  S.  819),  572. 
Tobey    v.    Matimore     (104    N.    Y. 

Supp.  393),  1088. 
Tobey  v.  Webster   (3  Johns.  N.  Y. 

468),   685. 
Tobias   v.    Cohn    (36   N.   Y.    363), 

685. 
Tobin   V.   Young    (17   N.    E.    Rep. 

625),  189,  217. 
Todd  V.  Blight  (30  L.  J.  C.  P.  21), 

792- 


iodd  V.  Philhower   (24  N.  J.  Law, 

796),  462. 
Tod-Heatley  v.  Benham    (58  L.  J. 

Ch.  83),  747. 
Toleman    v.    Portbury    (24    L.    T. 

24),  625,  651,  721. 
Toler    V.    Hayden    (18    Mo.    399), 

1274. 
Toler    V.    Seabrook    (39    Ga.    14), 

516. 
Toles    V.     Meddaugh     (106    Mich. 

398),  314. 
Tolle  V.  Orth  (75  Ind.  298),  1218. 
Tollman    v.    Myrphy     (120    N.    Y. 

345),  1151. 
Tolman  v.  Smith  (85  Cal.  280),  27. 
Tolsma  v.  Adair    (32  Wash.  383). 

1233. 
Tomes  v.  Chamberlaine,  (5  Mee.  & 

Wei.  14),  198. 
Tomle  V.  Gampton   (129  111.  379), 

792. 
Tomle   V.   Hampton    (28    111.   App. 

142),  792,  827. 
Tomlinson    v.    Day     (2    Brod.     & 

Bing.  680),  581,  1178. 
Tomlinson  v.  Greenfield    (31  Ark. 

557),  1436. 
Tompkins  v.  Lawrence   (8  Car.  & 

P.  729),  128. 
Tompkins  v.  Snow  (63  Barb.  N.  Y. 

525),    920. 
Tondro  v.  Cushman   (5  Wis.  279), 

920,  953. 
Tone   V.   Brace    (11   Paige,   N.   Y. 

566),  698. 
Toney    v.    Goodley    (57    Mo.    App. 

235),  1430,  1446. 
Took  V.  Glascock   (1  Saund.  343J, 

683,   684. 
Toole  V.  Beckett  (67  Me.  544),  808. 
Torrence  v.  Irwin   (32  Yeates,  Pa. 

210),  686. 
Torreson  v.  Walla  (11  N.  D.  481), 

852. 
Torrey  v.  Burnett   (38  N.  J.  Law- 

457),  1264. 


CCXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[refebexces  are  to  pages.] 


Torrey  v.  Torrey    (14  N.  Y.  480), 

234. 
Torrey  v.  Wallace  (3  Cush.  Mass. 

442),   616,  1021,   1080. 
Torriono  v.  Young  (6  Car.  &  P.  8). 

138. 
Totten  V.   Phipps    (52  N.  Y.  354), 

814. 
Toupin    V.     Peabody     (162     Mass. 

473),  390,  392. 
Tourtellot  v.   Rosebrook    (11   Met. 

Mass.    480),   844. 
Tourtelot    v.    Junkin     (4    Blackf. 

Ind.  483),  592. 
Towell  V.  Tranter  (3  H.  &  C.  458), 

374. 
Towerson  v.  Jackson   (61  L.   J.  J. 

B.  36,  1891,  2  Q.  B.  484),  34. 
Towne  v.    Bowers    (81    Me.    491), 

1306. 
Towne    v.    Butterfleld     (97    Mass. 

105),  198,  922,  940,  959. 
Tov/ne  v.  Campbell  (3  Com.  Bench. 

921),  154,  159,  160. 
Towne    v.    Thompson    (68    N.    H. 

317),  796. 
Townley  v.  Bedwell  (14  Ves.  591), 

996. 
Townley    v.    Oregon   Ry.    Co.    (33 

Oreg.   333),   686. 
Townsend     v.     Albers     (3     E.     D. 

Smith,  N.  Y.  560),  1210. 
Townsend    v.    Boyd     (217    Pa.    Sr. 

386),  940. 
Townsend    v.    Gilsey    (1    Sweeney 

N.    X.   155),   1168. 
Townsend  v.  Hubbard   (4  Hill,  N. 

Y.  351),  332. 
Townsend    v.    Isenberg    (45    Iowa. 

670),  312,  1111. 
Townsend   v.   Tickell    (5   E.  C.   L. 

31),    1074. 
Trabue     v.     McAdams     (8     Bush. 

Ky.  74),  1045. 
Tracy  v.  Albany  Exch.  Co.    (7  N. 
Y.  472),  1367,  1368,  1384. 


Traders'  Bank  of  Kirwin  v.  First 
Nat.   Bank    (6    Kan.   App.   400), 
1250. 
Traherne  v.  Saddleir  (5  Bro.  P.  C. 

179),  1106. 
Traintor  v.  Cole   (120  Mass.  162), 

84. 
Trapnall  v.  Merrick  (21  Ark.  503), 

329,   559. 
Trappan  v.  Morie  (18  Johns.  N.  Y. 

1),  1441. 
Trask  v.  Graham    (47  Minn.  571), 

518,    615,    1021,    1080. 
Trask  v.  Wheeler   (7  Allen,  Mass. 

109),  490. 
Trathen   v.    Kipp    (15   Colo.   App. 

426),  563. 
Travers  v.  Cook  (42  HI.  App.  580), 

1425,  1442. 
Traylor  v.   Cabanne    (8   Mo.   App. 

131),  45,  327. 
Treackle   v.    Coke    (1   Vern.    165), 

520. 
Treadwell    v.    Reynolds    (47    Cal. 

171),    350,    351. 
Treat  v.  Lord  (42  Me.  552),  434. 
Trebar  v.  Biggs  (L.  Rep.  Ex.  151), 

1064. 
Trelvar  v.  Bigge  (43  L.  J.  Ex.  95), 

i045. 
Tremeere    v.    Morrison     (4    M.    & 

Scott,   603),   47. 
Trenar  v.  Jackson  (46  How.  Prac. 

N.  Y.  389),  721. 
Trenkman  v.  Schneider   (56  N.  Y. 

Supp.   770),   295,  564,   1143. 
Treport's  Case    (6  Coke,  14a),  86, 

953.  - 
Tress  v.   Savage    (4   E.   &  E.   36), 

147,   196,   332. 
Trevivian    v.    Lawrence     (6    Mod. 

256),   953. 
Trill    V.    Eastman    (3    Met.    Mass. 

121),  614. 
Trimble  v.  Durham  (70  Miss.  295). 

1418,  1449. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCXVH 


[reff.rexces  are  to  pages. 


Trimble's    Heirs    v.    Ward    (14    B. 

Mon.  Ky.  8),  449. 
Trinity  Church  v.  Cook    (11  Abb. 

Pr.  N.   Y.   371),   1024. 
Trinity  Church  v.  Higgins  (4  Rob. 

N.  Y.  1),  1034. 
Trinity  Church  v.  Vanderbilt    (98 

N.  Y.  170).  1017. 
Tripp  V.   Hasceig    (20   Mich.  254), 

1315. 
Tritton  v.  Barnhart  (56  L.  T.  306), 

757. 
Tritton   v.    Foote    (2   Brown's   Ch. 

497),   1363. 
Tritton    v.    Toole    (2    Bro.    C.    C. 

636),  1372. 
Trout    V.    McDonald     (S3    Pa.    St. 

144),  25,  100. 
Trower   v.   Wahner    (75    111.   655), 

800,  804. 
Truesdell  v.  Booth   (4  Hun.  N.  Y. 

100),  1149,  1152. 
Trulack     v.    Donahue     (76     Iowa, 

758),    1116. 
Trull  V.  Granger  (8  N.  Y.  115,  673. 

677. 
Truss  V.  Old    (6   Rand.   Va.   556), 

685,  1300,  1336. 
Trust    Co.    of    North    America    v 

Manhattan  Trust  Co.    (23  C.  C. 

A.  30),  1420. 
Trustees  v.  Cowen  (4  Paige,  N.  Y. 

510),  616. 
Trustees  v.  Lynch   (70  N.  Y.  440), 

742. 
Trustees     v.     Robinson     (Wright, 

Ohio,  436),  343. 
Trustees   v.    Stevenson    (1    Houst. 

Del.   451),   915. 
Tryon  v.  Davis  (8  Wash.  106),  28. 
Tscheider  v.   Biddle    (8   Fed.   Cas. 

4210),   984,   1188. 
Tubb  V.  Fort  (58  Ala.  277),  492. 
Tube  V.  Montgomery   (7  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  557),  1187. 
Tuberville    v.    Stampe     (12    Mod. 

152),  843. 


Tucker  v.    Adams    (52    Ala.    254). 

317. 
Tucker  v.   Bennett    (81   Pac.   Rep 

423),  853. 
Tucker    v.    Byers    (57    Ark.    215), 

291. 
Tucker  v.  Keeler    (4  Vt.  161),  33. 

232. 
Tucker   v.    Linger    (51    L.    J.    Ch. 

713),  711. 
Tucker  v.  Morse  (1  C.  &  Ad.  865), 

8. 
Tucker    v.    Whitehead     (58    Miss. 

762),  1112. 
Tucker  Zeve  &  Co.  v.  Thomas   (35 

Tex.   Civ.  App.  499).  1414. 
Tudgay  v.  Sampson  (30  L.  T.  262), 

459. 
Tufts  V.  Stone  (70  Miss.  54),  1448. 
Tulk  V.  Moxhay  (2  Phil.  Ch.  774), 

768. 
Tullis    V.    Tacoma    Land    Co.     (19 

Wash.  St.  140),  941. 
Tully  V.  Dunn    (42  Ala.  262),  518, 

561. 
Tunis    V.    Grandy     (22    Grat.    Va. 

100),  1178.  1180. 
Tunis  Lumber  Co.  v.  R.  G.  Dennis 
Lumber  Co.    (97  Va.  682),  1250. 
Turbeville   d.  Darden   v.   Ryan    (1 

Humph.  Tenn.  113),  97. 
Turley    Institute    v.    Memphis     (8 

Heisk.  Tenn.  845),  1019. 
Turner  v.   Bank,  of  Fox  Lake    (3 

Keyes  N.  Y.  425),  547. 
Turner  v.   Cameron's  etc.   Ry.    (5 

Ex.   932),   575. 
Turner  v.  Cool   (23  Ind.  56),  1315, 
Turner  v.   Davis    (48   Conn.   397). 

258. 
Turner  v.  Doe  dem.  Bennett  (9  M. 

&  W.   643),  214,  215. 
Turner  v.  Ferguson  (33  Tex.  505), 

112. 
Turner  v.  Gaither  (S3  N.  C.  357), 
19. 


ecxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[beferexces  are  to  pages.] 


Turner  v.  Hutchinson   (2  F.  &  F. 

185),  97. 
Turner  v.  Kennedy  (57  Minn.  104), 

1265. 
Turner    v.     McCarthy     (4     E.     D. 

Smith,  N.  Y.  247,  804. 
Turner  v.  Power  (7  B.  &  C.  625), 

581. 
Turner  v.  Strange    (56  Tex.  141), 

1303. 
Turner  v.  Thompson  (58  Ga.  268), 

409,  410. 
Turner  v.  Townsend  (42  Neb.  376), 

874. 
Turner  v.  Wentworth    (119  Mass. 

459),  1249. 
Tustin   V.    Faught    (23    Cal.    237), 

27. 
Tuttle  V.  Bean  (13  Met.  275),  663. 
Tuttle  V.  Manufacturing  Co.    (145 

Mass.  169),  806,  860. 
Tuttler   V.    Reynolds    (1    Vt.    80), 

182. 
Twiss  v.  Boehmer  (39  Oreg.  359), 

243,  258. 
Twycross  v.  R.  R.  Co.    (10  Gray, 

Mass.  293),  1025. 
Tyler  v.  Davis  (61  Tex.  674),  920, 

930. 
Tyler  v.  Disbrow    (40  Mich.  415), 

784. 
Tyler  v.  Dyer  (13  Me.  41),  571. 
Tyler's  Estate  v.  Giesler    (74  Mo. 

App.   543),  463,   644,  1058. 
Tyrringham's  Case  (4  Coke,  37a), 

446. 
Tyrwhitt  v.  Lambert    (3  P.   &  D. 

676),    581. 
Tyson  v.  Chestnut  (118  Ala.  387). 

694. 
Tyson  v.  Shueey  (5  Md.  540),  685. 


U. 


Udden  v.  O'Reilly    (180  Mo.   650) 

828. 
Udell  V.  Peak   (70  Tex.  547),  973. 


Uggla  V.  Brokaw  (102  N.  Y.  Supp. 

857),  807. 
Underbill    v.    Collins    (132    N.    Y. 

271),  1199. 
Underwood    v.    Birchard     (47    Vt. 

305),   672,  701. 
Underwood  v.  Burrows   (7  Car.  & 

P.  26),  420. 
Underwood   v.    Hitchcock    (1   Ves. 

Sr.   279),   1002. 
Underwood     v.      Stuyvesant      (19 

Johns.  N.  Y.  181),  431. 
Unger  v.   Bamberger    (6  Ky.  Law 

Rep.    447),    1364. 
Ungles  V.   Graves    (2  Blackf.   Ind. 

191),    1441. 
Union  Banking  Co.  v.  Gittings  (45 

Md.  181),  385,  566. 
Union  Pacific  R.  Oo.  v.  Chicago  R. 

I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (164  ni.  88),  561. 
Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  R. 

L  &  P.  Ry.   Oo.    (51   Fed.   Rep, 

309),  67. 
Union  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chickasaw,  Coop. 

Oo.    (95  S.  W.  Rep.  171),  73. 
Union  W.  &  El.   Co.  v.  Mclntyre, 

(84   Ala.   78),  1467. 
Union  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Chabot 

(93   Me.   339),   1420. 
Union  Water  Power  Oo.  v.  Lewis- 
ton   (95  Me.  471),  453. 
United  States  v.   Boswick,    (94  U- 

C.   66),   710. 
United  States  v.  Brooks   (10  How. 

U.  S.  442),  38,  39. 
United  States  Flournoy  Live  Stock 

&  R.  E.  Co.)   69  Fed.  Rep.  886), 

40. 
United     States    Bank    v.     Athens 

Armory  (35  Ga.  344),  28. 
United    States   v.    Parrott    (1    Mc- 
Allister U.  S.  C.  O.  271),  710. 
United    States   Trust    Co.    v.    New 

York  W.  S.  &  B.  R.  Co.   (lOl  N. 

Y.  483),  1122.     . 
United  States  Trust  Co.  v.  O'Brien 
(143  N.  Y.  284),  692,  759. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCXIX 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


United  States  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Stevens 

(52  Mich.  330),  1298. 
University  v.  Joslyn    (21  Vt.  52), 

332,  559. 
Updegraff   v.    Lesem    (Colo.    App. 

1900,    62    Pac.    Rep.    342),    628, 

1250,    1267. 
Updike    V.     Campbell     (4     E.     D. 

Smith,  N.  Y.   570),  775. 
Upham  V.  Head  (74  Kan.  17),  865. 
Upper   Appomatox    Co.   v.    Hamil- 
ton (S3  Va.  319),  1437. 
Upton   V.    Greenless    (17    Com.    B. 

64),   1136. 
Upton  V.  Hosmer   (70  N.  H.  493), 

1045,  1294. 
Upton  V.  Townsend   (17  C.  B.  30), 

699,   1129,   1142,  1340. 
Usher  v.  Moss  (50  Miss.  208),  139. 
Utah  Loan,  etc.  Co.  v.  Garbutt   (6 

Utah,  342),  55,  148,  151. 
Utah    Optical    Oo.    v.    Keith     (18 

Utah  464),  1185. 
Uttendorfer    v.    Saegers    (50    Cal. 

496),  685. 

V. 

Vai  V.  Weld   (17  Mo.  332),  847. 
Vale  V.  Moorgate  Buildings  (80  L. 

T.  487),   744. 
Valentine  v.  Healey  (86  Hun.  259), 

83,  85. 
Valle  V.  Fargo    (1  Mo.  App.  344), 

1014. 
Valpy  V.  St.  Leonard's  Wharf  Co. 

(1  L.  G.  R.  305),  1028. 
Va.    Min.    &    Improvement   Co.    v. 

Hoover   (82  Va.  449),  282. 
Van  V.  Oorpe    (3  Myl.  &  K.  269), 

364,   607. 
Van    Arsdale   v.    Buck    (81    N.    Y. 

Supp.  1017),  573. 
Vanatta  v.  Brewer    (32  N.  J.   Eq. 

268>,   620. 
Van   Brunt  v.  Wallace    (88   Minn. 

116),  219,  1207. 


Van  Buskirk  v.  Gordon   (10  N.  Y. 

St.  Rep.  351),  847,  877,  1214. 
Vance   v.   Lowther    (45   L.   J.   Ex. 

200),  343. 
Vance  v.  Ranfurley    (1  Ir.  Ch.  R. 

322),  1370. 
Vance    v.    San    Antonio    Gas    Co. 

(Tex.  60  S.  W.  R.  317),  680. 
Vancleave  v.  VvMlson  (73  Ala.  387), 

944. 
Van    Cortlandt    v.    Underbill     (17 

Johns.  N.  Y.  405),  1273. 
Vandegrift    v.     Abbott     (75     Ala. 

487),   563. 
Vanderbeck  v.  Hendry  (34  N.  J.  L. 

467),  804,  813. 
Vanderbilt    v.    Persse     (3    E.    D. 

Smith,  N.  Y.  727),  1149,  1167. 
Vanderheuvel  v.   Starrs    (3  Conn. 

303),  317. 
Vanderpool  v.  Smith  (1  Daly  N.  Y. 

311),  1134,  1190. 
Vanderpool  v.  Smith  (2  Daly  N.  Y. 

135), 1349. 
Van  Deusen  v.  Young  (29  N.  Y.  9), 

716,  1336. 
Vandoren  v.  Everitt  (5  N.  J.  Law, 

460),  15,   1314,  1306. 
Van  Doren  v.  Robinson   (13  N.  J. 

Eq.  256),  984. 
Van    Driel    v.    Rosierz    (26    Iowa 

575),  493. 
Vanduyn  v.  Hepner  (45  Ind.  589), 

957. 
Vane   v.    Lord    Barnard    (2    Vern. 

738),  725. 
Van  Every  v.  Ogg    (59  Cal.  563), 

852,   862. 
Van  Home  v.  Grain    (1  Paige,  N. 

Y.  455),  999. 
Van  Hess  v.  Hyatt    (28  Fed.  Cas. 

16,  867),  390. 
Van  Ness  v.  Pacard    (2  Pet.  U.  S. 

137),  465,  1245,  1250,  1259. 
Vann    v.    Rouse    (94    N.    Y.    401), 

1154,  1360. 


ecxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


[rEFEREXCES    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Van  Patten  v.  Leonard   (55  Iowa, 

520),  1408. 
Van     Rensselaer     v.     Bradley     (3 

Denio  N.  Y.  135),  541. 
Van  Rensselear  v.  Gallup  (5  Denio 

N.  Y.  454),  541. 
Van  Rensselear  v.  Jewett  (5  Denio, 

121),  524. 
Van  Rensselaer  v.  Jones   (2  Barb. 

N.  Y.   643),  543,  1095. 
Van  Rensselaer  v.  Pennimann    (6 

Wend.    N.    Y.    569),    1195,    1203, 

1276,   1397. 
Van  Rensalaer  v.  Quackenboss  (17 

Wend.  N.  Y.  34),  1444. 
Van  Rensselear  v.  Read  (26  N.  Y. 

558),  504. 
Van  Rensselaer  v.  Secor  (32  Barb. 

N.  Y.  469),  262,  1069. 
Van  Schaick  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  R. 

Co.   (38  N.  Y.  346),  1080. 
Van  Siclen  v.  City  of  New  York 

64,  688. 
Van  Soligen  v.  Harrison  (39  N.  J. 

Law,  51),  333. 
Van   Studdiford  v.  Kohn    (46  Mo. 

App.  436),  173. 
Van    Vleck    v.    White    (72    N.    Y. 

Supp.  1026),  1267,  1285. 
Van  Wagner  v.  Van  Nostrand   (19 

Iowa,  422),  491. 
•Van     Warden     v.     Winslow     (117 

Mich.    564),    689. 
Van  Wicklen  v.  Paulsen  (14  Barb. 

N.  Y.  654),  492,  593,  1111. 
Van  Wickles  v.  Alpaugh    (3  N.  J. 

Law,  446),  960. 
Van  Wormer  v.   Orane    (51   Mich. 

363),  902. 
Varley  v.  Coppard   (L.  R.  7  O.  P. 

505),  1053. 
Varley  v.  Leigh    (2  Ex.  446),  560. 
Vatel  V.  Herner  (1  Hilt,  N.  Y.  149), 

1131,  1136. 
Vaughan  v.  Blanchard   (1  Yeates, 

Pa.  175),  1180. 


Vaughan  v.  Hancock  (3  O.  B.  766), 

379. 
Vaughan  v.  Menlove  (3  Bing.  N.  C. 

468),  844. 
Vaughn  v.    Howell    (83    Ga.    336), 

1318. 
Vaughn   v.    Matlock    (23    Ark.    9). 

604. 
Veal  V.  Hanlon  (123  Ga.  642),  801, 

853. 
Vegely  v.  Robinson   (20  Mo.  App. 

199),  522. 
Venable  v.  McDonald  (4  Dansi,  Ky. 

336),  198. 
Vere  v.   Lovenden    (12   Vea.   179), 

607. 
Vermilya  v.  Austin  (2  E.  D.  Smith, 

N.  Y.  302),  1180. 
Vermont  v.   Society,  etc.    (28  Fed. 

Cases,  16,  919),  632. 
Vernam  v.  Smith   (15  N.  Y.  327), 

576. 
Verplanck   v.    Wright    (23    Wend. 

N.  Y.  506),  620. 
Ver    Steeg   v.    Becker-More    Paint 

Co.  (108  Mo.  App.  257),  153,  244, 

346. 
Vetter's    Appeal    (99    Pa.    St.    52), 

505. 
Viany  v.  Ferran   (5  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S. 

N.   Y.   110),   1390. 
Vick  V.  Ayres  (56  Miss.  670),  322. 
Victory  v.  Foran  (56  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ot.  507),  805. 
Victory  v.   Stroud    (15   Tex.   573), 

258. 
Vigers  v.  St.  Paul's  (14  Q.  B.  909), 

485. 
Vilas    V.    Mason     (25    Miss.    310). 

1301. 
Villard  v.  Roberts   (1  Strob.  S.  C. 

393),  395. 
Vincent  v.  Corbin   (85  N.  C.  108), 

162. 
Vincent  v.  Crane  (10  Det.  Leg.  N. 

653),    559,    893,   906,    1054. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCXXl 


[beferexces  are  to  pages.] 


Vincent   v.   Frelich    (50   La.   Ann. 

378),  1349. 
Vincent  v.   Rather    (31    Tex.    77), 

101. 
Viner  v.  Vaughan    (2   Beav.  4GG), 

710. 
Vinson    v.    Graves     (16    La.    Ann. 

162),  1359. 
Vinz  V.  Beatty  (61  Wis.  645),  275. 
Virden  v.  Ellsworth  (15  Ind.  144), 

592. 
Viterbo  v.  Friedlander   (120  U.  S. 

707j,  783,  1359. 
Vivian  v.  Moat  (50  L.  J.  Oh.  331), 

965. 
Voege  V.  Ronalds    (83  Hun.  114), 

466,  1364,  1378. 
Voight  V.  Resor  (80  111.  331),  262. 
Volmer  v.  Wharton  (34  Ark.  691), 

1432. 
Von    Glahn    v.    Brennan    (81    Cal. 

261),  182. 
Voorhies   v.    Burchard    (55    N.    Y. 

98),  446. 
Voorhees   v.   McGinnis    (48   N.   Y. 

282),  1246,  1248. 
Vorse  V.  Des  Moines  M.  &  M.  Co. 

(104  Iowa,  541),  1014,  1027,  1264, 

1267. 
Vose   V.    Baker    (1    Cranch,    C.    C. 

104),  690. 
Vose  V.   Bradstreet    (27  Me.   156), 

337,  462. 
Voss  V.  King  (38  W.  Va.  607),  920, 

936. 
Vyvyvan  v.  Arthur   (1  Barn.  &  C. 

410),  768. 
Waddilove  v.  Barnett   (2  Bing.  N. 

C.  543),  545. 
Wade    V.    Halligan    (16    111.    507), 

697,  1139,  1180. 
Vade   V.    Herndl,    (127   Wis.    544), 

1169,   1186. 
Wade  V.  Smith  Penn.  Oil  Co.    (45 

W.  Va.  380),  995. 
Wade  V.  South  Penn.  Oil  Co.    (45 

W.  Va.    390),  936. 


Wades    v.    Figgatt    (75    Va.    575), 

1437. 
Wadleigh    v.    Janvrin    (41    N.    H. 

503),  1260. 
Wadlington  v.  Hill  (18  Miss.  560), 

604. 
Wadlow   v.   Markey    (95    111.   App. 

484),  1061. 
Wadman  v.  Burke    (81   Pac.  Rep. 

1012),  1287,  1288. 
Wadsworthville  v.  Jennings  (40  S. 

C.  168),  967. 
Waggener  v.  McLaughlin  (33  Ark. 

195),  956,   1005. 
Waggoner  v.   Jermaine    (3   Denio, 

306),    794. 
Waggoner  v.  Snoddy  (36  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  514),  1046. 
Wahl  V.  Barroll  (8  Gill.  Md.  288), 

551,  1097,  1228. 
Wainscottv.  Silvers  (13  Ind.  497). 

844. 
Wainwright  v.   Ramsden    (5   Mee. 

Wei.  602),  1179. 
Wait,  In  re   (7  Pick.  Mass.  100), 

51S. 
Waite    V.    O'Neil     (76    Fed.    Rep. 

408),  893,  1157,  1136,  1140.  1343. 
Walden  v.   Bodley    (14  Pet.   U.   S. 

156),  921. 
Walden  v.  Conn.  (84  Ky.  312),  679, 

688. 
Waldo    V.    Hall     (14    Mass.    486). 

1077. 
Waldorff  Astoria  Segar  Co.  v.  Sal 

omon  (184  N.  Y.  584),  745. 
Walker  v.  Cromley    (14  Wend.  N 

Y.   63),   1087. 
Walker    v.    Dohan     (39    La.    Ann. 

743),  1086. 
Walker    v.    Edmundson    (111    Ga. 

454),  995. 
Walker   v.    Engler    (30    Mo.    130), 

657. 
Walker  v.  Fisher    (117  Mich.  72), 

936. 


cexxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Walker  v.   Gilbert    (2   Rob.  N.  Y. 

214),  860,  861. 
Walker  v.   Harper    (33   Mo.   592), 

920. 
Walker  v.  Jeffreys   (1  Hare.  341), 

1385. 
Walker  v.  Patterson  (33  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  50),  1420. 
Walker  v.   Ricbardson    (2   Mee.   & 

Wei.  882),  1199. 
Walker  v.  Seymour  (13  Mo.  592), 

1389. 
Walker  v.  Swayzee  (3  Abb.  Pr.  N. 

Y.  138),  860,  879. 
Walker   v.   Tucker    (70    111.    528), 

453,  455,  760,  1129,  1136. 
Walker  v.  Wadley   (124  Ga.  275), 

1370. 
Walker  v.  Whittemore  (112  Mass. 

187)    1023. 
Walker  Ice  Co.  v.  American  Steel 

&  Wire  Co.  (185  Mass.  463),  435. 
Walker's  Case  (3  Co.  22a),  559. 
Wall  V.  Hinds  (4  Gray,  Mass.  256), 

1019,  1093,  1300,  1349,  1354. 
Wallace  v.  Drew   (59  Barb.  N.  Y. 

413),  431. 
Wallace  v.  Kennedy  (47  N.  J.  Law, 

242),  1213. 
Wallace   v.   Lent    (1   Daly,   N.   Y. 

481),  785,  1150. 
Wallace   v.    Patten    (12    CI.    &    F. 

491),   1227. 
Wallace   v.   Wilcox    (27   Tex.   60), 

958. 
Waller  v.  Edmonds  Cockfield   (111 

La.    595),    1130. 
Walls  V.  Atcheson    (3  Bing.  462), 

1199,  1208. 
Walrond  v.  Hawkins   (44  L.  J.  C. 

P.   116),   647,  1058. 
Wailser  v.   Graham    (45  Mo.  App. 

629),   976. 
Walsh  V.  Bourse  (15  Super.  Ct.  Pa. 

219),  817. 
Walsh  V.  Lonsdale  L.  R.    (21  Oh. 

Div.  9),  505. 


Walsh   V.    Martin    (69   Mich.    29), 

464,   1200,    1398. 
Walsh  V.  Pemberton   (Selw.  N.  P. 

613),  510. 
Walsh    V.    Sichler    (20    Mo.    App. 

374),  1264. 
Walter  v.  Dewey  (16  Johns.  N.  Y. 

222),    528. 
Walter  v.  Maunde  (1  J.  &  W.  181), 

1075. 
Walter  v.  Waterhouse    (3    Saund. 

420),  1340. 
Walter   Commission   Co.   v.    Gille- 

land   (98  Mo.  App.  584),  664. 
Walters   v.   Hutchin's   Adm'x    (29 

Ind.  136),  1336. 
Walters    v.    Myer    (39    Ark.    560), 

1400,  1403. 
Vv^alters  v.  Snow  (32  N.  Car.  292), 

867. 
Walton  V.  Jordan  (65  N.  Car.  170), 

1317. 
Walton  V.  Stafford  (162  N.  Y.  563), 

1063. 
Walton  V.   Wray    (54    Iowa,   531), 

1250. 
Wamganz  v.  Wolff    (86   Mo.   App 

205),  1186. 
Wampler  v.  Weinmann   (56  Minn. 

1),  1354. 
Ward  V.  Bull    (1   Fla.   271),   1340, 

1345. 
Ward  V.  Day   (5  B.  &  S.  359),  656. 
Ward   V.    Day    (4   Best   &    Smith, 

327),  654. 
Ward  V.   Earl    (86  111.  App.   635), 

1252. 
Ward    V.    Edesheimer    (17    N.    Y. 

Supp.  173),  672. 
Ward  V.  Fagan  (28  Mo.  App.  110), 

800. 
Ward  V.  Fagin  (101  Mo.  669),  847, 

849. 
Ward  V.  Hartpole   (3  Bligh.  470), 

475: 
Ward  V.  Kelsey,   (42  Barb.  N.  Y. 

582),  857,  864. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cexxiu 


[BEFEREXCES    ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Ward  V.  Langmade   (9  0.  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.  85),  757. 
Ward  V.  Lumley   (5  H.  &  N.  87), 

1237. 
Ward  V.  Noel   (37  Ala.  500),  409. 
Ward  V.  Philadelphia  (6  Atl.  Rep. 

263),  929. 
Ward  V.  People  (6  Hill,  N.  Y.  144), 

435. 
Ward  V.  Sheppard    (3  N.  C  283). 

717. 
Ward  V.  Walker    (111  Iowa,  611), 

1422. 
Ward  V.  Walton  (4  Ind.  75),  1195. 
Ward  V.  Wandell   (10  Pa.  St.  98), 

585. 
Ward  &  Co.  v.  Robertson  (77  Iowa, 

159),   418. 
Wardlow  v.  Herrington    (54  S.  E. 

Rep.  699),  1126. 
Ware  v.  Lithgow  (71  Me.  62),  699. 
Ware  v.  Ware   (6  N.  J.  Eq.  117), 

724. 
Warfield  v.    Oliver    (23   La.   Ann. 

612),  1415. 
Waring  v.  King  (8  M.  &  W.  571) 

577. 
Warne  v.  Waggoner   (15  Atl.  Rep. 

1507),  1188. 
Warner  v.  Abbey  (112  Mass.  345), 

686,  690. 
Warner    v.    Cochrane     (128     Fed. 

Rep.  553),  645,  654,  1058,  1079. 
Warner  v.  Hitchins  (5  Barb.  N.  Y. 

■666),  883,  895. 
Warner    v.    Rice    (31    Ark.    344), 

1410,  1411. 
Warren  v.   Jones    (70  Miss.   202), 

1430,  1432. 
Warren  v.  Wagner   (75  Ala.  188). 

892,  1130,  1160,  1170,  1176,  1180. 
Warren,  In  re  (4  Ct.  CI.  526),  874. 
Warrill   v.    Barnes    (57    Ga.    404), 

1424. 
Warstell    v.    Ward    (1    Bush.    Ky. 

198),  1466. 


Washburn  v.  Frank   (31  La.  Ann. 

427),  1446. 
AVashington  v.  Conrad   (2  Humph. 

Tenn.   562),   924. 
Washington  v.  Williamson  (23  Md 

244),  1441. 
Washington  Co.  v.  Roger  Williams 

Silver  Co.   (25  R.  I.  483),  1069. 
Washington    Natural    Gas    Co.    v. 

Johnson  (123  Pa.  St.  576),  1081. 
Watchman  v.  Crook   (5  Gill  &  J. 

239),  604. 
Waterhouse  v.  Joseph  Schlitz  .(12 

S.  D.  397),  798. 
Waterman  v.  Clark    (58  Vt.  601), 

1271. 
Waterman    v.    Harkness     (2    Mo. 

App.  494),  1014. 
Waters   v.   Reuber    (16   Neb.   99), 

1265. 
Watkins  v.  Duvall   (69  Miss.  364), 

1412. 
Watkins    v.    Goodall     (138    Mass 

533),  804,  813,  816. 
Watkins  v.   Green    (22   R.   I.   34), 

465. 
Watriss    v.    First    National    Bank 

(130  Mass.  343),  914. 
Watriss  v.  First  Nat.  Bank    (124 

Mass.  571),  1269,  1287,  1290. 
Watson  V.  Almirall  (70  N.  Y.  Supp 

662),  848,  855. 
Watson   V.    Duke    of   Northumber- 
land (11  Ves.  Jr.  153),  572. 
Watson  V.  Home  (7  B.  &  C.  2S5), 

1007. 
Watson  V.  Hospital   (14  Ves.  333). 

874. 
Watson  v.  Hunkins  (13  Iowa,  547), 

1112. 
Watson    V.    Huntoon    (4    III.    App 

291),  563. 
Watson  V.  Merrill   (136  Fed.  Rep. 

359),  1239. 
Watson  V.  Moulton   (100  111.  App. 

560),  847,  855. 


cexxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED, 


[references  ake  to  pages.] 


Watson  V.  Shackford  (95  Me.  69), 

789. 
Watson  V.  Smith   (10  Yerg.  Tenn. 

476),  964. 
Watson  V.  Waud  (8  Ex.  335),  556. 
Watt  V.  Scofield  (76  111.  261),  1420, 

1431,   1432,   1457. 
Watts  V.  Coffin    (11  Johns.  N.  Y. 

495),  877. 
Watts  V.  Kellar  (56  Fed.  Rep.  1), 

981. 
Watts    V.    Lehmann    (107    Pa.    St. 

106),  1301. 
Way  V.  Meyers  (64  Ga.  760),  1131. 

1132. 
Way  V.  Reed  (6  Allen,  Mass  364), 

637,  1094. 
Wayland  v.  Mosely   (5  Ala.   430), 

549. 
Weatherall    v.    Geering    (12    Ves. 

504),    1066. 
Weatherbury    v.    Baker     (25    La. 

Ann.  229),  1044. 
Weathersby  v.    Sleeper    (42   Miss. 

732),   1250,   1264. 
Weaver  v.  Earle  (5  Gush.  31),  723. 
Weaver   v.    Southern    Oregon    Co. 

(31   Oreg.   14),    575. 
Webb    V.    Arnold     (52    Ark.    358). 

1465. 
Webb  V.  Austin    (7  M.  &  G.  701), 

952,  953. 
Webb  V.  King  (21  App.  D.  C  141), 

667,  1032. 
Webb  V.  Marshall   (13  Wall.  U.  S. 

15),  1422. 
Webb    V.    Plummer    (2    B.    &    Ad. 

746),   603,  1314. 
Webb   V.  Russell    (3  T.    R.    401), 

1206. 
Webb   V.    Sharpe    (80    U.    S.    14). 

1436,  1454. 
Webb  V.  Weaver  (79  111.  App.  657), 

573. 
Weber  v.  Gage  (39  N.  H.  182),  440. 
Weber   v.   Liebermann    (94   N.    Y. 

Supp.  460),  82f>. 


V/ebster  v.  Cooper  (14  How.  U.  S. 

501),    640. 
Webster  v.  Nichols   (104  111.  160), 

615,  644,  647,  1034,  1068,  1407. 
Webster  v.  Nosser   (2  Daly,  N.  Y. 

186),  878. 
Weddall    v.    Capes    (1    M.    &    W. 

5052),  1196. 
Weeber  v.  Hawes   (80  Minn.  476), 

1358. 
Weed  V.  Crocker   (13  Gray,  Mass. 

219),  513,  1364. 
Weed   V.    Standley    (12    Fla.    166), 

1402. 
Weeks  v.   International  Trust  Co. 

125  Fed.  Rep.  370),  637. 
Weeton  v.  Woodcock    (7  M.   &  Q. 

14),  1287. 
Wegner  v.  Lubenow  (12  N.  D.  95), 

503,  504. 
Weichelbaum  v.  Burlett   (20  Kan. 

709),  956. 
Weide  v.   St.  Paul   Boom  Co.    (99 

N.  W.  Rep.  421),  1068. 
Weider  v.   McComb    (10  Tex.  Civ. 

App.    85),   933. 
Weigall  V.  Waters    (6  T.  R.  488). 

851. 
Weil  V.  Abraham    (66  N.  Y.  Supp. 

244),  735. 
Weil  V.  Abrahams    (100  N.  Y.  St. 

Rep.  244),  759. 
Weil  V.  Gilchrist  (52  Ohio  St.  677), 

899. 
Weil  V.  Monro  (3  N.  Y.  Supp.  25), 

419. 
Weinberg   v.    Greenberger    (93    N. 

Y.  Supp.  530).  587. 
Weinberger    v.    Kratzenstein     (71 

App.    Div.    155),    820. 
Weiner  v.  Baldwin   (9  Kan.  App. 

772),  1222. 
Weinhandler  v.   Eastern   Brewing 

Co.   (89  N.  Y.  Supp.  16),  1070. 
Weinmann's  Estate  In  re  (30  Atl. 

Rep.    389),   1062. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


CCXXV 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Weinstein    v.    Harrison    (60    Tex. 

4J6),  848,  849. 
Weisbrod  v.  Dembowsky  (25  Misc. 

Rep.  485),  644. 
Weiss  V.  Mendelson  (24  Misc.  Rep. 

692),   1205,   1240. 
Weitheimier  v.  Circuit  Court    (83 

Micli.    5),   1060. 
Welch,  In  re  (108  Fed.  Rep.  367), 

1254. 
Welch  V.  Fitterling  (72  Minn.  483), 

641,  644. 
Welch  V.  Horton   (73  Iowa,  250), 

491,  1112,  1115. 
Welch  V.  Walsh    (177  Mass.  555), 

593. 
Welcome    v.    Hess    (90    Cal.    507), 

1200,  1213,  1293. 
Welcome    v.    Labonte     (63    N.    H. 

124),    519. 
Weld  V.   Clayton  le  Moors  Urban 

Council  (86  Law  T.  584),  1029. 
Weldon    v.    Harrison     (17    Johns. 

N.  Y.  66),  1052. 
Well  V.  Raymon    (142  Mass.  206), 

1054. 
Weller  v.  McConnick  (19  'Atl.  Rep. 

1102),  825. 
Wellmaker   v.  Wheatley    (123   Ga. 

201),  982. 
Wells  V.  Cody  (112  Ala.  278),  1117. 
Wells  V.  Higgins   (132  N.  Y.  459), 

1123. 
Wells  V.    Mason    (5    111.   84),    934, 

1171. 
Wells  V.  Sheerer  (78  Ala.  142),  965. 

972. 
Wells  V.  Thompson    (50  Ala.  83), 

1437,    1438. 
Welsh   V.   Phillips    (54   Ala.    309), 

1228. 
Weltman  v.  August   (11  Tex.  Civ. 

App.    604),   1284. 
Weltner's  Appeal  (03  Pa.  St.  302), 

1441. 
Went  worth  v.  Railroad  Co.   (55  N. 

H.  540),  685. 


Werdner  v.  Foster  (2  P.  &  W.  Pa. 

26),  1080. 
Werner  v.  Footman   (54  Ga.  128), 

465. 
Werner  v.  Padula  (167  N.  Y.  641), 

1358. 
Wertheimer  v.   Circuit  Court    (83 

Mich.  56),  733. 
Wertheimer  v.  Hosmer    (83  Mich. 

56),  757. 
Wertheimer  v.  Saunders   (95  Wis. 

573),  802,   803. 
Wescott  V.  Delano    (20  Wis.  514), 

1316. 
Wesener  v.  Smith  (85  N.  Y.  Supp. 

837),  834. 
Wessel  V.   Gerken    (36  Misc.   Rep. 

221),    817,    822. 
West  V.  Blakeway   (2  Man.  &  Gr. 

727),  1281. 
West  V.  Davis   (7  East,  363),  634. 
West  V.  Dobb  (10  B.  &  S.  987),  612, 

1056. 
West  V.  Lassels    (Cro.  Eliz.   851), 

541. 
West    V.    Louisville,    etc.    Co.     (8 

Bush,  Ky.  404),  794. 
West  V.  Price  (2  J.  J.  Marsh.  Ky. 

380),    958. 
West  V.  Sink  (2  Yeates,  Pa.  374), 

1443,  1444. 
West    Chicago    Masonic    Ass'n    v. 

Cohn  (192  111.  210),  825. 
Western  v.  Russell    (3   Ves.  &  B. 

192),  982. 
Western  Granite  &  Marble  Co.  v. 

Knickerbocker    (103    Oal.    Ill), 

409. 
Western  N.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Deal   (90 

N.  C.  110),  1232. 
Western    N.    Y.    &    P.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Rieck   (83  App.  Div.  576),  1369. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Oo.  v.   Smith 

(64  Ohio  St.  106),  681. 
West  Ham  Board  v.  East  London 

Waterworks  Co.   (69  Law  J.  Ch. 

257),  707. 


cexx\a 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


[eeferences  are  to  pages.] 


West  Koslikonong  v.  Ottesen    (80 

Wis.    62),  944. 
Westlake  Degraw  (25  Wend.  N.  Y. 

669),  877. 
Westmoreland  v.  Cambria  Co.  (130 

Pa.  St.  233),   634. 
Westmoreland  v.  Foster    (60  Ala. 

44),  1118. 
Westmoreland  v.  Wooten  (58  Miss. 

825),  1429,  1457. 
Westmoreland  Natural  Gas  Oo.  v. 

De  Witt   (130  Pa.  St.  235),  645. 
Weston  V.   Collins    (34   L.   J.   Cli. 

353),  991. 
West  Shore  Mills  Co.  v.  Edwards 

24  Oreg.  475),  492,' 503,  920,  936. 

1111,  1112. 
West  Shore  R.  Co.  v.  Wenner  (79 

N.  J.  L.  233),  612  1051. 
West   Side  Auction  House   Co.   v. 

Ct.   Ins.  Co.    (85   111.  App.  497), 

1216. 
West  Side  Savings  Bank  v.  New- 
ton   (76   N.    Y.    616),   784,   1142, 

1148. 
West   Transportation   Co.   v.   Lan- 
sing  (49  N.  Y.  499),  1365,  1374. 
West  Virginia,  etc.  v.  Mclntire  (44 

W.  Va.  210),  616. 
Wetherell  v.  Joy  (40  Me.  325),  552. 
Wetherill    v.    Gallagher    (211    Pa. 

St.  306),  1261. 
Wetmore    v.    Robinson    (2    Conn. 

529),  439. 
Wetsel    V.    Mayers    (91    111.    497), 

1441. 
Wetzel  V.  Meranger   (85  111.  App. 

457),    1298. 
Wetzell  V.  Richcreek  (53  Ohio  St. 

62),  1077,  1088. 
Whalen   v.   Kauffman    (19    Johns, 

N.  Y.  97),  604. 
Wharton   v.   Anderson    (28    Minn. 

301),  555. 
Wheat  V.   Watson    (57  Ala.    581), 

1199. 


Wheeler  v.  Bedell   (40  Mich.  693), 

1246. 
Wheeler    v.     Bedford     (54     Conn. 

244),  440,  441. 
Wheeler  v.   Crawford    (86  Pa.   St. 

327),  850. 
Wheeler    v.     Dascomb     (3     Cush. 

Mass.  285),  620. 
Wheeler  v.  Earle   (5  Cush.  Mass. 

35),  612,  616,  768,  769. 
Wheeler  v.  Foote   (97  S.  W.  Rep. 

447),   957. 
Wheeler  v.  Gilsey  (35  How.  Prac 

N.  Y.  139)   441. 
Wheeler   v.    Stevens    (6   H.    &   N. 

155),  1236. 
Wheeler  v.  Walden  (17  Neb.  122), 

1195,   1199,   1200. 
Wheeler   v.   Warschauer    (21   Cal. 

309),  934.  .       . 

Wheelock  v.  Warshauer    (34   Cal. 

265),  1171,  1173. 
Wheeton  v.  Woodcock    (7  Mee.  & 

Wei.  14),  1265. 
Whetstone  v.  Davis   (34  Ind.  510) 

1381. 
Whetstone  v.  McCartney    (32  Mo. 

App.   430),   559,   1093. 
Whidden  v.  Toulmin  (6  Ala.  104). 

1441. 
Whipley   v.    Dewey    (8    Cal.    35), 

1285. 
Whipple  v.  Foot   (2  Johns.  N.  Y. 

418),  1306,   1329. 
Whipple   V.    Gorsuch    (101    S.    W. 

Rep.  735),  692.    . 
Whipple  V.  Tucker    (123  111.  App. 

223),  465. 
Whitaker  v.  Hawley   (Cy.  4  687), 

1342,  1342. 
Whitcomb  v.  Cummings  (68  N.  H. 

67),   1094. 
Whitcomb  v.  Mason   (62  Atl.  Rep. 

749),  423,  804,  813. 
Whitcomb   v.   Starkey    (G3   N.    H. 

607),  1081. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCXXVU 


[references   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


White  V.  Albany  Railway  Co.   (17 

Hun.  N.  Y.  95),  857. 
White  V.  Arndt  (1  Whart.  Pa.  91), 

1270. 
White  V.  Berry  (24  R.  I.  74),  1235. 
White  V.  Bradley  (6G  Me.  254),  410. 
White  V.  Campion  (1  W.  N.  C.  Pa. 

130),  855. 
White  V.  Grennish  (11  C.  P.  N.  S. 

209),  1229. 
White  V.  Griffing   (44  Conn.  437), 

1121. 
White  V.  Harrow  (86  L.  T.  4),  409. 
White  V.  Hotel  (1897)   (1  Oh.  767), 

616,  769. 
White  V.  Kane  (53  Mo.  App.  300), 

1112. 
White  V.  Loomis    (27  Hun,  N.  Y. 

328),  1083. 
White  V.  McAllister   (67  Mo.  App. 

314),   1452. 
White  V.  McMurray  (2  Brewst.  Pa. 

485),  665. 
White  V.    Molyneux    (2    Ga.   124), 

1340,  1345. 
White    V.    Montgomery     (58     Ga. 

204),  828,  840. 
White  V.  Southend  Hotel  Co.    (66 

L.  J.  Ch.  387),  768. 
A\Tiite  V.  Thomas  (52  Miss.  49,  52), 

1456. 
White  V.  Thurber   (55  Hun,  447), 

700,  854,  864. 
White  V.  Wagner  (4  Har.  &  J.  373), 

721,  733. 
White  V.  Wakley    (26   Beav.   17), 

889,  962. 
White  V.  Walker  (38  111.  422),  556. 
White  V.  Warner  (2  Mer.  459),  667, 

1038. 
White  V.   Weaver    (68   N.   J.   Eq. 

644),  982. 
White's  Appeal    (10   Pa.   St.   252), 

1232. 
Whitehead   v.   Clifford    (5   Taunt. 
518),  576,  1210,  1238. 


Whitehead  v.  Comstock  Oo.  (25  R. 

I.  423),  427,  783,  823. 
Whitehouse   v.   Aiken    (77   N.    E. 

Rep.    499),    408. 
Whitfield  v.  Brandwood  (2  Stark.), 

1007. 
Whiting    V.    Edmunds    (94    N.    Y. 

309),  958,   965. 
Whiting  V.  Eichelberger  (16  Iowa, 

422),  1404. 
Whitley  v.  Gough    (2  Dyer,  140), 

1200. 
Whitlock  V.  Duffield    (1  Hoff.  Ch. 

N.  Y.  110),  1363,  1367. 
Whitlock's    Case    (8    Coke,    69b), 

529. 
Whitman  v.  Louten  (3  N.  Y.  Supp. 

754),  1236. 
Whitmarsh  v.  Cutting   (10  Johns, 

360),  1306,  1311. 
'^Tiitmore  v.  Humphries  (41  L.  J- 

C.  P.  43),  961. 
"Wliitmore   v.    Orono    Co.    (91    Me. 

297),  788. 
Whitney  v.  Allaire  (4  Denio,  N.  Y. 

554),  480. 
Whitney  v.  Farrar    (51  Me.  418), 

1450. 
Whitney  v.  Myers  (8  N.  Y.  Super 

Ct.   266),   1195,   1201,   1213. 
Whitney  v.  Olney  (3  Mason,  U.  S. 

280),  448. 
Whitney    v.    Railway     (11     Gray, 

Mass.  359),  742. 
Whitney  v.  Sweet    (22  N.  H.  10), 

1299. 
Whitton  V.  Peacock  (2  Bing.  N.  C. 

411),  941. 
Wick.  V.  Bredin    (1S9  Pa.  St.  S3), 

1286. 
Wickenden  v.  Webster  (5  El.  &  B. 

387),   739. 
Wickey  v.  Eyster  (58  Pa.  St.  501), 

1441. 
Wiener  v.  Baldwin   (9  Kan.  App. 
772),  1213. 


QCXXVIH 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are  to  pages.! 


Wiggin  V.  Wiggin  (58  N.  H.  235), 

927. 
Wiggins  V.  St.  Louis,  M.  &  S.  E.  R. 

Co.    (95  S.  W.  Rep.  311),  681. 
Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(142  U.  S.  396),  1249. 
Wigglesworth  v.  Dallison  (1  Doug. 

210),  1313,  1314. 
Wilber    v.    Follansbee     (97    Wis. 

577),  814. 
Wilbraliam    v.    Livesy    (18    Beav. 

206),  607. 
Wilcox  V.  Gate    (65  Vt.  478),  729, 

783. 
Wilcox  V.  Cartwright  (1  Lack.  Leg. 

Rec.  Pa.  130),  638. 
Wilcox  V.  Hines   (100  Tenn.  524), 

791,  859. 
Wilcox  V.  Pa.  etc.  Co.    (15  W.  N. 

Cas.  Pa.  367),  1154. 
Wilcox  V.   Zane    (167   Mass.    302), 

804. 
Wilcoxen  v.  McCray  (38  N.  J.  Eq. 

466),  404. 
Wilcoxin  v.  Donnelly   (90  N.  Car. 

245),  492. 
Wilczinski  v.  Lick  (68  Miss.  596), 

1436. 
Wilde  V.  Cantillon   (1  Johns.  Cas. 

N.  Y.  123),  686. 
Wilder  v.  Beed  (4  Ohio,  N.  P.  440), 

1060. 
Wildey  Lodge  v.  City  of  Paris  (73 

S.  W.  Rep.  69),  645,  1044,  1058. 
Wildman  v.   Taylor    (4   Ben.   42), 

639. 
Wildrick  v.    Swain    (34  N.  J.   Eq. 

167),  549. 
Wild's  Lessee  v.  Serpell  (10  Gratt. 

Va.  405),  923. 
Wiley  V.  Conner  (44  Vt.  68),  1318. 
Wilgus  V.  Gettings  (21  Iowa,  177), 

1250. 
Wilgus   V.    Whitehead    (8    Pa.    St. 

131),  460,  556. 
Wilkerson    v.    Farnham    (82    Mo. 

672),  1277. 


Wilkerson  v.  Thorp  (128  Cal.  221), 

1458. 
Wilkes  V.  Davis  (3  Mer.  509),  1293. 
Wilkins  v.  Pensacola  City  Co.    (36 

Fla.  36),  965,  972. 
Wilkins  v.  Wingate  (6  Term.  Rep. 

62),  581. 
Wilkinson    v.    Clauson    (29    Minn. 

91),  698,  782. 
Wilkinson  v.  Colley  (5  Burr.  2694), 

1124. 
Wilkinson  t.  Hull    (1  Bing.  713), 

609. 
Wilkinson  v.  Ketler  (69  Ala.  435), 

1315,  1424. 
Wilkinson  v.  Libby  (1  Allen,  Mass. 

375),  1015. 
Wilkinson  v.  Pettit  (47  Barb.  N.  Y. 

230),  616,  1081,  1391. 
Wilkinson  v.  Rogers  (10  Jur.  N.  S. 

5),   617,   737,  757. 
Wilkinson   v.    Stanley    (43    S.   W. 

Rep.  606),  1186. 
Wilkinson    v.   Wilkinson    (62    Mo. 

App.  519. 
Willard   v.    Benton    (57    Vt.    286). 

638. 
Willard    v.    Rogers    (54    111.    App 

583),  1423. 
Willard  v.  Tayloe    (8  Wall.  U.   S. 

558),  981,  982. 
Willard  v.  Tillman   (19  Wend.  N. 

Y.  358),  1340. 
Willard  v.  World's  Fair  Encamp- 
ment Co.  (59  111.  App.  336),  140  7, 

1428. 
Williams  v.  Baker    (41  Md.   523), 

448. 
Williams  v.  Bartholemew   (1  Bos. 

&   Pul.    326),    530. 
Williams  v.  Bosanquet   (1  Brod.  & 

Bing.  238),  1081,  1106. 
Williams  v.   Braden    (2   Mo.   App. 

Rep'r  846),  1419,  1457. 
Williams  v.  Burrell  (1  Com.  Bench 

402),  614. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


CCXXIX 


[references   ABE   TO   PAGES.] 


Williams  v.  Cash  (27  Ga.  507),  920, 

949. 
William    Clun's    Case     (10    Coke, 

127b),  531. 
Williams  v.  Craig  (2  Edw.  Ch.  N. 

Y.  297),  1020. 
Williams  v.   De  Lisle   Store  Com- 
pany  (104  Mo.  App.  567),  1432. 
Williams  v.  Downing    (18  Pa.   S*^^. 

60),  1074,  1107. 
Williams  v.  Earle  (9  B.  &  S.  740), 

617. 
Williams   v.   Exhibition   Co.    (188 

111.  19),  1296. 
Williams  v.  Gabriel  (75  L.  J.  K.  B. 

149),  1180. 
Williams  v.  Garrison  (29  Ga.  503), 

964. 
Williams  v.  Glover  (66  Ala.  189), 

512. 
Williams  v.  Hay  ward  (1  El.  &  El. 

1040),  485,  1118,  1145. 
Williams  v.  Iliphant  (3  Ind.),  694. 
Williams   v.   Kent    (67    Md.    350), 

463,  1009. 
Williams   v.   Ladew    (171    Pa.    St. 

369),  578. 
Williams  V.  Lane  (62  Mo.  App.  66), 

1264,  1287. 
Williams  v.  Lilley   (67  Conn.  50), 

999. 
Williams  v.  McAiley  (Cheves,  S.  C. 

20),  958,  960. 
Williams  v.  McFall  (2  S.  &  R.  Pa. 

280),  798. 
Williams    v.    Mershon     (57    N.    J. 

Law,  242),  1382. 
Williams  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co. 

(10    Det.    Leg.    N.    238),    1025, 

1096. 
William  v.   New   Albany   &   S.   R. 

Co.    (5   Ind.   111.),  870. 
Williams  v.  Towl    (65  Mich.  204), 

955,   956. 
Williams   v.   Vanderbret    (145    111. 

238),  648,   657,  1195,   1200,   1213. 


Williams  v.  Wait    (2   S.   D.   210), 

927,  937. 
Williams    v.    Williams    (12    East, 

209),  1258. 
Williams  v.  Williams  (43  L.  J.  C. 

P.  382),  891. 
Williams  v.  Woodward    (2  Wend. 

N.  Y.  487),  1069. 
Williamson   v.    Crassett    (62   Ark. 

393),  1195,  1236. 
Williamson  v.  Russell   (18  W.  Va. 

612),  955. 
Williamson  v.   Stevens    (82  N.   Y. 

Siipp.  1047),  695. 
Willi    V.    Drj'den     (52    Mo.    319), 

1087. 
Willington  v.  Brown  (8  Q.  B.  169), 

942. 
Willis  V.  Astor  (4  Edw.  Ch.  N.  Y. 

594),  1363,  1369. 
AVillis  V.  Branch  (94  N.  Car.  142), 

5G5. 
Willis    V.    McKinnon    (165    N.    Y. 

612),  952. 
Willis    V.    Moore     (59    Tex.    628), 

482,    1316,    1329. 
Willoughby  v.  Atkinson  Furn.  Co. 

(93  Me.  185),  820,  895,  1379. 
Vv  illoughby  v.  Lawrence    (116  111. 

11),  644,  1068,  1110. 
Wills  V.  Gas  Co.  (130  Pa.  St.  222), 

641,  643,  644. 
Wills  V.  Summers   (45  Minn.  90), 

1021,  1080. 
Willy  V.  Mulledy    (78  N.  Y.  310), 

916. 
Wilmot    V.    Smith    (3    Car.    &    P. 

453),  537. 
Wilson   V.   Been    (74    N.   Y.    531), 

458. 
Wilson  V.   Douglas    (2    Strobh.    S 

C.  97),  672. 
Wilson   v.   Edwards    (3   B.   &   Cr. 

734),  798. 
Wilson  V.  Gerhardt  (9  Colo.  585), 

1092,  1093. 


■ci-xxx; 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[eEFERENCES   ABE  TO  PAGES.] 


Wilson  V.   Goldstein   (152   Pa.   St. 

524),  629. 
Wilson  V.  Hart  (35  L.  J.  Ch.  569), 

740,  769,  77"1. 
Wilson  V.  Hatton    (L.  R.  2  Exch. 

Div.  336),  785. 
Wilson  V.   Hunter    (14  Wis.   683), 

446. 
Wilson    V.    Jones     (1    Bush,    Ky. 

173),  G32,  666. 
Wilson  V.  Leonard   (3  Beav.  373), 

1105. 
Wilson   V.   Lerche    (90    Mo.   473), 

958. 
Wilson  V.  Lunt  (11  Colo.  App.  56), 

1092. 
Wilson  V.  Lyons    (94  N.  W.  Rep. 

636),   482. 
Wilson  V.  Pa.  Trust  Co.   (114  Fed. 

Rep.  742),  1240. 
Wilson   V.   Phillips    (2    Bing.    13), 

621. 
Wilson  V.  Raybould   (56  111.  417), 

1186. 
Wilson  V.  Sewell   (4  Burr.  1980), 

1201,  1202. 
Wilson  V.   Smith    (5  Yerg.   Tenn. 

379),   922,   953,   1132,   1133. 
Wilson  V.  State  (39  So.  Rep.  776), 

1449. 
Wilson  V.   Stewart   (69  Ala.  302), 

1458. 
Wilson  V.  Treadwell   (81  Cal.  58), 

873. 
Wilson  V.  Twamler    (73  J.   K.   B. 

703),  770. 
Wilson  V.  Wilson   (2  Vt.  68),  439. 
Wilson  V.   Woolfryes    (6   M.   &   S. 

341),  953. 
Wimp  V.  Early  (104  Mo.  App.  85). 

1453. 
Winant  v.  Hines   (14  Daly,  N.  Y. 

187),  1207,  1214. 
Windom    v.    Stewart    (43    W.    Va. 

711),  869. 
Windsor   Hotel   Oo.    v.    Hawk    (49 

How.  Pr.  N.  Y.  257),  453. 


Wineman  v.  Hug'hson  (44  111.  App. 

22),  1112. 
Winestein  v.  Ziglatski-Marks  Co. 

(77  Conn.  404),  483. 
Winfrey    v.    Work    (75    Mo.    55), 

1228. 
Wing  V.   Gray    (36  Vt.   261),   462, 

760,  763. 
Wingard  v.  Banning  (39  Cal.  543), 

1460. 
Wink  V.  Early  (104  Mo.  App.  85), 

1318. 
Winkler  v.   Gibson    (2   Kan.   App. 

621),  1323. 
Winn  V.  Bull    (47  L.  J.  Ch.  139), 

388. 
Winn   V.    Spearing    (26   La.   Ann. 

384),  877. 
Winn  V.  State   (55  Ark.  360),  910.. 

1283. 
Winn  V.  Strickland  (34  Fla.  610), 

934,  968. 
Winne  v.   Hammond    (37   111.  99), 

1445. 
Winne  v.  Kelley    (34   Iowa,   339), 

879. 
Winship  v.  Pitts    (3  Paige,  N.  Y. 

259),  713. 
Winslow   V.   Bait.   &   Ohio  R.   Co. 

(188  U.  S.  646),  1374. 
Winslow   V,   Rand    (29    Me.    362), 

491. 
Winston    V.    Academy     (28    Miss. 

118),  679,  920. 
Winter  v.  Dumerque  (12  Jur.  N.  S. 

726),   1071. 
Winterbottom  v.  Wright    (10  Me. 

&  Wei.  109^,  913. 
Winterfield    v.    Strauss    (24    Wis. 

394),  492. 
Winterink  v.   Maynard    (47   Iowa, 

366),  533. 
AVinton  v.  Cornish   (5  Ohio,  477), 

1158,  1342,  1343. 
Winward   v.    Robbins    (3    Humph. 

(Tenn.  614),  940. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCXXXl 


[referexces  are  tg  pages.] 


Wisdom  V.  Newberry  (30  Mo.  App. 

241),  879,  869. 
Wise  V.  Decker   (30  Fed.  Cas.  No. 

17,906),  560. 
Wise   V.    Faulkner    (51   Ala.    359), 

49i,  492. 
Wise  V.  Ffaaf  (98  Md.  576),  1113. 
Wisner  v.   Ocumpaiigh    (71  N.  Y. 

113),   1408. 
Wister  v.  Campbell  (10  Phila.  Pa. 

359),  1238. 
Withers  v.  Larrabee  (48  Me.  570). 

1208. 
Witherspoon  v.  Nickels    (27   Ark. 

332),  1252. 
Withington  v.  Nichols    (187  Mass. 

575),  541. 
Witman  v.  Watry    (31  Wis.   638), 

1199,  1213. 
Witte  V.  Quinn  (38  Mo.  App.  681), 

1180,  1182. 
Witte  V.  Witte   (6  Mo.  App.  488), 

558. 
Witty  V.  Matthews  (52  N.  Y.  512), 

850. 
Witty  V.  Williams  (12  W.  R.  755), 

526. 
Wix    V.    Rutson    (68    L.    J.    Q.    B. 

298),  1027,  1030. 
Wolcott  V.  Hamilton    (61  Vt.  79), 

1318,  1319. 
Wolcott  V.  Sullivan  (6  Paige,  Ch. 

N.    Y.    117),    860. 
Wolf    V.    Holton    (92    Mich.    136), 

949. 
Wolf  V.  Johnson  (3  Miss.  513),  934. 
Wolf   V.    Weiner    (2    Brewst.    Pa. 

524),  1180. 
Wolfe  V.  Arrott  (109  Pa.  St.  473), 

459,  471. 
Wolgamot  V.   Brunner    (4  Har.   & 

McH.  Md.  89),  547. 
Wolveridge  v.   Steward    (1   Cr.   & 

M.  644),  1085. 
Womack    v.    McQuarry     (28    Ind. 

103),  1158,  1340. 


Womble  v.  Leach    (83  N.  C.   84), 

1418. 
Wood    V.    Bogle    (115    Mass.    30), 

1020. 
Wood  V.  City  of  Williamsburg  (46 

Barb.  N.  Y.  601),  685. 
Wood  V.  Day   (7  Taunt.  646),  953. 
Wood  V.  Drouthett   (44  Tex.  36.5), 

959. 
Wood  V.  Hubbell    (10  N.  Y.  479), 

1190,  1352. 
Wood   V.   Londonderry    (10   Beav. 

465),  1116. 
Wood  V.  Partridge  (11  Mass.  488), 

522,  539. 
Wood    V.    Sharpless    (174    Pa.    St. 

588),  456,  879,  869. 
Weed  V.  Turner  (7  Humph.  Tenn. 

517),  944. 
Wood  V.  Welz  (167  N.  Y.  570),  596. 
Woodbridge    v.    Connor    (49    Me. 

353),  690. 
Woodbury    v.    Butler    (67    N.    H. 

545),  489. 
Woodbury  v.  Short   (17  Vt.   387), 

431. 
Woodbury  v.  Swan   (59  N.  H.  22), 

957. 
Woodcock    V.    Carlson    (41    Minn. 

542^  1318. 
Woodhull  T.  Rosenthal    (61  N.  Y. 

382),  1048. 
Woodman    v.    Railroad    Co.     (149 

Mass.  335),  803. 
Woodrow     V.     O'Connor     (28     Vt. 

776),  1274. 
Woodruff  V.  Halsey  (8  Pick.  Mass. 

333),   690. 
Woodruff    V.    Oswego    Starch    Co. 

(74  N.  Y.  Supp.  961),  1035. 
Woods  V.  Charlton  (62  N.  H.  649), 

1329. 
Woods  V.   Cotton  Co.    (134   Mass. 

357),  813. 
Woods  V.  Edison  Elec.  111.  Co.  (184 

Mass.  523),  456. 


eexxxii 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


[refekexces  are  to  pages.] 


Woods  V.  Hyde  (31  L.  J.  Ch.  295), 

994. 
Woods  V.  Naumkeag  Mfg.  Co.  (134 

Mass.    357),    782,    816,   822. 
Woodward  v.  Gyles  (2  Vern.  119), 

765. 
Woodward    v.    Lindley     (43     Ind. 

433),  1218,  1226. 
Woodworking    Co.    v.    Southwick, 

(119  N.  Car.  611),  1250. 
Woodworth  v.  Harding   (77  N.  Y. 

Supp.  969),  1120. 
Woodworth  v.  Thompson  (44  Neb. 

311),   856. 
Woolcock  V.  Dew  (1  F.  &  F.  337), 

886. 
Wooler    V.    Knott    (45    D.    J.    Ex. 

313),  622. 
Wooley  V.   Osborne    (39  N.  J.   Eq. 

54,   59),   874. 
Woolley  V.  Maynes  (15  Utah,  341), 

1459. 
Woolley  V.  Watling    (1  Car.  &  P. 

610),  576. 
Woolsey  v.  Abbott   (65  N.  J.  Law, 

253),  1114. 
Woolsey  v.  Henke  (125  Wis.  134), 

460. 
Worley    v.     Frampton     (5     Hare. 

500),  1395. 
Worthington    v.    Ballauf    (6    Ohio 

Dec.  1121),  1101. 
Worthington    v.    Cooke     (58    Md. 

51),  541. 
Worthington   v.    Hewes    (19    Ohio 

St.   66),   5G9. 
Worthington  v.  Lee  (61  Md.  530), 

551. 
Worthington  v.  Parker    (11   Daly, 

N.  Y.  545),  864. 
Worrill   v.    Barnes    (57    Ga.    404), 

1457. 
Wooten   V.   Gwyn    (56   Miss.   422), 

1432. 
Wootley    V.    Gregory    (2    Y.    &    J. 

536),  1237. 


Wray  v.  Rhinelander  (39  How.  Pr. 

N.  Y.  299),  1276,  1283,  1398. 
Wray-Austin  Mach.  Co.  v.  Flower 

(12  Det.  Leg.  N.  214),  1222. 
Wright  V.   Bircher    (72   Mo.    179), 

1405,  1427,  1428,  1434. 
Wright    V.    Burroughs     (3    C.    B. 

685),   490,   641. 
Wright    V.     DuBignon     (114     Ga. 

765),  1244,  1256. 
Wright  V.  E.  M.  Dickey   (83  Iowa, 

464),  1451,  1452. 
Wright  V.  Everett  (87  Iowa,  697), 

76L 
Wright  V.  Freeman    (5  Har.   &  J. 

487),  439. 
Wright   V.    Hardy,    Miss.    (24    So. 

Rep.  697),  489. 
Wright  V.  Heidorn    (6  Ohio,  Dec. 

151),  616. 
Wright  V.  Howard   (1  Sim.  &  Stu. 

190),  432. 
Wright    V.    Jessup    (87    Pac.    Rep. 

930),  956. 
Wright    V.    Kelly    (4    Lans.    N.   Y. 

57),  1090. 
Wright    V.    Lattin     (38    111.    293), 

876,  1182. 
Wright    V.    MacDonnell     (88    Tex. 

140),  1265,  1289. 
Wright  V.  Newton    (2  C.  M.  &  R. 

124),  1057. 
Wright  V.  Perry   (188  Mass.  268), 

801. 
Wright  V.  Roberts    (22  Wis.  161), 

1336. 
Wright   V.    Tuttle    (4    Day,    Conn. 

313),  599. 
Wrottesley     v.     Adams     (2    Dyer. 

177),  1200. 
Wander   v.   McLean    (124   Pa.   St. 

334),  792. 
Wunderlich  v.   Reis    (34   Hun.    N. 

Y.  1),  1104. 
Wusthoff   V.    Schwartz    (32   Wash. 

327),  1142,  1155,  1170. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCXXXlll 


[referexces  ake  to  pages.] 


Wyatt    V.    Stagg    (5    Bing.    N.    C. 

564),  1197. 
Wyatt    V.    Turner    (37    Ga.    640), 

1404. 
WyckofE    V.    Frommer     (12    Misc. 

Rep.    149),    1176. 
Wyckoff    V.    Schofield     (98    N.    Y. 

475),   1125. 
Wyman    v.    Farrar    (35    Me.    64), 

428. 
Wyndham  v.  Way  (4  Taunt.  316), 

1259. 
Wynne   v.   Haight    (27    App.    Div. 

7),  802,  855. 
Wyoming    Coal    Co.    v.    Price    (81 

Fa.  St.  156),  951. 
Wyse    V.    Russell    (16    Misc.    Rep 

53),  1141. 


T. 


Yarborough  v.  Monday  (2  Dev.  S. 

C.  493),  332. 
Yarnall  v.  Haddaway  (4  Har.  Del 

437),   1466. 
Yates   V.    Bachley    (33  Wis.    185), 

1176. 
Yates    V.    Kinney    (19    Neb.    275), 

139,  312. 
Yates  V.  Smith  (11  111.  App.  459), 

1325.    1327. 
Yaw  V.  L'eman   (1    Wils.  2),  1007. 
Yeager  v.  Weaver  (64  Fa.  St.  425), 

695. 
Yeazel    v.    White    (40    Neb.    432), 

1326. 
Yellow  Jacket   Silver  Min.   Co.   v. 

Stevenson  (5  Nev.  224),  66. 
Yesler's  Estate  v.  Orth   (24  Wash. 

483),  159. 
Yocum  v.  Barnes   (8  B.  Mon.  Ky. 

496),  599. 
Yonge  v.  Bradford  (Hob.  3),  20. 
York  V.  Carlisle  (19  Tex.  Oiv.  App. 

269),   1423,   1432. 


York  V.  Jones  (2  N.  H.  454),  1228. 
York  V.  Steward    (21  Mont.   515), 

697,  1140. 
Youmans  v.  Caldwell    (4  Ohio,  St. 

71),  465. 
Young  V.  Burhans   (80  Wis.  428), 

867,   878. 
Young  V.  Bransford  (12  Lea  Tenn. 

244),  805. 
Young   V.   Collett    (6   N.    W.   Rep. 

115),  784,  1151. 
Young  V.  Ellis  (91  Va.  297),  538. 
Young  T.  Gay   (41  La.  Ann.  758), 

313. 
Young  V.  Hefferman   (67  111.  App. 

354),  927. 
Young    V.    Kimball     (23    Fa.    St. 

193),  1460. 
Young  V.  Faul   (10  N.  J.  Eq.  401), 

326. 
Young    V.    Feyser    (3    Bos.    N.    Y. 

308),  1061. 
Young  V.  Smith   (28  Mo.  65),  155, 

182. 
Young    V.    Spencer    (10    Barn.    & 

Cres.  145),  713. 
York  V.   Stewart    (21   Mont.   515), 

782. 
Young  V.  Ward  (33  Me.  359),  327. 
Young  V.  West  Side  Hotel  Co.    (2 

Ohio,  Dec.  140),  1447. 
Young    V.    Wrightson     (11     Ohio, 

Dec.   104),  570. 
Youngblood    v.    Enbank     (68    Ga. 

630),    1264. 
Younggreen    v.    Shelton    (101    111. 
App.  89),  679. 


Z. 


Zachry  v.   Stewart    (67    Ga.    218), 

1412. 
Zapp    V.    Johnson    (87    Tex.    641), 

1454. 


CCXXXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


[eefekexces  are  to  pages.] 


Zarkowski  v.  Astor  (13  Misc.  Rep. 

507),  1274. 
Zeiter  v.  Bowman   (6  Barb.  N.  Y. 

133),  590. 
Zeysing  v.  Welbourn   (4  Mo.  App. 

352),    1228. 
Ziegler  v.  Brennan   (75  App.  Div. 

584),  812. 
Zigler  V.  McClellen  (15  Oreg.  499), 

882. 
Zink  V.  Bohn    (3  N.  Y.  Supp.  4), 

329,   489. 


Zink  V.  Grant    (25  Oliio  St.  352), 

776. 
Zimmer  v.  Black   (59  Hun,  N.  Y. 

826),  1348. 
Zinnel  v.   Bergdoll    (9  Pa.   Super. 

Ct.   522),  303. 
Zouch   d.    Abbotts   v.    Parsons    (3 

Burr.  1794),  1202. 
'  Zouch  d.  Ward  v.  Willingdale    (1 

H.  Bl.  311),  648. 
Zule  V.  Zule   (24  Wend.  N.  Y.  76), 

539. 


LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  PARTIES  TO  THE  LEASE. 

§  1.  The  general  rule. 

2.  Leases  by  life  tenants. 

3.  Leases  by  life  tenants  under  a  power. 

4.  The  termination  of  terms  created  by  a  life  tenant  as  a  landlord. 

5.  The  validity  of  lease  by  tenants  for  years. 

6.  Guardianship  in  general. 

7.  The  liability  of  an  intruder  as  guardian. 

8.  The  power  of  a  guardian  in  socage. 

9.  The  power  of  testamentary  guardians. 

10.  The  power  to  lease  of  a  guardian  appointed  by  a  court. 

11.  When  the  permission  of  the  court  to  the  making  of  the  lease  is 

required. 

12.  Limitations  upon  the  power  of  a  guardian  to  lease. 

13.  The  duty  of  the  guardian  to  lease. 

14.  The  guardian's  duty  to  collect  rents. 
IZ.     Formal  requisites  of  the  lease. 

16.  Covenants  by  guardians. 

17.  An  infant's  liability  for  rent. 

18.  The  ratification  of  a  lease  made  by  an  infant. 

19.  The  invalidity  of  a  lease  made  by  a  fevie  sole. 

20.  The  effect  of  her  marriage  upon  a  lease  made  by  a  feme  sole. 

21.  The  invalidity  of  a  lease  made  by  a  feme  covert  at  the  common 

law. 

22.  The  husband's  power  at  common  law  to  lease  lands  of  the  wife. 

23.  The  right  of  a  married  woman  to  lease  under  the  modern  stat- 

utes. 

24.  The  effect  of  the  death  of  the  husband  or  wife  upon  a  lease  made 

by  the  wife. 

25.  The  control  of  the  husband  over  leases  held  by  the  wife  as  ex- 

ecutrix. 

26.  The  disposition  of  a  term  by  the  husband  of  a  lessee  to  take 

effect  at  his  death. 

27.  Leases  of  community  property. 
The  modern  rule  as  to  the  relation  of  mortgagor  and  mortgagee. 

1 


28. 


2  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  29.  The  right  of  the  mortsagee  to  the  rent  at  the  common  law 

30.  The  appointment  and  powers  of  a  receiver  in  foreclosure. 

31.  The  effect  of  a  foreclosure  upon  the  tenant's  rights. 

32.  The  right  to  rents  of  the  purchaser  on  a  sale  under  foreclosure. 

33.  The  power  of  the  Federal  government  to  lease  lands. 

34.  The  validity  of  leases  of  lands  owned  by  Indians. 

35.  Leases  by  aliens. 

36.  Leases  to  aliens. 

37.  The  effect  of  the  death  of  the  lessee  on  leases  for  terms  of  years. 

38.  The  expiration  of  a  lease  for  years  on  the  death  of  the  lessee. 

39.  The   liability   of   the   personal    representative    of   the    deceased 

lessee  of  a  term  of  years. 

40.  The  remedies  of  the  personal  representative  of  the  lessee. 

41.  The  rights  of  an  executor  of  a  lessor. 

42.  The  liability  of  a  personal  representative  for  rents. 

43.  The  power  of  an  administrator  to  lease  the  lands  of  his  intes- 

tate. 

44.  The  power  of  an  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  to  lease. 

45.  The  general  rule  as  to  the  power  of  executor  to  make  leases. 

46.  A  lease  which  is  executed  by  one  of  several  executors  or  admin- 

istrators. 

47.  A  lease  by  an  executrix  being  a  feme  sole. 

48.  The  equitable  jurisdiction  over  leases  made  by  executors. 
48a.  The  power  of  trustees  to  grant  leases. 

48b.  The  proper  covenants  in  leases  by  trustees. 
48c.  Signature  by  one  of  two  or  more  trustees. 
48d.  The  personal  liability  of  the  trustee. 

§  1.  The  general  rule.  As  a  general  rule  any  person  who 
has  capacity  to  make  a  valid  contract  may  enter  into  a  lease 
either  as  landlord  or  tenant.  This  rule  is  subject  to  the  excep- 
tions which  are  recognized  by  the  law  of  contracts.  In  the  fol- 
lowing sections  we  shall  enumerate  and  examine  certain  parti- 
cular classes  of  lessors  and  lessees,  and  determine  so  far  as  pos- 
sible the  extent  of  the  power  to  contract  so  far  as  the  power 
to  contract  is  limited  and  defined  by  the  particular  facts  of 
each  case  and  the  nature  of  the  position  occupied  by  the  land- 
lord or  tenant. 

§  2.  Leases  by  life  tenants.  A  tenant  of  a  life  estate  may 
convey  all  or  any  portion  of  his  estate  by  deed  or  parol  lease. 
If  he  conveys  all  his  estate  it  is  an  assignment  of  it.  If  he 
grants  a  term  for  years  it  is  a  lease.^    Any  lease  he  may  grant, 

iMcC^mpbell   v.   McCampbell.   5   Litt.    (Ky.)    92;    King   v.    Sharp,   6 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  55. 


PAETIES  TO  THE  LEASE.  3 

no  matter  for  how  long  a  term  of  years,  is  good  only  for  the 
life  of  the  lessor  and  terminates  with  his  death.     So,,  if  a  per- 
son has  an  estate  for  the  life  of  another  he  may  grant  a  lease 
for  a  term  of  years  which  will  be  good  during  the  life  of  the 
cestui  que  vie  but  upon  his  death  it  is  absolutely  void  even 
though  the  lessor  in  the  meantime  has  acquired  the  reversion.^ 
The  executor  or  administrator  of  a  life  tenant  cannot  maintain 
an  action  for  rent  accruing  after  the  death  of  the  life  tenant.^ 
A  lease  executed  by  a  tenant  for  life,  who  was  then  under  age, 
in  which  the  reversioner  is  named,  if  not  executed  by  him  is 
void  on  the  death  of  the  tenant  for  life.    An  execution  by  the 
reversioner  afterwards  is  not  a  confirmation  of  the  lease  so  as 
to  bind  the  lessee  in  an  action  brought  on  his  covenant  con- 
tained in  it.*    Before  the  statute  11  George  II,  c.  19  the  execu- 
tor of  a  tenant  for  life  who  made  a  lease  for  years  and  died 
before  the  rent  was  payable,  could  not  recover  rent  from  the 
tenant  for  years.     That  statute  provided  that  the  executors  of 
the  tenant  for  life  might  recover  a  proportion  of  the  rent  down 
to  the  death  of  their  testator.     The  statute,  however  did  not 
destroy  the  right  of  the  reversioner  or  the  remainderman  to 
enter  upon  the  tenant  for  years  for  the  latter  had  no  more  right 
than  his  lessor,  and  the  estate  of  his  lessor  having  terminated 
by  his  death  the  tenant  for  years  was  simply  a  tenant  at  suffer- 
ence.     If  the  executor  of  the  tenant  for  life  held  over  the  re- 
mainderman might  either  eject  him  or  regard  him  as  his  ten- 
ant and  recover  for  use  and  occupation.     The  remainderman 
has  the  same  rights  and  remedy  against  a  tenant  for  years,  as 
against  a  life  tenant  holding  over  on  the  death  of  his  lessor.' 
§  3.  Leases  by  life  tenants  under   a  power.     There   is   a 
marked  and  important  distinction  between  a  power  to  lease 
created  by  a  will  or  a  deed  with  a  devise  of  the  fee  to  another 
and  a  power  to  lease  which  is  not  expressly  created  in  this  man- 
ner but  is  merely  the  outcome  of  and  an  incident  to  the  owner- 
ship of  an  estate  for  a  limited  period  with  a  remainder  or  revci-- 
sion  in  another.    In  the  first  case  a  lease  for  any  term  of  years 
not  exceeding  the  limitations  placed  upon  the  power  in  the  in- 

2  Co.  Litt.  476,  6  Co.  15a.  Watts,  7  Term  Rep.  832,  Esp.  501, 

s  Steuber  v.  Huber,  107  App.  Div.  4  R.  R.  387. 

599,  95  N.  Y.  Supp.  348.  s  Co.  Litt.  50,  2  Black  Com.  145; 

■*  Ludford  v.  Barber,  1  Term  Rep.  Fevans  v.  Briscoe,  4  H.  &  J.  (iid.) 

86,  1  R.  R.  56;    Doe  d.  Martin  v.  139,  140. 


4  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

strument  will  be  valid  and  will  be  binding  upon  the  owner  of 
the  reversion;  while  in  the  latter  ease  the  lease  created  by  the 
owner  of  the  limited  estate  will  terminate  with  the  expiration, 
of  the  limited  estate  itself.  Hence  if  an  estate  be  granted  to 
one  for  life  with  a  power  to  grant  leases  for  twenty  years,  his 
lease  for  twenty  years  will  be  valid  and  binding  upon  the  re- 
mainderman though  his  own  interest  in  the  life  estate  may  ex- 
pire the  next  day.  But  if  the  life  tenant  is  not  invested  with 
an  express  power  to  grant  leases  for  years  he  can  only  grant 
leases  which  will  be  good  during  his  life.  Though  he  grant  a 
lease  expressly  for  a  term  it  will  not  be  binding  upon  the  re- 
versioner or  remainderman  after  the  death  of  the  life  tenant. 
A  power  to  grant  leases  which  shall  be  valid  after  the  expiration 
of  a  life  estate  is  of  considerable  value,  both  to  the  life  tenant 
and  to  the  remainderman  or  reversioner,  for  unless  the  life  ten- 
ant possesses  this  power  he  cannot  enjoy  the  use  and  profits  of 
his  estate  to  the  best  advantage.  If  he  cannot  give  long  leases 
it  may  happen  that  the  premises  will  remain  vacant,  waste 
may  occur,  and  the  buildings  be  permitted  to  remain  out  of 
repair,  owing  to  the  fact  that  it  is  impossible  to  procure  ten- 
ants who  will  accept  a  lease  whose  existence  is  dependant 
upon  the  uncertainty  of  the  life  of  the  life  tenant.  And  on 
the  other  hand  if  the  life  tenant  is  permitted  to  give  leases 
for  a  defijiite  term  of  years  which  shall  be  binding  on  those 
who  follow  him  in  the  ownership  he  will,  by  the  receipt  of 
a  larger  rent,  be  encouraged  and  enabled  to  keep  the  build- 
ings in  better  repair,  and  to  pay  taxes  and  interest  charges, 
so  that  in  the  end  his  power  will  not  only  operate  to  his  own 
advantage  but  also  to  that  of  his  successor.  But  while  the 
power  to  grant  a  permanent  lease  extended  beyond  the  es.- 
tate  owned  by  the  lessor  is  to  be  favored  if  possible  it  will 
never  arise  by  mere  implication.  It  must  be  expressly  con- 
ferred upon  the  life  tenant  or  other  persons  owning  the  es- 
tate which  is  subordinate  to  the  fee  simple. 

A  power  of  a  life  tenant  to  make  leases  at  his  discretion 
which  shall  bind  the  remainderman  after  his  death,  must  be 
strictly  pursued.  Equity  will  aid  a  defective  execution  of 
such  a  power  where  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  and  the 
interests  of  the  lessee  demand  it.  But  while  equity  will  aid 
tlie  defective  execution  of  a  power  to   grant  leases,   it  will 


PARTIES  TO  THE  LEASE.  D 

not  interpose  where  there  has  been  no  execution  of  such  a 
power  for  on  general  principles  if  the  execution  of  the  power 
in  the  life  tenant  is  discretionary,  it  will  leave  it  to  his  elec- 
tion freely  to  give  or  to  refrain  from  giving  a  lease.  If  he 
has  not  executed  it,  equity  will  not  do  for  him  what  he  did 
not  see  fit  to  do  for  himself.  The  question  of  the  execution 
by  a  life  tenant  of  a  power  to  lease,  frequently  arises  between 
one  who  has  entered  under  such  a  lease  and  the  remainder- 
man. If  the  lessee  can  show  circumstances  which  ordinarily 
would  warrant  the  interference  of  equity,  he  will  be  protected 
imder  his  lease  from  the  life  tenant,  though  it  may  not  have 
been  executed  in  accordance  with  the  express  limitations  of 
the  power.  Thus  if  the  life  tenant  has  given  an  agreement 
for  a  lease  which  was  subsequently  to  be  executed  in  proper 
form  which  has  not  been  done,  and  the  lessee  had  entered 
thereunder  and  had  paid  rent  to  the  remainderman  after  the 
death  of  the  life  tenant  the  lessee  will  be  protected  in  his  pos- 
session of  the  premises  upon  the  basis  of  an  estoppel  on  the 
remainderman.* 

§  4.  The  termination  of  terms  created  by  a  life  tenant  as  a 
landlord.  At  the  common  law  upon  the  death  of  a  life  tenant 
who  has  made  a  lease  for  a  term,  the  lease  for  the  term  is  at  an 
end  irrespective  of  its  length,  unless  the  life  tenant  has  power 
to  lease  for  a  term.  The  term  is  not  revived  as  to  the  remain- 
derman merely  by  the  acceptance  of  rent  by  him.^  The  lessee 
of  a  tenant  for  life  upon  the  termination  of  the  life  estate  of 
his  lessor  becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance,  of  the  owner  of  the 
fee.  He  may  at  once  abandon  possession  as  he  is  not  bound 
to  remain  as  the  tenant  of  the  reversioner  with  whom  he  has 
no  relation  or  privity  whatever.  And  if  he  promptly  aban- 
don the  premises  he  will  escape  all  liability  for  rent  subse- 
quently accruing  whether  to  the  personal  representative  of 
the  life  tenant  or  to  the  reversioner.^     The  remainderman  or 

6  Howard  v.  Carpenter,  11  Md.  St.  432,  56  N.  E.  199,  48  L.  R.  A. 
259,  283.  735;    Lowrey  v.  Reef,  1  Ind.  App. 

7  Doe  V.  Butcher,  1  Doug.  50;  244,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  626;  Miller  v. 
Jenkins  v.  Church,  Cowper,  482;  IMainwaring,  Cro.  Car.  399;  Jones 
Mayhew's  Case,  I'Coke,  147;   Lud-  v.  Cowper,  Willes,  169. 

ford  V.  Barber,  1  T.  R.  86;   Sykes  s  Hoagland    v.    Crum,    113    111. 

V.    Benton,   90   Ga.    402,    17    S.   E.       365. 
Rep.  1002;  Noble  v.  Tyler,  61  Ohio 


b  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

reversioner  is  not  bound  to  give  the  lessee  of  the  tenant  for 
life  a  notice  to  quit  upon  the  death  of  the  tenant  for  life. 
The  lessee  of  a  tenant  for  life  is  presumed  to  know  the  limi- 
tations upon  his  landlord's  title  and  the  duration  of  his  estate. 
If  the  subtenant  shall  remain  in  possession  after  the  death  of 
the  tenant  for  life  with  the  consent  or  acquiescence  of  the 
reversioner  or  remainderman,  the  latter  may  recover  from 
him  the  reasonable  value  of  the  use  and  occupation  of  the 
premises  for  such  period  as  he  has  been  in  possession.''  ■  But 
he  may  be  e-victed  by  the  reversioner  after  the  expiration  of 
the  interest  of  the  life  tenant  under  whom  he  claims.  He  can- 
not maintain  an  action  on  the  imi:)lied  covenant  for  quiet  en- 
joyment against  the  heirs  of  his  landlord. ^°  The  tenant  of 
a  life  tenant  has  as  against  the  remainderman  or  reversioner 
no  rights  which  can  be  enforced  at  law.^^  There  is  no  privity 
of  estate  or  contract  between  the  subtenant  and  the  owner  of 
the  fee  in  remainder.  For  this  and  other  reasons  the  subten- 
ant cannot  as  against  the  remainderman  remove  his  buildings 
or  other  fixtures  on  the  termination  of  his  lease  by  the  death 
of  the  life  tenant  without  the  consent  of  the  remainderman.^^ 
But  the  subtenant  may  on  the  death  of  his  immediate  lessor 
remove  any  crop  which  he  may  have  sown  during  the  term 
This  is  the  rule  under  the  common  law  principle  of  emble- 
ments. And  he  may  enter  after  the  death  of  the  life  tenant 
for  the  purpose  of  removing  the  crop  for  a  reasonable  period 
after  the  expiration  of  his  term.^^  As  to  third  persons  who 
are  not  parties  to  the  lease,  the  subtenant  has  no  title  which 
will  enable  him  to  secure  damages  for  their  acts  in  relation 
to  the  land.  He  cannot  enjoin  a  third  person  from  commit- 
ting waste  nor  can  he  recover  damages  for  waste  or  for  tres- 
pass committed  upon  the  property.^*    - 

» Guthman    v.   Vallery,    51   Neb.  12  Jones  v.    Shefflin,   45   W.   Va. 

824,  71  N.  W.  Rep.   734.  729,  31  S.  E.  Rep.  975. 

10  Penfold  V.  Abbott,  32  L.  J.  Q.  i3  Carman  v.  Hosier,  105  la.  367, 
B.  67,  9  Jur.  (N.  S.)  517,  7  L.  T.  75  N.  W.  Rep.  322;  Guthman  v.  Val- 
384,  11  W.  R.  169;  Adams  v.  Gib-  lery,  51  Neb.  824,  71  N.  W.  Rep.  734. 
ney,  4  M.  &  P.  491,  6  Bing.  656,  8  1*  Johnson  v.  Grantham,  104  Ga. 
L.  J.  (O.  S.)  C.  P.  242,  31  R.  R.  558,  30  S.  E.  Rep.  781.  In  West 
514.  Virginia  a  yearly  term  created  by 

11  Carman  v.  Mosler,  105  la.  307  a  lease  executed  by  a  life  ten- 
75  N.  W.  Rep.  323.  ant  runs  to  the  end  of  the  current 


PARTIES  TO  THE  LEASE.  / 

Though  the  lease  of  a  life  tenant  for  a  term  is  on  his  death 
so  far  as  the  remainderman  is  concerned,  absolntely  void,  it 
is  competent  for  the  subtenant  by  holding  over  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  remainderman  to  make  a  new  lease.  The  relation- 
ship of  landlord  and  tenant  may,  after  the  death  of  a  life 
tenant,  arise  between  his  subtenant  and  the  remainderman  by 
the  acts  of  the  parties.  Thus  a  lease  by  the  widow  of  the  de- 
ceased owner  of  real  property,  who  had  only  a  dower  interest 
when  she  made  the  lease  may  be  ratified  by  the  heirs  of  the 
deceased  on  the  death  of  the  widow.^^  The  acceptance  of 
rent  by  a  remainderman  and  permitting  the  tenant  to  make 
improvements,  are  not  an  affirmance  of  the  lease  which  is 
absolutely  void  at  the  death  of  the  tenant  for  life.^® 

So  a  reversioner  by  accepting  the  rent  from  a  subtenant 
after  he  comes  into  possession,  does  not  thereby  confirm  a 
covenant  for  a  perpetual  renewal  so  as  to  make  such  cove- 
nant binding  on  him.^^  Where  a  lease  is  determined  by  the 
expiration  of  the  estate  of  the  landlord  who  is  a  life  tenant, 
and  the  lessee  continues  to  hold  luider  the  remainderman,  pay- 
ing the  same  rent,  the  question  whether  a  new  lease  has  been 
made,  is  a  question  of  fact.  If  the  tenant  continues  to  hold 
under  the  remainderman,  and  nothing  passes  between  them 
except  the  pajTnent  and  receipt  of  rent,  the  new  landlord  is 
not  bound  by  a  stipulation  in  the  old  lease  which  is  unknown 
to  him,  and  which  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  custom  of  the 
country.^^  The  fact  that  the  remainderman  received  rent  and 
sold  the  premises  thereafter  with  a  mention  of  the  lease  in 
the  deed,  and  an  exception  of  the  lease  in  the  covenant  against 
encumbrances,  and  notice  was  taken  of  the  lease  in  a  subse- 
quent mortgage,  does  not  prevent  the  lease  from  expiring 
with  the  interest  of  the  tenant  for  life.^®     The  remainderman 

year    in    whicli    the    life    tenant  Yate  v.  Church,  Cowp.  482;   Doe  d. 

dies  unless  it  is  renewed  by  the  Jolliffe  v.  Sybourn,  2  Esp.  667. 

remainderman  accepting  the  sub-  i"  Higgins    v.    Rosse,    3    Bligh. 

tenant  as  his  tenant.     Holden  v.  113. 

Boring,  '52  W.  Va.  37,  43  S.  E.  86.  is  Oakley   v.   Monch,  4   H.   &  C. 

15  Martens  v.  O'Connor,  101  Wis.  251,  35  L.  J.  Ex.  87;  L.  R.  1  Ex. 
118,  76  N.  W.  Rep.  774.  159,  12  Jur.   (N.  S.)   253,  14  L.  T. 

16  James  d.   Aubrey  v.   Jenkins,  20,  14  W.  R.  406. 

Bull.  N.  P.  96;   Doe  d.  Simpson  v.  is  Doe  d.  Potter  v.  Archer,  1  Bos. 

Bitcker,    1    Doug.    50;    Jenkins   d.      &    P.     531.     And    see    Jordan    v. 

Waj-d,  1  H.  Bl.  97,  2  R.  R.  728. 


8  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

who,  on  the  death  of  the  life  tenant  assents,  either  expressly 
or  by  necessary  implication  to  the  continued  occupation  of 
the  premises  by  a  subtenant  who  has  taken  a  lease  from  the 
deceased  life  tenant  creates  a  new  tenancy  which  is  either  at 
will  or  from  year  to  year  as  the  case  may  be.  Before  the  re- 
mainderman consents  the  subtenant  is  merely  his  tenant  at 
sufferance.  After  a  new  lease  is  created  by  the  consent  of 
the  remainderman  he  and  the  subtenant  stand  towards  each 
other  as  landlord  and  tenant.  There  are  then  privity  of  con- 
tract and  privity  of  estate  between  them  and  their  relations 
are  regulated  by  the  terms  of  the  new  lease  which  has  been 
made.^°  In  leasing  premises  for  a  long  term  it  is  always  ad- 
visable to  protect  the  interests  of  the  lessee  where  a  life 
tenant  has  no  power  to  grant  leases  for  a  term  to  have  both  the 
life  tenant  and  the  reversioner  or  remainderman  unite  in  the 
execution  of  the  lease.  Of  course  where  the  remainderman 
or  the  reversioner  unites  with  the  life  tenant  in  the  execution 
of  a  lease  as  lessors  the  term  does  not  come  to  an  end  with 
the  death  of  the  life  tenant  during  the  term.  On  the  death 
of  the  life  tenant  the  term  continues  and  the  lease  at  once  be- 
comes the  lease  of  the  remainderman  or  reversioner.^^  The 
interest  which  the  subtenant  has  in  the  term  rises  out  of  the 
successive  estates  of  the  lessors  as  each  of  them  in  turn  be- 
comes entitled  to  the  ownership  and  possession  of  the  prop- 
erty. So  too,  a  remainderman  or  reversioner  may  by  his  con- 
duct and  declarations  made  during  the  life  of  the  life  tenant 
so  estop  himself  that  after  the  death  of  the  life  tenant  he  will 
be  taken  and  regarded  as  the  lessor  of  the  subtenant.-^ 

§  5.  The  validity  of  leases  by  tenants  for  years.  A  lessee  of 
a  term  for  years  may  make  a  lease  as  to  a  portion  of  his  term 
which  will  make  him  a  lessor.  Broadly  speaking  if  he  carves 
out  a  term  less  in  duration  than  his  own  term  it  is  a  lease,  while 
if  he  parts  with  all  his  term  it  is  an  assignment.  This  is  not 
always  so,  and  in  any  case,  whether  a  term  created  by  a  lessee 

20  Bacon's  Abr.   "Leases."  O.   1;  21  Lake  Erie  Gas  Co.  v.  Petter- 

Pennington   v.    Taniere,   12   Q.    B.  son,  184  Pa.  St.  364,  39  Atl.  Rep.  68. 

998;    Tucker  v.  Morse,  1  C.  &  Ad.  22  Simpson  v.  Butcher,  1  Doug. 

365;   Martin  v.  "Watts,  2  T.  R.  83;  50. 
Crune  v.  Prideaux,  10  East,  187; 
Collins  V.  Weller,  7  T.  R.  478. 


PARTIES  TO   THE  LEASE.  9 

shall  be  a  sublease  or  an  assignment,  depends  upon  the  intention 
of  the  parties  to  the  instrument.  The  importance  of  determin- 
ing whether  an  instrument  is  a  sublease  or  an  assignment  arises 
from  the  fact  that,  if  it  is  a  sublease,  the  tenant  for  years  has 
a  reversion  however  small  and  may  then  pursue  against  his  les- 
see all  the  remedies  at  law  or  in  equity  tor  non-payment  of 
rent  and  other  breaches  of  condition  which  a  landlord  may  have 
against  his  tenant.  And  also  as  is  elsewhere  fully  explained,  it 
is  sometimes  very  important  and  in  fact  absolutely  essential  to 
determine  whether  an  instrument  is  an  assignment  or  a  sub- 
lease where  the  tenant  for  years  is  expressly  forbidden  to  assign 
and  sublet  or  either.  If  in  the  instrimient  transferring  the  term 
the  termor  reserves  rent  payable  to  himself,  and  a  right  to  re- 
enter for  a  breach  of  condition,  the  writing,  though  conveying 
the  whole  interest  of  the  termor,  would  be  regarded  in  law  as  a 
sublease,  and  not  as  an  assignment.  Tenants  from  year  to  year 
and  tenants  for  a  fixed  and  certain  period  less  than  a  year  have 
usually  the  same  power  to  grant  lease  less  than  their  term  as 
have  tenants  for  years.  Such  leases  are  always  subject  to  be 
determined  by  the  expiration  of  the  longer  term  out  of  which 
they  are  granted.  From  the  peculiar  nature  of  their  tenancy 
tenants  at  will  and  tenants  at  sufference  are  precluded  from 
granting  leases  which  will  be  of  any  effect  or  value  as  against 
their  lessor.  The  tenant  of  a  tenant  at  will  is  as  to  tlie  original 
lessor  merely  a  tenant  at  sufference.  whom  the  owner  may  oust 
as  a  trespasser,  without  notice  to  quit,  for  any  alienation  by  a 
tenant  at  will  of  his  term  will  tenninate  the  estate  at  the  elec- 
tion of  his  lessor. 

§  6.  Guardianship  in  g-eneral.  Several  kinds  or  species  of 
guardians  are  known  to,  and  recognized  by,  the  law,  whose 
rights,  powers  and  duties  differ  according  to  the  class  to  which 
they  belong.  They  are  first,  guardians  by  nature,  as  the  father 
or  mother  of  the  infant ;  second  by  nurture ;  third,  in  socage ; 
fourth,  by  will  or  deed;  fifth,  by  appointment  by  a  competent 
tribunal,  usually  a  probate  court;  sixth,  volunteer  and  de  facto, 
as  where  a  person  enters  upon  an  infant's  land  or  interferes  with 
his  property  without  claim  of  right.  In  such  case  equity  will 
consider  him  responsible  pro  tanto  as  a  guardian.  The  father  of 
an  infant  is  its  guardian  by  nature  until  it  attains  majority,  and 
after  his  death,  during  the  infant's  minority  its  mother  becomes 


10  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

its  guardian  by  nature,-^  until  the  infant  arrives  at  tlie  legal  age 
when  it  may  choose  its  own  guardian.  The  right  of  the  mother 
to  act  as  the  guardian  by  nature  may  be  defeated  by  the  will 
of  the  father  of  the  infant.  "Where  both  the  parents  of  an  in- 
fant are  deceased,  the  paternal  grandfather  is  the  guardian  by 
nature.-*  Under  the  common  law  the  natural  guardian  has 
jurisdiction  and  control  only  of  the  person  of  the  infant,-^ 
find  he  cannot  make  a  valid  lease  of  the  lands  of  his  ward 
without  an  order  of  the  court  permitting  and  directing  him 
to  do  so.-"  It  has  been  intimated  that  perhaps  a  lease  at 
will  made  hy  him  would  be  good,  in  the  absence  of  an  express 
disaffirmance  thereof  by  tlie  infant  when  he  attained  his  major- 
ity.^^  And  where  the  mother,  being  only  guardian  by  nature  of 
several  infants,  enters  into  a  lease  for  a  long  term  of  years 
which  is  joined  in  by  her  eldest  child,  he  being  then  nineteen 
years  of  age,  and  the  lessee  builds  upon  the  land  and  pays  the- 
rent  for  many  years  to  the  infants  after  they  had  attained  their 
majority;  and  where  upon  all  the  circumstances  the  execution 
of  the  lease  had  been  very  beneficial  to  the  infants  themselves, 
a  court  of  equity,  on  the  application  of  the  lessee,  will  not  hesi- 
tate to  establish  and  coniirm  the  lease  upon  the  ground  that  the 
infants  had  so  acted  that  they  weie  estopped  to  disaffirm  it.^^ 

zsCapal's  Heirs  v.  McMillan,  8  (N.  Y.)  631,  30  Am.  Dec.  77;   Rex 

Port.    (Ala.)    197;    Fields  v.  Law,  v.   Inhabitants,   5   Mod.   221;    Rex 

2    Root    (Conn.)    320;     Jarrett    v.  v.  Inhabitants,  3  B.  &  Ad.  714. 
State,  5  Gill  &  J.   (Md.)   27.     The  26  Indian     Land     &    Trust     Co., 

mother  is  the  natural  guardian  of  (Jnd.  Terr.  1904),  79  S.  W.  Rep. 

an    illegitimate   child   and   has   a  134;    May  v.  Calder,  2  Mass.  55; 

right  to  its  control  and  custody.  Anderson  v.  Darby,  1  Nott  &  Mc- 

Copeland   v.    State,    60    Ind.    394;  Cord  (S.  C.)  369;  Ross  v.  Cobb,  9 

Baker    v.    Winfrey,    15    B.    Mon.  Yerger   (Tenn.)    363.     In  Texas  a 

(Ky.)    504;    Friesner  v.  Symonds,  lease    by    a   natural    guardian    is 

46  N.  J.  Eq.  521,  20  Atl.  Rep.  257.  good  but  a  lease  of  lands  by  the 

24  In  re  Benton,  92   Iowa,   262;  natural  guardian  of  an  infant  ex 

60  N.  W.  Rep.  614.  pires   upon  the   guardian's   death 

20  Nelson   v.   Goree's   Adm'r,   34  when   he   is  not  the  guardian  of 

Ala.  565;   Capal's  Heirs  v.  McMil-  the    infant's    estate.     MaxAA-ell    v. 

Ian,  8  Port.  (Ala.)  197;  Kendall  v.  Habon,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  565,  55 

Miller,  9  Cal.  591;  Kline  v.  Beebc,  S.  W.  Rep.  1124;  Hearne  v.  Lewis. 

6  Conn.  494;   Indian  Land  &  Trust  78  Tex.   276.   14   S.  W.   Rep.   572; 

Co.    (Ind.    Ter.    1904).    79    S.    W.  Porter  v.  Sweeney,  61  Tex.  213. 
Rep.  134;  Hyde  v.  Stone,  7  Wend.  27  pigot    v.    Garnish,    Cro.    Eliz 

(N.    Y.)    354.    22    Am.    Dec.    532;  C78,  734. 
Fonda    v.    Van    Home,    15    Wend.  28  Smith  v.  Low,  1  Atk.  489 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  11 

§  7.  The  liability  of  an  intruder  as  a  guardian.  A  stranger, 
who  as  a  wrongdoer  and  without  claim  of  right,  intrudes  upon 
the  lands  of  an  infant  or  interferes  with  his  property  and  re- 
ceives the  rents  and  profits  thereof  may  be  treated  by  the  infant 
as  his  guardian,  by  estoppel ;  and  he  will  be  held  accountable,  in 
equity,  for  the  rent  of  the  lands  which  he  has  received,  or  which 
he  might  have  received  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  diligence  in 
renting  them.^®  The  infant  may,  after  he  has  attained  his  ma- 
jority, maintain  a  bill  in  equity  for  the  purpose  of  an  account- 
ing for  the  rents,  after  he  has  recovered  the  land  in  ejectment. 
If  the  intruder  continues  in  possession  after  the  infant  has  be- 
come of  ag-e,  equity  will  include  this  time  in  the  accounting.^" 

§  8.  The  power  of  a  guardian  in  socage.  Guardianship  in 
socage  is  a  consequence  and  outcome  of  the  descent  of  land 
held  in  socage  tenure  to  an  infant,  and  the  guardianship  de- 
volves, by  the  common  law,  upon  the  next  of  kin  to  whom  the 
inheritance  cannot  descend.'^  This  species  of  guardianship  con- 
fers more  than  the  control  and  custody  of  the  person.  The  guar- 
dian in  socage  has  absolute  control  of  the  lands  until  the  heir 
attains  the  age  of  fourteen,  and  is  entitled  to  the  profits  for  the 
benefit  of  the  heir.  At  the  age  of  fourteen  the  infant  may  choose 
his  own  guardian,  but  if  he  fails  to  do  so,  the  authority  of  the 
guardian  in  socage  continues.^-  A  guardian  by  socage  has  ab- 
solutely no  power  or  control  over  the  personal  property  of  the 
ward,^^  but  he  may  lease  the  real  property  of  the  ward  in  his 
own  name,  and  this  lease  will  bind  the  ward  to  the  same  extent 
as  though  made  in  the  name  of  the  latter.^*     In  modern  times 

29  Davis  V.  Harkness,  6  111.  173,  33  Foley  v.  Mutual  Life  In.  Co., 
41  Am.  Dec.  184.  138  N.  Y.  333,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  211; 

30  Drury  v.  Connor,  1  Har.  &  G.  34  Am.  St.  456,  20  L.  R.  A.  620 
(Md.)  220.  See,  also,  Goodhue  v.  (affirming  64  Hun,  63,  18  N.  Y. 
Barnwell,  1  Rice  Ch.   (S.  C.)   198.  Supp.  615). 

312  Black.  Comm.  88;    Co.  Litt.  3*  Byrne     v.     Van     Hoesen,     5 

87b.  Johns,    (N.    Y.)     66;     Thacker    v. 

32  Byrne     v.     Van     Hoesen,     5  Henderson,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  271; 

Johns.   (N.  Y.)   66;   Jackson  v.  De  Emerson  v.  Spicer,   55  Barb.    (N. 

Walts,  7  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   157;   Syl-  Y.)    528;    38   How.  Prac.   114    (af- 

vester  V.  Ralston,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  firmed   in    46   N.   Y.    594);    Galla- 

S86;  Rex  v.  Oakley,  10  East,  494;  gher  v.  David  Stevenson  Brewing 

Rex   V.    Sherrington,    3    B.   &   Ad.  Co.,   13   Misc.    Rep.   40,    34   N.    Y. 

714;  Rex  v.  Manners,  3  Ad.  &  El.  Supp.  94,  25  Civ.  Proc.  Rep.  IOC: 

597.  Wade  v.  Baker,  1  Lord  Raym.  130; 


12  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

at  least  as  will  be  subsequently  explained,  the  father  has  full 
power  to  appoint  a  guardian  by  his  will  whose  authority  on  the 
death  of  the  father  will  supersede  that  of  the  guardian  in  soc- 
age. The  father  of  an  infant  cannot,  however,  be  his  guardian 
by  socage  as  such  guardian  must  be  a  person  M'ho  cannot  in- 
herit from  the  ward.^^  The  authority  of  a  guardian  by  socage 
to  lease,  and  this  is  also  true  of  all  species  of  guardians,  continues 
onlj'  daring  the  minority  of  the  ward.  And,  moreover,  if  the 
ward  of  a  guardian  by  socage  on  attaining  the  age  of  four- 
teen years  elect  to  enter  upon  his  lands  he  may  repudiate  the 
lease  so  far  as  it  has  still  to  run.^®  The  death  of  the  ward  ter- 
minates the  lease,  and  so,  also,  does  tlie  death  or  removal  of  the 
guardian  by  socage. ^^ 

§  9.  The  power  of  testamentary  guardians.  In  England  by 
the  statute  12  Car.  2,  c  24,  all  tenures  of  land  with  a  few  ex- 
ceptions were  converted  into  tenures  in  socage,  and,  by  the 
same  statute,  guardianship  in  chivalry  with  all  its  inconveniences 
and  opportunities  for  injustice  was  abolished.  It  was  also  pro- 
vided that  the  father  of  any  minor,  being  under  the  age  of 
twenty-one  years  and  not  married  at  the  time  of  his  death, 
might  by  a  deed  or  will  executed  in  the  presence  of  at  least  two 
witnesses,  appoint  a  guardian  of  such  minor  who  would  have 
the  custody  and  tuition  of  the  minor  until  he  or  she  should  have 
attained  the  age  of  twenty-one.  By  the  same  statute  the  guard- 
ian thus  appointed  was  authorized  to  assume  the  complete  cus- 
tody and  control  of  all  the  ward's  property,  both  real  and  per- 
sonal; and  to  manage  the  same  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  the 
ward  until  he  should  have  attained  his  majority,  when  the 
guardian  must  account  to  him  for  the  property  as  well  as  for 
the  rents  and  proceeds  of  the  same.  The  testamentary  guardian 
thus  appointed  had  in  law  the  same  right  to  begin  actions  and 
take  other  proceedings  for  the  infant  as  the  guardian  in  soc- 
age might  do.     This  statute  also  enabled  the  father,  who  could 

Rex  V.  Oakley,  10  East,  491;  Hill  Bedell  v.  Constable,  Vaughn,  182; 

V.  Saunders,  4  B.  &  C.  536.  Wade    v.    Baker.    1    Lord    Raym. 

86  Graham  v.  Houghtaling,  30  N.  130;    Rex  v.  Sutton,  3  Ad.  &  El. 

J.   L.   552.     Contra  by   statute   in  597. 

New  York,   Holmes  v.  Seeley,   17  't  Balder    v.   Blackborn,    Browl. 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  71.  79. 

30  Osborn.  v.  Garden,  Plowd.  293; 


PAKTIES  TO   THE  LEASE.  13 

not  be  himself  the  guardian  in  socage  to  supersede  such  guard- 
ian by  appointing  a  guardian  for  his  child  by  an  instrument 
properly  executed.  In  England  it  has  always  been  held  that  a 
guardian  appointed  by  deed  or  will  possesses  the  same  power 
and  authority  as  a  guardian  in  socage,  and  that  he  may  lease 
the  lands  of  his  ward,  unless  expressly  restrained  from  doing 
so  by  the  instrument  by  which  he  was  appointed.^* 

§  10.  The  power  to  lease  of  a  gnardian  appointed  by  a  court. 
A  guardian  appointed  by  a  court  has  usually  under  most  of  the 
modern  statutes,  the  power  to  lease,  though  it  may  not  be  ex- 
pressly conferred  upon  him  by  the  statute  authorizing  the  court 
to  appoint  him.^^  The  possession  of  this  power  to  lease  is  in 
most  cases  assumed  to  exist  and  indeed  if  not  expressly  conferred 
must  be  implied  from  the  duty  which  in  all  the  states  is  incum- 
bent upon  the  guardian  to  secure  the  greatest  possible  profit  or 
income  from  the  real  property  of  his  w^ard  and  from  his  liability 
for  rent  in  case  he  fails  to  use  due  diligence  in  doing  so.  The 
guardian,  in  leasing,  may  reserve  the  rents  either  to  the  ward 
or  to  himself  and  in  either  case  the  pa\Tuent  of  the  rent  to  the 
guardian  and  his  receipt  wdll  release  the  lessee  and  be  binding 
on  the  ward.*"  So  also,  a  guardian  has  the  power  to  enter  into 
an  agreement  with  another  person  permitting  the  latter  to 
raise  a  crop  on  the  land  of  the  ward,  and  to  keep  two  thirds  of 
it,  rendering  to  the  infant  the  balance  as  rent.*^  In  the  ab- 
sence of  a  permissory  statute  the  guardian  has  no  power  to  sell 
land  of  the  ward  without  recourse  to  a  court  of  competent  juris- 
diction and  obtaining  its  permission.  Hence  a  guardian  cannot 
lease  land  for  the  purpose  of  developing  it  by  drilling  oil  wells 
as  the  oil,  being  a  part  of  the  land  itself  is  also  a  part  of  the 
corpus  of  the  estate  of  the  ward  over  which  the  guardian  has 
no  control.*^ 

88  Bedell   v.   Constable,   Vaughn,  (Md.)  323;  Richardson  v.  Richard- 

179;    Parry   v.    Hodgson,    2    Wils.  son,  49  Mo.  29;  Tracker  v.  Hender- 

129;      Shaw     v.     Shaw,     Vern.     &  son,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)   271. 

Scriv.  606.    The  rule  would  doubt-  <«  Ross   v.   Gill,   1   Wash.    (Va.) 

less  be  the  same  in  this  country.  7. 

Thacker   v.    Henderson,    63    Barb.  4i  Weldon  v.  Lytle,  53  Mich.  1, 

(N.  Y.)    271.  18  N.  W.  Rep.  533. 

39  Huff  V.   Walker,   1   Ind.   193;  42  stoughton's    Appeal,    88    Pa. 

Magruder    v.    Peter,    4    Gill    &    J.  St.  198. 


14  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  .\JS^D  TENANT. 

§  11.  When  the  permission  of  the  court  to  the  making  of  the 
lease  is  required.  In  all  cases  it  is  advisable,  and  in  most  cases 
absolutely  necessary,  to  obtain  the  approval  of  a  court  of  com- 
petent jurisdiction  to  the  action  of  the  guardian  before  he  can 
execute  a  lease  of  the  laud  of  his  ward.*^  If  a  statute  provides 
that  the  guardian  may  act  under  the  direction  of  the  court,'**  or 
if  it  clearly  requires  that  he  shall  apply  to  the  court  to  sanction 
his  actions  in  the  management  of  the  estate  of  the  ward,'*^  a 
lease  executed  without  the  sanction  and  approval  of  the  court 
may  be  rescinded  by  the  lessee  or  by  the  ward.*®  So,  too,  in 
England,  a  guardian  appointed  by  the  chancellor  being,  as  it 
were,  in  the  position  of  a  receiver,  cannot  execute  a  valid  lease 
without  the  prior  permission  of  the  court  of  chancery.*^  A 
court  of  equity  on  an  application  by  a  guardian  for  leave  to 
execute  a  lease  of  land  belonging  to  infants,  will  order  the  exe- 
cution if  the  best  interests  of  the  infant  owners  seem  to  re- 
quire it.  Thus,  permission  was  given  to  lease  property  for  a 
term  of  ninety-nine  years,  where  the  lessee  was  to  improve  the 
property  at  his  own  expense,  with  a  provision  for  a  readjust- 
ment of  the  rent  every  twenty  years,  where  it  appeared  that  an 
increase  in  the  rent  would  result  only  if  betterments  were  made 
upon  the  land.  These  improvements  would  of  course  have  to  be 
made  by  the  owners,  if  the  lease  were  not  executed,  and  the  cir- 
cumstances that  some  of  the  infant  owners  were  females,  and  that 
this  arrangement  would  give  them  a  fixed  income  whereas  before 
this  the  land  had  been  unproductive  call  loudly  to  a  court  of 
equity  to  give  the  relief  demanded.*^ 

.  §  12.  Limitations  upon  the  power  of  a  guardian  to  lease. 
The  power  of  the  guardian  to  lease  will  not  enable  him  to  make 
a  valid  lease  of  the  land  of  his  ward  for  a  longer  period  than 

43  Field  V.   Harrick,  5   111.  App.  was  construed,  provided  that  con- 
54   (affirmed  in  101  111.  110).  servators   "shall   have   the  charge 

44  Bates    V.    Dunham,    58    Iowa,  of"   and   "shall    manage"    the    es- 
308  12  N.  W.  Rep.  309.  tates  of  their  wards  and  the  court 

«  Huff  V.  Walker,  1  Ind.  193.  held    that   they    might   lease    the 

4c  Haskell  v.  Sutton,  53  W.  Va.  real  property  of  their  wards  with- 

206,  216,  44  S.  E.  Rep.  553;    Field  out  the  approval  of  the  court. 

V.  Ilerrick,  5  111.  App.  54  (affirmed  t^  Rex  v.  Sutton,  3  Ad.  &  El.  597. 

in  101  111.  110).  Contra,  in  Palmer  '^  Ricardi  v.  Gaboury,  115  Teun. 

V.  Chesehoro,  55  Conn.  114,  10  Atl.  4S4,  89  S.  W.  Rep.  98. 

Rep.  508,  where  the  statute,  which 


P.SJBTIES   TO   THE  LE.VSE. 


15 


the  majority  of  the  ward.  But  a  lease  by  a  guardian  for  a  term 
extending  beyond  the  term  of  his  guardianship  is  not  void  on 
the  ward  becoming  of  age,  but  is  voidable  only.  Such  lease  may 
therefore  be  confirmed  by  the  ward  by  parol,  or  by  any  act 
equivalent  to  an  affirmance,  such  as  the  receipt  of  rent  by  the 
ward  after  he  is  of  age."  So,  a  lease  by  a  guardian  of  an  infant 
under  the  age  of  fourteen,  for  a  term  of  years  extending  beyond 
the  arrival  of  the  infant  at  that  age  may  be  avoided  by  another 
^ardian  chosen  by  the  infant  when  he  attains  that  age.^*» 

§  13.  The  duty  of  the  gn^ardian  to  lease.  A  guardian  of  an 
infant  owning  real  property  has  the  duty  incumbent  upon  him 
to  lease  the  same  for  the  best  rent  that  can  be  procured  and  if 
he  shall  fail  to  do  so  he  is  liable  personally  for  the  rent  which  he 
might  have  obtained.^^  In  some  states  it  is  provided  by  statute 
that  the  guardian  cannot  himself  occupy  the  lands  of  his  ward, 
but  that  he  must  lease  them  under  the  direction  of  the  court. ''^ 
But  the  rule  is  otherwise  at  common  law.^^  A  guardian  who  is 
a  cotenant  of  land  with  his  ward  is  liable  to  him  for  rent, 


*o  Field  V.  Heriick,  108  111.  110 
114;  Van  Doren  v.  Everitt,  5  N.  J. 
Law,  528;  Ross  v.  Gill,  4  Call. 
(Va.)  250;  Bacon  v.  Taylor.  Kir- 
by  (Conn.)  398;  Jackson  v. 
O'Rorke  (Neb.  1904),  98  N.  W. 
Rep.  1068;  Field  v.  Schieffelin,  7 
Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  150;  Putnam  v. 
Ritchie,  6  Paige  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  390; 
Smith  V.  Low,  1  Atk.  489;  Overbach 
V.  Heermance.  Hopk.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 
337;  Kitchen  v.  Lee,  11  Paige  Ch. 
(N.  Y.)   107. 

50  Snook  V.  Sutton,  10  N.  J. 
Law,  133. 

51  Clark  V.  Burnside,  15  111.  62; 
Griffin  v.  Collins  (Ga.  1908),  53  S. 
E.  Rep.  1004;  Mudd's  Ex'rs  v. 
Reed,  11  Ky.  Law  Rep.  998; 
Drury  v.  Connor,  1  Har.  &  G. 
(Md.)  220;  Shurtleff  v.  Rile,  140 
Mass.  213.  4  N.  E.  Rep.  407;  Smith 
V.  Gummere,  39  N.  J.  Eq.  17;  In 
re  Kopp,  2  N.  Y.  Supn.  495,  15  Civ. 
Pro.  Rep.  282;    In  re  Laney's  Es- 


tate, 14  Pa.  Co.  St.  Rep.  4,  2  Pa. 
Dist.  Rep.  800;  Hughes'  Appeal, 
53  Pa.  St.  500;  Harvin  v.  Riggs, 
1  Rich.  Eq.  Cases  (S.  C.)  287;  Har- 
ley  V.  Deewitt,  2  Hill  Eq.  (S.  C.) 
367;  Peale's  Adm'r  v.  Thurman, 
77  Va.  753. 

52  Muller  V.  Brumer,  69  111.  108. 

53  In  Louisana  a  father  and  the 
natural  tutor  or  guardian  of  his 
minor  child  who  has  for  several 
years  cultivated  land  which  was 
the  common  property  of  himself 
and  the  minor  child,  will  be 
charged  with  the  yearly  rent  of  a 
one  undivided  half  which  was 
owned  by  the  child,  together  with 
legal  interest  thereon.  The  infant 
cannot  be  charged  with  the  losses 
of  the  cultivation  as  the  relation- 
ship between  the  father  and  child 
in  the  land  is  that  of  landlord  and 
tenant  and  it  cannot  be  said  that 
they  cultivated  it  jointly.  Succes- 
sion of  Trosclair,  34  La.  Ann.  326. 


16  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

thoiigli  he  may  not  have  used  more  than  his  own  portion  of 
the  land,  as  it  is  his  duty  as  guardian  to  see  to  it  that  the  land 
of  his  ward  is  made  productive.^*  He  is  only  the  agent  or 
bailiff  of  the  ward,  and  if  he  occupy  the  land  of  the  ward,  he 
becomes  thereby  the  tenant  of  his  ward  and  he  is  responsible  for 
the  reasonable  value  of  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  land,  less 
the  reasonable  value  of  the  improvements,  if  any,  made  by  him.^^ 
If  the  guardian  does  not  himself  occupy  the  ward's  land  he  is 
not  liable  for  an  error  in  judgment  in  leasing  it  for  a  lower  rent 
than  could  have  been  obtained  by  further  inquiry  where  he  has 
acted  in  manifest  good  faith  and  has  obtained  the  approval  of 
the  court/'^ 

§  14.  The  guardian's  duty  to  collect  rents.  The  guardian 
may  sue  in  his  own,  name  and  usually  without  joining  the  ward 
as  a  party,  for  rent  which  accrues  under  a  lease  made  by  him. 
He  must  employ  due  diligence  in  collecting  the  rents  promptly 
as  they  accrue.  If  it  appears  that  he  did  not  use  proper  efforts 
to  collect  the  rent,  the  ward  can  hold  him  liable  for  the  reason- 
able rental  value  of  the  land.^^  AVhere  a  guardian  allows  the 
administrator  of  the  estate  in  which  his  Avard  has  an  interest,  to 
take  charge  of  the  real  property  of  his  ward,  he  is  liable  for  the 
rents  up  to  the  time  the  land  was  sold  to  pay  decedent's  debts.^® 

§  15.  Formal  requisites  of  the  lease.  The  lease  of  a  guardian 
is  valid  and  will  bind  the  ward  though  it  be  made  in  the  name  of 
the  guardian  individually  and  delivered  as  his  individual  deed.^* 
It  is  always  advisable  that  a  lease  of  a  guardian  shall  be  in 
writing  but  this  is  by  no  means  indispensable  where  the  statute 
of  frauds  does  not  apply;  though,  if  by  statute,  a  guardian's 
lease  must  be  in  writing,  an  oral  lease  is  absolutely  void.""    A 

54  Harvey  v.  Dewitt,  2  Hill  Eq.  r,8  Coggins  v.  Fly  the.  113  N.   C. 

(S.  Car.)   367.  102,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  96,  and  to  the 

05  Taylor  v  Calvert,  138  Ind.  67,  same  effect   Appeal    of   Wills,    22 

37  N.   E.   Rep.    531;    In  re   Kopp,  Pa.  St.  325. 

2  N.  Y.  Supp.  495,  15  Civ.  Pro.  Rep.  so  whyler    v.    Van    Tiger    (Cal. 

282;  see,  also,  Royston  v.  Royston,  1887),  14  Pac.  Rep.  846;   Field  v. 

29  Ga.  82,  as  to  the  guardian's  lia-  Schiefflin,    7    John.    Ch.    (N.    Y.) 

bility  for  the  improved  rent.  150,  11  Am.  Dec.  441. 

scMcElheny    v.    Musick,    63    111.  eo  Sawyers   v.   Zachery,   1  Head 

328.  (Tenn.)  21.     A  guardian's  stipula- 

67  Mudd's  Ex'rs  v.  Reed,  11  Ky.  tion    in  his  lease   to   pay   for   im- 

Law  Rep.  998.  provenients  on  the  land  does  not 


PAETIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  17 

person  who  in  giving  a  1(  ase,  describes  himself  as  guardian  of 
another  will  be  held  personally  liable  thereon  unless  something 
.  appears  in  the  contract  clearly  showing  a  contrary  intent  even 
though  the  execution  of  the  lease  may  have  been  approved  by 
the  court.*^^ 

§  16.  Covenants  by  ^ardians.  A  guardian  cannot  covenant 
so  as  to  bind  the  property  of  his  ward.  Hence  if,  in  executing  a 
lease,  a  guardian,  or  other  person  standing  in  the  position  of  a 
trustee,  enter  into  general  covenants  such  as  a  covenant  for 
quiet  enjoyment,  he  fails  to  bind  the  beneficiary  or  the  estate 
which  he  represents.  The  guardian  is,  however,  bound  person- 
ally by  such  covenants  and  a.s  to  him  they  stand  upon  the  same 
footing  as  though  the  lease  had  been  made  by  the  guardian  or 
other  q^iasi  trustee  in  his  individual  right.®^  A  covenant  in  a 
lease  made  by  a  guardian  to  renew  it  at  the  end  of  the  term,  is 
not  binding  where  by  statute  the  consent  of  the  court  is  required 
to  a  lease  executed  by  a  guardian.®^ 

§  17.  An  infant's  liability  for  rent.  The  general  rule  of 
law  is  that  an  infant  can  bind  himself  or  his  estate  for  neces- 
saries. This  is  so,  however,  only  where  he  is  living  apart  from 
his  father,  and  where  he  is  laboring,  receiving  the  profits  of  his 
own  labor  and  appropriating  them  to  his  own  use.  In  all  such 
cases  as  the  parent  whose  duty  it  is  to  support  the  infant,  is  not 
receiving  any  of  tlie  fruits  of  the  infant's  industry,  the  latter 
will  be  liable  either  on  his  express  promise,  or  the  law  will  imply 
a  promise  on  the  part  of  the  infant  to  pay  for  necessaries  which 
have  been  furnished  him.^*  In  applying  the  rule  the  principal 
difficult}'  is  to  determine  what,  in  the  particular  case,  are  neces- 
saries. Though  we  are  without  any  direct  adjudication  upon 
this  question  in  its  relation  to  the  occupancy  of  real  property 
by  an  infant,  inasmuch  as  shelter  from  the  extremes  of  tempera- 
ture, and  protection  from  the  vicissitudes  of  the  weather,  are 

bind  the  ward.     Barrett  v.  Cocks,  Wolfe,   50    Iowa,    286;    Sumner   v. 

12  Heisk.    (Tenn.)    566.  Williams,   8    Mass.   163;    Whitney 

61  Nichols    V.    Sargent,    125    111.  v.  Dewey,  15  Pick.  (Mass.)   428. 

209.  17  N.  E.  Rep.  475,  8  Am.  St.  63  Globe   Soap   Co.   v.   Louisville 

Rep.  378.  &  N.  Ry.,  27  Ohio  C.  C.  759. 

«2  Craddock   v.    Stewart,   6  Ala.  e*  Green    v.    Wilding,    59    Iowa, 

77;    Chestnut   v.    Tyson    105    Ala.  679,   13   N.   W.   Rep.   764,   44  Am. 

149,    16    So.    Rep.    723;    Bloom    v.  Rep.  696. 
2 


18  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  ^VND  TENANT. 

prime  necessities  of  hiunan  existence  without  which  human  life 
is  neither  safe  nor  tolerable,  it  would  seem  that  the  infant  would 
be  liable  for  the  rent  of  premises  which  he  had  occupied  as  a 
dwelling,  whether  upon  an  express  contract  to  pay  rent  for  them 
or  for  their  reasonable  value.  The  rule  is  that  what  are  neces- 
saries for  which  an  infant  would  be  liable  is  a  question  for  the 
jury  depending  on  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.®^  The  prin- 
cipal facts  by  which  they  ought  to  be  guided  in  their  inquiry  are 
whether  the  articles  were  suitable  to  the  infant's  estate  and  con- 
dition and  whether  he  was  without  the  means  of  supply.®' 
Thus  under  this  rule  the  jury  may  consider,  in  determining 
the  liability  of  the  infant  for  rent,  the  size,  character  and  loca- 
tion of  the  premises  in  question  in  comparison  with  his  parent's 
abode,  and  his  own  financial  condition  and  usual  manner  of 
living,  the  size  of  his  family  if  he  have  a  family,  and  whether 
or  not  his  parent  or  guardian  is  willing  and  of  means  sufficient 
to  provide  a  dwelling  place  for  him.  So,  too,  inasmuch  as  the 
husband,  though  an  infant,  is  liable  for  necessaries  furnished 
his  wife,  he  would  doubtless  be  liable  for  rent  or  for  the  use 
and  occupation  of  premises  occupied  by  her  as  a  dwelling^ 
under  such  circumstances  as  would  render  him  liable  if  he  were 
an  adult. ''^  But  on  the  other  hand,  inasmuch  as  articles  pur- 
chased by  an  infant  to  be  used  in  or  to  enable  him  to  carry  on 
business  are  not  in  law  necessaries,  he  would  not  be  liable  for 
the  rent  or  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  premises  occupied  by 
him  solely  for  business  purposes.®* 

85  Stanton    v.    Willson,    3    Day  essaries   belongs   to  the   court  or 

(Conn.)     37,     3    Am.     Dec.     255;  to  the  jury.    Many  cases  hold  that 

Swift  V.  Bennett,  10  Gush.  (Mass.)  whether  articles  of  a  certain  class 

43G.  or  kind  are  such  as  infants  would 

06  Davis   V.    Caldwell,    12   Cush.  be  liable  for,  or  whether  certain 

(Mass.)  512.  kinds  of   expenditures  are  neces- 

67  As  to  the  liability  of  an  in-  saries,  must  be  determined  by  the 
fant  for  his  wife's  necessaries  see  court;  but  whether  a  particular 
Cantine  v.  Phillips'  Administra-  class  is  suitable  to  the  condition 
tor,  5  Har.  (Del.)  428;  Price  v.  and  estate  of  the  infant  is  for  the 
Sanders,  60  Ind.  310;  Cole  v.  See-  jury.  McKanna  v.  Merry,  61  111. 
ley,  25  Vt.  220.  177;  Garr  v.  Haskett,  86  Ind.  373; 

68  The  authorities  are  not  alto-  Merriam  v.  Cunningham,  11  Cush. 
gether  harmonious  upon  the  ques-  (Mass.)  40;  Henderson  v.  Fox, 
tion   whether   the   jurisdiction   to  5  Ind.  489. 

determine  what  articles  are  nee- 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  19 

§  18.  The  ratification  of  a  lease  made  by  an  infant.  Accord- 
ing to  the  general  rules  relating  to  the  making  of  contracts  by 
infants,  a  lease  executed  by  an  infant  is  not  void  but  is  voidable 
at  the  election  of  the  infant  on  his  becoming  of  age.  The  lessee 
of  the  infant  cannot  set  up  the  infancy  of  his  lessor  to  invalidate 
the  lease  or  to  exempt  him  from  the  payment  of  rent.*^^  The  in- 
fant has  a  reasonable  time  after  his  attaining  his  majority,  in 
Avhich  he  may  elect  whether  to  ratify  or  to  repudiate  his  lease.'" 
The  ratification  cannot  be  implied.  A  direct  promise  to  pay 
rent  or  an  express  agreement  to  ratify  the  lease  is  essential. 
There  must  be  an  express  confirmation  or  a  new  promise,  volun- 
tarily and  deliberately  made,  with  a  knowledge  that  there  is  no 
existing  legal  liability  on  the  lease.^^  Subject  to  these  limita- 
tions and  qualifications,  an  infant  who,  on  reaching  his  majority, 
retains  land  leased  to  him  during  his  infancy  ratifies  the  lease."- 
It  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  effect  a  disaffinnance  by  an  infant 
lessee  that  he  shall  place  the  lessor  in  statu  quo.  The  infant  is 
not  bound  to  pay  or  to  tender  back  the  benefit  or  advantage 
which  he  has  received  under  the  lease.^^  This  general  rule  has 
not  been  repealed  by  a  statute  which  provides  that  the  marriage 
of  any  female  infant  to  an  adult  shall  be  a  discharge  of  her 
guardian  and  that  the  guardian  shall  thereupon  render  his  ac- 
count to  the  ward.  The  statute  does  not  release  the  married 
woman  from  the  disability  of  infancy  and  she  may  still  disaffirm 
her  lease,'*  when  she  subsequently  attains  her  majority. 

§  19.  The  validity  of  a  lease  at  will  made  by  a  feme  sole.  A 
feme  sole  may  at  the  common  law  execute  a  valid  lease  of  her 
lands.  The  marriage  of  a  feme  sole  does  not  of  itself  determine 
a  lease  at  will  made  by  her  as  lessor  before  her  marriage,  though 
her  husband  has  the  right  thereafter  to  put  an  end  to  it.  The 
reason  of  this  is  the  consideration  which  the  common  law  has 
for  the  rights  of  the  husband  for  it  might  be  that  the  lease  at 

60  Field  V  Herrick,  108  111.  110,  72  Baxter  v.   Bush,    29  Vt.   465; 

114;    Porch  v.  Fries,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  Robson  v.  Flight,  4  De  G.  J.  &  S. 

204,'  209.  €08.  34  L.  J.  Ch.  226,  11  Jur.  N.  S. 

70  Green    v.    Wilding,    59    Iowa,  147,  11  L.  T.  725.  13  W.  R.  393. 
679,   13   N.   W.   Rep.   761,   44   Am.  t3  Shipley  v.  Smith,  162  Ind.  526, 
Rep.  696.  72  N.  E.  Rep.  803,  804. 

71  Turner  v.  Gaither,  83  N.  C  '*  Shipley  v.  Smith.  162  Ind.  526, 
357,  35  Am.  Rep.  574.  72  N.  E.  Rep.  803,  804. 


20  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TEiNANT. 

will  would  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  husband  when  he  assumed 
the  ownership  of  the  chattels  of  the  wife.  Hence  the  lease  at 
will  of  the  woman  did  not  determine  except  by  some  express 
declaration  or  act  on  the  part  of  the  husband  evincing  his  in- 
tention that  it  should  come  to  an  end,'^  So  also,  where  a  feme 
sole  as  lessee  takes  a  lease  at  will,  her  subsequent  marriage  is 
not  a  determination  of  the  will  for  though,  by  the  marriage,  she 
at  the  common  law  came  under  the  will  of  her  husband  the  law 
required  some  express  act  on  his  part  before  the  lease  at  will 
was  determined."^ 

§  20.  The  effect  of  her  marriage  upon  a  lease  made  by  a 
feme  sole.  By  the  common  law  as  we  have  seen,  the  husband 
upon  the  marriage  became  entitled  absolutely  to  all  the  personal 
property  of  the  wife  in  possession,  as  well  as  to  the  rents  and 
profits  of  the  real  estate  owned  by  her.  If  she  were  possessed 
as  lessee  of  a  term  of  years  it  became  his  property  during  her 
life.  He  could  sell,  forfeit,  surrender  or  otherwise  dispose  of 
the  term  during  coverture  without  her  consent,^^  and,  if  he  sur- 
vived the  wife  the  lease  became  to  all  intents  and  purposes  his 
own  by  marital  right,'^*  without  the  necessity  of  his  taking  out 
administration  upon  his  wife's  estate.'^  During  the  life  of  the 
wife,  the  interest  of  the  husband  in  a  lease  for  years  in  which 
she  was  lessee  was  liable  under  an  execution  against  him.^°  If, 
however,  the  husband  made  no  disposition  of  the  lease  during 
his  life,  on  his  death  it  went  absolutely  to  his  wife  if  she  sur- 
vived him ;  *^  nor  could  he  dispose  of  the  lease  by  his  will  because 
the  jus  disponendi  exists  and  can  operate  only  during  the  life 
of  the  husband.*^    A  woman  being  possessed  as  lessee  of  a  term 

75  Henstead's  Case,  5  Coke,  10;  ''^  Doe  d.  Roberts  v.  Polgrean,  1 

Forse  &  Hembling's  Case,  4  Coke,  H.  Black.  535;   In  re  Bellamy,  El- 

64a;   Co.  Lltt.  55b.  tici"  v.  Pearson,  53  L.  J.  Ch.  174, 

7«  Blunden   v.    Baugh.   Cro.  Car.  25  Ch.  D.  620,  49  L.  T.  708,  32  W. 

304;  Henstead's  Case,  5  Coke,  10;  ^-  358. 

Co    Litt    55.  ^°  Bacon,    Abr.    "Baron    &   Fem- 

"  Meriwether  v.  Booker,  5  Litt.  "le"  C;  Co.  Litt.  46,  351. 
(Ky.)  256.  SI  Co.  Litt.  351;  Druce  v.  Benni- 
es 2  Black.  Comm.  432,  433;  son,  6  Ves.  394;  Moody  v.  Math- 
Yonge  V.  Radford,  Hob.  3;  Ells-  ews,  7  Ves.  183;  Wildman  v.  Wild- 
worth  V.  Hines,  5  Wis.  613;  Dan-  man,  9  Ves.  Jr.  177,  7  R.  R.  153. 
iels  V.  Richardson,  22  Pick  (Mass.)  '^2  Bracebridge  v.  Cook,  Plowd. 
565_  418;    Co.  Litt.  300a,  b;   351b;    Cro. 

Car.  344. 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  21 

for  years  on  marrying-  an  alien  the  marriage  is  not  a  gift  in  law 
of  her  interest  in  the  term.*'  If  a  woman  who  is  a  lessee  for 
years  marries,  the  act  of  the  husband  thereafter  in  taking  a 
new  lease  for  both  their  lives  is  in  law  a  surrender  of  the  lease 
and  binding  on  the  wife."* 

§  21.  The  invalidity  of  a  lease  made  by  feme  covert  at  the 
common  law.  A  lease  executed  by  a  feme  covert  of  her  own 
lauds  during  coverture  is  by  the  common  law,  absolutely  void, 
from  the  execution,  and  cannot  be  enforced.^''  In  equity  how- 
ever the  rule  is  different  for  in  that  jurisdiction  a  married  wo- 
man upon  whom  a  power  to  lease  lands  has  been  expressly  con- 
fered  by  will  or  deed  may  execute  such  power  without  the  con- 
currence of  the  husband  provided,  however,  that  from  the  instru- 
ment conferring  the  power  to  lease  it  is  clear  that  the  donor  of 
the  power  intended  to  exclude  the  disability  of  coverture  **^  But 
at  the  common  law  the  husband  is  entitled  to  the  receipt  and 
use  of  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  wife's  lands  and  she  cannot 
by  any  action  on  her  part  which  will  be  binding  upon  him,  di- 
vest him  of  them.^^  And  it  has  also  been  held  that  in  equity 
the  husband  acquirea  at  once  upon  his  entering  into  an  en- 
gagement to  marry  an  inchoate  right  to  the  rents.  A  con- 
tract by  the  woman  with  whom  he  has  contracted  to  marrj-  exe- 
cuted between  the  engagement  and  the  marriage  by  which,  with- 
out his  consent  and  knowledge  she  parts  with  her  real  property 
is  in  equity  a  fraud  upon  his  rights.  The  chancellor  will  set 
such  a  contract  aside  although  it  would  be  binding  at  common 
law.^*  For  it  is  well  settled  in  equity  that  the  concealment  from 
the  husband  of  the  execution  of  a  deed  conveying  her  property 

83  Theobalds  v.   Duffoy,    9   Mod.  Lord  St.  John  v.  Lady  St.  John, 

102,  104,  and  the  wife  may  sue  and  11    Ves.    Jr.    526,    531;     1    Black, 

be  sued  thereon  as  a  feme  sole  not-  Comm.  444. 

withstanding  her  marriage  to  the  so  Hearle  v.   Greenbank,  3  Atk. 

alien.  695. 

S4  2  Roll.  Abr.  495.  «'  Den  v.  Quimby,  3  N.  J.  Law. 

85  Snyder   v.    Webb,    3    Cal.    83;  985;   Baynton  v.  Finnall,  12  :\Ii?s. 

Keller  V.  Klopfer,  3  Colo.  132;  Ela  193;    Clarke's   Appeal,   V9   Pa.    St. 

V.  Card,  2  N.   H.  175;    Murray  v.  376. 

Emmons,  19  N.  H.  483;  De  Wolf  v.  ss  Logan  v.  Simmons,  3  Ired.  Eq, 

IMartin,    12    R.    I.    533;    see,    also,  (N.  C.)   487,  494;    McAfee  v.  Fer- 

IManby  v.  Scott,  1   Mod.  124,  127;  guson.  9  B.  Mon.  Ky.  475;    Crane 

Jennings  v.  Bragg,  Cro.  Eliz.  447;  v.  Morris,  6  Peters  (U   S.)  598. 


22  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

prior  to  her  marriage  by  which  his  rights  will  be  defeated  is 
presumptive  fraud,  and  will  be  sufScient  to  convince  any  equity 
on  his  application.^^  The  marriage  of  a  single  woman  who  is  a 
lessee  under  a  lease  executed  prior  to  her  marriage  renders  her 
husband  liable  to  all  the  covenants  of  her  lease.^^  He  is  thereby 
responsible  for  all  the  rent  in  arrears  at  the  date  of  the  mar- 
riage and  for  all  the  rent  which  may  subsequently  become  due 
during  the  coverture.  He  will  be  liable  for  the  rent  even  after 
the  death  of  the  wife.°^  And  during  the  coverture  the  husband 
and  wife  may  be  sued  jointly  upon  any  of  the  covenants  of  the 
lease.®^ 

§  22.  The  husband's  power  at  common  law  to  lease  lands 
of  the  wife.  The  common  law  from  the  date  of  the  marriage 
regarded  husband  and  wife  as  but  one  person,  and  therefore 
recognizes  but  one  will  between  them  which  is  placed  in  the  hus- 
band as  the  better  able  to  provide  for  and  to  govern  the  family. 
A  distinction  however  is  made  by  the  common  law  as  to  the 
power  and  control  which  the  husband  shall  have  over  the  wife's 
estate  between  real  and  personal  property,  for  he  has  ab- 
solute control  of  the  personal  property  so  that  no  act  of  hers 
has  any  force  to  affect  his  disposition  or  control  of  it.^^  At  the 
common  law  the  husband  acquires  by  the  marriage  the  absolute 
right  to  receive  the  rents  and  profits  of  lands  owned  by  the  wife. 
This  right  continues  during  the  coverture  as  to  all  lands  owned 
by  the  wife  which  are  not  settled  to  her  separate  use  by  an  in- 
strument Avhich  will  be  recognized  and  enforced  in  a  court  of 
equity.^*  Hence  from  this  rule  it  follows  that,  at  the  common 
law,  the  husband  may,  during  the  coverture,  execute  leases  of 

89  Ball    V.    Montgomery,    2    Ves.  land  v.  Myall,  14  Bush.  (Ky.)  474; 

Jr.  194;   McAfee  v.  Ferguson,  9  B.  Darnall  v.  Hill,  12  Gill  &  J.  (Md.) 

Mon.  Ky.  475,  478.  lo9;  Clapp  v.  Stoughton,  10  Pick. 

00  Anon.  6  Mod.  239.  (Mass.)  463,  470;  Baynton  v.  Fin 

81  Roll's  Abr.  "Baron  and  Feme"  nail,    12    Miss.    193;     Burleigh    v. 

(G)    pi.  1;   Anon.  G  Mod.  239.  Coffin,  22  N.  H.  118,  53  Am.  Dec. 

i'2  Anon.  6  Mod.  239.  236;    Lucas    v.    Rickerich,    1   Lea. 

03  10    Co.    42;     2    Inst.    510;    Ba-  (Tenn.)     726,    728;     Brasfield    v. 

con's  Al)r.  "Baron  and  Feme"  C.  Brasfield,   12   Pickle    (Tenn.)    580, 

i'4  Weens  V.  Bryan,  21  Ala.  302;  583,  36  S.  W.  Rep.  384;    Shaw  v. 

307;  Bishop  v.  Blair,  36  Ala.  302;  Partridge,  17  Vt.  626;  Moore's  Ex. 

Chancey  V.  Strong,  2  Root  (Conn.)  v.  Ferguson,  2   Munf.    (Va.)    421; 

369;  Hayt  v.  Parks,  39  Conn.  357;  DoKl's  Trustee  v.  Geiger's  Adm'r, 

Davis  V.  Watts,  90  In-l.  372;   Moio-  2  Gratt.   (Va.)   98. 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  23 

the  lands  of  his  wife,  not  settled  upon  her  as  her  separate  prop- 
erty and  may  enforce  all  his  rights  as  lessor  under  such  leases 
in  an  action  brought  in  his  name  alone  without  joining  that  of 
his  wife.''^  He  may,  however,  by  an  appropriate  instrument  in 
writing  relinquish  to  the  wife  the  rents  and  profits  to  which  he 
is  entitled,"^  in  which  case  they  are  absolutely  free  from  his  con- 
trol and  the  wife  may  then  collect  the  rents  from  the  lessee  and 
give  receipts  for  the  same.^'^  This  he  may  also  do  by  his  course 
of  action  as  when,  without  remonstrance  on  his  part,  he  permits 
his  wife  to  collect  the  rents  of  her  land  and  apply  them  to  her 
own  use.®®  The  rents  accruing  during  the  life  of  the  wife  be- 
long to  the  husband  and  if  a  tenant  not  having  notice  of  the 
marriage  pay  rent  to  the  wife  during  coverture,  the  husband  may 
collect  it  again.  On  his  death  they  do  not  belong  to  the  wife 
but  are  assets  in  the  hancU  of  the  personal  representative  of 
the  husband  and  may  be  collected  by  him.®*  On  the  other  hand 
the  husband's  personal  representative  cannot  charge  the  wife 
for  services  rendered  by  the  husband  in  caring  for  the  land  of 
the  wife  during  the  coverture  or  for  money  expended  by  the 
husband  for  improvements  made  upon  them  during  that  period.^ 
It  is  perhaps  needless  to  say  that  the  rules  of  the  common  law 
just  stated  have  been  largely  and  perhaps  universally  modified 
and  abrogated  by  modern  statutory  legislation  in  the  United 
States.  But  a  statute  forbidding  the  sale  of  the  wife's  property 
to  pay  the  husband's  debts  and  forbidding  the  husband  to  sell 
the  wife's  lands  wdthout  her  consent  does  not  deprive  the  hus- 
band of  his  right  to  the  rents  and  profits  of  her  land.^  The  rule 
at  common  law  just  stated  is  applicable  to  a  dower  interest  held 
bj'  the  wife  in  the  land  owned  by  her  former  husband.^  Upon 
the  death  of  the  husband  the  wife  at  common  law  regains  the 
rights  which  she  had  as  a  feme  sole  over  all  her  lands  remaining 

95  Shaw    V.     Partridge.     17    Vt.  on  Shaw  v.  Partridge,  17  Vt.  626, 
626,  631;    Clapp  v.   Stoughton,  10       631. 

Pick.  Mass.  470.  i  Burleigh  v.  Coffin,  22  N  H.  118, 

96  See  Cheney  v.  Pierce,  38  Vt.       58  Am.  Dec.  236. 

515,  524.  2  Brasfleld  v.  Brasfield,  12  Pickle 

97Hayt  V.  Parks,  39  Conn.  357,  (Tenn.)    580,   583,  36   S.  W.   Rep. 

3C1.  384. 

98  Leacester  v.   Biggs,  1   Taunt.  ^  Shaw  v.  Partiidge,  17  Vt.  62C, 

367;  Cheney  v.  Pierce,  38  Vt.  515,  631. 

524. 


24  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

unsold  at  his  death,*  and  the  same  result  follows  where  the  wife 
obtains  a  divorce  a  vinculo  from  the  husband.^ 

§  23.  The  right  of  a  maiTied  woman  to  lease  under  the  mod- 
ern statutes.  The  rules  of  the  common  law  denying  a  married 
woman  the  powder  to  lease  her  lands  during  coverture  have 
been  greatly  modified  and  in  most  cases  entirely  abrogated  in 
the  United  States.  Under  modern  statutes  she  has  in  general 
the  same  power  to  take,  enjoy  and  dispose  of  her  property,  real 
or  personal,  with  its  rents,  issues  and  profits  as  though  she  were 
a  single  woman.  Hence  she  may  lease  her  real  property  and  as- 
sign or  sublet  any  terms  for  years,  which  she  may  own  substan- 
tially to  the  same  extent  as  though  she  were  unmarried."  In  many 
of  the  states  under  the  local  statutory  regulations  which  must 
in  each  case  be  consulted  the  consent  of  the  husband  or  his 
joinder  in  the  lease  is  still  required.'^  In  other  jurisdictions 
she  may  lease  without  the  concurrence  of  her  husband.* 
So  too.  under  some  statutes  she  may  lease  her  lands  to 
her  husband.^  A  married  woman  may  without  the  consent  or 
participation  of  her  husband  make  a  lease  of  her  land  for  a 
period  not  to  exceed  three  years,  such  lease  not  being  a  convey- 
ance of  or  incumbrance  upon  her  land  within  the  meaning  of  a 
statute  which  denies  her  the  power  to  convey  or  incumber  except 
by  deed  in  which  her  husband  shall  join.''' 

§  24.  The  effect  of  the  death  of  the  husband  or  wife  upon  a 
lease  made  by  the  wife.  At  the  common  law  the  power  of  the 
husband  to  execute  a  lease  of  the  lands  of  the  wife  without  her 
consent  and  which  shall  be  bindinir  on  her  during  the  coverture 
is  undoubted.     The  question  arises,  Has  the  husband  the  power 

4  Daniels     v.     Richardson.     22  sota  Gen.  Stat.  1858,  C.  61,  §  108; 

Pick.  (Mass.)  565.  Maryland  Gen.  Laws,  C.  45,  §§  1- 

G  Doe  V.  Brown,  5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  3;    Rhode  Island  Gen.  Stat.  1857, 

309.  C.  136,  §§  4-8;   Vermont  R.  S.  C. 

sKnapp  V.  Smith,  27  N.  Y.  277;  65,  §  2,  C.  71,  §  1. 
Draper  v.  Stouvenal,  35  N.  Y.  512,  s  Prevost  v.  Lawrence,  51  N.  Y. 

7  Reese  v.  Cochran,  10  Tnd.  195;  219. 
Den  V.  Lawahee,  4  Zab.  N.  J.  613;  o  Albin  v.   Lord,   39   N.   H.   196; 

Miller  v.  Hlne,  13  Ohio,  565;  San-  state    v.    Hayes,    59    N.    H.    450; 

ford   v.    Johnson,    24    Minn.    172;  Bank   of   America   v.    Banks,   101 

Shinn  v.  Holmes,  25  Pa.  St.  142;  u.  S.  240. 

Thorndell  v.  Morrison,  25  Pa.  St.  lo  Pearcy  v.  Henley,  82  Ind.  129; 

326;   Peck  v.  Ward,  18  Pa.  St.  506.  Shipley   v.    Smith.    162    Ind.    526, 

The     following     statutes     amonj;  70  X.  E.  Rep.  803,  804. 
others  may  be  consulted:    Minne- 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  25 

to  lease  the  wife's  land  for  a  terra  which  will  extend  boyond  his 
own  life?  In  other  words  would  a  lease  made  by  the  husband 
of  the  lands  of  the  wife  terminate  with  his  death?  It  is  settled 
that  upon  the  death  of  the  husband  before  the  wife  a  lease  made 
by  him  does  not  become  ipso  facto  void  but  the  M'ife  has  the 
right  to  reject  or  accept  it.  She  may  repudiate  it  by  a  re-entry 
on  the  land  or  she  may  affirm  it  by  accepting  the  rent.^^  For 
if  she  accepts  rent  after  the  death  of  her  husband  she  will  be  re- 
garded as  having  affirmed  the  lease.  It  was  also  held  in  an  early 
case  that  where  rent  was  reserved  under  the  lease  of  the  wife's 
land  made  by  the  husband:  and,  after  the  entn-  of  the  less;^e. 
the  husband  died  before  the  rent  became  due,  his  widow  by  mar- 
rjang  again  became  estopped  from  rejecting  the  lease  where  her 
second  husband  received  the  rent.  For  by  her  re-marriage  the 
widow  was  presumed  at  the  common  law  to  have  transferred  to 
her  second  husband  aU  the  power  which  she  possessed  as  a  widow 
to  disaffirm  or  to  accept  the  lease  and  for  this  reason  his  ratifi- 
cation of  the  lease  was  binding  on  her.^^  At  the  common  law 
a  lease  by  the  husband  and  wife  of  land  which  she  did  not  own 
as  her  separate  property  was  voidable  on  the  death  of  the  wife 
by  her  heirs  who  may  enter  upon  the  land  and  terminate  the 
lease.  It  is  valid,  however,  until  the  actual  entrj^  of  the  heirs. 
But,  by  a  statute  ^*  the  interest  in  the  lease  of  the  lessee  was 
protected  by  continuing  him  in  possession,  preventing  the  heirs 
of  the  wife  from  taking  possession  until  the  end  of  the  term 
while  it  was  the  same  time  held  that  they  might  collect  the  rent." 
§  25.  The  control  of  the  husband  over  leases  held  by  the 
wife  as  executrix.  At  the  common  law  the  husband  had  con- 
siderable power  over  and  control  of  personal  property  held  by 

11  Greenwood  v.  Tyber,  Cro.  Jac.      Saund.  180  note;   1  Roll.  Abr.  349 
5G3;    Doe  v  Weller,  7  T.  R.  478;        (Y)  pi.  2. 

Jordan   v.   Wikes,   Cro,   Jac,   332,  i3  Hill  v.  Saunders,  2  Bing.  112, 

Smallman   v.    Agbarow,   Cro.   Ja^.  9  Moore  288,  1  Car.  &  P.  80;    see, 

417;  Brown  v.  Lindsay,  2  Hill  (S.  also,  7  D.  &  R.  17;   4  B.  &  C.  529, 

C.)  542;  Winstell  v.  Hehl,  6  Bush.  28  R.  R.  375;    Bac.  Ab.".  302;    Co, 

(Ky.)    58.     See,   also,   Jackson   v.  Litt.  45b, 
Mordant,  Cro.  Eliz.  112.  i*  Dyer,  159a,  Rolle's  Abr.  321; 

12  Greenwood  v.  Tyber,  Cro.  Jac.  1  Bac.  Abr.  tit.  "Baron  and  Feme," 
5C3;     Worthington    v.    Young,    6  6,  498. 

Ohio,  313;   Trout  v.  McDonald,  83  "32  Henry  VIII  C.  28, 

Pa.    St.    141;    Wotton    v.    Hele,    2 


26  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AXD  TENANT. 

the  wife  as  executrix.^®  lie  did  not  of  course  take  the  absolute 
right  to  or  become  the  absolute  owner  in  law  of  any  property 
which  she  lield  when  he  married  her  or  which  she  acquired  dur- 
ing the  coverture  in  a  representative  eapacit}^  The  common 
law  did  not  give  him  the  absolute  property  in  chattels  such  as 
leases  Avhich  she  held  in  autre  droit?'  The  husband  might 
however  at  the  common  law  grant  or  demise  a  lease  which  she 
held  as  an  executrix  subject  to  the  interest  of  those  whom  she 
represented.  Thus,  where  a  wife  was  administratrix  of  a  former 
husband  and  as  such  was  possessed  of  a  term  of  years  as  lessee, 
her  second  husband  had  power  to  grant  the  term.^^  Upon  the 
death  of  a  wife  who  is  an  executrix  or  administrator  no  prop- 
erty in  terms  of  years  held  by  her  as  such  passes  to  the  husband 
but  they  devolve  upon  the  administrator  de  bonis  non  of  the 
deceased  wife.^*  A  feme  sole,  at  the  common  law  can  act  as  a 
guardian  in  socage  or  by  appointment  under  a  statute.  By  her 
marriage  her  husband  acquires  no  authority  to  possess  or  con- 
trol the  property  of  the  ward  or  to  receive  its  rents  or  profits, 
and  a  payment  to  him  on  account  of  the  ward,  unless  with  the 
consent  of  the  wife  is  not  binding  either  on  the  guardian  or  the 
ward.^" 

§  26.  Disposition  of  a  term  by  the  husband  of  a  lessee  to 
take  effect  at  his  death.  Though  the  husband  may  not  be- 
queath a  term  which  lie  holds  by  his  marital  right  he  may  dur- 
ing the  coverture  grant  subleases  out  of  the  term  to  begin  after 
his  death  which  will  bind  the  wife.  As  he  may  during  cover- 
ture dispose  of  the  whole  term,  nothing  prevents  him  from  dis- 
posing of  any  part  of  it  during  the  coverture.  His  irrevocable 
disposition  of  a  portion  of  the  term  during  coverture  binds  his 
estate  at  once  though  it  has  no  operation  until  his  death.  This 
disposition  of  the  chattel  differs  i-adically  from  a  devise  for  a 
devise  not  being  operative  until  his  death  comes  too  late  to  pre- 
vent the  operation  of  the  rule  Avhich  on  his  death  at  once  vests 
the  term  in  the  surviving  wife  and  nullifies  the  devise.  The 
portion  of  the  term  remaining  after  the  sublease  by  the  husband 

leWankford     v.     Wankford,     1  Wankford,  1   Salk.  299,  30C;    and 

Salk.  299,  306.  Arnold  v.  Bidgood,  Cro.  Jac.  31S. 

17  Co.  Litt.  SFila.  10  Co.  Litt.  351a. 

isLevick  V.  Coppin,  3  Wils.  277;  20  Holmes  v.  Field,  12  111.  424. 
2    W.    Bl.    801;    See    Waukford    v. 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE,  27 

on  the  termination  thereof  and  which  he  has  failed  to  dispose 
of  belongs  to  the  surviving  wife.-^  If,  however,  the  husband  dur- 
ing coverture  grants  the  whole  term  on  condition  "^^hich  is 
broken,  his  executor  may  enter  and  the  wife  though  surviving 
him  is  barred  for  there  was  an  absolute  conveyance  during  the 
coverture,  and  the  breach  of  the  condition  was  contingent  and 
uncertain.  So.  too,  as  the  breach  happened  after  the  death  of 
the  husband  the  disposition  was  continuous  and  unbroken  dur- 
ing his  life.  On  the  other  hand  if  the  breach  occurs  during  the 
life  of  the  husband  and  he  re-enters  for  the  breach  the  status  quo 
is  restored  and  his  possession  thereafter  is  precisely  the  same 
as  it  was  before.  If  the  wife  survive  liim  she  will  take  precisely 
as  though  the  disposition  never  had  been  made  by  him.  If, 
however,  the  husband  shall  merely  charge  the  term  with  the 
payment  of  a  rent  and  die,  the  wife  is  no  longer  bound  because 
the  term  itself,  not  having  been  disposed  of,  all  intermediate 
grants  end  with  his  life.-- 

§  27.  Leases  of  community  property.  In  some  of  the  west- 
ern states  an  ownership  of  property  by  the  husband  and  wife 
called  "community  property"  is  recognized.  The  decisions  are 
not  harmonious  on  the  question  of  the  power  of  the  husband  to 
make  a  valid  lease  of  the  community  property.  In  the  state  of 
California  the  courts  hold,  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  Mexico 
from  which  the  California  law  is  derived,  that  the  title  to  the 
property  held  in  community  is  in  the  husband  and  for  that 
reason  he  can  dispose  of  it  absolutely  as  though  it  were  his  own. 
He  may  sell  it  ^^  or  he  may  mortgage  ^*  without  the  wife's  con- 
sent. That  is  to  say  he  can  transfer  or  incumber  it  by  a  deed 
signed  by  him  alone.  It  follows  therefore  that  he  may  lease  the 
community  property  for  a  term  of  years  and  collect  and  use  the 
rents  of  the  same.  In  AA^ashington  the  law-  is  otherwise.  In  that 
state  the  matter  is  regulated  by  a  statute  under  which  a  lease  of 
the  community  property  must  be  signed  by  the  wife.  The  stat- 
ute forbids  the  husband  to  encumber  the  community  property. 
In  that  state  unless  the  wife  joins  in  the  lease  of  the  community 

21  Loftus  Case,  Cro.  Eliz.  279.  24  Bernal  v.  Gleim,  33  Cal.  668; 

22  Co.  Litt.  4Gb,  351a;  Brace-  Tolman  v.  Smith,  85  Cal.  280; 
bridge  v.  Cook,  Plowd.  418.  Earchman  v.  Byrne,  83  Cal.  23. 

23  Fuller    V.    Ferguson.    26    Cal. 
546;  Tustin  v.  Faught,  23  Cal.  237. 


28  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

property,  it  is  void,-'^  and  the  lessee  enjoys  no  rights  thereunder 
provided  he  knew  the  land  was  community  property.  It  seems 
under  the  statute  that  a  tenant  who  did  not  know  the  lease  was 
community  property  may  abandon  the  land.  He  must,  however, 
demand  a  valid  lease  before  he  does  so  and  the  refusal  of  the 
wife  to  grant  it  will  exempt  him  from  the  payment  of  rent.-* 
Not  only  may  the  tenant  refuse  to  pay  rent  but  he  may,  after 
the  wife  has  refused  to  sign  the  lease  recover  damages  against 
her.-^  And  if  a  tenant  has  entered  under  a  lease  signed  by  the 
husband  only  he  may  procure  a  specific  performance  of  the 
lease  against  the  wife  where  it  was  executed  with  her  knowledge 
and  consent  though  not  sigTied  by  her.-^ 

§  28.  The  modern  rule  as  to  the  relation  of  the  mortgagor 
and  mortgagee.  In  order  to  understand  the  position  of  the 
tenant  of  a  mortgagor  as  regards  the  mortgagee  before  the  con- 
dition of  the  mortgage  is  broken,  we  must  state  a  general  prin- 
ciple relating  to  the  law  of  real  estate  mortgages.  By  the  mod- 
ern rules  of  law,  and  also  in  equity,  a  mortgagor  in  possession 
of  the  premises  is  regarded  as  the  legal  owner  and  the  mortgage 
conveyance  is  regarded  as  a  security.  The  mortgage  conveys  no 
title  to  the  land.  The  mortgagee  has  but  a  chattel  interest  and 
the  mortgagor  continues  to  hold  the  freehold.  The  mortgagor, 
being  the  legal  owner  and  in  possession,  may  lease  the  land  and 
he  and  his  grantee  are  entitled  to  the  rents  and  profits  and  they 
may  sue  the  lessee  to  recover  them.-^  A  mortgagor  has  a  right 
to  the  possession  in  modem  times  at  least  until  entry  by  the 

2»  Snyder  v.  Harding,  34  "Wash.  30  Iowa,  26S;  Norcross  v.  Norcross, 

236,  75  PaG.  Rep.  812.  105  Mass.  265;  Miner  v.  Beekman, 

2«  Isaacs  V.  Holland,  4  Wash.  54,  11      Abb.     Prac.      (N.     Y.)      147; 

57,  29  Pac.  Rep.  976;  Tryon  v.  Da-  O'Dougherty    v.     Felt,     65     Barl). 

vis,  8  Wash.  106,  35  Pac.  Rep.  598.  (N.  Y.)   220;   Mason  v.  Lenderoth, 

2T  Dietz    V.    Winehill,    6    Wash.  S8  A.  D.  38,  84  N.  Y.  Supp.  740; 

109,  32  Pac.  Rep.  1056.  Wyckoff  v.  Scofield,  98  N.  Y.  475; 

28  Payne  v.  Still,  10  Wash.  433,  Williams  v.  Beard,  1  S.  Car.  309; 
38  Pac.  Rep.  994.  Ihayer    v.    Cramer,    McCord,    (S. 

29  Jackson  v.  Lodge,  36  Cal.  28,  Car.)  Ch.  395;  Buchanan  v.  Mun- 
41;  Mark  v.  Witzler,  39  Cal.  247:  loe,  22  Tex.  537;  Whalin  v.  White, 
Elfe  V.  Cole,  26  Ga.  197;  United  25  N.  Y.  462.  465;  Astor  v.  Turner, 
States  Bank  v.  Athens  Armory,  11  Paige  (N.  Y.)  436;  Lawrence  v. 
35  Ga.  344;  West  v.  Adams,  106  Conlan,  28  Misc.  Rep.  44.  56  N.  Y. 
111.  App.  114;   Priest  v.  Wheelock,  Supp.  345. 

59  Ind.  497;  White  v.  Wittemeyer, 


PARTIES   TO   THE   LEASE.  29 

mortgagee  or  until  the  premises  are  sold  under  a  foreclosure. 
After  a  breach  of  the  condition  his  possession,  may  be  terminated 
at  any  time  by  the  mortgagee,,  though  he  is  not  on  that  account 
a  tenant  of  the  mortgagee.  So  long  as  the  mortgagor  or  his 
tenants  are  by  the  mortgagee  permitted  to  remain  in  possession, 
whether  before  or  after  condition  broken,  the  mortgagor  is  en- 
titled to  receive  the  rents  and  use  them  for  his  own  account  and 
benefit.^"  The  law  will  not  imply  a  contract  between  a  mort- 
gagor holding  over  after  a  default  and  a  mortgagee,  that  rent 
or  even  the  reasonable  value  of  the  use  and  occupation  of  the 
premises  shall  be  paid.^^  The  same  rules  apply  to  a  deed  which 
is  absolute  in  form  and  without  any  defeasance  if  the  purpose 
of  the  deed  is  to  secure  a  debt.^^  The  possession  which  the  mort- 
gagor holds  is,  according  to  the  above  considerations  a  possession 
in  his  own  right.  It  is  not  a  possession  as  a  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance of  the  mortgagee. ^^  It  follows  therefore  that  all  leases 
made  by  him  subseqeunt  to  the  mortgage  are  valid  as  against 
the  mortgagee  down  to  the  sale  under  foreclosure.  Hence,  a 
mortgagee  who  takes  a  lease  of  the  mortgaged  premises  from 
the  mortgagor  before  condition  broken  and  while  the  mortgagor 
is  in  the  actual  occupation  of  the  land  is  a  tenant  of  the  mort- 
gagor.^* A  lease  by  the  mortgagee  is  absolutely  void,  where 
under  the  statute  or  otherwise,  the  mortgagor  is  entitled  to 
possession  until  foreclosure.  The  lease  confers  no  right  to  pos- 
session.^^ 

§  29.  The  rig'ht  of  the  mortgagee  to  the  rent  at  common  law. 
The  common  law  regards  a  mortgage  in  substance  and  effect  as 
an  assignment  of  the  reversion.  Thus,  a  mortgage  transfers 
all  the  title  which  the  mortgagor  had  and  confers  on  the  mort- 
gagee the  right  to  enter  and  hold  possession  of  the  estate  in  the 
absence  of  a  stipulation  that  until  a  breach  of  the  condition  the 
mortgagor  should  hold  possession.     The  mortgagee  having  en- 

30  Willington   v.    Gale,    7    Mass.  28-41;  Johnson  v.  Sherman,  15  Cal. 

138;    Mayo   v.   Fletcher,   14   Pick.  287. 

(Mass.)    525,   531;    Moss  v.  Galli-  33  Hopper  v.  Wilson,  12  Vt.  695; 

more,  1  Doug.  269,  282.  Crippen  v.  Morrison,  13  Mich.  23; 

81  Mayo    V.    Fletcher,    14    Pick.  Kidd  v.  Temple,  22  Cal.  255. 

(Mass.)    525,  533;    Gibson  v.  Far-  34  Wood     v.     Felton,     9     Pick, 

ley,     16     Mass.     280;     Wilder     v.  (Mass.)    171. 

Houghton,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  87.  ss  Connolly  v.  Giddings,  24  Neb. 

s2  Jackson    v.     Lodge,     36     Cal.  131,  134,  37  N.  W.  Rep.  939. 


30  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

tered  is  held  responsible  for  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  premises 
for  which  he  must  account  to  the  mortgagor.  He  must  apply 
them  to  the  payment  of  the  mortgage  debt  and,  if  there  is  a  sur- 
plus, it  would  have  to  be  paid  to  the  owner  of  the  equity  of  re- 
demption.^® "Where  the  premises  are  not  occupied  by  a  tenant 
the  mortgagee  may  enter  at  once  and  lease  them  according  to 
the  rule  of  the  common  law.  If  the  premises  at  the  date  of  the 
mortgage  are  under  lease  for  a  term  of  years  the  mortgagee  can- 
not disturb  the  possession  of  the  lessee  who  has  a  prior  title  to 
his  and  therefore  he  cannot  enter.  But  inasmuch  as  at  common 
law  the  mortgage  is  regarded  as  a  conveyance  of  the  reversion 
the  mortgagee  may  give  notice  to  the  lessee  of  the  mortgagor 
who  is  in  possession  under  a  lease  prior  to  the  mortgage,  and  he 
will  thereafter  become  entitled  to  collect  the  rent  due  under  the 
lease  and  which  may  subsequently  become  due  and  also  to  en- 
force all  the  remedies  which  the  mortgagor  has  and  ever  had 
against  the  tenant.^^  Tenants  who  have  not  received  notice 
of  the  mortgagee  who  pay  rent  to  the  mortgagor  are  protected.^'^ 
But  rents  which  are  due  and  payable  when  the  mortgagee  re- 
ceives his  conveyance  or  which  become  due  and  payable  before 
he  notifies  a  prior  lessee  of  his  right  to  collect  rent,  are  mere 
chattel  interests  or  debts  due  from  the  tenant  to  the  mortgagor, 
which  are  wholly  disconnected  from  the  reversion  and  do  not 
pass  by  an  assignment  of  it."'^-*  The  tenant  of  a  mortgagor  whose 
lease  is  prior  to  a  mortgage  by  continuing  in  possession  after  a 
notice  from  the  mortgagee  to  pay  rent  to  him,  becomes  by  im- 
plication the  tenant  of  the  latter,  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
lease  signed  by  the  mortgagor.^'^    The  mortgagee  cannot  however 

36  Robinson  V.  Robinson,  1  N.  H.  1    Vt.    457;    Newall    v.    Wright,    3 

161;    Onderdonk  v.  Gray,  19  N.  J.  Mass.  138,  159;    Fitcliburg  Cotton 

Eq.  65;    Myers  v.  Estell,  48  Miss.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Melven,  15  Mass.  268, 

372;  Kellogg  V.  Rocliwell,  19  Conn.  270;     Burden    v.    Thayer,    3    Met. 

446;    Harrison  v.  Wyse,  24  Conn.  (Mass.)  79;  Miriclv  v.  Hoppen,  118 

1;  Reitanbaugh  v.  Ludwick,  31  Pa.  Mass.     282;     Moss    v.     Gallimore, 

St.  131.  Doug.  278,  279. 

■■i7  Mansony  v.  U.  S.  Bank,  4  Ala.  37a  Russell    v.    Alien,    2    Allen 

746;  Coker  v.  Pearsall,  6  Ala.  342;  (Mass.)    42. 

Baldwin  v.  Walker,  21  Conn.  168,  r.Tb  Burden    v.    Thayer,    3    Met. 

181;  Moore  v.  Titman,  44  111.  367;  (Mass.  79. 

Russell  V.  Allon,  2  Allon    (Mass.)  ^^c  Brown   v.   Story,   1   M.   &  G. 

42,  43;   Clark  v.  Abbott,  1  Md.  Ch.  114. 
474,    478;     Babcock    v.    Kennedy, 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE,  31 

by  giving  the  prior  lessee  notice  to  pay  rent  to  him  after  con- 
dition broken  compel  him  to  remain  as  his  tenant  on  the  terms 
of  the  original  lease.  Unless  the  lease  has  been  in  fact  or  in 
legal  contemplation  assigned  to  the  mortgagee  no  privity  of  con- 
tract exists  between  him  and  a  lessee  whose  lease  antedates  his 
mortgage.  The  lessee  may  therefore  on  receipt  of  notice  from 
the  mortgagee  surrender  possession  if  he  shall  do  so  in  a  rea- 
sonable time  and  he  cannot  thereafter  be  held  liable  for  rent  ei- 
ther to  the  mortgagor,  who  was  his  lessor,  or  to  the  mortgagee. 
His  payment  of  rent  to  the  mortgagee  is  a  good  defense  in  an  ac- 
tion by  the  mortgagor  or  by  the  grantee  of  the  reversion.^^  The 
rules  and  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties  at  common  law 
are  very  different  where  a  lease  is  made  after  a  mortgage  by  a 
mortgagor  who  remains  in  possession  by  his  lessee  of  the  mort- 
gaged premises.  There  is  in  such  case  no  privity  of  contract 
or  estate  between  the  mortgagee  and  the  lessee  who  stands  in 
the  place  of  and  is  subject  only  to  the  obligations  of  the  mort- 
gagor to  the  mortgagee,  of  whom  rent  cannot  be  collected  so 
long  as  he  is  allowed  to  remain  in  possession  of  the  premises. 
Hence  until  the  mortgagee  has  actually  entered  or  some  equiva- 
lent act  has  occurred,  the  mortgagee  can  maintain  no  action 
against  the  lessee  for  the  recovery  of  rent  except  on  an  express 
promise  to  pay."'^ 

§  30,  The  appointment  and  powers  of  receivers  in  foreclosure. 
The  rules  regulating  the  appointment  of  receivers  in  foreclosure 
proceedings  belong  more  properly  to  the  subject  of  mortgages 
than  they  do  to  the  topic  of  landlord  and  tenant.    Some  general 

38  Smith  V.  Taylor,  9  Ala.  633;  Watts  v.  Coffin,  11  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
Massachusetts  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  495;  Partington  v.  Woodcock,  5 
Wilson,  10  Met.  (Mass.)  126;  Nev.  &  Man.  672,  36  E.  C.  L. 
Myers  v.  White,  1  Rawle  (Pa.)  41S,  6  Ad.  &  El.  690,  698;  and  see, 
35.5;  Weidner  v.  Foster,  2  P.  &  W.  also,  Peters  v.  Ellcins,  14  Ohio, 
(Pa.)    23.  344;   Rogers  v.  Humphreys,  4  Al. 

39  Baldwin  v.  Walker,  21  Conn.  &  El.  299,  313;  Hughes  v.  Buck- 
168,  181;  Fitchburg  Cotton  Mfg.  nell,  8  Car.  &  P.  566;  Evans  v. 
Co.  V,  Melven,  15  ^lass.  268;  Field  Elliot,  9  Ad.  &  El.  342;  Higgin- 
V.  Swan,  10  Met.  (Mass.)  112,  botham  v.  Barton,  11  Ad.  &  EI. 
114;  The  Massachusetts  Hosp.  307;  Burrows  v.  Grandin,  1  Dow!. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  10  Met.  &  L.  213;  Wheeler  t.  Branscombe, 
(Mass.)    126,    127;     McKircher    v.  5  Q.  B.  373. 

Hawley,   16   Johns.    (N.  Y.)    289; 


32  LAW  OF  IxAJSDLOED  AIsD  TENAIsT. 

consideration,  however,  may  be  touched  upon  in  this  place.  In 
the  first  place  the  mortgagee,  unless  he  has  stipulated  for  the 
rents  and  profits  of  the  estate,  is  not  entitled  to  receive  them 
until  he  has  acquired  possession.  It  follows  therefore  that 
something  more  than  merely  the  failure  to  pay  the  debt  is  re- 
quired to  entitle  the  mortgagee  to  the  appointment  of  a  re- 
ceiver. Where  the  mortgagor  is  insolvent,  or  where  there  is 
danger  that  the  rents  wiU  be  wasted  or  misappropriated,  or  the 
property  neglected  or  wasted  during  the  foreclosure,  a  receiver 
of  the  rents  may  be  appointed.  The  purpose  of  the  appointment 
of  the  receiver  is  to  preserve  the  subject  matter  of  the  litigation. 
In  order  therefore  that  the  receiver  may  be  appointed  it  must 
be  shown  that  there  is  a  likelihood  of  the  mortgagee  suffering 
a  loss.  If  on  the  other  hand  it  appears  that  there  is  no  apparent 
danger  that  the  mortgagee  will  suffer  if  a  receiver  of  the  rents 
is  not  appointed,  the  court  will  not  give  him  this  relief. *°  If  it 
appears  from  the  circumstances  that  a  receiver  ought  to  be  ap- 
pointed it  will  be  his  duty  to  collect  the  rents  of  the  mortgaged 
premises  and  to  apply  the  net  proceeds  thereof,  after  de- 
ducting the  expenses  of  administration  to  the  payment  of  the 
mortgage  debt.  Notice  of  the  appointment  of  the  receiver 
should  be  brought  promptly  to  the  tenant's  knowledge.*^  A 
receiver  appointed  in  foreclosure  is  entitled  to  collect  rents  that 
accrue  in  the  future  or  which,  if  they  have  accrued,  are  in  the 
hands  of  the  tenant  when  he  receives  notice  of  the  receivership. 
He  has  no  title  to,  nor  can  he  collect  rents  from  the  lessor  or 
owner  which  the  latter  has  received  prior  to  the  appointment 
of  the  receiver.*^    And  even  where  a  tenant  has  paid  rent  in  ad- 

40  Myers  v.  Estell,  48  Miss.  372,  and  there  is  danger  that  the  rents 
406;  Meyer  v.  Thomas,  131  Ala.  due  from  the  sub-tenants  may  be 
65,  21  So.  Rep.  494;  Moritz  v.  wasted,  the  court  may,  in  an  ac- 
Miller,  87  Ala.  331,  6  So.  Rep.  209;  tion  to  foreclose  a  lien  contained 
Pcllan.d  V.  Fertilizer  Co.,  122  Ala.  in  the  original  lease  appoint  a  re- 
409,  25  So.  Rep.  169.  ceiver  of  these  rents.    The  charac- 

41  The  right  to  the  appointment  ter  of  the  lease  and  its  language 
of  a  receiver  in  an  action  to  fore-  creating  the  lien  will  always  be 
close  a  lien  for  rent  created  by  considered.  Mavor  v.  Northern 
the  lease,  would  presumably  be  Trust  Co.,  93  111.  App.  314. 
based  upon  the  same  considera-  42  Howell  v.  Ripley,  10  Paige 
tions  as  are  recognized  in  the  (X.  Y.)  43;  Argall  v.  Pitts,  7S  N. 
foreclosure  of  a  mortgage.  If  the  Y.  239,  242;  Whycoff  v.  Scofield, 
tenant    has    sublet    the    premises  9S  N.  Y.  475,  478;  Rider  v.  Bagley, 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  33 

vance  to  the  mortgagor  before  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  in 
foreclosure  was  known  to  the  tenant,  the  receiver  cannot  recover 
the  rent  from  the  tenant. ^^  But  a  receiver  may  prevent  a  les- 
sor from  collecting  the  rents  of  the  premises  from  the  subtenants 
of  the  lessee  though  the  latter  has  paid  his  rent  in  advance  to  the 
owner  of  the  freehold.**  In  conclusion  it  may  be  said  that  the 
tenants  may,  by  the  process  of  the  court,  be  compelled  to  pay 
their  rent  to  the  receiver  and  that  his  right  to  collect  the  rent 
is  superior  to  the  rights  of  the  creditor  of  the  mortgagor  under 
a  judgment  which  is  rendered  after  the  receiver  was  appointed.*^ 
§  31.  The  effect  of  a  foreclosure  on  the  tenant's  rights.  Ac- 
cording to  modern  theories,  a  tenant  of  a  mortgagor  is  entitled 
to  possession  as  against  the  mortgagee.  There  is  no  privity  of 
contract  between  the  tenant  of  the  mortgagor  and  the  mortgagee 
by  which,  before  the  foreclosure,  the  tenant  owes  any  duty  to 
the  mortgagee;  but  the  sale  under  a  foreclosure  which  cuts  off 
the  equity  of  redemption  destroys  all  the  rights  of  tenants  whose 
leases  were  executed  subsequently  to  the  mortgage  which  is  fore- 
closed provided  they  are  made  parties  to  the  action.*^  The  ten- 
ants are  divested  of  their  estate  by  the  decree  and  the  sale  there- 
under and  they  are  thereafter  trespassers,  or  at  the  best  tenants 
at  sufferance  of  the  purchaser,  at  the  foreclosure  sale.*^  A  lessee 
takes  the  property  subject  to  all  rights  of  a  mortgagee  whose 
mortgage  is  on  record  at  the  date  of  the  lease.  But  the  fact  that 
the  mortgage  gives  the  mortgagee  a  right  to  have  a  receiver  ap- 
pointed does  not  destroy  any  rights  which  the  tenant  may  have 
under  the  lease  except  that,  upon  notice  to  him,  he  must  pay  the 
receiver  the  rents. *^  And  the  receiver  can  collect  only  such 
rents  as  accrue  and  are  not  paid  to  the  owner  of  the  equity 

84  N  Y.   461,  465;    Hollenbeck  v.  Cal.  255;   Tucker  v.  Keeler,  4  Vt. 

Donnell,  94  N  Y.  342.  161;     Thompson    v.    Flathers,    45 

43  Hartley  v.  Meyer,  2  Misc.  Rep.  La.  Ann.  120;   Hartley  v.  ileyer,  2 

56,  49  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  351,  20  N.  Y.  Misc.  56,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  855. 

Supp.  855.  47  McFarland    R.    E.    Co.    v.    Jo- 

4*  Fletcher    v.    McKeon,    75    N.  seph   Gerardi   Hotel   Co.,   202   Mo. 

Y.  Supp.  817,  71  A.  D.  278.  597,  607,  100  S.  W.  Rep.  577;   Cul- 

45Woodwatt  V.   Connell,   38   111.  verhouse   v.   Wortz,    32    Mo.    App. 

App.  475.  419. 

46  0akes    v.    Aldridge,    46    Mo.  48  Fletcher  v.  McKeon.  71  A.  D. 

App.  11;    Crippen  v.  Morrison,  13  278,  75  N.  Y.  Supp.  817. 
Mich.  23,  35;    Kidd  v.  Temple,  22 

3 


34  I^VW  OF  LANDLORD  .VND  TENANT. 

of  redemption.*^  Any  rights  which  the  lessee  may  have  to 
remove  his  fixtures,  or  to  recover  on  a  covenant  of  the  lease 
from  his  landlord,  he  will  be  able  to  enforce  down  to  the  time 
that  the  property  is  sold  on  the  foreclosure.  The  mere  fact  that 
the  tenant  whose  lease  was  subsequent  to  the  mortgage  continues 
in  possession  after  the  mortgagee  notifies  him  of  the  mortgage 
and  demands  rent  from  him  does  not  constitute  him  a  tenant  of 
the  mortgagee  in  the  absence  of  other  circumstances  from  which 
a  tenancy  could  be  implied.^" 

§  32.  The  right  to  rents  of  the  purchaser  at  the  sale  under 
foreclosure.  The  mortgagor  may  collect  rents  accruing  from 
his  tenants  down  to  the  day  of  the  delivery  of  the  deed  to  the 
purchaser  at  foreclosure.^^  To  protect  himself  the  purchaser, 
as  soon  as  he  receives  the  deed,  should  at  once  notify  all  the 
tenants  that  he  claims  to  receive  all  rent  from  them  which  may 
thereafter  accrue.  Usually  the  decree  directs  tliat  he  be  let  into 
possession  on  the  presentation  of  the  deed.  The  title  of  a  pur- 
chaser on  foreclosure  is  not  perfect  nor  is  he  entitled  to  any 
rent  payable  in  advance  until  he  has  fully  complied  with  a  di- 
rection in  the  decree  in  foreclosure  requiring  him  to  produce  to 
the  tenant  the  deed  of  the  sheriff  and  a  certified  copy  of  an 
order  confirming  the  sale.^^  Where  a  judgment  in  foreclosure 
provides  that  the  purchaser  at  the  foreclosure  sale  shall  be  let 
into  possession  upon  the  production  of  the  deed,  he  does  not  ac- 
quire title,  or  the  right  to  collect  the  rents  until  he  receives  his 
deed.  The  mortgagor  up  to  that  time  continues  to  be  the  owner 
and  may  legally  collect  the  rents.  Nor  can  the  purchaser  sub- 
sequently recover  from  him  rents  which  he  has  collected  prior 
to  the  delivery  of  the  deed.  Neither  can  he  recover  rents  from 
the  tenants  which  are  payable  in  advance  after  the  foreclosure 
sale,  unless  he  shall  promptly  notify  the  tenants  that  he  is 

49  Wyckoff  V  Scofield,  98  N.  Y.  Misc.  Rep.  538,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  134, 
475;  Rider  v.  Bagley,  84  N.  Y.  461.  58   N.  Y.   St.   Rep,   11;    O'Neill   v. 

50  Towerson  v.  Jackson,  61  L.  Morris,  28  Misc.  Rep.  613,  59 
.T.  J.  B.  36  (1891),  2  Q.  B.  484,  65  N.  Y.  Supp.  1075;  Mason  v.  Lende- 
L.  T.  332,  40  W.  R.  37,  56  J.  B.  21.  roth,  84  N.  Y.  Supp.  740,  741;   As- 

oiWhalin)    v.    White,    25    N.    Y.  tor  v.   Turner,  11   Paige    (N.   Y.) 

462,  465;    Mitchell  v.  Bartlett,  51  436;  Clason  v.  Gorley,  5  Sandf.  (N. 

N.  Y.  447,  451;    Peck  v.  Knicker-  Y.)  447. 

booker  Ice  Co.,   18   Hun    (N.   Y.)  r,2  whalin  v.  White,  25  N.  Y.  462, 

183;    Cummiugs    v.    Rosenberg,    6  464. 


PAETIES   TO   THE   LEASE.  35 

the  owner."  And  this  rule  as  to  the  collection  of  rents,  applies 
to  a  case  where  the  mortgagor  himself  remains  in  possession  after 
the  foreclosure  sale.  The  purchaser  on  foreclosure  may  treat 
him  as  a  trespasser,  or  as  a  tenant;  but  he  cannot  collect  rent 
from  a  mortgagor  holding  over  after  foreclosure  prior  to  a  de- 
mand on  him  for  possession  or  for  the  payment  of  rent  if  he  de- 
sires to  remain.^*  This  rule  applicable  to  the  mortgagor  holding 
over  does  not  apply  however  where  the  mortgage  expressly  de- 
clares that  the  mortgagor  shall  become  the  tenant  of  the  pur- 
chaser at  the  foreclosure  sale.  The  purchaser  may  collect  rent 
from  the  day  of  the  delivery  to  him  of  the  deed  without  demand, 
or  notice  to  the  mortgagor  holding  over."^ 

§  33.  The  power  of  the  federal  government  to  lease  lands. 
Express  power  to  lease  land  for  governmental  purposes  is  usually 
conferred  by  act  of  congress  upon  those  federal  officials  within 
the  scope  of  whose  duties  lies  the  occupation  of  land.  The  oc- 
cupation of  land  by  the  federal  government,  with  the  consent 
of  the  owner  and  without  an  assertion  of  ownership  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States,  raises  a  presumption  that  the  relationship 
of  landlord  and  tenant  exists  between  the  government  and  the 
owner  of  the  land.^®  The  federal  government  will  then  be  held 
liable  to  pay  the  owner  tlie  reasonable  value  of  the  use  and  occu- 
pation of  the  land  where  no  rent  has  been  agreed  upon  between 
the  parties."    For  the  presumption  in  all  such  cases  is  that  the 

53  David  Bradley  &  Co.  v.  Pea-  titled  to  rent  from  that  date.  If 
body  Coal  Co.,  99  111.  App.  427.  the  owner  has  collected  rents  in 

54  North  American  Trust  Co.  v.  advance,  and  this  was  not  known 
Burrow,  68  Ark.  584,  60  S.  W.  Rep.  to  the  purchaser  when  he  bought, 
950.  he    will    be    entitled    to    a    rebate 

55  GrifiBth  v.  Brackman,  97  Tenn.  upon  his  bid  to  that  amount. 
387,  37  S.  W.  Rep.  273.  "Winfrey  v.  Work,  75  Mo.  55. 

In;   Massachusetts    it    has    been  &«  Chills    v.    United    States,    16 

held  that  a  mortgagee  who  enters  Ct.    CI.    79;     Langford    v.    United 

on   breach   of   condition   may   coi-  States,  12  Ct.  CI.  338.     The  local 

lect  rent  from  the  tenant  in  pos  law  of  landlord  and  tenant  is  then 

session  and  may  expel  him  if  he  applicable.       Clifford     v.     United 

does  not  pay  the  rent.     Stone  v.  States,  34  Ct.  CI.  223.     Spofford  v. 

Patterson,   19   Pick.    (Mass.)    476.  United  States,  32  Ct.  CI.  452. 

The  purchaser  at  partition  is  en-  s?  Clifford   v.    United    States,   34 

tilled  to  possession  from  the  date  Ct.  CI.  223,  which  also  holds  that 

of  the  sale.     If  a  tenant  be  in  pos-  proof  of   the  use   and   occupation 

session,  the  purchaser  will  be  en-  of    the    premises    by    the    Federal 


36  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

entry  of  the  federal  officials  upon  tlie  land  was  made  with  an  in- 
tention on  their  part  of  observing  the  constitutional  obligation 
not  to  take  property  without  due  process  of  law  and  that  they 
expected  to  pay  adequate  and  proper  compensation  and  also  that 
the  assent  of  the  owner  to  the  use  of  the  land  by  the  government 
was  given  with  an  expectation  on  his  part  that  he  would  re- 
ceive compensation.^^  Aside  from  statutory  authorization  a  post- 
master has  no  power  to  bind  the  United  States  by  a  lease  of 
premises  for  use  as  a  postoffice.  But  the  occupation  of  premises 
b}'  a  postmaster  for  governmental  purposes  in  connection  with 
the  performance  of  his  duties  as  postmaster  may  raise  an  im- 
plied contract  on  the  part  of  the  federal  authorities  to  pay  the 
owner  the  reasonable  value  of  the  use  and  occupation  of  the 
premises.^^  It  has  also  been  held  that  a  lease  entered  into  by  an 
officer  of  the  government  for  a  term  of  years  is  obligatory  upon 
the  United  States  only  until  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year  in  which 
it  was  made  with  an  option  in  the  government  to  renew  it  from 
year  to  year  until  the  end  of  the  term  specified ;  and,  if  the  gov- 
ernment abandons  the  premises  in  the  middle  of  the  fiscal  year, 
or  at  any  time  during  such  year,  the  landlord  may  recover  the 
rent  down  to  the  end  of  that  fiscal  year  but  no  longer.^"  Nor 
will  the  occupancy  of  the  premises  after  the  expiration  of  such 
year  by  a  federal  official  have  the  effect  of  continuing  the  lease, 
or  afford  the  landlord  an  opportunity  to  treat  the  government 
as  holding  over  where  the  occupancy  by  the  official  is  unauthor- 
ized.*^^ In  order  that  the  United  States  shall  be  liable  in  an  ac- 
tion for  the  use  and  occupation  of  land  the  use  and  occupation 
must  have  been  with  the  owner's  consent.     "Where  the  United 

government    is    sufficient    to    es-  igencies   of    the   oHice,   and   leave 

tablish   the   relationship   of   land-  the  owner  to  his  remedy  in  the 

lord  and  tenant.  courts  for  compensation  on  an  im- 

B8  Clifford   V.   United   States   34  plied     assumpsit,     which     would 

Ct.  CI.  223.  arise      under      the      constitution 

C9  Postoffice:     "While     no     con-  whenever  private  property   is  ta- 

tract  that  a  postmaster  can  make  ken   for   public   use.     Semmes    v. 

for  the  use  of  a  building  can  be  United  States,  26  Ct.  CI.  119,  dis- 

binding  on  the  governjnent,  as  to  tinguishing     Bradley     v.     United 

the  time  of  occupying  or  price  to  States,  13  Ct.  CI.  166,  98  U.  S.  104. 

be    paid,    or    any    other    matters  co  Smoot  v.  United  States,  38  Ct. 

whatever,    he    may     undoubtedly  CI.  418. 

take    possession    of   any   building  oi  Smoot   v.    United    States,    38 

suitable  and  necessary  for  the  ex  Ct.  CI.  418. 


PARTIE.S   TO   THE   LEASE.  37 

States  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war  of  the  Rebellion  took  pos- 
session of  certain  promises  on  land  adjacent  to  that  upon  which 
a  battle  was  fought,  and  used  the  same  as  a  hospital  for  sick  and 
wounded  soldiers  for  several  months,  leaving  the  premises  ulti- 
mately in  a  dilapidated  and  ruinous  condition,  the  owner  cannot 
in  the  absence  of  statute  recover  for  their  use  and  occupation. 
The  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  does  not  exist  between  the 
parties,  as  the  land  was  occupied  without  the  consent  of  the 
owner.  Congress,  however,  has  provided  by  statute  that  under 
certain  circumstances  the  owner  of  land  may  be  compensated 
for  the  use  of  his  land  occupied  by  the  government.  But  the  stat- 
ute does  not  create  the  conventional  relation  of  landlord  and 
tenant  between  the  owner  and  the  government  or  render  the 
latter  liable  for  remuneration  for  being  deprived  of  the  use  of  the 
premises  during  the  period  he  was  necessarily  occupied  in  repair- 
ing the  damages  done  while  the  army  was  in  occupation.®^ 

§  34.  The  va'idity  of  leases  of  land  owned  by  Indians.  In 
theory  at  least  the  Indians  are  regarded  as  the  wards  of  the 
federal  government.  It  has  been  held  that  a  state  legislature  has 
no  power  to  authorize  leases  of  Indian  lands  held  in  reserva- 
tion.®^ The  matter  is  always  regulated  by  treaty  or  federal 
statute.  In  the  absence  of  treaty  or  act  of  congress  expressly 
-conferring  power  upon  Indians  who  are  settled  upon  raserva- 
tions  to  lease  their  lands,  a  lease  by  them  of  such  land,  particu- 
larly to  a  white  person,  is  void.®*  So  a  note  for  rent  of  reserva- 
tion land  cannot  be  enforced  where  the  leasing  of  such  land  is 
forbidden  by  act  of  congress.®^  For  it  is  the  general  rule  that 
the  right  of  the  Indian  nations  or  tribes  to  their  lands  within 
the  United  States  is  a  right  of  possession  or  occupancy  only.  The 
title  to  the  fee  of  the  lands  occupied  by  Indians  is  in  the  United 
States  and  the  Indian  title  cannot  be  conveyed  wholly  or  in  part 
to  any  one  except  to  the  United  States.®®     A  good  and  valid 

«2  Madison      Female      Sem.      v.  land     from     any     Indian     nation 

United  States,  23  Ct.  CI.  1S8,  101.  "shall  be  of  any  validity  in  law 

G3  Buffalo  R.  &  P.  Co.  V.  Lavery,  or   in   equity   unless   the   same   is 

75  Hun,  396,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  443.  made  by  treaty  or  convention  en- 

64  Baker  v.  Jones,  38  Hun  (N.  tered  in  pursuant  to  the  constitn- 
Y.)   625.  tion.     Cherokee    Strip    Live-Stock 

65  Chaffee  v.  Garrett.  6  Ohio,  421.  Ass'n  v.  Cass  Land  &  Cattle  Co., 
Act.  Cong.  July  30.  1834  (U.  S.  R.  138  Mo.  394,  40  S.  W.  Rep.  107. 

S.    §    2116)    provides   no   lease   of  ec  Jones  v.  Meehan,  20  S.  Ct.  1, 


38 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


grant  of  a  part  of  lands  owned  or  occupied  by  an  Indian  tribe- 
or  nation  may  be  made  to  an  individual  passing  to.  and  vesting 
in  him  the  fee  simple  of  said  lands  by  the  execution  of  a 
treaty  between  the  Indian  occupants  of  the  land  and  the  United 
States.  The  title  becomes  vested  by  virtue  of  the  treaty  as  soon 
as  it  goes  into  operation  without  the  passage  of  any  act  of  con- 
gress or  the  issuance  of  any  patent  from  any  executive  depart- 
ment of  the  federal  government.*^'     So  also,  where  by  a  treaty 


175  U.  S.  1,  44  Law.  ed.  49,  citing 
cases.  In  the  early  and  leading 
case  of  Johnson  v.  Mcintosh,  8 
Wheat.  453,  5  Law.  ed.  681,  de- 
cided in  1823,  it  was  held  that 
grants  of  land  northwest  of  the 
river  Ohio  made  in  1773  and  1775 
by  the  chiefs  of  certain  Indian 
tribes  to  private  individuals  con 
veyed  no  title  which  could  be  re- 
cognized in  the  Federal  Courts 
and  Chief  Justice  Marshall  in  de- 
livering judgment  said:  "The  us- 
ual mode  adopted  by  the  Indians 
for  granting  lands  to  individuals 
has  been  to  reserve  them  in  a 
treaty,  or  to  grant  them  under 
the  sanction  of  the  commissioners 
with  whom  the  treaty  was  nego- 
tiated." The  early  statute  on 
this  topic  is  act  of  July  22,  1790, 
which  invalidated  the  sale  of  In- 
dian lands  to  any  person  unless 
Etch  sale  was  made  and  duly  ex- 
ecuted at  some  public  treaty  held 
under  the  authority  of  the  United 
States,  1  Stat,  at  L.  138.  See, 
also,  act  of  March  1,  1793,  1  Stat. 
at  L.  330,  in  which  it  was  pro- 
vided that  no  purchase  or  grant 
of  lands,  or  of  any  title  or  claim 
thereto  from  any  Indians  or  na- 
tion or  tribes  of  Indians  shall  be 
valid  unless  the  same  be  made  by 
treaty  or  convention.  This  pro- 
vieion  was  subsequently  re-en- 
aeted  in  acts  May  19,  179G,  chap. 


30,  sec.  12,  and  March  3,  1799,  sub- 
stituting for  the  words  "purchase 
or  grant"  the  words  "purchase, 
grant,  lease  or  other  conveyance." 
See,  1  Stat,  at  L.  472,  746.  This 
language  of  the  temporary  acts  of 
1796  and  1799  was  repeated  in- 
the  first  permanent  enactment 
upon  the  subject  bein,g  the  act  of 
March  30,  1802,  ch.  13  §  12.  2 
Stat,  at  L.  143. 

G7  Jones  V.  Meehan,  20  S.  Ct.  1, 
175  U.  S.  1,  44  Law.  ed.  49;  citing 
Mitchell  V.  United  States,  9  Pet- 
ers (U.  S.)  711,  748,  9  Law.  ed. 
283,  296;  Doe  d.  Godfrey  v. 
Beardsley,  2  McLean  C.  C.  417, 
418;  United  States  v.  Brooks,  10' 
How.  (U.  S.)  442,  460,  13  Law.  ed. 
489,  496;  Holden,  v.  Joy,  17  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  211,  247,  21  Law.  ed.  523,. 
53.j;  Best  v.  Fold,  18  Wall.  (U. 
S.)  112,  116,  21  Law.  ed.  805,  807. 
In  construing  a  treaty  between 
the  United  States  and  an  Indian 
tribe  or  nation  in  order  to  ascer- 
tain whether  some  stranger  to  it 
may  claim  a  valid  title  to  land 
under  it  the  character  of  the  par- 
ties to  the  treaty  must  be  taken 
into  consideration.  The  fact 
must  be  remembered  that  the  ne- 
gotiations are  carried  on  by  fed- 
eral officials  who  are  skilled  in  di- 
plomacy, masters  of  a  written 
language,  understanding  the  pro- 
per   and    technical    language    em- 


PiVKTIES   TO   THE   LEASE,  39 

between  the  United  States  and  an  Indian  tribe' the  rights  of  the 
nation  are  extinguished  and  certain  portions  of  the  land  which 
was  formerly  occupied  by  the  Indians  as  a  tribal  reserv^ation  are 
reserved,  by  the  treaty,  to  certain  Indians  in  severalty  as  indi- 
viduals, the  individual  Indian  allottees  take  the  fee  simple 
which  is  alienable  at  their  pleasure  unless  the  United  States  has 
by  act  of  congress  or  by  a  provision  in  the  treaty  expressly  or 
impliedly  prohibited  alienation.  The  reservation  to  certain  indi- 
vidual Indians  is  part  of  the  consideration  of  the  cession  by  the 
tribe  of  its  right  by  the  treaty.  Nor  does  it  follow  because  be- 
fore the  reser\'ation  only  the  government  can  purchase  from  the 
Indians  that  after  the  reservation  and  creation  of  absolute  indi- 
vidual rights  by  and  under  the  treaty  and  with  the  consent  of 
the  United  States  the  individual  reservees  cannot  alien.  The 
title  thus  created  is  property  and  alienable  unless  the  government 
has  forbidden  its  sale.  And  if  the  property  can  be  sold  it  can 
with  equal  propriety  be  leased  by  its  individual  owner.^^  It  is 
always  competent  however  for  congress  to  provide  that  land  al- 
lotted to  Indians  in  severalty  shall  not  be  alienable.  Hence  it 
follows  that  in  a  case  where  by  an  act  of  congress  reservation 
lands  are  alloted  to  the  Indians  in  severalty,  and  it  is  also  pro- 
vided that  these  Indians  shall  on  recei\ang  the  lands  in  severalty 

ployed  to  create  estates  at  com-  meaning  ot  the  words  to  lawyers 
men  law  and  assisted  by  an  in-  but  the  sense  in  which  they 
terpreter  employed  by  them-  would  naturally  be  understood  by 
selves  on  the  oae  hand  and  by  In-  the  Indians.  Kansas  Indians,  5 
dians  a  weak,  ignorant  and  de-  Wall.  (U.  S.)  737,  760,  sub  nom.; 
pendent  class  of  persons,  possess-  Blue  Jacket  v.  Johnson  County 
ing  no  written  language  of  their  Com'rs,  18  Law.  ed.  667;  "Wan- Jap- 
own,  usually  not  familiar  with  E  Ah  v.  Miami  County  Com'rs,  18 
the  language  in  which  the  treaty  Law.  ed.  674;  Choctaw  Nation  v. 
which  they  sign  is  written  and  United  States,  119  U.  S.  1,  27,  28, 
wholly  ignorant  of  legal  language  30  Law.  ed.  306,  314,  315,  7  Sup. 
or  phraseology  even  when  it  may  Ct.  75. 

happen     that     they     have     some  cs  Jones  v.  Meehan,  20  Sup.  Ct. 

knowledge  of  English.     It  follows  1,  175  U.  S.  1,  44  Law.  ed.  49,  af- 

because    of   this    condition    of   af-  firming  70  Fed.  Rep.  453;    United 

fairs  that  when  it  becomes  neces-  States  v.  Brooks,  10  How.   (U.  S.) 

sdry  to  ascertain  the  extent  and  442,    13    Law.    ed.    489;    Crews   v. 

character  and  an  interest  in  land  Burcham,  1  Black.  352,  17  Law.  ed. 

which  is  claimed  under  a  treaty  91;    see  also  Wilcoxen   v.   Hybar- 

its   language   must   be   construed.  ger,  1  Ind.  Ter.  135,  38  S.  W.  Rep. 

not    according    to    the    technical  669,  670. 


40  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

become  citizens  of  the  United  states  and  have  and  enjoy  all  the 
rights  of  such  citizens,  but  the  statute  forbids  the  alienation  of 
such  lands,  a  lease  of  land  thus  held  by  an  Indian  is  void.^*  A 
lease  of  land  in  Indian  Territory  by  citizens  of  the  United  States 
is  valid  to  all  intents  and  purposes  where  all  the  requisites  of  a 
valid  contract  have  been  complied  with.  A  law  of  an  Indian 
nation  prohibiting  the  leasing  of  lands  in  that  territory  does  not 
apply  to  the  leasing  or  holding  by  citizens  of  the  United  States 
of  lands  located  there.  The  lessee  of  such  lands  being  a  white 
man  is  subject  to  the  general  rules  of  the  law  of  landlord  and 
tenant  as  if  the  property  were  located  in  any  state  of  the  union 
and  to  the  provisions  of  the  statutes  enacted  by  congress  for  the 
government  of  the  territory.^**  In  unlawful  detainer  between 
persons  not  citizens  of  the  Cherokee  nation,  a  demurrer  to  the 
complaint  on  the  ground  that  it  was  based  on  a  refusal  to  pay 
rent,  which  was  prohibited  by  law,  is  without  merit  as  there  is 
no  law  prohibiting  the  payment  of  rent  in  such  territory.  Thus 
a  law  of  an  Indian  nation  requiring  all  persons,  not  citizens  of 
the  nation  owning  houses  for  the  purpose  of  renting  them,  to 
dispose  of  them  within  a  certain  time,  does  not,  as  between  par- 
ties who  are  citizens  of  the  United  States  but  not  citizens  of  the 
Indian  nation,  invalidate  a  lease  of  property  held  in  violation 
of  that  law.''^  For  it  is  a  general  rule  that  the  validity  of  a  con- 
tract between  citizens  of  the  United  States  which  is  valid  under 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  state  in  which  it  is 
made  cannot  be  affected  by  the  customs  or  laws  of  the  Indian 
tribes  in  whose  territory  the  contract  is  execut'  d.'^ 

«9  Beck  V.  Flournoy  Live  Stock  tween  persons  not  citizens  of  tlie 

&  Real  Estate  Co.,  12  C.  C.  A.  497.  Cherokee   nation,   a   demurrer   to 

65  Fed.  Rep.  30,  27  U.  S.  App.  618;  the  complaint  on  the  ground  that 

United    States    v.    Flourney    Live  it  was  based  on  a  refusal  to  pay 

Stock  &  Real  Estate  Co.,  69  Fed.  rent,    which    was    prohibited    by 

Rep.    886;     Pilgrim    v.    Beck,    69  law,  is  without  merit  as  there  is 

Fed.  Rep.  895.  no   law   prohibiting   the   payment 

70  Walker  Trading  Co.  v.  Grady  of  rent  in  such  territory. 
Trading  Co.,   1   Ind.   Ter.  191,   39  ti  Walker  Trading  Co.  v.  Grady 

S.  W.  Rep.  354;   In  Ellis  v.  Fitz-  Trading  Co.,  1   Ind.  Ter.   191,   39 

Patrick,  (Ind.  Ter.)  64  S.  W.  Rep.  S.  W.  Rep.  354. 
567  this  case  was  cited  and  ap-  72  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing 

proved  and  it  was  expressly  held  Ass'n  v.  Bond,  66  Fed.  Rep.  633, 

that     in     unlawful     detainer     be-  13  C.  C.  A.  665. 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  41 

§  35,  Leases  by  aliens.  At  the  common  law  an  alien  friend 
may  take  a  fee  simple  in  land  though,  he  has  no  capacity  to  hold, 
for,  upon  office  found,  the  king  takes  the  land  under  his  preoga- 
tiveJ^^  The  alien  may  while  in  possession  lease  his  land  and  his 
lease  will  be  valid  as  against  himself.  The  lessee's  interest 
in  and  title  to  the  term  being  founded  solely  on  the  title  of 
his  alien  lessor  will  be  subject  to  the  possibility  of  termination 
by  a  proceeding  which  terminates  the  title  of  the  latter, 

§  36.  Leases  to  aliens.  At  the  common  law  an  alien  being 
a  friend  might  take,  hold  and  transfer  personal  property  to  the 
same  extent  and  with  the  same  power  as  a  citizen.  In  relation  to 
real  estate  he  was  under  certain  disabilities  whicli  are  not  neces- 
sary to  enumerate  here.  As  to  the  capacity  of  an  alien  to  hold 
land  under  lease  under  the  English  law  a  distinction  was  made 
between  the  lease  of  a  house  for  the  habitation  of  a  merchant, 
being  an  alien  friend  and  a  lease  of  premises  consisting  of  mead- 
ows, pastures,  forests  or  farm  lands.  His  holding  of  the  latter 
under  a  lease  for  a  term  of  years  was  always  subject  to  office 
found."  He  might,  however,  hold  under  a  lease  a  house  for  hab- 
itation as  against  all  the  world  for  this  was  necessary  and  allow- 
able in  favor  of  trade,  for  without  a  dwelling  he  could  not  carry 
OD  his  trade  in  the  kingdom.'^*  But  in  England  by  statute  it 
was  also  provided  "  that  all  leases  of  houses  or  shops  to  aliens 
being  artificers  or  handicraftsmen  should  be  void.  The  courts, 
however,  in  construing  this  statute,  when  it  was  set  up  as  a  de- 
fense in  an  action  to  recover  rent  on  a  lease  were  very  prone  to 
confine  its  operation  very  strictly."^ 

§  37.  The  effect  of  the  death  of  the  lessee  on  leases  for  terms 
of  years.  The  interest  of  lessees  in  leases  for  years  being  at  the 
common  law  mere  chattel  interests,  though  the  terms  which  are 
created  by  the  leases  may  be  for  a  thousand  years,  on  the  death  of 
the  lessee  passes  to  and  becomes  vested  in  the  executor  or  admin- 
istrator of  the  lessee."  For  terms  for  years,  unlike  leases  at  will, 

72a  Co.  Litt.  2b.  tt  Cody   v.    Quarterman,    12   Ga. 

73  Calvin's  Case,  7  Coke,  2b.  SS6;    Schee   v.   Wiseman,   79    Ind. 

74  Co.  Litt.  2b.  389;  Cunningham  v.  Baxley,  96 
76  32  Henry  VIII.,  c.  16,  s.  13.  Ind.  367;  Lewis  v.  Ringo,  3  A.  K. 
TeBridgham  v.  Frontec,  3  Mod.  INTarsb.    (Ky.)    247;    Journe's  Siic- 

'94;  Pilkington  v.  Peach,  2  Show.  cession,  21  La.  An.  391;  Dilling- 
135;  Jevan  v.  Harridge,  1  Sid.  ham  v.  Jenkins,  7  S.  &  M.  (Miss.) 
308,  2  Keb.  116.  479,    487    (lease    for    ninety    nine 


42 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


not  ordinarily  terminated  by  the  death  of  the  lessee  during  the 
term  but  survive  and  pass  to  his  personal  representative.'^*  It 
is  not  material  in  connection  with  this  rule  that  a  lease  for  years 
be  expressly  given  to  a  man  and  his  heirs  or  anciently  to  a  sole 
corporation  and  his  successors  as  in  any  case  it  goes  to  the  les- 
see's personal  representative  upon  the  death  of  the  lessee.'®  So, 
also,  a  lease  to  A,  his  executors,  etc.,  for  a  j-ear,  and  so  on  from 
year  to  year  for  so  long  as  it  shall  please  the  lessor  and  A,  his 
executors,  etc.,  does  not  expire  on  the  death  of  A,  but  on  that 
event  happening,  vests  in  his  executors.^"  A  lease  for  years 
to  one  without  naming  heirs  or  executors,  would  by  operation 
of  law,  in  case  the  lessee  dies  testate,  vest  in  his  executors, 
and  no  words  of  limitation  would  alter  the  succession.*^  The 
personal  representative,  if  there  is  one,    is  entitled  to  notice  to 


years).  Webster  v.  Parker,  42 
Miss.  465,  471  (lease  for  ninety 
nine  years);  Faber  v.  Mc  Rae,  56 
Miss.  227,  229;  Sutter  v.  Lack- 
man,  39  Mo.  91;  Green  v.  Green, 
2  Redfield  Sur.  (N.  Y.)  408;  Doe 
d.  Shore  v.  Porter.  3  Term  Rep. 
13,  1  R.  R.  626.  S.  P.,  James  v. 
Dean,  15  Ves.  241,  8  R.  R  171; 
Murdock  v.  Ratcliff,  7  Ohio  St.  1, 
Wiley's  Appeal,  8  Watts  &  S. 
(Pa.)  244;  Payne  v.  Harris,  3 
Strobh.  Eq.  (S.  Car.)  39.  Contra 
in  McKee  v.  Howe,  17  Colo.  538, 
31  Pac.  Rep.  115,  where  a  statute 
was  construed  which  provided  that 
"real  estate"  should  embrace  chat- 
tels real  and  all  interests  in  land 
in  fee,  for  life  or  for  years,  and 
lands,  tenements  and  heredita- 
ments and  all  interests  therein,  it 
was  held  that  a  lease  for  years  was 
.  real  property  on  the  death  of  the 
lessee  and  devolved  upon  his  heir 
and  not  upon  his  administrator. 
See  also  as  to  the  character  of  a 
perpetual  lease  which  in  Ohio  has 
been  by  the  statute  divested  of  its 
chattel  qualities  and  is  now  de- 
scendible   to    the    lessee's    heirs. 


Gansen  v.  Moarman,  5  Ohio  S.  & 
C.  P.  Dec.  287. 

7s  Alsup  V.  Banks,  68  Miss.  664, 
9  So.  Rep.  895,  24  Am.  St.  Rep. 
294,  13  L.  R.  A.  598;  In  re  Walk- 
er's Estate,  6  Pa. ,  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 
515;  Charles  v.  Byrd,  29  S.  Car. 
544,  8  S.  E.  Rep.  1. 

70  Co.  Litt.  46b;  Fulwood's  Case, 

4  Coke,  65a. 

80  Mackay  v.  Mackreth,  4  Dougl. 
213,  2  Chit.  461. 

SI  Charles  v.  Byrd,  29  S.  C.  544, 

5  S.  E.  Rep.  1,  4;  1  Wms.  Ex.  464. 
Where  a  term  of  years  is  be- 
queathed to  A.  for  his  life  and  on 
his  death  to  his  heirs,  or  to  the 
heirs  of  his  body,  the  word  "heirs" 
under  the  rule  in  Shelly's  case  is 
a  word  of  limitation  and  not  a 
word  of  purchase.  A.  under  such 
circumstances  takes  the  whole 
term  as  personal  property  and 
upon  his  death  it  devolves  upon 
his  personal  representatives.  If 
the  rule  in  Shelly's  has  been  abro- 
gated by  a  statute  as  in  most  of 
the  states  or  if  from  the  language 
of  the  will  it  is  clear  that  the 
testator,  In  disposing  of  the  term 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  43- 

quit  where  such  notice  is  required  to  be  given  before  tlie  lessor 
can  bring  ejectment.*"-  "Where  the  defendant  in  ejectment  alleges 
that  notice  to  quit  was  not  served  on  the  representative  he  must 
show  that  there  was  a  personal  representative  of  the  lessee  on 
whom  the  notice  to  quit  might  have  been  served.  It  will  not 
be  presumed  there  was  a  personal  representative  as  he  can  only 
exist  by  appointment  by  will  or  by  the  issuance  of  letters  of  ad- 
ministration. Hence  until  it  be  shown  that  there  was  an  ad- 
ministrator of  a  tenant  from  year  to  year,  service  of  a  notice  to 
quit  upon  his  widow  in  possession  of  the  premises  is  sufBcient.^^ 
§  38.  The  expiration  of  the  lease  for  years  on  the  death  of 
the  lessee.  The  general  rule  that  a  lease  for  years  upon  the 
death  of  the  lessee  devolves  as  personal  property  upon  his  per- 
sonal representative  is  of  course  subject  to  an  exception  where 
the  lease  is  expressly  or  by  implication  to  terminate  by  opera- 
tion of  law  on  his  death.  If  the  lessee  is  the  employee  of  the 
lessor  and  his  occupation  of  the  premises  is  a  mere  incident  of 
the  contract  of  hiring,  the  occupation  will  terminate  with  the 
death  of  the  servant.  The  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant 
under  certain  circumstances  existing  between  a  servant  and  his 
employer  will  therefore  terminate  on  the  death  of  the  tenant. 
Thus,  where  a  church  had  employed  a  pastor  on  a  yearly  salarj^ 
together  with  the  use  by  the  pastor  of  the  parsonage  as  a  resi- 
dence the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  between  the  par- 
ties terminates  at  his  death ;  and  the  right  of  occupancy  by  the 
pastor  then  ceasing,  there  is  nothing  to  pass  to  his  personal  rep- 
resentative.®* So,  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  will  be  recog- 
nized where  the  lessee  by  the  terms  of  the  lease  is  bound  to  ren- 
der service  to  the  lessor  about  the  demised  premises  which  ser%"- 
ices  are  personal  to  the  less;'e  and  which  no  one  besides  him- 

for   years    intended    that    "heirs"  82  Roe  on  dem.  of  Shore  v.  Por- 

should  operate  as  a  word  of  pur-  ter,  3  T.  R.  13;  James  v.  Dean,  11 

chase  and  not  as  a  word  of  limi-  Ves.  393;  Rees  v.  Perrot.  4  Car.  & 

tation,  A.,  the  ancestor,  will  take  Payne,  230. 

a  life  estate  in  the  term  and  his  ss  Rees    v.     Perrot,     4     Car.     & 

heir  a  remainder  as  a  purchaser.  Payne.  230. 

The  personal  representative  of  A.  s*  East  Norway  Lake  N.  E.  Lu- 

takes   nothing.     Williams'    Execu-  theran     Church     v.     Froislie,     37 

tors,  678;  Fearne  Contingent  Rem.  Minn.  447,  35  N.  W.  260. 

490;   Doe  v.  Lyde.  1  T.  R.  393;  Ex 

parte  Sterne,  6  Ves.  1.56.. 


44  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

self  could  render.  The  fact  that  a  tenant  of  a  farm  is  ex- 
pressly bound  by  his  lease  to  see  that  the  land,  is  Avell  cultivated 
and  is  fertilized,  that  no  waste  is  committed,  that  buildings  and 
fences  are  kept  in  good  repair  and  that  certain  houses  are 
erected  in  particular  places  upon  the  land  does  not  imply  that 
his  death  shall  terminate  the  term  as  these  are  services  which 
any  good  tenant  may  perform,  either  himself  or  bj^  others  whom 
he  may  hire  for  the  purpose.'-  The  ordinary  rule  above  stated 
does  not  apply  to  a  lease  to  a  firm  or  a  partnership  of  a  building 
which  is  owned  by  one  of  the  partners  for  the  purpose  of  carry- 
ing on  the  business  of  the  partnership.  Under  such  circum- 
stances when,  by  reason  of  the  death  of  any  of  the  partners  the 
partnership  is  dissolved,  the  term  is  at  an  end.^^  But  where  the 
agreement  between  the  partners  provides  that  the  firm  shall  not 
be  dissolved  upon  the  death  of  one  of  the  partners,  but  the  per- 
sonal representative  of  his  estate  is  to  be  substituted  for  him,  the 
rule  that  the  death  of  a  partner  terminates  the  lease  does  not 
apply.  This  provision  of  the  copartnership  articles  exempting 
them  from  the  operation  of  the  ordinary  in^ile  that  the  death  of 
a  partner  dissolves  the  firm,  being  known  to  all  the  parties  to 
the  lease  will  be  read  as  a  part  of  it  and  as  though  written  in 
it.8^ 

§  39.  The  liability  of  the  personal  representative  of  the  de- 
ceased lessee  of  a  term  of  years.  The  personal  representative 
of  a  lessee  for  years  on  the  death  of  the  lessee  becomes  an  as- 
signee of  the  term.  But  the  executor  of  a  lessee  is  not  liable  as 
assignee  until  he  takes  actual  possession  of  the  premises.  After 
he  takes  actual  possession  he  becomes  liable  for  the  rent.^*  In 
this  respect  his  character  and  liability  as  an  assignee  or  quasi  as- 
signee of  the  lessee  differ  very  materially  from  those  of  an  as- 
signee by  contract  who  is  liable  for  the  rent  from  the  date  of 
the  assignment  whether  he  takes  the  possession  or  not.  By  tak- 
ing possession  the  personal  representative  becomes  liable  in  his 

85  Charles   v.    Byrd,    29    S.   Car.  Rt  in  re  Markle's  Estate,  17  Pa. 

544,  8  S.  E.  Rep.  1,  4.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  337,  5  Pa.  Dist.  Rep. 

8"  .Johnson  v.  Hartshorne,  52  N.  47. 

Y.  172,  177;  Doe  v.  Miles,  1  Stark.  ss  Ex  parte  Galloway,  21  Wend. 

181;   Doe  on  d.  Colnaghi  v  Bluck,  (N.    Y.)     32;     Howard    v.    Heln- 

8  C.  &  P.  464,  in  which  the  part-  erschit,  16  Hun,  177.     See,  Knick- 

nership  having  heen  dlssolverl  no-  erbocker    Life    Insurance    Co.    v. 

tice  to  quit  was  dispensed  with.  Patterson,  75  N.  Y.  589, 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  45 

representative  capacity  on  the  lessee's  covenant  to  pay  rent.^' 
But  the  personal  representative  of  a  deceased  lessee  who  takes 
possession  of  and  occupies  the  premises  which  had  been  leased 
to  the  person  whom  he  represents  does  not  by  this  action  render 
himself  personally  liable  to  the  lessor  for  the  rent  subsequently 
accruing  under  the  lease  while  he  is  in  the  occupation  of  the 
premises.  He  is  liable  personally  only  for  the  actual  profits  of 
the  land  or  for  so  much  as  it  is  reasonably  worth.  And  for  that 
proportion  of  the  rent  payable  under  the  lease  which  exceeds 
the  profits  he  is  liable  only  as  in  his  representative  capacity  out 
of  the  estate.^"  In  any  case,  however,  his  personal  liability  to 
the  lessor  does  not  exceed  what  the  premises  yield  and  he  may 
show  what  the  net  profits  are  in  a  suit  against  him  personally 
for  the  rent  brought  b}^  the  lessor.  The  law  looks  upon  him  as  a 
quasi  assignee  and  he  is  none  the  less  an  assignee  because  his 
personal  responsibility  is  less  than  an  assignee  in  fact.^^  AVhere 
the  personal  representative  is  sued  in  his  representative  capacity 
on  a  lease  which  has  been  signed  by  his  decedent  the  estate  is  lia- 
ble according  to  the  express  covenants  of  contract  entered  into  by 
the  deceased  and  the  representative  cannot  defend  by  showing 
the  rental  value  of  the  premises  is  less  than  the  rent  agreed  to 
be  paid.    Where  an  executor  is  sued  personally  as  having  entered 

89  The  lessee's  administrator  Andreae,  61  Law  J.  Q.  B.  630; 
who  does  not  at  once  quit  and  sur-  Tiaylor  v.  Cabanne,  8  Mo.  App. 
render  the  leased  premises  on  his  131;  Remnant  v.  Brembridge,  2 
appointment  or  on  a  notice  to  quit,  Moore,  94;  8  Taunt.  191,  19  R.  R. 
but  keeps  the  decedent's  property  495. 

on  the  premises  for  several  weeks,  ^^  Becker  v.  Walworth.  45  Ohio 

and   claims   rent  from   an   under-  St.    169,    172,    12    N.    E.    Rep.    1. 

tenant    which    accrued    after   the  The  executor  of   a  lessee   cannot 

death  of  his  intestate  will  be  pre-  be  made  liable  as  assignee  of  a 

sumed  to  have  taken  possession  of  term    without   an    entry    and    an 

the  premises.     He  is  personally  li-  actual  taking  possession  by  him  of 

able  to  the  lessor  down  to  the  date  the  demised  premises;   but,  if  he 

of  the  service  of  the  notice  to  quit  enter  and  take  possession,  he  may 

for  the  actual  value  of  the  use  of  be  made  liable  as  assignee,  though, 

the   premises.     Inches   v.    Dickin-  by  proper  pleading,  he  may  limit 

son,  7  Allen    (Mass.)    71,  79  Am.  such  liability  for  rent  to  the  yearly 

Dec.  765.  value   which  the  premises  might 

90  Fisher  v.  Fisher.  1  Bradf.  Sur  have  yielded,  Rendall  v.  Andreae, 
(N.  Y.)  345;  In  re  Kemp's  Estate,  61  Law  J.  Q.  B.  630. 

34  Pittsb.  Leg.  J.  82;    Rendall  v. 


46  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  xVND  TENANT. 

on,  and  being  in  possession  of,  the  premises,  or  where  he  is  sued 
vHS  being  the  assignee  of  the  term  he  may  plead  in  defense  that 
he  is  an  executor,  that  he  is  without  assets  and  that  the  prem- 
ises are  of  less  value  than  the  yearly  rent.  These  defenses  must 
be  specially  alleged  in  the  answer  for  the  presumption  is  that  the 
value  of  the  premises  is  greater  than  the  rent  reserved  and  that 
he  has  received  or  is  receiving  enough  from  the  land  to  pay  the 
rent.  The  plea  of  the  personal  representative  that  the  yearly 
value  of  the  premises  is  less  than  the  rent  agreed  to  be  paid  where 
he  is  siied  as  executor  and  has  entered  as  such  will  show  that  he 
is  not  personally  liable  by  reason  of  any  excess  due  from  the  es- 
tate but  that  as  executor  he  is  liable  only  for  the  amount  he  has 
actually  received.^^  The  plea  of  an  administrator  that  the  prem- 
ises were  of  less  value  than  the  arrears  of  rent  and  that  he  had 
paid  all  the  profits  he  had  received  from  them  is  not  supported 
by  evidence  that  the  deceased  had  underlet  them  and  that  the  ad- 
ministrator had  been  unable  to  collect  the  rent  from  the  under- 
tenant or  by  proof  that  the  premises  were  out  of  repaii*,  where 
the  lease  contained  a  covenant  by  the  deceased  to  repair  the  prem- 
ises.^^  The  liability  of  an  executor  who  takes  possession  under  a 
lease  to  his  testator  on  a  covenant  to  repair,  contained  in  the  lease 
is  usually  personal.    He  may  refuse  to  take  possession  but  if  he 

92  Traylor  v.  Cabanne,  8  Mo.  App.  him  for  enforcing  a  personal  lia- 
131,  134;  In  re  Galloway,  21  Wend.  bility  against  him.  The  mere  fact 
(N.  Y.)  32;  Rubery  v.  Stevens,  4  that  receipts  signed  by  the  lessor 
Barn.  &  Adol.  241;  Wollaston  v.  acknowledged  payments  by  the  ex- 
Hakewill,  3  Man.  &  Gib.  297.  The  ecutor  as  such  does  not  alone 
lessor  has  the  right,  when  the  ex-  show  that  the  lessor  elected  to 
ecutor  of  the  lessee  enters  upon  hold  him  liable  for  the  rent  in 
the  premises  to  look  for  his  rent  that  capacity  only,  where  the  re- 
either  to  the  estate  or  to  the  ex-  ceipts  were  given  thus  at  the  ex- 
ecutor personally.  The  remedies  ecutor's  request  so  that  he  might 
against  the  estate  and  against  the  use  them  as  vouchers  in  the  pro- 
executor  are  not  inconsistent.  bate  court  and  when  the  insolvency 
The  executor  on  entering  upon  the  of  the  estate  was  unknown  to  th> 
premises  is  in  contemplation  of  lessor  when  he  signed  the  receipts, 
law  the  assignee  of  the  lease  and  Becker  v.  Walworth,  45  Ohio  St. 
can  avoid  personal  liability  for  169,  173,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  1. 
rent  only  by  showing  an  express  o=*  Hornidge  v.  Wilson.  3  P.  &  D. 
contract  by  the  lessor  to  look  to  641,  11  A.  &  E.  645;  9  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
him  as  executor  only  or  such  con-  72. 
duct  by  the  lessor  as  will  piec.lude 


PARTIES   TO   THE   LEASE.  47 

does  so  he  must  keep  the  premises  in  repair  where  the  person 
under  whose  rights  he  claims  was  bound  to  do  so.  So  while  an 
executor  who  has  occupied  premises  held  by  his  testator  under  a 
lease  with  covenants  to  pay  taxes  and  rent  and  to  keep  in  repair 
is  liable  on  the  covenant  to  pay  taxes  and  rents  only  so  far  as  he 
has  received  profits,  he  is  liable  for  the  breach  of  the  covenant  to 
repair  to  the  same  extent  as  any  other  assignee.^* 

§  40.  The  remedies  of  the  personal  representative  of  the 
lessee.  The  personal  representative  of  the  lessee  may  usually 
sue  to  enforce  any  express  covenant  in  the  lease  binding  on  the 
lessor.  Thus,  a  personal  representative  of  the  lessee  may  sue  to 
recover  damages  for  trespass  on  the  premises  committed  by  the 
landlord  or  any  other  person  before  or  after  the  death  of  the 
intestate,^^  or  he  may  sue  to  recover  the  possession  of  a  life  es- 
tate.^® So,  too,  the  personal  representative  of  the  lessee  may  sue 
the  landlord  for  damages  resulting  from  a  forcible  entry  by 
the  landlord  made  at  the  death  of  the  lessee."^  The  personal 
representative  of  the  deceased  lessee  is  entitled  to  the  possession 
of  the  premises  for  the  remainder  of  the  term  sub.ject  to  his 
obligation  to  pay  the  landlord  for  the  use  of  the  same.  The  per- 
sonal representative  cannot,  because  he  is  entitled  to  the  posses- 
sion, make  a  parol  surrender  to  the  landlord  of  the  unexpired 
term  and  take  a  lea^e  to  himself  personally.  The  surrender  being 
by  parol  would  be  invalid  under  the  statute  of  frauds.  It  would 
also  be  set  aside  in  equity  as  a  violation  of  the  duty  which  the 
representative  owes  to  the  estate.  It  need  not  be  shown  that  the 
taking  of  the  lease  to  himself  personally  would  be  beneficial  to 
him,  as  that  will  be  presumed  and  the  law  will  not  permit  him  to 

91  Tremeere  v.  Morrison,  4  M.  &  96  Cunniiigham    v.     Baxley,     96 

Scott,  603,  1  Bing.  (N.  C.)  89,  3  L.  Ind.  367,  369;   Sutter  v.  Lackman, 

J.  C.  P.  260.     "The  general  rule  is,  39  Mo.  41. 

that  the  executor  of  a  lessee  is  lia-  a^  Smith  v.  Dodds,  35  Ind.  452; 

ble    as    an    assignee,    except    that  construing  2  Gav.  &  H.  St.  P.  527. 

with  respect  to  rent,  his  liability  Where   the   testator  at  his   death 

does  not  exceed  what  the  property  held  land  under  a  lease  for  a  term 

yields;   no  such  exception  applies  of  years  his  executor  is  the  proper 

to  the  covenant  to  repair."     Tre-  person  to  begin  ejectment  against 

meere  v.  Morrison,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  a    trespasser.     Duchane    v.    Good- 

89.  title,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  117;  Mosher 

o'Schee    v.    Wiseman,    79    Ind.  v.  Yost,  33  Barb.   (X.  Y.)  277. 
389. 


48  LAW  OF  Lu\.NDLOED  AND  TENANT. 

obtain  an  advantage  to  himself  at  the  expense  of  the  estate  which 
he  represents. ^^  A  representative  of  the  deceased  lessee  may 
execute  a  valid  sub-lease  for  any  period  short  of  the  term  which 
devolves  upon  him  by  the  death  of  the  lessee.  The  rent  which  he 
collects  from  the  sub-tenant  is  assets  of  the  estate  for  the  purpose 
of  distribution  among  the  next  of  kin.^^  "While  the  executor  may 
grant  a  sub-lease  before  letters  testamentary  are  issued  to  him, 
an  administrator  cannot  do  so,  nor  can  he  assign  the  premises 
until  he  has  received  his  letters.  The  authority  of  the  adminis- 
trator to  sublet  is  derived  from  his  letters  of  administration, 
while  the  authority  of  the  executor  is  derived  from  the  will  in 
which  he  is  appointed.  The  issuance  of  letters  testamentaiy  to 
the  executor  confirms  all  his  acts  done  prior  thereto.^  Any  dam- 
ages which  may  be  recovered  against  any  person  by  a  personal 
representative  of  the  lessee  are  personal  property  of  the  estate 
and  are  assets  in  the  hands  of  the  personal  representative  to  be 
applied  to  the  paying  of  debts  or  to  be  distributed  according  to 
law.^ 

§  41.  The  rights  of  an  executor  of  a  lessor.  If  in  the  lease 
the  lessor  reserve  rent  to  himself  by  name  in  the  case  of  a  lease 
for  years,  the  rent  will  be  determined  by  the  death  of  the  lessor 
during  the  term.  If,  however,  he  shall  reserve  the  rent  generally 
without  stating  to  whom  it  shall  go  it  will  go  to  his  heirs  on  his 
death  during  the  term,  and  in  such  case  the  law  will  make  the 
distribution.^  If  the  lessor  reserve  rent  to  himself,  his  execu- 
tor and  assigns,  and  the  lessee  covenants  to  pay  the  executor,  tlie 
lease  survives  the  death  of  the  lessor  and  the  heirs  and  devisee 
may  sue  and  recover  the  rent  though  it  is  expressly  reserved  to 
the  executor.  The  rather  technical  character  of  these  rules  of  the 
old  common  law  have  been  modified  in  modern  times.  As  a  gen- 
eral principle  rents  which  have  accrued  and  become  due  and 

88  Charles   v.    Byrd,    29    S.   Car.  i  Bank  of  Hamilton  v.  Dudley's 

544,  559,  8  S.  E.  Rep.  1.  Lessee,  2  Pet.  (U.  S.)  492,  493. 

99  Bacon's  Abr.  tit.  Lease,  (1)7;  2  Schee  v.  Wiseman,  79  Ind.  389, 

Finch's  Case,  G  Coke,  67b;   Inches  392. 

V.  Dickinson,  2  Allen   (Mass.)   71,  3  Co.  Litt.  47;   Plow.  171;  Whit- 

78  Am.  Dec.  765;  Bendall  v.  Sum-  lock's  Case,  8  Co.  68,  71;    Sachere- 

mersett,  2  W.  Bl.  692;    Hudson  v.  rell  v.  Frogott,  2  Saund.  367;  Sury 

Hudson,  1  Ark.  400;    Wankford  v.  v.  Brown,  Lutch,  99,  101;    Jaques 

Wankford,  1  Salkeld,  299,  301;  v.  Gould,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  384,  387. 
Broker  v.  Charters,  Cro.  Eliz.  92. 


PARTIES   TO   THE  LK.VSE.  49 

payable  during  the  lifetime  of  the  lessor,  if  he  is  the  owner  in 
fee  simple  of  the  land,  go  to  his  personal  representative  on  his 
death  and  are  assets  in  his  hands  for  the  payment  of  debts.  It 
is  not  material  whether  the  rents  are  reserved  to  the  lessor  alone 
or  whether  they  are  reserved  to  him  and  his  executors.*  But 
rents  accruing  subsequently  to  the  death  of  the  lessor  are  an.  in- 
cident of  the  reversion  and  go  to  the  heirs  and  devisees  of  the 
lessor  at  the  death  of  the  lessor.  ITie  personal  representative  of 
the  deceased  lessor  has  no  title  to,  nor  can  he  recover  from  the 
lessee  rents  which  have  acciiied  after  the  death  of  the  person 
whom  he  represents.^  The  fact  that  the  will  of  the  deceased 
lessor  confers  upon  his  executor  a  power  of  sale  for  the  purpose 
of  paying  debts  or  legacies  does  not  confer  a  power  upon  the 
executor  to  collect  the  rents  which  accrue  after  the  death  of  the 
testator,  or  to  use  them  as  assets  of  the  estate."  For  the  power 
in  the  executor  to  sell  is  merely  a  power  in  trust  and  confers  no 
estate  in  the  land  on  him  which  entitles  him  to  its  possession,  or 
which  places  him  in  the  position  of  a  landlord,  as  respects  any 
tenant  who  may  occupy  the  land.  The  power  of  sale  is  a  mere 
naked  power.  The  land  devolves  upon  the  heir  or  devisee  of  the 
lessor  subject  to  be  divested  by  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  sale. 
Until  that  takes  place  the  heir  or  devisee  may  occupy  the  land 

4  Wells  V.  Cowles,  4  Conn.  182;  280;  Lobdell  v.  Hayes,  78  Mass. 
McDowell  V.  Hendrix,  67  Ind.  513;  236;  Bloodworth  T.  Stevens,  51 
Ball  V.  First  National  Bank,  80  Miss.  475;  Shouse  v.  Krusor,  24 
Ky.  501;  Sohier  v.  Eldredge,  103  Mo.  App.  279;  Allen  v.  Van  Hou- 
Mass.  345;  Bloodworth  v.  Stevens.  ten,  19  N.  J.  L.  47;  In  re  Spears, 
51  Miss.  475.  89  Hun.  49,  35  N.  Y.  Sup.  35;  Fay 

5  Masterson  v.  Girard's  Heirs,  v.  Holloran,  35  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  295; 
10  Ala.  60;  Dixon  v.  Niccolls,  39  Fleming  v.  Chunn,  57  N.  C.  422; 
111.  372,  89  Am.  Dec.  312;  Foltz  v.  Haslage  v.  Krugh,  25  Pa.  St.  97; 
Prouse,  17  111.  487;  Dorsett  v.  Adams  v.  Adams,  4  Watts  (Pa.) 
Gray,  98  Ind.  273,  275;  Kidwell  v.  160;  Huff  v.  Latimar,  33  S.  C.  255, 
Kidwell,  84  Ind.  224;  Crane  v.  11  S.  E.  Rep.  758;  Smith  v. 
Guthrie,  47  Iowa,  542;  Shawhan  v.  Thomas,  82  Tenn.  324:  Rowan  v. 
Long,  26  Iowa,  488,  492,  96  Am.  Riley,  65  Tenn.  (6  Baxt.)  67. 
Dec.  164;  Head  v.  Sutton,  31  Kan.  s  Clendenning  v.  Currier,  6  Gill 
616,  3  Pac.  Rep.  280;  Eastin  v.  &J.  (Md.)  420;  Greenland  v.  Wad- 
Hatchitt,  15  Ky.  L.  Rep.  780;  Ball  dell,  5  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  835;  Watts' 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  80  Ky.  501;  Estate.  168  Pa.  St.  430,  433,  32  Atl. 
Stinson  v.  Stinson,  38  Me.  593;  Rep.  26,  36  W.  N.  C.  372,  47  Am. 
Mills    V.    Merryman,    49    Me.    65;  St.  Rep.  893. 

Getzandaffer    v.    Caylor,    38    Md. 

4 


50 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


himself  or  he  may  lease  it  to  others,  reserving  and  enjoying  its 
rents  and  profits.  This  rule  applies  to  a  power  of  sale  conferred 
by  a  statute  upon  the  executor  or  other  personal  representative 
of  a  deceased  lessor,  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  debts  of  the 
decedent.^  So  also,  an  administrator  of  the  deceased  lessor  can- 
not by  a  bill  in  equity  have  the  rents  which  accrue  and  become 
payable  after  the  death  of  his  intestate  from  a  creditor  of  the 
intestate,  set  off  against  a  judgment  obtained  by  the  creditor, 
against  the  administrator.  The  reason  of  this  is  that  the  admin- 
istrator has  no  rights  in  or  to  the  real  property  or  to  the  profits 
unless  the  estate  is  insolvent.^  The  executor  of  the  landlord 
may  sue  the  tenant  for  damages  caused  by  a  breach  of  covenant 
by  the  tenant  which  happened  during  the  life  of  the  landlord. 


7  Lobdell  V.  Hayes,  12  Gray 
(Mass.)  236;  Brooks  v.  Jacken, 
125  Mass.  307,  309. 

s  Bullock  V.  Sneed,  13  Sm.  &  M. 
Miss.  293.  "The  probate  court 
does  not  necessarily  have  any  ju- 
risdiction over  the  rents.  The  ad- 
ministrator neither  has  the  right 
against  the  consent  of  the  heirs, 
nor  Is  he  required,  to  occupy  the 
estate  or  collect  the  rents  there- 
from. He  may  receive  the  income 
of  the  real  estate  by  the  request 
of  the  heirs,  or  with  their  acqui- 
escence. He  would  not  be  re- 
garded as  a  trespasser  in  so  do- 
ing, unless  done  in  opposition  to 
their  interests,  or  in  defiance  of 
their  wishes.  It  is  often  conveni- 
ent, and  sometimes  of  decided  ad- 
vantage for  him  to  do  so;  as 
where  heirs  are  minors  without 
guardians;  or  are  of  affairs 
abroad,  or  unacquainted  with  the 
management  of  affairs,  and  where 
the  administrator  may  be  himself 
an,  heir,  or  have  intimate  business 
or  family  relations  with  the  estate 
and  in  other  cases.  In  many  cases, 
there  is  an  understanding  or  agree- 
ment, that  the  administrator  shall 
take   the   rents,   and   account   for 


them  as  assets  for  the  benefit  of 
the  estate,  where  such  a  course 
may  save  the  sale  of  the  real  es- 
tate for  debts,  or  where  the  heirs 
get  the  advantage  of  them  on  the 
general  distribution.  In  such  case 
the  administrator  would  account 
in  the  probate  court  for  such  rents 
with  the  general  assets  according 
to  such  agreement,  but  not  neces- 
sarily by  force  of  any  requirements 
of  the  statute.  Such  we  believe 
to  be  a  somewhat  common  prac- 
tice." By  Peters,  J.,  in  Kimball 
V.  Sumner,  62  Me.  305.  310.  In 
Boynton  v.  Peterborough  &  Shir- 
ley R.  Co.,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  467, 
the  court,  by  Shaw,  C.  J.,  said: 
"The  heir  takes  the  estate  accord- 
ing to  the  well-known  rule  of  in- 
heritance, at  the  time  of  the  de- 
cease of  the  ancestor,  subject  only 
to  be  divested  by  a  sale,  pursuant 
to  law,  conducted  in  the  manner 
prescribed  by  statute.  All  the  le- 
gal consequences  of  this  relation 
are  held  to  follow.  The  heir  is 
the  owner  until  he  is  divested;  he 
has  the  exclusive  possession  and 
right  of  possession;  he  may  take 
the  rents  and  profits  to  his  own 
use  and  without  account." 


P.VRTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  51 

This  nile  applies  to  all  covenants  entered  into  by  the  tenant, 
unless  the  covenant  is  expressly  in  favor  of  the  heir  of  the  land- 
lord, in  which  case,  only  the  heir  can  sue;  or  nnl&ss  the  covenant 
is  a  mere  personal  contract,  the  benefit  of  which  dies  with  the 
person  of  the  landlord.  This  rule  has  been  applied  to  breaches 
■of  a  covenant  to  repair  occuring  during  the  life  of  the  landlord.^ 
§  42.  The  H'ability  of  a  personal  representative  for  rents. 
If  the  personal  representative  of  a  deceased  lessor  takes  pos- 
session of  tlie  lands  of  his  decedent,  and  occupies  them  for  his 
own  use  or  leases  them  and  retains  the  rents  he  must  pay  the 
heirs  or  devisees  the  rental  value  of  the  lands.^"  They  may  re- 
cover the  rents  from  him  in  an  action  at  law,^^  and  in  equity  he 
■will  be  regarded  as  a  trustee  for  the  heirs  and  devisees  to  the  ex- 
tent of  the  money  which  came  into  his  hands  from  the  rents  of 
the  premises.^-  But  where  the  personal  representative  is  an  heir 
of  the  decedent  and  he  collects  the  rent  it  will  be  presumed  that 
he  collected  it  as  an  heir  and  he  cannot  be  compelled  to  account 
for  it  to  the  next  of  kin/''  A  personal  representative  who  collects 
the  rents  has  no  right  or  duty  to  account  for  them  to  the  next  of 
kin  in  making  up  his  account.  He  is  not  chargeable  on  his  ac- 
counting but  he  is  personally  liable  to  the  heirs  at  law  for  money 
received  and  in  equity  as  a  trustee  for  those  who  by  law  are  en- 
titled to  receive  the  rents  of  the  real  property  of  the  person  he 
represents."    If  the  personal  property  is  insufficient  to  pay  the 

9  Raymond  v.  Fitch,  2  C.  M.  &  20  S.  E.  Rep.  431;    Jones'  Appeal, 

R.  .588;   Kingdon  v.  Nottle,  1  M.  &  3  Grant  Cases   (Pa.)    250;    Robb's 

Sel.  355;    King  v.  Jones,  5  Taunt.  Appeal,  41  Pa.  St.  45. 

518,    1    Marsh.    107;     Ricketts    v.  is  Schwartz'  Estate,    14    Pa.    St. 

Weaver,  121  M.  &  W.  718,  723,  13  L.  42. 

J.,  Ex.  195.  1^  Smith   v.   King,   22   Ala.    558; 

IP  Henderson     v.     Simmons,     33  Goodrich     v.     Thompson,     4     Day 

Ala.  291,  70  Am.  Dec.  590;    In  re  (Conn.)  215;   Eppinger  v.  Canepa, 

Misamore's  Est.,    90    Cal.    169,    27  20  Fla.  262;    Hendrix  v.  Hendrix, 

Pac.  Rep.  6;    In  re  Holderbaum's  65  Ind.  329,  331;  Evans  v.  Hardy, 

Est.,  82  Iowa,  69,  72,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  76   Ind.   527;    Head  v.   Sutton,   31 

898;    Stearns   v.    Stearns,   1    Pick.  Kan.   616.   3   Pac.  Rep.  280;    Hen- 

(Mass.)    157;    Shuffler   v.  Turner,  derson's   Succession,   24   La.   Ann. 

Ill  N.  C.  297,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  417.  435;  Lewis  v.  Carson,  16  Mo.  App. 

11  Brooks  V.  Jackson,  125  Mass.  342;  Lucy  v.  Lucy,  55  N.  H.  9,  10; 

307,    309;     Gibson    v.    Farley,    16  Griswold  v.  Chandler,  5  N.  W.  492; 

Mass.  280.  Stagg   v.    Jackson,    1    N.    Y.    206; 

i2Autrey  v.  Autrey,  94  Ga.  579,  Fisher  v.  Fisher,  1  Bradf.  (N.  Y.) 


52 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  jVKD  TENANT. 


debts,  or  if  tlie  estate  is  insolvent,  the  personal  representative 
may  sell  the  land  for  the  purpose  of  paying  debts ;  but  until  that 
time  the  heirs  are  entitled  to  receive  the  rents  and  profits,  and 
the  mere  fact  that  the  personal  estate  is  insolvent  does  not  author- 
ize the  administrator  or  executor  to  collect  the  rents.^^  And  an 
administrator  who,  without  the  consent  of  the  widow  of  the  de- 
ceased, leases  land  which  had  been  assigned  to  her  for  her  dower, 
will  be  liable  to  her  personally  for  the  rents  which  he  has  re- 
ceived under  the  lease.^" 

§  43.  The  power  of  an  administrator  to  lease  the  lands  of 
his  intestate.  An  administrator,  as  such,  has  ordinarily  no 
power  to  execute  leases  of  the  real  property  of  his  intestate 
though  where  an  administrator  is  permitted  by  the  heir  to 
lease  land  whether  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  debts  of  the 
deceased,  or  meeting  the  expenses  of  administration  or  for 
any  other  proper  and  legal  purpose,  the  heir  will  be  estopped 
from  subsequently  questioning  the  validity  of  the  action  of 
the    administrator.^^      For    an    administrator    may,    with    the 


355;  Campbell  v.  Johnson,  1  Sandf. 
Ch.  (N.  Y.)  148;  Floyd  v.  Herring, 
64  N.  C.  409;  Conger  v.  Atwood, 
28  Ohio  St.  134,  22  Am.  Rep.  462; 
Carlisle's  Appeal,  38  Pa.  St.  259; 
McCoy  v.  Scott,  2  Rawle  (Pa.) 
222;  Jewell  v.  Jewell,  11  Rich.  Eq. 
(S.  C.)  296;  Stockwell  v.  Sargent, 
37  Vt.  16. 

15  Kimball  v.  Sumner,  62  Me. 
305;  Gibson  v.  Farley,  16  Mass. 
283;  Boynton  V.  Peterborough,  etc., 
Co.,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  467,  469;  Pal- 
mer V.  Palmer,  13  Gray  (Mass.) 
326;  Stearns  v.  Stearn,  1  Pick. 
(Mass.)  157;  Newcomb  v.  Steb- 
bins,  99  Mass.  616,  617. 

16  Boyd  Y.  Hunter,  44  Ala.  705. 
A  statute  which  requires  an  ex- 
ecutor or  an  administrator  who 
uses  any  part  of  the  rral  estate, 
to  account  for  the  income  of  the 
same  in  the  probate  court  means 
that  he  shall  accoun't  for  the  rents 
only  to  such  persons  to  whom  they 


belong.  He  must  account  for  them 
to  the  heirs  or  devisees  unless 
they  expressly  or  by  necessary  im- 
plication agree  that  the  rents  shall 
be  applied  with  other  assets  to 
pay  the  legacies,  the  debts  and  the 
expenses  of  administration.  Brooks 
V.  Jackson,  125  Mass.  307,  310. 
Where  by  a  statute  an  adminis- 
trator has  power  to  rent  the  lands 
of  his  decedent  it  would  seem  rea- 
sonable that  he  should  account  for 
the  rents  received  as  assets  and 
in  a  court  of  probate.  See,  Bon- 
durant  v.  Thompson,  15  Ala.  202; 
Smith  V.  King.  22  Ala.  558. 

17  Crowder  V.  Shackelford,  35 
Miss.  320,  359;  Ashley  v.  Young, 
79  Miss.  129,  29  So.  Rep.  822; 
Stearns  v.  Stearns,  1  Pick.  (Mass.) 
157;  Choate  v.  Arrington,  116 
Mass.  552;  Brent  v.  Chipley,  104 
Mo.  App.  645,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  270. 
See,  also.  Jackson  v.  O'Rorke  (Neb. 
1904),  98  N.  W.  Rep.  1068. 


PARTIES   TO   THE   LEASE.  53 

knowledge  of  the  heirs  and  without  their  dissent  rent  the  lands 
of  his  intestate  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  debts  of  the  estate 
and  the  rent  is  then  assets  in  his  hands  for  that  purpose.^^  In 
some  states  it  is  expressly  provided  by  statute  that  an  executor 
or  administrator  may  rent  or  sell  lands  for  the  purpose  of  paying 
the  debts  of  the  deceased  person  whom  he  represents.^'  Such  a 
lease  is  not  likely  to  be  of  much  value  or  to  meet  with  favorable 
consideration  from  a  prospective  tenant.  It  is  in  some  cases  pro- 
vided that  an  administrator's  lease  shall  be  terminated  with  his 
ofi&ce.^®^  And  in  all  cases  where  the  execution  of  a  lease  by  an 
administrator  is  in  question  it  is  ver^^  advisable,  if  not  indispen- 
sable, for  the  protection  of  all  parties,  to  secure  the  approval  of 
the  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  estates  of  decedents  to  the 
execution  of  the  lease  by  the  administrator.^" 

§  44.  The  power  of  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  to 
lease.  Inasmuch  as  a  power  to  sell  or  to  lease  lands  conferred 
upon  an  executor  by  the  will  is  a  special  power  in  trust  which 
indicates  and  is  based  upon  some  special  trust  or  confidence 
which  the  testator  had  and  reposed  in  the  executor  personally  it 
is  a  general  rule  that  such  special  testamentary  power  to  sell  or 
lease  does  not  devolve  on  an  administrator  with  the  will  annexed. 
So  far  as  leasinu-  the  property  of  the  testator  is  concerned  the 
administrator  with  the  will  annexed  has  such  powers  only  as  are 
conferred  upon  an  administrator  by  statute.-^  In  some  of  the 
states  by  express  statute  the  administrator  with  the  will  an- 
nexed possesses  and  may  exercise  all  powers  which  might  have 

18  Ashley  v.  Young,  79  Miss.  129,  Ga.  461;  Hall  v.  Irwin,  7  111.  176; 
29   So.   Rep.   822.  Owens  v.  Cowan,  7  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 

19  Palmer  v.  Stiner,  68  Ala.  400.       1.52;    Brown   v.    Hobson,   3   A.   K. 
isaBurbank    v.    Dyer,    52     Ind.      Marsh.  (Ky.)  380,  13  Am.  Dec.  187; 

392;   Smith  v.  Park,  31  Minn.  70.  Montgomery   v.   Milliken,    9   Miss. 

20  Bank  V.  Dudley,  2  Pet.  (U.  S.)  49.5;  Brush  v.  Young,  28  N.  J.  L. 
492;  Roe  v.  Summerset,  2  W.  Bl.  237;  Naundorf  v.  Schuman,  41  X. 
692.  See,  also,  Brent  v.  Chipley,  J.  Eq.  14,  2  Atl.  609;  Dominick 
104  Mo.  App.  645.  v.  Michael,  4  Sandf.  Ch.    (X.  Y.) 

21  The  following  cases  refer  only  374;  Gilchrist  v.  Rea,  9  Paige  Ch. 
to  a  power  of  sale  conferred  on  the  (X.  Y.)  66;  Brain  v.  Mattison,  54 
executor  by  the  will  but  by  anal-  X.  Y.  663;  Dunning  v.  Ocean  Bank, 
ogy  they  would  doubtless  be  ap-  61  N.  Y.  497;  Ferebee  v.  Proctor,  2 
plicable  to  a  testamentary  power  Der.  &  B.  (X.  C.)  439;  Moody  v. 
to  lease  laads:  Lucas  v.  Price,  4  Vandyke,  4  Binn.  (Pa.)  31;  :Moo- 
Ala.  679;  Lockwood  v.  Stradley,  1  dy's  Lessee  v.  Filmer,  3  Grant 
Del.  Ch.  298;   Harker  r.  Smith,  7  Cas.  (Pa.)  17. 


54  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AKD  TENANT. 

been  exercised  by  the  executor  including  a  power  to  sell  the 
land  of  the  testator.-- 

§  45.  General  rule  as  to  the  power  of  executors  to  make 
leases.  As  a  general  rule  and  speaking  broadly,  it  may 
safely  be  said  that  in  the  absence  of  an  express  direction  in 
the  will  creating  in  the  executor  some  power  over  the  real 
estate  of  his  testator  an  executor  has  no  interest  in  or  control 
over  the  real  property  of  the  testator  which  will  enable  him 
to  execute  a  valid  lease  of  the  same.-^  In  Michigan  it  has  been 
held  that  an  executor's  lease  for  two  years  of  the  real  estate 
of  his  testator,  which  he  has  taken  possession  of  and  occupied 
with  the  consent  of  the  heirs  or  devisees,  though  void  as  a 
lease  for  two  years,  under  a  statute  allowing  an  executor  to  lease 
the  real  property  of  his  testator  "from  year  to  A^ear,"  is  valid 
as  a  lease  from  year  to  year.^*  Inasmuch  as  the  legal  title  to 
land  undisposed  of  by  will  is  in  the  heir  alone  an  administrator 
cannot  sue  a  tenant  at  will  of  his  decedent  for  rent  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  contract  of  renting  between  the  administrator  and 
the  tenant.'^ 

§  46.  A  lease  which  is  executed  by  one  of  several  executors 
or  administrators.  One  of  several  executors  having  power  to 
lease  may  execute  a  lease  which  will  be  valid  and  binding  on  all 
of  them  though  by  the  will  creating  the  power  to  lease  the  power 
is  in  express  words  confen^ed  upon  all  the  executors.-®  So,  a 

22  Kidwell  V.  Brummagim,  32  tive  has  the  power  to  rent  or 
Cal.  436;  Dilworth  v.  Rice,  48  Mo.  to  sell  the  lands  for  the  purpose 
124;  Sandifer  v.  Grantham,  62  of  paying  the  debts  of  the  de- 
Miss.  412;  Hester  v.  Hester,  2  ceased  and  where  in  the  exercise 
Ired.  Eq.  (N.  C.)  330;  Creech  v.  of  this  power  he  claims  the  rents 
Grainger,  106  N.  C.  213;  10  S.  E.  which  have  accrued  after  the 
Rep.  1032;  In  re  Still's  Estate,  2  death  of  the  decedent  he  may  re- 
Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  105,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  cover  the  same  as  his  title  to  the 
Rep.  379,  31  W.  N.  C.  252.  rents  is  the  same  as  to  any  other 

23  Hankins  v.  Kimball,  57  Ind.  chose  in,  action.  Palmer  v. 
42;    Rutherford's  Heirs  v.  Clark's  Steiner,  68  Ala.  400. 

Heirs,  4   Bush.    (Ky.)    27;    Ely  v.  24  Grady   v.    Warrell,    105   Mich. 

Scofield,  35  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  330;   In  310,  63  N.  W.  Rep.  204. 

re  Hillard's  Estate,  8  Luzon  Leg.  25  Cummings     v.     Watson,     149 

Reg.    (Pa.)    237;    Bruer  v.  Hayes,  Mass.  262,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  36.G.     And 

10  Ohio  Dec.  583.     The  rule  of  the  compare,   Howard   v.    Patrick,    38 

text  has  been  modified  by  statute  Mich.  795. 

in  some  states.     Thus  where  by  a  20  Chandler  v.  Ryder,  102  Mass. 

statute    the    personal    representa-  268;    Bunner   t.    Storm,    1    Sandf. 


TARTIES   TO   THE   LEASE.  55 

lease  for  years  may  be  assigned  by  one  of  several  administrators 
so  as  to  bind  the  others.-^  But  where  by  a  statute  the  majority 
of  several  executors  named  must  join  in  the  execution  of  a  con- 
tract a  lease  signed  by  one  is  not  valid  as  to  the  others.  Nor 
can  such  a.  lease  signed  by  one  of  two  or  more  executors  be  re- 
garded as  binding  on  the  others  upon  any  presumption  that  the 
executor  who  signed  acted  as  their  agent  when  its  term  exceeds 
one  year  and  the  statute  requires  that  the  authority  of  an  agent 
to  make  a  lease  for  more  than  one  year  shall  be  in  writing.-' 
The  rule  is  that  where  a  term  for  years  is  specifically  bequeathed 
it  will  on  the  death  of  the  testator  vest  in  the  executor  for  the 
purposes  of  administering  the  estate.  The  legatee  will  acquire 
title  through  the  executor  and  not  directly  from  the  testator. 
The  legatee  has  no  right  to  enter  or  to  demand  or  receive  the 
rents  until  the  executor  has  given  his  assent  to  the  bequest  or 
has  accounted  and  turned  the  term  over  to  the  legatee.  Hence 
a  person  who  proposes  to  take  an  assignment  of  the  lease  from 
the  executor  or  to  whom  the  executor  proposes  to  sublet  ought  to 
ascertain  whether  or  not  the  latter  has  assented  to  the  bequest 
for  if  he  has  his  power  over  the  term  is  at  an  end.  The  lega- 
tee must  be  consulted  and  if  he  does  not  agree  to  the  new  tenant 
or  assignee  he  may  eject  him  by  judicial  proceedings.^® 

§  47.  A  lease  by  an  executrix  being  a  feme  sole.  At  the  com- 
mon law  the  power  of  a  feme  sole  who  was  also  an  executrix  to 
lease  a  term  as  a  feme  sole  is  terminated  by  her  marriage  and 
thereafter  her  husband  must  be  the  lessor  in  all  leases  which  she 
desires  to  make  in  her  representative  capacity.'"     AVhether  she 

Ch.  (N.  Y.)  387;  Ogden  v.  Smith,  when  done  by  one  only  without  the 
2  Paige  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  195;  Doe  v.  concurrence  or  knowledge  of  the 
Hayes,  7  Taunt.  222;  Simpson  v.  others.  The  rule  is  different  as 
Gutteridge,  1  Madd.  609,  617  (as-  to  the  torts  of  one  executor  and  as 
signment  of  a  lease);  Hayes  v.  to  acts  of  the  executors,  which 
Sturges,  7  Taunt.  217.  It  is  a  could  not  lawfully  be  done  by  all. 
very  old  an/d  well  recognized  rule  2-  Lewis  v.  Ringo,  3  A.  K. 
of  the  common  law  that  a  release,  Marsh.  (Ky.)  247. 
surrender  of  a  term,  the  confes-  2s  Utah  Loan  &  Trust  Company 
sion  of  a  judgment,  an  attorn-  v.  Garbutt,  6  Utah,  342.  23  Pac.  758. 
ment  of  one  executor  and  any  29  Doe  v.  Guy.  4  Esp.  154;  .John- 
other  lawful  act  which  all  the  ex-  son  v.  Warwick.  17  C.  B.  516,  Fen- 
ecutors  may  lawfully  do,  will  be  ton  v.  Clegg,  9  Ex.  680. 
binding    and    conclusive    on    all  «o  Arnold  v.   Bidgood,   Cro.   Jac 


ub  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

joins  with  him  or  not  in  the  execution  of  the  instrument  does, 
not  affect  its  validity  at  the  common  law.^^ 

§  48.  The  equitable  jurisdiction  over  leases  made  by  execu- 
tors. Leases  which  have  been  made  by  the  personal  represen- 
tative though  they  be  valid  in  law,  may,  under  some  circum- 
stances, be  set  aside  in  equity  on  the  application  of  interested 
parties.  In  order  that  a  lease  made  by  an  executor  may  be  valid, 
it  must  appear  that  the  lease  was  made  by  him  in  order  to  se- 
cure a  due  and  proper  administration  of  the  property  of  the 
deceased  person  whom  he  represents.  Hence,  if  a  lease  is  made 
by  the  personal  representative  which  is  clearly  improvident  and 
unprofitable  to  the  persons  who  take  the  estate  of  the  deceased 
it  may  be  annulled  in  equity  on  application  of  the  persons  who 
have  been  prejudiced  by  the  action  of  the  personal  representa- 
tive in  making  the  lease.^^  If  the  lessee  is  not  responsible  for 
the  waste  committed  by  the  personal  representative,  and  particu- 
larly, where  he  had  entered  upon  the  premises  and  made  im- 
provements, equity  may  decree  that  he  should  receive  compensa- 
tion so  far  as  the  next  of  kin  were  benefited  by  what  he  had  con- 
tributed. So,  also,  if  a  lease  made  by  a  personal  representative 
is  tainted  with  fraud  on  his  part  to  the  prejudice  of  the  benefi- 
ciaries of  the  estate,  the  latter  may  have  it  set  aside  in  equity.^' 
So,  generally  if  a  sale  of  the  land  of  the  decedent  be  necessary 
to  enable  the  personal  representative  to  pay  legacies  and  debts  of 
the  estate,  or,  if  under  all  the  circumstances  a  sale  is  more  bene- 
ficial to  the  legatees  than  a  lease,  the  latter,  when  made  by  a  per- 
sonal representative,  may  be  set  aside  in  equity  and  a  sale  may  be 
ordered.^* 

§  48a.  The  power  of  trustees  to  grant  leases.  A  trustee  in 
whom  is  vested  the  legal  estate  may  grant  leases  for  reasonable 
times  and  at  reasonable  rents  where  the  term  of  the  lease  does 
not  exceed  the  duration  of  the  legal  estate  in  the  trustee.^^    In 

318;    Levick  v.  Coppin^  2  W.   Bl.  ss  Keating  v.   Keating,   Loyd   v. 

801.  Gov.  Co.  temp.  Sugd.  613. 

81  Leviclf  V.  Copin,  2  W.  Bl.  801;  34  Drohan  v.  Drohau,  1  Ball  &  B. 

1    Piatt    on    Leases,    3G8;     Wood-  185. 

fall,  Landlord  and  Tenant,  51,  52.  35  Hutcheson  v.  Bennefield   (Ga. 

32  Margrave     v.     Archibold,     1  1902),  42  S.  E.  Rep.  422;   Geer  v. 

Dow  P.  C.  107.  Traders'  Bank,  132  Mich.  215,  93 

N.  W.  Rep.  437,  9  Det.  Leg.  N.  578. 


PARTIES   TO   TUE  LE.VSE.  57 

some  states  the  permission  of  the  court  is  required  before  the 
trustee  can  lease  property.  For  example,  in  the  state  of  Xew 
York  b}^  statute  a  trustee  may  lease  real  estate  during  the  life 
of  the  beneficiary  for  a  term  not  to  exceed  five  years  without  ap- 
plication to  the  court  but  if  a  tei^m  exceed  that  limit  he  must  se- 
cure the  permission  of  the  supreme  court.^^  As  a  general  rule 
a  trustee  has  no  power  to  make  a  lease  which  was  extended  be- 
yond the  term  of  his  trust.^^  A  trustee,  unless  expressly  author- 
ized to  do  so  by  the  person  who  has  created  the  trust  has  no 
power  to  make  leases  extending  beyond  the  term  of  the  trust. 
If  the  trust  estate  is  terminated  by  the  death  of  the  beneficiaiy 
or  by  his  marriage  or  by  his  attainment  of  his  majority  or  by 
the  happening  of  any  event  which  has  been  designated  by  the 
creator  of  the  trust  as  working  its  termination  the  lease  becomes 
ipso  facto  void.^*  If  the  rule  were  otherwise  it  would  be  possible 
for  a  trustee  by  granting  long  leases,  or  by  making  leases  with 
covenants  of  renewal,  to  deprive  the  person  on  whom  the  legal 
title  will  devolve  at  the  termination  and  expiration  of  the  trust 
term  of  the  possession  and  beneficial  enjoyment  of  the  property. 
The  person  in  whom  the  legal  interest  would  devolve  would  take 
it  encumbered  with  outstanding  leases  and  have  tenants  thrust 
upon  him  without  his  choice  whom  he  could  by  no  means  get  rid 
of  until  the  termination  of  their  terms.  The  same  rule  would 
apply  where  the  trust  instrument  provides  that  on  the  happen- 
ing of  the  event  which  terminates  the  trust  the  trustees  shall 
convey  the  trust  estate  to  a  person  designated.  A  lease  entered 
into  by  the  trustee  during  the  existence  of  the  trust  does  not 
last  until  the  estate  is  in  fact  conveyed.  It  terminates  at  the 
same  instant  as  the  trust  estate  and  a  formal  conveyance  of  the 
trust  estate  by  the  trustee  is  unnecessary  and  is  usually  dis- 
pensed with.?®  Very  often  powers  to  lease  in  express  language 
are  inserted  in  trust  deeds  or  in  wills  creating  trusts.  Ajid 
where  there  is  a  power  to  grant  leases  for  twenty  years  a  lease 
by  the  trustee  for  any   period  short  of  the   twenty  years   is 

36  Weir  V.  Barker,  93  N.  Y.  Supp.       31  N.  Y.  Supp.  206,  208;  In  re  Mc- 
742.  Caffrey,  50  Hun,  371,  3  N.  Y.  Sup. 

37  In  re  Armory  Board.  29  Misc.       96. 

174,  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  882.  94  N.  Y.  39  Watlcins  v.  Reynolds,  123  N. 

St.  Rep.  882,  30  Civ.  Pro.  Rep.  Y.  211,  25  N.  E.  Rep.  322. 

38  Gomez  v.  Gomez,  81  Hun,  566, 


58  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

valid.^"  So.  a.  power  to  lease  for  any  time  not  to  exceed  twenty- 
one  years  Avill  authorize  a  lease  for  twenty-one  years  which 
is  detenninable  at  the  option  of  the  lessee  at  the  expiration 
of  a  less  number  of  years.*^  To  state  the  rule  concisely  any 
lease  by  a  trustee  for  a  term  which  is  less  than  the  term  permit- 
ted to  be  made  by  a  power  vested  in  him  is  valid  though  it  may 
exceed  the  duration  of  the  trust.  But  the  power  to  lease  for 
twenty-one  years  or  to  make  building,  and  repairing  leases  for 
sixty-one  years  will  authorize  a  lease  for  forty  years  containing 
the  usual  covenant  by  a  tenant  to  repair.*^ 

§  48b.  The  proper  covenants  in  leases  by  trustees.  In  the 
absence  of  anj^  instructions  contained  in  the  instrument  creat- 
ing the  trust  prescribing  what  conditions  or  covenants  shall  be 
inserted  in  the  lease,  any  covenants  may  be  inserted  in  leases 
by  trustees  which  are  consistent  with  the  general  intention  of 
the  creator  of  the  trust  and  which  do  not  prejudice  the  interest 
of  the  beneficiary  or  of  the  person  who  takes  the  legal  interest 
after  the  trust  has  terminated.*^  There  ought,  however,  always 
to  be  a  covenant  by  the  lessee  to  pay  the  rent.  If  this  be  not 
inserted  an  assignment  of  the  lease  by  him  will  prevent  the  col- 
lection of  rent  in  case  the  term  created  by  the  lease  shall  extend 
beyond  the  term  of  the  trust.  There  ought  always  to  be  a  coven- 
ant providing  for  a  re-entry  upon  the  breach  of  a  condition  by 
the  lessee  so  that  the  remainderman  may  be  protected  as  well  as 
the  trustee.  A  trustee  cannot,  unless  expressly  authorized  to  do 
so  by  the  terms  of  the  trust  insert  covenants  of  renewal  in  the 
lease.  His  covenants  for  a  renewal  though  perhaps  binding  on 
him  during  the  trust  term  will  not  bind  those  who  take  the  prop- 
erty after  the  expiration  of  the  trust.**     The  trustee  will  him- 

40  Isherwood  v.  Olclknow,  3  M.  &  tinf?  trustees  to  lease,  it  was  held 
S   382.  that  the  trustees  might  execute  a 

41  Edwards  v.  Milbank,  4  Drew.  lease  for  a  much  longer  term  than 
606,  29  L.  .T.  Ch.  45.  the  period  during  which  the  trust 

42  Easton  v.  Tratt,  2  H.  &  C.  676.  w^ould  exist.  Marsh  v.  Reed,  184 
In  a  case  where  the  circumstances  111.  263,  56  N.  E.  Rep.  306.  affirm- 
of  the   property,   its  location  and  ing  64  111.  App.  535. 

the    conditions     surrounding    the  43  Goodtitle  v  Finucan,  12  Doug. 

estate  generally,  were  such  that  a  575. 

court  of  equity  could  see  that  tho  ■'■'  Gomez    v.    Gomez,    31    N.    Y.. 

interest  of  the  beneficiary  of  the  Supp.  200,  81  Hun,  5G0. 

trust  would  *  e  favored  by  permit- 


TARTIES   TO   THE  LEASE.  59 

self  be  personally  liable  on  the  covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment.*'' 
A  trustee  whose  sole  power  is  to  receive  the  rents  and  profits, 
sell  the  land  and  invest  the  proceeds  has  no  power  to  lease.*' 

§  48c.  Signature  by  one  of  two  or  more  trustees.  A  lease 
for  a  term  of  years  signed  by  one  only  of  several  trustees  in 
whom  the  title  to  the  property  is  vested  is  invalid.  Such  a  lease 
is  an  important  and  material  act  vrhere  the  making  of  it  was 
essential  to  carry  out  the  trust  contained  in  the  instrument  under 
Avhich  the  trustees  were  appointed  and  inasmuch  as  it  required 
an  exercise  of  judgment  and  discretion  should  have  been  parti- 
cipated in  by  all  the  trustees.  The  signature  of  one  trustee  does 
not  bind  the  others  nor  will  there  arise  an  implication  of  agency 
in  the  case  of  trustees  which  might  perhaps  be  recognized  in  the 
case  of  joint  tenants  or  partners.  Doubtless  one  of  several  trus- 
tees may  under  some  circumstances,  be  entrusted  by  his  asso- 
ciates with  the  business  of  the  trust  as  their  agent.  This  rule, 
however,  will  not  apply  to  such  acts  as  a  trustee  ought  to  as- 
sume the  responsibility  for  and  which  properly  require  a  de- 
liberate exercise  of  the  will  and  judgment  of  all  of  them.  Nor 
will  a  lease  which  is  invalid  because  not  signed  by  all  the  trus- 
tees become  valid  by  the  acquiescence  or  subsequent  recognition 
of  its  existence  by  the  other  trustees  who  have  not  signed  it. 
The  trustees  may  sign  at  different  dates  and  the  lease  will  bind 
all  as  soon  as  all  have  signed.  But  until  all  have  signed  it  is 
no  lease  and  if  it  purports  to  lease  a  term  of  years  it  will  be  in- 
valid under  the  statute  of  frauds.  This  being  the  case,  mere 
silence  or  recognition  vnW  not  validate  it  for  it  is,  at  most,  only 
a  lease  at  will  where  the  lessee  has  gone  into  possession.*'^ 

§  48d.  The  personal  liability  of  the  trustee.  The  instrument 
of  lease  will  not  be  invalidated  merely  because  it  does  not  refer 
to  the  power  though  it  is  always  fitting  and  advisable  that  it 
should  do  so.  In  case  the  right  to  grant  a  lease  of  the  character 
in  question  does  not  exist  by  reason  of  any  interest  which  the 
lessor  may  possess  aside  from  the  power  the  intention  will  be 

45  Chestnut   v.    Tyson.    105    Ala.  47Winslo'^  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio 

149,  16  So.  Rep.  723.  Railroad.  188  U.  S.  646.  23  S.  Ct. 

<5  In  re  Hoysradt,  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  443,  47  Law.  ed.  635,  reversing  18 

841.  20  Misc.  265,  79  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  App.  D.  C.  438. 
841. 


60  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

presumed  to  execute  the  power  on  his  part.*^  If  the  lessor  has 
an  interest  and  estate  in  the  land  as  well  as  a  power  and  the  in- 
strument does  not  clearly  indicate  whether  he  means  to  make 
the  lease  by  virtue  of  his  estate  or  by  virtue  of  his  power  and 
it  is  immaterial  whether  the  lease  shall  operate  by  the  power 
or  by  the  estate  of  the  lessor  it  will  then  be  presumed  that  the 
lessor  intends  not  to  execute  the  power  but  to  grant  the  lease  out 
of  his  own  estate  or  interest.  If,  however,  a  lease  created  by  a 
lessor  who  has  both  an  estate  and  a  power  will  be  invalid  if  re- 
ferred to  an  intention  to  grant  a  lease  out  of  the  estate  and  valid 
if  refen^ed  to  an  intention  on  his  part  to  execute  the  power  it 
will  be  by  implication  referred  to  an  intention  to  execute  a  lease 
under  the  power  and  not  under  the  estate  or  interest.  Trustees 
■who  execute  a  lease  in  their  individual  names,  and  in  the  body 
of  the  lease  covenant  to  pay  the  rent  without  using  any  language 
showing  an  intention  to  bind  the  beneficiary,  are  liable  person- 
ally on  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  although  in  the  caption  of  the 
lease  they  are  described  as  "trustees  of"  an  organization  men- 
tioned. The  word  trustees  is  merely  descriptio  personarum  and 
the  court  will  not  receive  parol  evidence  to  show  the  intent  of 
the  parties.** 

48  Pitcher  V.  Daniel,  12  Rich.  (S.  «  Stohie  v.  Dills,  62  111.  432,  438. 

Car.)  Eq.  349. 


CHAPTER  IL 

CORPORATION  LEASES. 

§  49.     The  common  law  power  of  corporations  to  grant  leases. 

50.  The  common  law  rule  as  to  the  power  of  a  corporation  to  be- 

come a  lessee. 

51.  The  form  .of  corporation  leases. 

52.  The  necessity  for  seal  on  a  corporation  lease. 

53.  By  what  officer  a  corporation  lease  should  be  executed. 

54.  The  period  for  which  a  corporation  lease  may  run. 

55.  When  leases  are  ultra  vires. 

56.  The  effect  of  the  dissolution  of  a  corporation  upon  an  existing 

lease. 

57.  The  power  of  municipal  corporation  to  grant  leases, 

58.  A  municipal  corporation  as  a  tenant. 

59.  Ultra  Vires  leases  by  municipal  corporatioms. 

60.  Leases  of  park  grounds  by  municipal  corporation. 

§  49.  The  common  law  power  of  corporations  to  grant  leases. 

At  the  common  law  a  private  corporation  which  by  express 
grant  or  by  necessary  implication  has  power  to  o\^ti  and  control 
real  estate  may  grant  leases  thereof  and  receive  and  use  the 
rents  of  the  same  in  aU  cases  where  the  granting  of  the  lease  is 
proper  or  necessary  to  enable  the  corporation  to  carry  on  its 
business,  or  to  carry  out  the  purposes  and  object  of  the  corpo- 
ration.^ The  power  and  capacity  of  the  corporation  in  this  re- 
spect are  the  same  as  though  it  were  an  individual.  It  is  usually 
advisable  to  ascertain  if  tlie  corporation  has  charter  power  to 

1  Phillips   V.    Aurora   Lodge,    87  etc.,  14  Abb.  Pr.  (N.Y.)  209;  Den- 

Ind.    505;    Dubuque   v.   Miller,    11  ike  v.  N.  Y.  &  Rosedale  Co.,  80  N. 

Iowa,   558;    Crescent  City  Wharf,  Y.  599;   Rives  v.  Dudley,  3  Jones 

etc.,  Co.  v.  Simpson,  77  Cal.  286,  19  (N.  C.)  Law,  126;   Baltimore,  etc., 

Pac.  Rep.  426;  New  Orleans  v.  Guil-  Co.  v.  McCutcheon,  13  Pa.  St.  1; 

lotte,  14  La.  Ann.  875;   Phillips  v.  Co.  Litt.  44a;  Attorney  General  v. 

Eastern  Railway,  138   Mass.   122;  Moses,   2   Madd.   308;    Spendlomes 

Taylor  v.  Carondelet,  22  Mo.  203;  v.     Burkitt,     Hob.     7;     Bunny    v. 

State  V.  Flavell,  24  N.  J.  Law,  370;  Wright,  1  Leon,  59;    Featherston- 

Nicoll  V.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  haugh  v.  Lee,  M.  P.  Co.,  L.  R.  1 

N.    Y.    121;     Matthews    V.    Mayor,  Eq.  318. 


62    .  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

lease.  But  it  is  not  always  necessary  that  an  express  authority 
to  lease  the  real  estate  of  a  corporation  shall  be  conferred  upon 
it  by  its  articles  of  incorporation.  The  circumstances  of  the  par- 
ticular case  may  be  such  that  a  lease  will  be  valid  without  ex- 
press charter  authority.  For  if  a  corporation  is  in  such  a  condi- 
tion that  it  cannot  continue  its  operations  successfully,  and  is  in 
failing  financial  circumstances,  it  may  lawfully  lease  its  entire 
property,  though  it  may  not  be  expressly  authorized  to  do  so.- 
So  also  the  trustees  of  a  corporation  who  by  its  charter  are  vested 
with  the  control  of  its  property  may  lease  the  same  as  an  assem- 
bly room  when  the  premises  are  not  being  used  by  the  corpora- 
tion itself.^  But  a  lease  which  by  its  operation  suspends  the 
ordinary  business  of  the  corporation  may  be  absolutely  void  and 
is  unquestionably  so  where  a  statute  provides  that  the  suspension 
of  the  business  of  the  corporation  for  a  specific  period  shall  work 
a  forfeiture  of  all  the  rights,  privileges  and  franchises  of  the 
corporation.* 

§  50.  The  common  law  rule  as  to  the  power  of  a  corporation 
to  become  a  lessee.  It  is  undisputed  that  a  corporation  -whether 
lay  or  ecclesiastical,  aggregate  or  sole,  at  the  common  law"  pos- 
sessed the  implied  power  to  take  and  hold  real  property  under  a 
lease  from  its  owner  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  to  do  so  to  carry 
out  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  incorporated.  The  right  to 
hire  premises  which  are  necessary  to  the  cariying  on  of  the 
business  of  the  corporation  is  a  power  which  is  inherent  to  every 
corporation.  So  thoroughly  is  this  recognized  that  the  question 
is  hardly  ever  raised.^  If  a  corporation  has  actually  used  and 
occupied  land  as  a  lessee  which  is  necessary  for  its  business,  and 

2  As  to  the  statutory  power  of  been  held  that  a  lease  to  a  corpo- 
a  water  company  to  lease  its  prem-  ration  in  another  state  was  valid, 
ises  to  another  water  company  see  Black  v.  Delaware  &  R.  Canal  Co., 
Moore  v.  Chartiers  Valley  Water  22  N.  J.  Eq.  130.  The  charter 
Co.,  216  Pa.  St.  467,  6.^  Atl.  Rep.  power  to  erect  and  maintain  docks 
936.  confers  by  implication  the  power 

3  Phillips  V.  Aurora  Lodge,  I.  O.  to  lease  such  docks  after  their 
G.  T.,  87  Ind.  'jO'>.  erection.     Smith  v.  Berndt,  1  N.  Y. 

4Conro  V.  Port  Henry  Iron  Co.,  Supp.  108. 

12  Barb.    (N.  Y.)   27.     In  conetru-  s  Blanchard  v.  Warner,  1  Blatch. 

ing    an    express    statutory    power  (U.    S.)     258;     Jesus    College    v. 

conferred   upon   a   corporation   to  Gibbs,    1   Y.    &   C.    145;    Lowe    v. 

lease   its  property  to  a   company  London  R.   R.  Co.,   14   Eng.   L.  & 

"in  this  state  or  otherwise"  it  has  E.  R.  10. 


CORPORATION  LEASES.  63 

wliieli  has  been  occupied  for  the  carrying  on  of  the  corporation 
business,  with  the  consent  of  the  owner  it  may  be  sued  in  as- 
sumpsit for  use  and  occupation.^  An  express  power  vested  in  a 
corporation  by  its  charter  to  hire  premises  for  corporation  pur- 
poses by  implication  vests  in  it  all  powers  which  are  necessarily 
incidental  thereto  and  which  are  required  to  render  the  posses- 
sion and  occupation  of  the  premises  beneficial  to  the  corporation. 
The  corporation  would  therefore  enjoy  the  incidental  power  to 
enter  into  the  usual  covenants  in  a  lease  as,  for  example,  the 
covenant  to  repair  even  though  it  would  thereby  become  liable 
to  rebuild  in  case  of  the  destruction  of  the  premises  by  fire.''  So, 
too,  the  power  of  a  corporation  to  lease  land  from  the  owner  in- 
cludes by  implication  the  incidental  power  to  agree  to  pay  a 
specific  sum  of  money  for  rent  or  to  pay  such  a  sum  as  arbitra- 
tors may  agree  upon.^  A  coi-poration  which,  as  a  lessee  of  land, 
has  entered  and  occupied  the  same  cannot  defend  an  action  for 
rent  or  for  iLse  and  occupation  on  the  ground  that  it  is  not  a 
corporation  de  jure.  It  is  sufficient  so  far  as  the  landlord's 
rights  are  concerned  that  it  is  a  corporation  de  facto  while  he.  on 
the  other  hand,  is  estopped  to  repudiate  his  obligations  under 
the  lease  upon  the  ground  that  the  corporation  has  no  legal  exis- 
tence where  he  has  recognized  and  dealt  with  it  as  a  corporation.® 
The  plaintiff  in  an  action  for  rent  is  relieved  from  proving  the 
existence  of  a  corporation  in  answer  to  a  plea  of  nul  tiel  c&rpo- 
raiion  where  it  appears  that  there  has  been  the  execution  and  de- 
livery of  a  valid  lease  by  the  landlord  to  the  corporation.  The 
existence  of  a  lease  or  other  writing  in  which  the  corporation  is 
described  in  its  corporate  capacity,  executed  and  delivered  to 
the  corporation  is  prima  facie  proof  of  the  existence  of  the  cor- 
poration.^" 

§  51.  The  form  of  corporation  leases.  Aside  from  the  neces- 
sity for  a  seal,  no  particular  form  is  requisite  to  be  followed  in 
the  execution  of  a  lease  by  a  corporation.    No  different  language 

6  Lowe  V.  London  R.  R.  Co.,  14  s  The  Alexandria  Canal  Co.  v. 
Eng.  L.  &  E.  Rep.  19.  There  can  Swann,  5  How.  (46  U.  S.)  83,  12 
be  no  question  that  a  corporation       Law.  ed.  60. 

may  become  a  tenant  from  year  to  o  Whitford  v.  Laidler,  94   N.  Y. 

year.     Crawford  v.  Longstreet,  43  145.  151,  46  Am.  Rep.  151. 

N.  J.  Law,  325.  lo  West  Side  Auction  House  Co. 

7  Abby  V.  Billups,  35  Miss.  618,  v.  Connecticut,  etc.,  Ins.  Co.,  186 
72  Am.  Dec.  143.  111.  15S,  57  N.  E.  Rep.  839. 


64  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

is  required  from  that  used  in  cases  where  the  parties  are  nat- 
ural persons."  The  lease  to  bind  the  corporation  either  as  les- 
see or  lessor  must  be  in  its  form  the  instrument  of  the  corpora- 
tion and  not  of  its  individual  officer  or  agent.  It  may  not  al- 
ways be  necessarj^  that  the  signature  of  the  lease  shall  be  tech- 
nically the  signature  of  the  corporation,  though  that  is  always 
advisable.  If  from  the  body  of  the  lease  it  is  clearly  apparent 
that  Uie  corporation  is  intended  to  be  bound,  and  particularly 
if  the  corporation  being  the  lessor  shall  have  permitted  the  les- 
see to  go  into  possession  and  to  pay  rent,  it  cannot  repudiate  the 
instrument  because  it  has  not  subscribed  to  it  the  name  of  the 
corporation  or  because  it  is  not  sealed  with  its  corporate  seal. 
Hence  where  the  agent  of  a  corporation  had  made  a  contract 
agTeeing  to  give  a  person  a  lease ;  and  the  corporation  had  per- 
mitted the  latter  to  enter  and  had  received  the  rent  from  him  it 
it  bound  to  give  him  a  lease  and  cannot  refuse  to  do  so  upon  the 

ground  that  the  contract  was  not  sealed  and  signed  by  the  cor- 
poration.^2 

§  52.  The  necessity  for  a  seal  on  a  corporation  lease.    By 

the  ancient  common  law  it  was  a  rule  that  a  corporation  could 
transfer  or  grant  its  real  property,  and  in  fact,  could  make  a 
contract  of  any  description  only  under  its  corporate  seal.  This 
doctrine,  however,  that  a  corporation  can  contract  only  under  its 
corporate  seal  is  now  universally  repudiated.^^  Such  a  rule  based 
as  it  was  upon  the  almost  superstitious  reverence  which  the  early 
common  law  tribunals  in  England  entertained  for  a  seal  could 
only  be  tolerated  when  corporations  were  not  numerous.  As 
soon  therefore  as  the  increase  in  commercial  enterprise  brought 
about  the  formation  of  large  companies  by  which  the  capital  of 
numerous  individuals  was  combined  in  the  form  of  corporate 
capital  to  carry  on  the  increasing  trade  of  the  community  the  rule 
was  entirely  abrogated.  The  modern  rule  is  that  all  corporations, 

11  Poole  V.  Bentley,  12  East,  168;  ter  v.  Ely,  7  Sim.  211;  Canal  Co. 
Morgan  v.  Powell,  7  Man.  &  G.  989.  v.  Wilmot,   9  East,  360;    Macbean 

12  Conant  V.  Bellows  Falls  Canal  v.  Irvine,  4  Bibb  (Ky.)  17;  Long 
Co.,  29  Vt.  2G3.  V.    Madison    &    Flax   Co.,    1    A.    K 

13  Sustaining  the  common  law  Marsh.  105;  Franlifort  Bank  v.  An- 
rule  see  Rochester  v.  Pierce,  1  derson,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  1; 
Camp.  466;  Rex  v.  Chipping  Nor-  In  re  Cape  Sable  Co.,  3  Bland 
ton,    5    East,    239;     Bridge    Com-  (Md.)    606. 

pany  v.  Side,  2  C.  &  P.  371;    Car- 


CORPORATION  LEASES. 


C5 


in  the  absence  of  a  restraining  statute,  may  make  all  contracts 
which  are  within  the  scope  of  their  general  powers  without  the 
use  of  a  corporate  seal.  Applying  this  general  rule  to  the  sub- 
ject under  discussion,  it  follows  that  the  lease  must  be  one  which 
the  corporation  has  a  right  to  make,  under  its  charter  or  under 
the  statute  law  of  the  state  in  order  to  carry  out  the  purpose  of 
its  creation.  And  the  effect  of  the  modem  repudiation  of  the 
ancient  rule  is  only  to  place  a  corporation  upon  an  equality  with 
the  individual  so  far  as  the  necessity  for  a  seal  is  concerned.  If 
a  contract  when  executed  by  an  individual  must  be  under  seal 
in  order  to  possess  validity  the  same  contract  when  executed  by 
a  corporation  must  also  be  under  seal.^* 

§  53.  By  what  officer  corporation  lease  should  be  executed. 
Until  the  contrary  appears  it  may  safely  be  presumed  upon  the 
general  principles  of  the  law  of  corporation  contracts  that  the 
president  of  a  corporation  has  power  to  lease  the  lands  of  the 
corporation.^^  The  leasing  of  land  on  his  part  where  the  corpo- 
ration has  power  to  own  land,  is  so  manifestly  for  the  benefit  of 
the  corporation  and  seemingly  so  far  an  incident  of  his  general 
powers  as  its  president  that  it  will  require  some  affirmative  proof 


1*  Shropshire  v.  Behrens,  77  Tex. 
275,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  1043.  The 
modern  rule  that  a  corporation 
may  contract  without  seal  as  ap- 
plicable to  contracts  generally  is 
sustained  by  the  following  cases: 
Curry  v.  Bank,  8  Port.  (Ala.)  360; 
McKiernan  v.  Lenzen,  56  Cal.  61; 
Dennis  v.  Maynard,  15  111.  457; 
Northeastern  F.  Ins.  Co.  v  Schet- 
ter,  38  111  166;  B.  S.  Green  Co.  v. 
Blodgett,  55  111.  App  556;  Chris- 
tian Church  of  Wolcott  v.  John- 
son, 53  Ind.  273;  Ring  v.  Johnson 
County,  6  Iowa,  263;  Lathrop  v. 
Commercial  Bank,  8  Dana.  (Ky.) 
114,  33  Am.  Dec.  481;  Kennedy  v. 
Baltimore  Insurance  Co.,  3  Har.  & 
J.  (Md.)  367,  6  Am.  Dec.  499;  Pe- 
trie  V.  Wright,  14  Miss.  G47;  Buck- 
ley V.  Briggs.  30  Mo.  452;  Teitig 
V.  Boesman,  12  Mont.  404.  31  Pac. 
Rep.  371;   Brady  v.  City  of  Brook- 


lyn, 1  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  584;  Gates  v. 
Home  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  4  Am.  Law 
Rev.  395;  Thew  v.  Porcelain  Mfg. 
Co.,  5  Rich  (S.  C.)  415;  Fowler  v. 
Bell  (Tex.  1896),  35  S.  W.  Rep. 
822;  Ford  v.  Hill,  92  Wis.  188,  66 
N.  W.  Rep.  115;  Bank  of  Virginia 
V.  Poitiaux,  3  Rand.  (Va.)  136.  In 
Crawford  v.  Longstreet,  43  N.  J. 
Law,  S25,  a  lease  for  years  by  a 
corporation  not  sealed  was  held 
valid. 

15  Baltimore  &  P.  Steamboat  Co. 
V.  McCutcheon,  13  Pa.  St.  13.  See, 
also,  as  sustaining  the  general 
rule  Boston  Tailoring  Co.  v. 
Fisher,  59  111.  App.  400;  Savings 
Bank  of  Cincinnati  v.  Benton,  2 
Met.  (Ky.)  240;  Northern  Cent. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Bastian,  15  Md.  494;  Pot- 
ter V.  New  York  Infant  Asylum, 
44  Hun  (N.  Y.)  367. 


66  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

to  show  he  has  not  the  power.  But  where,  by  tlie  charter  of  the 
corporation,  the  power  to  lease  is  vested  exclusively  in  the  board 
of  directors  a  court  of  equity  may  enjoin  a  lessee  from  entering 
upon  the  possession  of  corjDorate  real  estate  imder  a  lease  made 
by  the  president  of  the  corporation  without  the  authority  and 
consent  of  the  board  of  directors.^*  The  general  manager  of  a 
corporation  will,  unless  it  is  proved  that  the  other  contracting 
parties  had  knowledge  of  the  limitation  of  his  authority  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  authority  to  lease  land  which  is  owned  by  the  cor- 
poration.^^ This  rule  is  based  on  the  principle  of  estoppel.  A 
corporation  which  permits  its  general  manager  or  any  other  offi- 
cial to  deal  with  the  public  as  its  general  agent,  as  for  example, 
in  buying  and  selling  its  real  or  personal  property,  and  in  hir- 
ing and  discharging  its  employes,  will  be  estopped,  as  against 
a  lessee  of  premises  owned  by  the  corporation,  to  assert  that  the 
powers  of  the  general  manager  to  act  for  the  corporation  in  leas- 
ing land  were  restricted  by  orders  emanating  from  its  direc- 
tors.^* In  all  eases  one  who  takes  a  lease  of  land  owned  by  a 
corporation  should  make  diligent  inquiries  as  to  authority  of  the 
agent  with  whom  he  is  dealing.  It  has  been  held  in  one  case 
that  the  agent  or  other  officer  making  the  lease  must  have  ex- 
press authority  to  do  so  and  that  individual  directors  cannot 
bind  a  corporation  by  a  lease.^^  A  lease  may  be  binding  on  a 
corporation  when  made  by  an  agent  without  express  authority 
and  at  the  same  time  the  lease  may  not  be  enforced  by  the  cor- 
poration. So,  a  corporation  cannot  enforce  a  lease  made  by  its 
agent  without  the  authority  of  its  board  of  directors.^" 

§  54.  The  period  for  which  a  corporation  lease  may  run.  At 
the  common  law  a  corporation  owning  the  fee  simple  of  land 
may  lease  it  for  any  term  of  years  however  long.  If  by  statute 
or  at  common  law  a  corporation  has  power  to  lease  its  property 
and  franchises  the  fact  that  the  lease  is  for  so  long  a  time  as  to 
practically  constitute  a  lease  of  the  property  in  fee  does  not,  as 
between  the  parties  of  the  lease,  effect  its  validity.^^    Nor  will 

18  Yellow  Jack^  Silver  Min.  Co.  is  Hartford    Iron    Mfg.    Co.    v. 

V.   Stevenson,   5    Nev.   224.  Cambria  Min.  Co.,  80  Mich.  491. 

17  Singer  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Malean,  105  20  Berlin  v.  Belle  Isle  Scenic  Ry. 
Ala.  316,  16  So.  Rep.  913.  Co.,  12  Det.  Leg.  N.  573,  105  N.  W. 

18  Phillips    &   Buttorff   Mfg.    Co.  Rep.  130. 

V.  Whitney,   109   Ala.   645,  20  So  21  Dickinson      v.      Con.solidated 

Rep.  333.  Traction  Co.,  119  Fed.  Rep.  817. 


CORPORATION  LEASES.  67 

a  court  of  equity  annul  a  lease  for  a  very  long  term  made  by  a 
corporation  on  the  application  of  a  minority  stockholder,  if  the 
action  of  the  corporation  in  making  the  lease  was  approved  by  the 
majority  of  the  stockholders,  unless  it  can  be  sho^vn  that  the 
making  of  the  lease  was  procured  by  fraud,  or  that  its  execution 
was  detrimental  to  the  interest  of  the  corporation.--  The  mere 
fact  of  the  length  of  the  tenn  of  the  lease  will  not  alone  be  con- 
sidered as  ground  for  annulling  the  lease.  The  fact  that  the 
lease  extended  beyond  the  term  of  the  life  of  the  corporation 
does  not  invalidate  it.  The  lease  is  valid  during  the  corporate 
life  of  the  corporation.  If  by  statute  the  corporate  existence  can 
be  extended  the  lease  may  also  be  valid  for  such  period  as  the  life 
of  the  corporation  is  extended.-*  A  lease  to  a  corporation  which 
is  to  extend  beyond  the  period  of  the  existence  of  the  corporation 
as  limited  by  its  charter  is  not  void  for  that  reason.  Such  a  case 
is  analogous  to  that  for  a  time  certain  if  the  lessee  shall  live 
so  long.  Thus  a  lease  to  a  corporation  for  nine  hundred  and 
ninety-nine  years  is  valid  though  the  corporation  is  to  expire  in 
forty  years  particularly  where  it  is  binding  on  the  corporation 
and  its  successors  and  in  the  charter  provisions  are  made  for  a 
renewal  of  the  charter  by  the  state  legislature.-*  By  statutory 
enactment  of  the  Congress  the  charter  of  a  national  bank  may  be 
extended  upon  the  expiration  of  its  corporate  existence  almost 
as  a  matter  of  course.  It  may  readily  be  assumed  from  this  stat- 
ute that  a  national  bank  is  not  limited  in  the  making  of  leases 
of  premises  for  banking  purposes  to  terms  which  shall  be  lim- 
ited by  the  corporate  existence  of  the  bank."^  The  lease  of  prem- 
ises entered  into  by  a  national  bank  as  lessee  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  transacting  its  banking  business  is  not  invalid  though  the 
term  shall  extend  beyond  the  period  of  the  life  of  the  bank  under 
its  charter.  Accordingly  it  has  been  held  that  a  lease  to  a  na- 
tional bank  of  premises  for  a  term  of  ninety-nine  years  is  valid.-* 
The  fact  that  a  lease  of  property  to  a  corporation  runs  to  its 

22  Dickinson  v.  Consolidated  309,  329,  2  C.  C.  A.  174,  10  U.  S. 
Traction  Co.,  119  Fed.  Rep.  871.  App.  98. 

23  Hill  V.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.  R.  25  Weeks  v.  International  Trust 
Co.,  143  N.  Car.  539,  55  S.  E.  854,  Co.,  125  Fed.  Rep.  370,  374,  60  C. 
864;  Tate  v.  Neary,  65  N.  Y.  Supp.  C.  A.  236;  reversing  116  Fed.  Rep. 
40.  898. 

24  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  2c  Brown  v.  Schleier,  118  Fed. 
R.    I.   &   P.  Ry.   Co.,   51    Fed.   Rep-  Rep.  981,  984,  55  C.  C.  A.  475,  478. 


68  LiAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

assignees  or  successors  may  avoid  an  objection  that  its  term  does 
not  expire  until  after  the  existence  of  the  corporation  is  at  an 
end.  And  it  is  not  material  if  the  lease  under  such  circumstances 
is  assignable,  th.at  it  is  assignable  only  with  the  consent  of  the 
lessor.  Thus  a  national  bank  may  validly  lease  a  building  for 
its  own  occupancy  for  a  term  extending  beyond  its  existence 
though  the  lease  is  assignable  only  upon  the  assent  of  the  land- 
lord." 

§  55.  When  leases  are  ultra  vires.  A  lease,  like  any  other 
contract  of  a  corporation,  may  under  certain  circumstances  be 
ultra  vires.  In  determining  whether  a  lease  is  ultra  vires  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  a  corporation  has  no  powers  ex- 
cept such  as  are  expressly  given  to  it  by  and  in  its  charter,  or 
which  are  incident  and  necessary  to  its  corporate  existence.  It 
will  be  presumed  to  possess  such  powers  as  are  necessary  to  en- 
able it  to  carry  into  effect  the  express  powers  conferred  upon  it 
by  its  charter.  Corporations  have  almost  universally  the  ex- 
press power  to  own  real  property  conferred  upon  them  by  char- 
ter; and,  where  this  is  the  case,  the  act  of  the  corporation  in 
leasing  lands  owned  by  it  cannot  be  ultra  vires  as  the  leasing  of 
land  is  an  inseparable  incident  of  their  ownership  and  necessary 
to  the  full  enjoyment  of  such  ownership  for  otherwise  the  o\vner 
will  be  absolutely  prevented,  unless  he  is  able  to  cultivate  or 
otherwise  occupy  the  land  himself,  from  deriving  any  profit 
from  his  ownership.  In  regard  to  corporations  leasing  their 
lands,  the  general  principle  should  always  be  kept  in  mind  by 
the  lessee  that  persons  dealing  with  coi-porations  are  chargeable 
with  notice  of  the  limitations  imposed  upon  them  by  the  terms 
of  their  charters.  The  lessee  ought  to  employ  care  to  see  to  it 
that  the  provisions  of  the  charter,  if  any  there  be,  regulating 
the  leasing  of  the  property  of  the  corporation  with  which  he  is 
dealing  are  being  complied  with.  But  where  he  acts  in  good 
faith  in  entering  into  the  lease,  and  he  is  permitted  to  enter  into 
possession  and  to  pay  rent  to  the  corporation,  it  will  be  estopped 
to  plead  snljsequently  that  it  acted  ultra  vires  in  making  the 
lease.  Accordingly  a  lease  made  by  a  company  is  not  ultra  vires 
merely  because  it  did  not  receive  the  approval  of  the  company  as 
provided  for  by  the  charter.    The  fact  that  the  lessee  under  such 

27  Weeks  v.  International  Trust  Co.,  125  Fed.  Rep.  370,  374;  reversing 
116  Fed.  Rep.  898. 


CORPORATION  LEASES.  69 

a  lease  entered  into  possession  and  began  working  the  land  and 
with  the  permission  of  the  lessor  was  permitted  to  do  so  for  more 
than  three  months  estops  the  lessor.-^  A  corporation  having 
by  its  charter  the  poAver  to  brew,  and  to  sell  beer  and  to  lease 
premises  for  that  purpose  has  power  to  lease  a  saloon  for  the 
purpose  of  selling  its  own  beer.-^  And  the  fact  that  after  taking 
a  lease  itself  of  premises  for  that  purpose  it  sublets  them  to  an- 
other for  the  same  purpose  will  not  avail  the  corporation  to 
plead  ultra  vires.^"  So,  the  lease  of  premises  by  a  company 
which  has  charter  power  to  buy  and  sell  lager  beer  is  not  invalid 
because  a  portion  of  the  premises  is  used  for  saloon  purposes.*^ 
So  also,  a  corporation  which  has  charter  power  "to  carry  on  a 
general  brewing  and  malting  business  and  to  manufacture  and 
sell  soda  water"  may  execute  a  valid  lease  of  premises  "to  be 
occupied  for  a  saloon  and  for  no  other  purpose."  A  lease  for 
saloon  purposes  would  be  by  implication  within  the  power  of  the 
corporation.^^  It  is  usually  held  that  a  corporation  which  pur- 
poses to  act  as  a  lessor  cannot  by  its  action  disable  itself  from 
performing  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  created.  If  the  pur- 
pose of  the  occupation  by  the  tenant  is  similar  to  that  for  which 
the  corporation  which  is  the  lessor  was  incorporated  there  can 
be  no  question  of  the  validity  of  the  lease.  Thus,  a  corporation 
which  has  been  created  to  bore  for  oil  may  lease  its  land  to  a 
person  who  intends  to  take  the  oil  from  it,  upon  a  royalty  to  be 
paid  to  the  lessor.  The  lease  is  not  an  abandonment  by  tlia 
corporation  of  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  created.^^  So  also, 
a  corporation  organized  for  literaiy  and  scientific  purposes  may 
lease  a  portion  of  its  building  for  theatrical  and  similar  pur- 
poses.   A  national  bank  has  implied  power  under  its  charter  to 

2s  Equator  Min.,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Gu-  S3  Starke   v.    J.    M.    Guffey,   Pe- 

anella,  18  Colo.  548,  33  Pac.  Rep.  tr oleum  Co.  (Tex.  1905),  86  S.  W. 

613.  Rep.   1,  affirming   80    S.   W.    Rep. 

29  Welsh  V.  Ferd.  Herm  Brewing  1080. 

Co.,  47  Mo.  App.  608.  s*  Catholic  Institute  v.  Gibbons, 

30  Welsh  V.  Ferd.  Herm  Brewing  7    Dee.    Re.    576,    3    Bull,   581,    af- 
Co.,  47  Mo.  App.  608.  firmed  in  Gibbons  v.  Catholic  In- 

31  Keeley  Brewing  Co.  v.  Mason,  stitute,  7  Dec.  Re.  548,  3  Bull,  887; 
116  111.  App.  603.  Gibbons  v.   Catholic   Institute.   34 

32  Brewer,   etc..   Brewing  Co.   v.  Ohio  St.  289. 
Boddie,  181  111.  622,  55  N.  E.  Rep. 

49. 


70  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

erect  office  buildings  for  its  own  use  and  to  rent  out  offices  in 
them  so  far  as  the  renting-  of  offices  does  not  constitute  an  aban- 
donment of  the  purpose  for  which  the  bank  was  incorporated.^^ 
§  56.  The  effect  of  the  dissolution  of  a  corporation  upon  an 
existing  lease.  In  the  absence  of  express  statutory  provision 
the  dissolution  of  a  corporation  operates  as  an  extinguishment 
of  all  debts  due  from  or  to  it.  In  most  of  the  states  of  the  union 
provision  has  been  made  by  statute  for  the  winding  up  of  cor- 
porations and  saving  the  rights  of  those  who  have  claims  against 
them  at  the  date  of  their  dissolution.  The  United  States  supreme 
court  has  held  that  the  executory  contracts  of  a  corporation  are 
not  extinguished  by  its  dissolution.^^  And  in  the  state  of  New 
York  it  has  been  expressly  held  that  a  lease  to  a  corporation  is 
not  terminated  by  its  dissolution  but  that  the  obligation  to  pay 
the  rent  due  and  which  has  accrued  before  dissolution  may  be 
enforced  against  the  receiver  of  the  corporation.^"  Where  a 
corporation  on  the  petition  of  its  stockholders  is  voluntarily  dis- 
solved and  a  receiver  appointed  for  its  property,  it  comes  under 
the  rule  that,  in  the  case  of  an  executory  contract  containing  con- 
tinuing mutual  obligations,  where  one  party  voluntarily  disables 
himself  from  further  performing  the  contract,  the  injured  party 
may  sue  at  once  for  the  entire  damage  sustained  during  the 
whole  period  caused  by  the  loss  of  the  contract.  The  obligation 
of  the  corporation  to  pay  rent  during  the  term  is  an  executory 
agreement  the  perfoniiance  of  which  in  the  future  may  be  of 
value  to  the  lessor  and  which  the  corporation  by  its  voluntary 
action  disables  itself  from  performing.  The  case  is  stronger  to 
protect  the  rights  of  the  lessor  where  the  receiver  after  his  ap- 
pointment elects,  as  he  may  do,  to  vacate  the  premises  and  to 
abandon  the  lease  as  an  asset  of  the  corporation.  The  breach 
of  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  is  then  complete  and  final  and  the 
lessor  may  at  once  present  his  claim  for  damages  to  the  receiver 

35  Farmer's     Deposit     National  receiver  where  a  corporation  had 

Bank    v.     Western     Pennsylvania  leased  property  and  the  lease  was 

P'uel  Co.,  215  Pa.  St.  115,  64  Atl.  to  run  for  999  years  and  as  long 

Rep.  374.  as  the  lessee  corporation  shall  con- 

sc  Shields  v.  Ohio,  95  U.  S.  319,  tinue  to  exist  as  such  and  be  cap- 

24  Law.  ed.  357.  able  of  exercising  all  its  functions. 

37  People  V.  National  Trust  Co.,  New   York   El.   R.  Co.   v.   Manhat- 

82  N.   Y.   283.     See   fuither  as  to  tan  Ry.  Co.,  C3  How.  Pr.    (.N.  Y.) 

the   effect   of   the   appointment   of  14. 


CORPORATION  LEASES.  71 

and  sue  at  once  if  he  shall  refuse  to  pay.  To  accept  any  oth?r 
view  of  the  matter  would  be  to  confer  an  unlimited  power  upon 
all  corporations  of  repudiating  all  their  executory  covenants  by 
instituting  proceedings  by  the  stockliolders  for  voluntary  dis- 
solution. True  the  damages  for  such  a  breach  of  contract  are 
unliquidated,  indefinite  and  difficult  of  proof,  but  a  right  to 
bring  an  action  at  once  exists  which  is  not  to  be  defeated  by  any 
real  or  apparent  difficulty  in  the  remedy.*^ 

§  57.  Power  of  municipal  corporations  to  grant  leases.  In 
determining  the  existence  of  a  power  in  a  municipal  corporation 
to  grant  leases  of  the  property  which  it  holds  and  owns  as  such, 
a  clear  distinction  must  be  made,  and  is  made  b}^  most  of  the 
cases,  between  property  which  the  corporation  owns  in  a  private 
or  semi-private  capacity,  and  property  which  it  owns  as  a  quasi 
trustee  for  a  public  or  charitable  use.  or  for  some  public  purpose. 
"Where  the  property  is  held  in  trust  for  the  general  use  of  the 
public  the  corporation  cannot,  without  some  express  legislative 
authority  lease  or  alienate  the  same  to  private  persons  or  corpo- 
rations.^® This  would  be  the  case  as  regards  lands  devoted  to 
the  use  of  the  general  public  as  streets  and  highways,  parks, 
wharves,  levees,  bridges  and  the  like.  Thus  a  lease  by  a  city  of 
such  land  for  private  purposes  will  generally  be  invalid  in  the 
absence  of  specific  legislative  authority  in  the  city.*°  Where 
by  the  statute  of  title  of  school-houses  is  vested  in  the  board  of 

38  Kalkhoff  V.  Nelson,  60  Minn.  by  a  city  of  property  in  wliich  it 
284,  288,  62  N.  W.  Rep.  332.  had   an    easement   only    for   levee 

39  Weekes  v.  City  of  Galveston,  purposes  is  void  and  confers  no 
21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  102,  51  S.  W.  rights  of  possession  as  against  the 
Rep.  544,  which  related  to  a  lease  grantor  of  the  easement.  San- 
hy  a  city  of  an  island  in  its  har-  born  v.  Van  Duyne,  90  Minn.  215, 
bor    originally    conveyed    to    the  96  N.  W.  Rep.  41. 

city  by  the  state  for  the  use  and  ^o  See    on    the    general    subject 

benefit  of  the  general  public  and  Alve    v.    Henderson,    16    B.    Mon. 

for    the    advancement    of    naviga-  (Ky.)   131,  168;    Macon  v.  Dasher 

tion    and    fishing.     See    Leaux    v.  (Ga.    1893),    16    S.    E.    Rep.    75; 

City  of  New   York,   87  App.   Div.  Mowry  v.  Providence,  16  R.  I.  422. 

405,  84  N.  Y.  Supp.  514;  Pennsylva-  16  Atl.  Rep.  511;   Warren  Co.  Sup. 

nia  R.  R.  Co.  v.   St.   Louis,  A.   &  v.    Patterson,    56    111.    Ill;    Hoad- 

T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  290;  Ma-  ley's  Admr's  v.  San  Francisco,  124 

rine    T.    Co.   v.   Railroad.    41   Fed.  U.  S.  639;   San  Francisco  v.  Itzell, 

Rep.  643;   Thomas  v.  West  Jersey  80  Cal.  57;   Meriwether  v.  Gai'rett, 

R.  R.  Co.,  101  U.  S.  70;    Mahon  v.  102  U.  S.  472. 
Columbus,  58  Miss.  310.     A  lease 


/2  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

education  or  in  similar  bodies  in  trust  for  the  use  of  public 
schools,  a  lease  of  a  public  school  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on 
therein  a  private  or  select  school^,  is  invalid  as  in  violation  of  the 
trust.  The  use  of  the  school  by  the  lessee  will  be  restrained  at 
the  suit  of  a  taxpayer  though  he  may  not  show  any  special  in- 
jury and  the  mere  fact  that  the  use  to  which  the  lessee  puts  it 
is  of  the  same  character  as  the  public  use  to  which  it  was  re- 
strained, is  not  material,  for  by  putting  it  to  a  private  use  it  is 
evident  that  some  portion  of  the  public  would  be  prevented  from 
availing  themselves  of  an  opportunity  to  receive  education.*^ 
In  respect  to  property  which  the  municipal  corporation  owns 
in  a  quasi  private  capacity  the  power  to  lease  is  much  more  ex- 
tensive and  usually  may  be  exercised  without  express  statutory 
authority.  The  municipal  corporation  may  lease  its  private 
property  whenever  it  is  deemed  expedient  and  profitable  to  do 
so.*^  If  the  lease  be  valid  it  will  not  be  set  aside  for  some  ir- 
regularity in  form  or  in  the  use  of  the  corporate  name.*^  Under 
this  rule  would  come  all  cases  where  the  municipal  corporation 
should  assume  the  power  to  lease  buildings,  such  as  town  halls, 
engine  houses,  sichool-houses  and  similar  structures  owned  and 
used  by  it  in  a  semi-private  capacity.  Thus  it  is  a  very  common 
occurrence,  particularly  in  small  towns,  for  the  municipality  to 
rent  the  town  hall  or  city  hall  to  private  persons  or  to  associa- 
tions and  lodges  as  a  place  in  which  to  give  concerts,  fairs  and 
similar  entertainments.  A  person  who  has  entered  in  possession 
under  such  a  lease  cannot  be  heard  to  plead  its  ultra  vires  char- 
acter as  against  the  city  who  is  the  lessor.**  So  also,  where  a 
building,  which  has  been  devoted  to  public  uses  is  no  longer  used 
for  such  purposes,  it  may  be  repaired  and  rented  to  private  per- 

41  Weir  v.  Day,  35  Ohio  St.  143.  enabled  a  county  to  "sell  or  other- 

42  Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Kim-  wise  dispose  of  its  school  land" 
ball,  114  Cal.  414,  46  Pac.  Rep.  enables  the  county  to  lease  the 
271;  Belchers  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Grain  land  as  well  as  to  sell  it  and  hav- 
Elevator,  101  Mo.  192,  13  S.  W.  ing  leased  it  its  lessees  will  be 
Rep.  822;  Holywood  v.  First  Par-  protected  by  the  courts  in  their 
ish  (Mass.)  78  N.  E.  Rep.  124;  possession.  Falls  County  v.  De 
Taylor  v.  Carondelet,  22  Mo.  105;  Lancey,  73  Tex.  463,  11  S.  W.  Rep. 
Hand  v.  Newton,  92  N.  Y.  88.  492. 

43  New  York  v.  Kent,  5  N.  Y.  44  Bell  v.  Platteville,  70  "Wis. 
Supp.  567;  McDonald  v.  Sfhnei-  139;  Stone  v.  Oconomowoc,  71 
der,  27  Mo.  405;   St.  Louis  v.  Mer-  Wis.  155. 

ton,  6  Mo.  476.     A  statute  which 


COEPORATION  LEASES.  73 

sons  by  the  city.'*"  A  municipal  corporation  may  lease  a  part 
of  a  public  building  for  private  purposes  if  the  portion  leased 
is  not  necessary  for  municipal  use,  and  the  lease  is  valid  and  en- 
forcible  until  some  urgent  public  necessity  arises  for  the  use  of 
the  land  leased  for  its  original  purposes.  The  use,  however,  must 
be  a  public  and  municipal  use  and  the  susequent  lease  of  the 
same  land  to  another  person  for  a  private  use,  does  not  give 
the  latter  any  right  to  occupation  or  to  deprive  the  first  lessee 
of  his  possession  unless  the  second  lessee  shall  see  fit  to  compen- 
sate him.  And  upon  general  principles  under  such  circumstances 
the  second  lessee  has  no  action  against  the  city  for  a  failure  to 
deliver  possession  where  he  Imows  or  can  ascertain  by  reasonable 
inquiries  that  the  land  was  in  the  possession  of  another  person 
as  lessee/® 

§  58.  A  municipal  corporation  as  a  tenant.  Broadly  speak- 
ing a  municipal  corporation  has  the  right  to  lease  a  building  for 
its  use  for  city  purposes,  whenever  the  public  necessities  require 
it  and  it  is  deemed  more  expedient  to  lease  than  to  buy.'*^ 
This  is  so  even  in  the  absence  of  express  statutory  authorization 
as  it  is  a  necessary  incident  to  municipal  government  and  essen- 
tion  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  municipal  purposes.  If  the 
charter  limits  the  length  of  the  term,  or  prescribes  the  charac- 
ter of  the  buildings  which  may  be  hired  or  the  formalities  with 
which  the  lease  must  be  executed  it  must  be  consulted  and  its 
terms  followed.  But  in  the  absence  of  such  statutory  require- 
ments the  length  of  the  term  for  which  the  city  may  legally  con- 
tract to  hire  the  building  will  depend  upon  all  the  circum- 
stances among  which  may  be  mentioned  the  character  of  the 
building  demised,  its  condition  when  the  lease  is  executed,  the 
purpose  for  which  it  is  to  be  used  by  the  corporation,  the  diffi- 
culty in  securing  other  property,  the  prospects  as  to  other  similar 
buildings  being  erected,  the  financial  condition  of  the  city  and 
other  relevant  facts.*^  A  distinction  is  made  between  those  pow- 
ers of  the  corporation  which  are  public  and  legislative  and  those 
which  are  of  a  purely  business  and  semi-private  nature.     The 

<5  Bates  V.   Bassett,   60  Vt   530.  <7  Davies  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  XeTV 

reunion   Ry.   Co.  v.   Chickasaw       York,  83  N.  Y.  207. 

Cooperage  Co.    (Tenn.),  95  S.  W.  48  City     of     Michigan     City     v. 

Rep,  171.  Leeds.  24  Ind.  App.  271,  55  N.  B. 

Rep.  799, 


74  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

power  to  execute  a  lease  is  merely  a  power  to  do  a  species  of 
municipal  business  essential  to  the  corporation's  existence.  And 
if  the  power  to  execute  a  lease  is  not  required  to  be  evidenced  in 
a  particular  way  the  municipal  corporation  may  be  bound  by 
an  implied  hiring  arising  from  its  use  and  occupation  of  prem- 
ises to  the  same  extent  as  an  individual.*^  If  tlie  liability  of  the 
city  to  pay  rent  is,  by  the  express  tenns  of  the  lease  made  to 
depend  upon  the  making  of  an  appropriation  to  pay  it  by  the 
city  council,  the  city  is  not  liable  in  an  action  for  the  rent  if 
no  appropriation  has  been  made  though  the  city  has  power  to 
make  the  appropriation  and,  having  received  the  benefit  of  the 
use  and  occupation  of  the  premises,  morally  ought  to  have  done 
gQ  GO  Jq  Texas  the  courts  have  refused  to  apply  the  well  recog- 
nized rule  that  a  tenant  holding  over  after  the  expiration  of  his 
term  will  by  implication  of  law  be  regarded  as  agreeing  at  the 
option  of  the  landlord  to  hold  for  another  year  upon  the  terms. 
of  his  prior  lease  to  municipal  corporations.  Hence,  where  a 
city  rented  premises  for  one  year,  with  the  right  of  a  renewal ; 
and  the  officers  of  the  city  occupied  the  premises  and  rent  was. 
paid  for  several  years,  no  agreement  for  the  creation  of  a  tenant 
from  year  to  year  will  be  implied  from  holding  over.  The  law 
will  not  imply  a  contract  of  lease  from  the  fact  that  city  offi- 
cials, not  by  law  authorized  to  execute  a  lease,  have  continued 
in  the  occupation  of  the  demised  premises  after  a  valid  lease  for 
the  same  has  expired.  Where  the  municipal  charter  or  other 
statute  expressly  prescribes  in  what  manner  and  by  what  board 
or  officials  municipal  contracts  can  be  validly  executed  by  the 
city,  the  municipal  corporation  cannot  become  bound  by  a  lease 
which  is  not  executed  by  the  persons,  or  in  the  manner  prescribed. 
And,  although  a  contract  may  in  a  sense  be  implied  on  tlie  part 
of  the  city  to  do  justice  where  it  has  received  the  benefit  of  a 
contract  which,  under  the  statute,  it  had  the  power  to  make,  but 
which  was  not  executed  in  the  statutory  mode,  the  corporation 
cannot  be  held  under  an  implied  contract,  where  the  contract  is 
wholly  exeeutory.°^  It  has  been  held  that  a  city  under  a  charter 
providing  that  it  shall  have  a  general  power  of  municipal  cor- 

<»  City     of     Michigan     City     v.  City  of  Bridgeport,  75  Conn.  495, 

Leed,  24   Ind.  App.  271,  55  N.  E.  04  All.  Rep.  196. 
Rep.  799.  f^i  City  of  San  Antonio  v.  French,. 

BO  Marsh,  Merwin  &  Lemmon  v.  80  Tex.  575,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  440. 


CORPORATION  LEASES.  ii> 

poration  at  common  law,  and  expressly  authorizing  it  to  lease 
real  estate  for  the  convenience  of  the  inhabitants  has  power  to 
lease  private  land  for  temporary  use  as  a  public  street  or  high- 
way, where  the  convenience  of  the  inhabitants  requires  it.  For, 
though  it  is  true  that  ordinarily  the  fee  simple  title  to  streets 
and  public  highways  is  vested  in  the  municipal  corporation,  yet 
it  is  conceivable  that  circumstances  may  arise  calling  for  a  tem- 
porary'- use  only  of  private  grounds  for  public  traffic.  Thus,  it 
may  be  necessaiy  for  the  city  to  secure  a  temporary  right  of 
way  around  some  temporary  obstruction  in  a  street  or  to  open 
a  temporary  street  betAveen  two  points  while  a  permanent  street 
is  being  built  or  repaired,  particularly  when  the  very  dilatory 
process  of  taking  land  by  right  of  eminent  domain  is  consid- 
ered. In  the  case  of  a  lease  under  such  circumstances,  the  only 
right  the  public  acquires,  is  a  right  to  use  the  premises  tempo- 
rarily as  a  street.  AVhen  the  term  is  at  an  end,  the  landlord  may 
resume  possession  and  after  that  date,  his  right  becomes  abso- 
lute as  against  the  public.  The  premises  thus  used  temporarily, 
never  become  public,  but  always  remain  private  property,  so 
that  the  principles  which  apply  to  ordinary  city  land  do  not 
apply  here,  and  if  the  city  at  the  expiration  of  the  term  fails  to 
quit,  and  deliver  up  the  possession,  but  continues  to  use  it  for 
public  purposes,  the  landlord  may  at  his  option,  hold  the  city  as 
a  tenant  from  year  to  year  upon  the  terms  of  the  lease._^^  Unless 
it  is  expressly  empowered  to  do  so  by  its  charter,  a  municipal 
corporation  cannot  lease  land  from  a  private  owner  for  the  pur- 
pose of  carrying  on  a  park  or  pleasure  ground  as  a  private  enter- 
prise for  profit  to  be  derived  from  subletting  the  land  or  privi- 
leges in  the  park  or  from  payments  by  the  public  for  admis- 
sions. Neither  a  charter  power  to  hold  real  estate  nor  the  power 
to  make  such  necessary  regulations  as  may  be  for  the  health, 
benefit  or  general  welfare  of  the  public,  authorizes  a  municipal 
corporation  to  hire  land  for  the  purpose  of  engaging  in  private 
business.  The  rule  would  be  different  if  the  pui-pose  for  which 
the  land  was  leased  were  a  public  one,  such  as  the  maintenance 
of  a  public  park,  a  public  wharf,  or  hospital  or  the  opening  of 
a  street  or  an  avenue  for  public  travel  or  traffic.  But  the  leasing 
of  land  for  private  business  purposes  is  ultra  vires,  and  will  be 

62  Oilman  v.  Milwaukee,  31  Wis.  563. 


76  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AJOT)  TENANT. 

restrained  by  a  court  of  equity  upon  the  application  of  a  tax- 
payer, and  if  such  a  lease  is  executed  it  will  neither  be  enforced 
on  the  application  of  the  lessee,  nor  can  the  lessor  collect  rent 
for  its  occupation  by  the  municipal  corporation.^^ 

§  59,  Ultra  vires  leases  by  municipal  corporations.  The 
general  principles  of  the  doctrine  of  contracts  ultra  vires,  so  far 
as  it  relates  to  and  regulates  the  contracts  of  municipal  cor- 
porations, are  applicable  to  their  leases.  The  authority  of  the 
officers  of  a  municipal  corporation  to  make  leases  is  limited  to 
such  leases  as  are  either  expressly  or  by  implication  within  the 
purposes  for  which  the  corporation  was  created  and  these  pur- 
poses are  customarily  such  as  are  specified  in  the  charter  or  other 
statute  under  which  the  corporation  has  been  incorporated. 
Municipal  officers  are  held  strictly  within  the  scope  of  the  pow- 
ers and  authority  conferred  upon  them  by  statute,  though  of 
course  such  powers  may  be  implied  as  well  as  express,  and  hence, 
it  follows  that  no  municipal  officer  can  bind  the  municipal  cor- 
poration either  as  lessor  or  lessee  unless  the  lease  be  such  a 
one  as  he  has  statutory  authority  to  make.  Persons  dealing  in 
contractual  relations  with  municipalities  are  presumed  to  know 
the  powers  and  authority  under  the  statute  of  the  officers  with 
whom  they  deal;  and,  though  this  is  simply  a  practical  applica- 
tion of  the  rather  far  fetched  fiction  that  every  one  is  presumed 
to  know  the  law,  yet  the  principle  is  so  well  esta,blished  and  so 
well  recognized  by  the  courts  that  it  behooves  every  intending 
lessee  or  lessor  of  a  municipal  corporation,  not  only  to  inform 
himself  of  the  general  characteristics  of  its  charter  but  also  of 
the  specific  powers,  authorities  and  duties  of  the  officer  or  offi- 
cial board  with  whom  he  is  dealing.  "Whether  or  not  a  given 
lease  is  ultra  vires  can  usually  be  determined  only  upon  a  careful 
examination  of  the  municipal  charter  and  collateral  legisla- 
tion, affecting  and  controlling  the  powers  of  municipal  coi-po- 
rations  in  general,  or  of  the  particular  city  or  town  in  question. 
There  is,  however,  a  wide  distinction  as  to  their  enforcement  be- 
tween contracts  which  are  illegal  because  beyond  the  corporate 
powers  or  because  contrary  to  public  policy,  and  those  which 
are  within  the  corporate  powers  but  which  have  been  made  by  an 
officer  not  possessing  the  power  to  execute  them.    The  unauthor- 

03  Bloomsburg  Land  Imp.  Co.  v.  Borough  of  Bloomsburg,  215  Pa.  St. 
452,  64  Atl.  Rep.  602. 


CORPORATION   LEASES.  77 

ized  act  of  the  municipal  official  in  executing  the  contract  with- 
out the  authority  to  do  so  may  be  ratified,  either  by  words  or 
conduct  on  the  part  of  the  city,  if  it  has  the  charter  power  to 
make  such  a  contract.  But  a  contract  ultra  vires  cannot  be  rati- 
fied, unless  the  power  to  do  so  is  expressly  conferred  by  the 
legislature.  Thus,  where  a  municipal  official  hires  or  rents  city 
property  for  a  use  or  purpose  which  is  consistent  and  compat- 
able  with  the  purposes  of  the  charter,  his  action  may  be  ratified 
by  the  action  of  the  city  in  accepting  or  delivering  possession, 
and  paying  or  receiving  rent  according  to  the  circumstances 
whether  the  city  is  the  landlord  or  the  tenant.  But  a  lease  ab- 
solutely ultra  vires  may  be  revoked  by  the  city  and  the  lessee 
cannot  recover  any  damages  he  may  have  sustained  thereby, 
though,  if  the  consideration  which  has  been  received  by  the  city 
has  not  been  restored  a  court  of  equity  will  order  that  this  shall 
be  done  before  relieving  the  city  from  its  obligation  upon  the 
lease."* 

§  60.  Leases  of  park  grounds  by  municipal  corporation.  In 
the  absence  of  an  express  statutory  prohibition  it  is  generally 
admitted  that  a  municipal  corporation  owning  and  controlling 
grounds  which  are  dedicated  to,  and  used  for  a  public  park,  may 
lease  such  grounds  to  private  persons  to  be  used  by  them  for 
purposes  which  are  germane  to  the  general  purpose  for  which 
the  park  was  established.  The  principal  and  indeed  the  sole 
purpose  of  the  establishment  of  public  parks  is  to  provide  amuse- 
ment and  recreation  for  the  general  public  and  to  give  an  op- 
portunity to  those  who  frequent  them  to  enjoy  the  fresh  air  and 
quiet  which  they  can  find  in  no  other  place  in  the  crowded  city. 
As  subsidiary  purposes  may  be  mentioned  the  opportunity  to 
enjoy  the  beauties  and  delights  of  natural  scenery  as  they  have 
been  enhanced  by  the  skill  and  industry  of  the  landscape  gar- 
dener and  to  visit  museums  and  art  galleries  which  may  be  lo- 
cated within  the  confines  of  the  parks.  In  making  leases  the 
city  authorities  must  use  care  to  secure  such  tenants  only  who 
will  not  by  the  use  which  they  make  of  the  ground  leased  to  them 
seriously  interfere  with  the  purposes  for  which  the  public  parks 

B4  An    ultra    vires    lease,     exe-  lessee  for  the  sum  he  paid  for  it. 

cuted  by  a  city  and  afterward  re-  Weekes  v.  Galveston,  21  Tex.  Civ, 

voked  by  it.  does  not  render  the  App.  102,  51  S.  W.  Rep.  544. 
city  liable  to  an  assignee  of  the 


78  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

exist.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  a  lease  of  park  lands  for  such 
a  use  as  would  materially  prevent  the  free,  uninterrupted  and 
convenient  use  of  the  park  by  the  public  generally  or  by  any 
numerous  class  of  persons  would  be  held  by  the  court  to  be  an 
unwarranted  abuse  of  the  municipal  discretion.  Leases  of  park 
land  for  hotel  purposes  have  generally  been  sustained. ^^  If  the 
hotel  is  conducted  in  a  proper  manner  it  cannot  fail  to  add  to 
the  advantages  which  the  public  will  derive  from  the  use  of  the 
park.  For  if  it  is  proper  for  the  city  to  provide  recreation  and 
amusement  for  the  public  it  is  certainly  proper  to  provide  for 
the  rest  and  refreshmeoits  of  those  who  resort  to  the  parks  for 
what  the  city  has  provided  for  them.  And  inasmuch  as  it  is 
usually  inexpedient  if  not  illegal  for  a  city  to  engage  in  hotel 
keeping,  it  is  surely  in  its  discretion  for  it  to  delegate  this  work 
to  others  under  proper  restrictions.  By  a  long  established  cus- 
tom refreshments  have  been  for  years  served  to  visitors  to  the 
great  parks  of  our  country,  so  that  it  is  too  late  now  for  a  valid 
objection  to  be  raised  on  the  grounds  of  the  diversion  of  the  parks 
from  their  primary  purpose  by  a  lease  of  a  portion  of  them  for 
use  as  a  hotel  or  restaurant.^*'  In  the  absence  of  an  express  stat- 
utory prohibition,  a  municipal  corporation,  or  its  park  depart- 
ment may  lease  a  building  on  park  lands  for  restaurant  pur- 
poses to  a  private  party.  Such  a  building  properly  conducted 
as  a  restaurant  will  be  of  great  public  service  to  the  frequenters 
of  the  park,  add  to  its  attractions,  and  conduce  to  the  further- 
ance of  the  purposes  for  which  parks  are  maintained,  which  is 
the  recreation  and  amusement  of  the  public.  The  municipal 
authorities  cannot  give  a  lease  for  an  unreasonable  term,  or  ab- 
dicate the  general  control  which  they  must  exercise  under  their 
charter  powers  over  the  city  property.  And  if  the  effect  of  the 
lease  is  to  prevent  the  park  officials  from  performing  any  of  the 
duties  which  they  owe  to  the  public,  of  the  operation  of  the  res- 
taurant or  other  buildings  which  has  been  leased  interferes  ma- 

88  Harter   v.    City   of   San    .Tose,  lie  park  for  trainine;  and  rnnnin.^ 

141  Cal.  659,  75  Pac.  Rep,  344,  346;  race  horses  is  not  necessarily  ul- 

Gushee  v.   City  of  New  York,   58  tra    vires.     But   the    absolute    ex- 

N.  Y.  Supp.  967;    State  ex  rel.  At-  elusion    of    the    public    from    the 

torney     General     v.     Schweickart,  park  will  n,ot  bo  permitted.     Bry- 

109  Mo.  346,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  47.  ant  v.  Logan,  56  W.  Va.  141,  49  S. 

6«  A  lease  of  a  portion  of  a  pub-  E.  Rep.  21, 


CORPORATION  LEASES.  79 

terially  with  the  use  of  the  park  by  the  public,  or  tends  to  dimin- 
ish its  utility  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  has  been  created  and 
for  which  it  is  supposed  to  be  maintained,  a  court  of  equity  will 
interfere  and  set  aside  the  lease  upon  the  instance  and  applica- 
tion of  a  resident  taxpayer  or  other  person  having  a  legal  capac- 
ity to  sue.  Thus  a  lease  must  always  be  subject  to  the  power 
of  the  park  officials  to  make  such  rules  and  regulations  for  the 
necessary  government  of  the  park  as  they  may  be  authorized  and 
commanded  to  mal^e  by  the  statute.  On  the  other  hand  as  soon 
as  the  lease  is  made  and  the  lessee  enters  he  is  protected  by  the 
court  from  capricious  and  unnecessary  interference  by  the  park 
officials.^'^ 

67  Gushee  v.  City  of  New  York,      ing  26  Misc.   Rep.   287,   56   N.   Y. 
5,8  N.  Y.  Supp.  967,  42  App.  Div.       Supp.  1002. 
37,  92  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  967;   affirm- 


CHAPTER  III. 

LEASES  BY  JOINT  OWNERS. 

§  81.  Leases  by  Joint  tenants  and  tenants  in  common  distinguished. 

62.  Tenancy  in  common. 

63.  The  relation  of  landlord  and  tenants  among  tenants  in  common. 

64.  Tenants  in  common  as  lessors. 

65.  Actions  by  tenants  in  common  to  recover  rent. 

66.  Effect  of  a  lease  by  joint  owners. 

67.  The  right  of  joint  tenants  to  the  rent. 

68.  The  liability  of  joint  lessees  for  rent. 

69.  The  liability  for  rent  of  co-partners  in  business. 

§  61.  Leases  by  joint  tenants  and  tenants  in  common  dis- 
tinguished. An  important  distinction  exists  as  to  the  execu- 
tion and  operation  of  leases  between  tliose  made  by  joint  tenants 
and  those  made  by  tenants  in  common.  If  all  the  joint  tenants 
unite  in  the  execution  of  a  lease  it  is  regarded  in  law  as  but  one 
lease  made  by  one  lessor.  Where  several  tenants  in  common  join 
in  the  execution  of  a  lease  it  is  regarded  as  several  leases  of 
their  separate  and  respective  shares.^  While  the  joint  owner- 
ship lasts  joint  tenants  taken  together  constitute  but  one  tenant 
of  the  land  and  therefore  they  are  said  to  be  seized  per  tout. 
For  purposes  of  alienating  the  land  each  is  seized  per  my  and  for 
this  reason  all  the  joint  tenants  are  said  to  be  seized  per  my  et 
per  tout.  This  being  the  case  either  of  the  joint  tenants  may 
make  a  lease  of  the  whole  property  though  it  will  not  bind  the 
others  unless  they  shall  assent  thereto.  In  other  words  a  lease 
of  the  property  to  be  binding  on  all  the  joint  tenants  must  eitlier 
be  executed  or  subsequently  ratified  by  all  of  them.^ 

1  Comyn's  Digest,  Title,  Estates  136,  162.  A  lease  by  one  of  sev- 
(G)  6;  see  Jurdain  v.  Steere,  Cro.  eral  joint  tenants  "to  the  extent 
jac.  83.  of  his  interest"   carries  not  only 

2  Kingsland  v.  Ryckman  5  Daly  an  undisputed  interest  owned  by 
(N.  Y.)  13;  Co.  Litt.  168&;  Rolle's  him,  but  also  an  interest  in  the 
Abr.  488;  Morris  v.  Barry,  Wils.  premises  claimed  by  him  but 
1;    Bond    V.    Cartwright,    1   Vent.  which   is   in   litigation   when   the 


LEASES  TO  JOINT  OWNERS.  81 

§  62,  Tenancy  in  common.  This  species  of  tenancy  differs 
from  a  joint  tenancy  in  tliat  in  the  case  of  a  tenancy  in  common 
there  need  be  no  nnity  except  a  unity  of  possession.  One  of  the 
tenants  in  common  may  hold  the  fee  and  another  a  life  estate  or 
a  term  for  years.  As  to  the  quantity  of  land  one  may  own  the 
half  and  several  others  may  own  the  other  half,  either  equally 
or  unequally  among  them.^  Neither  of  the  several  tenants  in 
common  is  entitled  to  the  exclusive  possession  of  all  the  land 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  others  nor,  until  partition  shall  have 
been  made,  to  possession  of  a  particular  part  of  it.  Hence  inas- 
much as  he  cannot  exclude  his  co-tenants  by  his  own  occupa- 
tion of  the  land  he  is  unable  without  their  consent  or  their 
ratification  to  lease  either  all  or  any  particular  portion  of  the 
land  in  such  a  way  that  his  lessee  shall  have  the  right  to  an. 
exclusive  possession  of  what  the  lessor  has  presumed  to  demise 
to  him.  A  lessee  of  one  tenant  by  a  lease  in  which  the  others 
have  not  joined  is  as  to  them  a  trespasser  so  far  as  he  occupies 
any  portion  of  the  land  owned  in  common  and  liable  to  an  ac- 
tion quare  clansum  fregit.^  The  co-tenant  in  common  cannot, 
before  partition,  lease  a  distinct  portion  of  the  estate  by  metes 
and  bounds  unless  with  the  assent  of  his  co-tenant  but  he  may  do 
so  after  a  partition  even  though  the  partition  shall  have  been 
made  by  parol.^  Though  as  to  the  lessor's  co-tenant,  a  lessee  of 
one  tenant  in  common  is  a  trespasser,  yet,  as  to  strangers,  he  is 
entitled  to  the  occupation  and  possession  of  what  he  has  been  de- 
mised and  may  maintain  his  possession  by  the  same  means  as 
though  his  lea,se  had  been  executed  by  all  the  tenants  in  common.' 
As  between  him  and  his  lessor  the  same  rules  are  applicable  that 
regulate  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  generally.  The  lessee 
•cannot  deny  the  title  of  his  lessor  nor  the  title  of  the  co-tenants  of 
his  lessor  where  all  the  tenants  in  common  derive  their  title  from 
the  same  source.  On  the  other  hand  his  lessor  is  bound  to  se- 
cure him  in  his  possession  and  if  he  is  ousted  by  the  act  of  the 
co-tenants  of  his  lessor  it  is  an  eviction  as  to  his  lessor  and  stops 
the  running  of  rent  as  to  him. 

lease  is  signed  but  wtiich  he  sub-          b  Wood  v.      leet.  36  N.  T.  499, 

sequently  acquires.     White  v.  Stu-       509;    Pope  v.  Whitehead,  68  N.  C. 

art,  76  Va.  546.  101;    Whaley  v.  Dan^er.  28  Ch.  & 

8  2  BlacliStone's  Com.  192.  Cef.  267. 

^Erwin  v.  Olmsted,  7  Cow.  (N.           e  Collier  v.  Corbett,  15  Cal.  183; 

Y.)  227.  Hart  v.  Robinson,  21  Cal.  346. 
6 


82  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  xVND  TENANT. 

§  63.  The  relation  of  landlord  and  tenants  among  tenanxs 
in  common.  It  is  permissilbe  for  two  or  more  tenants  in  com- 
mon to  agree  between  or  among-  themselves  by  an  express  lease 
that  one  or  more  of  them  shall  have  the  exclusive  use,  control 
and  possession  of  the  premises,  paying  rent  for  the  same  to  the 
others.  If  such  an  agreement  is  made  the  relationship  of  land- 
lord and  tenant  exists  between  those  who  are  in  possession  pay- 
ing rent  and  those  who  are  out  of  possession  receiving  it.  But 
where  there  is  no  such  express  agreement  the  relation  of  -land- 
lord and  tenant  does  not  exist  between  one  tenant  in  common 
in  actual  possession  and  the  others.'^  It  is  entirely  competent 
for  one  tenant  in  common  to  make  a  lease  of  his  undivided  share 
to  his  co-tenant  and  to  contract  with  him  for  that  purpose.*  Un- 
doubtedly they  may  create  among  or  between  themselves  the  re- 
lationship of  landlord  and  tenant  by  an  express  oral  or  written 
agreement.®  Of  course  such  a  contract  can  exist  only  by  the 
mutual  intention  and  assent  of  the  tenants  in  common.  There 
must  be  an  express  contract  of  lease  to  create  the  relationship 
of  landlord  and  tenant.  The  mere  fact  that  one  of  two  or  more 
tenants  in  common  is  permitted  the  undivided  occupation  and 
control  of  the  entire  property  and  agrees  to  pay  his  co-tenants 
a  reasonable  compensation  for  the  use  of  the  whole  property  or 
for  the  use  of  his  undivided  share,  does  not  create  the  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant.  Nor  would  this  relation  be  created  if 
instead  of  the  parties  agreeing  that  one  tenant  in  common  should 
pay  the  other  what  the  use  of  the  shares  of  the  others  were  rea- 
sonably worth  they  should  fix  and  agree  upon  the  precise  sum 
of  money  which  one  tenant  should  pay  the  others  for  the  use  of 
the  property.  Nor  would  the  use  of  the  word  "rent"  to  signify 
a  share  of  the  monthly  income  thus  paid  establish  the  existence 
of  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant.^"  For  a  tenant  in  com- 
mon in  the  possession  of  property  is  not  liable  to  his  co-tenants 
for  rent  or  for  use  and  occupation  unless  there  was  an  express 
promise  to  pay  rent  or  unless  the  tenant  in  possession  excludes 

7  Bird  V.  Earle,  15  Fla.  447;  Cor-  »  Lsigh  v.  Dickson,  L.  R.  12  Q. 
rigan  v.  Riley,  26  N.  J.  Law,  79,       B.  Div.  194. 

783.  10  Smitli   v.   Smitli,   98   Me.   597, 

8  Smith  V.  Smith,  98  Me.  597,  57  601,  57  Atl.  Rep.  999.  See,  also, 
Atl.  Rep.  997..  Williamson   v.   Jones,   43    W.   Va. 

562,  27  S.  E.  Rep.  411. 


LEASES  TO  JOINT  OWNERS.  83 

his  co-tenant  from  possession  in  which  event  he  must  account 
for  the  value  of  the  property.^^  The  rule  is  not  altered  by  the 
fact  that  if  the  tenant  in  common  had  not  occupied  the  land  no 
rent  V70uld  have  been  received  for  it.^^  A  tenant  in  common 
though  he  does  not  exclude  his  co-tenant  will  be  liable  to  account 
for  the  rent  if  he  shall  rent  the  premises  to  another.^^  "Where  a 
tenant  in  common  goes  into  possession  of  the  whole  of  the  prem- 
ises under  a  lease  thereof  signed  by  his  co-tenant  as  lessor  and 
holds  over  after  the  expiration  of  the  term  he  will  be  presumed 
to  be  holding  over  under  the  lease  and  not  by  virtue  of  his  title 
as  a  tenant  in  common.  The  ordinary  rule  as  to  tenants  holding 
over  will  then  be  applicable  and  the  lessor  may  treat  his  co-ten- 
ant as  a  trespasser  or  as  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  and  collect 
rent  according  to  the  terms  of  the  lease  which  has  expired.  This 
rule,  however,  is  confined  to  cases  where  the  co-tenant  expressly 
leases  the  whole  premises  and  occupies  them  solely  by  virtue  of 
the  terms  of  the  lease  for  if  he  claims  to  be  in  possession  under 
his  own  title  a  different  rule  is  invoked.^*  Married  women  who 
are  tenants  in  common  owning  their  share  as  separate  property, 
may  lease  to  their  co-tenants  and  may  thereafter,  without  join- 
ing their  husbands  as  parties  plaintiff,  sue  for  rent  due.^°    If  the 

11  Terrell     v.     Cunningliam,     70  ser  v.  Dresser,  40   Barb.    (N.  Y.) 

Ala.  100;  Fielder  v.  Chiles,  73  Ala.  300;    Wilcox  v.   Wilcox,   48   Barb. 

567;    Hamby  v.  Wall,  48  Ark.  135,  (N.  Y.)  327,  329. 

2  S.  W.  Rep.  705,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  12  Stephens     v.     Taylor      (Tex. 

218;  Belknap  v.  Belknap,  77  Iowa,  1896),  36  S.  W.  Rep.  1083. 

71,  73,  41  N.  W.  Rep.  568;    Israel  is  Ormer   v.    Harley,    102    Iowa, 

V.  Israel,  30  Md.  120,  125,  96  Am.  150,  71  N.  W.  Rep.  241;   McCaw  v. 

Dec.   571;    Sargent  v.  Parsons,  12  Barker,  115  Ala.  543,  22  So.  Rep. 

Mass.  149;  Holmes  v.  Williams,  16  131,  132. 

Minn.  164;  Izard  v.  Bodine,  11  N.  i*  Valentine  v.  Healey,  86  Hun 
J.  Eq.  403,  69  Am.  Dec.  595;  Bucke-  (N.  Y.)  259,  261;  O'Connor  v.  De- 
lew  V.  Snedeker,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  82;  laney,  53  Minn.  247,  249,  54 
Valentine  v.  Healey,  86  Hun,  259,  N.  W.  Rep.  1108,  39  Am.  St.  Rep. 
33  N.  Y.  Supp.  246,  247;  Gaboon  601.  An  agreement  between  ten- 
V.  Kinen,  42  Ohio  St.  190;  Ward  ants  in  common,  as  to  a  mode  of 
V.  Ward,  40  W.  Va.  611.  21  S.  E.  enjoying  the  property  pending  a 
Rep.  746,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  911,  29  L.  controversy  as  to  its  possession 
R.  A.  449;  Hixon  v.  Bridges  (Ky.  does  not  necessarily  create  the 
1897),  38  S.  W.  Rep  1046;  Carver  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant 
V.  Hoffman,  109  Ind.  54?,  10  N,  E.  between  them.  Corrigan  v.  Riley, 
Rep.  567;  Mumford  v.  Brown,  1  26  N.  J.  L.  79. 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  53;  IMcKay  v.  Mum-  is  Gaboon  v,  Kinin,  42  Ohio  St. 
ford,  10  Wend.   (X.  Y.)  351;    Ores-  190. 


84  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  is  established  or  shown  to 
exist  between  the  tenant  in  common  who  is  in  occupation  and 
those  who  are  not  in  possession,  the  rent  stipulated  for  in  the 
instrument  of  letting  may  be  collected  by  an  action,^®  and  the 
parties  to  the  lease,  though  they  are  tenants  in  common  of  the 
reversion,  have  the  ordinary  rights  and  obligations  of  landlord 
and  tenant  to  one  another.  Thus  the  tenant  in  common  who  is 
the  landlord  has  a  lien  upon  the  goods  of  the  tenant  in  common 
who  is  a  lessee  for  the  rent  of  the  premises.^''  "Where  one  tenant 
in  common  has  by  a  lease  demised  his  interest  to  his  co-tenant 
if  the  tenant  in  common,  who  was  the  lessee,  continues  in  the 
occupation  as  a  tenant  at  sufferance  after  the  expiration  of  the 
lease  he  will  be  liable  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation  at 
the  suit  of  his  co-tenant/® 

§  64.  Tenants  in  common  as  lessors.  It  is  very  well  settled 
that  one  tenant  in  common  cannot  make  a  valid  lease  of  the 
entire  premises,  which  shall  bind  his  co-tenants.^^  For  example, 
an  agreement  by  one  of  several  tenants  in  common  allowing  a 
stranger  to  erect  sign  boards  on  the  land  owned  in  common,  does 
not  bind  his  co-tenants.-"  A  lease  of  land  owned  by  several  per- 
sons as  tenants  in  common  is  valid  as  to  all  of  them  only  when 
all  join  in  its  execution  or  subsequently  ratify  it.  Such  a  lease 
is  not  binding  upon  those  of  the  tenants  in  common  who  neither 
join  in  it  nor  ratify  it.  The  lease  is  not,  however,  absolutely 
void  as  it  is  voidable  merely  by  those  who  did  not  consent  to  its 
execution.2^     The  tenants  in  common  who   have  not  actually 

i«  Elliott  V.  Knight,  64  111.  App,  McCorniick,  132  111.  104,  22  N.  E. 

87.  Rep.    511;    Edmonds   v.   Mounsey, 

17  Grabfelder  v.  Gazetti  (Tex.),  15  Ind.  App.  399,  44  N.  E.  Rep.  196; 
26  S.  W.  Rep.  436.  Benoist    v.    Rothschild.    145    Mo. 

18  Leigh  V.  Dickesen,  54  L.  J.  Q.  399,  46  S.  W.  Rep.  1081;  Mussey 
B.  18,  15  Q.  B.  D.  60,  52  L.  T.  790,  v.  Holt,  24  N.  H.  248,  55  Am.  Dec. 
33  W.  R.  538.  234;    Hayden  v.  Patterson,  51  Pa. 

10  Lee  V.  Livingston,  143  Mich.  St.  261;  Jackson  v.  O'Rorke  (Neb. 

203,  206,  106  N.  W.  Rep.  713.  1904),  98   N.  W.  Rep.  10G,S;    Mar- 

ao  Walker  v.  Marion,  143  Mich.  tens  v.  O'Connor,  101  Wis.  18,  76 

27,  106  N.  W.  Rep.  400;  Moreland  N.  W.  Rep.  774.     Tenants  in  com- 

V.   Strong,   115  Mich.   211.  men  of  land  may  make  a   joint 

21  De   Witt   V.    Harvey,   4   Gray  lease.     Massie    v.    Long,    2    Ohio, 

(Mass.)    486,   49;    Cunningham   v.  287,  15  Am.  Dec.  547;  Doe  v.  Flem- 

Pattee,  99  Mass.  248;    Traintor  v.  ing,  2  Ohio,  501. 
Cole,  120  Mass.  162,  164;  Harms  v. 


LEASES  TO  JOINT  OWNERS.  85 

joined  in  the  lease  may  subsequently  ratify  it  expressly  or  by 
necessary  implication.  The  acceptance  of  rent  from  a  lessee  by 
one  or  more  of  the  tenants  in  common  who  have  not  signed 
the  lease,  a  demand  for  rent  made  by  them,  their  express  recog- 
nition that  the  occupant  is  a  lessee  or  any  other  fact  show- 
ing an  understanding  on  their  part  that  he  occupies  the  rela- 
tionship of  a  tenant  will  be  relevant  to  show  a  ratification. 
Their  silence  and  neglect  to  object  to  the  action  of  their  co-tenant 
in  executing  the  lease  after  the  fact  of  its  execution  or  the  fact 
of  the  occupation  of  the  premises  by  a  person  claiming  to  be  in 
possession  as  a  tenant  may  also  be  equivalent  to  a  ratification. 
The  lessee  may  rightfully  assume  that  one  of  several  tenants  in 
common  who  alone  executed  his  lease  was  authorized  to  do  so  by 
his  co-tenants  from  the  fact  of  their  acquiescence  and  acceptance 
of  rent.^^  They  may  elect  after  its  execution  whether  they  will 
or  will  not  ratify  the  acts  of  their  fellow  tenants  in  executing 
the  lease  and,  if  they  desire  to  do  this,  a  lessee  who  has  occupied 
the  premises  under  the  lease  cannot  escape  the  payment  of  rent 
upon  the  ground  that  the  lease  is  void  and  of  no  effect.  Thus  a 
sealed  lease  signed  by  one  tenant  in  conunon  for  himself  indi- 
vidually and  as  an  agent  for  the  other  is  not  absolutely  void  nor 
can  a  tenant  refuse  to  pay  rent  under  his  covenants  therein, 
where  he  has  remained  in  possession.-^ 

The  lessee  of  one  tenant  in  common  who  has  entered  and  re- 
mained in  possession  of  the  premises  with  the  consent  of  the  other 
joint  owners  cannot  when  sued  for  the  rent  claim  that  the  lease 
is  void  because  it  was  not  executed  by  all.  Having  enjoyed  the 
possession  he  must  abide  by  his  covenant  to  pay  rent.-*  In  theory 
a  lease  of  land  by  two  or  more  tenants  in  common  is  not  regarded 
as  one  lease  by  all  of  them  of  the  premises  in  their  entirety  but  as 
several  leases  by  the  tenants  in  common  of  their  undivided  sep- 
arate and  respective  shares.  The  relation  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ant does  not  exist  between  a  lessee  of  one  tenant  in  common  of  a 

22  Valentine  v.  Healey,  158  N.  24  Codman  v.  Hall,  9  Allen 
Y.  369,  373,  52  N.  E.  Rep.  1097,  re-  (Mass.)  335,  338.  where  one  party 
versirLg  1  App.  Div.  502,  37  N.  Y.  executes  a  deed,  it  is  his  deed 
Siipp.  287.  though  the  other  party   does  not 

23  Harms  v.  McCormick,  132  111.  execute  his  part.  Com.  Dig.  Fait. 
104,  108,  22  N.  E.  Rep.  511.     See  C.  2. 

Moreland  v.  Strong,  115  Mich.  211, 
73  N.  W.  Rep.  140. 


86  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

portion  of  the  premises  and  the  tenants  in  common  of  the  lessor 
"unless  the  lessee  shall  in  fact  attorn  to  the  other  tenants  in  com- 
nion.^^  For  tenants  in  common,  having  each  several  and  dis- 
tinct estates  in  the  land  cannot  make  a  joint  lease  of  the  whole 
estate;  but  any  lease  made  by  them  shall  be  taken  to  be  the  lease 
of  each  of  his  respective  share,  and  the  cross  confirmation  of 
each  for  the  share  of  the  other,  with  no  estoppel  on  either  part.-' 
And  though  tenants  in  common  join  in  making  a  lease  using  joint 
words,  the  lease  operates  in  law  as  the  separate  lease  of  each  for 
his  moiety.  The  estates  are  several  and  the  reversion  is  also  sev- 
erable.^^ The  lessee  of  the  tenants  in  common  is  the  lessee  of  each 
of  them  and  each  one  is  a  lessor  and  may  sue  separately  for  the 
rent  unless  it  is  expressly  reserved  to  them  jointly.  The  lessee 
of  any  one  tenant  in  common  of  such  tenant's  share  in  the  prop- 
erty which  is  owned  in  common  upon  his  entry  thereon,  will  have 
the  same  rights  in  relation  to  the  other  tenants  in  common  which 
his  lessor  possessed  before  the  demise.^^  Hence  one  tenant  in  com- 
mon of  land  cannot  regard  the  lessee  of  the  share  of  another 
tenant  in  common  as  holding  the  relation  of  lessee  to  the  former 
so  as  to  give  him  a  right  to  oust  him  from  his  possession  of  the 
undivided  share  which  has  been  leased  to  him.-^  "Where  a  lessee 
occupies  under  a  lease  from  one  of  two  or  more  tenants  in  com- 
mon paying  the  rent  reserved  to  his  lessor,  he  is  not  liable  for  use 
and  occupation  to  another  tenant  in  common  to  whom  he  has  not 
attorned  and  to  whose  occupation  of  his  share  of  the  property 
he  has  not  objected.  But  by  an  attornment  to  the  other  tenants 
in  common,  with  the  consent  of  his  lessor,  his  lease  becomes  bind- 
ing on  both  and  both  are  equally  bound  by  its  terms  as  from  the 
beginning.^" 

25  Austin  V.  Ahearne,  61  N.  Y.  Knight's  Case,  Moore,  199,  202; 
6,  16,  17.  Heatlierly  d.  Worthington  v.  Wes- 

26  Beer  v.  Beer,  12  C.  B.  60,  81,  ton,  2  Wils.  232;  Clialloner  v. 
21  L.  J.  C.  P.  124,  16  Jur.  923;  Davies,  1  Ld.  Ray.  404;  Doe  d. 
Doe  d.  Poole  v.  Errington,  1  Ad.  &  Poole  v.  Errington,  1  Ad.  &  E. 
E.  750,  755,  3  N.  &  M.  646,  1  Mo.  750,  755. 

&   Rob.   343;    Joules  v.   Joules,   1  28  Keay    v.    Goodwin,    16    Mass. 

Brown,  39;   Trepart's  Case,  6  Rep.  1,  4. 

14b;   Moore  v.   Fursden,   1   Show,  29  King  v.   Dickerman,  11   Gray 

342.  (Mass.)   480. 

27  1  Rolle,  Abr.  Estoppel  (B.)  so  Austin  v.  Ahearne,  61  N.  Y. 
p.  4,  p.  877;    Bac.  Abr.  Joint-Ten-  6,  17. 

ants   (H.);    Co.  Litt.  45  a.,  197  a. 


LEASES  TO  JOINT  OWNERS. 


87 


§  65.  Actions  by  tenants  in  common  to  recover  rent.  By 
the  ancient  common  law  of  England  ^^^  where  land  owned  by  ten- 
ants m  common  was  leased,,  the  lessors  could  recover  arrears  of 
rent  by  an  action  of  debt  in  which  all  were  obliged  to  join.^^ 
This  is  possibly  law  where  the  rent  is  reserved  on  general  terms. 
But  as  the  ordinary  rule  is  that  while  it  is  always  allowable  and 
usually  advisable  for  all  the  tenants  in  common  to  join  in  an 
action  for  the  rent  yet  if  the  payment  of  the  rent  is  reserved  to 
each  of  them  separately  each  must  bring  a  separate  action.  If 
the  leasing  is  for  an  entire  rent  and  the  lease  fails  to  state  that 
it  is  reserved  to  each  of  the  tenants  lessors  in  proportion  to  his 
share  in  the  reversion  all  the  tenants  ought  to  join,  and  the  sum 
recovered  is  to  be  divided  by  the  tenants  in  common  according 
to  their  respective  shares.'^  But  there  are  some  authorities  which 
hold  that  where  the  rent  is  reserved  in  an  entire  sum  it  is  within 
the  election  of  the  several  co-lessors  whether  they  shall  or  shall 
not  unite  in  an  action  to  recover  the  same.^^  And  where  there 
has  been  a  severance  of  the  ownership  of  the  rent,  understood 
and  acted  on  alike  by  the  parties,  one  tenant  in  common  may 


30a  By  the  English  cases,  on  a 
lease  by  joint  tenants  reserving 
the  entire  rent  they  may  join  in  an 
action  to  recover  the  rent.  If  there 
he  a  separate  reservation  of  rent 
to  each  of  them,  each  must  bring 
a  separate  action.  In  trespass  or 
an  injury  to  the  possession,  ten- 
ants in  common  must  join.  Por- 
ter V.  Bleiler,  17  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
149,  155.  In  Decker  v.  Livington, 
15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  482,  it  was  said, 
"two  tenants  making  a  lease  of 
their  tenements  for  a  term  of 
years,  the  rent  being  behind,  shall 
have  an  action  of  debt  against  the 
lessee,  and  not  divers  actions,  for 
the  action  is  in  the  personalty."  In 
Hill  V.  Gibbs,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.)  56, 
the  rule  is  laid  down  generally 
that  tenants  in  common  must  sue 
separately  when  the  action  is  in 
the  realty,  and  that  they  must  join 
when  the  action  relates  to  per- 
sonalty.   Judge  Bronson  said,  "the 


action  is  not  in  the  realty  merely 
because  it  has  some  relation  to 
land.  Thus,  debt  for  rent  and 
covenant  on  not  repairing  upon 
a  joint  demise  is  a  personal  ac- 
tion, and  tenants  in  common  must 
join.  So,  too,  they  must  join  in 
actions  for  trespass  or  nuisance 
to  the  land,"  he  adds,  "the  English 
rule  was  they  may,  ours  say  they 
must  join." 

31  Co.  Litt.  198b,  316,  317. 

32  Bryant  v.  Wells,  56  N.  H.  152, 
153;  Powis  v.  Smith,  1  D.  &  R.  490. 

5  B.  &  Aid.  850,  851,  24  R.  R.  587. 
See  Harrison  v.  Barnby,  5  T.  R. 
246.  2  R.  R.  584;  Cutting  v.  Derby, 
2  Black,  1075;  Porter  v.  Bleiler, 
17  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   149,  155. 

33  Martin  v.  Crompe,  1  L.  Ray. 
340;   Bradbume  v.  Botfield,  14  M. 

6  W.  567;  Last  v.  Dinn,  28  L.  J. 
Ex.  94;  HunUey's  Case,  3  Dyer, 
326a. 


88 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 


sue  in  his  own  name  for  what  is  due  him  without  joining  his  co- 
tenant  as  a  party  to  the  action.^*  In  the  case  of  a  joint  demise 
by  two  tenants  in  common  without  specifying  to  whom  the  rent 
is  reserved  the  rent  follows  the  reversion  and  on  the  death  of 
one  of  them  the  reversion  being  split  tlie  share  of  the  deceased 
lessor  goes  to  his  heir  who  is  thereafter  entitled  to  the  rent.^^ 
§  66.  Eifect  of  a  lease  by  joint  owners.  A  lease  of  property 
by  one  of  two  joint  owners,  executed  by  one  of  them  only,  but 
with  the  consent  and  at  the  request  of  the  other,  is  a  lease  of 
both.^^  Where  all  those  who  hold  in  joint  tenancy  make  a  lease 
of  the  land  which  they  thus  hold  and  one  of  the  tenants  dies  the 
term  still  endures,  though  it  was  a  lease  at  will,  and  the  rent 
inures  to  the  survivors.  The  lessee  if  he  shall  continue  in  pos- 
session after  the  death  of  one  of  two  joint  tenants  may  be  sued 
by  the  survivor  for  the  whole  rent  thereafter  accruing.^^    Other- 


34  Wolsey  V.  Lasher,  35  App.  Div. 
108,  54  N.  Y.  Supp.  737;  Sanborn 
V.  Randall,  62  N.  H.  620. 

A  covenant  to  pay  rent  to  sev- 
eral lessors  is  a  joint  or  a  several 
obligation,  according  to  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties.  If  a  lessee 
covenant  with  two  or  more  lessors 
jointly  to  pay  to  each  a  specified 
share  of  the  rent,  the  covenant  is 
several,  as  the  interest  of  each 
lessor  is  several,  though  the  cove- 
nant to  pay  is  joint.  Each  lessor 
may  therefore  sue  for  his  propor- 
tion of  the  rent  without  joining 
the  others.  Gray  v.  Johnson,  14 
N.  H.  414,  418;  Withers  v.  Bircham, 
3  B.  &  C.  254;  James  v.  Emery,  8 
Taunt.  245. 

30  Beer  v.  Beer,  12  C.  B.  60,  81, 
21  L.  J.  C.  P.  124,  16  Jur.  923. 

A  tenant  in  common  of  a  rever- 
sion may  maintain  an  action  for 
an  injury  to  the  reversion  with- 
out joining  his  co-tenant  as  a 
plaintiff.  So,  too,  he  may  bring  an 
action  for  the  breach  of  a  covenant 
iu  a  lease  running  with  the  land 
without  joining  his  co-tenants 
where  the  severance  of  the  rever- 


sion takes  place  after  the  demise. 
Roberts  v.  Holland,  62  L.  Q.  Q.  B. 
621,  (1893)  1  Q,  B.  665,  5  R.  370, 
41  W.  R.  494.  A  lease  by  a  widow 
who  is  tenant  of  an  estate  in 
dower  does  not  bind  the  heirs  who 
are  tenants  in  common  with  her. 
It  gives  the  lessee  no  right  to  the 
use  or  possession  of  the  land.  The 
heirs  who  are  co-tenants  with  the 
widow  may  ratify  the  lease  and 
render  it  a  valid  and  binding  lease 
on  them.  The  lease,  however,  is 
not  void,  but  is  voidable  merely. 
Where  one  of  the  heirs  is  an  in- 
fant he  cannot  ratify  it.  Where 
some  of  the  tenants  owning  land 
subject  to  the  widow's  dower  ratify 
her  lease  and  the  others  take  no 
action  and  the  lessee  goes  in  pos- 
session under  the  lease,  an  illegal 
combination  between  those  who 
had  ratified  which  shall  result  in 
an  injury  to  the  lessee  is  action- 
able. Martens  v.  O'Connor,  101 
Wis.  18-21,  76  N.  W.  Rep.  774. 

30  Wenger  v.  Raymond,  104  Pa. 
St.  33,  36,  31  Pitts.  L.  J.  493. 

37  Jackson  v.  Dunbar,  68  Miss. 
288,  290,  10  So.  Rep.  38. 


LEASES  TO  JOINT  OWNERS.  89 

wise  the  survivor  would  lose  the  whole  fruits  and  benefit  of 
the  survivorship  and  no  injury  can  come  to  the  lessee  as  he 
would  have  to  pay  the  whole  rent  in  any  event.^^  In  the  case  of 
a  tenancy  at  will  where  the  lessors  are  joint  tenants,  either  may 
terminate  the  will  without  or  even  against  the  consent  of  the 
other.^^  Where  there  is  a  lease  by  joint  tenants  from  year  to 
year,  either  may,  without  the  consent  of  the  other  and  even 
against  his  express  wishes,  give  a  notice  to  quit  to  the  lessee.  A 
notice  to  quit  signed  by  one  of  several  joint  tenants  who  are 
lessors  is  the  notice  of  all.*®  If,  however,  a  lease  provides  that 
the  lessors  being  joint  tenants  shall  all  give  notice  to  quit,  a  no- 
tice not  signed  by  all  is  ineffectual  to  terminate  the  term.  Thus 
where  a  lease  provides  that  the  lessor  or  his  heirs  or  executors 
may  give  notice  to  quit  under  his  or  their  respective  hands  and 
seals,  and  the  lessor  dies  appointing  tliree  executors  by  his  will 
all  the  executors  must  unite  in  the  notice  to  quit  and  a  notice 
signed  by  only  two  of  them  is  not  sufficient.*^  One  or  two 
joint  tenants  may  demise  his  or  their  portion  to  another  so  as 
to  create  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  between  them  with 
a  right  to  distrain  as  to  rent  in  arrears.*-  This  would  be  the 
case  where  one  joint  tenant  for  the  pajonent  of  an  annual  sum 
places  another  in  exclusive  possession  of  the  whole  of  the  prem- 
ises and  retires  from  its  possession.  The  parties  would  then  be 
estopped  to  deny  they  were  landlord  and  tenant.*^ 

§  67.  The  right  of  joint  tenants  to  the  rent.    Where  all  the 
joint  tenants  unite  in  a  lease  reserving  rent  to  all  any  one  of 

38  Henstead's   Case,   5   Coke,   10.      that   tenancy;    the   tenant   has   a 

39  Co.    Litt.    186;    Whayman    v.      right,  upon  such  a  notice,  to  give 
Chaplin,  3  Taunt.  120.  up  the  whole,  and,  unless  he  comes 

ioDoe  d.  Aslin  v.   Summersett,  to  a   new   arrangement   with   the 

1  B.  &  Ad.  13&,  141,  in  which  case  other   joint   tenants,    as   to    their 

Lord     Tenterden,     C.     J.,     said:  shares  he  is  compellable  to  do  so." 

"Upon  a  joint  demise  by  joint  ten-  ■*!  Right  v.  Cufhell,  5  Esp.  149, 

ants,  upon  a  tenancy  from  year  to  5  East,  491,  499.     If  the  lease  does 

year,    the    true    character    of   the  not  require  a  notice  by  all  execu- 

tenancy  is  this,  not  that  the  tenant  tors,   a  notice  by  one  of  two   or 

holds  of  each,  the  share  of  each  more  executors  will  be  sufficient, 

so    long    as    he    and    each    shall  *2  Cowper  v.  Fletcher,  6  B.  &  S. 

please,  but  that  he  holds  the  whole  464,    473,   34   L.   J.   Q.   B.    187,   11 

of  all  so  long  as  he  and  all  shall  Jur.   (N.  S.)   780,  12  L.  T.  420,  13 

please;  and  as  soon  as  any  one  of  W.  R.  739;   Coke,  Litt.  186a,  Bac. 

the  joint  tenants  gives  a  notice  to  Abr.  Leases    (1),   5,   p.   776. 

quit,  he  effectually  puts  an  end  to  *3  Pleadall's  Case,  2  Leon.  259. 


90  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

them  may  collect  the  rent  and  his  release  will  release  all  the 
others.^*  And  a  reservation  of  rent  to  one  joint  tenant  only 
enures  to  the  benefit  of  all.*^  One  joint  tenant  cannot  sue  sep- 
arately for  his  share  of  the  rent  or  for  the  rent  which  is  due  all 
of  them.  He  must  join  with  him  as  parties  plaintiff  in  any  and 
eveiy  action  regarding  the  property  or  its  income  all  the  joint 
tenants/^  On  the  death  of  one  or  more  joint  tenants  who  are 
lessors,  the  right  of  action  to  collect  the  rent  is  in  the  survivors.*^ 
On  the  death  of  one  of  two  joint  lessors,  the  survivor  is  the  prop- 
er party  to  sue  to  recover  for  a  breach  of  a  covenant  in  the  lease. 
Under  such  circumstances  no  right  of  action  passes  to  the  per- 
sonal representative  of  the  deceased  lessor.**  And  where  a 
joint  lease  was  executed  by  the  deceased  lessor  as  a  guardian, 
his  ward,  after  attaining  his  majority,  may  join  with  the  sur- 
viving lessor  to  enforce  a  covenant  made  for  his  benefit.'*"  Inas- 
much as  all  the  authorities  hold  that  parceners  whatever  may  be 
their  number,  constitute  but  one  heir  and  hold  by  unity  of  title 
as  well  as  by  unity  of  interest,  it  follows  that  none  of  them  can 
sue  for  rent  or  for  use  and  occupation  or  distrain  for  the  same 
without  joining  the  others.^"  Where  one  joint  tenant  receives 
more  than  his  share  of  the  rents  from  a  lessee  of  the  lands  he 
is  accountable  in  equity  to  his  co-tenants  for  as  much  of  the 

44  Newman  v.  Keffer,  18  Fed.  (N.  Y.)  149;  Cobb  v.  Kidd,  8  Fed. 
Cases,  No.  10,177;  Robinson  v.  Rep.  695,  696.  Contra,  Sanborn 
Hoffman,  1  M.  &  P.  474,  4  Ring.  v.  Randal],  62  N.  H.  620.  If  after 
562,  3  Car.  &  P.  234,  6  L.  J.  (0.  S.)  an  action  has  been  commenced  by 
C.  P.  113,  29  R.  R.  627.  several    joint    tenants    to    recover 

45  Sacheverel  v.  Frigate,  1  Vent.  rent  one  dies,  the  action  may  be 
161;  Co.  Litt.  47a.  192a,  214a.  prosecuted  by  the  survivors.    Cobb 

46  Dewey  v.  Lambier,  7  Cal.  347;  v.  Kidd,  8  Fed.  Rep.  695,  696. 
EllLs  V.  Culver,  2  Har.  (Del.)  129;  47  .Jackson   v.   Dunbar,   68   Miss. 
Frazier   v.    Spear,    2    Bibb    (Ky.)  288,    10    So,    Rep.    38;    Bryan    v. 
385;  Bullock  v.  Hayward,  10  Allen  Averett,   21  Ga.  401,  402,   68  Am. 
(Mass.)   460;   Smoot  v.  Wathen,  8  Dec.  464. 

Mo.  522;  Pickering  v.  Pickering,  11  48  Salisbury  v.   Shirley,   66   Cal. 

N.  H.  141;  Mobley  v.  Bruner,  59  Pa.  223,  226. 

St.  481,  98  Am.  Dec.  360;  Bonoyan  49  Salisbury  v.   Shirley,   66   Cal. 

V.  Palmer,  5  Mod.  171;   Decker  y,  223,  225. 

Livingston,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  479;  co  Decharms      v.      Harwood,      4 

Hill  V.  Gibbs,  5  Hill    (N.  Y.)    56;  Maule   &    Sel.    400,    10    Bing.    526, 

Sherman  v.  Ballou,  8  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  529,  3  L.  J.  C.  P.  198;   Stedman  v. 

304;    Porter    v.    Bleiler,    17    Barb.  Bates,  1  Ld.  Rajin.  640. 


LEASES  TO  JOINT  OWNERS.  91 

rents  as  he  has  collected  which  exceeds  what  he  is  entitled  to.^^ 
Where  rent  has  become  due  to  several  joint  lessors  an  assignment 
of  the  revereion  by  one  of  them  does  not  alter  the  nature  of 
the  bygone  rent  and  hence  the  right  of  distress  is  lost.^^ 

§  68.  The  liability  of  joint  tenants  for  rent.  "Where  the 
premises  are  leased  to  two  or  more  tenants  jointly  all  are  both 
severally  and  jointly  liable  according  to  the  exact  language  of 
the  covenant  to  pay  rent.  Under  a  lease  to  two  persons  jointly, 
both  are  liable  for  the  rent  though  only  one  has  occupied.  The 
occupation  of  one  makes  both  liable  on  the  joint  and  several 
covenant  to  pay  the  rent.^^  For  the  enti-y  of  one  of  two  or  more 
joint  lessees  under  a  lease  which  is  signed  by  all  at  the  date 
which  is  designated  in  the  lease  for  the  beginning  of  the  term 
is  the  entry  of  all  the  lessees.  All  are  bound  thereafter  to  pay 
the  rent,  or  for  use  and  occupation  though  some  never  enter 
upon  the  premises.'**  On  the  other  hand,  if  two  persons  to  whom 
a  lease  is  made  as  joint  lessees  enter,  both  are  liable  upon  the 
covenant  to  pay  rent  though  only  one  of  them  has  in  effect  exe- 
cuted the  lease.^^  Where  the  liability  of  joint  lessees  is  both 
joint  and  several,  a  judgment  for  rent  or  for  use  and  occupa- 
tion may  be  recovered  against  any  one  of  them  separately.^^  Or 
a  judgment  may  be  recovered  against  them  jointly  and  severally, 
and  execution  issued  against  only  one  of  them  in  the  discretion 
of  the  lessor.  One  of  several  joint  lessees  may  show,  when  sued 
on  the  joint  obligation  to  pay  rent,  that  the  lessor  has,  for  a 
valuable  consideration,  released  the  joint  and  several  liability 
and  has  accepted  in  its  place  a  separate  obligation  and  promise 
to  pay  rent  for  each  joint  lessee.^''  Among,  or  between  joint 
lessees  it  will  be  presumed  that  relations  of  a  confidential  char- 
acter exist.  They  may  be  regarded  as  qiiasi  trustees  towards 
each  other  so  that  no  benefit  can  be  acquired  by  any  one  of  them 
from  the  lessor  under  the  lease  which  shall  not  enure  to  the  bene- 

61  Nelson's  Heirs  v.  Clay's  Heirs,  657,  665;  Glen  v.  Dungey,  4  Exch. 

1  J.  J.  Marsh.    (Ky.)    138,  23  Am.  61. 

Dec.  387.  ss  McLaughlin   v.   McGovem,   34 

52Stavely   v.    Alcock.    16    Q.    B.  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  208. 

636,  20  L.  J.  Q.  B.  320,  15  Jur.  628.  56  Ding  v.  Kennedy,  7  Colo.  App. 

63  Kendall    v.    Carland,    5    Cush.  72,  41  Pac.  Rep.  1112;  Wolz  v.  San- 

(Mass.)  74,  80.  ford.  10  111.  App.  136. 

6*  Goshorn  v.  Stewart,  15  W.  Va.  ? '  Walker  v.  Githens,  156  Pa.  St. 

178,  181,  27  Atl.  Rep.  36. 


92  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

fit  of  his  co-lessees.  Thus,  a  renewal  of  a  lease  in  which  two  or 
more  are  jointly  interested  as  lessees  which  is  procured  in  the 
name  of  one  lessee  only,  but  which  was  intended  to  be  for  the 
benefit  of  all  will  enure  to  the  benefit  of  all  the  joint  lessees.^^ 
One  of  several  lessees  jointly  and  severally  liable  to  pay  rent 
who  is  compelled  to  pay  the  whole  rent  which  becomes  due  under 
a  covenant  to  pay  rent  has  an  action  for  contribution  against 
those  who  are  jointly  liable  with  him.  This  is  equally  true  in 
the  case  of  a  covenant  by  lessees  jointly  liable  to  repair  the 
premises.  But  one  tenant  in  common  of  a  house  who  expends 
money  on  ordinary  repairs,  not  being  such  as  are  necessary  to 
prevent  the  house  from  going  to  ruin,  has  no  right  of  action 
against  a  co-tenant  for  contribution.^^ 

§  69.  The  liability  for  rent  of  co-partners  in  business.  The 
members  of  a  firm  which  is  a  tenant  under  a  lease  are  liable 
jointly  and  severally  on  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  and  also  for 
use  and  occupation.  A  signature  by  the  firm  name  subscribed 
by  one  partner  will  be  binding  upon  all  upon  the  theory  that 
each  partner  is  in  law  the  agent  of  all.  So,  a  lease  signed  by* 
one  partner  individually  as  lessee  and  witnessed  by  all  the  others 
who  signed  their  names  individually  binds  the  firm.*^"  But  a 
lease  in  writing  under  seal  to  several  partners  which  is  only 
signed  by  one  for  himself  and  as  an  agent  for  the  other  partners 
is  not  binding  upon  the  others  unless  there  is  an  agency  also 
under  seal.®^  One  who  becomes  a  partner  after  the  execution  of 
a  lease  by  his  co-partners  becomes  liable  thereby  individually 
and  jointly  for  the  rent  to  the  same  extent  as  those  who  have 
executed  the  lease.  But  this  rule  applies  only  where  the  lease 
has  actually  become  in  some  manner  one  of  the  partnership  as- 
sets.®^  A  lease  by  one  member  of  a  firm  owning  real  estate  is 
binding  upon  all  where  it  is  authorized  or  ratified  by  them.  A 
lease  of  real  estate  which  is  brought  into  a  partnership  business 
and  is  used  as  partnership  property  made  by  one  partner  in  his 

68  Burrell  v.  Bull,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  eo  Busman  v.  Ganster,  72  Pa.  St. 

(N.  Y.)  15.  285. 

BO  Leigh    V.    Dickeson,    54    L.    J.  ei  Snyder  v.  May,  19  Pa.  St.  235, 

Q.  B.  18,  15  Q.  B.  D.  60,  52  L.  T.       240. 

790,  33  W.  R.  538.  02  Guinzburg  v.  Claude,  28  Mo. 

App.  258. 


LEASES  TO  JOINT  OWNERS.  93 

own  name  to  a  third  party  will  not  inure  to  his  individual  bene- 
fit. It  will  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  firm  and  he  will  be  regarded 
as  a  trustee  for  the  firm  to  the  extent  of  the  rents  received  by 
him.^^  Where  there  is  a  lease  by  partners  and  one  of  them  dies 
the  other  may  sue  for  the  rent  as  a  survivor.  This  is  the  rule 
where  they  sue  on  the  covenant  to  pay  rent.  A  surviving  part- 
ner, however,  who  sues  for  use  and  occupation  taking  place  after 
the  death  of  the  other  partner  may  sue  in  his  iudvidual  name  and 
for  his  own  benefit.®* 

63  Moderwell  v.  Mullison,  21  Pa.         «*  Wheatley  v.  Boyd,  7  Ex.  20. 
St.  257. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
LEASES  BY  AGENTS. 

5  70.  The  agent's  authority  to  lease  must  be  strictly  pursued. 

71.  The  apparent  authority  of  the  agent 

72.  Lease  under  seal  made  by  an  agent. 

73.  An  agent's  authority  in  writing  under  the  statute  of  frauds. 

74.  The  ratification  of  a  lease  executed  by  an  agent  without  authority 

from  the  principal. 

75.  The  fraud  and  false  representations  by  an  agent. 

76.  The  authority  of  an  agent  to  accept  possession  on  abandonment 

by  the  tenant. 

77.  The  power  of  an  agent  appointed  to  manage  property. 

78.  "WTiere  the  agent  renders  himself  personally  liable. 

79.  Undisclosed  principal  where  a  lease  is  under  seal. 

§  70.  The  agent's  authority  to  lease  must  be  strictly  pursued. 

An  agent  whether  he  has  been  authorized  in  writing  or  by  parol 
to  lease  the  premises,  must  proceed  strictly  according  to  the 
powers  which  have  been  conferred  upon  him  by  his  principal, 
and  if  he  exceeds  his  authority  his  principal  is  not  bound  by 
his  acts.^  Thus  an  agent  who  has  a  general  power  to  make  leases 
for  his  principal  does  not,  by  implication,  possess  the  power  to 
grant  leases  of  his  principal's  lands  which  shall  contain  particu- 
lar or  unusual  covenants  or  which  confer  special  and  peculiar 
privileges  upon  the  tenant.  So  an  agent  who  has  merely  the 
power  to  lease  for  a  term  of  years  does  not  bind  his  principal  to 
give  a  renewal  where,  in  making  a  lease  for  a  term  of  years,  he 
inserts  in  the  lease,  without  the  consent  of  his  principal,  a  clause 
giving  the  tenant  the  right  to  a  renewal.^  The  authority  vested 
in  an  agent  to  make  a  lease  for  one  year  does  not  permit  him  to 
bind  his  principal  by  a  lease  for  a  longer  term.     Nor  will  an 

1  "An  attorney  either  at  law  or  or  client,  unless  authority  for  such 
in  fact  iias  no  authority  either  to  purpose  is  expressly  given."  How- 
make  a  lease,  or  to  ratify  or  con-  ard  v.  Carpenter,  11  Md.  259,  281. 
firm  an  imperfect  one,  or  to  per-  -  Schumacher  v.  Pabst  Brewing 
feet  an  inchoate  agreement  for  a  Co.,  78  Minn.  50,  80  N.  W.  Rep. 
lease  of  property  of  his  principal  838. 


LEASES  BY   AGENTS.  95 

agent  who  has  power  to  lease  a  tract  of  land  at  a  rent  specified 
by  implication  have  power  to  lease  a  portion  of  the  tract.^  An 
agent  who  has  the  authority  to  lease  his  principal's  land  which 
is  vacant  and  unimproved  cannot  bind  his  principal  by  a  clause 
in  the  lease  to  build  houses  or  to  make  improvements  upon  the 
land.'*  Even  though  the  agency  be  created  by  an  instrument 
conferring  very  wide  powers  and  discretion  upon  him,  nothing 
will  be  implied  in  favor  of  the  agent,  and  against  the  principal. 
Thus  a  power  of  attorney  by  which  the  attorney  is  to  hold  pos- 
session of  a  farm  providing  that  it  is  to  be  "the  same  as  if  it 
were  your  owtq,  I  intend  it  will  be"  does  not  empower  the  at- 
torney to  lease  it  to  a  creditor  and  to  apply  a  part  of  the  rent 
on  his  own  debt.^  Some  of  the  cases,  however,  construe  the  power 
of  an  agent  to  lease  with  considerable  more  liberality  Thus,  a 
general  power  to  lease,  to  rent  or  to  let  conferred  upon  an  agent 
has  been  considered  sufficient,  not  only  to  enable  him  to  make  a 
new  lease,  but  also  to  extend  a  lease  which  has  expired.®  Usually 
a  general  agent  of  the  landlord  or  a  general  manager  of  his 
property  has  a  more  extensive  power  in  relation  to  leasing  his 
principal's  property  than  an  agent  whose  sole  duty  it  is  to  col- 
lect rent.  The  power  and  authority  of  an  agent  to  collect  rent  are 
very  limited.  This  matter  is  regulated  by  the  general  rules  of 
the  law  of  agency.  It  has  been  held  that  an  agent  who  has  the 
general  and  exclusive  charge  of  the  business  of  his  principal  may 
have  the  power  to  modify  the  terms  of  existing  leases.  Thus,  in 
New  York  it  has  been  held  that  a  general  agent  has  power  to 
modify  the  express  terms  of  a  lease  which  was  executed  by  his 
principal  by  agreeing  that  a  tenant  of  premises  which  have  been 
destroyed  by  fire  may  occupy  the  premises  rent  free  until  re- 
pairs have  been  made  or  until  the  premises  have  been  restored 
to  a  tenantable  condition.  The  modification  is  valid  and  binding 
on  the  principal  though  not  made  with  his  knowledge,  as  the 
remaining  in  possession  of  the  tenant  is  the  consideration  of  the 
agreement  by  the  agent  for  under  the  New  York  statute  the  ten- 
ant has  the  right  to  abandon  the  premises  and  the  rent  ceases.'^ 

3  Borderre  v.  Den,  106  Cal.  594,  e  Pittsburg  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fidelity 

600,  39  Pac.  Rep.  94(3.  Title  &  Trust  Co.,  207  Pa.  St.  223, 

■*  Peddicord  v.  Berk,  74  Kan.  236,  56  Atl.  Rep.  436. 

86  Pac.  Rep.  465.  ■  Ireland  t.  Hyde,  69  N.  Y.  Supp, 

c  Ward  V.  Thrustin,  40  Ohio  St.  8S9. 
347. 


96  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

An  agent  who  is  empowered  to  attend  to  the  repairs  of  premises 
owned  by  his  principal  will  not  be  permitted  to  exceed  his  au- 
thority. Doubtless  his  authority  will  permit  him  to  bind  his 
principal  by  contracts  to  furnish  labor  and  material  for  the  or- 
dinarj^  repairs  of  the  premises  leaving  it  for  the  court  to  deter- 
mine what  shall  constitute  ordinary  repairs.  But  he  has  little, 
if  any,  power  to  bind  his  principal  in  other  respects.  Thus,  for 
example,  his  representation  as  to  the  safety  or  healthfulness  of 
the  premises  made  to  the  tenant  when  the  lease  is  executed  are 
not  binding  on  the  landlord.  His  power  to  bind  his  principal  by 
statements  as  to  the  condition  of  the  premises  is  not  as  exten- 
sive as  that  of  an  agent  who  is  employed  to  rent  the  premises.* 
§  71.  The  apparent  authority  of  the  agent.  A  lessee  of  land 
dealing  with  an  agent  who  has  an  apparent  authority  to  make 
the  lease,  may  rely  upon  that  appearance  of  authority,  and  the 
principal  will  be  bound  by  the  acts  of  the  agent  within  the  scope 
of  the  apparent  authority.  But,  the  lessee  who  relies  upon  such 
apparent  authority  to  sustain  a  lease  which  has  been  made  by 
the  agent  must  either  show  that  the  agent  has  done  similar  acts 
in  excess  of  his  real  authority  which  were  subsequently  ratified 
by  the  principal  or  that  the  particular  lease  in  question  was 
actually  ratified  by  the  principal  either  expressly  or  by  impli- 
cation. Generally  speaking,  an  agent  whom  the  landlord  has 
appointed  merely  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  the  rents  of  his 
real  estate  cannot  be  regarded  as  having  an  implied  power  to 
lease  the  premises.  He  is  not  a  general  agent  but  merely  a 
special  agent  for  a  single  purpose.  Of  course,  his  actions  in 
making  a  lease  may  be  ratified  by  his  principal  as  would  be  the 
ease  where  the  agent  collected  the  rent  on  a  lease  made  by  him, 
and  the  principal,  knowing  of  the  making  of  the  lease,  accepted 
and  retained  the  rent.  According  to  some  authorities,  the  agent 
whose  sole  power  is  to  collect  the  rents  may  make  a  lease  at  will 
which  is  binding  on  the  landlord,  for  it  is  said  that,  having  to 
make  a  return  of  the  rents  to  his  principal,  the  latter  might 
suffer  a  loss  if  the  agent  were  not  by  implication  given  the  power 
to  lease  the  premises  at  will.®  An  agent  whose  duties  are  merely 
the  care  and  supervision  of  land,  as  for  example,  a  steward  or 

«  Daley   v.   Quick,  33   Pac.   Rep.  o  Woodfalls'  Landlord  &  Tenant, 

859,  99  Cal.  179.  C3;    Tibbitts   v.   Moore,   19   N.   H. 

369. 


LEASES  BY  AGENTS.  C7 

land  atrent,  cannot  nsiially  bind  his  principal  either  by  a  con- 
tract to  make  a  lease  or  by  a  lease  itself.^"  But  in  one  case 
it  was  held  that  the  power  vested  in  a  steward  to  manage  and 
superintend  a  landed  estate  will  authorize  him  to  bind  his  prin- 
cipal by  an  agreement  to  make  the  usual  and  customary  leases 
according  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  property.^^  But,  it 
has  been  held  in  England  that  a  farm  bailiff  upon  whom  express 
authority  had  been  conferred  to  lease  lands  from  year  to  year 
upon  the  ordinary  terms  which  were  recognized  in  the  neighbor- 
hood, and  to  receive  the  rents  accruing  under  such  leases,  has 
not  the  implied  authority  from  such  circumstances  to  let  the  land 
upon  unusual  terms  unknown  to  the  owner  and  to  insert  express 
stipulations  in  the  lease?  without  express  authority  to  do  so  on 
the  part  of  his  principal. ^^  So,  also,  a  general  agent  among 
whose  duties  is  that  of  collecting  rents,  making  repairs  and  at- 
tending  to  the  care  of  the  premises  belonging  to  a  non-resident 
landlord  has  no  power  to  change  the  terms  of  existing  leases  by 
discounting  rents  which  are  not  due  and  by  accepting  for  the 
same  less  than  is  due." 

§  72.  Lease  under  seal  made  by  an  agent.  At  the  common 
law  where  a  lease  executed  by  an  agent  is  executed  under  seal, 
or  where  a  lease  must  be  executed  under  seal  and  an  agent  exe- 
cutes it,  his  authority  to  execute  it  must  also  be  under  seal.^* 
On  the  other  hand,  the  authority  of  the  agent  to  make  a  parol 

loColler   V.    Gardner,    21    Beav.  (N.  Car.  Law)   218,  220;  Hanford 

151.                                                            .  V.  McNair,   9  Wend.    (N.  Y.)    54; 

11  Peers  v.  Sneyd,  17  Beav.  151.  Blood   v.    Goodrich.,   9    Wend.    (N. 

12  Turner  v.  Hutchinson,  2  F.  &  Y.)  68;  Cooper  v.  Rankin,  5  Binn. 
F.  185.  (Pa.)    612;  .Gorden  v.  Buckley,  14 

isHalladay    v.    Underwood,    90  S.  &  R.   (Pa.)   331;   Cain  v.  Head, 

111.  App.  130.  1  Coldw.    (Tenn.)   163;   Turbeville 

14  As  to  the  rule  in  the  case  of  d.    Darden    v.    Ryan,    1    Humph, 

deeds  generally,  see  Rowe  V.  Ware,  (Tenn.)    113;    Harrison    v.    Jack- 

30  Ga.  278;  Bragg  v.  Fesenden,  11  son,  7  T.  R.  207;   3  Bacon's  Abr. 

111.  544;   Maus  v.  Worthing,  4  111.  tit.   "Leases,"   408.     The   only  ex- 

20,    27     (Breeze,    J.,    dissenting) ;  ception   to   this   rule  occurs   in    a 

Rhodes    v.     Louthain,     8     Blackf.  case  where  the  agent  or  attorney 

(Ind.)  413;  Wheeler  v.  Nivins,  34  affixes  the  seal  and  signs  the  name 

Me.    54;     Banergee    v.    Hevey,    5  of  the  principal  in  the  actual  pres- 

Mass.  11,  23;   Shuetz  v.  Bailej',  40  ence  of  the  latter.     Maus  v.  War- 

Me.  69,  75;   Smith  v.  Perry,  29  N.  thing,  4  111.  27. 
J.  L.  74;   Kime  v.  Brooks.  9  Ired. 

7 


98  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

lease  which  is  to  be  executed  by  him  for  his  principal  or  his  au- 
thority to  make  an  agreement  for  a  lease,  which  is  to  be  executed 
under  seal  by  the  principal,  need  not  be  in  writing.^^  An  agent 
may  be  authorized  by  parol  to  make  a  lease  which  may  be  valid 
without  writing.^'^  And  an  agent  may  be  authorized  by  parol, 
to  execute  a  written  contract  binding  his  principal  to  make  a 
lease  for  more  than  one  year.^^  The  common  law  rule  which  re- 
quires the  authority  of  an  agent  to  execute  an  instrument  under 
seal  to  be  evidenced  by  some  writing  itself  under  seal  is  admit- 
tedly technical  and  the  courts  in  modern  times  have  sought 
strenuously  to  relax  it.  No  authority  under  seal  was  required  to 
execute  a  writing  not  under  seal.  And  the  reason  of  this  is  that 
such  writings  not  under  seal,  such  as  notes  and  the  like  are  usual- 
ly barred  by  statute  unless  they  are  sued  on  and  enforced  within 
a  comparatively  short  period.  But  deeds  being  usually  evi- 
dence of  the  title  to  real  property  and  being  capable  of  being 
produced  to  enforce  rights  after  some  considerable  lapse  of  time 
when  the  conditions  and  circumstances  under  which  they  were 
executed  by  the  agent  are  incapable  or  at  least  difficult  to  be 
proved  are  on  an  entirely  different  footing.  In  such  cases  it 
is  but  reasonable  in  order  to  avoid  forgery  and  fraud  in  the  use 
of  deeds  to  require  the  person  who  relies  upon  the  deed  to  show, 
in  a  case  where  it  is  executed  by  an  agent,  by  some  writing  of 
equal  solemnity  and  formality  with  the  instrument  he  claims 
under,  that  the  agent  was  authorized  to  execute  it.^^  And  where 
an  agent  has  without  authority  under  seal,  executed  a  sealed  in- 
strument, the  subsequent  action  of  the  principal  in  executing  an- 
other instrument  under  seal  to  take  the  place  of  the  invalid  in- 
strument constitutes  such  a  ratification  of  the  latter  as  will  vali- 
date it  from  the  time  of  ite  execution,^^  and  estop  the  principal 
from  asserting  its  invalidity.  So,  where  an  agent  without  any 
authority  under  seal,  executes  a  sealed  instrument  in  the  name 
of  his  principal  and,  on  the  instrument  being  shown  to  the  prin- 

iB  Brown  V.  Eaton,  21  Minn.  409;  15  So.  Rep.  44;  Curtis  v.  Blair,  26 

Coles  V.  Trecothick,  9  Ves.  Sr.  234,  Miss.  309. 

250.  18  Kime  v.  Brooks,  9  Ired.  Law 

i«M'Gunnagle    v.    Thornton,    10  (N.  Car.)  218,221. 

S.  &  R.   (Pa.)  251,  253;  McDowell  J»  Bragg  v.  Fesenden,  11  111.  544, 

V.  Simpson,  3  Watts   (Pa.)   129.  545. 

17  Lobdell  V.  Mason,  71  Miss.  936, 


LEASES  BY  AGENTS.  99 

cipal  after  his  name  and  seal  have  been  put  upon  it  by  the 
aofent,  the  principal  acknowledges  it  to  be  his  act  and  deed,  or 
uses  words  which  are  equivalent  to  such  acknowledgment,  its 
ratification  will  be  implied  and  it  will  be  valid  ah  initio.-'^ 

§  73.  The  agent's  authority  in  writing  under  the  statute  of 
frauds.  In  some  states  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  the  agent's 
authority  to  make  a  lease  for  more  than  one  j'car,  must  be  in 
writing.'^  Where  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  no  lease  of 
lands  to  exceed  one  year  can  be  executed  by  an  agent  unless  he 
is  authorized  in  writing  to  do  so,  a  lease  for  more  than  one  year 
which  is  executed  by  the  agent  of  the  lessor  and  which  is  deliv- 
ered to  the  lessee  is  void  if  the  agent  was  not  authorized  in  writ- 
ing to  sign  the  lease.  And  the  fact  that  the  duplicate  copy  re- 
tained by  the  principal  was  afterwards  signed  by  him  does  not 
validate  the  lease  w^here  it  does  not  appear  that  this  signing  was 
ever  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  lessee.-^  In  the  absence  of 
statute,  a  lease  for  one  year  in  writing  and  not  under  seal,  may 
be  executed  by  an  agent  whose  authority  is  created  by  parol.^^ 
Under  the  statute  of  frauds,  a  lease  for  a  term  of  three  years, 
though  signed  by  an  agent,  is  not  binding  upon  the  lessee  unless 
the  agent's  authority  from  the  lessor  is  in  writing.^*  So  the 
agent  must  be  authorized  in  writing  in  order  to  bind  his  prin- 
cipal in  the  adoption  of  the  lease  for  more  than  one  year.-^  The 
performance  of  the  conditions  of  an  invalid  lease  by  the  lessee 
wiU  take  the  lease  out  of  the  statute  of  frauds.  Thus  a  lessee 
who  has  been  in  the  possession  of  the  premises  and  paid  rent 
for  more  than  a  year,  cannot  object  that  a  lease  in  writing  is  in- 
valid under  the  statute  of  frauds,  or  refuse  to  pay  rent  because 
it  was  executed  by  an  agent  who  was  not  authorized  in  writing 

20  Rhode  v.  Louthain,  8  Blackf.  App.    549;    Hoover   v.   Pacific   Oil 

(Ind.)   413.  Co.,  41  Mo.  App.  317. 

2iCal.  Civ.  Code,  §  1624,  subd.  5;  24  Hoover  v.  Pacific  Oil  Co.,  41 

How.  St.  Mich.,  §  6179.  Mo.  App.  317;  Lehman  v.  Nolting, 

22  Ohesebrough  v.  Pingree,  72  56  Mo.  App.  549;  Chesebrough  v. 
Mich.  438,  445,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  747,  Pingree,  72  Mich.  438,  40  N.  W. 
1  L.  R.  A.  529.  See,  also.  Ham-  Rep.  747.  See,  also,  Borderre  v. 
mond  V.  "Winchester,  82  Ala.  470,  2  Den,  106  Cal.  594,  600,  39  Pac.  Rep. 
So.    Rep.    892;    Darity    v.    Darity  946. 

(Tex.),  71  S.  W.  Rep.  950.  25  Sheo  v.  Seeling,  89  Mo.  App. 

23  Lehman    v.    Nolting,    56    Mo.       146. 


100  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

by  the  landlord  to  execute  the  lease. ^^  But  it  has  also  been  held 
that  a  lease  made  by  an  agent  which  is  absolutely  void  under 
the  statute  of  frauds  because  the  authority  of  the  agent  to  make 
the  written  lease  is  not  in  writing,  is  not  good  as  an  oral  lease 
for  a  year.  If  the  statute  expressly  declares  such  lease  to  be 
void,  it  cannot  be  valid  for  any  portion  of  time  however  short.-^ 
§  74.  The  ratification  of  a  lease  executed  by  an  agent  with- 
out authority  from  the  principal.  Upon  general  principles  of 
the  law  of  agency  there  can  be  no  question  that  a  lease  which 
has  been  executed  by  an  agent  in  the  name  of  his  principal 
which  either  exceeds  the  authority  of  the  agent,  or  which  the 
agent  had  no  authority  to  execute,  may  be  ratified  and  subse- 
quently confirmed  by  the  principal  so  that  it  will  become  valid 
and  binding  upon  him.  The  principal  may  ratify  and  validate 
the  invalid  action  of  the  agent,  either  by  express  oral  language, 
by  writing  or  by  some  act,  such  as  receiving  rent,  which  will 
estop  him  from  afterwards  rejecting  the  lease.-^  A  ratification 
by  the  principal  may  be  inferred  from  his  acts  and  conduct  as 
well  as  from  his  express  language.  In  order  to  constitute  a  rati- 
fication by  conduct,  the  acts  and  conduct  which  are  relied  upon 
must  be  clearly  proven  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury.  No  rati- 
fication of  the  lease  will  be  implied  from  weak  or  doubtful  cir- 
cumstances which  are  capable  of  a  construction  which  is  consis- 
tent with  a  repudiation  of  the  action  of  the  agent.  The  action 
of  the  principal  in  putting  a  tenant  in  possession  and  receiving 
rent  from  him  which  agrees  with  the  terms  of  the  lease  is  a 
ratification  by  the  principal.^"     The  knowledge  of  the  action  of 

26Tean   v.   Pline,   60  Mich.   385,  Bank    v.    Mortley,    19    Wis.     62; 

27  N.  W.  Rep.  557.  Trout  v.  McDonald,  83  Pa.  St.  144; 

27  Borderre  v.  Den,  106  Cal.  594,  Ducaii   v.    Hartman,    143    Pa.    St. 
600,  39  Pac.  Rep.  946.  595,  22  Atl.  Rep.  1099,  48  L.  I.  441, 

28  Irons  V.  Reyburn,  11  Ark.  378;  re-affirmed,  149  P.  St.  114,  24  Atl. 
Borderre  v.  Den,  106  Cal.  594,  609,  Rep.  190. 

39  Pac.  Rep.  946;  Bragg  v.  Fessen-  29  Bless  v.  Jenkins,  129  Mo.  647, 

den,   11    111.    544;    Powell   v.   Gos-  31  S.  W.  Rep.  938.     The  failure  of 

som,  18  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)    179,  192;  a   married  woman   to   notify   one 

Adams  v.  Power,  52  Miss.  828,  833 ;  who  leased  her  property  from  her 

Anderson  v.  Connor,  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  husband  in  the  name  of  the  hus- 

449;  Ovcrby  v.  Overby,  18  La.  Ann.  band,  and  without  the  knowledge 

546;    Baines  v.   Burbridge,   15  La.  or  consent  of  the  married  woman, 

Ann.  628;  Breithaupt  v.  Thurmond,  of  her  ownership,  does  not  estop 

3    Rich.    (S.   C.)    216;    Wisconsin  her  from  disputing  the  validity  of 


LEASES  BY  AGENTS.  101 

the  agent  in  signing  and  executing  the  lease  must  be  brought 
home  to  the  principal  and  when  knowing  exactly  what  the  agent 
has  done  in  leasing  the  property  he  enjoys  the  benefits  and  fruits 
of  the  agent's  acts,  he  will  not  be  permitted  to  repudiate  his  acts. 
Under  this  rule  it  is  unquestioned  that  the  receipt  of  rent  by 
the  principal  under  a  lease  which  had  been  made  by  the  agent 
without  the  authority  of  the  principal  would  constitute  a  rati- 
fication of  the  lease. ^**  And  where  the  principal  receives  rent 
after  the  execution  of  a  lease  by  an  agent  without  authority  or 
where  the  lease  is  invalid  because  not  under  seal,  equity  will 
compel  the  principal  to  ratify  the  lease,  and  will  order  a  seal 
attached  thereto  and  direct  the  principal  to  do  anything  eise 
which  will  validate  the  lease. "^  Where  the  actions  and  eon- 
duct  of  the  principal  are  relied  upon  to  constitute  a  ratification 
of  a  lease  made  by  an  agent  without  authority,  it  must  appear 
that  the  principal  was  acting  with  a  full  knowledge  of  all  the 
material  facts  in  the  case.  For  the  actions  of  the  principal  done 
in  complete  ignorance  of  the  conduct  of  the  agent  cannot  be  re- 
garded in  law  as  a  ratification.^-  Where  an  agent  of  a  landlord 
having  power  to  rent  for  one  year  only,  rents  for  two  years,  and 
during  the  second  year  the  principal  received  the  rent  agreed 
upon,  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the  prin- 
cipal ratified  the  letting  by  the  agent.  The  jury  might  infer 
from  such  evidence  that  he  was  a  general  agent  for  the  renting 
of  the  property.     If  being  such,  he  was  limited  by  instructions 

the  lease.    The  fact  that  the  prop-  Reid  v.  Hibbard,  6  "Wis.  175;  Wis- 

erty  stood  in  the  name  of  the  true  consin  Bank  v.  Morley,  19  Wis.  62. 
owner  on  the  record  is  always  ma-  3i  Story  on  Agency,  §  239. 

terial.   So  it  is  not  material,  so  far  32  Chapman  v.  Lee,  47  Ala.  143; 

as  the  power  of  the  wife  is  con-  Mapp  v.  Phillips,  32  Ga.  72;   Tid- 

cerned  to  deny  the  validity  of  the  rick   v.    Rice,    13    Iowa,    214,   221; 

lease,  that  the  lessee  always  paid  Dickinson    v.    Conway,    12    Allen 

his  rent  to  the  husband,  and  in  do-  (Mass.)    487;    Hammond    v.    Han- 

ing  so  always  supposed  he  was  the  nin,  21  Mich.  374;   Gulick  v.  Gro- 

sole  owner  of  the  premises.    Long  ver,  33  N.  J.  Law,  463;    Seymour 

V.  Poth,  73  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  251,  37  v.  Wyckoff,  10  N.  Y.  213;   Meehan 

N.  Y.  Supp.  670,  16  Misc.  85.  v.  Forrester,  52  N.  Y.  277;  Wright 

soRoby  V.   Cossitt,   78    111.    638;  v.  Burbank,  64  Pa.  St.  247;   Will- 

Haynes    v.     Seachrest,     13     Iowa,  iams  v.  Storm,  6  Coldw.    (Tenn.) 

455;    Ruggles   v.   "Washington   Co.,  203,    207;    "Vincent    v.    Rather,    31 

3    Mo.    496;    Hastings    v.    Bangor  Tex.  77. 
House    Proprietors,    18    Me.    436; 


102  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

to  rent  for  one  year,  and  in  violation  of  his  instructions,  rented 
for  two  years,  slight  evidence  of  ratification  by  the  landlord 
would  be  sufficient.  Under  such  circumstances  the  principal  is 
responsible  to  the  innocent  third  persons  not  having  knowledge 
of  a  limitation  upon  the  power  of  an  agent  to  lease  the  premises 
for  the  act  of  the  agent;  providing  he  does  not  promptly  re- 
pudiate such  acts  before  the  tenant  has  entered.^^ 

§  75.  Fraud  and  false  representations  by  an  agent.  The 
question  of  the  binding  character  upon  a  principal,  of  fraudu- 
lent conduct  and  false  representation  by  the  agent  in  the  leas- 
ing of  property  has  frequently  been  discussed.  Unquestionably 
a  principal  who  is  proved  to  have  instructed  his  agent  to  mis- 
represent the  condition  of  the  premises,  or  the  rate  of  rent  whic!i 
he  has  received  from  them,  or  who  at  the  time  of  the  execution 
of  the  lease,  knows  that  his  agent  has  been  guilty  of  fraud  or 
falsehood  in  this  respect,  though  not  by  his  direction,  will 
be  held  responsible  for  his  agent's  acts.  Thus,  if  an  owner  of 
property,  knowing  that  the  premises  were  unsafe,  uninhabitable 
or  objectionable  on  account  of  a  nuisance  existing  in  or  near 
them  should  employ  an  agent  to  lease  the  same  who  was  ignorant 
of  these  facts ;  and  the  agent,  being  thus  ignorant  of  these  facts 
represents  the  premises  as  being  desirable  and  safe  the  principal 
would  be  liable  for  the  representation  of  his  agent.  So.  where 
the  owner  of  a  house  who  employed  an  agent  to  let  it  for  him  and 
stated  to  the  agent  that  it  was  in  good  condition  and  unobjec- 
tionable in  every  respect,  and  the  agent,  relying  on  these  state- 
ments, rented  the  house  which  was  objectionable  because  it  was 
located  next  door  to  a  disorderly  house,  it  was  held  that  the 
lease  was  not  binding  on  the  tenant  because  of  the  misrepresen- 
tation made  by  the  agent.^^ 

§  76.  The  authority  of  an  agent  to  accept  possession  on  aban- 
donment by  the  tenant.  The  tenant  must  prove  that  an  agent 
to  wliom  he  may  have  delivered  the  keys  of  the  premises  had 
authority  as  the  agent  of  the  landlord  to  accept  them  and  thus 
assent  to  a  surrender.  The  agent's  authority  to  assent  to  a  sur- 
render will  not  be  inferred  from  authority  in  the  agent  to  col- 
lect the  rent  of  the  premises.     Nor  will  the  failure,  neglect  or 

82  Reynolds  v.  Davison,  31   Md.  33  Fuller  v.  "Wilson,  3  Q.  B.  58, 

662,  688.  68;    Bennett  v.   Judson,   21   N.   Y. 

238. 


LEASES  BY  AGENTS.  103 

refusal  of  the  landlord  to  return  a  tey  delivered  to  the  agent  by 
the  tenant  on  the  abandonment  of  the  premises  by  the  latter 
amount  to  a  ratification  of  the  acceptance  by  the  acrent  and 
create  a  surrender  by  operation  of  law  where  the  landlord  does 
nothing  else  conclusively  indicating  an  intention  on  his  part 
to  accept  the  keys  in  token  of  surrender.^*  The  power  to 
accept  a  new  tenant  in  the  case  of  a  lease  executed  under  seal  for 
a  term  which  exceeds  a  year  and  to  release  the  former  tenant 
by  the  acceptance  of  his  surrender  must  be  expressly  conferred 
and  will  not  be  implied.  The  mere  fact  that  the  agent  has 
general  power  to  act  for  the  landlord  in  the  care  of  his  prop- 
erty does  not  necessarily  confer  on  the  agent  the  power  to  ac- 
cept a  surrender  of  the  premises  or  to  make  a  new  lease  to  a 
new  tenant.  Thus,  an  agent  whose  duties  are  to  make  leases, 
to  receive  rents,  to  give  receipts  for  the  same  and  to  allow  for 
the  expenses  of  repairs  made  by  tenants,  possesses  no  implied 
power  to  accept  a  Siurrender  of  a  lease  which  is  in  writing  and 
which  is  under  seal.^^  The  surrender  of  a  key  to  an  agent  of 
this  character,  unless  with  the  direct  consent  of  the  landlord, 
or  with  his  subsequent  ratification,  does  not  constitute  a  sur- 
render by  implication  of  law.  But  a  general  agent  will  have 
his  power  to  act  for  the  landlord  given  a  fairly  reasonable 
construction.  An  agreement  bj^  him  to  pay  the  expenses  which 
a  tenant  might  incur  in  moving  if  he  would  promptly  move 
from  the  premises  on  the  expiration  of  his  term  is  within  the 
scope  of  the  power  of  a  general  agent  who  has  power  to  lease, 
to  collect  rent  and  to  look  after  the  premises  generally.^® 

§  77.  The  power  of  an  agent  appointed  to  manage  property. 
Real  estate  agents  who  make  it  their  business  to  let  houses  or 
other  real  estate,  are,  if  shown  to  be  in  possession  of  the  keys 
of  the  house,  at  least  prima  facie  authorized  to  grant  leases  for 
the  premises  upon  such  terms  as  they  may  see  fit  to  make  and 
also  to  give  the  tenant  possesion.    But  this  presumption  may  be 

34  Blake  v.  Dick,  15  Mont.  236,  35  Wallace  v.  Dinning,  11  Misc. 
38  Pac.  Rep.  1072;  Thomas  v.  Nel-  Rep.  117,  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  159;  Wil- 
son, 69  N.  Y.  118;  Baylis  v.  Pren-  son  v.  Lester,  64  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
tice,  75  N.  Y.  604;  Ryan  v.  Jones,  431,  433. 

20  N.  Y.   Supp.  842,  2  Misc.  Rep.  so  Creighton     v.     Finlayson,     46 

65;    Barkley  v.   McCue,   55   N.  Y.  Neb.  457,  459,  64  N.  W.  1103. 
Supp.     608,     25    Misc.    Rep.     738; 
Barkley  v.  Holt,  84  N.  Y.  S.  957. 


104  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

rebutted  by  proof  on  the  part  of  the  landlord  that  the  authority 
of  the  agent  was  restricted  by  him.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
tenant,  in  dealing  with  the  agent,  to  ascertain  the  limits  and 
character  of  the  authority  which  the  principal  has  delegated 
to  him.  The  existence  and  scope  of  the  authority  of  the  real 
estate  agent  to  let  premises  and  to  bind  his  principal  is  to  be 
determined  in  the  same  manner  as  the  authority  of  any  other  sort 
of  agent.  The  court  in  determining  the  scope  of  his  authority 
will  take  into  consideration  the  facts  in  the  case,  the  usages 
of  the  locality  if  there  are  any  and  particularly  the  conduct  of 
the  principal  in  prior  transactions  with  the  agent.  A  written 
authority  "to  act  as  our  agent  for  our  properties  and  to  man- 
age said  properties"  is  very  general  and  at  the  same  time  very 
vague  in  its  terms.  The  precise  limit  of  a  power  to  manage  land 
would  depend  largely  upon  the  circumstances  and  conditions 
of  the  land  as  they  are  shown  in  the  evidence.  On  the  one 
hand  the  power  to  manage  land  would  clearly  not  authorize  an 
agent  to  sell  it.  It  is  also  clear  that  it  would  clearly  authorize 
him  to  make  leases  in  the  ordinary  form  and  on  the  ordinary 
terms.  Construing  this  power  it  may  safely  be  said  that  a  power 
to  manage  land  implies  authority  in  the  agent  to  do  all  that  had 
been  done  prior  to  the  creation  of  the  power  by  the  principal, 
or  by  other  persons  with  the  express  or  implied  assent  or  con- 
sent of  the  principal  except  to  sell  the  land  or  to  mortgage  it. 
In  other  words  it  is  implied  that  the  agent  may  do  what  is 
usual  and  customary  to  do  with  property  of  the  kind  in  that 
locality.  Under  such  a  power  the  agent  could  lease  farmland 
for  terms  and  on  conditions  usual  for  farms  in  the  vicinity 
where  the  land  is  located.  And  an  agent  having  such  power 
could  unquestionably  lease  dwelling  or  business  property,  lo- 
cated in  a  town  or  city,  upon  such  terms  and  conditions  as  are 
customary  in  the  town  or  city  where  the  property  is  located. 
So,  for  illustration,  if  there  were  an  open  mine  on  the  land  the 
management  of  it  might  include  the  working  or  leasing  of  the 
open  mine  by  the  agent.  And  on  the  other  hand  the  opening  of 
a  mine  where  none  had  been  opened  before,  or  the  making  of  a 
lease  conferring  the  power  to  open  mines,  would  be  a  doubtful 
act  unless  perhaps  the  land  were  located  in  a  mining  country  and 
its  use  for  other  purposes  is  thereby  necessarily  limited.  But 
an  agent  with   power  to  manage  property,  or  with  a  general 


LEASES  BY  AGENTS.  105 

power  for  a  limited  period,  has  no  power  thereby  to  make  a 
lease  for  a  long  term  which  shall  extend  beyond  the  period 
during  which  he  has  a  right  to  act.  Thus,  an  agent  to  manage 
land  appointed  for  one  year  only  cannot  grant  a  lease  for  fif- 
teen years  of  the  sole  right  to  quarry,  take  or  sell  stone  or  coal 
from  the  land  which  is  already  improved  and  is  valuable  min- 
eral land.  And  the  consideration  in  this  case  would  be  that 
this  was  not  a  grant  of  an  annual  profit  which,  when  taken  out 
of  the  land,  would  be  replaced  by  the  operation  of  nature,  but 
a  permanent  diminution  of  the  body  and  value  of  the  land  itself 
which  would  be  similar  to  the  opening  of  a  mine  where  none 
had  been  opened  before  and  hence  would  be  clearly  not  within 
the  power  of  the  agent  appointed  for  the  ordinary  manage- 
ment of  property.^'  An  agent  who  is  instructed  or  who  has  an 
agent's  power  to  lease  to  a  responsible  tenant  is  answerable  in 
damages  to  his  landlord  if  he  fails  to  exercise  reasonable  dili- 
gence in  ascertaining  the  responsibility  of  the  tenant.  He  must 
make  the  same  inquiry  regarding  the  tenant  as  a  prudent  man 
would  make  in  carrying  on  his  own  affairs.^^  So,  an  agent 
authorized  to  let  premises  must  act  in  good  faith  to  his  prin- 
cipal and  he  cannot  let  the  premises  to  himself  without  the 
consent  of  his  principal  given  after  a  full  disclosure  of  all  the 
circumstances  by  the  agent  to  the  principal."' 

§  78.  Where  the  agent  renders  himself  personally  liable.  In 
order  to  escape  personal  liability,  the  agent  who  executes  the 
lease  should  always  sign  the  name  of  his  principal  by  himself 
as  agent,  thus,  ''John  Doe  by  Richard  Rowe  his  agent"  or  "his 
attorney"  as  the  case  may  be.*"  For  in  the  case  of  a  lea.se 
or  other  writing  which  is  signed  "John  Doe  agent  for  Richard 

37  Duncan  v.  Hartman,  143  Pa.  S.)  15o;  Green  v.  Keppe,  18  C.  B. 
St.  595,  606,  22  Atl.  Rep.  1099,  24  149;  Deslandes  v.  Gregory,  2  E.  & 
Am.  St.  Rep.  570;  Id.,  149  Pa.  St.  E.  602;  Clayton  v.  Souther,  1  Exch. 
114,  24  Atl.  Rep.  190.  717;    Parker  v.   Winslow,  7  El.  & 

38  Hayes  v.  Tindall,  1  B.  &  S.  B.  492.  A  person  who  describes 
296;  Hemmenway  v.  Hemmenway,  himself  in  an  agreement  to  make 
5  Pick.  (Mass.)  389;  Moore  v.  a  lease  as  making  it  on  behalf  of 
Gholson,  34  Miss.  372;  Anthony  v.  another  will  be  personally  liable 
Smith,  9  Humph.   (Tenn.)    508.  if  in  subsequent  part  of  it  he  prom- 

39  Whichcote  v.  Lawrence,  3  ises  that  he  will  himself  execute  it. 
Ves.  746.  Norton  v.  Herron,  1  Car.  &  P.  648, 

40  Cooke  V.  Wilson,  1  C.  B.   (N.  R.  &  M.  229,  28  R.  R.  797. 


106  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

Rowe"  or  '"for  John  Doe,  Richard  Rowe  agent"  all  the  words 
that  follow  after  the  name  of  the  agent  are  treated  as  mere 
descriptio  personae,  and  the  lease  or  other  writing  will  be  bind- 
ing on  the  agent  individually  upon  the  ground  that  he  has  not 
disclosed  the  name  of  his  principal.*^  But  the  principal  and 
not  the  agent  will  be  bound  if  it  appear  from  the  language  of 
the  lease  itself  that  it  was  signed  by  the  agent  for  the  prin- 
cipal and  not  for  the  agent  himself.*^^  A  person  who,  on  being 
sued  for  rent  of  premises  leased  by  him  in  his  own  name,  claims 
that  he  was  the  agent  of  another  in  making  the  lease,  will  have 
the  burden  on  him  to  convince  the  court  of  that  fact.*^  Thus 
an  authorized  agent  who  executes  a  lease  under  seal  in  which 
he  states  he  is  the  agent  of  a  disclosed  and  known  principal, 
and  who  assumes  to  contract  for  such  principal  only  and  not  for 
liimself  personally  or  individually  is  not  bound  by  the  lease  per- 
sonally or  individually  though  he  has  signed  his  individual 
name.*^  So  also,  a  lease  which  reads  "We  have  leased  to"  a 
lessee  named,  and  which  is  signed  "L.  and  Son,  agents  for  W." 
is  the  lease  of  the  principal,  and  not  of  the  agents.**  And  it  has 
been  held  that  the  mere  fact  alone,  that  an  agent  executes  a 
lease  in  his  own  name  does  not  make  him  individually  liable 
thereon,  unless  the  language  of  the  lease  shows  a  clear  intent 
that  he  shall  be  liable  individually."  The  fact  that  a  lease 
is  executed  by  an  agent  in  his  own  name,  does  not  alone  neces- 
sarily render  it  invalid.**  It  is  binding  on  the  lessee  who  is 
estopped  to  show  that  the  lessor,  though  styling  himself  an 

<xCompton   v.    Cassada,    32    Ga.  (Ky.)   237;   Hall  v.  Woods,  10  N. 

428;    Fisks  v.   Eldredge,   12   Gray  H.  237. 

(Mass.)   474;  Fowler  v.  Atkinson,  42  shakel   v.    Hennessey,   57   111. 

6  Minn.  578;   Robertson  v.  BanlvS,  App.  332. 

9  Miss.  666;  McColgan  v.  Katz,  29  43  whitford  v.  Laidlaw,  94  N.  Y. 

Misc.  Rep.  136,  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  291;  145,  149;    Kiersted,  V.  O.  &  A.  R. 

Bellas  V.   Hays,   5  S.   &  R.    (Pa.)  R.  Co.,  69  N.  Y.  343,  345,  25  Am. 

427,  436.  438;   Pryer  v.  Coulter,  1  Rep.  199. 

Bailey   Law    (S.    Car.)    517,    520;  44  Duncklee  v.  Webber,  151  Mass. 

Kleckner  v.  Klapp,  2  Watts  &  S.  408,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  1082. 

44;  Robertson  v.  Pope,  1  Rich.  Law  *'>  Frambach  v.  Frank,  33  Colo. 

(S.  Car.)  501;  Comb's  Case,  9  Rep.  529,  81  Pac.  Rep.  247. 

76;  White  v.  Cuyler,  6  T.  R.  17C;  4o  Murray  v.  Armstrong,  11  Mo 

Co.  Lltt.  48c.  209;     Potter    v.    Bassett,    35    Mo, 

4iaMagill   v.   Hinsdale,  6   Conn.  App.  417. 
464,  469;  Cook  v.  Sanford,  3  Dana 


LEASES  BY  AGENTS.  107 

agent,  had  no  title  to  the  premises.*'^  These  niles  apply  also  to 
a  lease  which  is  signed  by  an  agent  acting  for  an  undisclosed 
lessee.  Thus  a  lease  signed  by  a  person  in  the  capacity  of  a 
lessee  in  his  individual  name,  is  binding  on  him  individually, 
though  it  may  be  recited  in  the  lease  that  he  is  acting  for  an- 
other. The  lease  is  his  individual  lease  and  he  and  not  his 
principal  is  liable  on  the  covenant  to  pay  the  rent  though  the 
principal  may  have  had  the  use  and  occupation  during  the  term. 
The  covenants  in  such  a  lease  can  be  enforced  only  by  or 
against  the  person  who  actually  covenants  though  in  fact  he 
covenants  for  another's  benefit  and  this  fact  is  known  to  the 
lessor.  Nor  can  he  escape  individual  liability  where  he  signs  as 
an  individual  merely  by  showing  he  was  authorized  to  sign  the 
lease  as  an  agent  and  that  he  intended  to  do  so  as  an  agent  and 
not  as  a  principal.  For  the  intention  of  the  parties  under  such 
circumstances  is  a  question  of  fact  and  the  presumption  is  that 
it  was  intended  to  be  binding  on  the  agent  as  an  individual 
unless  an  express  ratification  by  the  principal  is  proved.*^  But, 
while  parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  exonerate  the  agent 
of  an  undisclosed  principal  from  his  liability  for  rent  on  a  lease 
where  the  liability  of  his  principal  on  the  covenants  does  not 
appear  upon  the  face  of  the  lease**  such  evidence  is  received  to 
charge  the  principal  upon  a  lease  and  to  enable  him  to  sue  or 
to  be  sued  thereon.^"  A  tenant  who  has  enjoyed  the  use  and 
occupation  of  the  premises,  cannot  defend  in  an  action  for  the 
rent  by  showing  that  the  lease  was  not  signed  by  the  landlord 
as  the  principal.  Thus  in  an  action  against  the  tenant  upon 
notes  given  for  rent  the  defendant  is  estopped  to  show  that  the 
lease  was  not  signed  by  the  real  owner,  where  the  tenant  had  in 
fact  signed  the  lease,  and  the  real  owner's  agent  had  signed 
his  name  individually  in  place  of  that  of  the  owner."  So  that  a 
person  who  styles  himself  in  the  lease  "sole  lessor,"  and  signs 
the  lease  with  his  own  name,  followed  by  the  word  agent  is,  so 

*7  Bedford  v.   Kelly,    61    Pa.   St.  <»  Higgins   v.    Senior,    8   Mee.   & 

491.  Wei.  844. 

48  Kiersted  v.  O.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  so  Hlggins   v.    Senior,    8   Mee.   & 

69  N.  Y.  343,  1  Hun   (N.  Y.)   151,  Wei.  844;  Humphrey  v.  Dale,  7  E. 

55    How.    Prac.    51;    Whitford    v.  &  B.  266. 

Laidler,  25  Hun   (N.  Y.)   136,  140.  si  Lagerfelt  v.   McKie,   100  Ala. 

430,  14  So.  Rep.  281. 


108  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

far  as  .the  lessee  is  concerned,  the  landlord  and  he  alone  can 
recover  rent  and  distrain  for  the  non-payment  therefor.^^  And 
generally  an  agent  who  has  the  full  management  of  his  prin- 
cipal's real  estate  with  the  power  to  rent  it,  may  maintain  an 
action  for  the  possession  of  the  premises  where  a  tenant  to 
whom  the  agent  has  leased  it,  fails  to  pay  the  rent.^^  A  prin- 
cipal may  ratify  a  lease  which  was  executed  by  his  agent  as  a 
lessor  in  such  manner  as  to  bind  the  agent  only.  After  the  prin- 
cipal has  I'atified  the  lease,  he  may  sue  upon  any  covenant  •"'* 
contained  in  the  lease  signed  by  his  agent.  A  lease  executed  by 
the  agent  in  which  he  exceeds  the  authority  conferred  upon  him 
by  the  principal  without  the  knowledge  of  the  party  with  whom 
he  is  contracting  though  it  may  not  bind  the  principal,  is  bind- 
ing upon  the  agent.  But  when  an  agent  acts  in  good  faith  and 
discloses  to  the  other  contracting  party  the  extent  of  his  real 
authority  the  lease  will  not  be  obligatory  upon  the  agent  in 
case  it  shall  turn  out  that  he  has  exceeded  his  authority.^^  For 
if  the  party  contracting  with  him  actually  knows  the  extent  of 
his  authority  and  accepts  a  lease  from  him  which  is  in  excess  of 
his  authority,  he  must  take  the  consequences.-''^ 

§  79.  Undisclosed  principal  where  a  lease  is  under  seal.  The 
principal  cannot  maintain  an  action  for  rent  on  a  covenant  in 
a  lease  under  seal  which  is  executed  by  the  agent  only  under  the 
agent's  seal  and  which  does  not  disclose  the  fact  that  the  prin- 
cipal is  a  party  to  it.  An  action  upon  such  a  sealed  instrument 
must  be  brought  by  a  party  to  it  and  can  be  brought  by  no 
other  person.  The  agent  who  executes  a  lease  under  his  own 
name  and  seal  is  alone  responsible  for  he  and  not  his  principal 
has  entered  into  the  covenants  and  inasmuch  as  he  alone  can  be 
held  liable  for  the  performance  of  these  covenants  it  follows 
that  he  alone  can  enforce  the  obligations  which  are  incumbent 
on  the  other  party.  Where  the  agent  of  the  owner  executes  a 
lease  under  the  name  and  seal  of  himself  and  not  of  his  prin- 

f.2  Seyfert    v.    Bean,    83    Pa.    St.  P.  C.  547;  Fenn  v.  Harrison,  3  T. 

450,  34  L.  I.  213.  R.   758. 

■'^-  Hinckley  v.  Guyon,  172  Mass.  (".g  Sinclair    v.    Jackson,    8    Cow. 

412,  52  N.  E.  Rep.  523.  (N.   Y.)    543;    Galewski   v.   Appel- 

M  Brooks  V.  Cook   (Ala.),  38  So.  baum,  32  Misc.  Rep.  203,  65  N.  Y. 

Rep.  641.  Supp.  694, 

65  Hamilton  v.  Clanricard,  5  Bro.. 


LEASES  BY  AGENTS.  109 

cipal  he  and  not  the  owner  is  the  proper  person  to  bring  an 
action  for  the  rent.'^^  The  executor  of  an  e.'itate  cannot  sue  on 
a  lease  executed  under  seal  by  an  agent  in  the  agent's  name 
as  lessor  where  the  lease  does  not  show  who  was  the  principal.'* 
The  contrary  rule  is  recognized  where  there  is  a  written  lease 
not  under  seal.  It  may  then  be  shown  by  parol  that  the  prin- 
cipal and  not  the  agent  is  the  real  party  in  interest  and  the  un- 
disclosed principal  may  sue  as  landlord  to  recover  the  rent.^® 
But  the  fact  that  a  lease  is  not  required  to  be  under  seal  does 
not  always  permit  a  lease  actually  under  seal  to  be  regarded  as 
a  simple  contract  and  allow  an  undisclosed  principal  to  sue 
thereon.  Under  some  circumstances  a  seal  may  be  treated  as 
surplusage.  Thus  if  it  appear  on  the  face  of  the  sealed  instru- 
ment itself  that  the  lease  was  actually  made  on  behalf  of  the 
principal  and  from  parol  evidence  that  he  has  derived  a  benefit 
from  it,  he  may  sue  and  be  sued  on  it,  though  it  has  been  signed 
only  by  the  agent  in  his  own  name.  The  mere  fact  that  an  agent 
signs  a  sealed  lease  as  agent  not  mentioning  the  name  of  the 
principal  either  in  the  signature  or  in  any  part  of  the  lease 
is  not  enough  alone  to  admit  parol  evidence  of  the  existence 
of  the  principal  or  to  permit  the  principal  to  sue  thereon.®*' 

sTSchaeffer  v.  Henkel,  75  N.  Y,  153;     Brooks    v.    Cook    (Ala.),    81 

378,  381,  7  Abb.  N.  C.  1;  Briggs  v.  Pac.    Rep.    247. 

Partridge,  64  N.  Y.  357.  eo  Manett  v.    Simpson,    61    Hun, 

58  McColgan   v.   Katz,   60   N.    Y.  620,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  448.    See  Hays 

Supp.  291,  29  Misc.  Rep.  136.  T.    Moody,    2    N,    Y.    Supp.    385; 

68  Bryant  v.  Wells,  56  N.  H.  152,  Hardy  v.  Williams,  31  N.  Car.  177. 


CHAPTER  V. 
THE  CHARACTER  OF  THE  PROPERTY  WHICH  MAY  BE  LEASED. 

S  80.  What  may  be  leased. 

81.  A  lease  of  land  held  adversely. 

82.  Leases  of  public  land. 

83.  The  lease  of  land  or  houses  with  chattels  to  be  used  therewith. 

84.  Lease  of  surplus  waters  of  canaLs. 

85.  Leases  by  a  tenant  in  dower  or  curtesy. 

86.  Agricultural  leases  in  New  York. 

87.  The  power  to  lease  a  homestead. 

83.     The  lease  of  a  portion  of  a  homestead. 

89.    The  mode  of  the  execution  of  a  lease  of  a  homestead. 

§  80.  What  may  be  leased.  At  the  common  law  not  only 
land  itself  but  all  chattels  and  heriditaments,  corporeal  or  in- 
corporeal, might  be  the  subject  of  a  lease.  Thus,  an  advowson^ 
might  be  leased.  So,  also,  corrodies,^  estovers,^  ferries,*  fish- 
eries,°  offices,  franchises,*^  rights  to  tolls,  '^  rights  of  common,^ 
rights  of  way,^  and  rights  of  herbage,^"  may  be  the  subject  of  a 
lease  at  common  law.  So,  a  stall  in  a  market  may  be  leased.^^  So, 
also,  there  may  be  a  lease  of  the  right  to  take  herbage,  timber 
or  minerals  from  the  land  ;^-  of  water  power,^^  and  of  the  priv- 
ilege of  putting  up  advertising  sig-ns  upon  a  wall,^*  all  of  which 

•1  Anonymous,  3  Dyer,  323,  b.  pi.  s  Luney  v.  Brown,  Lutch.  99. 

30.  » Newmarch     v.     Brandling,     3 

2  Bacon's  Abr.  tit.   Leases    (A).  Swanst,  99;   Osborn  v.  Wise,  7  C. 

sBro.  Abr.  tit.  Leases,  40;    Ba-  &  P.  761,  764. 

con's  Abr.  tit.  Leases  (A) ;  1  Piatt  i"  Hill    v.    Barry,    Hayes    &   Jo, 

on  Leases,  24.  688. 

4  Peter  v.  Kendal,  6  B.  &  C.  703,  n  Washington     Market     Co.     v. 

711;   Hansen  v.  Kirtley,  11  Iowa,  Hoffman,  101  U.  S.  112,  25  L.  Ed. 

565.  782. 

6  Duke  of  Somerset  v.  Fogwell,  12  Maring  v.  Ward,  50  N.  Car. 
5  B.  &  C.  875,  884;  Eastham  v.  An-  272,  275. 

derson,  119  Mass.  526,  530;  Water-  i3  Channel  v.  Merrifleld,  206  111. 

town  v.  White,  13  Mass.  477.  278,  69  N.  E.  Rep.  32. 

«  2  Inst.  221,  400.  n  Landau  v.  O.  J.  Gude  Co.,  84 

7  Harris  v.  Morricc,  10  M.  &  W.  N.  Y.  Supp.  672. 
260. 


CHARACTER  OF  PROPERTY  WHICH  MAY  BE  LEASED.  Ill 

are  distinct  from  a  lease  of  tlie  land  itself  and  do  not  pass  any 
interest  in  the  land  except  to  occupy  it  temporarily  within  the 
limits  of  the  authority  expressly  conferred. 

§  81.  A  lease  of  land  held  adversely.  At  the  common  law  an 
actual  or  constructive  possession  of  the  land  by  the  lessor  is 
always  required  as  the  basis  of  a  lease.  Hence,  it  follows  that 
a  lease  in  presenti  creating  a  right  to  an  immediate  possession  in 
the  lessee,  executed  and  delivered  while  the  premises  demised 
are  in  the  adverse  possession  of  a  third  person  is  absolutely 
void.^°  So  far  as  the  validity  of  the  lease  is  concerned  it  does 
not  matter  whether  the  adverse  possession  has  or  has  not  ripened 
into  a  title,  or  whether  the  lessor  knew  of  the  adverse  posses- 
sion or  not.^*  In  some  cases  by  statute  it  is  provided  that  prop- 
erty held  adversely  may  be  transferred.  Such  a  statute  vali- 
dates a  lease  of  property  in  the  adverse  possession  of  another 
than  the  lessor.^'  A  lease  by  a  person  against  whom  property 
is  held  adversely  to  the  person  who  claims  title  against  him  is 
valid.  The  execution  of  the  lease  puts  an  end  to  the  adverse 
possession  because  by  it  the  occupant  admits  its  ownership  to  be 
in  the  lessor  which  he  will  be  subsequently  estopped  to  deny.^^ 
But  the  rule  that  land  held  adversely  cannot  be  the  subject  of  a 
valid  lease  at  the  common  law  does  not  apply  to  the  case  of  a 
lease  which  is  to  take  effect  as  soon  as  another  lease  which  is 
then  in  existence  shall  terminate.  The  rule  does  not  apply  to 
leases  in  reversion.  The  possession  of  the  tenants  is  then  not 
adverse  to  the  landlord.  During  the  possession  of  the  first  ten- 
ant the  lessee  under  the  lease  in  reversion  is  the  owner  of  an 
interesse  termini  which  vests  in  possession  at  the  expiration  of 
the  earlier  lease.  This  lease  may  be  granted  with  or  without  a 
deed.^"  Unless  the  common  law  rule  is  superseded  by  a  statute 
the  only  mode  by  which  one  whose  land  is  held  adversely  may 
lease  it  is  by  the  execution  of  a  lease  and  the  delivery  of  it  in 
escrow  to  a  third  person  with  a  power  of  attorney  to  make  an 

15  Iseham  v.  Morrice,  Cro.  Car.  623,  16  Pac.  Rep.  5011,  5  Am.  St. 
109.  Rep.  479. 

16  Sohier  v.  Coffin,  101  Mass.  179,  is  Abbey,  etc.,  Ass'n  v.  Welland, 
183.     See  Warner  v.  Bull,  13  Met.  48  Cal.  614. 

(Mass.)  1.  19  Winter   v.    Loveday,    2    Salk. 

17  Lewis  V.  Brandle,  107  Mich.  537;  Clarges  v.  Funucan,  2  Doug. 
7,  9;  Rice  v.  Whitmore,  74  Cal.  619,      565,  568;  Smith  v.  Day,  2  M.  &  W. 

684,  699. 


112  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

entry  upon  the  land  and  to  deliver  the  lease  to  the  lessee  after 
the  entry  and  while  in  actual  possession.  The  common  law 
authority  regulating  this  method  of  procedure  will  be  found  in 
the  notes.-"  A  lease  for  years  executed  by  an  heir  after  the 
death  of  his  ancestor  but  before  his  own  actual  entry  on  the 
land  which  is  required  to  vest  him  with  the  possession  at  the 
common  law  is  valid.  The  law  presumes  that  he  is  in  posses- 
sion the  instant  the  ancestor  dies.  If,  however,  a  stranger  to 
the  title  actually  enters  before  the  heir  takes  possession  and 
sets  up  an  adverse  possession  to  the  heir,  the  lease  of  the  heir 
will  be  void  at  common  law.-^ 

§  82.  Leases  of  public  land.  Vacant  or  unappropriated  pub- 
lic land  which  is  owned  by  the  state  or  the  United  States  and 
which  is  subject  to  pre-emption  by  settlers  cannot  be  leased  in 
the  absence  of  a  statute  permitting  it.^-  In  some  States  the 
leasing  of  public  land  by  the  state  or  the  county  is  permitted 
by  statute.  A  lease  which  is  contrary  to  the  statute  is  invalid 
and  passes  no  title  to  the  lessee.  The  invalidity  of  the  lease  is 
absolute  and  beyond  the  effect  of  subsequent  curative  statutes." 
The  statutory  provisions  regulating  the  leasing  of  public  land 
have  for  their  object  either  the  prohibition  of  the  making  of 
leases  by  the  public  authorities  or  the  prohibition  of  the  making 
of  leases  by  the  claimants  of  the  land.  In  the  absence  of  an  ex- 
press statutory  prohibition  a  lease  of  public  land  which  is 
executed  by  a  claimant  to  it  before  his  entry  has  been  per- 
fected by  him,  is  valid.  If  the  title  has  been  perfected  in  the 
claimant  and  he  has  occupied  the  land  he  will  unquestionably 
have  the  same  right  to  lease  it  as  any  other  owner,-*  but  if  it 
appears  to  be  the  intent  of  the  parties  to  the  lease  that  the  lessee 
of  the  claimant  shall  enter  upon  the  land  and  occupy  it  under 
the  lease  before  the  title  of  the  claimant  has  been  confirmed  or 
perfected  according  to  law  it  is  very  doubtful  if  the  lease 
would  be  obligatory  on  the  claimant  who  subsequently  enters 

20  4  Bacon's  Abr.  tit.  Leases  (H)  22  Turner  v.   Ferguson,    33    Tex. 
4;   Co.  Litt.  48&;    Sharp  v.  Sharp,       505,  508,  509. 

Cro.  Eliz.  483;    Stephens  v.  Eliot,  23  Sexton  v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of 

id.  484;  Jennings  v.  Bragg,  id.  447;  Coahoma,  86  Miss.  380,  38  So.  Rep. 

Davis  V.  Bridges,  2  Roll's  Abr.  25.  636. 

21  Comyn's     Digest,     tit.     Seizin  24  Tiernan  v.  Miller,  69  Neb.  764, 
(A),   Sheppard's  Touchstone,  269.  96  N.  W.  Rep.  661. 


CHARACTER  OF  PROPERTY  WHICH  MAY  BE  LEASED.  IIS 

and  attempts  to  repudiate  the  lease.^'  Where  a  lease  by  a 
patentee  of  public  land  who  has  entered  upon  it  is  valid,  his 
lessee  has  the  same  rights  during  the  term  to  the  possession  and 
enjoyment  of  the  land  as  has  any  other  tenant.-^ 

§  83.  The  lease  of  land  or  houses  with  chattels  to  be  used 
therewith.  In  England  the  validity  of  leases  of  chattels  is  ad- 
mitted. Thus  a  lease  of  a  dwelling  house  and  the  furniture  or 
of  a  mill  and  the  machinery  in  it  is  valid.  During  the  term  for 
which  chattels  are  leased  the  tenant  has  an  interest  in  them  as 
will  deprive  the  owner  or  landlord  of  his  possession  of  them. 
The  relation  of  the  landlord  to  the  chattels  is  precisely  the  same 
as  the  relation  of  the  landlord  of  the  land  to  the  demised  laud. 
By  the  execution  of  the  lease  for  a  term  the  landlord  is  pre- 
vented from  bringing  an  action  against  a  third  party  for  any 
injury  to  the  cliattels  during  the  term  which  does  not  amount  ta 
a  permanent  destruction  of  them.  This  rule  has  been  applied 
to  leases  of  furnished  houses.  Thus,  wdiere  the  landlord  of  a. 
house  demises  it  furnished  to  a  tenant,  and  the  furniture  of  the 
house  belonging  to  the  landlord  but  in  the  actual  possession 
of  the  tenant  is  taken  from  the  house  on  an  execution  against 
the  tenant,  the  landlord  cannot  recover  in  trespass  for  th^- 
goods  against  the  sheriff  though  the  sheriff  knew  that  the 
landlord  owned  the  furniture.  For  in  this  case  the  injury  is  not 
to  the  landlord  but  to  the  tenant  by  depriving  him  of  the  use 
of  the  furniture.^^  And  the  tenant  may  therefore  sue.  Nor  can 
a  landlord  under  such  circumstances  where  the  chattels  which 
he  has  leased  to  a  tenant  are  taken  by  a  third  person  maintaiu 
an  action  of  trover  or  conversion  to  recover  the  chattels  for  the 
right  to  the  possession  of  the  chattels  continues  in  the  tenant 
during  the  term,  and  the  only  action  which  the  landlord  may 
maintain  during  the  term  in  regard  to  the  chattels  is  an  action 
for  the  destruction  or  their  substantial  and  permanent  impair- 
ment.^® 

25  Orrell  v.  Bay  Mfg.  Co.  (Miss.  affords   an  answer  to   it.     If,   in- 

App.,  1906),  40  So.  Rep.  429.  stead  of  the  household  goods,  the 

28  Tiernan  v.  Miller  &  Leith,  69  goods  here  taken  had  been  ma- 
Neb.  764,  96  N.  Wj  Rep.  661.  chines  used  in  manufacture  which 

27  Ward  v.  Macauley,  17  R.  4S0.  had   been   leased  to   a   tenant,   no 

28  Gordon  v.  Harper,  7  T.  R.  9.  doubt  could  have  been  made  but 
In  this  case  the  court  said:  "The  that  the  sheriff  might  have  seized 
very  statement  of  the  proposition  them  under  an  execution  against. 


114 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


One  who  leases  a  farm  together  with  the  live  stock,  farm- 
ing tools,  and  other  articles  to  be  used  therewith  and  binds  him- 
self to  return  these  articles  of  personal  property  or  others  of 
equal  value  at  the  end  of  the  term,  acquires  thereby  no  absolute 
title  to  the  personal  property.  His  creditors  have  no  claim  to 
these  articles  of  personal  property  as  against  the  landlord, 
though  the  tenant  may  use  the  personal  property  during  the 
term  and  may  also  sell  it  providing  he  shall  return  property 
of  equal  value  at  the  end  of  the  term.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, it  will  be  necessary  at  the  expiration  of  the  term, 
whether  by  lapse  of  time  or  otherwise,  for  the  landlord  or  the 
tenant  to  determine  by  an  agreement  between  them,  or  by  some 
proceeding  of  an  equitable  nature,  who  owns  the  personal  prop- 
erty then  on  the  farm.  On  the  other  hand,  an  agreement  as  to 
the  ownership  of  such  property  may  be  implied  from  the  lan- 


the  tenant,  and  the  creditor  would 
have  been  entitled  to  the  bene- 
ficial use  of  the  property  during 
the  term;  the  difference  of  the 
goods,  then,  cannot  vary  the  law. 
The  cases  which  have  been  put  at 
the  bar  do  not  apply;  the  one  on 
which  the  greatest  stress  was  laid 
was  that  of  a  tenant  for  years  of 
land  whereon  timber  is  cut  down, 
in  which  case  it  was  truly  said, 
that  the  owner  of  the  inheritance 
might  maintain  trover  for  such 
timber,  notwithstanding  the  lease. 
But  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  only  right  of  the  tenant  is  to 
the  shade  of  the  trees  when  grow- 
ing, and  by  the  very  act  of  felling 
it,  his  right  is  absolutely  deter- 
mined; and  even  then  the  property 
does  not  vest  in  his  immediate 
landlord,  for  if  he  has  only  an  es- 
tate for  life,  it  will  go  over  to  the 
owner  of  the  inheritance.  Here, 
however,  the  tenant's  right  of  pos- 
session during  the  term  cannot  be 
divested  by  any  wrongful  act,  nor 
can  it  thereby  be  revested  in  the 
landlord.     I  forbear  to  deliver  any 


opinion  as  to  what  remedy  the 
landlord  has  in  this  case,  not  being 
at  present  so  called  upon  to  do; 
but  it  is  clear  that  he  cannot  main- 
tain trover."  Ashurst,  J.,  said: 
"I  have  always  understood  the  rule 
of  law  to  be,  that  in  order  to  main- 
tain trover,  the  plaintiff  must  have 
a  right  of  property  in  the  thing 
and  a  right  of  possession,  and  that 
unless  both  these  rights  concur 
the  action  will  not  lie.  Now,  here 
it  is  admitted  that  the  tenant  had 
the  right  of  possession  during  the 
continuance  of  his  term,  and  con- 
sequently one  of  the  requisites  is 
wanting  to  the  landlord's  right  of 
action.  It  is  true  that  in  the  pres- 
ent case  it  is  not  probable  that  the 
furniture  can  be  of  any  use  to  any 
other  than  the  actual  tenant  of 
the  premises;  but  supposing  the 
things  leased  had  been  manufac- 
turing engines,  there  is  no  reason 
why  a  creditor  seizing  them  under 
an  execution  should  not  avail  him- 
self of  the  beneficial  use  of  them 
during  the  term." 


CHARACTER  OF  PROPERTY  WHICH   MAY  BE  LEASED.  115 

guage  of  the  lease,  or  the  conduct  of  the  parties.  If,  for  example, 
the  landlord  attaches  the  stock  and  farming  implements  on  the 
farm  as  the  tenant's  property  when  the  lease  is  forfeited  and 
a  trustee  of  the  tenant.'  or  the  tenant  himself,  or  his  creditors 
sue  the  landlord  for  conversion  it  may  reasonably  be  implied 
that  the  parties  had  agreed  that  the  personal  property  belonged 
to  the  tenant.-'  Where  the  lessor  delivers  to  the  lessee  certain 
movable  personal  property,  as  stock,  feed  or  utensils  on  a  farm, 
which  are  to  be  used  by  the  lessee  in  connection  with  his  occu- 
pation of  the  leased  premises,  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  lessee, 
with  a  proviso  that  the  personal  property  is  to  be  returned  at 
the  end  of  the  term  a  bailment  or  lease  of  the  personal  property 
is  created  and  not  a  sale.  The  right  of  the  lessee  to  the  pos- 
session of  the  personal  property  during  the  term  is  paramount 
to  the  right  of  the  lessor  and,  a  fortiori  to  the  right  of  an  at- 
taching creditor  of  the  lessor.  The  property  cannot  legally  be 
taken  out  of  his  possession  as  his  right  thereto  is  perfect  and 
absolute  but  only  for  the  term.^°  One  who  hires  a  furnished 
house  must  determine  for  himself  what  articles  of  furniture 
he  shall  claim  as  within  the  lease.  It  is  his  duty  when  the 
lease  is  executed  to  make  a  personal  examination  of  the  prem- 
ises in  order  to  ascertain  what  furniture  is  contained  therein, 
and,  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement  to  the  contrary,  it  will  be 
presumed  that  by  the  lease  of  a  house  together  with  the  fur- 
niture therein  the  tenant  takes  only  the  furniture  that  is  ac- 
tually contained  in  the  house  at  the  execution  of  the  lease.  A 
lease  of  a  house  with  the  furniture  therein  raises  no  implied 
covenant  on  the  part  of  the  landlord  that  the  house  is  completely 
furnished.  Nor  can  the  tenant  prove  by  parol  evidence  that 
the  landlord  orally  promises  to  supply  any  deficiency  in  the 
furniture.^^ 

29  Wilson  V.  Griswold,  79  Conn.  supply  all  deficiencies  in  the  fur- 
18,  66  Atl.  Rep.  783.  niture  was   rejected.     The  tenant 

30  Smith  V.  Niles,  20  Vt.  315,  320,  never  went  into  possession,  but 
49  Am.  Dec.  782.  See  note  1  Dyer,  sued  to  have  the  lease  cancelled 
767.  for    fraud    or    reformed    on    the 

31  Wilson  V.  Deen,  74  N.  Y.  531.  ground  of  mistake,  and  the  court 
In  this  case  an  offer  of  evidence  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  no  re- 
by  the  tenant  that  the  landlord  lief,  no  fraud  or  mistake  being 
orally  promised  at  the  time  of  the  shown. 

execution    of    a    written    lease    to 


116  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  84,  Lease  of  surplus  waters  of  canals.  In  many  of  the 
states  it  is  by  statute  provided  that  a  private  corporation  or  the 
State  itself  controlling  and  operating  a  canal  may  lease  the  use 
of  the  surplus  water  which  accumulates  in,  and  which  is  not 
required  for  the  operation  and  maintenance  of  the  canals.  Where 
a  lease  of  this  sort  is  made  the  lessor  reserving  the  right  to 
resume  the  possession  of  the  water  when  it  is  needed  for  naviga- 
tion, the  lessee  takes  the  lease  subject  to  the  implied  right  of 
the  State  to  discontinue  its  canals  whenever  the  legislature 
deems  it  expedient  to  do  so.^-  So  generally  even  though  by 
express  reservation  of  this  sort  may  be  inserted  in  the  lease,  the 
lease  so-called  is  in  law  a  mere  license  to  use  the  surplus  water, 
and  hence  without  any  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  State  to 
create  or  to  maintain  a  surplus  of  water.  The  abandonment  of 
the  canal  as  a  canal  imposes  no  liability  for  damages  on  the 
State  for  the  agreement  is  a  license  and  it  is  hence  revocable, 
unless  an  express  provision  be  inserted  to  the  contrary.^^  For 
canals  are  authorized,  constructed  and  maintained  by  the  State 
for  pblic  purposes  only  and  as  an  aid  to  the  farming  and  mer- 
cantile classes  of  the  community  in  forwarding  heavy  freight 
cheaply  from  one  part  of  the  state  to  another.  They  are  not 
primarily  designed  to  afford  cheap  water  power  to  be  leased 
or  sold  for  use  by  private  persons  or  corporations.  Hence  the 
latter  use  is  subordinate  to  the  general  public  use  for  traffic-, 
and  the  right  to  this  private  use  may  be  terminated  by  the 
State  whenever,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  it  abandons 
or  relinquishes  the  primary  and  public  use.^* 

32  Fox  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  104  U.  S.  743,  26  Law  Ed.  928;  Fish- 
U.  S,  743,  26  Law  ed.  928;  Wa-  back  v.  Woodruff,  51  Ind.  102; 
bash,  etc..  Canal  Trustees  v.  Butt,  Hoagland  v.  New  Yorlt,  C.  &  St. 
2.5  Ind.  49;  Armstrong  v.  Pennsyl-  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  Ind.  443,  13  N,  E. 
vania  R.  Co.,  38  N.  J.  Law,  1;  Hop-  Rep.  472,  affirming,  111  Ind.  443, 
poclt  V.  United  New  .Jersey  R.,  etc.,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  80;  Hubbard  v.  City 
Co.,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  286;  Bucliingliam  of  Toledo,  21  Ohio  St.  379;  Com- 
V.  Smith,  10  Ohio,  288;  Cooper  v,  monwealth  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
Williams,  4  Ohio,  253,  22  Am.  Dec.  51  Pa.  St,  351, 

745,  5  Ohio,  391,  24  Am.  Dec.  299;  34  Little  Miami  Elev.  Co.  v.  City 

Kankauna    Water    Power    Co.    v.  of    Cincinnati,    30    Ohio    St.    629, 

Green  Bay,  etc.,  Canal  Co.,  142  U.  where  an  abandoned  canal  was  by 

S.   254,    12    S.   Ct.   173,    35   L.    Ed.  a  municipal  corporation  converted 

1004.  into    a    highway.      A    statute    au- 

33  Fox  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  104  thorizing  payment  for  the  damage 


CIIAUACTER  OF  PROPERTY  WHICH   MAY  BE  LEASED.  117 

If  the  lease  of  surplus  water  expressly  i)enuits  a  resumption 
of  the  water  whenever  in  the  opinion  of  the  State  officials  the 
lease  shall  cease  to  be  of  advantage  to  the  State,  no  reason  need 
be  given  for  the  action  of  the  officials  ^^  in  resuming  the  use  of 
the  water  nor  is  the  lessee  entitled  to  compensation  or  damages. 
And  where  a  statute  provides  that  every  lease  of  surplus  canal 
waters  shall  contain  a  reservation  to  the  lessor  of  the  privilege 
of  resuming  the  use  of  such  water  wherever  it  is  necessary 
to  do  so  an  agreement  by  State  officials  with  the  lessee,  that  when 
he  is  deprived  of  the  use  of  the  water  under  this  reservation  the 
State  shall  compensate  him  for  his  permanent  erection  of  mills 
or  the  like  is  invalid  as  a  contract  tending  to  retard  or  prevent 
the  proper  performance  of  official  duty.^®  Hence  under  such  a 
lease  a  lessee  who  builds  dams,  mills  or  factories  cannot  re- 
cover the  value  of  the  same  when  the  lease  is  unexpectedly  ter- 
minated by  the  State.  Successive  lessees  of  the  power  to  be 
derived  from  surplus  water  of  a  canal  not  required  for  the  use 
and  operation  of  the  canal,  must,  in  case  the  surplus  becomes 
inadequate  to  supply  all  of  them  sufficiently,  be  supplied  in  the 
order  of  the  execution  of  their  leases.^"  in  point  of  priority  in 
time  according  to  the  dates  on  which  their  respective  leases  were 
executed.^^- 

which  has  been  caused  by  the  ed.  917.  If,  however,  a  company- 
state  resuming  leased  surplus  owning  a  canal  has  been  holding 
water  of  a  canal  does  not  apply  the  canal  out  as  a  source  of 
to  a  lease  permitting  a  revocation  water  supply  for  power  and  ex- 
or  resumption  without  payment  of  pensive  manufacturing  establish- 
damages.  Ex  parte  Miller,  2  Hill  ments  have  been  erected  along  the 
(N.  Y.)  418.  banks  of  the  canal  in  reliance  on 

35  Ex  parte  Miller,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  obtaining  power,  the  company,  in 

418;   Mattoon  v.   Munroe,  21  Hun  equity,  may  be  compelled  to  lease 

(N.  Y.)  474.  its  surplus  water,  if  it  be  reason- 

S6  State     V.     Board     of     Public  ably   within   its   power  to   do   so. 

Works,  42  Ohio  St.  607.  Millers  v.  Augusta,  63  Ga.  772.    In 

3'  Wabash  &  E.  Canal  Trustees  one   case    it   was   held    to   be    the 

V.  Reinhart,  22  Ind.  463.  clear  duty  of  the  state  to  lease  cer- 

38  Usually   the   state  or  a   com-  tain  water  of  a  state-owned  canal 

pany  operating  a  canal  is  not  re-  where  the  legislature  of  the  state 

garded  as  bound  to  lease  surplus  had  provided  that  the  contractors 

water  to  all  applicants  in  the  ab-  who  had  dug  it  were  to  be  paid 

sence     of     statute     requiring     it.  out    of    the    rents    of    the    water- 

Buiney  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  Canal  power.     French  v.  Gapen,   105  U. 

Co.,    8    Pet.    (U.    S.)    201,   8    Law.  S.  509,  26  Law  Ed.  951. 


118  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  85.  Leases  by  a  tenant  in  dower  or  curtesy.  Inasmuch  as 
the  right  of  dower  is  during  the  lifetime  of  the  husband  and 
Until  dower  is  assigned  to  the  widow  a  mere  personal  right  and 
confers  no  estate  in  the  land,  it  is  not  capable  of  being  leased.'® 
However,  after  dower  has  been  assigned  to  her,  a  Avidow  may 
lease  the  land  which  she  holds  in  dower  for  a  term  or  for  her 
life.  The  rights  of  the  lessee  of  the  widow  are  the  same  as  the 
rights  of  any  lessee  of  any  tenant  for  life.  It  has  been  held 
that  a  covenant  contained  in  a  so-called  lease  of  the  right  to 
have  dower  assig-ned  by  which  the  tenant  agrees  to  pay  the 
widow  rent  in  consideration  of  her  forbearing  to  exercise  her 
right  to  dower,  is  a  personal  covenant.  Hence,  it  does  not  run 
with  the  land  so  as  to  bind  the  tenant's  assignee.  Nor  is  the 
widow's  contract  a  release  of  her  dower  if  it  is  merely  an 
agreement  on  her  part  to  forbear  asserting  her  dower  for  a  cer- 
tain time.***  The  tenant  of  an  estate  by  the  curtesy  may  execute 
a  lease  to  the  same  extent  as  a  tenant  of  any  other  life  estate. 
Where  the  husband  during  the  lifetime  of  the  wife  with  or 
without  her  consent,  leases  her  land  for  a  term,  the  vesting  in 
him  of  the  estate  by  the  curtesy  will  validate  his  lease  to  the 
extent  that  the  term  is  unexpired.  But,  if  before  the  death  of 
the  wife  the  husband  makes  a  lease  of  her  land  in  his  own  name 
and  agrees  to  confer  the  possession  on  the  lessee  when  the  lessor 
shall  become  a  tenant  by  the  curtesy  the  future  lease  is  subject 
to  being  defeated  by  the  act  of  the  wife  in  conveying  or  devising 
to  another  than  her  husand  her  real  property,*^  as  a  result  of 
which  the  husband's  estate  by  the  curtesy  is  defeated. 

55  86.  Agricultural  leases  in  New  York.  In  New  York,  prior 
to  the  constitutional  provision  which  we  are  now  to  discuss,  a  very 
large  portion  of  the  manorial  lands  were  leased  in  fee,  or  for 
very  long  terms,  by  their  proprietors  reserving  an  annual  rent 
in  money,  produce  or  services.  As  the  population  increased  and 
farming  became  widespread  it  was  very  soon  apparent  that 
such  a  mode  of  land  tenure  was  unfavorable  to  progress  for  the 
tenants,  owning  only  the  usufruct,  subject  at  any  moment  to  be 
forfeited  by  breach  of  condition,  felt  none  of  the  pride  of  in- 

3«  Chicago,  B.  &  D.  Ry.  v.  Kelly,  <»  Croade  v.  Ingraham,  13  Pick. 

221    111.    498,   77    N.   B.    Rep.    619;  (Mass.)   33,  35,  36. 

Hyatt  V.  O'Connell,  130  Iowa,  567,  11  Porch  v.  Fries,  18  N.  J.  Eq- 

107  N.  W.  599.  204,  209. 


CHARACTER  OF  PROPERTY  WHICH  MAY  BE  LEASED.  110 

dependent  ownership  and  had  no  desire  or  incentive  to  improve 
or  even  to  cultivate  in  a  husbandlike  manner,  land  which  was 
liable  at  any  time  to  pass  from  them  or  their  heirs  without  com- 
pensation. To  remedy  this  evil  the  framers  of  the  constitution  of 
1846,  abrogated  such  tenures  and  provided  furthermore  "that 
no  lease  or  grant  of  agricultural  land  for  longer  period  than 
twelve  years,  thereafter  made,  in  which  should  be  reserved  any 
rent  or  service  of  any  kind,  should  be  valid."  The  rents  or 
services  mentioned  are  only  such  as  are  certain  and  periodical 
and  issue  out  of  the  land  and  are  paid  for  its  use.  Construing 
the  New  York  statute  some  of  the  cases  have  held  that  a  lease 
for  more  than  twelve  years  is  void  in  toto.*-  Other  cases  have 
held  that  the  lease  is  good  for  the  period  limited  by  the  statute 
or  constitution  but  that  it  is  void  as  to  the  excess  of  the  term 
over  that  period.*^  So  a  lease  of  farm  land  for  twelve  years 
or  a  covenant  to  renew  every  twelve  years  during  the  life  of  a 
landlord  is  void  except  as  to  the  first  twelve  years.**  A  lease 
of  farm  land  for  twelve  years  to  commence  at  the  expiration 
of  a  prior  term  of  eight  years  is  invalid.*^  Where  a  tenant 
holding  farm  land  under  a  valid  unexpired  lease  surrendered 
it  and  then  executes  two  leases,  one  for  eight  and  one  for  twelve 
years  to  run  successively,  the  two  leases  are  construed  together 
as  one  lease  and  both  are  invalid.  But  the  fact  of  their  in- 
validity does  not  revive  the  valid  lease  which  has  been  surren- 
dered.*® The  statutes  and  constitutional  prohibition  do  not  apply 
to  life  estates  or  to  leases  for  life  as  they  are  for  an  indefinite 
period  depending  for  their  duration  wholly  on  the  contingency 
of  death,  though  they  may  possibly  exceed  twelve  years  in 
duration.*^  For  as  a  general  rule  in  order  that  the  lease  shall 
be  void  it  must  in  fact  extend  beyond  the  twelve  year  period. 
The   possibility  that  it  may   extend  beyond  the   period  is  not 

42  0dell  V.  Durant,  62  N.  Y.  524;        (N.  Y.)   606,  14  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.) 
Clark  V.  Barnes,  76  N.  Y.  301,  32       418. 

Am.  Rep.  306.  *'^  Clark  v.  Barnes,  76  N.  Y.  301, 

43  Hart  V.  Hart,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)       304,  32  Am.  Rep.  706. 

606;    Robertson  v.  Hayes,  83  Ala.  46  Clark  v.  Barnes,  76  N.  Y.  301, 

290,  3  So.  Rep.  674;  Parish  v.  Rog-  304,  32  Am.  Rep.  706. 

ers,    20    App.    Div.    279,    46    N.   Y.  4-  Parish  v.  Rogers,  20  App.  Div. 

Supp.  1058.  279,  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  1058;   Wegner 

44  Becker  v.  De  Forest,  1  Swee-  v.  Lubenow,  12  N.  D.  95,  95  N.  W. 
ney,  52S;    Hart  v.  Hart,  22  Barb.  Rep.  442,  445. 


120 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


sufficient/^  A  statute  which  limits  the  duration  of  leases  in 
which  rent  or  service  is  reserved  does  not  apply  to  a  life  estate 
for  which  a  gross  sum  is  paid.  The  terms  of  the  statute  as  they 
are  restrictive  of  the  free  alienation  of  landed  property  will  not 
be  extended  by  construction.  The  terms  "rent  or  service"  will 
be  construed  in  their  strict  and  technical  sense.  Eent  is  usually 
a  profit  arising  out  of  the  income  or  yearly  profits  of  land,  and 
differs  from  a  lump  sum  paid  as  the  consideration  for  the  trans- 
fer of  an  estate  in  land.  Hence  a  life  lease  for  which  no  rent 
is  to  be  paid  is  not  void  under  the  statute  though  tlie  considera- 
tion for  it  be  paid  in  instalments  or  consist  of  services  so  long 
as  the  payment  or  rendition  of  services  be  not  made  by  way  of 
rent.*®  A  lease  of  agricultural  land  is  within  the  prohibition 
though  the  land  is  leased  for  other  than  agricultural  purposes, 
for  it  is  the  character  of  the  land,  not  the  purpose  of  its  use 
which  determines  the  validity  of  the  lease.^° 


<s  In  Parish  v.  Rogers,  20  App. 
Div.  279,  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  1058,  it 
is  said:  "A  particular  proliibition 
upon  the  free  alienation  of  prop- 
erty cannot  be  extended  or  en- 
larged beyond  the  terms  in  which 
the  restriction  is  expressed  by  the 
application  of  any  rule  of  liberal 
interpretation.  On  the  contrary, 
the  provision  must  be  made  to 
bear  a  restrictive  interpretation, 
and  be  limited  in  its  operation  and 
effect  by  the  language  employed. 
If  we  hold  that  an  estate  for  life 
is  per  se  an  estate  exceeding 
twelve  years  in  duration,  and 
therefore  void,  it  follows  that  such 
estate  in  agricultural  lands,  with 
a  reservation  of  rent,  are  entirely 
abrogated  and  the  owner  of  prop- 
erty is  prohibited  from  creating 
such  an  estate  either  for  his  own 
life  or  that  of  another.  .  .  . 
The  •  purpose  of  the  constitution 
was  not  to  Interdict  the  creation 
of  such  estates,  but  to  limit  the 
time  beyond  which  they  shall  not 
extend.     Where  the  time  is  speci- 


fied in  the  lease  and  exceeds  the 
limit  it  is  void  per  se,  but  where 
it  is  left  indefinite,  and  its  termi- 
nation depends  upon  the  contin- 
gency of  death,  which  may  happen 
within  the  period  of  limitation,  it 
cannot  be  said  to  be  void  ipso 
facto,  as  being  made  for  a  period 
longer  than  twelve  years." 

40  Stephens  v.  Reynolds,  6  N.  Y. 
454;  Wegner  v.  Lubenow,  12  N.  D. 
95,  95  N.  W.  Rep.  442,  444;  Par- 
sell  V.  Stryker,  41  N.  Y.  480.  The 
lease  "must  reserve  rent,  as  rent, 
payable  at  stated  periods,  and  a 
grant  or  lease  of  land  for  life  or 
for  a  long  term  of  years,  for  a 
specified  consideration,  whether 
payable  in  instalments  or  at  one 
time  is  not  such  a  lease."  Parsell 
v.  Strylter,  41  N.  Y.  480. 

soodell  V.  Durant,  62  N.  Y.  524, 
525.  In  Maryland  by  Acts  1884, 
page  649,  chapter  485,  it  is  pro- 
vided that  all  leases  for  a  period 
in  excess  of  fifteen  years  shall  be 
redeemable  at  the  option  of  the 
tenant   on    his    paying   a   sum   of 


CHARACTER  OF  PROPEETY  WHICH  MAY  BE  LEASED.  121 

§  87.  The  power  to  lease  a  homestead.  The  occupant  of  real 
estate  which  is  exempt  from  a  sale  under  execution  by  a  statute 
because  it  is  claimed  to  be  the  homestead  of  the  occupant  may 
execute  a  valid  lease  of  all  or  of  a  portion  of  the  same  to  the 
same  extent  as  the  owner  of  any  other  sort  of  real  estate.  This 
rule  is  subject  to  the  exception  that  where  the  owner  of  the 
homestead  is  a  married  man  it  is  usually  necessary  that  his  wife 
shall  join  in  the  lease.  As  between  the  homesteader  and  his 
lessee  the  validity  of  the  lease  cannot  be  questioned  by  either  on 
the  g-round  that  the  premises  are  the  homestead  of  the  lessor. 
This  rule  has  been  so  well  recognized  that  there  are  few,  if  any, 
direct  adjudications  upon  it.  Assuming  the  lease  itself  is 
valid  as  between  the  parties  to  it,  the  question  remains  to  be 
considered,  to  what  extent  third  parties  are  affected  by  it.  In 
other  words,,  the  question  is  to  what  extent  does  the  leasing  of 
a  homestead  by  the  owner  and  its  actual  occupation  thereafter 
by  the  lessee  constitute  an  abandonment  or  a  waiver  of  the  home- 
stead privilege  by  the  lessor  so  far  as  the  rights  of  his  creditors 
are  concerned?  The  waiver  or  abandonment  of  a  homestead 
exemption  once  established  in  good  faith  is  largely  a  matter  of 
intention  depending  on  the  circumstances  in  any  particular  case. 
Some  sort  of  an  occupancy  by  the  homesteader  is  essential  to 
the  existence  of  the  exemption.  But  actual  occupancy  of  the 
whole  tract  embraced  in  the  exemption  is  not  required.  This 
is  often  impracticable  or  very  inconvenient,  particularly  in  the 
case  of  farm  land  or  land  which  is  located  in  the  country.  Hence 
a  constructive  occupation  and  use  as  a  homestead  has  often 
been  held  sufficient  if  the  homestead  claim  continues  to  be  main- 
tained in  good  faith.  A  temporary  absence  although  it  may  be 
prolonged  for  months  and  perhaps  years,  is  not  of  itself  alone 
an  abandonment  of  the  right  and  the  fact  that  a  portion  and 
even  the  whole  of  the  land  is  rented  does  not  destroy  the  home- 
stead exemption  unless  the  statute  expressly  or  by  necessary 

money  which  is  to  be  fixed  under  being  remedial  must  be  liberally 

rules   therein   set   forth.     The  ob-  construed.     Its   provisions  cannot 

ject  of  the  statute  was  to  abolish  be  waived  by  the  consent  of  the 

long  leases  which  it  was  believed  parties.     It  applies  to  land  which 

were  injurious  to  the  prosperity  of  is  to  be  built  upon  as  well  as  to 

the  city  of  Baltimore.     Stewart  v.  land   which   has   buildings   on   it. 

Garter,  70   Md.   242,  16   Atl.   Rep.  Swan   v.   Kemp,  55  Atl.  Rep.   441, 

€44.  2  L.  R.  A.  711.     The  statute  443,  97  Md.  6S6. 


122 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


implication  requires  an  actual  occupancy  by  the  homestead 
claimant. ^^  Accordingly  it  has  been  held  that  the  leasing  of 
land  which  Mas  claimed  to  be  the  homestead  of  an  old  man  whose 
extreme  age  and  illness  compelled  him  to  i^eside  with  one  of  his 
children  elsewhere,'^-  or  the  leasing  of  the  homestead  by  a  per- 
son who,  for  reasons  of  his  own,  had  temporarily  removed  there- 
from ^^  but  intended  subsequently  to  return  thereto  ^*  cannot  be 
regarded  as  an  abandonment  of  the  homestead  and  hence  will  it 
not  subject  the  premises  to  be  levied  on  under  an  execution. ^^ 


51  Hixon  V.  George,  18  Kan.  253; 
Bank  v.  Warner,  22  Kan.  537;  Gar- 
linghouse  v.  Mulvane,  40  Kan. 
428,  19  Pac.  Rep.  798;  Shirack  v. 
Shirack,  44  Kan.  653,  24  Pac.  Rep. 
1107.  See,  also,  as  sustaining  the 
text,  Scaife  v.  Argall,  74  Ala.  473; 
Metcalf  V.  Smith,  106  Ala.  301.  17 
So.  Rep.  537;  Fuller  v.  Whitlock, 
99  Ala.  411,  13  So.  Rep.  80;  Hines 
V.  Duncan,  79  Ala.  112,  58  Am. 
Rep.  580;  Gates  v.  Steele,  48  Ark. 
539,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  53;  Simpson  v. 
Biffle,  63  Ark.  289,  38  S.  W.  Rep. 
345;  Dallemand  v.  Mannon,  4  Colo. 
App.  262,  35  Pac.  Rep.  679;  Simon- 
son  V.  Burr,  121  Cal.  582,  54  Pac. 
Rep.  87;  Stewart  v.  Brand,  23 
Iowa,  477;  Sibley  v.  Lawrence,  46 
Iowa,  563;  Pitney  v.  Eldridge,  58 
Kan.  215,  48  Pac.  Rep.  854;  Du- 
lanty  v.  Pynchon,  6  Allen  (Mass.), 
510;  Earll  v.  Earll,  60  Mich.  30, 
26  N.  W.  Rep.  822 ;  Spratt  v.  Early 
(Mo.),  69  S.  W.  Rep.  13;  Locke 
V.  Rowell,  47  N.  H.  46;  Wetz  v. 
Beard,  12  Ohio  St.  431;  Hancock 
V.  Morgan,  17  Tex.  582;  Newron  v. 
Calhoun,  68  Tex.  451,  4  S.  W.  Rep. 
645;  C.  B.  Carter  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Clay  (Tex.  1888),  10  S.  W.  Rep. 
293;  H.  P.  Drought  &  Co.  v.  Stall- 
worth  (Tex.  1907),  100  S.  W.  Rep. 
3  88.  Contra,  Benson  v.  Aitken,  17 
Cal.  163;  Burson  v.  Dow.  r,r,  111. 
146;    Smith   v.  Bunn,  75  Mo.  559; 


Warren  v.  Patterson,  32  Neb.  727, 
49  N.  W.  Rep.  703. 

52  Gates  V.  Steele,  48  Ark.  539,  4 
S.   W.   Rep.   53. 

53  Stewart  v.  Brand,  23  Iowa, 
477. 

54  Hixon  V.  George,  18  Kan.  253; 
Dulanty  v.  Pynchon,  6  Allen 
(Mass.)  510;  Earl  v.  Earl,  60 
Mich.  30,  26  N.  W.  Rep.  822;  Wetz 
V  Beard,  12  Ohio  St.  431;  Han- 
cock V.  Morgan,  17  Tex.  582;  Hines 
V.  Nelson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  24  S. 
W  Rep.  541. 

55  In  Alabama,  Code  1876,  sec- 
tion 2843,  provides  that  the  leas- 
ing of  a  homestead  for  a  period  of 
more  than  twelve  months  at  any 
one  time  shall  be  deemed  an  aban- 
donment of  it.  Under  this  statute 
a  lease  for  twelve  months,  with 
a  new  lease  to  begin  at  its  expira- 
tion, is  an  abandonment  of  the 
homestead.  Scaife  v.  Argall,  74 
Ala.  473.  In  California  the  leas- 
ing of  the  homestead  after  the 
death  of  the  wife  of  the  occupant, 
upon  an  agreement  by  the  lessee 
to  keep  the  occupant's  infant  child, 
is  an  abandonment  of  the  home- 
stead, though  some  furniture  was 
loft  in  the  house  and  the  debtor, 
after  his  remarriage,  reoccupied 
the  premises.  Benson  v.  Aitken.  17 
Cal.  163.  In  Texas  where  the 
plaintiffs  rented,  for  a  few  months. 


CHARACTER  OF  PROPERTY  WHICH   MAY  BE  LEASED. 


123 


§  88.  The  lease  of  a  portion  of  a  homestead.  Premises  which 
are  occupied  by  a  person  who  has  made  and  filed  a  declaration 
that  they  are  his  homestead,  are  no  less  his  homestead,  because 
he  leases  a  portion  of  them  to  anotJier  party  while  continuing  to 
occupy  the  remainder  himself. ^^  Hence  M'here  the  occupant  of  a 
homestead  leased  a  bam  on  his  premises,  and  temporarily  left 
his  residence  there,  he  did  not  lose  the  homestead  exemption  as 
to  the  groimd  covered  by  the  barn,  though  the  statute  in  terms 
required  that  the  premises  shall  not  only  be  owned  but  also 
occupied  by  the  claimant  as  a  homestead.^'  So  the  owner  of  a 
homestead  consisting  of  a  farm,  who  fences  otf  a  portion  of  it, 
and  leases  it  for  a  term  with  the  privilege  of  a  renewal  for 
another  term  does  not  by  his  lease  and  the  separation  of  one 
part  of  the  farm  from  the  other,  lose  his  exemption  as  to  either 
portion.*^ 


their  city  home,  which  they  had 
occupied  for  a  number  of  years  as 
a  homestead,  and  went  to  live  on 
a  ranch,  but  with  no  intention  of 
abandoning  their  city  home,  to 
which  they  soon  returned,  such 
temporary  lease  does  not  consti- 
tute an  abandonment.  Hines  v. 
Nelson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  24  S.  W. 
Rep.  541.  In  Wisconsin  it  has 
been  distinctly  held  that  a  debtor 
who  removes  from  his  homestead, 
without  any  intention  of  acquir- 
ing another  elsewhere,  for  tempo- 
rary purposes  merely,  or  from 
some  necessity,  and  with  the  in- 
tention of  returning  again  to  oc- 
cupy the  same  as  and  for  his 
homestead  as  soon  as  circum- 
stances will  allow,  does  not  for- 
feit or  lose  the  exemption  of  the 
same  from  sale  on  execution, 
though  he  should,  while  absent 
therefrom,  rent  it  to  a  tenant. 
Herrick  v.  Graves,  16  Wis.  157.  In 
New  Hampshire  nothing  short  of 
a  voluntary  abandonment  of  a 
homestead,  so  understood  by  all 
the  parties,  will  divest  the  estate 


in  the  homestead;  and  no  infer- 
ence of  an  intent  to  abandon  the 
homestead  will  be  made  from  a 
kase  of  the  premises  for  one  year 
at  a  time  by  the  person  holding 
the  homestead  right  when  the  in- 
tention to  retain  the  residence  is 
clearly  evidenced  by  other  facts. 
Locke  V.  Rowell,  47  N.  H.  46. 

5«  Bailey  v.  Dunlap,  138  Ala.  415, 
419,  35  So.  Rep.  451;  Heathman  v. 
Holmes,  9i  Cal.  291.  29  Pac.  Rep. 
404;  IMaroney  Hardware  Co.  v. 
Counelles  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1894), 
25  S.  W.  Rep.  448;  Prufrock  v. 
Joseph  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1894),  27 
S.  W.  Rep.  264. 

5"  Guy  V.  Downs,  12  Neb.  5^2,  12 
N.  W.  Rep.  8. 

5s  Pitney  v.  Eldredge,  58  Kan. 
215,  48  Pac.  Rep.  854.  The  fact 
that  an  owner  does  not  exclusively 
occupy  an  entire  homestead  does 
not  destroy  the  exemption.  A  part 
may  be  used  for  other  purposes 
than  a  homestead  where  the  whole 
amounts  to  but  one  tract  of  land 
not  exceeding  the  area  permitted 
to  be  exempt  under  the  law.    And 


124  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  89.  The  mode  of  the  execution  of  a  lease  of  a  homestead. 
The  statute  usually  requires  that  both  husband  and  wife  must 
join  in  a  deed  of  conveyance  affecting  a  homestead  except  where 
the  deed  of  conveyance  is  executed  as  a  security  for  the  pur- 
chase price.  In  the  latter  ease  the  signature  of  the  husband  is 
sufficient.  Usually  the  husband  has  no  power  of  encumbering  the 
homestead  by  a  lease  or  other  conveyance  without  the  signature 
of  his  wife.  In  Texas  the  lease  of  a  homestead  for  a  term,  with 
the  privilege  of  an  indefinite  renewal  which  is  not  signed  and 
separately  acknowledged  by  the  wife,  has  been  held  as  invalid.'® 
A  statute  which  requires  the  wife  to  join  in  the  execution  of 
the  conveyance  of  the  homestead  is  mandatory.  It  follows 
necessarily  that  an  instrument  which  purports  to  affect  or  to 
encumber  the  homestead  in  which  the  wife  has  not  joined  Is 
invalid  as  to  her.  Her  privileges  in  the  homestead  will  be  re- 
served as  against  the  holder  of  the  void  conveyance  and  it  is 
not  material  under  the  statute  that  the  title  to  the  homestead  is 
in  the  husband  alone  for  any  conveyance  by  him  which  confers 
a  possession  which  interferes  in  any  way  with  the  enjoyment  of 
the  premises  by  the  wife  as  a  homestead  is  invalid.^"  Cir- 
cumstances may  arise,  however,  where  the  wife  will  be  estopped 

where  the  part  which  is  claimed  cupancy  of  the  entire  farm  is  not 
to  be  not  a  part  of  the  homestead  essential,  and  the  circumstance 
has  not  been  totally  abandoned  as  that  the  tenant  cultivated  the  part 
a  part  thereof  by  making  it,  for  leased  to  him  in  the  same  manner 
instance,  another  person's  home-  as  his  lessor  is  very  material  in 
stead,  or  by  using  it  or  permitting  showing  that  there  has  been  no 
it  to  be  used  in  some  other  way  abandonment  of  the  homestead, 
inconsistent  with  the  homestead,  Bebb  v.  Crowe,  39  Kan.  342;  Huff- 
it  is  still  a  homestead.  Thus,  to  man  v.  Hill,  47  Kan.  613. 
show  that  property  though  leased  eg  Southern  Oil  Co.  v.  Colquitt 
Is  still  a  homestead  it  may  be  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  69  S.  W.  Rep. 
proved  that  rent  was  to  be  paid  169.  See,  also,  Wiliams  v.  Galves- 
in  six  month  Instalments  and  a  ton  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  58  S.  W.  Rep. 
default  in  the  payment  of  any  of  551. 

the  instalments  entitled  the  owner  so  Hosteller  v.  Eddy,   128  Iowa, 

of  the  homestead  to  re-enter.     So,  401,   104   N.  W.   485;    Coughlin  v. 

under  the  lease  he  was  entitled  to  Coughlin,  26  Kan.  116,  118;  Kloke 

go  on  the  land  to  see  that  waste  v.   Wolf    (Neb.   1908),   111   N.   W. 

was.  not  committed   and  that  the  Rep.   134;    Wea   Gas,   etc.,   Co.    v. 

covenants   in  the  lease  were  per-  Franklin  Land  Co.,   54  Kan.   533, 

formed.  Actual  and  continuous  oc-  535,  38  Pac.  Rep,  790. 


CHARACTER  OF  PROPERTY  WHICU  MAY  BE  LEASED.  125 

to  assert  the  invalidity  of  a  lease  of  a  liomestead  which  Avas 
executed  without  her  joining  in  it.  Her  acquiescence  after  she 
knows  of  the  execution  of  the  lease  and  with  knowledge  of  the 
occupation  by  the  tenant,  and  of  his  cultivation  of  the  land  as 
a  tenant  after  the  lease  had  been  signed  may  all  be  proved,  and, 
if  it  appears  equitable  from  her  silence  and  her  conduct  that 
the  lease  should  be  supported,  the  court  may  act  accordingly. 
If,  for  illustration,  the  tenant,  relying  upon  the  wife's  silence 
and  failure  to  object,  shall  have  planted  a  crop  which  is  about 
to  be  reaped  when  the  wife  raises  the  question  of  the  validity 
of  the  lease,  it  is  very  likely  that  the  court  would  not  declare 
the  lease  void  in  an  action  by  the  wife  against  the  tenant  with- 
out compelling  her  to  compensate  the  tenant  for  the  value  of 
the  crop.** 

61  Johnson  v.  Samuelson,  69  Kan.  263,  76  Pac.  Rep.  867. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR. 

§  90.     The  origin  of  tenancy  from  year  to  year. 

91.  The  continuity  of  the  several  yearly  periods. 

92.  The  use  of  express  language  in  creating  a  tenancy  from  year 

to  year. 

93.  The  character  of  the  cultivation  of  the  land  as  determining  the 

period  of  the  tenancy. 

94.  The  payment  of  a  yearly  rent  as  creating  a  tenancy  from  year 

to  year. 

95.  The  effect  of  the  death  of  either  party  upon  a  tenancy  from  year 

to  year. 

96.  The  rule  as  to  repairs  by  a  tenant  from  year  to  year. 

97.  A  tenancy  from  year  to  year  created  by  a  tenant  holding  over. 

98.  Rebutting  the  presumption  which  arises  on  a  tenant  holding 

over. 

99.  The  modification  of  the  terms  of  the  original  lease  as  against  a 

tenant  holding  over. 

100.  Holding  over  excused  when  it  is  caused  by  the  action  of  the 

board  of  health. 

101.  Statutory  modification  of  the  rule  that  a  holding  over  creates  a 

tenancy  from  year  to  year. 

102.  Tenancies  from  year  to  year  created  by  leases  void  under  the 

statute  of  frauds. 

103.  Tenancies  from  year  to  year  arising  from  defective  and  unexe- 

cuted leases. 

104.  The  necessary  incidents  of  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year. 

105.  Tenancies  from  month  to  month.     How  created. 

106.  Tenancy  from  month  to  month  by  holding  over. 

107.  The  commencement  of  the  monthly  period. 

108.  The  conversion  of  tenancies   from   month  to  month   into  ten- 

ancies from  year  to  year. 

109.  The  statutory  rules  creating  a  tenancy  from  month  to  month  by 

holding  over. 

110.  Tenancies  from  week  to  week. 

111.  The  necessity  of  notice  to  quit  at  common  law. 

112.  The  length  of  time  required  by  the  notice  to  quit. 

113.  The  length  of  the  notice  to  quit  in  weekly  and  monthly  ten- 

ancies. 

114.  Statutory  regulation  of  the  notice  to  quit. 

115.  The  necessity  and  the  sufficiency  of  a  notice  to  quit  in  the  case 

of  tenancy  from  month  to  month. 


TENANCY  FROM   YEAR  TO  YEAR.  127 

■■§  lie.  The  statutory  regulation  of  the  notice  to  quit  in  tenancies  from 
month  to  month. 

117.  Notice  to  quit  when  required  by  the  express  terms  of  the  lease. 

lis.  The  form  and  the  character  of  the  notice  to  quit. 

119.  The  construction  of  the  language  of  the  notice  to  quit. 

120.  To  whom  notice  must  be  given. 

121.  By  whom  the  notice  to  quit  must  be  given. 

122.  The  date  upon  which  the  period  stated  in  the  notice  must  termi- 

nate. 

123.  The  necessity  of  personal  service  of  the  notice  to  quit. 

124.  A  notice  to  quit  given  by  an  agent. 

125.  Waiver  of  defects  in  the  notice  to  quit. 

126.  Waiver  of  a  notice  to  quit  by  a  subsequent  notice. 

127.  The  effect  of  a  notice  to  quit. 

128.  The  withdrawal  of  a  notice  to  quit. 

129.  The  waiver  of  a  notice  to  quit  by  the  receipt  of  rent 

130.  When  a  notice  to  quit  may  be  dispensed  with  by  a  surrender. 

131.  A  disavowal  of  the  landlord's  title  by  the  tenant  may  dispense 

with  giving  a  notice  to  quit  by  the  landlord. 

§  90.  The  origin  of  tenancy  from  year  to  year.  The  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant  in  a  hiring  or  a  tenancy  from  year  to 
year  imquestionably  had  its  origin  in  the  reluctance  of  the 
English  courts  to  enforce  the  arbitrary  will  of  the  landlord 
in  determining  estates  at  will  and  in  their  desire  to  protect  the 
rights  of  the  tenants  to  their  crops  growing  on  the  land  upon 
the  determination  of  the  estate.  The  precarious  and  uncertain 
character  of  the  tenure  which  was  at  the  will  of  the  landlord 
and  the  inducement  which  this  tenure  offered  for  the  landlord 
to  terminate  it  without  notice  because  of  which  a  tenant  of  agri- 
cultural land  might  be  unjustly  deprived  of  the  fruits  of  his 
industry  in  sowing  and  cultivating  the  land  appealed  to  the 
courts.  The  tenancy  from  year  to  year  is  the  offspring  of  ten- 
ancy at  will  which  in  early  times  was  almost  the  sole  tenancy 
recognized.  In  the  quaint  language  of  the  early  law  the  tenancy 
from  year  to  year  was  substituted  for  the  vague  and  uncertain 
tenancy  at  will  to  uphold  and  effectuate  the  just  maxim 
that  he  "who  sows,  may  reap."^  Hence  so  long  ago  as  the 
time  of  the  year  books,  a  general  occupation  of  land  no  time  or 

1  This   desire   to   secure   to    the  early  gave  rise  to  the  doctrine  of 

tenants    the    crops    which    were  emblements    which    still    endures, 

growing  on  his  land  at  the  termi-  Litt.  §  68. 
nation  of  the  tenancy  at  will  very 


128  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

duration  of  the  tenancy  being  mentioned  was  by  implication 
tind  in  favor  of  the  cultivation  of  the  soil  construed  by  the  com- 
mon law  judges  to  be  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  and  that  the 
tenancy  could  not  be  determined  and  the  tenant  put  out  of  his 
land  without  a  reasonable  notice  by  the  landlord  of  his  inten- 
tion to  terminate  the  tenancy,  which  notice  was  very  early 
required  to  be  given  at  least  six  months  before  the  termination 
of  any  year.^ 

§  91.  The  continuity  of  the  several  yearly  periods.  On  a 
mere  cursory  examination  of  the  tenancy  from  year  to  year  it 
would  seem  that  each  annual  term  constitutes  a  separate  and 
distinct  estate  or  term.  Though  this  is  true  in  fact  the  law  con- 
sider the  several  yearly  terms  as  merged  as  soon  as  two  or  more 
of  them  have  passed  and  the  law  then  looks  forward  to  each  fu- 
ture recurring  year  as  it  arrives  as  a  separate  term  only  until 
it  is  consolidated  with  those  which  have  preceded  it.  Every 
year  after  the  first  is  a  springing  interest  or  estate  arising  from 
and  based  on  the  first  annual  term,  assimilating  to  it  and  soon 
to  become  a  parcel  of  it.  But  on  the  other  hand  each  recurring 
yearly  tenancy  is  for  a  separate  period  so  that  the  term  may  be 
pleaded  against  the  tenant  as  commencing  with  the  first  day  of 
the  current  year  though  the  tenant  has  in  fact  occupied  the 
premises  for  several  years  previously  thereto.^  It  may  be  said 
however  that,  though  the  lessor  may  adopt  this  course  in  plead- 
ing, it  is  not  compulsory  upon  him  to  do  so.  He  may  declare  on 
the  demise  from  year  to  year  either  as  a  new  .demise  or  as  a 
part  of  an  old  contract.  So,  it  has  been  said  that  if  a  tenant 
from  year  to  year  shall  hold  for  two  years  or  more  either  he  or 
his  landlord  may  then  plead  the  lease  as  having  been  made  for 
so  many  years  from  the  date  of  its  original  making  of  the  lease.* 
So  too  at  common  law  in  the  case  a  tenant  from  year  to  year 
holding  over  and  dying  during  the  third  year  of  his  tenancy, 
it  was  held  that  the  landlord  might,   even  after  his  tenant's 

2  See  remarks  of  Lord  Kenyon  A  tenancy  from  year  to  year  is  not 

in  Martin  v.  Watts,  7  T.  R.  85,  and  to  be  considered  as  a  continuous 

Share  v.  Porter,  3  T.  R.  13.  tenancy,  but  as  commencing  every 

8  Cattley   v.   Arnold,   1   John.   &  year.      Tomliins    v.    Lawrance,    8 

H.  651,  657;  Bartlett  v.  Baiter,  34  Car.  &  P.  729;  Gandy  v.  Jubber,  5 

L.   J.   Ex.    11;    Tomkins   v.   Law-  B.  &  S.  78,  33  L.  J.  Q.  B.  151,  10 

ranee,  8  Car.  &  P.  729,  731.  .lur.   (N.  S.)    652,  9  L.  T.  800,  12 

« Birch  V.  Wright,  1  T.  R.  380.  W.  R.  52G. 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR. 


129 


death  in  the  third  year,  distrain  for  the  unpaid  rent  of  the 
second  year  on  the  theory  that  when  a  tenant  from  year  to 
years  holds  over,  his  holding  over  must  be  regarded  as  an  agree- 
ment which  is  a  part  of  the  original  contract  and  in  execution 
of  it,  and  that  the  third  year  was  not  in  the  nature  of  a  sep- 
arate term  of  one  year  but  that  it  was  merely  an  offshoot  and 
incident  of  the  first  year.^ 

§  92.  The  use  of  express  language  in  creating  a  tenancy  from 
year  to  year.     In  England  bj^  many  of  the  earlier  common  law 


5  Legg  V.  Strudwick,  2  Salk.  414. 
"Leases  from  year  to  year  appear 
at  first  view  to  give  several  dis- 
tinct estates.  In  truth,  they  give 
only  one  time  of  continuance. 
That  time,  however,  may  be  con- 
fined to  one  year,  or  extended  to 
several  years,  according  to  circum- 
stances attending  the  tenancy  in 
its  progress.  In  the  first  place,  the 
lease  is  for  one  year  certain,  and 
after  the  commencement  of  every 
year,  or  perhaps  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  period  in  which  a  no- 
tice determining  the  tenancy  may 
be  given,  it  is  a  lease  for  the  sec- 
ond year;  and  in  consequence  of 
the  original  agreement  of  the  par- 
ties every  year  of  the  tenancy  con- 
stitutes a  part  of  the  lease,  and 
eventually  becomes  a  parcel  of  the 
term,  so  that  a  lease  which  is  in 
the  first  instance  but  for  one  year 
certain,  may,  in  the  event  of  a 
term,  be  one  hundred  years  or 
more.  Under  this  species  of  ten- 
ancy the  law  considers  the  lease 
with  a  view  to  the  time  which  has 
elapsed,  as  arising  from  an  estate 
for  all  that  time,  including  the 
current  year.  For,  as  all  the  time 
for  which  the  land  may  be  held 
under  a  running  lease  is  originally 
given,  and  in  effect  passes,  by  the 
same  instrument  or  contract,  the 
whole  time  is  consolidated,  and 
every  year  as  it  commences  forms 

9 


a  part  of  the  time."  Preston  on 
Estates,  p.  76.  The  importance  of 
the  principles  just  enumerated  lies 
in  the  somewhat  technical  charac- 
ter of  the  laws  of  common-law 
pleading  in  their  relation  to  fram- 
ing a  declaration  in  an  action  on 
the  covenant  for  rent.  In  Cattley 
V.  Arnold,  1  Johns.  &  H.  651,  28 
L.  J.  Ch.  352,  5  Jur.  (N.  S.)  361, 
7  W.  R.  245.  Vice  Chancellor  Wood 
says:  "In  the  case  of  Oxley  v. 
James,  13  Mee.  &  W.  209,  214,  I 
find  some  observations  of  Lord 
Wensleydale,  which,  while  they 
state  the  reasons  for  the  decision 
of  the  court  both  in  that  case  and 
in  a  previous  case  of  Pike  v.  Eyre. 
9  B.  &  Cr.  909,  appear  to  me  cor- 
rectly to  express  the  result  of  the 
authorities  as  to  the  nature  of 
this  tenancy.  'Legg  v.  Strudwick," 
he  saj'-s,  'and  Bacon's  Abridgment, 
Leases,  L.  3,'  show  what  is  the  na- 
ture of  an  estate  from  year  to 
year;  namely,  a  lease  for  a  year 
certain,  with  a  growing  interest 
during  every  year  thereaftrr. 
springing  out  of  the  original  con- 
tract and  parcel  of  it.  A  demise, 
therefore,  by  such  a  person  for  a 
term  of  years  is  no  assignment: 
he  never  means  to  part  with  tha 
whole  benefit  of  that  interest.  It 
is  a  term  for  so  many  years,  sub- 
ject to  determination  by  the  cessa- 
tion of  the  original  interest.'  " 


130 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


authorities  it  was  at  one  time  heicl  that  a  lease,  whether  it  were 
oral  or  in  writing  being  couched  in  express  language  "from 
year  to  year  so  long  as  the  parties  were  pleased  to  continue," 
was  at  least  a  lease  for  two  years  certain  and  that  for  that 
reason  the  lease  was  not  terminable  by  a  notice  to  quit  served 
during  the  first  year.®  But  the  more  recent  rule  is  that  an 
express  agreement  whether  in  writing  or  by  parol  creating  a 
lease  by  which  one  becomes  a  lessee  "from  year  to  year"  at  a 
certain  definite  and  fixed  annual  rent,  constiutes  an  express 
lease  from  year  to  year  which  is  determinable  by  either  party 
to  it  at  the  end  of  the  first  year,  to  the  same  extent  that  it  is 
determinable  at  the  end  of  any  subsequent  year,  by  the  service 
of  a  proper  and  timely  notice  to  quit.'^  Hence  it  follows  that 
where  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  has  been  by  implication 


6  Agar d  v.  King,  Cro.  Eliz.  775; 
Legg  V.  Strudwick,  2  Salk.  414; 
Doe  d.  Chadburn  v.  Green,  9  A.  & 
E.  658,  8  L.  J.  Q.  B.  100,  1  P.  &  D. 
454;  Birch  v.  Wright,  1  T.  R.  380; 
Monck  V.  Geekie,  5  Q.  B.  841;  Hall 
V  Myers,  43  Md.  581;  Hanchett  v. 
Whitney,  1  Vt.  315. 

T  Wood  V.  Beard,  46  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
100,  2  Ex.  D.  30,  35  L.  T.  866; 
Clarke  v.  Smarridge,  7  Q.  B.  957, 
14  L.  J.  Q.  B.  327,  9  Jur.  721.  In 
which  case  Lord  Denman  said: 
"Now  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year 
lasts  fully  as  long  as  both  parties 
please;  and  that  is,  it  is  deter- 
minable by  either  party  at  the  end 
of  any  year,  by  giving  notice  to 
quit  one-half  a  year  before  the  end 
of  the  year.  There  is  no  reason 
why  it  should  not  be  so  determined 
at  the  end  of  the  first  year  as  well 
as  at  the  end  of  any  subsequent 
year,  unless  the  parties  have  by  ex- 
press contract  precluded  such  de- 
termination. In  the  cases  of  Agard 
V.  King,  Cro.  Eliz.  775;  Denn.  dem. 
Jacklin  v.  Cartright,  4  East,  29 
Bellases  v.  Burbrick,  1  Salk.  209 
Legg  V.  Strudwick,  2  Salk.  414 
Birch  V.  Wright,  1  T.  R.  378,  380 


Doe   dem.   Chadburn   v.  Greene,   9 

A.  &  E.  658,  such  express  contract 
appears  either  by  the  proceedings 
or  by  the  evidence.  In  this  case 
there  is  no  such  express  contract 
but  the  tenancy  for  two  years  at 
least  is  supposed  to  be  implied  by 
necessity  of  law."  The  court,  how- 
ever, held  that  no  such  necessity 
existed.     "If   A.   demise   lands   to 

B.  for  a  year,  and  so  from  year  to 
year,  this  is  not  a  lease  for  two 
years,  and  afterwards  at  will;  but 
it  is  a  lease  for  every  particular 
year,  and,  after  the  year  is  begun, 
the  defendant  cannot  terminate 
the  lease  until  the  year  is  ended." 
Stomfil  V.  Hicks,  2  Salk.  413,  Ld. 
Ray.  680.  A  lease  at  an  annual 
rent,  "for  the  term  of  one  year 
and  an  indefinite  period  there- 
after," where  the  tenant  enters 
and  occupies  for  several  years,  is 
a  lease  from  year  to  year,  and  on 
the  tenant's  death  passes  to  his 
personal  representatives,  who  in 
their  representative  capacity  are 
liable  for  the  rent  so  long  as  they 
occupy.  Pugsley  v.  Aikin,  UN. 
Y.  494,  reversing  14  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
114. 


TENAXCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  ^'EAR.  131 

created  by  a  tenant  for  a  term  of  years  holding  over  and  paying 
rent  after  the  expiration  of  his  term  the  landlord  may  termi- 
nate the  tenancy  from  year  to  year  by  a  notice  to  go  into  effect 
at  the  end  of  the  first  year.*  A  lease  from  year  to  year  may  be 
created  by  an  indefinite  hiring  with  a  power  in  tlie  tenant  to 
leave  at  the  end  of  any  year.  The  renting  of  premises  for  an 
indefinite  period  and  their  occupation  by  a  tenant  for  one  year 
constitutes  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year.®  A  lease  of  land  for 
one  year,  with  a  privilege  of  continuing  the  same  from  year  to 
year  so  long  as  both  parties  agree,  creates  a  tenancy  from  year 
to  year.^°  A  lease  for  one  year  with  the  privilege  of  three  years 
from  a  certain  day,  confers  on  the  tenant  the  right  to  remain 
from  year  to  year  not  exceeding  three  years,  and  he  may  quit  at 
the  expiration  of  any  year  of  the  three.  In  a  lease  for  one  year 
from  a  certain  day  the  landlord's  right  to  re-enter  does  not 
begin  until  the  first  moment  of  the  corresponding  day  on  the 
following  year.^^  A  lease  for  "one  year,  and  so  on  from  year 
to  year."  is  a  lease  for  one  year  absolutely,  and  if  the  tenant 
continues  for  a  second  year  without  the  dissent  of  the  landlord, 
it  is  then  a  lease  for  another  year,  and  so  on  for  each  succeeding 
year.^-  A  lease  from  the  first  day  of  a  certain  month  "until 
such  time  as  the  tenancy  shall  be  terminated  as.  hereinafter  pro- 
vided" at  a  yearly  rent  with  a  provision  "that  it  shall  be  law- 
ful for  either  party  to  determine  the  tenancy  herein  created  by 
giving  to  the  other  three  calendar  months  notice  of  his  inten- 
tion in  writing  is  a  yearly  tenancy  determinable  by  three  months 
notice  to  expire  at  the  end  of  any  year  of  the  tenancy  and  not 
an  indefinite  tenancy  determinable  by  three  months  notice.^' 

§  93.  The  character  of  the  cultivation  of  the  land  as  de- 
termining- the  period  of  the  tenancy.  The  principle,  that  he 
who  sows  shall  reap,  founded  as  it  is  upon  the  broad  basis  of 
equitable  and  fair  dealing  between  man  and  man  and  upon  the 
well-recog-nized  rule  that  the  acceptance,  possession  and  enjoy- 

R  Clark   V.    Smarridge,    7    Q.    B.  n  Duffy  v.  Ogden,  64  Pa.  St.  240, 

957,  14  L.  J.  Q.  B.  327,  9  .Tur.  721.  27  L.   I.  77,  2  Leg.  Gaz.  73. 

!^Reg.  V.  St.  Giles,  4  B.  &  S.  509,  12  Lesley  v.  Randolph.   4  Rawle 

33  L.  J.  M.  C.  3,  10  .Tur.    (N.  S.)  (Pa.)   123. 

205,  9  L.  T.  411,  12  W.  R.  125.  "  Lewis  v.  Baker.  75  Law  J.  K. 

10  Hatfield  v.  Lawton,  108  App.  E.  848;  (1906)  2  K.  B.  599,  95  L.  T. 

Div.  113.  95  N.  Y.  Sui)p.  451.  10,  22  L.  T.  680. 


132  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

ment  of  the  benefits  and  i)rivileges  of  the  contractual  relations 
by  implication  creates  and  imposes  corresponding  and  reciprocal 
obligations  was  the  moving  cause  that  in  very  early  times  mod- 
ified estates  at  will  and  changed  them  into  tenancies  from  year 
to  year.  The  bulk  of  land  held  in  tenure  was  then  agricultural 
and  the  necessity  was  very  apparent  and  indeed  urgent  that 
some  protection  should  be  thrown  around  tenants  to  protect 
them  from  losing,  by  a  sudden  and  arbitrary  termination  of 
their  tenancy  at  will,  the  advantages  and  beneficial  results  of 
their  labors  in  husbandry.  The  possession  and  enjoyment  of  the 
products  of  the  tilled  land  was  the  consideration  which  moved 
and  impelled  the  tenant  cultivator  to  agree  to  pay  and  to  pay 
the  rent.  And  as  the  crops  were  usually  3'early  the  tenancy  was 
also  yearly.  So,  on  the  same  principle  where  land  is  hired  at 
a  yearly  rental  for  use  as  a  nursery  for  fruit  trees  which  do  not 
yield  their  produce  annually  but  only  after  the  trees  have 
reached  maturity  and  after  several  years  of  growth  the  lease  will 
be  regarded  by  the  law  as  a  lease  from  year  to  year  so  long  as 
is  necessary  for  the  purj30se  of  the  tenancy.^*  In  certain 
peculiar  circumstances  where  a  crop,  after  being  planted,  re- 
quires two  years  to  reach  the  condition  in  which  it  is  ready  for 
reaping  a  general  hiring,  no  term  being  specified,  might,  it 
seems,  be  regarded  by  the  common  law  as  a  tenancy  from  two 
years  to  two  years,  which  cannot  be  terminated  by  a  notice  to 
quit  at  the  end  of  the  second  or  third  year.  Crops  of  madder 
and  liquorice  would  very  likely  come  under  the  rule.  "We  are, 
however,  without  direct  judicial  authority  on  this  question  and 
at  the  most  have  merely  the  suggestions  or  opinions  of  text  book 
writers  to  guide  us.^^ 

1*  King  V.  Wlllcomb,  7  Barb.  (N.  When  it  is  a  lease  of  an  inherit- 

Y.)    263;   Miller  v.  Baker,  1  Met.  ance,  the  fruits  of  which  are  gath- 

(Mass.)  27.  ered  at  intervals  of  several  years, 

15  See  Adams  on  Ejectment,  138.  the  lease  is  deemed  to  continue  for 

"If  the  parties  have  omitted  to  ex-  all   the  time   that   is   requisite  to 

press  the  duration  of  the  term,  the  enable  the  tenant  to  gather  in  the 

lease  will  nevertheless  be  valid.   If  fruits.     In  a  case  where  a  person 

It  is  a  demise  of  an  inheritance  had   leased   land,    no   term    being 

of  which  the  fruits  are  gathered  mentioned,    for    the    purpose    of 

every    year,    such    as   a    meadow,  brick-making,  agreeing  to  pay  the 

vineyard,  etc.,  the  lease  is  deemed  lessor  so  much  per  one  thousand 

to   have    been    made    for   a    year.  bricks    upon    the    quantity    made,. 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR. 


133 


§  94.  The  payment  of  a  yearly  rent  as  creating  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year.  While  it  may  safely  be  said  that  a  mere 
general  letting  and  occupation  of  real  property,  nothing  having 
been  expressly  agreed  upon  by  the  parties  thereto  as  to  the  dura- 
tion or  termination  of  the  occupancy,  constitutes  ordinarily 
only  a  tenancy  at  will,  the  circumstance  in  connection  with  such 
a  lease  that  the  rent  is  payable  annually,  or  not  being  thus 
payable  is  calculated  and  fixed  at  so  much  per  year,  though  pay- 
able at  shorter  intervals  is  often,  though  not  always,  a  controll- 
ing fact  in  converting  what  would  otherwise  be  a  tenancy  at  will 
into  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year.^®  So,  also,  it  has  been  held 
that  though  when  the  tenant  goes  into  the  occupation  of  the 
premises  under  an  agreement  for  a  lease  but  paya  no  rent  he 
is  merely  a  tenant  at  will,  yet,  as  soon  as  he  begins  to  pay  rent 
by  the  year  for  his  occupation  under  the  agreement  for  a  lease 


the  court,  in  holding  that  the 
lessee  was  merely  a  tenant  from 
year  to  year,  relied  upon  the  facts 
that  no  premium  for  the  lease  was 
paid  to  the  lessor  by  the  lessee, 
that  there  was  no  power  of  dis- 
tress, and  no  right  of  re-entry  in 
the  lessor  and  no  obligation  on 
the  part  of  the  lessee  to  work  out 
the  brick  earth.  Consequently  the 
lessee  unless  the  tenancy  was  by 
the  year  might  hold  the  land  for 
ever  which  evidently  was  not  the 
intention  of  the  lessor.  In  re 
Stroud,  8  C.  B.  502,  530,  19  L.  J. 
C.  P.  117. 

16  Bishop  V.  Howard,  2  B.  &  C. 
100,  3  Dowl.  &  L.  293;  Richardson 
V.  Langridge,  4  Taunt.  128,  131; 
Cattley  v.  Arnold,  1  John.  &  H. 
651.  See,  also,  Braithwayte  v. 
Hitchcock,  10  Mee.  &  Wei.  497; 
Doe  d.  Lord  v.  Crago,  6  Com. 
Bench,  96,  98;  Cox  v.  Bent,  5  Bing. 
185,  2  M.  &  P.  281;  Doe  d.  Penning- 
ton V.  Taniere,  12  Q.  B.  998,  IS  L. 
J.  Q.  B.  49,  13  Jur.  119;  Dumn  v. 
Rothermel,  112  Pa.  St.  272;  Mc- 
Dowell V.  Simpson,  3  Watts  (Pa.) 


135;  Hellams  v.  Patton,  44  S.  C. 
454;  Reeder  v.  Sayre,  70  N.  Y. 
180,  26  Am.  Rep.  567;  Barlow  v. 
Wainwright,  22  Vt.  88;  Silsby  v. 
Allen,  43  Vt.  172;  Second  Nat. 
Bank  v.  O.  E.  Merrill  Co.,  69  Wis. 
501,  34  N.  W.  Rep.  514;  4  Kent's 
Com.  ni  et  seq.  Thus  an  oral 
lease  for  the  term  of  one  year  at 
the  rate  of  $10  per  month,  which 
rent  is  to  be  increased  to  .$11  for 
another  and  succeeding  year,  does 
not  create  a  monthly  tenancy  but 
a  hiring  by  the  year,  the  rent 
though  being  payable  by  the 
month.  Schneider  v.  Lord,  62 
Mich.  141,  28  N.  W.  Rep.  773.  "It 
is  clear  that  upon  proof  of  the 
payment  of  rent  in  respect  of  the 
occupation  of  premises  ordinarily 
let  from  year  to  year,  the  law  will 
imply  that  the  party  making  such 
pajTuents  holds  under  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year."  Doe  d.  Lord 
v.  Crago,  6  Com.  Bench,  90,  98.  A 
lease  from  a  certain  date  "at  a 
yearly  rent"  creates  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year.  Florence  v. 
Robinson,  24  L.  T.  705. 


134  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

he  becomes  a  tenant  from  year  to  year,  ^"  Thoiigli  if  the  pay- 
ment of  a  yearly  rent  be  unexplained  a  tenancy  from  year  to 
year  is  presumed,  this  presumption  is  purely  one  of  fact  and 
it  may  be  rebutted  by  evidence  to  the  contrary. ^^  The  receipt 
of  rent  may  be  explained  so  as  to  rebut  the  implication  of  a 
Yearly  tenancy  arising  out  of  the  payment  of  rent  by  the  year.^* 
Hence,  from  this  it  follows  that  whether  a  tenancy  is  from  year 
to  year,  is  a  question  of  fact  on  all  the  evidence.-"  A  tenancy 
from  year  to  year  may  be  inferred  from  periodical  yearly  pay- 
ments only  where  it  is  impossible  to  account  for  such  payments 
except  upon  the  hypothesis  that  the  payments  were  for  rent. 
It  may  always  be  shown  that  the  payments  w^ere  for  another 
purpose.  Thus,  it  may  be  shown  that  a  building  contract  and 
not  a  lease  existed  between  a  landowner  and  an  occupant  of  land, 
and  that  the  payments  made  to  the  owner  were  made  on  such  a 
contract  for  the  privilege  of  erecting  buildings  of  which  the 
payee  was  to  have  a  lease  in  the  future.-^  So,  too,  the  landlord 
may  show  that  the  yearly  payment  of  rent  was  received  by  him 
under  some  mistake  of  fact,  or  under  a  misapprehension  or  in 
ignorance  of  certain  circumstances  where  it  is  apparent  that, 
if  he  had  full  knowledge  of  such  circumstances,  he  would  not 
have  received  the  payments.  Thus,  where  a  landlord  had  con- 
tinued to  receive  rent  from  a  tenant  after  the  termination  of  a 
lease  for  lives  because  the  death  of  the  lessees  had  been  con- 
cealed from  him,  it  was  held  that  no  tenancy  from  year  to  year 

17  Chapman  v.  Towner,  6  Mee.  &  though  nothing  were  said  about 
Wei.  100,  103;  Braithwayte  v.  the  duration  of  the  term,  it  is  an 
Hitchcoclc,  10  Mee.  &  Wei.  497;  Cox  implied  letting  from  year  to  year. 
V.  Bent,  5  Bing.  185.  See,  also,  But  if  two  parties  agree  that  one 
Hull  V.  Wood,  14  M.  &  W.  682;  shall  let,  and  the  other  shall  hold, 
Mann  v.  Lovejoy,  R.  &  M.  355;  so  long  as  both  parties  please,  thai 
Saunders  v.  Musgrave,  '6  B.  &  C.  is  a  holding  at  will,  and  there  is 
524.  nothing    to    hinder,  parties    from 

18  Rogers  v.  Pitcher,  1  Marsh,  making  such  an  agreement."  By 
541,  1  Taunt.  202;  Williams  v.  Lord  Mansfield  in  Richardsen  v. 
Bartholomew,   1    Bos.   &  Pul.   326.  Langridge,  4  Taunt.  128,  130. 

in  Doe  d.  Lord  v.  Crago,  6  Com.  21  Camden  v.  Batterbury,  5  C.  B. 

Bench,  90,  17  L.  J.  C.  P.  263,  12  (N.    S.)    808,   817,   28    L.    J.   C.   P. 

Jur.  705;   Hurley  v.  Hanrahan,  15  187,  5   Jur.    (N.   S.)    627,   affirmed 

W.  R.  990.  7  C.  B.   (N.  S.)   864,  28  L.  J.  C.  P. 

20  "If  there  were  a  general  let-  335.  5  Jur.    (N.  S.)    1405,  7  W.  R. 

ting  at  a  yearly  rent,  though  pay-  616. 
able  half  yearly  or  quarterly,  and 


TENAN'CY  FROM   YEAR   TO   YEAR.  135 

existed  and  as  soon  as  he  discovered  this  fact,  which  had  been 
concealed  from  him,  he  might  eject  the  occupier  without  pre- 
vious notice  to  quit.-^  An  actual  payment  of  rent  by  the  year 
is  not  ahvays  necessarj^  An  admission  by  a  person  who  has 
entered  on  premises  under  an  executory  contract  to  make  a  lease 
that  he  owes  the  owner  a  half  year's  rent,  in  response  to  a  bill 
rendered  him  for  a  half  year's  rent  by  the  landlord,  creates 
a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  though  no  rent  is  actually  paicl.-^ 
For  an  admission  by  a  tenant  that  rent  is  payable  by  the  year 
is  usually  sufficient.  An  agreement  for  a  lease  to  be  executed 
in  the  future  for  the  term  of  twenty-one  years,  with  a  further 
agreement  that  the  tenant  shall  go  into  possession  at  once,  and 
that,  until  such  lease  should  be  executed,  a  yearly  rent  should 
be  payable  and  recoverable  by  distress  or  otherwise  in  like  man- 
ner as  if  such  lease  should  have  been  executed,  creates  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year,  before  any  rent  is  paid.-*  But  an  agreement 
to  pay  rent  by  the  year,  though  usually  it  creates  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year,  does  not  control  an  express  tenancy  for  a 
shorter  period.  A  letter  written  by  the  lessee  in  which  he  states 
that  he  will  agree  to  occupy  the  premises  for  three  months  if 
furnished,  or  will  take  them  "at  the  rate  of  a  specified  sum  per 
year"  if  unfurnished,  does  not,  by  the  words  "at  the  rate  of 
so  much  per  year,"  create  a  tenancy  for  a  year.^" 

22  Doe  d.  Lord  v.  Crago,  6  Com.  only.  In  the  present  case,  there 
Bench,  90.  was  distinct  proof  of  the  paj-ment 

23  Cox  V.  Bent,  2  M.  &  P.  281,  5  of  rent  for  two  quarters  of  a  year. 
Eing.  185,  7  L.  J.  (N.  S.)  C.  P.  68,  There  is  the  additional  fact  of  an 
30  R.  R.  566.  occupation  for  more  than  a  year; 

24  Doe  d.  Bailey  v.  Foster,  3  C.  but  in  the  case  of  Cox  v.  Bent,  5 
B.  215,  15  L.  J.  C.  P.  263.  Bing.  185,  2  M.  &  P.  281,  where  a 

25  Atherstone  v.  Bostock,  2  Man.  party  under  an  agreement  for  a 
&  G.  511,  10  L.  J.  C.  P.  113.  "Pay-  lease  had  occupied  for  more  than 
ment  of  rent,  indeed,  must  be  un-  a  year,  the  court  held  that  a  ten- 
derstood  to  mean  a  payment  with  ancy  from  j^ear  to  year  existed, 
reference  to  a  yearly  holding;  not  on  the  ground  of  the  occupa- 
for  in  Richardson  v.  Longridge,  4  tion,  but  because  the  party  had 
Taunt.  128,  a  party  who  had  paid  during  that  occupation  paid  a 
rent  under  an  agreement  of  this  half  year's  rent."  By  Parke,  B., 
description,  but  had  not  paid  it  in  Braythwaite  v.  Hitchcock,  10 
■with  reference  to  a  year,  or  any  M.  &  W.  494,  12  E.  J.  Ex.  38,  6  Jur. 
aliquot  part  of  a  year,  was  held  976. 

nevertheless  to  be  a  tenant  at  will 


136  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

§  95.  The  effect  of  the  death  of  either  party  to  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year.  It  is  well  settled  that  a  tenancy  from  year 
to  year  is  not  tenninated  by  the  death  of  either  the  landlord 
or  the  tenant  during  the  current  year.  On  the  death  of  the 
landlord,  in  case  of  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year,  the  unexpired 
term  passes  to  his  administrator  or  executor  as  a  part  of  the 
landlord's  personal  estate  and  is  assets  in  the  hands  of  the  repre- 
sentative for  the  payment  of  debts  and  legacies  or  for  distribu- 
tion among  the  next  of  kin  to  the  same  extent  as  other  per- 
sonal property  is.^^  So,  also,  on  the  death  of  the  tenant  of  an 
estate  from  year  to  year  the  estate  still  continues  and  the  per- 
sonal representative  may  enter  and  he  becomes  responsible  as 
such  and  not  personally  for  the  rent  to  the  extent  that  he  has 
assets  of  the  tenant.  And  the  fact  that  on  the  death  of  the  ten- 
ant his  widow  enters  and  pays  rent  to  the  landlord  does  not 
terminate  the  tenancy  from  year  to  year.-'  The  estate  of  the 
deceased  tenant  for  years  is  responsible  for  rent  which  has  ac- 
crued and  if  the  executor  enters  for  that  which  will  accrue.  The 
tenancy  from  year  to  year  survives  the  lessor  and  vests  in  his 
heirs.  An  exception  to  this  general  rule  occurs  where  the  interest 
of  the  landlord  of  an  estate  from  year  to  year  itself  terminates 
on  his  death  as  where  the  landlord  has  only  a  life  estate  or  inter- 
est in  the  land  with  the  fee  in  another.  Under  such  circumstances 
the  tenant  from  year  to  year  of  one  who  himself  is  only  a  life 
tenant  becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance  on  the  death  of  his  land- 
lord, unless,  as  sometimes  happens,  the  life  tenant  had  a  power 
to  lease,  which  he  has  exercised,  to  bind  the  estate  of  the  re- 
mainderman or  reversioner.  If  this  be  not  the  case,  the  latter 
may,  without  notice  or  demand  of  possession,  eject  the  tenant 
from  year  to  j'^ear  of  the  life  tenant  on  '^e  death  of  the  latter.^* 
If  the  remainderman  is  of  age  at  the  death  of  the  life  tenant, 
his  action  in  receiving  rent  from  the  tenant  from  year  to  year 
and  in  continuing  him  in  the  possession  may,  after  the  life  ten- 
ancy has  terminated,  by  constituting  a  new  tenancy  from  year 
to  year  as  between  him  and  the  tenant  holding  over,  prevent 
the  remainderman  from  ejecting  the  tenant  from  year  to  year 

20  Doe  d.  Hull  v.  Wood,  H  M.  &  27  Hull  v.  Wood,  H  M.  &  W.  082. 

W.  682.    See  Robie  v.  Mulh,  21  Me.  2?  Thomas  v.   Roberts.   16    M.   & 

114.  W.  780. 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  Y'EAR.  137 

"without  g"ivin<?  him  notice  to  qnit.-^  Such  an  estoppel  by  re- 
ceiving- rent  is  not  created  by  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  holding- 
over  vehere  the  remainderman  is  an  infant,  because  the  executors 
of  the  life  tenant  accept  rent  from  the  tenant  from  year  to 
year.^*^  The  action  of  the  executors  who  represent  the  deceased 
life  tenant  does  not  bind  the  infant  remainderman  and  would 
not  bind  a  remainderman  though  he  were  an  adult.  The  delay 
•of  the  personal  representative  of  the  tenant  for  years  in  enforc- 
ing his  right  to  possession  as  against  a  person  who  remains  in 
possession  on  the  death  of  a  tenant  for  years  does  not  prejudice 
the  rights  of  the  representative.  He  has  a  right  to  have  a  period 
>of  consideration  in  order  that  he  may  ascertain  whether  it  is  or  is 
not  advantageous  to  the  estate  that  he  should  take  possession 
and  the  fact  that  during  this  period  the  widow  of  the  deceased 
tenant  from  year  to  year  remains  in  possession  and  pays  rent 
to  the  landlord  does  not  prevent  the  personal  representative  from 
ousting  her.^^  In  the  absence  of  a  specific  statutory  require- 
ment to  the  contrary,  after  the  death  of  either  the  landlord  or 
tenant  of  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  the  personal  representa- 
tive of  the  deceased  may  give  or  receive  a  notice  to  quit  where 
the  tenancy  itself  has  sur\'ived.^"  So,  also,  a  tenancy  from  year 
to  year  is  never  terminated  by  the  insanity  of  either  the  land- 
lord or  the  tenant.  If  during  any  year  the  lessor  becomes  in- 
sane and  is  judicially  pronounced  incompetent  to  manage  his 
affairs,  the  committee  appointed  becomes  the  lessor  of  the  term 
and  the  tenant  must  deal  with  him  as  his  landlord.  The  same 
would  be  true  in  a  case  where  the  tenant  became  incompetent.^' 
§  96.  The  rule  as  to  repairs  by  a  tenant  from  year  to  year. 
A  tenant  from  year  to  year  is  bound  only  to  make  such  repairs 

28  Roe  d.  Jordan  v.  "Ward,  1  H.  It  is  more  than  a  mere  lease  from 

Black.  96.  year   to    year  for   if   it   had   been 

30  Thomas  v.  Roberts,   16  M.  &  such,  says  Lord  Mansfield  in  this 

W.  780.  case,  it  would  have  expired  with- 

81  Doe  d.  Hull  V.  Wood,  14  Mee.  out  notice  at  the  end  of  the  year 

&  Wei.  682.  after    the    death    of    A.    B.      The 

32  A  lease  to  A.  B.,  his  execu-  term,  however,  continues  after  the 

tors,   etc.,   from  year  to   year  for  death  of  A.   B.  until  it  is  termi- 

so  long  time  as  it  shall  please  the  nated  by  his  executor.    Mackay  v. 

lessor    and    A.    B.    his    executors,  Mackreth,  4  Doug.  213,  219. 
etc.,  does  not  expire  on  the  death  33  McFall  v.  McFall,  35  S.  C.  559, 

of  A.  B.,  but  vests  in  his  executors.  14  S.  E.  Rep.  985. 


138 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


as  will  keep  the  house  in  a  tenantable  position.  lie  is  not  re- 
sponsible for  ordinary  wear  and  tear,  nor  for  permissive  waste. ^* 
He  is  not  liable  to  make  substantial  and  lasting  repairs.^"  And 
is  only  bound  to  keep  the  house  which  he  occupies  in  such  a 
condition  that  it  may  be  habitable.^^  If,  however,  the  occupant 
is  tenant  from  year  to  year  under  a  void  lease,  which  contains 
the  usual  covenants  by  the  tenant  to  repair,  he  will  be  bound  by 
such  covenants  and  will  be  compelled  to  make  the  repairs  which 
are  called  for  bj^  them."'  Thus  where  a  lease  was  made  by  a 
corporation  for  the  term  of  three  years  and  the  tenant  agreed 
to  put,  maintain  and  deliver  the  premises  in  tenantable  repair 
and  he  entered  thereon,  he  was  held  to  be  a  tenant  from  year  to 
year  as  the  lease  was  void  because  the  seal  of  the  corporation 
was  not  on  it,  and  the  tenant  was  liable  to  keep  in  repair  ac- 
cording to  its  terms  though  he  was  a  tenant  from  year  to  year.^* 
On  the  other  hand  the  landlord  of  a  tenant  from  year  to  year 
is  not  bound  to  make  substantial  repairs  of  the  premises  in  the 
absence  of  an  express  agreement  on  his  part.^^ 


34  Torriono  v.  i'oung,  6  Car.  & 
P.  8,  12.  See  Martin  v.  Gilham,  2 
N.  &  P.  568,  7  A.  &  E.  540,  7  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  11. 

35  Ferguson  v.  ,   2  Esp. 

590,  5  R.  R.  757;  Horsefall  v. 
Mather,  Holt,  N.  P.  7,  17  R.  R.  589; 
Leach  v.  Thomas,  7  Car.  &  P.  328. 

36  Auworth  V.  Johnson,  5  Car.  & 
P.  239. 

37  Beale  v.  Sanders,  3  Bing.  (N. 
C.)  850,  5  Scott,  58,  3  Hodges,  147, 
6  L.  J.  C.  P.  283,  1  Jur.  1083. 

38  Ecclesiastical  Comm'rs  v.  Mer- 
rall,  38  L.  J.  Ex.  93,  L.  R.  4  Ex. 
162,  20  L.  T.  573,  17  W.  R.  67G. 

30  Gott  V.  Gandy,  2  El.  &  Bl.  845, 
2  C.  L.  R.  392,  23  L.  J.  Q.  B.  1,  18 
Jur.  310,  2  W.  R.  38.  A  covenant 
to  build  or  to  do  such  substantial 
repairs  as  are  not  usually  done 
by  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  will 
not  usually  be  implied  in  the  case 
of  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year. 
Such  covenants  will  not  be  im- 
posed even  though  the  agreement 


for  a  lease  stipulates  for  such  cov- 
enants or  stipulates  for  the  inser- 
tion of  the  usual  covenants.  Bowes 
V.  Croll,  6  E.  &  B.  264.  But  where 
a  tenancy  is  created  by  an  entry 
of  a  tenant  under  a  void  agree- 
ment to  make  a  lease  by  the  terms 
of  which  the  tenant  was  to  keep 
the  premises  in  good  and  tenant- 
able  repair  the  covenant  to  repair 
will  be  implied  and  will  bind  the 
tenant  from  year  to  year.  Thus 
where  a  tenant  went  into  posses- 
sion under  an  agreement  by  which 
he  was  to  have  a  lease  for  three 
years  and  a  quarter,  he  to  keep 
the  premises  in  tenantable  repair 
during  the  said  term,  and  the 
agreement  was  void  for  the  reason 
that  it  was  neither  stamped  as  a 
lease  nor  signed  by  the  parties,  it 
was  held  that  the  tenant  was 
bound  to  repair  during  his  occu- 
])ancy,  though  the  agreement  was 
void  under  the  statute  of  fraud''. 
In    (his  case    (Richardson    v.    Gif-- 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR, 


139 


§  97.  A  tenancy  from  year  to  year  created  by  tenant  holding 

over.  Where  the  tenant  holds  over  after  the  expiration  of  the 
lease,  and  the  lessor  receives  rent  accruing  subsequently  to  the 
expiration  of  the  term,  or  does  any  act  from  which  it  inay  be 
inferred  that  he  intends  to  recognize  him  still  as  a  tenant,  he 
becomes  thereby  by  implication  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  upon 
all  the  terms  of  the  original  lease.'"*    And  the  same  rule  is  true 


ford,  1  Ad.  &  El.  52)  the  court  by 
Parke,  .J.,  said:  "He  did  not  le- 
gally agree  for  the  term  of  three 
years,  but,  in  point  of  law,  he  was 
tenant  at  will  for  the  first  year, 
subject  to  the  terms  of  the  agree- 
ment on  his  own  part,  and  after- 
wards tenant  from  year  to  year 
subject  still  to  the  same  agree- 
ment, which  bound  him  to  keep 
the  premises  in  good  repair  as 
long  as  he  should  occupy."  And, 
hence,  generally,  when  a  tenant 
goes  into  possession  under  an 
agreement  for  a  lease,  or  under  a 
void  lease,  he  will,  after  payment 
of  rent  under  it,  be  treated  as  sub- 
ject to  the  terms  and  conditions 
of  the  agreement  or  lease  so  far 
as  the  same  are  applicable  to  a 
tenancy  from  year  to  year  but  no 
further.  If  any  of  the  conditions 
are  inconsistent  with  such  a  ten- 
ancy from  year  to  year  they  will 
be  rejected. 

40  Belding  v.  Texas  Produce  Co., 
61  Ark.  377,  33  S.  W.  Rep.  421; 
Parker  v,  Hollis,  50  Ala.  411; 
Stoppelkamp  v.  Mangeot,  42  Cal. 
316;  Bacon  v.  Brown,  9  Conn.  334; 
Robertson  v.  Simons,  109  Ga.  360, 
362,  34  S.  E.  Rep.  604;  Crutchfield 
V.  Remaley,  21  Neb.  178,  31  N.  W. 
Rep.  687;   Tanton  v.  Van  Alstine, 

24  111.  App.  405;  Quinlan  v.  Bonte, 

25  111.  App.  240;  Board  of  Direct- 
ors V.  Chicago  Veneer  Co.,  94  IlT. 
App.  492;  Belding  v.  Texas  Pro- 
duce  Co.,   61   Ark.   377,   33    S.   W. 


Rep.  421;  Goldsborough  v.  Gable, 
140  111.  269,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  722,  15 
L.  R.  A.  294;  Kleespies  v.  Mc- 
Kenzie,  12  Ind.  App.  404.  40  N.  E. 
Rep.  648;  Wheat  v.  Brown,  3  Kan. 
App.  431,  43  Pac.  Rep.  807;  Mos- 
hier  v.  Reding,  12  Me.  478;  Wig- 
gins V.  Ferry  Co.,  82  111.  230;  Clin- 
ton Wire  Cloth  Co.  v.  Gardner,  99 
111.  151,  165;  Clapp  v.  Paine,  18 
Me.  264;  Alleman  v.  Vink,  28  Ind. 
App.  142,  62  N.  E.  Rep.  461;  Thei- 
band  v.  Bank,  42  Ind.  312;  Hall  v. 
Myers,  43  Md.  416;  Gardner  v. 
Commissioners,  21  Minn.  33; 
Hunter  v.  Frost,  47  Minn.  1,  49  N. 
W.  Rep.  327;  Smith  v.  Bell,  44 
Minn.  524,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  263; 
Usher  v.  Moss,  50  Miss.  208;  Fin- 
ney V.  St.  Louis,  39  Mo.  177;  Quin- 
ette  V.  Carpenter,  35  Mo.  .  502; 
Bilcher  v.  Parker,  40  Mo.  113;  De- 
laney  v.  Flanagan,  41  Mo.  App. 
651 ;  Yates  v.  Kinney,  19  Neb.  275 ; 
Ketcham  v.  Ochs,  77  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1130,  70  N.  Y.  Supp.  268,  34  Misc. 
Rep.  470;  Ridgeway  v.  Hannum, 
129  Ind.  App.  124,  64  N.  E.  Rep. 
44;  Bradley  v.  Covel,  4  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  349;  Haynes  v.  Aldrich,  133 
N.  Y.  287,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  94,  45  N. 
^'.  St.  Rep.  243.  affg.  14  N.  Y.  Supp. 
951;  Commisioners  v.  Clark,  133 
N.  Y.  251;  Clark  v.  Howland,  85 
N.  Y.  204;  Jackson  v.  Salmon,  4 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  327;  Moore  v.  Beas- 
ley,  3  Ohio,  294;  Laguerenne  v. 
Dougherty,  35  Pa.  St.  45:  Logan  v. 
Herron,    8    S.    &    R.     (Pa.)     459; 


140 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


under  a  lease  for  two  years.*^  It  is  not  material  as  influencing 
this  construction  whether  the  same  rent  is  paid  by  the  tenant 
holding'  over  as  was  paid  under  the  lease  which  had  expired.*^ 
or  whether  the  tenant  holding  over  has  agreed  to  pay  an  in- 
creased rent  during  the  period  he  continues  to  hold  over.*'  In 
all  these  cases  the  payment  of  rent  creates  the  tenancy  from 
year  to  year.  If  the  rent  is  paid  by  the  year  or  so  much  per 
year  the  inference  is  almost  irresistible  that  he  had  in  mind  a 
tefiancy  from  year  to  year,  but  the  fact  that  the  rent  is  payable 
semi-annually  has  in  one  case  at  least  been  held  insufficient  to 
rebut  the  presumption.**  This  rule  applies  to  municipal  and 
other  corporations  as  well  as  to  individuals^  so  that  a  corpora- 
tion holding  over  after  the  expiration  of  its  lease  with  the  as- 
sent of  the  lessor  becomes  a  tenant  from  year  to  year.*^  There 
is  a  presumption  of  law  that  a  tenant  holding  over  with  the 
assent  of  the  lessor  becomes  a  tenant  from  year  to  year,  and  such 


Hemphill  v.  Flynn,  2  Pa.  St.  144; 
Phillips  V.  Monges,  4  Whart.  (Pa.) 
229;  Simmons  v.  Jarman,  122  N. 
C.  195,  29  S.  E.  Rep.  332;  Gladwell 
V.  Holcomb,  60  Ohio  St.  427,  433, 
54  N.  E.  Rep.  473;  Railroad  Co. 
V.  West,  57  Ohio  St.  161;  Amsden 
V.  Atwood,  35  Atl.  Rep.  311,  67 
Vt.  289,  31  Atl.  Rep.  448;  Noel  v. 
McCrary,  7  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  623; 
Emerick  v.  Tanner,  9  Gratt.  (Va.) 
220,  58  Am.  Dec.  217;  Allen  v. 
Bartlett,  20  "W.  Va.  46;  Arbenz  v. 
Exley,  52  W.  Va.  476,  44  S.  E.  Rep. 
149;  King  v.  Wilson,  98  Va.  259, 
35  S.  E.  Rep.  727;  Baltimore 
Dental  Ass'n  v.  Fuller,  101  Va.  627, 
44  S.  E.  Rep.  771;  Brown  v.  Kay- 
ser,  60  Wis.  1;  Bishop  v.  Howard, 
3  D.  &  R.  293,  2  B.  &  C.  100,  1  L. 
J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  243,  26  R.  R.  291; 
Kelly  V.  Patterson.  43  L.  J.  C.  P. 
320,  L.  R.  9  C.  B.  6S0,  30  L.  T.  842; 
Cornish  v.  Stubbs,  39  L.  .T.  C.  P. 
202,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  334,  22  L.  T.  21, 
18  W.  R.  547;  Doe  d.  Clarke  v. 
Smarridge.  7  Q.  B.  957,  14  L.  .T. 
Q.  B.  327,  9  Jur.  781;  Doe  d.  Hol- 


lingsworth  v.  Stennet,  2  Esp.  717; 
Doe  d.  Rogers  v.  Pullen,  3  Scott, 
271,  279,  2  Ring.  (N.  C.)  749,  2 
Hodges,  39,  5  L.  J.  C.  P.  229;  Digby 
V.  Atkinson,  4  Camp.  275,  278; 
Finch  V.  Miller,  5  Com.  Bench, 
428;  Pierce  v.  Shaw,  2  M.  &  R.  418; 
Bridges  v.  Potts,  17  Com.  Bench 
(N.  S.),  314,  335;  Dougal  v.  Mc- 
Carthy, 4  Reports,  402;  (1893)  1 
Q.  B.  736. 

4'  Belding  v.  Texas  Produce  Co., 
01  Ark.  377,  33  S.  W.  Rep.  421. 

42  Wheat  V.  Brown,  3  Kan.  App. 
431,  43  Pac.  Rep.  807. 

*"■  Zippar  V.  Reppy,  15  Colo.  260, 
25  Pac.  Rep.  164,  citing  Digby  v. 
Atkinson,  4  Camp.  275,  in  which 
Lord  Ellenborough  says:  "The 
mere  advance  of  the  rent,  in  my 
opinion,  makes  no  difference." 

44  Adams  v.  Cohoes,  127  N.  Y. 
175,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  25,  affg.  53  Hun, 
260,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  617,  25  N.  Y.  St. 
Rep.  523. 

45  Artt  V.  New  York,  28  N.  Y. 
Super.  Ct.  (5  Rob.)  248.' 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR, 


Ml 


presaimption  may  be  rebutted  by  proof  that  the  holding  was  in 
some  other  character  or  for  some  other  purpose.*" 

§  98.  Rebutting  the  presumption  which  arises  on  a  tenant 
holding  over.  The  presumption  that  a  tenant  holding  over 
and  paying  rent  after  the  expiration  of  his  term,  is  a  tenant 
from  year  to  year  is  as  a  general  rule  regarded  as  only  a  pre- 
sumption of  fact  and  continues  only  until  the  contrary  is 
shown.*^  It  may  be  shown  by  a  landlord  who  denies  that  a  ten- 
ancy from  year  to  year  has  been  created  by  his  receipt  of  rent 
from  a  tenant  holding  over,  that  the  landlord  accepted  or  re- 
ceived the  rent  from  the  tenant  under  some  mistake,  misunder- 
standing or  misapprehension  of  fact  or  in  ignorance  of  a  mater- 
ial fact  which  if  it  had  been  known  to  him  at  the  time  he  re- 
ceived or  accepted  the  rent  would  have  caused  him  to  decline  to 
receive  it.*^  The  receipt  of  rent  by  the  year  creates  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year  solely  because  the  law  presumes  that  such  was 
the  intention  of  the  parties.  It  is  presumed  that  they  thereby 
contracted  for  a  yearly  lease  and  as  an  intention  is  always  an 
essential  element  of  a  contract  if  there  is  no  intention  there  is 


46  Williamson  v.  Paxton,  18 
Gratt.  (Va.)  475.  The  silence  of 
the  landlord  where  a  tenant  for 
a  year  holds  over  may  and  in  fact 
in  most  cases  as  has  been  set  forth 
in  the  text  create  a  tenancy  for  an- 
other year  and  so  on  from  year  to 
year.  But  this  rule  does  not  apply 
to  the  case  of  a  tenant  whose  term 
i.s  for  a  very  short  period  only, 
less  than  year  holding  over  with 
the  acquiesence  of  the  landlord 
and  upon  the  tenant  promising  to 
pay  rent  at  the  same  rate  as  under 
the  lease  which  has  expired.  Mont- 
gomery V.  "Willis,  45  Neb.  434,  63 
N.  W.  Rep.  794.  A  tenancy  from 
year  to  year,  beginning  on  the  first 
day  of  November,  is  created, 
where  by  an  oral  lease  of  premises 
situated  in  New  York  city  it  is  in 
express  terms  agreed  that  the  hir- 
ing shall  be  for  one  year  from  the 
first  day  of  November,  and  the  ten- 


ant remains  in  possession  for  a 
number  of  years  without  any  fur- 
ther agreement  between  the  par- 
ties. 3  Rev.  St.  N.  Y.  (7th  ed.) 
p.  2200,  §  1,  does  not  apply  to  such 
a  case.  Laimbeer  v.  Tailer,  125  N. 
Y.  725,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  756,  affg.  4 
N.  Y.  Supp.  588,  21  St.  Rep.  380. 

47  Secar  v.  Pestana,  37  111.  525; 
Dubuque  v.  Miller,  11  Iowa,  583; 
Brewer  v.  Knapp,  1  Pick  (Mass.) 
332;  Quinnette  v.  Carpenter,  35 
INIo.  502;  Grant  v.  White,  42  Mo. 
285;  Darrill  v.  Stevens,  4  McCord 
(S.  C.)  39;  Moore  v.  Beasley,  3 
Ohio,  294;  Sheldon  v.  Davey,  42 
Vt.  637;  Stedman  v.  Gassett,  18 
Vt.  346;  Williams  v.  Paxton,  18 
Gratt.  (Va.)  475;  Mayor  of  Thet- 
ford  V.  Tyler,  8  Q.  B.  95. 

48  Doe  d.  Lord  v.  Crago,  6  Com. 
Bench,  90,  98;  Oakley  v.  Monck,  3 
H.  &  C.  706. 


142  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

no  lease.  The  parties  are  permitted  to  show  what  was  the  true 
intention  by  any  relevant  evidence  and  the  true  intention  when 
proved  ma\^  overcome  the  implied  intention.*^  The  right  of 
the  landlord  to  rebut  the  presumption  as  against  the  tenant  nec- 
essarily confers  upon  the  tenant  the  reciprocal  right  to  rebut  the 
presumption  of  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  as  against  the  land- 
lord seeking  to  recover  rent  from  him  upon  the  assumption  that 
he  is  a  tenant  from  year  to  year.  If  on  the  termination  of  a 
lease  for  a  definite  period  the  landlord  expresses  no  intention 
of  leasing  the  premises  to  the  tenant  for  a  new  definite  period 
but  simply  permits  him  to  remain  in  possession  and  to  pay  rent 
as  before,  he  is  a  tenant  from  year  to  year.  If,  however,  at  or 
before  the  expiration  of  the  lease  the  landlord  informs  the  ten- 
ant that  he  will  not  be  allowed  to  occupy  the  premises  after  tht 
expiration  of  the  term  except  as  tenant  from  month  to  month, 
no  implied  tenancy  from  year  to  year  will  arise,  for  an  implied 
tenancy  arises  only  from  the  presumed  intention  of  the  parties 
where  they  are  silent  and  where  they  permit  the  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case  to  speak  for  them  and  where  the  land- 
lord expressly  states  his  intention  and  the  tenant  is  silent,  the 
tenant  will  be  presumed  to  have  assented  to  the  proposition.^'" 
§  99.  The  modification  of  the  terms  of  the  original  lease  as 
against  a  tenant  holding  over.  The  presumjitiou  that  the  ten- 
ancy from  year  to  year  which  arises  from  a  tenant  holding  over 

49  "When  a  tenant,  whose  term  the    part    of    the    landlord    from 

has  expired  by  efflux  of  time,  in-  which   a  renewal   of  the  contract 

stead  of  quitting  the  premises  as  may  be  implied,  the  person  in  pos- 

he  ought  to  do,  remains  in  posses-  session  continues  a  wrong-doer,  is 

sion,  holding  over  as  it  is  called,  liable  to  be  treated   as  such  and 

he    is   g.   wrong-doer   and   may   be  must     attribute     to     his     original 

treated  as  such  by  the  owner,  his  wrong  and  subsequent  folly,   any 

landlord.     By   the   consent  of  his  inconveniences  which  may  ensue, 

landlord,  his  tenancy  may  be  con-  The  mere  unbroken  silence  and  in- 

tinued,  and  if  such  continuance  by  action  of  the  owner  will  not  im- 

consent  be  without  any  fixed  limit,  prove  or  enlarge  the  character  of 

he  becomes  a  tenant  from  year  to  the  tenant's  possession."     By  the 

year,  as  it  is  called.     This  consent  court,  Ewing,  C.  J.,  in  Den  ex  dem. 

may  be  either  express  or  inii)lied;  Decker  v.   Adams,   12   N.   J.   Law, 

actual  or  constructive  by  words  or  99,  on  page  100. 

by  some  act  recognizing  or  treat-  •'''"  Shipmau  v.  Mitchell,  G4  Tex. 

ing  him  as  a  tenant.    But  without  174. 
a   new   contract,   or   some   act   on 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR.  113 

is  on  the  same  terms  as  to  rent,  etc.,  as  was  the  oriyinal  lease, 
may  be  overcome  by  clear  proof  that  the  parties  to  the  original 
lease  on  or  before  its  expiration  agreed  that  the  rent  should  be 
modified  on  the  holding  over.  The  presumption  that  a  tenant 
holding  over  with  the  consent  of  the  landlord  is  a  tenant  at  will, 
or  from  year  to  year,  as  the  case  may  be.  upon  the  same  terms 
so  far  as  the  amount  of  rent  is  concerned  as  he  had  under  the 
original  lease  is  conclusively  rebutted  if  it  is  shown  that  a  new 
agreement  was  made  to  pay  an  advanced  rental  during  the  hold- 
ing over.  And  if  either  after  or  prior  to  the  termination  of  the 
lease  the  landlord  informs  the  tenant  that  in  case  he  holds  over 
after  the  expiration  of  an  existing  term  a  greater  rent  will  be 
expected  from  him  than  he  has  paid  under  the  original  lease, 
and  the  tenant  holds  over  iwthout  saying  anything  in  reply  co 
the  landlord's  demand  or  notice  for  an  advanced  rent,  his  con- 
tinuing in  possession  taken  in  connection  with  his  silence  will 
be  regarded  as  an  assent  on  his  part  to  pay  the  advanced  rental. ^^ 
AVhere  a  tenant  holding  under  a  lease  in  writing  from  year  to 
year  is  told  by  his  landlord  during  any  one  of  the  yearly  periods 
that  his  rent  will  be  greater  on  the  ensuing  year  and  he  there- 
after holds  over,  it  will  be  conclusively  presumed  that  he  has 
agreed  to  pay  an  increased  rental  and  the  terms  of  his  lease  will 
be  modified  accordingly.  He  will  thereafter  be  liable  to  pay  the 
increased  rent  from  year  to  year  so  long  as  he  continues  to  hold 
unless  the  rental  contract  is  again  modified  by  a  restoration  of 
the  rent  to  the  original  figure.^-  So,  if  a  tenant  is  told  by  his 
landlord  before  the  expiration  of  his  tenn  that  if  he  remains 

51  Hunt  V.  Bailey,  39  Mo.  257.  tantamount  to  saying  'I  will  con- 
See,  also,  Roberts  v.  Hayward.  3  tinue  in  on  the  terms  of  your  pro- 
Car.  &  P.  432,  in  which  the  court  posal.'  I  am  of  the  opinion  that 
by  Best,  C.  J.,  said  on  page  433:  under  the  circumstances  the  di.s- 
"The  tenancy  under  the  agreement  tress  was  regular.  I  think  the 
expired  at  midsummer,  1826.  Im-  landlord  had  the  right  to  make 
mediately  after  that  time,  the  any  terms  he  pleased  for  the  time 
plaintiff  (the  tenant)  was  a  tres-  subsequent  to  Lady's  Day,  1827, 
passer  but  the  landlord  was  not  and  if  the  plaintiff  would  not  ac- 
obliged  to  treat  him  as  such,  but  cept  them,  to  turn  him  out  of  pos- 
might  make   proposals   to  him   to  session." 

renew  the  relation  of  landlord  and  52  Moore  v.  Harter.  67  Ohio  St. 

tenant  between  them.    This  he  did  250,  65  N.  E.  Rep.  883:  Thompson 

and  the  plaintiff  did  not  say  'I  will  v.  Sanborn,  52  Mich.  141. 
go    out    directly.'     His    silence    is 


144  LAW   OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

thereafter  he  will  have  to  pay  an  increased  rent  which  is  dis- 
tinctly specified,  the  tenant  becomes  liable  for  the  rent  for  an- 
other year  at  the  increased  rate  though  on  the  notice  of  the  in- 
crease of  the  rent  he  has  notified  his  landlord  that  he  remains 
under  protest  and  only  until  he  can  secure  another  place.^^    The 
tenant's  conduct  in  continuing  in  possession  after  notice  by  tlie 
landlord  is  an  acceptance  of  the  landlord's  proposition.    An  ad- 
vance or  a  reduction  of  the  rent  made  by  agreement  or  by  as- 
sent on  the  part  of  the  tenant  does  not  always  conclusively  rebut 
the  presumption  or  implication  that  a  tenant  holding  holds  over 
under  the  terms  of  the  former  lease  so  far  as  such  terms  are  ap- 
plicable to  the  new  holding.    An  agreement  for  an  alteration  of 
the  rent  on  holding  over,  nothing  else  being  said  by  either  party, 
does  not  necessarily  amount  to  a  new  demise  which  will  render 
inadmissable  the  terms  and  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the 
original  letting.     Though  the  tenant  holding  over  does  not  ac- 
tually hold  under  the  original  lease  which  has  expired,  still, 
where  the  parties  have  made  no  new  arrangements  after  the 
original  lease  has  terminated  except  to  alter  the  amount  of  rent 
which  is  to  be  paid,  the  law  will  imply  that  they  had  at  all  times 
the  terms  and  provisions  of  the  old  lease  in  mind  and  that  they 
made  their  new  arrangement  with  reference  to  it.    The  landlord 
cannot  sue  a  tenant  holding  over  after  the  expiration  of  the 
original  lease  on  any  covenant  of  it,  where  any  of  the  implied 
covenants  are  broken  during  the  new  holding,  but  he  may  sue  him 
in  assumpsit  for  rental  and  the  former  lease  should  be  received  in 
evidence  to  show  the  character  of  the  covenant  which  it  is  claimed 
to  have  been  implied. °*     The  periods  at  which  the  rent  is  pay- 
able under  the  original  lease,  whether  yearly,  monthly  or  other- 
wise will  determine  when  the  rent  shall  be  payable  under  the 
lease  implied  from  the  holding  over.°°     And  in  conclusion  it 
should  be  sjiid  that  the  presumption  that  a  tenant  Avho  holds 
over  is  holding  over  upon  the  terms  of  the  original  lease  is  not 
rebutted  by  proof  of  a  different  intention  on  the  part  of  the 

c3  Brinkley  v.  Wolcott,  10  Heisk.  ■■••  Conway    v.    Starkweather,    1 

(Tenn.)  22.  Den.    (N.  Y.)    113;    Dorrlll  v.  Ste- 

o*Digby    V.    Atkinson,    4    Camp.       vens,  5  McCord   (S.  C.)   49. 
276,  27.S;    Monck  v.  Geekle.  9  Ad. 
&  El.  841. 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR.  145 

tenant  alone  which  is  not  communicated  to  or  assented  in  by  the 
landlord.'" 

§  100.  Holding  over — Excused  when  caused  by  action  of  the 
Board  of  Health.  The  power  of  Boards  of  Health  conferred 
upon  them  by  legislative  enactment  under  the  exercise  of  the 
police  power  to  regulate  the  care  and  transportation  of  persons 
ill  with  infectious  or  contagious  diseases  is  very  broad  and  far 
reaching.  In  the  state  of  New  York  and  perhaps  in  most  of  the 
states  of  the  Union  which  have  adopted  codes  of  sanitary  rules 
and  regulations,  the  isolation  of  such  persons  is  strictly  en- 
joined. It  is  provided  that  all  communication  with  a  house  or 
famil}^  infected  with  any  contagious,  infectious  or  pestilential 
disease  may  be  forbidden  by  a  Board  of  Health,  except  by 
.means  of  physicians,  nurses  or  messengers,  to  carry  the  neces- 
sary advice,  medicines  or  provisions  to  the  afflicted.  The  Board 
of  Health  has  jurisdiction  to  act  summarily  in  determining 
whether  a  condition  of  affairs  has  arisen  which  will  justify  it  in 
forbidding  general  access  to  or  egress  from  the  infected  prem- 
ises; its  action,  though  open  to  judicial  review  in  a  direct  pro- 
ceeding to  which  the  board  is  a  party,  cannot  be  questioned  in 
a  collateral  proceeding.  A  landlord  knows,  or  rather,  in  law,  he 
will  be  presumed  to  know  the  law  in  this  respect  and  the  parties 
to  a  lease  will  be  presumed  to  have  contracted  with  reference  to 
the  existence  of  the  law  giving  Boards  of  Health  such  discre- 
tionarj'  powers,  and  they  will  be  presumed  to  have  had  in  view 
in  contracting  any  contingency  which  would  give  occasion  for  the 
exercise  of  such  powers.  Hence  a  holding  over  which  is  invol- 
untary for  the  reason  that  the  tenant  is  prevented  from  remov- 
ing by  the  orders  and  direction  of  the  Board  of  Health  will  not 
be  equivalent  to  a  renewal  of  the  lease  by  the  tenant  nor  will  the 
landlord  be  permitted  to  recover  double  rent  under  a  statute 
providing  for  double  rent  in  a  case  of  a  holding  over  by  a  tenant 
after  he  has  given  notice  that  he  will  quit.^^ 

66  Chicago  V.  Peck,  196  111.  260,  ner.  99  111.  151.  165.     See  Hunt  v. 

63  N.  E.  Rep.  711,  afg.  98  111.  App.  Railey,  39  Mo.  257. 
434;    Board    of    Directors    of   Chi-  st  Haynes  v.  Aldrich,  133  N.  Y. 

cago  Theological  Seminary  v.  Chi-  2S7,   31  N.  E.   Rep.  94;    Herter  v. 

cago  Veneer  Co.,  94  111.  App.  492;  Mullen,  9  App.  Div.  593,  41  N.  Y. 

Clinton   Wire   Cloth   Co.    v.   Card-  S.  708. 

10 


146  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

§  101.  Statutory  modification  of  the  rule  that  a  holding  over 
creates  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year.  The  common  law  rule 
that,  where  a  tenant  for  years  holds  over,  and  continues  to  pay 
rent,  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  is  established,  is  abrogated  by 
statute  in  some  states.  Thus  in  Iowa,  it  is  enacted  by  statute 
that  any  person  in  possession  of  land  with  the  assent  of  the 
owner  is  presumed  to  be  a  tenant  at  will  until  the  contrary  is 
shown.^^  Where  such  statutes  exist  a  mere  tenancy  at  will  is 
created  by  a  tenant  holding  over  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  a 
special  contract  to  the  contrary,  though  he  may  pay  rent  by  the 
year.  So,  also,  where  a  statute  expressly  provides  that  the  time 
agreed  on  in  a  definite  letting  shall  be  the  termination  thereof 
for  all  purposes  and  the  premises  are  leased  in  express  terms 
for  one  year,  a  tenant  who  holds  over  after  the  expiration  of 
the  year  becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance  only  and  not  a  tenant 
from  year  to  year.^® 

§  102.  Tenancies  from  year  to  year  created  by  leases  void 
under  the  statute  of  frauds.  A  tenancy  from  year  to  year  may 
be  created  by  a  tenant  going  into  possession  of  land  and  paying 
rent  computed  by  the  year  under  a  parol  lease  for  a  term  of 
years  when  the  lease  for  years  is  void  as  such  under  the  statute 
of  frauds.^*^     On  the  entry  of  the  tenant  into  possession,  the 

6S  O'Brien    v.    Troxel,    76    Iowa,  v.    Newton,    23    N.    J.    Law,    111; 

760,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  704.  Loughran  v.  Smith,  75  N.  Y.  205; 

59  Wood  V.  Page,  24  R.  L  594,  54  Craske  v.  Cliristian  Union  Pub. 
Atl.  Rep.  372.  Co.,  17  Hun   (N.  Y.),  319;   Fried- 

60  Lockwood  V.  Lockwood,  22  lioff  v.  Smitti,  13  Neb.  5,  12  N.  W. 
Conn.  425;  Strong  v.  Crosby,  21  Rep.  820;  Humphrey  Hardware 
Conn.  398;  Stewart  v.  Apel,  5  Co.  v.  Herrick,  5  Neb.  (unof.)  524, 
Houst.  (Del.)  189;  Cady  v.  Quar-  99  N.  W.  Rep.  233,  234;  Schneider 
terman,  12  Ga.  386;  "Western  v.  Lord,  62  Mich.  141,  28  N.  W. 
Union  TeL  Co.  v.  Fair,  52  Ga.  18;  Rep.  773;  Schuyler  v.  Leggett,  2 
Swan  V.  Clark,  80  Ind.  57;  Nash  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  660;  Reeder  v.  Sayre, 
V.  Beckmen,  83  Ind.  536;  Coan  v.  70  N.  Y.  180,  184;  Condert  v.  Cohn, 
Mole,  39  Mich.  454;  Huntington  US  N.  Y.  309,  313,  23  N.  E.  Rep. 
V.  Parkhurst,  87  Mich.  38,  49  N.  298,  aff'g  43  Hun,  454,  6  N.  Y.  St. 
W.  Rep.  597;  Delaney  v.  Flanagan,  Rep.  733;  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  Co. 
41  Mo.  App.  651;  Hosli  v.  Yokel,  v.  West,  57  Ohio  St.  161,  49  N.  E. 
58  Mo.  App.  169;  Ridgley  v.  Still-  Rep.  344;  Rosenblat  v.  Perkins, 
well,  28  Mo.  40;  Goodfellow  v.  ]8  Or.  156,  22  Pac.  Rep.  598;  Thur- 
Noble,  25  Mo.  60;  Kerr  v.  Clark,  ber  v.  Dwyer,  10  R.  I.  355,  357; 
19  Mo.  132;  Scudly  v.  Murray,  34  Hellams  v.  Patton,  44  S.  C  454,  22 
Mo.  420,  86  Am.  Dec.  116;   Drake  S.  E.  Rep.  608;  Matthews  v.  Hipp, 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR. 


U7 


parol  lease,  though  it  be  invalid  so  far  as  the  creation  of  a  term 
in  writing  is  concerned,  creates  a  tenancy  at  will  and  is  also 
recognized  as  indicating  the  intention  of  the  parties  as  regards 
all  other  conditions  and  terms  of  the  original  letting.  The 
amount  of  the  rent  fixed  in  the  parol  lease  will  be  the  rent 
which  the  tenant  must  pay,  in  the  absence  of  an  express  agree- 
ment to  the  contrary,  and  generally  all  the  covenants  and  condi- 
tions which  are  contained  in  the  void  oral  lease  except  those 
which  fix  the  term  of  the  letting,  will  regulate  the  hiring  from 
year  to  year.^^  A  person  who  had  entered  upon  premises  under 
a  lease  which  is  void  under  the  statute  of  frauds  is  merely  a 
tenant  at  will.  His  continuing  in  possession  for  over  a  year 
after  the  date  of  his  entry'  and  also  his  paying  rent  upon  a  yearly 
basis  turns  his  holding  into  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year."^ 
Generally  the  payment  of  the  rent  for  one  year  at  a  yearly  rate 
with  a  holding  over  by  the  tenant  after  the  expiration  of  the 
first  year  will  constitute  the  tenancy  a  tenancy  from  year  to 
year.®^     Tenancies  for  other  periods,   as  for  example,  by  the 


66  S.  C.  162,  44  S.  E.  Rep.  577; 
Doe  d.  Rogers  v.  Pullen,  3  Scott, 
271,  2  Ring.  (N.  C.)  749,  2  Hodges, 
39,  5  L.  J.  C.  P.  229;  Dicke  v.  Har- 
per, 6  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  2S0;  Rerrey 
V.  Lindlej^  3  INIan.  &  G.  496; 
Thunder  v.  Relcher,  3  East,  449; 
Clayton  v.  Rlahey,  8  Term  Rep.  3, 

4  R.  R.  575;  Doe  d.  Rigge  v.  Rell, 

5  Term  Rep.  471,  2  R.  R.  642. 

61  Baylies  v.  Ingram,  84  A.  D. 
360,  82  N.  Y.  Supp.  891;  Coudert 
V.  Cohn,  118  N.  Y.  309,  313,  23  N. 
E.  Rep.  298,  aff'g  43  Hun,  454,  6 
N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  733;  Reeder  v. 
Sayre,  70  N.  Y.  180,  184;  Richard- 
son V.  GifEord,  1  Ad.  &  El.  52;  Doe 
V.  Collings,  7  C.  B.  939;  Tress  v. 
Savage,  4  El.  &  B.  36;  Lee  v. 
Smith,  9  Exch.  662;  Martin  y. 
Watts,  7  T.  R.  83;    Riggs  v.  Bell, 

5  T.  R.  471;  Clayton  v.  Blakely, 
8  T.  R.  3;  Pennington  v.  Taniere, 
12  Q.  B.  998;  Arden  v.  Sullivan. 
14  Q.  B.  832;  Doe  v.  Amey,  12  Ad. 

6  El.  476. 


62  Mathews  v.  Hipp,  66  S.  C. 
102,  44  S.  E.  Rep.  577. 

63  "Though  the  agreement  is  void 
by  the  statute  of  frauds  as  to  the 
duration  of  the  lease,  it  must  reg- 
ulate the  terms  on  which  the  ten- 
ancy subsists  in  other  respects,  as 
to  the  rent,  the  time  of  the  year 
when  the  tenant  is  to  quit,  etc. 
So,  where  a  tenant  holds  over 
after  the  expiration  of  his  term, 
without  having  entered  into  any 
new  contract,  he  holds  upon  the 
former  terms.  Now,  in  this  case, 
it  was  agreed  that  the  tenant 
should  quit  at  Candlemas;  and, 
though  the  agreement  is  void  as 
to  the  number  of  years  for  which 
defendant  was  to  hold,  if  the 
lessor  choose  to  determine  the 
tenancy  before  the  expiration  of 
the  seven  years  he  can  only  put  an 
end  to  it  at  Candlemas."  By  Lord 
Kenyon  in  Doe  d.  Rigge  v.  Bell,  5 
T.  R.  471. 


148  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

month,  or  by  tlie  quarter,  may  be  created  by  an  entry  into  pos- 
session under  a  lease  which  is  invalid  under  the  statute  of  frauds 
and  a  payment  of  rent  with  reference  to  a  particular  period 
short  of  a  year.  So,  a  tenancy  from  month  to  month  is  created 
by  the  acceptance  of  rent  under  a  lease  void  under  the  statute 
of  frauds,  where  the  rent  is  payable  monthly,®*  and  the  tenant 
goes  into  possession.  For  a  reservation  of  rent  in  the  void  lease 
according  to  a  particular  period  may  convert  a  holding  under 
the  void  lease  into  a  monthly  or  yearly  tenancy  according  to  the 
circumstances.  But  it  has  been  held  that  the  rule  that  an  an- 
nual reservation  of  rent  is  necessary  to  turn  a  lease  for  an  un- 
certain term  into  a  lease  from  year  to  year  does  not  apply  to  a 
parol  tenancy  for  years,  void  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  where 
the  rent  has  been  paid  in  advance,  and  such  tenancy  becomes  a 
tenancy  from  year  to  year,  though  no  rent  was  reserved  by  the 
year.®^  So  an  oral  agreement  by  which  a  tenant  under  a  written 
lease  for  five  years  relets  a  portion  of  the  premises  to  his  land- 
lord for  the  same  term  becomes,  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  a 
tenancy  from  year  to  year.®^^  But  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year 
cannot  be  created  by  an  occupancy  for  two  years  under  a  parol 
lease  for  five  years,  since  such  contract  is  void  as  one  not  to  be 
performed  in  a  year  and  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  is 
not  created  at  all.*'® 

§  103.  Tenancies  from  year  to  year  arising  from  defective 
and  unexecuted  leases.  AVhere  a  tenant  enters  and  pays  a 
yearly  rent  under  a  lease  for  a  term  of  years  which  is  void  for 
any  reason,  he  will  be  regarded  as  a  tenant  from  year  to  year. 
Thus,  for  example,  where  a  long  absent  owner  of  property  re- 
turns and  repudiates  the  lease  made  by  a  guardian  of  his  heirs, 
on  the  supposition  of  his  death,®''  or  the  mortgagee  fails  to  join 
in  a  lease  of  the  mortgaged  premises,®^  or  a  lease  for  five  years 
is  executed  by  the  tenant  alone,^®  or  a  lease  is  imperfectly  exe- 

84  Utah   L<oan,   etc.,    Co.    v.    Gar-  ee  Huglish  v.  Marvin,  128  N.  Y. 

butt,  6  Utah,  342,  23  Pac.  Rep.  758,  380. 

and  see,  also.  Donohue  v.  Chicago  "^  Farley  v.  McKeegan,  48  Neb. 

Bank  Note  Co.,  37  111.  App.  552.  237,  67  N.  W.  Rep.  161. 

80  Brant   v.   Vincent,    100   Mich.  88  Hart  v.  Stockton,  12  N.  J.  L. 

426,  59  N.  W.  Rep.  169.  322. 

e.'.a  Loundsberry  V.  Snyder,  31  N.  "o  Loughran   v.    Smith,    11   Hun 

y.  5U.  (N.  Y.)  3n. 


TENANCY  FROM   YEAR  TO  YEAR.  14:9 

cuted  SO  that  it  is  void/"  or  is  void  because  it  is  unacknowl- 
edged.'^^ A  tenant  who  enters  into  possession  of  the  premises 
and  pays  rent  under  an  agreement  for  a  lease,  as  he  becomes  a 
tenant  from  year  to  year,  is  thereafter  bound  by  all  the  cove- 
nants mentioned  in  the  agreement  for  a  lease  so  far  as  those 
covenants  are  consistent  with  a  lease  from  year  to  year.'^^ 

§  104.  The  necessary  incidents  of  a  tenancy  from  year  to 
year.  A  tenant  from  year  to  year  possesses  a  demisable  inter- 
est in  his  term  and  may  sublet  for  any  period  less  than  a  year 
subject  to  all  the  limitations  and  restrictions  which  are  appli 
cable  to  his  own  lease,  unless  expressly  forbidden  by  his  lease. 
If  he  or  his  landlord  shall  elect  to  terminate  the  tenancy  from 
year  to  year,  all  subleases  are  terminated  thereby  irrespective 
of  the  fact  that  otherwise  the  sublease  would  have  held  over  af- 
ter the  termination  of  any  year.  The  tenant  from  year  to  year 
may  also  mortgage  his  term.'^  He  may  also,  unless  expressly 
restrained  by  some  agreement  not  to  do  so,  assign  the  term  which 
he  has  and  his  assignee  takes  the  estate  subject  to  all  the  restric- 
tions and  covenants  which  were  attached  to  it  in  the  hands  of 
the  original  lessee.  A  tenant  from  year  to  year  may  unques- 
tionably sublet  a  portion  of  his  premises.  But  where  he  does 
this  and  then  surrenders  to  his  landlord  the  portion  remaining 
in  his  own  possession  without  either  receiving  a  notice  to  quit 
or  giving  one  to  his  sub-tenant,  or  surrendering  the  part  occu- 

'0  Fougera  v.  Cohn,  43  Hun  (N.  was  in  its  form  a  lease  by  them 

Y.)  454;  Carey  v.  Richards,  2  Ohio  not  as  trustees  but  as  individuals 

Dec.  630.  only.     It  was  not  signed  by   one 

"1  Thurber    v.    Dwyer,    10    R.    I.  of  the  trustees.     The  tenant,  how- 

355.     The  lessee  is  a  tenant  from  ever,  knew  that  they  were  trustees 

year  to  year  after  he  has  entered  and  Icnew  what  power  they  had  to 

and  paid  rent  by  the  year.     If  he  lease.      He    went    into    possession 

has  not  paid  rent  by  the  year  he  and  occupied  the  demised  premises 

would   be   a    tenant   at   will,   and  for  five  years,  paying  rent  by  the 

after    the    lease    was    pronounced  year.     The   lease,  of   course,   was 

void   perhaps   a   tenant  at   suffer-  void  as  a  lease  by  the  trustees,  but 

ance.      In   Kernochan   v.    Wilkins,  it  was  held  that  though  it  was  void 

3   App.  Div.    596.   38   N.   Y.    Supp.  as  a  lease   for  the  full  term,  yet 

236,  78  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  853,  the  cir-  it  created  a  valid  lease  from  year 

cumstances  were  as  follows:   Cer-  to  year. 

tain   trustees   deriving  their  pow-  t2  Doe    d.    Thompson    v.    Amey, 

ers  to  lease  land  from  a  will  made  4  P.  &  D.  177,  12  A.  &  E.  476. 
a  lease  for  the  term  of  ten  years.  '3  Burrows    v.    Gradin,    1    Dowl. 

The   written    instrument    of   lease  &  L.  213. 


150  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

pied  by  his  sub-tenant,  the  landlord  cannot  recover  rent  against 
the  sub-lessee.  There  is  no  privity  of  contract  between  the 
original  landlord  and  the  sub-tenant ;  the  former  shall  give  no- 
tice to  quit  in  his  own  name  for  as  to  the  part  sublet  the  original 
tenancy  still  exists  '^*  as  between  the  primary  landlord  and  his 
tenant  and  the  latter  continues  to  be  liable  for  the  rent  until  he 
sei'ves  a  notice  to  quit  or  until  the  landlord  accepts  a  surrender 
by  the  tenant. 

§  105.  Tenancies  from  month  to  month — Hov^r  created.  A 
tenancy  from  month  to  month  will  generally  arise  where  no  defi- 
nite term  of  letting  is  specified  by  the  parties  and  the  rent  is 
payable  monthly.'^^  So  a  lease  at  will  with  the  rent  payable  in 
monthly  instalments  becomes  a  tenancy  from  month  to  month."^ 
Such  a  tenancy  also  arises  where  the  tenant  holds  over  after  the 
expiration  of  a  term  for  years,  and  pays  rent  by  the  month  under 
a  provision  permitting  the  tenant  to  occupy  the  premises  by 
the  month  after  the  expiration  of  the  term/'^  or  where  the  ten- 
ant was  to  have  the  premises  as  long  as  he  paid  the  rent  thereon, 
which  was  in  terms  payable  monthly,  and  the  landlord  was  to 
have  the  premises  whenever  he  wanted  them.'^^  Similarly  an 
agreement  to  let  premises  for  one  year  from"  April  1st,  the  rent 
payable  monthly,  is  simply  a  tenancy  from  month  to  month. '^ 
So,  where  a  tenant  for  a  term  paid  a  month's  rent  and  took  a 
receipt  for  the  same  commencing  at  the  expiration  of  the  old 
term,  the  new  tenancy  was  from  month  to  month  and  it  was  not 
a  renewal  of  the  expired  term.^°  An  express  provision  in  the 
lease  that  the  tenancy  may  be  determinable  on  a  notice  of  a 
month  or  thirty  days  may  sometimes  determine  the  length  of 
the  term  of  a  letting^  as,  for  instance,  a  parol  agreement  made 

74  Pleasant  Lessee  of  Hayton  v.  ""  McDevitt  v.  Lambert,  80  Ala. 

Benson,  14  East,  234.  536,  2  So.  Rep.  438;   Shirk  v.  HofE- 

70  Hurd  V.  Whitsett,  4  Colo.  77;  man,  57  Minn.  230,  58  N.  W.  Rep. 

Wall  V.  Kllman,  2  Chest.  Co.  Rep.  990. 

(Pa.)   178;   Steffens  v.  Earl,  40  N.  78  Rogers    v.    Brown,    57    Minn, 

J.  L.  128;   State  v.  Schertinger,  51  223,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  981. 

N.  J.  L.  452.  79  Hungerford     v.     Wagoner,     5 

76  Sebastian  v.  Hill,  51  111.  App.  App.  Div.  590,  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  369. 

272;    Lehman   v.   Nolting,   56   Mo.  so  Baker  v.  Kinney    (N.  J.),  54 

App.    549;    J.    B.    Barnaby    Co.    v.  Atl.     Rep.     526;      Blumenberg     v. 

Johnston,  28  R.  I.  105,  65  Atl.  Rep.  Myers,  32  Cal.  93,  91  Am.  Dec.  560; 

613;    Rogers   v.    Brown,   57    Minn.  Alworth  v.  Gordon,  81  Minn.  445, 

223,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  981.  84  N.  W.  Rep.  454. 


TENANCY  FROM  TEAR  TO  YEAR.  151 

Lgfore  the  expiration  of  a  lease  under  seal  for  the  occupation  of 
the  premises  after  the  expiration  of  the  lease  until  terminated 
by  thirty  days  notice,  converts  the  lease  into  a  tenancy  from 
month  to  month. ^^  A  tenancy  from  month  to  month  is  created 
where  the  term  of  letting  is  for  one  month  only  and  is  to  expire 
at  noon  on  the  first  day  of  the  following  month,  and  the  tenant 
holds  over.^^  The  tenant  is  thereafter  a  tenant  from  month  to 
month.  And  an  entry  into  possession  under  a  verbal  letting  with 
an  agreement  to  pay  rent  by  the  month,  which  is  void  under  the 
statute  of  frauds  becomes  a  tenancy  from  month  to  month. ^^ 
For  if  the  term  is  not  fixed  in  a  parol  letting,  but  a  monthly 
rent  is  reserved,  a  tenancy  from  month  to  month  and  not  from 
year  to  year  usually  arises.^*  A  tenant  who  occupies  the  prem- 
ises under  a  lease  which  is  void  because  the  element  of  mutual- 
ity is  lacking  is  a  tenant  from  month  to  month  where  he  has  an 
option  to  terminate  the  lease  by  a  month 's  notice.  And  this  pre- 
sumption or  construction  is  very  materially  strengthened  by  the 
fact  that  the  tenant  is  to  pay  rent  only  for  the  period  he  ac- 
tually occupies  the  premises.^^  So  also  a  monthly  hiring  is 
created  Avhere  a  person  having  made  a  lease  which  is  invalid  un- 
der the  statute  of  frauds,  goes  into  possession  and  pays  rent  by 
the  mouth.  Ordinarily  this  would  be  a  tenancy  at  will  but  the 
circumstance  that  the  tenant  pays  by  the  month  converts  it 
into  a  lease  from  month  to  month.®^  Where  a  tenant  for  a  term 
of  years  has  an  option  to  continue  in  possession  as  a  tenant  by 
the  month  at  the  expiration  of  his  term,  the  tenant  holding  over 
at  once  becomes  a  tenant  from  month  to  month."  In  one  or  two 
states  of  the  Union  it  is  expressly  provided  by  the  statute  that  a 
tenant  going  into  possession  under  a  lease  which  is  void  under 

81  West  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  1029,  26  L.  R.  A.  799,  affirming,  50 
Morrison,  160  111.  288,  43  N.  B.  111.  App.  415;  Utah  Loan,  etc.,  Co. 
Rep.  393.  V.   Garbutt,    6   Utah,   342,   23   Pac. 

82  Gibbons  v.  Dayton,  4  Hun  (N.  Rep.  758. 

y.)  451;  Stoppelkamp  V.  Mangeot,  84  Hollis   v.    Burns,    100    Pa.    St. 

42  Cal.  316.  206,  45  Am.  Rep.  379. 

83  Warner  v.  Hale,  65  111.  395;  ss  Sigmund  v.  Newspaper  Co.,  82 
Brownell    v.    Welch,    91    111.    523;  111.  App.  178. 

Donohue    v.    Chicago    Bank    Note  so  Sebastian  v.  Hill,  51  111.  App. 

Co.,    37    111.    App.    552;    Blake    v.  272. 

Kurrus,  41  111.  App.  562;   Marr  v.  87  McDevitt  v.  Lambert,  SO  Ala. 

Ray,    151    111.    340,   37   N.  E.   Rep,  536,  2  So.  Rep.  438. 


152  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

the  statute  of  frauds  shall  be  taken  and  regarded  as  a  tenant 
from  month  to  month.^^  The  fact  that  rent  is  payable  quarterly 
and  that  the  tenant  gives  security  to  pay  one  quarter's  rent  in 
advance,  is  conclusive  that  the  tenancy  is  a  quarterly  tenancy 
and  not  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year.^^ 

§  106.  Tenancy  from  month  to  month  by  holding  over.  A 
tenancy  from  month  to  month  may  be  created  by  holding  over. 
Thus  a  tenant  under  a  lease  for  one  month  ^\\\o  holds  over  with 
the  consent  of  his  landlord  and  pays  rent  thereby  creates  a  ten- 
ancy from  month  to  month  which  can  only  be  terminated  upon 
one  month's  notice  to  quit.*^"  And  in  Missouri  a  tenant  of  prem- 
ises located  in  any  city  by  holding  over  becomes  under  the  stat- 
ute a  tenant  from  month  to  month.'*"  Similarly  where  a  tenant 
remained  in  possession  of  certain  property  two  months  after  the 
expiration  of  his  term,  paying  rent  each  month  at  the  rate  pro- 
vided for  in  the  lease,  a  mere  tenancy  from  month  to  month  is 
created.®^  And  a  lease  of  premises  for  a  certain  term  at  a 
monthly  rental,  under  which  the  tenant  holds  over  for  several 
months  without  a  new  agreement,  paying  the  same  rent  consti- 
tutes such  tenant  a  tenant  from  month  to  month. ^-  AYhere  the 
lease  specially  provides  that  after  the  expiration  of  the  term  the 
holding  shall  be  from  month  to  month,  the  tenancy  is  one  from 
month  to  month.''^  The  fact  that  a  tenant  is  distinctly  told  that 
if  he  holds  over  it  must  be  as  a  tenant  from  month  to  month,  a 
tenancy  from  month  to  month  is  created  and  no  other  contract 
of  letting  can  be  implied."* 

•s^Delany  v.  Flanagan,  41  Mo.  oiShipman  v.  Mitchell,  64  Tex. 
App.  651.  174.  A  tenant  who  enters  under 
88  Wilkinson  v.  Hall,  4  Scott,  a  parol  demise  which  is  void  under 
301,  3  Bing.  (N.  C.)  508,  3  Hodges,  the  statute  of  frauds  and  pays  rent 
&6,  6  L.  J.  C.  P.  82.  by  the  year  becomes  thereby  a  ten- 
se Stopplekamp  v.  Mangeot,  42  ant  from  year  to  year,  and  the 
Cal.  316;  Shirk  v.  Hoffman,  57  terms  of  the  agreement,  though  It 
Minn.  230,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  990.  is  void,    is    permitted   to   regulate 

90  Drey  v.  Doyle,  28  Mo.  App.  all  the  other  incidents  of  the  ten- 
249;  Smith  v.  Smith,  62  Mo.  App.  ancy  from  year  to  year,  as,  for  ex- 
596,  1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  580.  ample,  the  date  when  the  yearly 

91  Backus  V.  Sternberg,  59  Minn.  rent  shall  be  payable,  the  amount 
403,  61  N.  W.  Rep.  335.  of  the   rent  and  the  time  of  the 

92  Branton  v.  O'Briant,  93  N.  C.  year  when  the  tenant  must  quit. 
99.  Schuyler   v.   Leggatt,   4   Cow.    (N. 

93Pappe  V.  Trout,  3  Okl.  260,  41       Y.)    60. 
Pac.  Rep.  397. 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR.  153 

§  107.  The  commencement  of  the  monthly  period.  The  date 
iipon  which  an  entry  is  made  upon  the  demised  premises  may, 
in  the  absence  of  an  express  agreement  upon  this  point,  indicate 
the  day  upon  which  the  monthly  period  of  tenancy  shall  com- 
mence. But  usually  either  by  custom  or  by  an  express  agree- 
ment between  the  parties,  the  month  begins  with  the  first  day  of 
the  next  succeeding  month  to  that  in  which  the  tenant  moves  into 
the  premises,  at  least  where  the  tenant  does  not  move  in  or  be- 
gin to  pay  rent  on  the  first  of  that  mouth.  So,  where  a  lessee 
went  into  possession  on  the  sixth  of  the  month  and  paid  his  rent 
up  to  the  first  of  the  following  month  the  period  of  renting  is 
from  the  first  day  of  the  month  to  the  first  day  of  the  month. ^' 

§  108.  The  conversion  of  tenancies  from  month  to  month  into 
tenancies  from  year  to  year.  Where  a  tenant  enters  into 
possession  of  premises  under  a  lease  which  expressly  states  that 
it  is  from  month  to  month,  the  court  will  refuse  to  convert  his 
tenancy  into  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  simply  because  he  has 
continued  in  occupation  for  more  than  a  year.''*^  Similarly  where 
a  tenant  from  month  to  month  holds  over  for  more  than  a  year, 
and  the  landlord  elects  to  treat  him  as  a  tenant,  he  does  not 
thereby  become  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  but  continues  under 
the  terms  of  the  former  lease  so  far  as  applicable,  and  will  pre- 
sumptively remain  a  tenant  from  month  to  month  in  the  absence 
of  a  new  hiring  for  a  different  period.'*' 

§  109.  The  statutory  rules  creating  a  tenancy  from  month  to 
month  by  a  holding  over.  An  exception  to  the  general  rule 
that  a  parol  lease,  void  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  or  a  holding 
over  creates  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  has  been  created  by 
statute  in  some  states  of  the  Union.  Thus  in  Missouri  it  is  pro- 
vided by  statute  that  oral  lettings  of  stores^  shops,  houses,  tene- 
ments and  other  buildings  in  cities,  towns,  and  villages  shall  be 
tenancies  from  month  to  month.^*  Hence  where  a  lease  of  such 
premises  which  is  invalid  under  the  statute  of  frauds  is  made 
or  where  a  tenant  of  such  premises  holds  over  after  the  termina- 
tion of  a  lease  for  a  definite  period,  he  is  a  tenant  from  month 
to  month  under  the  statute.    The  statute  being  in  derogation  of 

05  Ver     Steeg     v.     Becker-Moore  o"  Hollis   v.    Burns,    100    Pa.    St. 

Paint    Co.     (Mo.    App.,    1904),    80  206. 

S.  W.  Rep.  346.  »«  Missouri  Rev.  St.  1879,  §  3078. 

9c  Jones  V.  Willis,  53  N.  Car.  430. 


.154  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

the  common  law  will  be  strictly  construed  and  it  lias  been  held 
inapplicable  to  the  oral  letting  of  land  in  a  city,  the  buildings 
on  which  are  the  property  of  the  tenant.®^  There  is  a  somewhat 
similar  statute  in  Louisiana  applicable  to  estates  which  are 
usually  tenancies  at  will.  By  the  Louisiana  statute  it  has  been 
expressly  provided  that  "if  the  renting  of  a  house  or  other  edi- 
fice or  an  apartment  has  been  made  without  fixing  its  duration, 
the  lease  shall  be  considered  to  have  been  made  by  the  month."  ^ 
The  effect  of  this  statute  is  to  make  a  holding  over  after  the  ex- 
piration of  a  tenn,  in  the  absence  of  a  new  agreement,  a  mere 
tenancy  from  mouth  to  month. - 

§  110.  Tenancies  from  week  to  week.  It  is  very  well  settled 
that  there  maj^  be  a  tenancy  from  week  to  week  of  land  leased 
This  is  aside  from  the  letting  of  furnished  rooms  or  apartments 
as  lodgings  where  the  rent  is  paid  weekly  and  the  occupant  is 
a  licensee.  Whether  a  letting  is  from  week  to  week  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  express  stipulation  in  the  lease  to  that  effect,  depends 
largely  upon  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  each  case,  the  most 
important  of  which  are  the  character  and  condition  of  the  prem- 
ises and  the  purpose  for  which  they  are  to  be  used  by  the  tenant. 
The  payment  of  rent  by  the  week  is  a  suggestive  fact  though 
by  no  means  conclusive.  Where  the  contract  is  silent  the  court 
may  imply  a  tenancy  from  week  to  week  exists  from  the  fact 
that  the  leased  premises  were  a  furnished  house  and  that  noth- 
ing was  said  in  the  lease  about  a  quarterly  letting  or  periodical 
payment  of  rent.^  Obviously  no  such  implication  of  a  weekly 
tenancy  would  usually  arise  in  the  case  of  an  unfurnished  house 
or  in  the  case  of  the  leasing  of  agricultural  lands  because  the 
obvious  purpose  of  the  occupation  of  the  tenant  would  be  nulli- 
fied by  presuming  a  weekly  hiring.  Where  the  letting  of  prem- 
ises was  expressly  from  week  to  a  week,  a  stipulation  in  the  lease 
that  after  the  expiration  of  the  tenancy  by  the  usual  week's  no- 
tice to  quit  the  tenant  shall  have  a  reasonable  time  after  the  ex- 
piration of  the  term  to  remove  his  goods  is  valid.  It  operates 
also  as  a  quasi  extension  of  the  term  so  as  to  give  the  tenant  a 

»8  Delany   v.    Flanagan,    41    Mo.  17;  Dolese  v.  Barbreat,  9  La.  Ann. 

App.  651.  352;  Marmiche  v.  Roumieu,  11  La. 

1  La.  Code  Act,  §  2655.  Ann.  477. 

2  Bowles  V.  Lyon,  6  Rob.  (La.)  3  Towne  v.  Campbell,  3  Com. 
262;  Gehabee  v.  Stanly,  1  La.  Ann.  Bench,  921. 


TENANCY  FROM  TEAR  TO  YEAR.  155 

right  to  enter  and  to  do  what  is  necessary  to  effect  the  removal.* 
but  obviously  does  not  permit  him  to  hold  over  from  week  to 
week.  A  provision  that  rent  shall  be  payable  at  the  rate  of  so 
much  per  week  may  indicate  a  weekly  hiring-,  but  where  it  is 
also  provided  that  the  rent  is  not  to  be  increased  during  a  par- 
ticular period,  the  presumption  of  a  tenancy  from  week  to  week 
is  overcome.^ 

§  111.  The  necessity  for  a  notice  to  quit  at  the  common  law. 
At  the  common  law  a  notice  to  quit  must  usually  be  given  by  the 
landlord  prior  to  bringing  ejectment  in  all  cases  of  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year.*  If,  however,  a  lease  is  to  end  on  a  precise 
date,  as  where  it  is  for  one  year  or  for  a  term  of  years,  no  notice 
to  quit  is  required  to  be  served  by  the  landlord  before  bringing  an 
action  for  ejectment.'^  A  tenant  for  a  definite  term  is  not  en- 
titled usually  to  a  notice  to  quit.  AYhere  a  lease  has  a  definite 
time  to  run,  or  the  term  is  to  end  at  a  certain  time,  a  notice  to 
quit  is  not  necessary.^  In  the  case  of  a  lease  for  a  year  or  for  a 
term  of  years,  which  is  to  expire  on  a  day  certain  and  fixed,  no 
notice  to  quit  is  required  to  be  served  upon  the  tenant  by  the 
landlord  but  the  term  expires  by  its  own  limitation,  and,  as  soon 
as  the  end  of  the  term  arrives,  the  landlord  has  a  right  to  re-en- 
ter without  delay  or  notice.^    So.  too,  where  by  the  express  terms 

*  Cornish  v.  Stubbs,  39  L.  J.  C.  Thomas  v.   Wright,   9    Serg.  &   R. 

P.  202,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  334,  22  L.  T.  (Pa.)    87;    Rich  v.  Keyser,  54  Pa. 

21,  18  W.  R.  547.  St.  86.     But  see  Nelson  v.  Ware, 

5  Adams  v.  Cairns,  85  L.  T.  10.  57  Kan.  670,  47  Pac.  Rep.  540. 

6  Hollingsworth  v.  Stennett,  2  ^  Cobb  v.  Stokes,  8  East,  358,  9 
Esp.  717,  5  R.  R.  769;  Martin  v.  R.  R.  464;  Messenger  v.  Arm- 
Watts,  7  Term  Rep.  83,  2  Esp.  501,  strong,  1  T.  R.  54.  1  R.  R.  148; 
4  R.  R.  387;  Moore  v.  Lawder.  1  Flower  v.  Darby,  1  T.  R.  162,  1  R. 
Stark.  308;  Warner  v.  Brown,  8  R.  169;  Tilt  v.  Stratton,  4  Bing. 
East,  166,  9  R.  R.  397;  Thomas  v.  46,  1  M.  &  P.  183,  3  Car.  &  P.  164, 
Black,  8  Houst.  (Del.)  507,  18  Atl.  6  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  C.  P.  50.  See  Cox 
Rep.  771;  Coomber  v.  Hefner,  86  v.  Sammis,  68  N.  Y.  Supp.  203. 
Ind.  108;  Elliott  v.  Stone  State  s  Young  v.  Smith,  28  Mo.  65; 
Bank,  4  Ind.  App.  155,  30  N.  E.  Stephen  v.  Brown,  56  INfo.  23. 
Rep.  537;  Moshier  v.  Kedwig,  12  »  Canning  v.  Fibush,  77  Cal.  196, 
Me.  478;  Grant  v.  White,  42  Mo.  198,  19  Pac.  Rep.  376;  Craig  v. 
App.  285;  Hosli  v.  Yokel,  58  Mo.  Graj^  1  Cal.  App.  598,  82  Pac.  Rep. 
App.  169;  Jackson  v.  Bryan,  1  699;  Reithman  v.  Brandenburg,  7 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  322;  Jackson  v.  Colo.  480,  4  Pac.  Rep  788;  Walker 
Salmon,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  327;  v.  Ellis,  12  111.  470;  Brownell  v. 
AVilliams  v.  Ackerman,  8  Or.  405;  Walsh,    91    111.    523;    Fort   r.    Mc- 


156 


LAW   OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 


of  a  lease  the  tenure  of  the  tenant  is  to  come  at  once  to  an  ena 
upon  the  happening  of  some  contingent  event,  no  notice  to 
quit  is  essential  and  the  term  is  absolutely  at  an  end  upon  the 
occurrence  of  the  event.  Thus  where  it  was  agreed  by  an  ex- 
press provision  in  the  lease  of  a  mill  that  the  term  should  end 
in  case  the  machinery  should  break  down  no  notice  to  quit  is 
required  and  the  term  is  at  an  end  at  once  as  soon  as  the  machin- 
ery breaks  down.^°  '  But  the  right  of  the  tenant  under  a  lease 
from  year  to  year  to  receive  notice  to  quit  and  the  reciprocal 
obligation  of  the  landlord  to  give  such  notice  are  inseparable 
and  essential  incidents  of  the  tenancy.  The  tenant  may  by  his 
own  conduct  or  by  his  acquiescence  in  and  assent  to,  conduct  on 
the  part  of  the  landlord,  waive  his  rights  to  a  notice  to  quit  at 
the  end  of  the  current  year.  Such  would  be  the  case  where  the 
tenant  abandoned  the  premises  during  the  year  and  refused  to 
pay  rent  for  them.  Indeed  it  has  been  held  that  a  notice  to 
quit  is  required  to  be  given  the  tenant  though  the  lease  from 


Grath,  7  111.  App.  302;  Frank  v. 
Taubman,  31  111.  App.  592;  Alcorn 
V.  Morgan,  77  Ind.  184,  786;  Mc- 
Clure  V.  McClure,  74  Ind.  108,  110; 
Myerson  v.  Neff,  5  Ind.  523; 
Thomas  v.  Walmer,  18  Ind.  App. 
112,  46  N.  E.  Rep.  695;  Hamit  v. 
Lawrence,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.) 
366;  Locke  v.  Coleman,  2  T.  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  12,  15,  15  Am.  Dec. 
18;  Bowles  v.  Lyon,  6  Rob.  (La.) 
262;  Chesley  v.  Welch,  37  Me.  106, 
109;  Preble  v.  Hay,  32  Me.  456; 
Clapp  V.  Paine,  18  Me.  264,  265; 
Stockwell  V.  Marks,  17  Me.  455,  35 
Am.  Dec.  266;  Darrell  v.  Johnson, 
17  Pick.  (Mass.)  263;  Danforth  v. 
Sargeant,  14  Mass.  491;  Ellis  v. 
Paige,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  71;  Wilson 
V.  Wodd  (Miss.  1904),  36  So.  Rep. 
609;  Mastin  v.  Metzinger,  99  Mo. 
App.  613,  616,  74  S.  W.  Rep.  431; 
Horner  v.  Leeds,  25  N.  J.  Law, 
106;  Steffens  v.  Earl,  40  N.  .L  Law, 
128,  133,  29  Am.  Rep.  214;  Allen 
V.  Jaquish,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  628; 
Gibbons  v.  Dayton,  4  Hun  (N.  Y.) 


45;  Logan  v.  Herron,  8  S.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  459;  Cobb  v.  Stokes,  8  East, 
358;  Right  v.  Darby,  1  T.  R.  159; 
Adams  v.  City  of  Cohoes,  53  Hun, 
260,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  611;  Logan  v. 
Herron,  8  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  459; 
Lane  v.  Nelson,  167  Pa.  St.  602, 
31  Atl.  Rep.  864,  865;  Mounts  r. 
Goranson,  29  Wash.  261,  69  Pac. 
Rep.  740;  Williams  v.  Bennett,  26 
N.  C.  122.  Notice  to  quit  is  not 
usually  required  upon  the  expira- 
tion of  a  term  of  one  year.  But 
where  a  notice  in  writing  is  ac- 
tually given  by  the  landlord  it 
may  be  admitted  in  evidence  in 
an  action  by  him  to  recover  the 
possession  brought  subsequently 
to  the  expiration  of  the  term. 
Snideman  v.  Snideman,  118  Ind. 
162,  20  N.  E.  Rep.  723.  One  who 
occupies  land  under  a  mere  license 
is  not  entitled  to  notice  to  quit, 
but  can  be  ejected  by  the  owner. 
Johns  V.  McDaniel,  60  Miss.  486. 

10  Scott  V.  Willis,  122  Ind.  1,  22 
N.  E.  Rep.  786. 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR.  157 

year  to  year  expressly  provides  that  tlie  term  is  to  continue  so 
long  as  the  rent  is  paid.^^  A  distinction  has  been  mac'e  by  the 
authorities  as  to  the  necessity  for  a  notice  to  quit  between  that 
class  of  cases  where  the  tenancy  is  of  an  indefinite  duration  or 
for  an  indefinite  number  of  years  as  was  the  universal  character 
of  these  tenancies  from  year  to  year  in  their  original  condition ; 
and  the  class  of  tenancies  from  year  to  year  which  arises  when 
a  tenant  holds  over  with  the  consent  of  his  landlord  after  the 
expiration  of  a  definite  term.  In  the  former  class  of  cases,  and 
particularly  where  the  premises  consisted  of  agricultural  land, 
a  six  months'  notice  to  quit  was  required  from  the  landlord  be- 
cause of  the  fact  that  the  tenant  from  year  to  year  could  not 
otherwise  know  at  any  time  during  the  existence  of  his  holding 
when  his  landlord  might  determine  it.  In  theory  a  tenant 
from  year  to  year  under  an  indeterminate  lease  has  in  each  cur- 
rent year  a  growing  interest  in  the  year  next  ensuing,  which 
cannot  be  arbitrarily  destroyed  by  his  landlord  without  notice 
to  quit.  Where,  however,  a  tenant  holds  over  after  the  expira- 
tion of  a  definite  term,  and  by  so  doing  creates  a  tenancy  from 
year  to  year,  no  year  of  the  tenancy  thus  created  by  holding 
over  arises  out  of  or  is  connected  with  the  year  which  precedes 
it  but  each  year  of  the  holding  over  creates  a  new  and  separate 
contract  for  a  year  between  the  parties  which,  being  for  a  fixed 
and  definite  period  may,  according  to  the  rule,  be  terminated 
without  notice.  The  assent  of  both  parties  to  the  original  lease 
is  necessary  to  create  the  new  lease  from  year  to  year  by  holding 
over.  This  assent  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  is  usually  implied 
from  the  fact  of  his  remaining  in  possession  and  paying  rent 
after  his  term  has  expired.  His  action  in  vacating  the  premises 
and  not  electing  to  hold  over  is  so  clear  a  m-anifestation  of  his 
intention  not  to  creae  a  new  yearly  tenancy  that  no  other  notice 
on  his  part  is  required.  And  though  by  remaining  in  possession 
the  tenant  is  presumed  to  offer  to  take  the  premises  for  another 
year,  the  landlord  is  not  bound  to  accept  the  offer,  and  unless 
he  does  so  by  accepting  rent  or  otherwise,  the  tenancy  is  ter- 
minated and  notice  to  quit  is  not  required  to  be  given  by  him.'  = 
A  notice  to  quit  is  not  required  to  be  served  by  a  landlord  in  the 

11  Doe    d.    Warner   v.    Brown,    8      v.  Holcomb,  60  Ohio  St.  427,  54  N. 
East,  1G5.     See,  also,  as  to  neces-      E.  Rep.  473. 
sity  for  a  notice  to  quit,  Gladwell  12  Gladwell  v.  Holcomb,  60  Ohio 


158  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

case  of  a  lease  expressly  "for  one  year"  coupled  with  a  further 
agreement  that  the  term,  might  continue  as  long  as  the  parties 
should  agree,  where  the  tenant  tells  his  landlord  during  any  one 
of  the  yearly  periods  that  he  does  not  wish  to  hold  for  another 
year.^^  Generally  one  who  has  entered  upon  land  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  owner  to,  cultivate  it  upon  shares  is  a  mere  cropper 
and  has  no  interest  as  a  tenant  in  the  land  itself.  His  possession 
is  the  possession  of  the  owner  and  his  only  right  under  this  con- 
tract is  to  have  a  fair  and  equitable  division  of  the  crop.  Hence 
he  is  not  usually  entitled  to  notice  to  quit  nor  need  he  serve 
notice  to  quit  upon  the  owner.^'* 

§  112.  The  length  of  time  required  for  the  notice  to  quit.  At 
the  common  law  and  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  requirement 
prescribing  a  different  time  a  six  month 's  notice  to  quit  is  usually 
required  in  the  case  of  tenancies  from  year  to  year.^^  It  has 
also  been  held  that  where  the  parties  themselves  have  failed  to 
stipulate  what  shall  be  the  length  of  the  notice  to  quit  the  mat- 
ter may  be  regulated  by  the  custom  of  the  locality.^°  The  cus- 
tom must  be  clearly  proved  and  the  burden  of  proof  to  show  the 
custom  is  upon  the  tenant  alleging  its  existence.  It  has  also 
been  held  that  a  notice  to  quit  must  be  given  a  reasonable  time 
before  the  expiration  of  the  calendar  year.'^^  And  that  the  ques- 
tion what  is  a  reasonable  time  to  give  notice  to  quit  under  a  lease 
from  year  to  year  is  always  a  question  for  the  determination  of 

St.    427,   437,   54   N.  E.   Rep.   473;  332;    Ellis  v.  Paige,  19  Mass.  71; 

Adams  v.  City  of  Colioes,  127  N.  Murray    v.    Armstrong,    11    Miss. 

Y.   175.     But   see   PeeM  v.   Bum-  209;     Critchfield    v.    Remaley,    21 

balek,  99  Wis.  62,  74  N.  W.  Rep.  Neb.  178,  31  N.  W.  Rep.  687;  God- 

745;  Robertson  v.  Simons,  109  Ga.  ard  v.   Railroad  Co.,   2   Rich.    (S. 

360,  34  S.  E.  Rep.  604.  Car.)  346  (three  months*  notice); 

13  Dunphy  v.  Goodlander,  12  Ind.  Hanchet  v.  Whitney,  1  Vt.  311,  315; 

App.  609,  40  N.  E.  Rep.  924.  Doe    d.    Strickland    v.    Spence,    6 

i4Davies    v.    Baldwin,    66    Mo.  East,  120;   Bridges  v.  Potts,  17  C. 

App.   577.     And   compare  Teft  v.  B.  N.  S.  314,  333;   Goode  v.  How- 

Hinchman,  76  Mich.  672,  43  N.  W.  ells,  4  M.  &  W.  199;  Right  v.  Darby, 

Rep.   680.  1  T.  R.  162;  Doe  v.  Porter,  3  T.  R. 

15  Spalding  v.  Hall,  6  D.  C.  123;  13;   Pitcher  v.  Donovan,  1  Taunt. 

Hamitt  v.  Lawrence,  2  .J.  J.  Marsh.  555;   Martin  v.  Watts,  7  T.  R.  85. 

(Ky.)  366;  Clapp  v.  Paine,  18  Mp.  I'iRoe  v.  Charnock,  Peake,  N.  P. 

264;    Hall  v.   Myers,   43   Md.   446;  C.  4. 

Danforth    v.    Sargeant,    14    Mass.  i"  Hately  v.  Myers,  96   111.  App. 

491;    Brewer   v.   Knapp,   18   Mass.  217. 


TENANCY  FEOM  YEAR  TO  YEAR.  159 

the  jury.^^  In  one  case  it  was  held  that  half  a  year's  notice  to 
quit  in  order  to  terminate  a  tenancy  at  will  must  be  given  either 
by  the  tenant  or  b}"  his  executor  before  an  action  of  ejectment 
will  lie.^®  And  the  fact  that  the  rent  under  a  lease  from  year  to 
year  is  payable  quarterly  does  not  dispense  with  the  necessity 
for  six  months'  notice  to  quit.^°^  In  the  case  of  tenancies  for 
periods  running  less  than  a  year  it  has  been  well  settled  from  an 
early  date  that,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  notice  to  quit  is  to  be 
regulated  by  the  term  of  the  letting  and  must  at  least  be  equiva- 
lent to  one  rental  period.  Short  terms  less  than  a  year  are  of 
modem  origin  as  compared  with  terms  for  years  and  terms  from 
year  to  year.  The  English  judges  have  admitted  that  the  rule  of 
less  than  six  months'  notice  is  not  based  upon  any  judicial  deter- 
mination,-" but  have  recognized  and  applied  it  as  a  custom  grow- 
ing out  of  the  necessity  of  the  case.  For  it  was  impracticable  as 
well  as  unfair  to  both  parties  to  these  short  terms  to  require  from 
either  of  them  the  six  months'  notice  that  was  demanded  as  a  rea- 
sonable notice  to  quit  in  the  case  of  tenancies  from  year  to  year. 
Nor  was  it  fair  to  the  parties  to  apply  the  rule  of  a  notice  of  half 
the  period  which  was  required  in  the  case  of  yearly  holdings  to 
these  much  shorter  terms.  But  whatever  may  be  the  reason  of 
the  rule  it  has  been  repeatedly  recognized  and  held  by  the  courts 
of  both  the  United  States  and  England.  In  the  case  of  a  ten- 
ancy from  mouth  to  month  a  notice  to  quit  of  at  least  one  month 
must  be  served.-^    The  period  of  the    notice  to  quit  in  the  case 

18  Jones  V.  Spartanburg  Herald  (by  statute  Mo.  R.  S.  §  3978); 
Co.,  44  S.  Car.  526,  22  S.  E.  Rep.  Steffens  v.  Earl,  40  N.  J.  Law,  128, 
731.  134,  29  Am.  Rep.  214;    Prlndle  v. 

19  Walker  v.  Constable,  3  Wils.  Anderson,  19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  391, 
25.  23    Wend.    (N.   Y.)    616;    Hunger- 

10  Shirley    v.    Newman,    1    Esp.  ford  v.  Wagner,  5  App.  Div.  590, 

266,  5  R.  R.  737.  591,  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  369;  People  ex 

2oHufEell    V.    Armistead,   7    Car.  rel.  Botsford  v.  Darling,  47  N.  Y. 

&  P.  56;   Towne  v.  Campbell,  3  C.  6G6;    HollLs  v.  Burns,  100  Pa.  St. 

B.  921.  206,   45   Am.  Rep.   379;    Teater  v. 

2iMcDevitt  V.  Lambert,  80  Ala.  King,  35  Wash.  138,  76  Pac.  Rep. 

636,    2    So.   Rep.   438;    Prickett   v.  688,  690;   Yesler's  Estate  v.  Orth, 

Ritter,    16    111.   96;    Seems   v.   Mc-  24   Wash.  483,   64   Pac.   Rep.   723; 

Lees,  24  111.  192;  Walker  v.  Sharp,  Doe  d.  Parry  v.  Hazell,  1  Esp.  94; 

14  Allen    (Mass.)    43;   Greenewald  Peacock  v.  Ruffun,  6  Esp.  4. 
V.  Schaales,  17  Mo.  App.  324,  327 


160  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT' 

of  a  monthly  tenancy  must  expire  with  the  end  of  some  monthly 
term.  The  notice  must  be  to  quit  at  the  end  of  the  period.--  As 
regards  the  particular  day  upon  which  the  tenant  is  notified  to 
quit,  it  may  be  the  day  which  corresponds  with  the  date  of  the 
original  letting.-^  If  the  tenancy  begins  on  a  particular  day, 
the  notice  must  be  to  terminate  on  the  corresponding  day  of  the 
succeeding  month.^^*  Apparently  the  notice  to  quit,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  statute,  may  be  to  quit  on  one  of  the  recurring  periods 
of  the  holding  and  if  the  notice  be  served  on  a  day  of  the  corres- 
ponding date  in  the  preceding  month,  it  will  be  sufficient.-^  On 
the  other  hand  it  has  been  held  that  a  notice  directing  a  monthly 
tenant  to  remove  on  the  day  his  monthly  term  expires  is  both 
usual  and  proper.  But  a  notice  directing  him  to  vacate  on  the 
following  day  is  not  insufficient  or  defective. -° 

§  113.  The  length  of  the  notice  to  quit  in  weekly  and  monthly 
tenancies.  By  some  of  the  English  cases  it  has  been  laid  down 
that,  in  the  case  of  an  ordinary  weekly  tenancy,  a  notice  to  quit 
is  not  by  implication  a  part  of  the  contract  of  hiring  unless  a 
usage  to  that  effect  binding  on  both  parties  is  proved.-^  But  the 
courts  have  very  frankly  admitted  the  manifest  injustice  of 
turning  out  a  Aveekly  tenant  without  notice  to  quit  though  clear- 
ly the  necessity  for  notice  is  neither  so  apparent  nor  so  urgent 
in  the  ease  of  a  monthly  or  a  weekly  tenant  as  it  is  in  the  case 
of  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  of  agricultural  land.  Hence  it 
has  been  held  that  a  week's  notice  to  quit  is  indispensible  and 
sufficient  in  the  case  of  a  tenancy  from  weelc  to  week  and  that 
such  tenanc}"  can  be  terminated  only  by  such  notice.-^'    And  if 

22  Fox  V.  Nathan,  32  Conn.  348;  134,  29  Am.  Rep.  214;  Baker  v. 
Steffens  v.  Earl,  40  N.  J.  Law,  128,  Kenney,  69  N.  J.  Law,  180,  54  Atl. 
135,  29  Am.  Dec.  214;  Hungerford       Rep.  526. 

V.  Wagner,   5   App.  Div.   590,   592,  2g  Searle  v.  Powell,  89  Minn.  278, 

39  N.  Y.  Supp.  369;  People  ex  rel.  94  N.  W.  868. 

Bottsford  V.  Darling,  47  N.  Y.  666.  27  Towne    v.    Campbell,    3    Com. 

23  Doe  d.  Eyre  v.  Lambly,  2  Esp.  Bench,  921;  Huffell  v.  Armistead, 
635;  Kemp  v.  Derrett,  3  Camp.  7  Car.  &  P.  56.  See,  also,  Jones  v. 
510;  Roe  v.  Ward.  1  H.  Black.  97;  Mills,  10  Com.  Bench  (N.  S.)  788, 
Doe  V.  Weller,  7  T.  R.  478;  Mills  797;  Sandford  v.  Clarke,  57  L.  J. 
V.  Goff,  14  Mee.  &  Wei.  72;  Doe  d.  Q.  B.  507,  21  Q.  B.  D.  398,  59  L.  T. 
Cornwell  v.  Mathews,  11  C.  B.  675.  226. 

24  Russell  V.  McCartney,  21  Mo.  28  steffens  v.  Earl,  40  N.  .T.  Law, 
App.  544.  128,  134,  16  Atl.  Rep.  186;  Harvey 

25  Steffens  v.  Earl,  40  N.  J.  Law,  v.  Copeland,  30  L.  R.  Ir.  412;  Jones 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR. 


161 


it  be  said  that  a  tenant  from  week  to  week  is  entitled  only  to  a 
reasonable  notice  to  quit  and  the  question  as  to  what  is  a  reason- 
able notice  be  left  to  the  jury  where  it  belongs,  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  they  would  be  guided  by  evidence  of  a  usage  or 
give  a  notice  of  the  length  of  the  term  in  all  cases  of  weekly  or 
monthly  tenancies  and  that  evidence  of  such  a  custom  would  be 
received  by  the  court. "^ 

§  114.  The  statutory  regnlations  of  notice  to  quit.  In  many 
of  the  states  of  the  United  States  the  length  of  time  which  is 
required  in  the  notice  to  terminate  the  tenancy  is  fixed  by  stat- 
ute, and  the  duty  of  giving  this  notice  is  reciprocal.  Hence 
either  party  to  the  lease  who  desires  to  terminate  it  must  cause 
the  required  notice  to  quit  to  be  served  on  the  other.    Iowa,  Con- 


V.  Mills,  10  Com.  Bench  (N.  S.) 
788,  30  L.  J.  C.  P.  66,  8  Jur.  (N. 
S.)  387;  Doe  d.  Peacock  v.  Raffan, 
6  Esp.  4;  Bowen  v.  Anderson 
(1894),  1  Q.  B.  164,  10  R.  47,  42 
W.  R.  236,  58  J.  P.  213. 

20  As  to  length  of  notice  to  quit 
in  the  case  of  monthly  tenancies, 
see  Doe  d.  Parry  v.  Hazell,  1  Esp. 
94;  and  Beamish  v.  Cox,  16  L.  R. 
Ir.  270,  affirmed,  I6  L.  R.  Ir.  458. 

soPulliam  v.  Sells  (Ky.,  1906), 
99  S.  W.  Rep.  289.  In  HufEell  v. 
Armlstead,  7  C.  &  P.  56,  the  court, 
by  Parke,  Baron,  said:  "The  only 
question  is  whether  the  tenancy 
commenced  on  the  Saturday  or 
Monday.  If  it  commenced  on  the 
Monday,  I  think  the  defendant, 
who  entered  on  that  day,  was  at 
liberty  to  quit  on  the  same  day  in 
another  week.  I  cannot  say  a 
week  has  been  exceeded  by  hold- 
ing six  days  and  two  fractions  of 
a  day.  Upon  the  question  of  a  no- 
tice to  quit,  the  law  is  clearly  set- 
tled that  a  yearly  tenancy  cannot 
be  determined  without  a  half 
year's  notice.  But  that  rule  can- 
not be  applied  to  a  weekly  taking, 
for  the  effect  of  it  would  be  to 
show    that    a    half    week's    notice 

11 


was  necessary  to  put  an  end  to 
such  a  tenancy.  I  am  not  aware 
that  it  has  ever  been  decided 
that  in  the  cases  of  an  ordinary 
monthly  or  weekly  tenancy  that 
a  month's  or  a  week's  notice  must 
be  given.  A  tenant  who  enters 
upon  a  fresh  week  may  be  bound 
to  continue  until  the  expiration  of 
that  week  or  to  pay  the  week's 
rent,  but  this  is  a  very  different 
thing  from  giving  a  week's  notice 
to  quit."  In  Parry  v.  Hazell,  1 
Esp.  94,  the  tenant  took  a  house 
by  the  month  and  he  had  a 
month's  notice  to  quit,  which  the 
court  held  sufficient.  In  the  case 
of  Peacock  v.  Ruffin,  6  Esp.  4, 
which  was  an  action  of  ejectment 
under  a  weekly  hiring,  it  appeared 
that  a  week's  notice  to  quite  had 
been  given.  As  it  appeared  from 
the  evidence  that  the  landlord  had 
agreed  to  give  the  tenant  four 
weeks'  notice,  he  was  nonsuited. 
Lord  Ellenbo  rough  saying:  "A 
week's  notice  is  certainly  sufficient 
where  the  holding  is  weekly,  but 
the  rule  of  law  as  to  the  legality 
of  notice  is  still  controllable  by 
the  agreement  of  the  parties." 


162 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 


necticut,  Illinois  and  Wisconsin  require  thirty  days,'^  Missouri, 
sixty  days,^-  Mississippi,  two  months,"^  Kentuclry  and  Oregon, 
ninety  days.^*  Delaware,  Indiana,  Kansas,  INIaine,  IMassaeliu setts, 
Michigan,  Minnesota,  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  North  Caro- 
lina, Pennsylvania  and  Rhode  Island  require  three  months'  notice 
to  quit.^^  Virginia  requires  three  months'  notice  for  land  within 
a  town  or  city  and  six  months  for  land  not  so  situated ;  ^^  Mary- 
land requires  six  month's  notice  to  quit  in  the  counties,^^  while 
the  North  Dakota  and  Oklahoma  statutes  provide  for  notice  at 
least  as  long  before  the  expiration  of  the  term  as  the  term  of 
the  hiring  itself,  not  exceeding  one  month.^^  The  other  states 
have  apparently  failed  to  provide  by  statute  the  length  of  time 
in  which  notice  must  be  given  to  terminate  a  tenancy  from  year 
to  year,  so  it  may  be  presumed  that  they  follow  the  common  law 
requirement  as  to  such  notice  which  is  six  months.^" 


81  Larkin  v.  Avery,  23  Conn.  304; 
Iowa  Code  1897,  §  2991;  S.  &  B. 
Ann.  St.  §  2187,  construed  in  Peehl 
V.  Bumbalek,  99  Wis.  62,  74  N.  W. 
Rep.  545;  Cleighton  v.  Sanders, 
89  111.  543. 

32  Mo.  Rev.  St.  1899,  p.  987, 
§  4109.  A  month's  notice  to  quit 
will  not  terminate  the  tenancy. 
Ridgely  v.  Stillwell,  25  Mo.  570; 
Wheat  v.  Brown,  64  Mo.  App.  505, 
43  Pac.  Rep.  807. 

33  Miss.  Ann.  Code  1892,  §  2544. 

34  Ky.  St.  1894,  §§  2295,  2296; 
Misc.  Laws  Or.  Code,  §  11,  sub.  2, 
§  13,  p.  615,  in  the  case  of  farm 
lands.  The  notice  prescribed  in 
Oregon  Code,  §  2987,  for  the  ter- 
mination of  estates  at  will,  applies 
also  to  the  termination  of  estates 
from  year  to  year.  Rosenblat  v. 
Perkins,  18  Or.  156,  22  Pac.  Rep. 
598. 

35  Del.  Rev.  Code  1893,  c.  120, 
§  4;  Ind.  Rev.  St.  1881,  §§  5208, 
5209,  construed  in  Elliott  v.  Stone 
City  Bank,  4  Ind.  App.  155,  30  N. 
E.  Rep.  537;  Kan.  Gen.  St.  1889, 
§    55;    Wheal    v.    Brown,    3    Kan. 


App.  431,  43  Pac.  Rep.  807;  Ware 
v.  Nelson,  4  Kan.  App.  258,  45  Pac. 
Rep.  923;  Gordon  v.  Gilman,  48 
Me.  473;  Withers  v.  Larrabee,  48 
Me.  570  (no  statute  in  this 
state).  Mass.  Rev.  Laws  1902, 
c.  129,  §  12;  Mich.  Comp.  Laws 
1897,  §  9257;  Minn.  St.  1894, 
§  5873;  Hunter  v.  Frost,  47  Minn. 
1,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  327;  N.  H.  Rev. 
St.  c.  209;  Currier  v.  Perley,  24 
N.  H.  219;  N.  J.  Gen.  St.,  p.  1921, 
§  29;  Snowhill  v.  Snowhill,  23 
N.  J.  L.  447;  N.  C.  Pub.  St.  1873, 
c.  64,  §  9;  Vincent  v.  Corbin,  85 
N.  C.  108. 

36  Va.  Code  1887,  §  2785;  Craw- 
ford V.  Morris,  5  Gratt.  (Va.)  90, 
107;  Harrison  v.  Middleton,  11 
Gratt.    (Va.)    527,  532. 

37  Md.  Pub.  Gen.  St.  art.  53, 
§  6. 

38  N.  Dak.  Rev.  Code,  §  4085; 
Okl.  Rev.  Stat.,  §  868. 

30  Goddard  v.  South  Carolina  R. 
Co.,  2  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  340;  Brown 
V.  Kayser,  60  Wis.  1,  18  N.  W.  Rep. 
523. 


TEN.ysrCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR.  163 

§  115.  The  necessity  and  the  sufficiency  of  a  notice  to  quit  in 
the  case  of  tenancies  from  month  to  month.  In  order  to  ter- 
minate a  tenancy  from  month  to  month,  a  notice  to  quit  is  usu- 
ally necessary.  In  the  absence  of  a  statutory  provision  or  of  a 
stipulation  in  the  lease  requiring  a  longer  notice,  a  tenant  from 
month  to  month  is  entitled  to  one  month's  notice  to  quif"  A 
notice  to  quit  given  on  May  31st  to  quit  within  thirty  days  and 
not  later  than  June  30th  is  sufficient  to  terminate  a  monthly  ten- 
ancy.*^ The  notice  to  quit  in  the  case  of  a  monthly  tenancy  must 
be  served  before  the  beginning  of  the  succeeding  rental  month. 
so  that  a  notice  served  on  June  1st  is  insufficient  to  terminate  the 
tenancy  on  July  Ist.^-  Where  a  statute  requires  the  notice  to 
quit  to  be  given  to  terminate  a  tenancy  from  month  to  month  a 
mere  tender  of  the  keys  of  the  premises  is  not  equivalent  to  the 
statutory  notice.*^  The  notice  should  be  to  quit  at  the  end  of 
one  of  the  recurring  periods  of  the  holding  and  if  served  on  the 
corresponding  date  of  the  preceding  month  is  sufficient.**  But 
while  it  is  proper  to  notify  a  tenant  from  month  to  month  to 
quit  on  the  day  upon  which  his  tenancy  expires,  still  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  notice  is  not  affected  by  the  fact  that  it  orders  him 
to  vacate  the  premises  on  the  day  following  the  last  day  of  the 
month.*^ 

§  116.  The  statutory  regrdations  of  the  notice  to  quit  in  ten- 
ancies from  month  to  month.     In    California   in   the    case    of 

40McDevitt  v.  Lambert,  80  Ala.  180,  54  Atl.  Rep.  526;  Klingenstein 

536,    2    So.   Rep.    438;    Stewart   v.  v.  Goldwasser,  58  N.  Y.  Supp.  342, 

Murrell,  65  Ark.  471,  47  S.  W.  Rep.  27  Misc.  536;  Hungerford  v.  Wag- 

130;  Eberlein  v.  Abel,  10  111.  App.  oner,  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  369,  5  App. 

626;    Donohue    v.    Chicago    Bank  Div.  590.    But  see  Teater  v.  King, 

Note  Co.,  37   111.  App.  552;    Seem  35  Wash.  138,  76  Pac.  Rep.  688. 
V.    McLees,    24    111.    192;    Coffin   v.  ■"  Leahy  v.  Liebman,  67  Mo.  App. 

Lunt,    69    Mass.    80;     Steffens    v.  191. 

Earl,  40  N.  J.  L.  128,  29  Am.  Rep.  ^2  Corby  v.  Brill  Book,  etc.,  Co., 

214;   Rivett  v.  Brown,  6  Wkly.  L.  76  Mo.  App.  506. 
Bui.   (Ohio)   378;  Wall  v.  Ullman,  4-.  Minn.  Gen.  St.  1878,  c.  75,  §  40, 

2  Chest.  Co.  Rep.  (Pa.)  178;  Will-  construed   in   Finch   v.   Moore,   50 

lams  V.  McAnany,  12   Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Minn.  116,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  384. 
191;    Banbury  v.   Sherin,   4   S.  D.  **  Baker  v.   Kinney    (N.  J.),  54 

88,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  723;  Fratcher  v.  Atl.  Rep.  526. 

Smith,    104  Mich.    537,    62   N.    W.  45  Searle    v.    Powell,    89    Minn. 

Rep.  832;  Hart  v.  Lindley,  50  Mich.  278,  94  N.  W.  Rep.  868. 
20;   Baker  v.  Kenney,  69  N.  J.  L. 


164  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

monthly  tenancies  **'  fifteen  days'  notice  to  quit  is  required  by 
statute.  In  Minnesota,*^  ]\Iissouri,*^  and  New  Hampshire,*^  the 
statutes  require  the  giving  of  a  month's  notice  to  terminate  a 
montlily  tenancy.  In  Illinois  ^'^  and  in  Colorado  a  ten  days'  no- 
tice to  quit  is  sufficient  in  the  case  of  monthly  tenancies.^^ 
Louisiana  and  Rhode  Island  require  by  statute  fifteen  days'^^ 
and  Marj^land  requires  a  thirty  days'  notice  in  the  city  of  Balti- 
more.^^ In  New  York  a  five  days'  notice  to  quit  is  sufficient  both 
in  yearly  and  monthly  tenancies.^*  A  government  lease  of  prop- 
erty in  the  District  of  Columbia  can  be  terminated  only  by  giv- 
ing one  month's  notice  and  giving  up  possession  of  the  property 
as  required  by  law.^^ 

§  117.  Notice  to  quit  when  required  by  the  express  terms  of 
the  lease.  In  some  cases  the  parties  to  a  written  lease  in  ex- 
plicit terms  provide  for  the  notice  to  quit.  A  provison  in  the 
lease  for  a  notice  to  quit  supersedes  the  statutory  require- 
ment for  such  a  notice  in  the  absence  of  a  direction  to  the  con- 
trary by  the  parties  to  the  lease.  Thus  the  parties  will  be  bound 
to  give  a  notice  to  quit  according  to  the  character  of  the  notice 
mentioned  in  the  lease  though  it  may  differ  in  the  length  of  time 
from  the  period  mentioned  in  the  statute.  So,  if  the  lease  re- 
quires a  thirty  day  notice  to  quit  to  be  given  on  the  sale  of  the 
premises  by  the  landlord,  such  notice  must  be  given  though  the 

*c  Civil  Code,  §  827;  McDonough  Edmundson   v.    Preville,   12    Colo. 

V.  Starbird,  105  Cal.  15.  App.  73,  54  Pac.  Rep.  394. 

4TGen.  St.  1878,  c.  75,  §  40;  02  La.  Civ.  Code,  art.  2655,  con- 
Shirk  V.  Hoffman,  57  Minn.  230,  strued  in  Bowles  v.  Lyon,  6  Rob. 
38  N.  W.  Rep.  990.  (La.)    262;    R.   I.  Pub.  St.,  c.  232, 

4«Mo.  Rev.  St.  1879,  §  3078;  §  3;  Comstock  v.  Cavanagh,  17  R. 
Withnell  v.  Petzold,  104  Mo.  409;  I.  233,  21  Atl.  Rep.  498. 
Smith  v.  Smith,  62  Mo.  App.  556,  ss  Md.  Code,  art.  4,  §§  885,  886, 
1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  580;  Drey  v.  construed  in  Kinsey  v.  Minneck, 
Doyle,  28  Mo.  App.  249;  Gunn  v.  43  Md.  112.  A  tenant  in  the  en- 
Sinclair,  52  Mo.  327;  Koken  Iron  joyment  of  premises  of  which  he 
Works  v.  Kinealy,  86  Mo.  App.  is  in  rightful  possession  and  enti- 
199.  tied  to  remain  in  such  possession 

*o  Blair  v.  Macon,  C4  N.  H.  4^87.  will  be  duly  protected  by  a  court 

50  Eberlein  v.  Abel,  10  111.  App.  of  equity  until  he  is  served  with 

626.  statutory   notice   to   quit.     Hately 

61  Mills    Ann.    St.,    §    1976,    con-  v.  Myers,  96  111.  App.  217. 

strued    in    Salomon    v.    O'Donnell,  54  Code  Civ.  Proc.  §  2231. 

5  Colo.  App.  35,  36  Pac.  Rep.  893;  ■"  Spofford  v.   United  States,  32 

Ct.  CI.   452. 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAE  TO  YEAR.  165 

statate  permits  a  three  days'  notice  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances.^"^  Where  a  lease  requires  a  notice  to  quit  of  a  particular 
character  to  be  given  in  the  event  of  a  certain  contingency  a 
statutory  notice  to  quit  is  proper  under  other  circumstances.  A 
provision  in  a  lease  requiring  a  notice  of  a  particular  descrip- 
tion differing  in  the  length  of  time  from  the  statutory  notice  will 
be  strictly  construed.  A  provision  in  a  lease  for  a  term  of  years 
that  it  may  be  terminated  at  the  expiration  of  one  year  on  sixty 
days'  notice  means  a  notice  of  sixty  days  to  terminate  at  the 
end  of  the  first  year  and  the  first  year  having  passed,  the  right 
to  terminate  on  notice  is  gone.^^  If  the  lease  for  years  is  silent 
as  to  when  the  period  of  notice  shall  expire,  the  notice  should  be 
to  quit  at  the  expiration  of  the  year  or  some  other  rental  period. 
Thus  a  three  months'  notice  to  quit,  expressly  provided  for  by 
the  lease  must  expire  on  the  day  which  is  the  anniversary  of  the 
commencement  of  the  lease,  in  the  absence  of  any  provision  to 
the  contraiy.^^  Where  a  lease  provides  that  it  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  three  months'  notice  on  either  side  at  any  time  to  ter- 
minate the  agreement,  the  notice  may  be  given  at  any  time, 
though  the  rent  be  payable  quarterly,  if  it  is  not  clearly  appar- 
ent that  the  hiring  is  from  year  to  year,''"  in  which  latter  ease 
the  notice  to  quit  must  be  given  to  terminate  on  a  rent  day.  A 
tenant  who  is  under  an  agreement  to  vacate  the  premises  upon 
their  sale  by  the  landlord  is  entitled  to  receive  notice  that  they 
have  been  sold.  He  must  have  reasonable  notice.  The  notice 
may  properly  be  given  him  by  the  purchaser.  The  length  of 
time  which  the  tenant  may  need  to  secure  premises  of  a  like 
character  is  no  criterion  of  what  may  be  a  reasonable  notice. 
Under  such  circumstances  a  thirty  days'  notice  will  be  regarded 
as  sufficient.'"' 

§  118.  The  form  and  the  character  of  the  notice  to  quit. 
Ordinarily  a  notice  to  quit,  particularly  where  the  lease  is  in 
writing  ought  itself  to  be  in  writing.    But  a  parol  notice  to  quit 

BBBuhman  v.  Nickels  &  Brown  1  K.  B.  444,  90  L.  T.  122,  20  T.  L. 

Bros.,    1    Cal.    App.    266,    82    Pac.  R.   159. 

Rep.  85.  =3  Soames  v.  Nicholson,  71  L.  J. 

57  M.  Fine  Realty  Co.  v.  City  of  K.  B.  24.  (1902)  1  K.  B.  157,  85 
New  York,  103  N.  Y.  Supp.  115.  L.  T.  614,  50  W.  R.  169. 

58  Dixon  V.  Bradford  and  Dis-  so  Cooper  v.  Gambill,  146  AJa. 
trict  Railway  Servants'  Coal  Sup-  184,   40   So.  Rep.   827. 

ply  Co.,  73  L.  J.  K.  B.  136,   (1904) 


166  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AKD  TENANT. 

g-iven  by  a  tenant  who  is  holding  under  a  parol  lease  has  been 
held  suffieient.^^  So  an  oral  notice  to  quit  given  by  an  em- 
ployee of  a  corporation  t<)  its  tenants  is  prima  facie  sufficient 
without  any  affirmative  evidence  of  the  agent's  authority  to 
give  it,^-  though  his  lack  of  authority  may  be  shown  by  the  ten- 
ant. The  giving  of  an  oral  notice  to  quit  by  the  tenant  which  is 
received  ^vithout  objection  by  the  landlord  is  a  waiver  of  the 
right  of  the  landlord  to  have  a  written  notice  to  quit.^^  A  writ- 
ten notice  to  quit  need  not  be  directed  to  the  tenant  eo  nomine 
if  it  is  proved  to  have  been  delivered  to  him  at  the  proper  time."* 
So.,  any  error  in  the  direction  of  the  notice  to  quit  either  in  the 
address  or  in  designating  the  tenant  or  describing  the  premises 
will  be  cured  by  the  tenant's  retention  without  objection  of  the 
notice  to  quit.®^  So  a  mere  variance  in  the  notice  from  the 
description  of  the  premises  contained  in  the  lease  will  not  in- 
validate a  notice  to  quit  where  the  tenant  was  not  misled  there- 
by.°®  In  all  cases  where  the  party  .served  with  a  notice  to  quit 
claims  that  it  is  irregular  either  in  form  or  in  the  manner  of  its 
service  he  ought  to  return  it  to  the  party  Mnthin  a  reason- 
able time  indicating  his  objection  to  it.  His  retention  of  an  ir- 
regular or  informal  notice  to  quit  particularly  in  a  case  where 
the  other  party  is  prejudiced  thereby  may  be  regarded  as  a 

61  Eberlein  v.  Abel,  10  111.  App.  where  the  signature  was  omitted 
626;  Timmins  v.  Rawlinson,  3  from  the  notice  to  quit,  see  Carle- 
Burr.  1603,  1  W.  Bl.  533;  Doe  d.  ton  v.  Herbert,  14  W.  R.  772.  A 
Macartney  v.  Crick,  5  Esp.  196,  notice  to  quit  is  not  invalidated 
8  R.  R.  848.  by    a    mistake    in    the    Christian 

62  Doe  d.  Rochester  v.  Pierce,  2  name  of  the  tenant  if  he  or  his 
Camp.  96.  family  on  receiving  it  understand 

63  Smith  v.  Snyder,  168  Pa.  St.  it  to  be  intended  for  him  and  re- 
541,  32  Atl.  Rep.  64,  in  this  case  tain  it.  Clark  v.  Keliher,  107 
the  tenant  in  informing  the  agent  Mass.  406.  The  date  given  in  a 
of  the  landlord  of  his  intention  to  written  notice  to  quit  is  immate- 
qtiit  told  him  he  would  hold  from  rial  except  when  the  period  of  no- 
month  to  month,  and  the  agent  tice  is  to  run  from  such  date.  The 
replied  he  would  see  his  principal  date  of  its  service  is  usually  con- 
and  would  let  the  tenant  know  trolling,  and  this  may  always  be 
what  the  landlord  would  do  before  shown  by  parol  evidence  under 
the  end  of  the  term  but  neglected  general  rules. 

to  do  so.  CO  Consolidated      Coal      Co.      v. 

«r.  Doe   V.    Spiller,    6   Esp.    70,    9  Schaefer,    135    111.    210,    25    N.    E. 

R.  R.  SIO.     As  to  the  validity  of  Rep.  788. 
a   notice   required    under   a   lease 


TENANCY  FROM  TEAR  TO  YEAR.  167 

waiver  of  the  irregularity  or  informality  in  form  or  mode  of 
servdce.  If  a  landlord  accepts  a  notice  to  determine  a  tenancy 
as  such  at  the  time  of  its  service,  the  fact  that  the  notice  is  im- 
perfectly expressed  does  not  affect  its  validity.*^  The  courts 
will  always  consider  the  substance  rather  than  the  form  of  the 
notice  to  quit  and  will  usually  disregard  all  technical  irregular- 
ities and  informalities  pro-vdded  it  shall  appear  that  the  party 
who  was  served  with  the  notice  to  quit  has  not  been  misled  or 
prejudiced  thereby.  A  notice  to  quit  served  on  the  tenant  ought 
to  be  signed  by  the  landlord  or  his-  agent  duly  authorized  to  do 
so.®®  The  notice  must  not  be  conditional,  but  absolute  and  posi- 
tive. A  notice  by  a  tenant  that  he  would  quit  unless  the  land- 
lord would  repair  is  not  a  good  notice  to  quit.®^  So,  a  notice 
served  by  a  landlord  upon  the  tenant  that  he  must  quit  or  pay 
an  advanced  rent,  or  make  repairs,  or  do  any  other  thing  in  the 
alternative  which  will  be  a  condition  of  his  remaining  in  posses- 
sion is  not  a  good  or  proper  notice  to  quit. 

§  119.  The  construction  of  the  language  of  the  notice  to  quit. 
The  courts  will  construe  the  language  of  the  notice  to  quit  in 
a  reasonable  manner.    If  the  meaning  of  the  language  is  doubt- 

67  General  Asur.  Co.  v.  Worsley,  street  number  when  possible), 
15  Reports,  328.  which  you  now  hold  of  me  (him) 

68  A  notice  prepared  and  signed      on   the  —   day   of  ,    190" — , 

by  a  clerk  of  the  authorized  agent  next,  or  at  the  expiration  of  the 

of  the  owner,  and  with  the  owner's  year    of     your    tenancy    thereof, 

and  agent's  names  signed  by  the  which  shall  expire  next  after  the 

direction  of  the  agent,  is  sufficient.  end  of  one  half-year  from  the  date 

Bond   V.   Chapman,   34   Wash.    St.  of  this  notice.     Dated  the  —  day 

606,  609.  76  Pac.  Rep.  97.  ,  190—.     D.  E."  A  notice  to 

69  Baltimore  Dental  Ass'n  v.  quit,  given  by  or  on  behalf  of  the 
Fuller,  101  Va.  627,  44  S.  E.  Rep.  tenant,  may  be  in  the  following 
771,  772.  A  notice  to  quit,  given  form,  the  words  between  paren- 
by  or  in  behalf  of  the  landlord,  thesis  being  used  when  the  notice 
may  be  in  the  following  form,  the  is  given  by  an  agent:  "To  E.  F. 
words  in  parenthesis  being  used  I  hereby  (as  agent  for  and  on  be- 
when  the  notice  is  by  an  agent:  half  of  Mr.  C.  D.,  your  tenant) 
"To  Mr.  A.  B.  I  hereby  (as  agent  give  you  notice  that  on  the  —  day 

for  and  on   behalf  of  Mr.   D.   E.,      of next  I  shall  (he  will)  va- 

your  landlord)  give  you  notice  to      cate  No.  — ,  ,  street,  city  of 

quit  and  deliver  up  the  possession      ,  county  of  ,  state  of 

of  the  premises,  situate  at  ,    which    I    (he)    now   hold 

in  the  county  of  ,  city  and  (holds)   of  you  as  tenant  thereof. 

state  of (adding  street  and      Dated,  the  — day  of ,  190 — ." 


168  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

fill  or  if  it  is  ambiguous,  the  court  will  so  construe  it  to  make 
it  sensible  rather  than  declare  it  void.  The  intention  of  the 
person  who  signs  the  notice  to  quit,  if  it  be  apparent  from  the 
whole  notice,  will  prevail  over  minor  inconsistencies  in  the  no- 
tice.'°  The  notice  to  quit  must  be  such  when  it  is  given  that  the 
tenant  could  safely  act  under  it.  And  if  he  could  not,  i.  e.,  if  the 
notice  as  given  was  not  the  act  of  the  landlord  and  not  binding 
on  him,  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  any  subsequent  ratifi- 
cation by  the  landlord  will  validate  it  and  make  it  binding  upon 
the  tenant.  A  statutory  notice  to  quit  must  usually  be  in  writ- 
ing and  must  contain  a  description  of  the  premises  sufficiently 
certain  for  identification.  It  ought  also  to  require  the  tenant 
to  remove  from  the  premises  on  the  specified  day.'^^  The  notice 
to  quit  should  include  the  whole  premises,  and  a  notice  to  quit 
only  a  part  of  the  premises  where  the  whole  are  held  under  the 
one  lease  is  insufficient  to  terminate  the  tenancy.'^-  Whether  the 
notice  to  quit  must  be  absolute  or  whether  it  may  be  conditional 
has  been  differently  decided.  A  notice  to  quit  delivered  by  the 
landlord  to  the  tenant  "unless  he  (the  tenant)  desires  to  re- 
main" upon  the  terms  proposed  by  the  landlord  has  been  held 
a  sufficient  notice.'^^  But  on  the  other  hand,  a  notice  by  the  land- 
lord that  he  would  not  renew  the  tenant's  term  unless  the  latter 
agreed  to  make  repairs  is  not  a  sufficient  notice  to  quit.  It  was 
held  that  the  notice  to  quit  ought  to  be  absolute  and  not  in  the 
alternative.'^* 

§  120.  To  whom  notice  must  be  given.  The  notice  to  quit 
when  given  by  a  landlord  must  usuallj^  be  served  on  the  actual 
tenant.    Notice  to  quit  to  one  of  several  lessees  holding  as  ten- 

ToDoe   V.    Culliford,    4    Dowl.    &  v.  Lampson,  66  Conn.  432,  34  Atl. 

Ry.    248.      Under   Conn.    Gen.    St.,  Rep.  39. 

§  1355,  which  provides  that  a  no-  ^i  McClung    v.     McPherson,     47 

tice  to  quit  shall  be  "substantially"  Oreg.  73,  81  Pac.  Rep.  8G7,  82  Pac. 

in  the  following  form,  "I  (or  we)  Rep.  13. 

hereby  give  you   notice  that   you  72  Alworth  v.  Gordon.  81  Minn. 

are     to     quit     possession     of    the  445,  84  N.  W.  Rep.  454. 

premises  now  occupied  by  you,"  a  73  Candler  v.  Mitchell,  119  Mich, 

notice  that  "you  are  hereby  noti-  564,  78  N.  W.  Rep.  551. 

fied  to  quit  possession"  of  certain  74  Baltimore  Dental  Association 

premi.scs  on  or  before  a  given  date,  v.   Fuller,    101    Va.    627,   44    S.    E. 

duly  signed,   is  sufficient.     Miller  Rep.  771. 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAE  TO  YEAR.  169 

ants  in  common  lias  been  held  5?ufficient  and  binding  on  all.^° 
Where  a  lease  is  to  several  persons  as  lessees,  if  one  of  them, 
acting  for  himself  only,  remains  in  possession  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term,  a  notice  to  quit  addressed  to  him  alone  is  suffi- 
cient to  terminate  the  tenancy  resulting  from  his  holding  over.''® 
A  party  found  in  possession  who  entered  after  a  tenant  had  va- 
cated, may,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  in  as  the  tenant's  assignee  so  that  notice  to  quit  may 
properly  be  served  upon  him.'^  It  is  a  safe  and  advisable  ruie 
to  serve  notices  to  quit  upon  all  persons  who  may  be  upon  the 
premises  though  the  landlord  may  know  they  are  not  his  ten- 
ants. Their  status  ought  to  be  accurately  described  in  the  no- 
tice to  quit  as  for  example,  that  they  are  occupants  or  sub-ten- 
ants, though  a  misdescription  where  no  one  has  been  misled  will 
not  estop  the  landlord.  A  notice  to  quit  ought  to  be  served  upon 
all  under  tenants  as  such  by  the  superior  landlord.  But  where 
on  notice  being  given  to  a  lessee,  he  serves  notices  to  quit  on  his 
under  tenants  and  the  lessee  then  quits  so  much  of  the  premises 
as  is  occupied  by  himself,  but  his  under  tenants  do  not  quit, 
ejectment  may  be  maintained  against  the  lessee  by  the  original 
lessor  for  so  much  of  the  premises  as  the  under  tenants  continue 
to  occupy.  The  possession  of  the  under  tenant  is  the  possession 
of  the  lessee.'^*  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  though 
the  service  of  a  notice  to  quit  on  sub-tenants  may  be  prudent 
and  advisable,  it  may  be  regarded  as  sufficient  service  to  deliver 
a  notice  to  quit  personally  to  the  original  lessee.  His  lessee  takes 
subject  to  the  rights  of  his  lessor  against  him  and  the  under 
tenant  is  bound  by  a  notice  to  quit  though  it  be  not  served  on 
him.'''     The  rules  which  are  applicable  to  the  service  of  a  no- 

75  Doe  d.  Macartney  v.  Crick,  5  ^s  Roe  v.  Wiggs,  2  Bos.  &  P. 
Esp.  196,  8  R.  R.  848:  As  to  a  case       (N.  S.)  330. 

where  one  tenant  lived  elsewhere  ^9  Schilling   v    Holmes.    23    Cal. 

than    the    premises    in    question.  227.     In  New  York  it  is  not  neces- 

Doe    d.    Bradford    v.    Watkins,    7  sary  to  serve  a  notice  on  sub-ten- 

East,  551,   3   Smith,   517,   8  R.   R.  ants  under  Laws  1882,  c.  303,  re- 

670.  quiring  noti<e  to  a  monthly  ten- 

76  Tice  V.  Coweiihoven,  63  N.  J.  ant  of  the  landlord's  election  to 
L.  24,  42  Atl.  Rep.  1054.  terminate  the   tenancy   as   a   pre- 

77  Doe  d.  Morris  v.  Williams,  6  requisite  to  summary  proceedings. 
B.  &  C.  41,  9  D.  &  R.  30,  30  R.  R.  Decker  v.  Sexton,  43  N.  Y.  Supp. 
244.  107,  19  Misc.  Rep.  59. 


170  LAW  OF  LuVNDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

tiee  to  quit  by  the  landlord  upon  his  tenant  are  also  applicable 
to  the  service  of  a  notice  to  quit  by  a  tenant  on  his  landlord.  A 
lessee  of  land  from  tenants  in  common  must  serve  notice  of  his 
intention  to  quit  on  all  the  lessors  who  hold  as  tenants  in  com- 
mon.®^ But  notice  to  quit  by  a  tenant  served  on  one  of  several 
joint  lessors  would  probably  be  sufficient.  And  there  being  no 
privity  of  contract  or  estate  between  a  sub-tenant  and  the  orig- 
inal landlord,  the  service  of  a  notice  to  quit  by  a  sub-tenant  upon 
the  original  landlord  may  be  dispensed  with.  A  notice  to  quit 
in  the  ease  of  a  corporation  being  tenants,  may  be  served  upon 
its  treasurer,^^  or  other  officer  qualified  to  receive  service  of 
court  process.  A  statutory  requirement  that  notice  to  quit  shall 
be  served  on  "any  person  in  possession"  is  not  fulfilled  by  a 
service  on  any  other  person  than  the  lessee. ^^ 

§  121.  By  whom  the  notice  to  quit  must  be  given.  As  a  gen- 
eral rule  only  that  person  who  is  the  immediate  owner  of  the 
reversion  can  serve  a  notice  to  quit.  A  landlord  who  during  a 
tenancy  from  year  to  year  grants  a  lease  of  the  same  premises  to 
a  third  person  for  a  term  of  years  cannot  thereafter  serve  on  the 
yearly  tenant  a  valid  notice  to  quit.^^  In  such  case  the  notice 
to  quit  must  be  served  by  the  tenant  for  years  who  after  he  has 
received  his  lease,  stands  in  the  place  of  the  landlord  so  far  as 
the  tenant  from  year  to  year  is  concerned.  A  notice  to  quit 
signed  by  one  of  two  or  more  joint  lessors  is  valid  and  binding 
on  all  of  them.  In  one  case  it  has  been  held  that  a  notice  to  quit 
in  the  names  of  all  of  the  joint  lessors  but  signed  by  only  one  is 
a  good  notice  to  quit.®*  And  so,  too,  such  a  notice  given  by  an 
agent  authorized  to  do  so  by  one  of  several  joint  lessors  deter- 
mines the  tenancy  as  to  all  the  lessors.*^  On  the  other  hand,  it 
was  held  that  a  notice  to  quit  to  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  from 
joint  lessors  must  be  signed  by  all  the  joint  lessors  at  the  time 
it  is  served,  if  it  is  given  by  one  of  them,  but  if  given  by  an 

so  Bless  V.  Jenldns,  ]29  Mo.  647,  82  Baragiano  v.  Villani,  117  111. 

31  S.  W.  Rep.  9:]S.     Long  Bros.  v.  App.  372. 

Bolen  Coal  Co.,  5C  Mo.  App.  605.  83  Wordsley    Brewery    Company 

81  Lindeke  v.  Associates  Realty  v.  Halford,  90  L.  T.  89. 

Co.,  77  C.  C.  A.  56,  146  Fed.  Rep.  si  Elliott  v.  Hulme,  2  M.  &  Ry., 

630.     Also  holding  that  a  statute  483,  6  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  345. 

regulating  the  service  of  summons  85  Kindersley  v.  Hughes,  7  Mee. 

on  a  corporation  is  applicable  to  &  Wei.  139,  10  L.  J.  Ex.  185. 
the  service  of  a  notice  to  quit. 


TENANCY  FROM  TEAR  TO  YEAR.  171 

agent  on  behalf  of  the  joint  tenants,  if  his  authority  is  recog- 
nized by  all  of  them  subsequently,  it  is  sufQcient.^^  But  a  no- 
tice to  quit  given  by  two  of  three  joint  trustees  who  are  lessors, 
is  bad,  though  all  three  are  named  and  the  third  afterwards 
adopts  it  and  joins  in  the  ejectment.*^  On  the  other  hand  it  has 
been  held  where  four  trustees  under  a  deed  of  trust  were 
joint  landlords  of  a  house,  that  a  notice  to  quit  served  on  the 
tenant  but  signed  by  only  three  of  them  was  sufficient  to  put  an 
end  to  the  connection  between  all  the  parties  as  landlords  and 
tenant.**  If  four  joint  tenants  enter  into  a  joint  lease  from  year 
to  year,  such  of  them  only  as  give  notice  to  quit  may  recover 
their  several  shares  in  ejectment.*^  A  notice  to  quit  leased 
premises  owned  by  two  tenants  in  common,  signed  and  served 
by  one,  acting  for  both,  with  the  knowledge  of  the  lessee,  is  suffi- 
cient.*°  A  notice  to  quit  signed  by  one  of  the  several  joint  ten- 
ants on  behalf  of  the  others  will  terminate  a  tenancy  from  year 
to  year  as  to  all.^^  A  general  agent  may  give  a  valid  notice  to 
quit  in  his  own  name,  but  it  is  otherwise  if  given  by  an  agent 
holding  only  a  special  or  limited  authority."^  An  infant  who 
has  become  entitled  to  the  reversion  of  an  estate  leased  from  year 
to  year,  must  give  notice  to  quit  before  he  can  eject  the  tenant.^' 
A  notice  to  quit  signed  by  a  mortgagor  who  had  a  general  au- 
thority from  the  mortgagee  to  determine  tenancies,  is  sufficient 
to  determine  a  tenrncj^  created  before  the  mortgage,  even  though 
the  notice  does  not  purport  on  the  face  of  it  to  be  on  behalf  of 
the  mortgagee.®*  But  a  mortgagor  who  remains  in  possession 
after  the  day  of  default  has  passed,  and  received  the  rents  and 
has  given  receipts  in  his  own  name,  cannot  by  notice  to  quit, 
signed  by  himself  only,  determine  a  tenancy,  which  existed  at 
the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  mortgage.®^ 

86  King  V.  Woodward,  3  B.  &  9i  Aslin  v  Summersett,  1  B.  & 
Aid.  689;  Jolliffe  v.  Sybourn,  2  Aid.  135,  8  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  369. 
Esp.  677.  92  Jones  v.  Phlpps,  9  B.  &  S.  761, 

87  Fisher  v.  Cuthell,  5  East,  491,  32  L.  J.  Q.  B.  198;    L.  R.  3  Q.  B. 
2  Marsh.  83,  5  Esp.  149,  7  R.  R.  303.  IS  L.  T.  813,  16  W.  R.  1044. 
752.  "3  Baker  v.  White,  2  Term  Rep. 

88  Alford  V.  Vickery,  Car.  &  M.  159.  1  R.  R.  453. 

280.  »*  Stackpoole    v.    Parkinson,    Ir. 

89  Whayman  v.  Chaplin,  3  Taunt.       R.  8  C.  L.  561. 

120,  12  C.  R.  615.  "c  Miles  v.  Murphy,  Ir.  R.  5  C.  L. 

90  Earl  Orchard  Co.  v.  Fava,  138       382. 
Cal.  76,  70  Pac.  Rep.  1073. 


172 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD   AND  TENANT. 


§  122.  The  date  upon  which  the  period  stated  in  the  notice 
must  terminate.  Where  a  notice  to  quit  is  given  at  common 
law  or  where  by  statutory  provision  a  tenancy  from  year  to 
year  can  be  tenninated  only  by  a  notice  to  quit  given  at  a  speci- 
fied date  during  the  pendancy  of  the  lease  it  is  always  necessary 
that  the  period  for  which  the  notice  was  given  should  terminate 
at  the  expiration  of  the  current  year,  or  month,  in  case  the  ten- 
ancy is  from  month  to  month.^^^  A  tenancy  from  year  to 
year  in  South  Carolina  looks  to  the  end  of  the  calendar  year  for 
its  termination  without  regard  to  the  time  of  the  commencement 
of  the  tenancy.^^  But  it  has  been  held  that  a  notice  to  quit  "at 
the  expiration  of  the  year's  tenancy"  is  sufficient,  although  it 
does  not  appear  on  the  face  of  it  that  it  was  given  six  months 
before  the  period  therein  specified  for  quitting.''^  And  a  notice 
to  quit  on  the  anniversary  of  the  day  "at"  or  "on"  or  "from" 
or  "on  and  from"  which  the  tenancy  commenced  is  generally 
good.®"     When  the  lease  expressly  provides  that  the  notice  to 


98  Hessher  v.  Moss,  50  Miss.  208; 
Prouty  V.  Prouty,  5  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  81;  Pinkelstein  v.  Herson,  55 
N.  J  Law,  217,  26  Atl.  Rep.  688; 
Lloyd  V.  Cozens,  2  Ashm.  (Pa.) 
131;  Lesley  v.  Randolph,  4  Rawle 
(Pa.)  123;  Dumn  v.  Rothermel, 
112  Pa.  St.  272;  Peehl  v.  Bumba- 
lek,  99  Wis.  62;  Godard  v.  South 
Carolina  R.  Co.,  2  Rich.  Law  (S. 
C.)  346;  Floyd  v.  Floyd,  4  Rich. 
Law  (S.  C.)  23;  Phoenixville  v. 
Walters,  147  Pa.  St.  501,  23  Atl. 
Rep.  776;  Flower  v.  Darby,  1 
Term  Rep.  159;  Rigge  v.  Bell,  5 
Term  Rep.  471;  Phillips  v.  Butler, 
2  Eop.  589;  Castleton  v.  Samuel, 
5  Esp.  173;  Pitcher  v.  Donovan, 
2  Campb.  78;  Thompson  v.  Mab- 
erly,  2  Campb.  573;  Mathewson 
V.  Wrightman,  4  Esp.  5,  6  R.  R. 
834;  Hinde  v.  Vince,  2  Campb. 
256;  Doe  v.  Brookes,  2  Campb. 
257;  Spicer  v.  Lea,  1  East,  312,  4 
Kent.  Com.  113. 

ooa  Hart  v.  Lindley,  50  Mich. 
20;   Hogsett  v.  Ellis,  17  Mich.  366; 


Shaw  V.  Hoffman,  25  Mich.  163; 
Steffens  v.  Earl,  40  N.  J.  Law,  128, 
29  Am.  Rep.  214.  Where  in  a  ten- 
ancy from  month  to  month  the 
month  commences  on  the  first  day 
a  notice  served  before  the  day 
named  in  it  requiring  the  tenant 
to  quit  on  the  last  day  of  the 
month  is  sufficient.  Petsch  v. 
Biggs,  31  Minn.  392.  A  statute 
which  provides  that  a  notice  to 
quit  shall  end  with  the  month  in 
the  case  of  a  monthly  tenancy 
must  be  strictly  observed.  Hence 
a  notice  to  quit  at  the  end  of 
thirty  days  given  during  a  month 
for  which  rent  has  been  paid  in 
advance  is  invalid  as  regards  the 
month  in  which  it  was  given. 
Simmons  v.  Jarman,  122  N.  C. 
195,  29  S.  E.  Rep.  332. 

»7  Wilson  V.  Rodeman,  30  S.  C. 
210;  Floyd  v.  Floyd,  4  Rich.  (S. 
C.)  23. 

OS  Gorst  V.  Timothy,  2  Car.  &  K. 
351. 

>'9  Sldcbotham  v.  Holland,  64  L. 


TENANCY  FROM  YEzVR  TO  YEAR.  173 

quit  may  be  given  at  any  time,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  period 
of  the  notice  to  quit  should  expire  at  the  end  of  the  current  year.^ 
To  illustrate  the  rule  let  us  cite  a  few  English  cases,  thus: 
Under  a  letting  from  year  to  year  which  is  dated  Dec.  20th,  1872, 
but  specifying  no  date  for  the  commencement  of  the  term,  a 
notice  to  quit  given  by  the  landlord  on  the  24th  of  June,  1874, 
was  held  a  good  notice  of  six  months.^  So,  a  notice  on  Sept.  28th, 
to  quit  on  the  ensuing  March  25th,  is  a  sufficient  half  year's 
notice.^  Likewise  a  notice  given  on  Sept.  26th  to  quit  at  the  end 
of  six  calendar  months  will  determine  a  holding  commencing  on 
March  25th.  and  this  is  true  if  the  word  "calendar"  had  been 
omitted  or  the  notice  had  expressly  said  half  a  year.*  A  notice 
to  quit  to  terminate  a  tenancy  for  a  term  of  years,  given  on  Dec. 
24th  to  quit  on  June  24th  next  was  good.'^ 

§  123.  The  necessity  for  personal  gervice  of  a  notice  to  quit. 
The  notice  to  quit  ought  to  be  personally  sei^ved  upon  the  tenant 
usually  at  some  place  upon  the  property,*  and  maist  be  served 
upon  all  lessees  or  on  all  lessors  who  have  the  title  to  the  term 
or  to  the  reversion  who  hold  as  tenants  in  common.''  Though 
the  notice  to  quit  ought  if  possible  to  be  personally  served 
upon  the  tenant  upon  the  premises  it  is  likely  that  a  service  by 
leaving  it  upon  the  premises  while  the  tenant  is  absent  therefrom 
with  some  person  of  mature  age,  under  such  conditions  that  the 
tenant  would  be  likely  to  receive  it  upon  his  return,  would  be 
sufficient  in  a  case  where  the  tenant  attempts  to  avoid  service  by 
absenting  himself  from  the  premises.*  A  statute  which  requires 
the  service  of  a  written  notice  to  quit  to  terminate  a  tenancy 
from  month  to  month  requires  the  personal  service  of  the  written 

J.  Q.  B.  200,    [1895]   1   Q.  B.  378,  *  Howard  v.  Wemsley,  6  Esp.  53, 

14   R.   135,   72  L.  T.  62,  43   W.   R.  9  R.  R.  806. 

228.  »  Buddie  v.  Lines,  11  Q.  B.  402, 

1  Bridges  v.   Potts,  17  C.   B.   N.  17  L.  J.  Q.  B.  10  8,  12  Jur.  80. 

S.   314;    Soames  v.   Nicholson,   71  e  De  Giverville  v.   Stolle,  9  Mo. 

Law  J.  K.  B.  24  [1902]  1  K.  B.  157,  App.  185;  Van  Studdiford  v.  Kohn, 

85  Law  T.  614,  50  Wkly.  Rep.  169.  46  Mo.  App.  436. 

2  Sandill   v.   Frankim,   44   L.    J.  t  Bless  v.  Jenkins,  129  Mo.  647, 
C.  P.  216,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  377,  32  L.  31  S.  W.  Rep.  9S8. 

T.  309,  23  W.  R.  473  s  The    statute    must    always    be 

3  Durant  v.  Doe,  6  Bing.  574,  4       consulted    as    to    the    metuod    of 
M.  &  P.  391,  8  L.  J.   (O.  S.)   C.  P.       Berving  the  notice  to  quit. 

227,    31    R.    R.    499;     Harrap    t. 
Green,  4  Esp.  198. 


174 


LxVW   OF  LANDLORD   AND   TENxVNT. 


notice  at  least  in  all  cases  where  such  service  can  conveniently  be 
made.®  Hence  under  such  a  statute  the  mere  reading  of  the 
notice  to  quit  to  the  tenant  is  not  sufficient  as  the  statute  requires 
personal  service,  and  the  personal  delivcTy  of  the  notice  to  the 
tenant.  On  the  other  hand  a  notice  to  quit  sent  by  mail  and 
which  is  actually  received  by  the  tenant  within  the  required  time 
is  sufficient,  though  this  mode  of  service  is  not  expressly  author- 
ized. The  tenant  accepts  all  risks  in  receiving  the  notice.^"  In 
the  absence  of  express  statutory  regulation,  a  notice  to  quit  nec- 
essary to  terminate  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  may  be  served 
upon  the  wife  of  the  tenant,  she  being  in  possession  in  case  where 
it  is  impossible  to  serve  the  tenant  in  person. ^^  Ex  7iecessitate 
rei  where  the  tenant  is  a  corporation  a  notice  to  quit  given  by 
the  landlord  may  be  served  on  one  of  its  officers.^^  If  a  notice 
to  quit  is  served  by  mail  it  seems  that  the  day  on  which  it  is  de- 
livered by  mail  to  the  tenant  will  be  considered  as  the  date  from 
which  the  notice  to  quit  is  to  run.^^ 


9  Van  Studdiford  v.  Kohn,  46  Mo. 
App.  436;  construing  Rev.  St.  1889, 
§  637.  See,  also,  Langan  v. 
Schlief,  55  Mo.  App.  213. 

»a  Langan  v.  Schlief,  55  Mo. 
App.  213. 

10  Alwoilh  V.  Gordon,  81  Minn. 
445,  84  N.  W.  Rep.  454;  Candler 
V.  Mitchell,  119  Mich.  564,  78  N. 
W.  Rep.  551.  A  notice  to  quit  put 
under  the  door  of  the  tenants 
house  will  be  valid  as  a  common 
law  notice  if  it  can  be  proved  to 
have  come  into  the  tenant's  hands 
half  a  year  before  the  expiration 
of  the  current  year.  Alfred  v. 
Vickery,  Car.  &  M.  280. 

11  Beiler  v.  Devoll,  40  Mo.  App. 
251;  Earl  Orchard  Co.  v.  Fava 
(Cal.)  70  Pac.  Rep.  1073.  Bell  v, 
Rlnker,  30  111.  App.  300;  Cadwal- 
lader  v.  Loerce,  10  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
1,  29  S.  W.  Rep.  666,  917.  See, 
also,  Jones  v.  Marsh,  4  T.  R.  464. 
The  service  of  a  notice  to  quit  is 
not  suflBcient  where,  in  case  of  a 
tenancy  from  month  to  month,  it 


is  served  upon  the  tenant  who  is 
a  storekeeper  by  delivering  it  to 
a  salesman,  of  the  tenant  who,  ow- 
ing to  the  temporary  absence  of 
his  employer,,  was  in  possession  of 
the  store  and  who  was  accus- 
tomed to  receive  papers  for  his 
employer  delivered  in  his  absence 
and  to  put  such  papers  in  a  box 
provided  for  that  purpose.  Such 
person  is  not  an  agent  of  the  ten- 
ant for  the  purpose  of  accepting 
service  of  such  a  notice  within  the 
meaning  of  Rev.  St.  1889,  6371  and 
it  not  appearing  that  the  said  no- 
tice ever  reached  the  principal  the 
service  was  manifestly  insufficient. 
Van  Studdiford  v.  Kohn,  46  Mo. 
App.  436. 

12  Doe  V.  Woodman,  8  East,  228. 

13  See  Reg.  v.  Slawstone,  18  Q. 
B.  388.  It  is  not  necessary  that 
the  notice  to  quit  should  be  di- 
rected to  the  tenant  if  it  can  be 
proved  to  have  been  delivered  to 
him  at  the  proper  time.  Doe  v. 
Wrightman,    4    Esp.    5.     It    may 


.  TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR.  175 

§  124.  A  notice  to  quit  given  by  an  agent.  Speaking  gen- 
erally a  notice  to  quit  signed  by  an  agent  of  either  party  to  a 
lease  is  good  if  at  the  time  of  the  agent's  signing  it  he  had  author- 
ity to  do  so.  The  agent's  authority  may  be  inferred  from  his 
previous  course  of  acting  in  reference  to  the  landlord  and  to  the 
premises.  An  agent  to  collect  rents  has  presumptively  no  author- 
ity to  sign  or  serve  a  notice  to  quit.  In  order  that  a  notice  given 
by  an  agent  be  sufficient,  he  must  have  had  authority  at  the 
time  it  was  given^  and  it  is  not  made  good  by  its  adoption  by  the 
principal  after  the  proper  time  for  giving  it.^*  "Where  a  notice 
to  quit  was  given  by  an  agent  in  the  names  of  A  and  B  and  also 
several  other  parties,  unnamed  it  was  held  valid  only  as  to  A 
and  B.^^  As  a  general  rule  an  agent  with  power  to  let  premises 
as  well  as  to  receive  the  rents  can  determine  the  tenancy  by  a 
notice  to  quit.^®  But  a  notice  to  quit  given  by  an  agent  of  the 
landlord  whose  only  authority  is  to  receive  rents  is  not  sufficient 
without  a  ratification  by  the  landlord.^'^  A  receiver  with  a  gen- 
eral authority  to  let  lands  to  tenants  from  year  to  year  has  also 
authority  to  determine  such  tenancies  by  a  regular  notice  to 
quit.^*  In  the  absence  of  a  statutory  requirement  to  that  effect 
the  authority  of  an  agent  to  sign  or  serve  a  written  notice  to 
quit  need  not  be  in  writing.^' 

either  be  served  personally  npon  (N.  C.)  677,  4  Scott,  396;  3  Hod- 
him  or  upon  his  attorney  or  it  may  ges,  84;  6  C.  L.  C.  P.  235,  1  Jur. 
be  left  with  his  wife  or  his  serv-  356.  See  also,  Pearse  v.  Boultor, 
ant  at  his  dwelling  house  or  at  2  F.  &  F.  133;  Hasler  v.  Lemoyne, 
the  demised  premises,  Jones  v.  5  Com.  Bench.  (N.  S.)  550. 
Marsh,  4  T.  R.  464,  but  in  all  such  is  Marsack  v.  Read,  12  East,  57. 
cases  a  statement  of  the  character  As  to  the  form  of  the  signature 
of  the  notice  should  be  made  to  the  name  of  the  principal  by  A., 
the  person  with  whom  it  is  left.  his  agent,  is  preferable.  But  the 
See  Doe  v.  Lucas,  5  Esp.  155,  signing  "H.,  agent  for"  the  land- 
Smith  V.  Clark,  9  Dowl.  202.  lord  to  a  notice  to  quit  is  as  effec- 

1*  Lyster  v.  Goldwin,  1  G.  &  D.  tual   as   though    the   notice    were 

463,  2  Q.  B.  143,  10  L.  J.  Q.  B.  275;  signed  with   the   landlord's   name 

Mann  v.  Watters,  10  B.  &  C.  626,  5  by  "H.,  agent."     Earl  Orchard  Co. 

M.  &  Ry.  357,  8  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  v.  Fava,  138  Cal.  76,  70  Pac.  Rep. 

297.  1073.     A  notice  given  by  an  agent 

15  Bailey  v.  Foster,  3  C.  B.  215,  should  be  given  and  signed  in  the 
15  L.  J.  C.  P.  263.  name  of  his  principal  according  to 
•  18  Manvers    v.    Mizem,    2    M.    &  the  English  cases.     Buron  v.  Den- 
Rob.  56.  man,  2  Exch.  188. 

17  Rhodes  v.   Robinson,  3   Bing.  lo  No  written  authority  is  neces- 


176  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT^ 

§  125.  Waiver  of  defects  in  the  notice  to  quit.  The  service 
of  a  written  notice  to  quit  is  waived  by  the  acceptance  of  an 
oral  notice.^*^  In  general  it  may  be  said  that  all  defects  either 
in  the  substance  or  the  form  of  a  notice  to  quit  or  in  the  manner 
or  time  of  its  service  are  waived  by  delay  in  objecting  if  the 
party  serving  it  has  been  induced  to  act  relying  upon  the  as- 
sumed validity  of  the  notice  and  its  service/^  Thus  all  object- 
ions to  a  notice  to  quit  which  has  been  served  by  the  tenant  is 
waived  by  the  lessor  resuming  possession  of  the  premises  with 
the  consent  of  the  tenant.-^  A  compliance  with  the  notice  to 
quit  by  the  tenant  waives  all  irregularities  and  informalities  in 
it.  So  the  action  of  the  tenant  in  notifying  his  landlord,  after 
he  has  received  from  him  a  notice  to  quit  that  he  intends  to 
move  estops  him  from  claiming  subsequently  that  the  notice  to 
quit  was  insufficient.-^  A  refusal  to  quit  also  constitutes  a 
waiver  by  the  tenant.  The  refusal  of  a  tenant  to  quit  on  the 
ground  that  he  is  a  tenant  from  year  to  year,  waives  any  formal 
insufficiency^  of  a  notice  to  terminate  a  tenancy  from  month  to 
month.^* 

§  126.  Waiver  of  a  notice  to  quit  by  a  subsequent  notice.  A 
notice  to  quit  which  has  been  properly  and  timely  served  may 
be  waived  by  the  party  who  served  it  subsequently  serving  an- 
other notice  the  terms  of  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  carrying 
out  of  the  former  notice  to  quit  by  the  person  upon  whom  it  was 
served.  Thus  the  service  of  a  notice  to  the  effect  that  in  default 
of  the  payment  of  rent  upon  a  certain  day  the  lease  will  be  con- 
sidered as  terminated  is  an  acknowledgment  of  the  existence  of 
the  lease' when  the  notice  was  served  and  waives  the  effect  of  a 

sary  under  Cal.  Civ.  Code,  §  2309,  612,  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  24,  27;    Shirley 

when  there  is  notice  to  quit,  pur-  v.  Newman,  1  Esp.  266. 

porting  to  be  signed  for  the  land-  22  Williams    v.    Jones,    1    Bush, 

lord  by  his  attorney,  if  the  attor-  (Ky.)  621;  Graham  v.  Anderson,  3 

ney  has  in  fact  authority  to  sign  Har.      (Del.)      364;      Elgutter     v. 

it.     Felton     v.     Millard,     81     Cal.  Drischaus,  44  Neb.  378,  63  N.  W. 

540,  21  Pac.  Rep.  533.  Rep.  19. 

2«  Smith  V.  Snyder,  168  Pa.  St.  29  Baltimore     Dental     Ass'n     v. 

514,  543,  32  Atl.  Rep.  64,  36  W.  N.  Fuller,  101  Va.  627,  44  S.  E.  Rep. 

C.  425;    Montgomery  v.  Willis,  45  771,  773. 

Neb.  434,  438,  63  N.  W.  Rep.  794.  2*  Drey    v.   Doyle,    28    Mo.   App. 

21  Ludington  v.  Garlock,  55  Hun,  249 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR.  177 

prior  notice  to  terminate  the  lease.-^  So  if  the  landlord  of  a 
tenancy  at  will  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  limited  in  a 
notice  to  quit  serves  a  second  notice  to  qnit  he  waives  his  right 
to  proceed  under  the  first  notice.-® 

§  127.  The  effect  of  a  notice  to  quit.  The  effect  of  the  ser- 
vice of  a  notice  to  quit  is  absolutely  to  put  an  end  to  the  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant  between  the  parties  as  of  the  date  men- 
tioned in  the  notice.  The  former  tenant  is  thereafter  under  no 
obligations  to  pay  rent  as  such  nor  is  he  liable  to  the  former 
landlord  for  any  breach  of  covenant  occurring  after  the  service  of 
the  notice  to  quit.  He  is  still  bound  however  for  rent  which  may 
have  accrued  before  the  date  which  is  named  in  the  notice  for 
the  termination  of  the  tenancy.  "When  the  period  of  the  notice 
has  expired  the  landlord  is  at  once  entitled  to  possession  and  the 
tenant  is  thereafter  a  trespasser;  or,  at  the  most  a  tenant  by 
sufferance  unless,  while  he  holds  over,  the  landlord  creates  a  new 
tenancy  by  receiving-  rent  or  other  similar  acts  constituting  a 
waiver  of  the  notice  to  quit.  But  the  service  of  a  notice  to  quit 
by  the  landlord  does  not  make  the  holding  of  the  tenant  adverse 
to  the  title  of  the  landlord.  It  will  not  permit  the  tenant  there- 
after to  deny  the  title  of  the  landlord  nor  will  it  set  running  the 
statute  of  limitations  in  favor  of  the  tenant  and  against  the  land- 
lord or  in  favor  of  any  other  preson.  The  tenant  is  still  a  tenant. 
Prior  to  the  notice  to  quit  he  is  a  tenant  under  the  lease.  Subse- 
quent to  the  notice,  provided  it  is  effective  to  terminate  the  ten- 
ancy if  he  remains  in  possession  he  is  a  tenant  holding  over  and 
may  therefore  be  a  trespasser  or  a  tenant  at  will  or  for  a  new 
term,  according  to  the  circumstances  and  the  conduct  of  the 
landlord  toAvards  him.^^  If  after  the  termination  of  this  period 
of  notice  mentioned  in  the  notice  to  quit  the  tenant  holds  over 
and  the  landlord  receives  rent  from  him  the  tenant  is  a  tenant 
from  year  to  year  on  the  terms  of  the  former  lease.  If  the  land- 
lord does  not  receive  rent  from  him  he  may  eject  him  as  a  tres- 
passer. 

25  Dockrill  v.  Schenk.  37  111.  954,  83  Hun,  298.  See  Doe  v.  Pal- 
App.  44.  mer,  16  East,  36. 

26  Morgan  v.  Powers   31  N.  Y.  S.  2"  Sittel  v.  Wright.  122  Fed.  Rep. 

434,  436,  58  C.  C.  A.  416. 

12 


178  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

§  128.  The  withdrawal  of  the  notice  to  quit.  Either  party 
to  the  lease,  having  served  a  notice  to  quit,  may  subsequently 
withdraw  it  orally  or  in  writing  by  appropriate  language.  The 
withdrawal  by  the  party  who  has  served  the  notice  must  be  con- 
sented to  by  the  other  or  it  will  be  ineffectual  to  restore  the  par- 
ties to  their  original  position.  For  if  the  party  on  whom  the 
notice  has  been  served  has  acted  upon  it  either  by  securing  a  new 
tenant,  if  he  be  the  landlord,  or  by  hiring  new  premises  if  he  be 
the  tenant,  he  may  refuse  to  accept  the  withdrawal  of  the  notice 
and  the  other  party  is  estopped  to  compel  him  to  continue  the 
relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant.  So  the  party  who  has  been 
served  with  a  notice  to  quit  has  an  absolute  right  without  giving 
a  reason  to  refvise  to  assent  to  its  withdrawal.  Where  a  lessee 
has  received  from  his  lessor  the  notice  to  quit  which  is  required 
to  be  given  by  the  lease  and  later  on  the  lessee  going  to  the  land- 
lord he  is  told  he  may  stay,  which  he  does,  the  notice  to  quit  is 
altogether  withdrawn  and  both  parties  are  then  remitted  to  the 
terms  of  the  original  lease,  the  covenants  of  which,  being  mutual, 
are  a  good  and  sufficient  consideration  for  the  new  arrangement 
under  which  the  tenant  continues  in  possession. ^^ 

§  129.  The  waiver  of  a  notice  to  quit  by  the  receipt  of  rent. 
The  duty  to  give  notice  of  an  intention  to  quit  is  reciprocal  and 
consequently  is  a  right  which  may  be  waived  by  either  party 
to  the  lease  who  is  entitled  thereto.  The  waiver  of  a  notice  to 
quit  after  it  has  been  given,  is  always  in  part  at  least  a  ques- 
tion of  intent.'®  A  lessor  may  nullify  the  effect  of  a  notice  to 
quit  served  by  him  by  his  subsequent  actions  or  language.  Thus 
the  effect  of  a  notice  to  quit  is  waived  by  the  landlord  consenting 
that  the  lessee  may  continue  in  possession  after  the  service  of 
the  notice  to  quit  upon  him.^"  So,  also  it  is  unquestionably  true, 
that  the  demand  and  acceptance  of  rent,  as  such  by  the  landlord 
which  becomes  due  after  the  service  of  the  notice  to  quit  and  its 
payment  by  the  tenant  constitute  a  waiver  of  the  notice  to 
quit.^^  The  receipt  of  the  rent  by  the  landlord  raises  an  impli- 
cation of  an  intention  on  his  part  that  the  tenant  shall  continue 

2s  Supplee  V.   Timothy,   124    Pa.  ■''o  Arcade    Inv.     Co.    v.     Gieriet 

St.  375,  384.  16  All.  Rep.  864,  23  (Minn.  1906),  109  N.  W.  Rep.  250. 

W.  N.  C.  386.  31  Collins     v.     Canty,     6     Gush. 

20  Lucas  V.  Brooks,  85  U.  S.  436,  (Mass.)  415;  Norris  v.  Morrill,  43 

21  L.  Ed.  779.  N.  H.  213;    Stedman  v.  Mcintosh, 


TEX-VNCY  FROil  YE.Ui  TO  YEAR.  179 

in  possession  which  intention  is  inconsistent  with  the  effect  of  a 
notice  to  quit.  The  same  result  follows  when  the  landlord  dis- 
trains for  the  rent  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  mentioend  in 
the  notice  to  quit.^-  But  the  money  must  have  been  received  by 
the  landlord  as  rent.  Hence  where,  after  the  service  of  a  notice 
to  quit,  a  tenant  holds  over  and  the  landlord  brings  an  action  of 
ejectment,  and,  pending-  this  action,  the  tenant  surrenders  posses- 
sion the  action  of  the  landlord  in  suing  for  and  recovering  a 
judgment  against  the  tenant  for  the  value  of  the  use  and  occupa- 
tion of  the  property  for  the  time  the  tenant  has  held  over  is  not 
a  waiver  of  the  notice  to  quit  as  the  money  is  not  paid  as  a  rent 
but  for  another  purpose.^^  The  landlord  may,  however,  accept 
from  the  tenant  after  the  service  of  a  notice  to  quit  the  payment 
of  rent  which  had  accrued  and  was  due  and  payable  before  the 
service  of  the  notice  without  losing  the  benefit  of  the  notice.^* 
The  service  of  a  notice  to  quit  after  the  expiration  of  the  time 
named  in  a  prior  notice  is  not  a  waiver  of  the  effect  of  the  prior 
notice  in  a  case  where  a  suit  had  been  begun  after  the  service  of 
the  latter  notice  and  its  prosecution  was  continued  thereafter."^ 
It  has  also  been  held  that  mere  acceptance  of  money  though 
called  by  the  tenant  rent  after  a  notice  to  quit  has  been  given 
is  not  of  itself  a  waiver  on  the  part  of  the  landlord  of  the  notice 
but  is  merely  a  circumstance,  to  be  taken  with  the  other  circum- 
stances of  the  case  from  which  such  intent  may  possibly  be  im- 
plied.^® For  the  money  must  not  only  be  received  as  rent  but 
it  must  in  fact  be  rent  and  calling  it  rent  by  either  party  to  the 
lease  is  not  conclusive.^^  Thus,  the  presumption  of  a  waiver 
which  arises  from  the  recept  of  rent  by  the  landlord  after  the 

27  N.  C.  571,  573;  Charter  v.  Cord-  33  Stedman  v.  Jrdntosh,  27  N.  C. 

went,  6  T.  R.  219,  220,  3  R.  R.  161;  571,  573. 

Keith  V.  Nat.  Teleph.  Co.,  63  L.  J.  3*  Norris    r.    Morrill,    43    N.    H. 

Ch.  373  [1894]  2  Ch.  147,  8  R.  776,  213. 

70  L.  T.  276,  42  .  R.  380,  58  J.  P.  35  Ewing  v.  O'Malley  (Mo. 
573;  Prindle  v.  Anderson,  19  Wend.  App.  1904),  S2  S.  W.  Rep.  1087. 
(N.  Y.)  391;  Anderson  v.  Prindle,  se  Cheany  v.  Batten,  Cowp.  24n, 
23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  616.  9  East,  314n,  9  R.  R.  570n;  Fryett 
32  Ward  V.  Willingale,  1  H.  Bl.  v.  Jeffreys,  1  Esp.  393;  Fitzpatrick 
311,  2  R.  R.  770.  See.  also.  Jenner  v.  Childs,  2  Brews.  (Pa.)  369. 
V.  Clegg,  1  M.  &  Rob.  213,  and  s-  in  the  recent  case  of  West- 
Blight  V  Dennet,  13  Com.  Bench,  ern  Union  Telegraph  v.  Pennsyl- 
178  as  to  effect  of  a  demand  for  vania  R.  R.  Co.,  120  Fed.  Rep.  362, 
rent  the  rule  was  stated  to  be  that  the 


180  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

service  of  tlie  notice  to  quit  may  be  entirely  overcome  by  proof 
that  the  rent  was  received  by  an  agent  without  authority  to  re- 
ceive it,  who  received  it  in  ignorance  of  the  steps  taken  by  his 
principal  to  determine  the  tenancy.^® 

§  130.  When  a  notice  to  quit  may  be  dispensed  with  by  a 
surrender.  Where  from  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  or 
.  from  the  conduct  of  the  parties  to  a  lease  from  year  to  year  it  Is 
clearly  evident  that  they  intended  to  terminate  any  particular 
yearly  teiin  without  a  notice  to  quit,  the  notice  to  quit  will  be 
wholly  dispensed  with.^^  Where  the  rule  recjuiring  a  notice  to 
quit  in  order  to  terminate  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  exists  a 
tenant  cannot  dispense  with  the  necessity  for  giving  such  notice 
by  vacating  the  premises  during  the  term  or  while  the  tenancy 
exists,  and  he  will  be  liable  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  such 
premises  until  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  has  been 
legally  terminated  by  giving  the  notice  required  by  the  statute.*" 
But  in  some  of  the  states  where  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year 
arises  from  a  holding  over  it  has  been  held  that  the  tenant  may 
quit  at  the  end  of  the  specified  term  without  giving  any  previous 
notice  to  quit.*^    An  actual  surrender  by  the  tenant  with  an  ac- 

acceptance  of  rent  accruing  after  not  only  received  but  retained  and 

a  notice  to  quit  had  been  given  by  collected.     It  was  held  that  the  ac- 

the  landlord   was  not  necessarily  ceptance    of    the    checks    as    rent 

an  absolute  <waiver  of  the  notice.  operated  not  only  as  a  waiver  of 

Such  an  act  by  the  landlord  may  the  notice  to  quit,  but  of  the  notice 

be  proved  but  is  only  one  fact  to  of     the     increase     of     the     rent, 

be  considered  in  connection  with  Murphy  v.   Little,   69   Vt.   261,  37 

all  the  evidence  as  showing  an  in-  Atl.  Rep.  968. 

tention  on  the  part  of  the  landlord.  39  Critchfield  v.  Remaley,  21 
And  a  notice  to  quit  once  given  Neb.  178,  31  N.  W.  Rep.  687.  Cit- 
cannot  be  withdrawn  without  the  ing  Brown  v.  Kayser,  60  Wis.  1,  18 
consent  of  both  parties.  If  this  be  N.  W.  Rep.  523. 
done  it  practically  amounts  to  a  *«  Huntington  v.  Parkhurst,  87 
new  hiring.  Mich.  38;  Buck  v.  Lewis,  46  Mo. 
38  Ash  V.  Calvert,  2  Campb.  387.  App.  227;  Hall  v.  Wadsworth,  28 
After  notice  to  quit  coupled  with  Vt.  210;  Mollett  v.  Brayne,  2 
a  notice  of  a  raise  of  rent  the  Campb.  N.  P.  103.  See  also  Hud- 
landlord  accepted  checks  mailed  dleston  v.  Johnston,  McClel.  &  Y. 
by  the  tenant  accompanied  by  let-  140. 

ters   which   expressly  stated  that  4i  Rorbach  v.  Crossett,  46  N.  Y. 

the  checks  were  for  the  rent  at  the  St.  Rep.  426,  64  Hun,  637,  19  N.  Y. 

rate   which    had   been    recognized  Supp.    450;    Cook    v.    Neilson,    10 

before  the  raise.    The  checks  were  Pa.  St.  41;    Brightly  N.  P.  463. 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR. 


181 


ceptanice  by  the  landlord  at  or  before  the  end  of  any  rental 
period  dispenses  with  the  necessity  for  a  notice  to  quit.  And  the 
surrender  need  not  be  express  for  an  implied  surrender  arising 
from  the  granting  of  a  new  lease  or  the  substitution  of  a  new 
tenant  will  be  sufficient.*^  Thus  a  parol  agreement  between  a 
landlord  and  a  tenant  from  year  to  year,  that  another  tenant 
shall  be  substituted  in  the  place  of  the  tenant  as  soon  as  such 
substitution  actually  takes  place,  is  a  surrender  which  is  suffi- 
cient under  the  statute  of  frauds  and  no  notice  to  quit  is  neces- 
sary.*' And  so  where  a  tenant  quitted  in  the  middle  of  his  term, 
apartemnts  which  he  had  hired  for  a  year,  and  the  landlord  let 
them  to  another  tenant,  the  former  tenant  was  not  liable  for  the 
rent  for  a  subsequent  portion  of  the  year  during  which  the  apart- 
ments had  remained  unoccupied.**  An  abandonment  of  the  prem- 
ises acquiesced  in  by  the  landlord  dispenses  with  the  necessity  for 
notice  by  the  landlord.  But  it  is  not  sufficient  if  the  third  per- 
son does  not  take  possession.*^  The  acceptance  by  a  tenant 
from  year  to  year  of  a  lease  for  a  definite  term,  will  terminate 


42  In  one  case  a  notice  to  quit 
seems  to  have  been  implied  from 
a  surrender  of  the  premises. 
There  it  was  held  that  where  a 
tenant  from  year  to  year  left  the 
premises  in  the  middle  of  the  year 
and  tendered  possession  to  the 
landlord  and  thereafter  the  ten- 
ant refused  to  pay  rent  for  the  re- 
mainder of  the  year  until  com- 
pelled to  do  so  by  suit,  his  lia- 
bility for  rent  terminated  at  the 
end  of  the  current  year  and  no 
further  notice  on  his  part  was  nec- 
essary. Adams  v.  Cohoes,  127  N. 
Y.  175,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  25,  38  N.  Y. 
St.  Rep.  678,  affirming  53  Hun, 
260,  25  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  523,  6  N.  Y. 
Supp.  617. 

43  Stone  v.  Whiting,  2  Stark.  235, 
19  R.  R.  710. 

44  Walls  V.  Atcheson,  3  Bing. 
462,  11  Mjore,  379,  2  Car.  &  P.  268, 
4  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  C.  P.  154,  28  R.  R. 
657. 


45  Taylor  v.  Chapman,  Peake  Ad. 
C.  19,  4  R.  R.  884.  Eimermann 
V.  Nathan,  116  Wis.  124,  92  N.  W. 
Rep.  550,  may  be  cited  as  an  illus- 
tration of  the  rule  that  a  surren- 
der may  dispense  with  a  notice  to 
quit.  The  facts  in  that  case  were 
substantially  as  follows:  The 
landlord  of  a  tenant  from  year  to 
year  refused  to  make  repairs  and 
his  tenant  then  told  him  he  would 
give  him  notice  in  two  or  three 
days.  He  failed  to  do  so  but  the 
landlord  advertised  the  premises 
to  let  and  put  up  a  "to-let"  sign 
upon  them.  This  notice  was  up 
for  more  than  thirty  days  before 
the  expiration  of  the  term  at  which 
time  the  tenant  moved  and  the 
landlord  took  the  keys.  The  court 
held  that  the  landlord  was  es- 
topped to  assert  that  no  notice  to 
quit  had  been  given. 


1S2 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD   AND  TENANT. 


the  prior  tenancy  as  it  is  a  surrender  and  no  notice  to  quit  is  re- 
quired to  terminate  the  tenancy  prior  to  the  end  of  the  term.*^ 
§  131.  A  disavowal  of  the  landlord's  title  by  the  tenant  may 
dispense  with  giving  notice  to  quit  by  the  landlord.  A  notice 
to  quit  need  not  be  given  by  the  lessor  when  the  lessee  has  during 
the  term  done  or  said  anything  which  amounts  to  a  disavowal  of 
the  lessor's  title.*"  It  is  consequently  very  important  to  deter- 
mine what  language  or  action  coming  from  a  tenant  amounts  to 
a  disavowal  of  his  landlord's  title.*''  A  disclaimer  has  been  de- 
fined to  be  "a  ren,unciation  by  the  party  of  his  character  as  ten- 
ant, either  by  setting  up  title  in  another,  or  by  claiming  title  in 
himself."*^  Usually  whether  there  is  a  disclaimer  depends  on 
the  language  and  conduct  of  the  tenant.  The  mere  fact  that  on 
a  demand  for  the  payment  of  the  rent  the  tenant  asks  whom  he 
shall  pay  it  to  while  he  admitted  himself  to  be  a  tenant  and 
offered  to  pay  the  rent  to  the  right  person  is  not  a  disclaimer.^" 


40  Roosevelt  v.  Hungate,  110  111. 
595. 

47Grubb  V.  Grubb,  10  B.  &  G. 
816,  8  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  321;  Doe 
d.  Williams  v.  Pasquali,  1  Peake, 
2.59,  3  R.  R.  188;  Smith  v.  Ogg, 
16  Cal.  88,  Bolton  v.  Landers,  27 
Cal.    104;    Ramsey   v.    Henderson 

91  Mo.  560,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  408. 
Amick  V.  Brubaker,  101  Mo.  473, 
14  S.  W.  Rep.  627;  Lyon  v.  La 
Master,  103  Mo.  612.  15  S.  W.  Rep. 
767;  Young  v.  Smith,  28  Mo.  65; 
Stephens  v.  Brown,  56  Mo.  23; 
Ramsey  v.  Henderson  (Mo.)  10 
"West.  Rep.  33;  Payton  v.  Stath,  5 
Pet.  (U.  S.)   485;  Wolf  v.  Hoi  ton, 

92  Mich.  136,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  459; 
Tuttle  V.  Reynolds,  1  Vt.  80; 
Brown  v.  Keller,  32  111.  151;  Jack- 
son V.  French,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
337;  Evans  v.  Enloe,  70  Wis.  345, 
34  N.  W.  Rep.  918;  Williams  v. 
Pasquali,  1  Peake,  259,  3  R.  R. 
688;  Jefferies  v.  Whittick,  Gow. 
195,  21  R.  R.  828;  Clun  v.  Clarke, 
Peake  Ad.  C.  239;  Foster  v.  Wil- 
liams,    Cowp.     622;     Cheeser     V: 


Creed,  2  M.  &  P.  648,  sub  nom.; 
Davis  V.  Creed,  5  Bing.  327,  7  L.  J. 
(O.  S.)  C.  P.  138;  Burgess  v. 
Thompson,  1  N.  &  P.  215,  5  A.  & 
E.  532,  6  L.  J.  K.  B.  57;  Landsell 
V.  Grover,  17  Q.  B.  589,  21  L.  J.  Q. 
B.  57,  16  Jur.  100. 

48  "It  is  sometimes  said  that  a 
tenancy  from  year  to  year  is  for- 
feited by  disclaimer;  but  it  would 
be  more  correct  to  say  that  a  dis- 
claimer furnishes  evidence  in  an- 
swer to  the  disclaiming  party's  as- 
sertion that  he  has  had  no  notice 
to  quit;  inasmuch  as  it  is  idle  to 
prove  such  a  notice  where  the 
tenant  has  asserted  that  there  is 
no  longer  a  tenancy."  By  Patter- 
son, J.,  in  Doe  d.  Graves  v.  Wells, 
10  Ad.  &  El.  427,  2  P.  «&;  D.  396. 
See,  also.  Von  Glahn  v.  Brenn^n. 
81  Cal.  261,  22  Pac.  Rep.  296. 

40  By  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Doe  d.  Wil- 
liams V.  Cooper,  1  M.  &  G.  135,  1 
Scott  N.  R.  36;  approved  in  Jones 
V.  Mills,  10  Com.  Bench  (N.  S.) 
788;  on  p.  796. 

CO  Jones  v.  Mills,  10  Com.  Bench 


TENANCY  FROM  YEAR  TO  YEAR.  183 

So,  too,  a  refusal  to  pay  rent  to  a  devisee  of  the  premises  under 
a  will  which  is  being  contested,"'^  is  not  a  disclaimer.  So  where 
a  tenant  from  year  to  year  agreed  to  purchase  the  premises  and 
thereafter  he  remained  in  possession  for  several  years  paying 
neither  rent  nor  interest  on  the  purchase  money  it  is  no  dis- 
claimer of  the  lessor's  title  for  him  to  tell  his  lessor  that  he  had 
bought  the  property  and  was  able  to  procure  and  ready  to  pay 
the  purchase  money.  This  statement  is  not  a  disavowal  of  title 
as  it  is  not  a  claim  that  the  tenant  holds  the  estate  on  any  ground 
which  is  of  necessity  inconsistent  with  the  continuance  of  a  ten- 
ancy from  year  to  year.^^  So,  Avhere  a  tenant  for  years  on  a  de- 
mand being  made  y  a  andlord  for  possession  under  a  belief  on 
the  part  of  the  landlord  that  the  lease  had  expired  refused  to  give 
Tip  possession  claiming  the  term  had  not  expired,  and  where  he 
said  in  reply  to  a  demand  for  rent  that  he  would  not  pay  the 
party  demanding  as  he  did  not  know  but  that  some  some  one 
else  might  afterwards  claim  the  rent  it  was  held  no  disavowal  or 
disclaimer  of  the  title  of  the  landlord.^^  Upon  the  other  hand 
where  a  tenant  said  "I  have  no  rent  for  you  because  A  has 
ordered  me  to  pay  none, "  ^*  or  where  the  lessee  of  a  life  tenant 
on  the  death  of  the  latter  says  to  his  personal  representative: 
"I  will  not  pay  rent  to  you;  I  am  a  tenant  of  another,"  a  dis- 
claimer and  disavowal  of  the  tenancy  and  of  the  lessor's  title,  dis- 
pensing with  notice  to  quit  is  very  clearly  made  out.  A  tenant 
who  after  his  lessor  has  granted  the  reversion  takes  a  lease  from 
a  third  party  by  thus  attorning  to  a  stranger,  repudiates  the 
relation  existing  between  his  landlord  and  himself  and  is  not  en- 
titled to  a  notice  to  quit.^«  The  right  of  the  landlord  to  oust  the 
tenant  without  notice  to  quit  which  he  acquires  by  the  disclaimer 
of  the  tenant  may  be  waived  by  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the 
landlord     The  right  of  a  landlord  to  maintain  ejectment  with- 

(N.  S.)  788,  31  L.  J.  C.  P.  66,  8  Jur.  v.  Cawder,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  398,  4  Tyr. 

(N.  S.)   387.  852,  3  L.  J.  Ex.  239. 

Bi  Doe  d.  Grubb  v.  Grubb,  10  B.  si  Doe  d.  Whitehead  v.  Pittman, 

&  C.  816.  2  W.  &  M.  672. 

62  Doe  d.  Gray  v.  Stanion,  1  M.  ss  Doe  d.  Calvert  v.  Frowd.  1  M. 

&  W.  69.5,  2  Gale,  154,  5  L.  J.  Ex.  &  P.  480,  4  Bing.  557,  560,  29  R.  R. 

253.  624. 

■•^  Doe  d.  Williams  v.  Cooper.  1  bg  Lyon   v.   La  Master,  103   Mo. 

Scott  (N.  R.)  36,  1  Man.  &  G.  135,  612,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  767. 
9  L.  J.  C.  P.  229;  see  Doe  d.  Lewis 


]S4 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


out  serving  a  prior  notice  to  quit  after  a  disavowal  may  be 
waived  by  the  landlord.  Such  a  waiver  would  be  implied  where 
after  the  disclaimer  or  disavowal  the  landlord  by  conduct  or 
language  recognizes  the  existence  of  the  relationship  of  landlord 
an  dtenant.  By  distraining  for  rent  after  a  disclaimer  the  land- 
lord waives  the  operation  of  the  disclaimer.^^ 


57  Doe  d.  David  v.  Williams,  7 
Car.  &  P.  322.  The  reason  that  a 
notice  to  quit  is  regarded  as  un- 
necssary  in  a  case  where  the  ten- 
ant has  denied  the  landlord's  title 
is  that  by  his  action  he  has  de- 
nied the  existence  of  the  relation- 
ship of  landlord  and  tenant  and 
is  therefore  estopped  to  assert 
any  rights  which  he  could  have 
claimed  as  a  tenant.  As  to 
whether  the  tenant  has  done  or 
said  that  which  amounts  to  a  dis- 
claimer is  usually  a  mixed  ques- 
tion of  fact  and  law.  If  the  facts 
or  the  language  of  the  tenant  are 
not  denied  by  him  it  is  for  the 
court  to  determine  if  they  con- 
stitute a  disclaimer.  The  ques- 
tion then  is  has  the  tenant  done 


or  said  anything  which  amounts 
by  a  reasonable  construction  to  a 
denial  on  his  part  that  the  rela- 
tionship of  landlord  and  tenant 
exists.  If  what  he  has  said  or 
done  amounts  to  a  setting  up  of 
a  title  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  or 
in  some  third  person  it  Is  a  dis- 
claimer. The  fact  that  the  ten- 
ant did  not  mean  to  repudiate  the 
relationship  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ant will  not  protect  him  for  the 
effect  of  what  te  said  or  did. 
Thus  a  refusal  to  pay  rent  to  a 
person  legally  entitled  until  such 
person  proves  his  right  is  a  dis- 
claimer although  the  tenant  does 
not  assert  a  better  title  in  himself 
or  another.  Calvert  v.  Frowd,  4 
Bing,  557 


"CHAPTER  VII. 

TENANCY  AT  WILL. 

§  133.     The  definition  of  an  estate  at  will. 

134.  A  reservation  of  rent  is  not  necessary  to  create  a  tenancy  at 

will. 

135.  The  liability  of  a  tenant  at  will  for  rent. 

136.  Tenancy  at  will  by  express  agreement. 

137.  The  mere  occupation  of  the  land  by  the  permission  of  the  owner. 

138.  Leases  of  an  uncertain  duration. 

139.  Entry  under  an  agreement  for  a  lease. 

140.  Tenancy  at  will  created  by  a  defective  or  unexecuted  lease. 

141.  Leases  void  under  the  statute  of  frauds. 

142.  The  vendee  of  the  land  having  gone  into  possession  under  a 

contract  to  buy. 

143.  Tenancy  at  will  by  holding  over. 

144.  The  occupancy  of  the  premises  incident  to  the  employment  of 

the  occupant. 

145.  The  judgment  debtor  holding  over  after  sale  under  execution. 

146.  The  lessee  of  a  judgment  debtor  holding  over  after  the  sale 

under  the  execution. 

147.  The  determination  of  the  will.    In  general. 

148.  The  termination  of  a  tenancy  at  will  by  the  death  of  either 

party  to  it. 

149.  The  partition  of  the  demised  premises  by  tenants  in  common. 

150.  Termination  of  the  tenancy  by  the  surrender  and  abandonment 

of  the  premises. 

151.  The  termination  of  a  tenancy  at  will  by  the  landlord's  aliena- 

tion of  the  premises. 

152.  Denial  of  the  title  of  the  landlord  by  a  tenant  at  will. 

153.  The  tenancy  at  will  may  be  determined  by  the  giving  of  a  new 

lease. 

154.  The  entry  of  the  landlord  on  the  land  as  terminating  the  ten- 

ancy. 

155.  Notice  to  quit  when  required  in  tenancies  at  will  at  common 

law. 

156.  Notice  to  quit  and  demand  of  possession  as  terminating  a  ten- 

ancy at  will. 

157.  Statutory  notice  required  to  terminate  a  tenancy  at  will. 

158.  The  termination  of  the  period  of  notice. 

159.  The  commission  of  waste  by  a  tenant  at  will. 

160.  The  assignability  of  the  tenant's  interest  in  an  estate  at  will. 

161.  The  right  of  a  tenant  at  will  to  recover  damages  for  an  injury 

to  the  land. 


186  LAW  OF  LANDLORD   AND   TENANT 

§  133.  The  definition  of  an  estate  at  will.  A  tenancy  at  will 
may  be  defined  to  be  a  tenancy  of  land  the  duration  of  which  is 
determinable  by  either  party  thereto.  Here  the  lessee  has  no  cer- 
tain estate  for  the  lessor  may  determine  it  any  time  he  wills  to 
do  so  while  on  the  other  hand  the  tenant  is  not  tied  down  to  any- 
fixed  and  definite  occupancy  of  the  premises  as  he  may,  in  turn, 
determine  the  tenancy  at  his  will.  In  other  words  a  tenancy  at 
will  is  at  the  will  of  both  parties  to  the  tenancy.^  This  proposi- 
tion however  must  be  qualified  by  the  statement  that  the  tenant 
at  will  who  sows  the  land  is  entitled  to  the  emblements  accord- 
ingly. Though  a  strict  tenancy  at  will  may  be  arbitrarily  deter- 
mined insianter  by  the  landlord,  yet  if  he  do  this  while  the  ten- 
ant's crops  are  unreaped,  he  must  permit  the  tenant  to  remove 
the  crops  and  to  have  free  and  unresricted  ingress  and  egress 
upon  the  land  for  that  purpose.^ 

§  134.  A  reservation  of  rent  is  not  necessary  to  create  a  ten- 
ancy at  will.  Inasmuch  as  a  person  who  occupies  land  rent  free 
may  be  under  certain  circumstances  a  tenant  at  will  it  is  never 
necessary  that  there  should  be  an  actual  reservaton  of  rent  to 
the  landlord  in  order  to  create  a  tenancy  at  will.^    Hence  a  per- 

1  Knight    V.    Coal    Co.,    47    Ind.  minable  at  the  will  of  either  party 

105,  17  Am.  Dec.  692.     "Tenant  at  to   the   demise."     1  Washburn  on 

will  is,  where  lands  or  tenements  Real     Property,     370,     quoted     in 

are  let  by  one  man  to  another,  to  Bright  v.  McQuat,  40  Ind.  521,  on 

have  and   to   hold   to   him   at  the  page,  523.    See,  also,  Willis  v.  Har- 

will    of    the   lessor;    by   force    of  rell,  118  Ga.  906,  908,  45  S.  E.  Rep. 

which  lease  the  lessee  is  in  posses-  794.     "A  tenancy  at  will  is  where 

sion.     In  this  case  the  lessee  is  the  land  is  held  by  the  tenant  as 

called  tenant  at  will,  because  he  long  as   lessor   and   lessee   please 

hath   no   certain   or   sure    estate;  that   the   tenancy   shall    continue, 

for  the  lessor  may  put  him  out  at  No  notice  from  either  party  is  nec- 

what  time  he  pleases."    Coke,  Lit.  eesary  to  terminate  a  tenancy  at 

ch.  XXII,  p.   55a;    2   Black.   Com.  will,  strictly  so-called;  any  act  by 

145;   4  Kent,  111,  quoted  in  Mor-  either  party,  affording  to  the  other 

ris  y.  Palmer,  44  S.  Car.  462,  464,  proper  evidence  of  his  determina- 

22  S.  E.  Rep.  726;  Woodfall,  L.  &  tion   that  the   tenancy   should  no 

T.  226.    "An  estate  at  will  in  lands  longer     continue,     is     sufficient." 

is  that  which  a  tenant  has,  by  an  Digby's    History    of    the    Law    of 

entry  made   thereon   under   a   de-  Real  Propery,  p.  212. 
mise  to  hold  under  the  joint  wills  2  2  Black.  Com.  146. 

of  the  parties  to  the  same.   It  does  s  Rex  v.   Jobling,  R.  &  R.  525; 

not  arise   until   actual   possession  Rex  v.  CoUett,  R  &  R.  498;  Nicholl 

taken  by  the  lessee,  and  is  deter-  v.  McKaeg,  10  B.  &  Cr.  721;    Rex 


TENANCY  AT  WILL,  187 

son  who  is  permitted  b}^  the  owner  of  land  to  occupy  the  land 
without  any  agreement  for  the  pay  meat  of  rent  having  been 
made  merely  upon  condition  that  he  shall  take  care  of  the  same 
is  a  tenant  at  will  so  long  as  he  fulfills  his  agreement.*  And  a 
person  who  is  placed  in  the  possession  and  occupancy  of  land  by 
the  owner  without  any  contract  to  pay  rent  but  with  an  express 
understanding  that  he  will  surrender  possession  whenever  the 
owner  shall  require  him  to  do  so  is  a  tenant  at  will.®  On  the  other 
hand  the  fact  alone  that  the  person  who  it  is  claimed  is  a  tenant 
at  will  does  pay  rent  does  not  overcome  the  fact  or  presumption 
that  he  is  a  tenant  a  will  unless  it  shall  appear  that  the  rent 
is  paid  by  him  upon  the  basis  of  a  yearly  or  monthly  holding." 
§  135.  The  liability  of  a  tenant  at  will  for  rent.  Except  per- 
haps in  the  case  of  a  tenancy  at  Avill  arising  from  the  occupation 
of  premises  by  a  vendee  before  taking  title,  a  tenant  at 
will  is  liable  for  rent  to  the  landlord.  In  this  respect  a  tenant 
at  will  differs  from  a  tenant  at  sufferance  who  in  the  absence  of 
statute,  is  not  liable  for  rent  to  the  owner  for  the  reason  that  he 
is  in  possession  by  the  oversight  of  the  owner  and  is  as  to  him  a 
mere  trespasser.  If  the  o\^Tier  at  the  common  law  receives  rent 
from  a  tenant  at  sufference  he  at  once  becomes  a  tenant  at  will 
or  from  year  to  year  according  to  the  length  of  the  rental  period. 
But  the  owner  may  recover  rent  or  for  use  and  occupation  from 
a  tenant  at  will  unless  he  has  agreed  to  let  him  occupy  the  prem- 
ises rent  free.  Where  the  amount  of  the  rent  which  the  tenant 
at  will  is  to  pay  has  been  fixed  by  the  parties  the  landlord  may 
distrain  for  it.'  On  the  other  hand  if  no  fixed  sum  as  rent  has 
been  agreed  upon  the  landlord  is  entitled  to  recover  a  fair  and 
reasonable  sum  for  use  and  occupation.*    Unless  the  tenant  can 

V.  Fillongley,  1  T.  R.  459,  8  L.  J.  7  Jur.    (N.   S.)    411,   3  L.  T.  809; 

(O.  S.)  K.  B.  310;  Rich  v.  Bolton,  Cox  v.  Bent,  5  Bing.  185,  5  M.  & 

46  Vt.  84.  R.  281,  17  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  68,  30  R.  R. 

4  Jones  V.  Shay,  50  Cal.  508;  5G6;  Braythwayte  v.  Hitchcock,  10 
Herrell  v.  Sizeland,  81  111.  457;  M.  &  "W.  494,  497;  Doe  dem.  Hull 
Groves  v.  Groves,  10  Q.  B.  486.  v.  Wood,  14  M.  &  W.  682. 

5  Humphries  v.  Humphries,  3  ^  Davies  v.  Thomas,  6  Exch.  858; 
Ired.  (N.  C.)  Law,  362;  Rex  v.  Anderson  v.  Midland  Railway  Co., 
Fillongley,  1  T.  R.  458.  30  L.  G.  B.  94. 

eBastow   v.    Cox,    11   Q.   B.    22;  s  Marwood  v.  Waters,   13   C.   B. 

Anderson  v.  Midland  Railway  Co.,      820.     Contra,   Hyde   v.  Moakes,   5 
3  El.  &  El.  614,  30  L.  J.  Q.  B.  94,       Car.  &  P.  42. 


188  LAW   OP  LANDLORD   AND  TENAN' 

show  that  it  hai  been  agreed  that  he  should  pay  no  rent,  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  the  tenant  at  will  is  to  pay  something  for  the 
use  of  the  premises  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  usually  upon  him 
to  show  that  he  should  not.  In  order  that  a  landlord  may  re- 
cover against  a  tenant  at  will  for  use  and  occupation,  the  tenant 
must  have  been  in  by  the  permission  of  the  landlord  and  as  his 
tenant.  The  landlord  cannot  recover  where  the  tenant  at  will  is 
a  subtenant  being  the  tenant  of  a  lessee  unless  the  landlord  has 
accepted  the  subtenant  as  his  own  tenant  at  will.® 

§  136.  Tenancy  at  will  by  express  agreement.  At  common 
law  all  estates  and  terms  the  duration  of  which  was  indefinite 
and  uncertain  were  estates  at  will.  Such  interests  and  estates 
being  extremely  precarious  on  account  of  the  readiness  with 
Avhich  they  might  arbitrarily  be  terminated  by  the  landlord  were 
of  little  value  to  the  tenants  who  because  of  these  facts  could 
be  greatly  inconvenienced  if  not  ruined  by  an  arbitrary  exercise 
of  the  will  of  the  landlord.  Such  estates  by  a  course  of  judicial 
legislation  commenced  at  a  very  early  period  were  gradually 
transformed  into  tenancies  from  year  to  year  which  were  still 
determinable  at  the  will  of  either  but  only  on  the  giving  of 
six  months'  notice  according  to  the  English  common  law.^°  The 
courts  in  this  process  of  transforming  one  species  of  tenancy  into 
another  seized  upon  two  circumstances,  i.  e.,  the  yearly  harvest- 
ing of  the  crops  by  the  tenant  at  will  and  the  payment  of  a 
rent  by  the  year  as  determining  factors  in  the  working  of  the 
transformation.  But  they  did  not  wholly  abolish  tenancies  at 
will,  recognizing  them  and  affirming  them  in  all  cases  of  hold- 
ing for  an  indefinite  term,  where  these  factors  are  not  discovered 
to  be  present  as  well  as  in  all  cases  where  the  parties  by  express 
language  or  by  necessary  implication,  may  fairly  be  presumed 
to  have  created  a  tenancy  at  will.  Though  the  ancient  tenancies 
at  will  are  now  largely  considered  as  tenancies  from  year  to 
year  and  are  terminable  only  upon  proper  notice  to  quit  by  either 
party  there  is  no  question  that  there  may  be  still  tenancies  at 
will  created  whenever  the  parties  expressly  stipulate  to  that 
effect."  In  Indiana  by  statute  it  is  provided  that  a  tenancy  at 
will  cannot  arise  or  be  created  without  an  express  agreement 

0  Phipps  V.    Sculthorpe,   1   B.   &  lo  i  Washburn  on  Real  Property, 

Aid.    50,    18    R.    R.    42G;    Hyde   V.      382. 
Moakes,  5  C.  &  P.  42.  n  Sullivan    v.    Enders,    3    Dana 


TENANCY  AT  WILL  189 

and  that  all  general  tenancies  in  which  the  premises  are  occu- 
pied by  the  consent,  either  express  or  constructive  of  the  land- 
lord, shall  be  tenancies  from  year  to  year.^-  "Where  a  notice  to 
quit  is  required  in  the  case  of  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  a  fa- 
ther who  permits  his  son  with  his  family  to  remain  in  possession 
of  premises  for  several  years,  and,  upon  the  son's  death,  tells 
the  widow  that  she  may  remain  for  that  year,  if  he  allows  the 
year  to  pass  and  another  to  begin  can  terminate  her  tenancy 
only  by  the  notice  required  by  statute  and  a  mere  demand  for 
rent  will  not  be  sufficient.^ ^ 

§  137.  The  mere  occupation  of  the  land  by  permission  of  the 
owner.  An  occupation  of  land  by  the  permission  of  the  owner 
without  any  lease  or  agreement  by  the  occupant  to  pay  him 
rent,  and  without  any  rent  being  paid  by  the  occupant,  and  also 
without  any  definite  term  or  period  of  occupation  agreed  upon 
by  the  parties,  undoubtedly  creates  a  tenancy  at  will.  The  oc- 
cupation of  the  land  must  be  with  the  consent  of  the  owner, 
which  may  be  either  express  or  implied,  in  the  absence  of  a 
statute  requiring  the  consent  to  be  express,  or  the  occupant  will 
be  a  trespasser  or  at  the  most  a  tenant  at  sufferance  of  the  own- 
er. So,  too,  the  period  of  occupation  must  be  undefined  and  un- 
limited for  if  a  definite  period  be  agreed  upon  or  implied  from 
the  payment  periodically  of  rent,  it  is  either  a  tenancy  for  years 
or  from  year  to  year  according  to  the  circumstances  of  each 
case.^*    Thus,  for  example,  a  widow  who,  with  the  knowledge  of 

(Ky.)    66,  citing  Squires  v.  Huff,  v.    Stone,   12   Cush.    (Mass.)    174; 

3  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  18.    A  parol  Sprague  v.  Quinn,  108  Mass.  553, 

agreement  to  pay  rent  in  advance  554. 

does  not  constitute  a  conditional  1=  Rev.  St.  1881,  §  5208. 

limitation  of  a  tenancy  at  will  so  is  Tobin  v.  Young  (Ind.),  17  N. 

as  to  entitle  the  landlord,  upon  the  E.  Rep.  625. 

failure  of  the  tenant  to  pay  rent  i*  Haj'den  v.  Collins   (Cal.  App. 

in    advance,    to    dispense    with    a  1906)   81  Pac.  Rep.  1120;   Jones  v. 

statutory  notice  to  quit,  or  to  enter  Shay,  50  Cal.  308;  Perkins  v.  Per- 

on   the    premises   at   once,    or    to  Idns  (Conn.  1886)  5  Atl.  Rep.  373; 

maintain    a    summary    proceeding  White  v.   Elwell,   48   Me.    360,    77 

to  secure  possession,  provided  by  Am.  Dec.  231;  Cheever  v.  Pearson, 

a    statute.      Nor    can    the    tenant,  16   Pick.    (Mass.)    266;    Wilson   v. 

a  fortiori  terminate  a  tenancy  at  Merrell,  OS   Mich.  707;    Larned  v. 

will  by  failing  to  pay  rent  alone  Hudson,    60   N.   Y.    102;    Dame  v. 

and    without    giving    a     required  Dame,  38  N.  H.  429,  75  Am.  Dec. 

statutory   notice   to    quit.     Elliott  159;    Earsfield  v.  Healy,  50  Barb. 


190  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

the  lessor  after  the  death  of  her  husband  remains  in  possession 
of  the  premises  which  her  deceased  husband  had  occupied  under 
a  lease  by  the  year/^  a  divorced  wife  who,  with  her  husband's 
consent,  occupies  land  which  is  owned  by  him/^  or  a  person  who, 
with  the  owner's  consent,  erects  buildings  on  land  and  occupies 
them  with  his  consent  without  paying  rent  to  the  owner,^'^  is  a 
tenant  at  will.  So,  where  a  parish  voted  that  certain  persons 
should  have  the  privilege  to  erect  a  seminary  on  public  and  un- 
occupied land  owned  by  the  parish  with  liberty  to  remove  the 
building  at  their  pleasure  and  that  the  same  persons  have  cer- 
tain land  to  be  used  in  connection  therewith  for  seminary  pur- 
poses, the  parties  who  are  thus  privileged  become  tenants  at 
will  of  the  parish. ^^  But,  a  tenancy  at  will  is  never  created 
where  the  occupation  is  without  the  consent  of  the  owner.  So, 
one  who  occupies  land  without  the  owner's  consent  and  during 
his  occupation  agrees  to  pay  the  owner  rent  for  the  time  he  has 
occupied  it  on  condition  that,  if  he  paid  the  rent,  he  might  con- 
tinue in  the  occupation  does  not  thereby  become  a  tenant  at  will 
or  lose  his  condition  as  a  trespasser  until  he  shall  actually  pay 
the  rent.^^ 

§  138.  Leases  of  an  uncertain  duration.  A  lease  in  writing 
or  by  parol  and  reserving  rent  in  .general  and  providing  for  its 
payment  but  not  specifying  any  period  during  which  the  term 
is  to  continue  creates  only  a  tenancy  at  will.  If  the  parties  to 
a  lease  do  not  name  or  fix  the  duration  of  the  term  or  do  not 
designate  its  duration  so  that  its  length  remains  indefinite  and 
uncertain,  there  is  a  presumption  that  the  lease  is  meant  to 
create  a  tenancy  at  will.^*'     A  written  lease  in  which  the  dura- 

(N.  Y.)    255;    Humphries  v.  Hum-  isperkins     v.     Perkins     (Conn. 

phries,   25  N.  C.  362;    .Johnson  v.  1886)  5  Atl.  Rep.  373. 

Johnson,  13  R.  I.  467;   Rex  v.  Col-  le  Wilson    v.    Merrill,    38    Mich. 

lett,  R.  &  R.  498;  Rex  v.  Jobling,  707. 

R.  &  R.  525;    Rex  v.  Fillongley,  1  "  Dame  v.  Dame,  38  N.  H.  429, 

Term    Rep.    458;    Doe   d.    Hull   v.  75  Am.  Dec.  195;   Couch  v.  Burke, 

Wood,  14  Mee.  &  Wei.  682,  687,  15  2  Hill  (S.  Car.)  534. 

L,.  J.  Exch.  41;   9  .Tur.  1060;  Rich-  isCheever  v.  Pearson,   16  Pick. 

ardson  v.  Langridge,  4  Taunt.  128  (Mass.)   266. 

(holding  that  a  mere  general  let-  m  Center     Creek     Min.     Co.     v. 

ting  is  a  tenancy  at  will).     See,  Frankenstein,     179    Mo.     564,     78 

also,  Morris  v.  Palmer,  44  S.  Car.  S.  W.  Rep.  785. 

462,  464,  22  S.  E.  Rep.  726.  20  st.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Hall, 


TENANCY  AT  WILL. 


191 


tion  of  the  term  is  not  stated  expressly  or  by  implication  creates 
a  strict  tenancy  at  will.-^  So,  a  lease  for  a  period  of  time  com- 
mencing on  a  certain  date  stated  and  to  continue  until  the 
lessor  is  prepared  to  improve  the  grounds  with  new  buildings,-- 
or  a  lease  for  as  long  as  the  parties  please  to  continue  it,-'  or 
a  lease  giving  a  right  to  occupy  land  for  a  stated  consideration 
so  long  as  the  occupant  pleases  to  occupy,-*  or  a  lease  for  such 
a  time  as  may  be  agreeable  to  us  both,-^  or  a  letting  from  month 
to  month  with  an  express  understanding  in  the  lease  that  the 
tenant  should  vacate  the  premises  whenever  the  landlord  desired 
possession  of  them,^®  or  a  lease  expressly  for  a  term  of  years 
but  which  is  to  determine  without  notice  whenever  the  premises 
are  sold,-'  or  permission  to  occupy  a  house  at  a  fixed  rent  until 
the  wife  of  the  occupant  recovers  from  an  illness,-^  creates  a 
tenancy  at  will.-^     An  agreement  by  the  parties  that  a  tenant 


71  Ark.  302,  74  S.  W.  Rep.  293; 
Jones  V.  Shay,  50  Cal.  508;  Herrell 
V.  Sizeland,  81  111.  457;  Pidgeon  v. 
Richards,  4  Ind.  374;  Fischer  v. 
Johnson^  106  Io\Ya,  181,  76  N.  W. 
Rep.  658;  Martin  v.  Knapp,  57 
Iowa,  342,  10  N.  W.  Rep.  721; 
Mattox  V.  Helm,  5  Litt.  (Ky.)  186, 
15  Am.  Dec.  64;  Goodenow  v.  Al- 
len, 68  Me.  308.  311;  Gardner  v. 
Hazleton,  121  IMass.  494;  Haines 
V.  Beach,  90  Mich.  563,  51  N.  W. 
Rep.  644;  Sanford  v.  Johnson,  24 
Minn.  172;  Den  v.  Drake,  14  X.  J. 
Law,  523;  Larned  v.  Hudson,  60 
N.  Y.  102;  Jackson,  v.  Bradt,  2 
Caines  (N.  Y.)  169;  Post  v.  Post, 
14  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  253;  Burns  v. 
Bryant,  31  N.  Y.  453;  Woodrovv 
V.  Michael,  13  Mich.  187;  Amick 
V.  Brubaker,  101  Mo.  473,  14  S.  W. 
Rep.  627;  Corby  v.  MacSpadden, 
63  Mo.  App.  648.  2  Mo.  App.  Rep. 
950;  Sanford  v.  Johnson,  24  Minn. 
72;  Lee  v.  Hernandez,  10  Tex.  137, 
138;  Harrison  v.  Middleton,  11 
Grat.  (Va.)  527;  Richardson  v. 
Langridge,  4  Taunt.  128,  13  R.  R. 
570;  Rae  v.  Lewis,  2  W.  Bl.  1173; 
Com.  Dig.  tit.  Estates,  H,  1.     "All 


leases  for  uncertain  terms  are 
prima  facie  leases  at  will;  it  is 
the  reservation  of  an  annual  rent 
that  turns  them  into  leases  from 
year  to  year."  Roe  v.  Lees,  2  W. 
Bl.  1173. 

21  Amick  V.  Brubaker,  101  Mo. 
473.  14  S.  W.  Rep.  627. 

22  Corby  v.  MacSpadden,  2  Mo. 
App.   Rep.   950,   63    Mo.   App.   648. 

23  Richardson  v  Langridge,  4  T. 
R.  128;  Bartow  v.  Cox,  11  Q.  B. 
122.  . 

21  Pidgeon  v.  Richards,  4  Ind. 
374. 

25  Murray  v.  Cherrington,  99 
Mass.  229. 

26  Woodrow  V.  Michael,  13  Mich. 
187. 

27  Pfanner  v.  Sturmer,  40  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  401;  Lee  v.  Hernan- 
dez, 10  Tex.  137. 

2s  Doyle  v.  Gibbs,  6  Lans.  (X. 
Y.)   ISO. 

29  A  parol  lease  of  premises  to 
endure  only  until  the  owner  shall 
sell  them  is  a  valid  lease  at  will 
though  by  its  terms  the  rent  was 
to  be  paid  every  two  months. 
Hence  upon  the  sale  being  made 


192 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 


may  occupy  premises  as  a  school  so  long  as  ^e  "kept  a  good 
school,"  is  a  tenancy  at  will.  And  the  requirement  that  the 
occupant  shall  keep  a  good  school  constitutes  a  conditional  limi- 
tation, the  breach  of  which  terminates  the  estate  of  the  tenant 
without  entry^  by  the  landlord.  Evidence  that  the  tenant  was 
an  incompetent  teacher  is  admissible  to  show  that  he  no  longer 
keeps  a  good  school.^" 

§  139.  Entry  under  an  agreement  for  a  lease.  AVhere  parties 
have  made  an  agreement  to  execute  a  lease  in  the  future,  and 
pending  this  agreement,  the  prospective  tenant  enters  upon  and 
occupies  the  premises  with  the  landlord's  consent,  he  becomes  at 
once  a  tenant  at  will  of  the  future  landlord  and  continues  so 
until  the  execution  of  the  lease  which  has  been  agreed  on  which 
is  the  principal  contract  and  into  which  the  tenancy  at  will  is 
then  merged.  But  if  during  the  tenancy  at  will,  rent  is  paid  by 
the  year,  the  party  who  has  entered  under  the  agreement  is  a 
tenant  thereafter  from  year  to  year  which  tenancy  is  also  ter- 
minable by  the  execution  of  the  future  lease. ^^     The  payment 


the  lease  terminates  at  once  Avith- 
out  notice  to  the  tenant.  Clark  v. 
Rhoads,  79  Ind.  342.  "Leases  for 
uncertain  times,  are,  prima  facie, 
leases  at  will;  it  is  the  reservation 
of  annual  rent  that  turns  them  in- 
to leases  from  year  to  year."  Roe 
ex.  d.  V.  Lees,  2  W.  Bl.  1173.  An 
entry  by  the  tenant  under  an  oral 
lease  for  the  term  of  fifteen  years 
■was  held  to  be  a  tenancy  at  will 
where  the  premises  upon  which 
the  tenant  entered  consisted  of  a 
house  which  the  landlord  erected 
for  the  tenant  upon  the  land  of  a 
third  person  with  an  agreement 
on  the  part  of  the  landlord  that 
he  would  remove  it  whenever  he 
was  directed  to  do  so.  It  follows 
therefore  that  a  notice  to  quit  is 
required.  Blackwell  v.  Bowers, 
67  Vt.  403,  31  Atl.  Rep.  848;  fol- 
lowing Stafford  v.  Adair,  ,57  Vt. 
63. 

30  Ashley    v.    Warner,    11    Gray 
(Mass.)   43. 


31  Carteri  v.  Roberts,  140  Cal. 
164,  73  Pac.  Rep.  818;  Carbett  v. 
Cochrane,  67  Conn.  570,  35  Atl. 
Rep.  509;  Lockwood  v.  Lockwood, 
22  Conn.  425,  433;  Weed  v.  Lind- 
say, 88  Ga.  686,  694;  Dunne  v. 
Trustees,  39  111.  578,  582;  Emmons 
V.  Scudder,  115  Mass.  367;  Swart 
V.  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,, 
12  Detroit  Leg.  N.  609,  105  N.  W. 
Rep.  74;  Childers  v.  Lee,  5  N.  Mex. 
576,  25  Pac.  Rep.  781;  Hamerton 
V.  Snead,  3  Bar.  &  Cr.  483,  10  E. 
C.  L.  159;  Chapman  v.  Towner,  6 
Mee.  &  Wei.  100;  Anderson  v.  Mid- 
land Ry.  Co.  3  E.  &  E.  614;  Pollen 
V.  Brewer,  7  Com.  Bench  (N.  S.) 
371;  Clayton  v.  Blakey,  2  Smith 
Lead.  Cas.  116,  note;  Hegan  v. 
Johnson,  2  Taunt.  148,  149;  Gray 
v.  Stanion,  1  Mee.  &  Wei.  695;  Cox 
V.  Bent,  5  Bing.  185;  2  M.  &  P. 
281;  Lamar  v.  Dixon,  L.  R.  6  II.  L. 
514;  Knight  v.  Benett,  11  Moore, 
222,  3  Bing.  361,  4  L.  .1.  (O.  S.) 
C.    P.    94,    28    R.    R.    640;    Doe    d. 


TENANCY  AT  WELL.  193 

of  rent  by  the  tenant  at  will  must  be  in  reference  to  a  yearly 
holding  in  order  to  convert  such  a  tenancy  at  will  into  a  yearly 
tenancy  or  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  for  if  the  party  who  has 
entered  on  the  premises  under  an  agreement  for  a  lease  pays  rent 
not  Avith  reference  to  a  year  or  any  aliquot  part  of  a  year  but 
merely  pays  rent  generally,  he  is  still  a  tenant  at  will.^^  One 
payment  of  yearly  rent  is  sufficient.  But  the  presumption  that 
a  tenancy  at  will  has  been  transformed  into  a  tenancy  from  year 
to  year  by  one  payment  of  a  yearly  rent  may  be  strengthened  by 
a  repetition  of  the  pa.jinents  and  a  continuance  in  possession  for 
more  than  a  year.^^  A  lessor  may  under  particular  circumstances 
be  estopped  by  his  conduct,  as  by  the  deliberate  failure  or  neglect 
to  sign  a  lease  that  the  tenant  has  signed,  to  assert  that  such  a 
lease  creates  only  a  tenancy  at  Avill.  He  cannot  accept  as  much 
of  the  contract  to  make  a  lease  as  proves,  or  as  is  likely  to  prove, 
favorable  to  his  interests,  while  rejecting  that  portion  of  it 
which  is  not  likely  to  be  of  advantage  to  him.  Thus,  where  the 
assignee  of  a  lessee's  interest  in  the  term  enters  upon  the  pos- 
session of  the  land  with  the  consent  of  the  lessor  who,  there- 
upon, prepares  a  new  lease  for  the  unexpired  term  which  new- 
lease  is  executed  by  the  assignee  but  is  not  executed  by  the  les- 
sor, the  latter  is  estopped  to  claim  that  the  new  agreement  which 
he  has  neglected  to  execute  is  a  revocation  of  the  lease  which  was 
assigned  and  he  is  also  estopped  at  the  same  time  to  assert  that 
by  reason  of  his  failure  to  sign  the  new  lease,  it  operates  only  to 
create  a  tenancy  at  will  in  the  assignee.^*  The  tenant  who  thus 
enters  on  land  under  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease  will  be  held 
liable  to  the  landlord  for  use  and  occupation  during  the  period 
he  is  in  possession,  in  the  absence  of  an  express  agreement  to  the 
contrary  between  the  parties.^^  Tenants  who  have  been  admitted 
into  the  possession  of  the  premises  under  an  agreeemnt  to  exe- 

West   Morland   v.   Smith,   1   M.   &  33  Braj'thwaite  v.  Hitchcock,  10 

Ry.  137;  6  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  44;  Doe  d.  M.  &  W.  494,  497. 

Pritchard  v.  Dodd,  2  N.  &  M.  838,  s*  Morris  v.  Palmer,  44   S.  Car. 

5    B.   &  Ad.    689;    Braythwaite   v.  462.  469,  22  S.  E.  Rep.  762. 

Hitchcock,  10  M.  &  W.  494,  12  L.  as  Forbes  v.  Smiley.  56  Me.  174; 

J.  Ex.  38,  6  Jur.  976;    Riseley  v.  Lyon    v.    Cunningham,    136    Mass. 

Ryle,  11  M.  &  W.  6,  12  L.  J.  Ex.  532,  540;    Greton  v.  Smith,  33  N. 

38.  Y.  245;   Rogers  v.  Pullen.  2  Bing. 

32  Richardson    v.    Langridge,    4  (N.  C.)    749;    Sloper  v.  Saunders, 

Taunt.  128.  29  L.  J.    (N.  S.)    Ex.  275;    Smith. 
13 


lO-i  LAW  OF  LANDLORD   AND  TENANT. 

cute  a  lease  of  them  for  a  term  of  years  cannot,  where  they  sub- 
sequently refuse  to  execute  the  lease  offered  to  them  in  con- 
formity with  the  contract  for  a  lease,  continue  in  the  possession 
of  the  premises  as  tenants  at  will  merely  because  the  landlord 
had  not  erected  upon  the  premises  such  a  building  with  respect 
to  plan  and  finish  as  was  contemplated  in  the  agreement.  The 
tenants'  remedy  is  either  to  execute  the  lease,  pay  the  stipulated 
rent,  occupy  the  premises,  and  compel  by  an  appropriate  equi- 
table action  the  specific  performance  of  the  contract  to  build  or 
to  vacate  the  premises  at  once  and  sue  for  any  damages  they 
may  have  sustained.  If  they  do  neither  they  are  simply  tenants 
at  will  and  after  proper  notice  to  quit  is  given  to  them  as  is  re- 
quired by  the  statute  they  may  be  summarily  removed  as  ten- 
ants at  sufferance  holding  over.''^^ 

§  140.  Tenancy  at  will  created  by  a  defective  or  unexecuted 
lease.  Somewhat  similar  to  the  case  of  one  who,  with  the 
owner's  consent,  enters  upon  land  pending  negotiations  between 
him  and  the  owner  for  a  lease  to  be  executed  in  the  future  is 
the  case  of  a  person  who  enters  under  a  lease  which  purports  to 
have  been  executed  by  both  the  parties  but  w^hich  is  invalid  and 
not  binding  on  the  landlord  because  he  has  not  authorized  its 
execution  by  the  person  who  signed  it  as  his  agent.  In  some 
of  the  states  such  a  lease  by  the  statute  of  frauds  creates  an 
estate  at  will  only,  though  it  may  expressly  provide  for  the  pay- 
ment of  a  yearly  rental.^''  So.  where  a  lease  which  is  signed 
by  the  lessee  is  not  executed  by  the  lessor,  it  has  been  held  to 
create  a  tenancy  at  will  only  though  the  lease  stipulated  for  the 
payment  of  a  monthly  rental.^^  And  a  lessee  who,  by  taking 
possession  under  a  lease  which  is  invalid  because  it  was  not  au- 
thorized by  the  lessor  becomes  a  tenant  at  will,  though  he  may 
be  liable  for  use  and  occupation,  cannot  be  sued  for  rent  under 
the  invalid  lease.^^  And  finally,  one  who  having  been  in  posses- 
sion under  a  valid  lease  which  has  expired,  continues  in  posses- 

V    Eldridge,  15  Com.  Bench,  236;  App.  549;   see,  also.  Hoover  v.  Pa- 

Thetford    v.    Tyler,    8    Q.    B.    95;  cific    Oil    Company,    41    Mo.    App. 

Dawes  v.  Bowling,  22  W.  R.  770.  317. 

ssaWeed  v.  Lindsay,  88  Ga.  686,  87  Nicholls    v.    Barnes,    32    Neb. 

695,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  836,  20  L.  R.  A.  195,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  342. 

33.  38  .Jennings  v.  MrComb,  112  Pa. 

so  Lehman    v.    Nolting,    56    Mo.  St.  518,  4  Atl.  Rep.  812. 


TEN^VNCY  AT  WILL,. 


195 


sion  under  a  void  lease,  is  a  tenant  at  will  and  not  a  tenant  hold- 
ing; over  nndcr  the  former  lease. ^® 

§  141.  Leases  void  under  the  statute  of  frauds.  Where  a 
tenant  enters  under  an  oral  lease  which  is  for  more  than  a  year 
and  which  is  for  that  reason  invalid  under  the  statute  of  frauds, 
or  in  fact  under  any  invalid  lease,  he  is  according  to  very  many 
of  the  authorities,  merely  a  tenant  at  will.  In  most  of  the  states 
this  is  expressly  so  provided  according-  to  the  language  of  the 
statutes  which  substantially  provide  that  all  parol  leases  which 
in  duration  shall  exceed  a  certain  term  shall  have  the  force  and 
effect  of  leases  at  will  only.  In  other  words,  the  statute  express- 
ly determines  and  fixes  the  tenancy  between  the  parties.**'     The 


39  Carney  v.  Mosher,  97  Mich. 
554.  The  execution  of  a  lease  for 
years  by  an  agent  of  the  lessor 
who  is  without  authority  to  do  is 
a  nullity.  Nevertheless  a  lease 
made  under  such  circumstances 
creates  a  tenancy  at  will  as  soon 
as  the  tenant  enters  under  it.  And 
where  after  his  entry  he  pays  rent 
by  the  month  a  monthly  tenancy 
is  created  which  is  binding  upon 
both  the  parties  to  the  written 
lease,  though  the  writing  is  un- 
enforcible  as  a  lease  for  a  term  of 
years.  Lehman  v.  Nolting,  56  Mo. 
App.  549.  A  tenancy  at  will  has 
been  held  to  have  been  created 
under  the  following  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances: 

A  lease  for  twenty-one  months 
was  void  for  want  of  authority  in 
the  agent  of  the  lessor  who  signed 
it.  The  lessee  entered  and  occu- 
pied the  premises  for  twelve 
months  and  paid  rent  for  that 
period  and  then  vacated  the  prem- 
ises. It  was  held  that  this  did 
not  create  a  tenancy  from  year  to 
year  but  that  the  lease  being  void 
as  such  was  simply  evidence  of  a 
tenancy  at  will  and  hence  was  ad- 
missible in  an  action  for  use  and 
occupation.     Mcintosh    v.    Hodges 


(Mich.  1897)  70  N.  W.  Rep.  550. 
See,  also,  as  to  the  effect  of  the 
acceptance  of  a  month's  rent  by 
the  landlord  where  the  tenant  had 
for  some  time  held  under  a  lease 
which  had  expired  and  which  he 
had  refused  to  renew  at  an  ad- 
vanced rental.  Fall  v.  Moore,  45 
Minn.  515,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  404. 

4oCrommelin  v.  Thiess,  31  Ala. 
412,  70  Am.  Dec.  499;  Petty  v. 
Kennon',  49  Ga.  468;  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Fain,  52  Ga.  IS; 
Nicholes  v.  Smith,  118  Ga.  922, 
925,  45  S.  E.  Rep.  708;  Packard  v. 
Cleveland  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
46  111.  App.  244;  Bailey  v.  Ward, 
32  La.  Ann.  839;  Thomas  v.  San- 
ford,  S.  S.  Co.,  71  Me.  548;  Duley 
v.  Kelly,  74  Me.  346;  Ellis  v. 
Parge,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  43;  Huyser 
V.  Chase,  13  Mich.  98,  103;  Hing- 
ham  V.  Inhabitants  of  Sprague, 
15  Pick.  (Mass.)  102;  Mcintosh 
V.  Hodges,  110  Mich.  319,  70  X.  W. 
R.  550;  Kelly  v.  Waite,  12  Met. 
(Mass.)  300;  Barrett  v.  Cox,  112 
Mich.  220,  70  N.  W.  Rep.  446; 
Goodwin  v.  Clover,  91  Minn.  438, 
98  N.  W.  Rep.  322;  Allen  v.  IMans- 
field,  82  Mo.  688;  Talamo  v.  Spitz- 
miller,  120  N.  Y.  37.  23  N.  E.  Rep. 
980,   8   L.   R.    A.   980,   17  Am.   St. 


196  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AJS'D  TENANT. 

statute  fixes  and  determines  the  character  of  the  tenure  and  the 
duration  of  the  term  but  leaves  the  other  incidents  of  the  rela- 
tionship between  the  parties  to  be  determined  according  to  their 
original  intention  as  expressed  by  them.  Inasmuch  as  the  lease 
is  not  binding  upon  either  party,  either  can  at  any  time  dissolve 
the  relationship  whatever  it  may  be,  that  exists  and  hence  neces- 
sarily the  holding  which  is  created  by  an  entry  under  a  void 
lease  can  be  nothing  else  but  a  tenancy  at  will.  The  courts, 
however,  will  respect  the  original  intent  of  the  parties  so  far  as 
possible.  The  tenant  at  will  under  the  lease  void  under  the 
statute  of  frauds,  will  be  presumed  to  hold  the  premises  subject 
to  the  terms  of  the  void  lease  except  as  to  its  duration  and  tcT*- 
mination.  So  far  as  such  terms  are  applicable,  they  will  be 
applied.^^  One  of  the  ever-present  and  most  striking  character- 
istics of  an  estate  at  will  is  its  easy  convertibility  into  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year  by  the  payment  and  acceptance  of  a  yearly 
rent.  Hence,  though  a  parol  lease  which  is  invalid  under  the 
statute  creates  in  the  first  instance  only  a  tenancy  at  will,  this 
tenancy,  like  any  other  tenancy  at  will,  may  be  turned  into  a 
tenancy  from  year  to  year  without  any  violence  to  or  any  evasion 
of  the  express  language  of  the  statute  of  frauds.  This  conversion 
may  result  from  the  payment  of  the  rent  by  the  year  or  from 
other  circumstances  showing  an  intention  on!  the  part  of  the 
parties  to  create  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year.  Such  an  impli- 
cation from  the  payment  of  rent  is  not  in  contravention  of  the 
statute  which  recognizes  as  valid,  leases  from  year  to  year  which 
have  been  created  by  parol.*-    A  mere  entry  and  remaining  in 

Rep.  607;    Stover  v.  Cadwallader,  2  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.)  100;   Schuy- 

2  Penny,  124;   McDowell  v.  Simp-  ler  v.  Leggatt,  2  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  660; 

son,  3  Watts   (Pa.)   135;   Clark  v.  Tress  v.  Savage,  4  E.  &  E.  36,  2  C. 

Smith,  25  Pa.  St.  137;   Phillips  v.  R.  L.  1315,  23  L.  J.  Q.  B.  339;    18 

Fearnside,  4  llayw.   (Tenn.)   158;  Jur.  680,  2  W.  R.  564;  Richardson 

Duke  V.  Harper,  6  Yerg.   (Tenn.)  v.  Gifford,  1  Ad.  &  El.  52,  3  N.  & 

280,  284,  27  Am,  Dec.  462;  Blanch-  M.  325,  3  L.  J.  Q.  B.  122;   Arden  v. 

ard  V.  Bowers,  67  Vt.  403,  31  Atl.  Sullivan,  14  Q.  B.  832,  14  Jur.  712, 

Rep.    848;     Denn    d.    Warren    v.  19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  268;    Beale  v.  San- 

Fearnside,   1   Wil5?.   176;    Goodtitle  ders,  3  Bing.   (N.  C.)  850,  5  Scott, 

d.   Galloway  v.   Herbert,   4   T.   R.  58,  3   Hodges,  147,   6  L.  J.  C.   P. 

680.  283,  1  Jur.  1083;    Goodwin  v.  Clo- 

41  Lockwood     V.     Lockwood,     22  ver,  91  Minn.  438,  98  N.  W.  Rep. 

Conn.    425;    Strong  v.   Crosby,   21  322. 
Conn.  498;    Taggard  v.  Roosevelt,  ^2  McDowell      v.      Simpson,      3 


TENANCY  AT  WILL.  19  T 

possG.'^sion  nndor  a  void  lease  for  a  period  short  of  a  year,  with- 
out payment  of  rent  are  not  enough  to  convert  the  est-ate  at  will 
into  an  estate  from  year  to  year  nor  do  these  create  a  tenancy 
for  a  year  under  the  statute  of  frauds.  Something  more  thnn 
this  is  always  necessary.  There  need  be  no  new  contract  of 
lease  in  express  terms  in  order  to  convert  the  tenancy  at  will 
into  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year.  But  there  must  be  something 
from  which  an  intention  to  create  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year 
may  reasonably  be  inferred  and  this  is  so  commonly  an  occupa- 
tion from  year  to  year  with  the  payment  of  rent  for  a  year  or  for 
an  aliquot  part  thereof  that  the  presumption  therefrom  is  usually 
conclusive  in  the  absence  of  explanatory  evidence  to  the  con- 
trary.^^  An  occupation  for  at  least  one  year  with  payment 
of  rent  at  so  much  per  year  will  usually  be  sufficient.  "Where 
is  is  claimed  that  a  tenancy  at  will  has  been  created  by  a  parol 
agreement  invalid  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  it  is  always  neces- 
sary to  show  an  entry  upon  the  premises  by  the  tenant.  And 
such  a  tenancy  if  proved  by  parol,  begins  only  with  the  date 
of  the  entry  into  possession  of  the  tenant.** 

§  142.  Vendee  of  the  land  having  g-one  into  possession  under 
a  contract  to  buy.  In  England  and  in  some  of  the  states  of  the 
Union  an  occupant  of  land  holding  under  an  executory  contract 
for  a  sale  and  conveyance  to  him  of  the  land  is  a  quasi  tenant 
at  will  and  he  cannot  be  evicted  without  a  previous  demand  for 
the  possession  though  he  may  not  be  entitled  to  notice  to  quit.*" 

Watts.   (Pa.)  135;   Dumn  v.  Roth-  the  latter  could  treat  him  as  such, 

ermel,  112  Pa.  St.  272,  282,  17  W.  and  the  tenant  could  not  relieve 

N.  C.  292,  43  L.  I.  376,  3  Atl.  Rep.  himself  from  liability  for  rent  up 

800;  Packard  v.  Cleveland  C.  &  St.  to   the   end   of   the    current  year. 

Louis  R.  Co..  46  111.  App.  244,  245.  And  the  terms  of  the  lease  void 

In  Talamo  v.  Spitzmiller,  120  N.  Y.  as  to  duration  would  control  as  to 

37,  on  page  42,  the  court  by  Brad-  rent." 

ley,  J.,  says:  "The  mere  fact  that  43  Talamo  v.  Spitzmiller,  120  N. 

a  person  goes  into  possession  un-  Y.  37,  42,  43,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  980.  8 

der   a    lease    void    because    for    a  L.  R.  A.  221.  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  607, 

longer   period   than   a   year,    does  citing  inter  alia  Reeder  v.  Saver, 

not   create   a    yearly   tenancy.     If  70  N.  Y.  184;   Laughran  v.  Smith, 

he  remains  in  possession  with  the  75  N.  Y.  209. 

consent  of  the  landlord  for  more  <+ Hardy  v.  Winter,  38  Mo.  106; 

than     one     year     under     circum-  Pollock  v.  Kitrell,  4  N.  C.  585. 

stances   permitting   the   inference  45  Hall  v.  Wallace.  88  Cal.  434, 

of  his  tenancy  from  year  to  year,  26  Pac.  Rep.  300;    Blum  v.  Robert- 


198 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


Ill  the  state  of  New  York  the  eontrarj^  rule  is  recognized  and 
it  is  held  that  a  vendee  in  possession  of  land  under  a  contract  to 
convey  is  not  a  tenant  of  the  vendor  at  all,  and  he  is  not,  for  this 
reason,  entitled  to  notice  to  quit.*®  The  entry  and  the  holding 
of  the  premises  under  a  parol  contract  made  by  a  reputed  agent 


son,  24  Cal.  127,  145;  Goodwin  v. 
Perkins,  134  Cal.  564,  66  Pac.  Rep. 
793;  Manchester  v.  Doddridge,  3 
Ind.  360.  363;  Venable  v.  McDon- 
ald, 4  Dana  (Ky.)  336,  337;  Pat- 
terson V.  Stoddard,  47  Me.  355,  74 
Am.  Dec.  490;  Towne  v.  Butter- 
field.  98  IMass.  106;  Kiernan  v. 
Linnehan,  151  Mass.  543;  Gould  v. 
Thompson,  4  Met.  (Mass.)  224, 
229;  Howard  v.  Merriam,  5  Gush. 
(Mass.)  563;  Proprietors  of  Town- 
ship No.  6  V.  McFarland,  12  Mass. 
325;  Lyons  v.  Cunningham,  136 
Mass.  532,  537;  Rawson  v.  Bab- 
cock,  40  Mich.  330;  Crane  v. 
O'Reiley,  8  Mich.  312;  Dwight  v. 
Cutler,  3  Mich.  572;  Love  v.  Ed- 
monston,  23  N.  Car.  152;  Dowd  v. 
Gilchrist,  46  N.  Car.  353;  Rich- 
ardson V.  Thornton,  52  N.  Car. 
458;  Kaas'  Estate,  5  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
Rep.  55;  Jones  v.  Jones,  2  Rich. 
Law  (S.  Car.)  542;  Den  v.  Web- 
ster, 10  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  510;  Win- 
nard  v.  Robbins,  3  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  614;  Carpenter  v.  United 
States,  17  Wall.  (U.  S.)  489;  Win- 
terbottom  v.  Ingham,  7  Q.  B.  611; 
Carrigan  v.  Woods,  I.  R.  1  C.  L. 
73;  Tomes  v.  Chamberlaine,  5  Mee. 
&  Wei.  14;  Braythwaite  v.  Hitch- 
cock, 10  Mee.  &  Wei.  494;  Gray  v, 
Stamon,  1  Mee.  &  Wei.  695;  Megan 
V.  Johnson,  2  Taunt.  148;  Lewis 
V.  Beard,  13  East,  210;  Newby  v. 
.Jackson,  1  B.  &  C.  448;  Roe  v. 
Street,  2  A.  &  El.  329;  Jones  v. 
Jones,  10  B.  &  C.  718;  Doe  d.  Stan- 
way  V.  Rock,  6  Jur.  266,  2  Man.  & 
Gr.   30;    Howard   v.   Shaw,   8  Mee. 


&  Wei.  118;  Doe  d.  Hiatt  v.  Miller, 
5  Car.  &  P.  595;  Doe  d.  Parker  v. 
Eoulton.  6  M.  &  S.  148. 

46  Jackson  v.  Miller,  7  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  747,  752;  Jackson  v.  Moncrief, 
5  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  29;  Wright  v. 
Moore,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  233; 
Doolittle  V.  Eddy,  7  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
78;  Jackson  v.  Kingsley,  17  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  158.  See  also  as  to  the 
early  rule  in  Massachusetts,  Little 
V.  Pearson,  7  Pick.  (Mass.)  301; 
Quincy  Parish  v.  Spear,  15  Pick. 
(Mass.)  144;  King  v.  Johnson,  7 
Gray  (Mass.)  239.  It  has  been 
much  discussed  whether  one  who 
is  let  into  possession  of  land  un- 
der contract  for  a  deed,  intended 
to  be  executed  and  delivered  as 
soon  as  the  title  can  be  examined 
and  the  deed  prepared,  can,  while 
the  contract  remains  in  force  and 
unexecuted,  be  regarded  as  a  ten- 
ant of  the  vendor  or  be  held  liable 
to  pay  for  the  use  and  occupation. 
By  perhaps  a  majority  of  the 
courts  it  is  considered  that  he  is 
a  licensee;  that  at  law  his  right  to 
occupy  is  determinable  at  any 
time  by  entry  or  demand  for  pos- 
session; that  if  he  accepts  the 
deed,  he  is  liable  for  nothing  ex- 
cept under  his  contract  for  the 
purchase;  that,  if  he  refuses  the 
deed,  he  may  then  be  held  liable 
to  pay  for  the  intervening  occu- 
pation either  in  an  action  of  tres- 
pass, after  entry,  or  ejectment,  or 
perhaps  in  assumpsit;  that,  if  the 
owner  refuses  to  give  a  deed  ac- 
cording to  the  contract,  the  vendee 


TENANCY  AT  WILL. 


199 


of  the  vendor  and  owner  who  had  no  anthority  to  make  it  and 
which  for  that  and  other  reasons  is  invalid,  have  the  same  effect 
in  creating-  a  tenancy  at  will  in  the  occnpant  as  wonld  an  entry 
under  a  valid  contract  which  was  binding  on  the  owner.^^  All 
the  rules  of  law  which  are  applicable  to  an  estate  at  will  in 
general  are  usually  admitted  to  be  applicable  to  a  tenancy  at 
will  which  is  created  by  a  purchaser  entering  upon  the  premises 
which  he  has  agreed  to  purchase.  His  estate  or  tenancy  may  be 
determined  by  a  simple  demand  of  possession,  by  a  sale  of  the 
premises  to  another  or  by  the  death  of  the  vendee.  So,  if  he 
disavows  the  vendor's  title  or  attorns  to  another  person,  his  ten- 
ancy is  at  an  end.*^  But  though  his  tenancy  is  at  an  end,  his 
rights  as  a  vendee  continue  unimpaired  and  in  full  vigor.  So, 
also,  it  should  be  noted,  however,  that  it  is  the  entry  into  the 
possession  of  the  vendee  rather  than  his  agreement  to  purchase 
w^hich  creates  the  tenancy  at  will.  Any  person  wiio  thus  enters 
with  the  consent  of  the  landlord  cannot  be  a  trespasser.  He 
must  be  a  tenant  of  some  sort.     The  character  of  the  tenancy 


may  immediately  abandon  the  pos- 
session, and  the  owner  cannot 
maintain  an  action  of  any  kind  on 
account  of  the  intervening,  occu- 
pation. There  may  be  special  cir- 
cumstances attending  the  transac- 
tion from  which  an  agreement  to 
pay  for  the  intervening  occupa- 
tion may  be  inferred  or  implied, 
but  it  is  not  by  these  courts  in- 
ferred or  implied  from  the  sole 
fact  of  a  permissive  occupation 
pending  the  preparation  and  de- 
livery of  the  deed." — By  Field,  J., 
in  L,yon  v.  Cunningham,  136  Mass. 
532,  on  page  537. 

A  person  who  contracts  for  the 
purchase  of  land  and  is  let  into 
possession  by  the  vendor  is  not  li- 
able on  the  vendor  failing  to  make 
a  good  title  for  the  value  of  use 
and  occupation  in  respect  to  the 
time  he  has  held  it.  Winterbot- 
tom  V.  Ingham,  7  Q.  B.  611,  14  L. 
J.  Q.  B.  298,  10  Jur.  4. 

*-  Hall  v.  Wallace,  88  Cal.  434, 


436,  26  Pac.  Rep.  360;  Patterson 
V.  Stoddard,  47  Me.  355,  74  Am. 
Dec.  490.  Contra  Smith  v.  Single- 
ton. 71  Ga.  68,  70;  see,  also,  God- 
frey V.  Walker,  42  Ga.  562,  573.  In 
Smith  V.  Singleton,  71  Ga.  68,  on 
page  -70,  the  court  after  pointing 
out  that  the  agent  had  no  author- 
ity to  sell  and  that  he  claimed 
none  and  also  calling  attention  to 
the  fact  that  the  principal  never 
ratified  the  act  of  the  agent  though 
it  came  to  his  knowledge  says: 
"The  transaction  amounted  to 
nothing  more  than  an  offer  to  pur- 
chase, which  was  never  accepted. 
There  was  no  contract  of  sale" 
which  could  have  been  enforced. 
Such  a  case  is  clearly  distinguish- 
able from  one  in  which  the  ven- 
dee is  in  possession  under  a  com- 
pleted contract  of  sale  and  had  a 
bond  for  title  on  payment  of  the 
purchase  money." 

48  Love    V.    Edmondston,    23    N. 
Car.  152,  154. 


200  LAW  OP  LANDLORD   AND  TENANT. 

which  is  created  when  the  vendee  is  already  in  possession  as  a 
tenant  from  year  to  year,  when  he  enters  into  the  contract  to 
purchase,  depends  upon  the  circumstances  of  each  case.  The 
presumption  is  that  he  continues  to  occupy  as  a  tenant  from  year 
to  year,  but  this  presumption  is  rebuttable  by  the  circumstances. 
The  buildings  and  improvements  which  are  on  the  land  when 
it  is  sold  continue  the  property  of  the  vendor  and  at  his  risk  un- 
til a  deed  is  tendered  to  the  vendee  though  the  vendee  goes  into 
possession.  If  caring  the  occupancy  of  the  vendee  as  a  tenant, 
the  buildings  are  destroyed  by  fire,  he  is  under  no  obligation  to 
take  a  deed  of  the  premises  where  the  continued  existence  of  the 
buildings  was  the  substantial  motive  which  prompted  the  pur- 
chase by  him  and  their  occupancy  was  the  purpose  with  which 
he  entered.  Hence  the  tenancy  at  will  is  terminated  by  the  fire 
destroying  the  buildings  and  the  vendee's  refusal  to  take  a  deed 
when  tendered  thereafter  by  the  owner.*^  In  those  jurisdictions 
where  a  vendee  who  goes  into  possession  prior  to  his  taking  title 
is  regarded  as  a  tenant  at  will  of  the  vendor,  it  has  been  held 
that,  if  while  he  is  in  actual  possession,  the  sale  goes  ojEf  and  he 
thereafter  continues  in  possession,  he  becomes  liable  to  the  ven- 
dor for  the  reasonable  value  of  the  use  and  occupation  of  the 
premises  for  the  period  he  remains  in  possession  after  the  con- 
tract of  sale  is  at  an  end.    Under  such  circumstances  the  pur- 

*9  Gould  v.  Thompson,  4  Mei.  have  been  merged  in  the  contract. 
(Mass.)  224,  229.  A  vendee  go-  But  if  the  sale  was  never  consum- 
ing on  the  land  who  is  to  pay  the  mated  the  owner  of  the  barn  was 
purchase  price  at  the  expiration  of  still  a  tenant  at  will  and  is  liable 
a  specified  period  on  his  failure  to  to  the  owner  of  the  land  for  use 
do  so  becomes  a  tenant  at  suffer-  and  occupation  of  the  land  for  the 
ance  of  the  owner,  though  before  period  he  remained  in  possession 
that  he  may  have  been  his  tenant  after  the  negotiations  for  sale 
at  will.  Sanders  v.  Richardson,  went  off.  But  on  the  other  hand 
14  Pick.  (Mass.)  522.  Where  the  he  is  entitled  to  a  reasonable 
owner  of  a  barn  moves  it  on  the  period  thereafter  to  quit  posses- 
land  of  another  while  negotiations  sion,  during  which  period  he  can- 
were  in  progress  by  which  he  ex-  not  be  charged  with  rent  or  use 
pected  to  sell  the  barn  to  the  and  occupation.  The  extent  of  the 
owner  of  the  land  he  is  while  the  liability  of  the  tenant  at  will  in 
negotiations  are  pending  a  tenant  such  a  case  is  the  reasonable 
at  will  of  the  owner  of  the  land.  value  of  the  use  and  occupation. 
If  the  negotiations  had  resulted  in  Michael  v.  Curtis,  60  Conn.  363, 
a  completed  contract  for  the  sale  368. 
of    the    barn    the    tenancy    would 


TENANCY  AT  WILL.  201 

chase  money  whicli  lie  lias  to  pay  but  which,  by  reason  of  the 
sale  going  off,  he  now  will  not  pay,  cannot  be  regarded  as  the 
consideration  for  the  agreement  by  the  vendor  to  permit  the 
vendee  to  remain  in  possession.^"  But  in  all  such  cases  there  is 
no  remedy  against  the  vendee  by  distress  as  no  rent  has  been 
fixed  by  any  agreement  of  the  parties.'^ 

§  143.  Tenancy  at  will  by  holding  over.  A  tenant  who,  on 
the  termination  of  his  lease  for  a  fixed  term  holds  over  with  the 
consent  of  the  landlord  has  in  some  cases  been  held  to  be  a  ten- 
ant at  will.^^  The  almost  universal  rule,  however,  is  that  a 
holding  over  by  a  tenant  for  years  creates  a  tenancy  from  year 
to  year.  The  cases  which  are  usually  cited  to  sustain  the  propo- 
sition that  a  tenant  holds  over  at  will  constitute  exceptions  to 
the  general  rule  that  a  holding  over  with  the  consent  of  the  land- 
lord creates  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year  under  the  terms  of  the 
lease  which  has  expired.  Upon  an  examination  of  the  language 
of  the  court  it  will  in  most  of  the  cases  be  found  either  that  they 
have  arisen  in  states  where  a  holding  over  after  the  expiration 
of  a  term  is  made  a  tenancy  at  will  by  the  statutoiy  law  of  the 
jurisdiction,^^  or  that  the  holding  over  was  regarded  by  the  par- 
ties as  merely  the  giving  of  a  license  for  some  special  purpose, 
or  that  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  never  had  ex- 
isted between  the  party  holding  over  and  the  owner  of  the  prem- 

50  Howard  v.  Shaw,  8  M.  &  W.  Hodges,  110  Mich.  319,  70  N.  W. 
118,  120,  10  L.  J.  Exch.  336;  Tew  Rep.  550;  Overdeen  v.  Lewis,  1 
V.  Jones,  13  M.  &  W.  12;  Winter-  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  90,  37  Am.  Dec. 
bottom  V.  Ingham,  7  Q.  B.  611,  14  440;  Fall  v.  Moore,  45  Minn.  515, 
L.  J.  Q.  B.  298,  10  Jur.  4;  Kirt-  48  N.  W.  Rep.  404;  Matthews  v. 
land  V.  Pounsett,  2  Taunton,  145.  Hipp,  66  S.  C.  162.  44  S.  E.  Rep. 

51  Howard  v.  Shaw,  10  L.  J.  577.  A  tenant  holding  over  is  a 
Exch.  336;  8  M.  &  W.  118,  120.  tenant    at    will    and    he    may    be 

52  Crommelin  v.  Thiess.  31  Ala.  turned  out  of  possession  without 
412,  419,  70  Am.  Dec.  499;  City  of  notice  but  it  is  otherwise  if  he 
Dubuque  r.  Miller,  11  Iowa,  583;  has  continued  in  possession  for  a 
Bennock  v.  Whipple,  12  Me.  346,  year   or   rent  has   been   received. 

28  Am.  Dec.  186;  Kendall  v.  Moore,  Doe  d.  Hollingsworth  v.  Stennett, 
30  Me.  327;  Walker  Ice  Co.  v.  2  Esp.  717,  5  R.  R.  769. 
American  Steele  &  Wire  Co.,  185  53  See  Kendall  v.  Moore,  30  Me. 
Mass.  463,  70  N.  E.  Rep.  937;  Ben-  327;  and  O'Brien  v.  Troxell,  76 
fey  v.  Congdon,  40  Mich.  283;  Iowa,  760;  40  N.  W.  Rep.  704. 
Hoffman  v.   Clark.   63   Mich.   175,  Construing  Code  of  Iowa,  §  2014. 

29  N.   W.   Rep.   695;    Mcintosh  v. 


202  LAW  OP  LANDLORD   AND  TENANT. 

ises,"  or  that  the  holding  over  was  done  and  permitted  by  the 
parties  not  as  a  prolongation  of  the  prior  lease  but  while  nego- 
tiations for  a  new  and  different  lease  were  in  progress  ^^  between 
them  or  that  some  other  equally  relevant  and  important  circum- 
stances existed  which  conclusively  rebutted  the  ordinary  pre- 
sumption that  tenant  holding  over  his  term  is  a  tenant  from 
year  to  year.  For  primarily  the  question  always  is  in  the  case- 
of  a  holding  over  what  was  the  intention  of  the  parties.  And 
this  intention,  when  it  is  ascertained,  will  be  respected  where 
there  is  no  statute  regulating  the  matter.  So,  too,  where  a  ten- 
ant, on  his  landlord  refusing  to  renew  the  lease  for  another 
term,  except  at  a  greatly  increased  rent  which  the  tenant  refuses 
to  paj',  continues  in  possession  of  a  portion  of  the  premises  for 
the  purpose  of  removing  his  fixtures  with  the  assent  of  the  land- 
lord, while  his  subtenant  of  a  part  of  the  premises  continues  to 
hold  possession  for  a  month  after  the  original  lessee  has  moved 
and  surrendered  the  key  of  another  portion  of  the  premises  to 
the  landlord,  the  tenant  thus  holding  over  becomes  a  tenant  at 
will.^^ 

§  144.  The  occupancy  of  the  premises  incident  to  the  employ- 
ment of  the  occupant.  Whether  an  occupation  of  land  by  a 
person  who,  while  an  occupant  of  the  land,  is  performing  serv- 
ices for  the  owner  of  the  land,  constitutes  the  occupant  a  tenant 
at  will  of  his  employer,  depends  wholly  upon  the  circumstances 
of  each  particular  case  and  upon  the  express  terms  of  the  agree- 
ment between  the  parties.  The  primary  inquiry  in  all  cases 
where  land  is  occupied  and  is  used  as  an  incident  to  services 
rendered  by  the  occupant  to  the  owner  is  directed  to  determine 
whether  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  exists  at  all  or 
whether  the  permission  to  occupy  the  land  is  merely  a  license 
granted  by  the  owner  for  his  own  convenience  and  revocable  by 
him  at  pleasure.  As  soon  as  it  determined  that  the  relationship 
is  that  of  landlord  and  tenant  the  same  tests  may  be  applied  to 
the  facts  appearing  in  the  case  to  determine  whether  or  not  the 
tenancy  is  one  at  will  as  are* ordinarily  applicable  in  any  case 
of  tenancy  which  is  shown  expressly  by  language  or  by  necessary 

54  Hoffman    v.    Clark,    63    Mich.  se  Landsberg  v.  Tivoli   Brewing 

175.  178,  29  N.  W.  Rep.  69r,.  Co.,  10  Det.  Leg.  N.  63,  94  N.  W. 

r-'-  Fall  V.  Moore,   45   Minn.   515,  Rep.  197. 
48  N.  W.  Rep.  404. 


TENANCY  AT  WILL.  203 

implication  from  conduct.  If  the  duration  of  the  employment 
is  uncertain  so  that  the  relationship  of  master  and  servant  may 
be  terminated  by  either  at  an}-  time  on  notice,  any  tenancy  aris- 
ing out  of  such  emplojanent  being  equally  uncertain  and  in- 
definite and  terminable  by  the  severance  of  the  relation  of  mas- 
ter and  servant  will  be  a  tenancy  at  will  only.  So,  a  minister 
of  a  dissenting  congregation  in  England  who  had  been  placed  in 
possession  of  a  chapel  and  dwelling  house  by  the  trustees  of  the 
congregation  upon  his  hiring  by  them  to  preach  and  was  to  live 
there  free  of  rent  with  their  consent  while  he  should  continue 
to  be  the  minister  of  the  congregation  is  merely  a  tenant  at  will 
of  the  trustees  and  his  estate  is  terminated  by  a  demand  for 
possession. ^^  The  letting  of  the  premises  for  a  term  which  is 
expressly  fixed  and  certain  or  the  payment  of  a  monthly  rent 
by  the  servant  has  sometimes  been  held  not  material  where  the 
emplojonent  could  be  terminated  at  any  time.  So,  a  laborer 
who  is  hired  by  a  farmer  for  a  year  who  agrees  to  furnish  him 
with  a  house  while  in  his  employ  is  a  tenant  at  will  of  the  far- 
mer though  the  laborer  is  to  receive  a  stipulated  compensation 
for  each  month  and  he  in  turn  is  to  pay  a  monthly  rental  for 
the  house.^^ 

57  Doe  d.  Nicholl  v.  McKeag.  10  had  the  right  to  terminate  the  ten- 
Bar.  &  C.  721;  Doe  d.  Jones  v.  ancy  at  pleasure  and  without  the 
Jones,  10  B.  &  C.  718,  8  L.  J.  (O.  customary  notice  to  quit  required 
S.)   K.  B.  310.  by    the    statute.     The     court    re- 

es  McGee  v.  Gibson,  1  B.  Mon.  garded  a  rule  of  the  company  that 
(Ky.)  105.  In  a  case  in  New  Jer-  a  lock-tender  who  was  discharged 
sey  where  a  person  was  employed  while  occupying  a  house  belong- 
by  a  canal  company  as  a  lock  ten-  ing  to  the  company  should  imme- 
der  and  as  part  compensation  for  diately  leave  the  house  as  not 
his  services  as  such  was  permitted  only  reasonable  but  indispensible 
to  occupy  a  dwelling  house  and  in  the  case  of  companies  operating 
garden  owned  by  the  company  un-  public  works  which  provided 
der  an  express  agreement  "as  long  dwellings  for  their  employees  con- 
as  he  was  in  the  employment  of  venient  to  their  posts  of  duty 
the  company;  and  when  he  ceased  where  the  purpose  of  their  occu- 
to  be  so  employed  he  was  imme-  pancy  was  to  facilitate  their  busi- 
diately  to  leave  the  house  the  ness  and  convenience  the  public, 
court  held  that  though  the  servant  The  necessity  of  notice  was  dis- 
was  a  tenant  there  was  no  rent  pensed  with  because  of  the  possi- 
reserved  and  that  he  only  re-  bility  that  while  the  time  of  the 
mained  a  tenant  while  he  per-  notice  was  running  the  perform- 
formed     services.     The     company  ance  of  the  duty  of  the  employee 


20i  LAW   OP  LANDLORD   AND  TENANT. 

§  145.  The  judgment  debtor  holding  over  after  sale  under 
execution.  An  execution  debtor  who  is  left  in  the  occupancy 
of  land  which  has  been  sold  under  an  execution  provided  it  be 
done  with  the  consent,  express  or  implied,  of  the  purchaser  at 
the  execution  sale,  is  a  tenant  at  will  of  such  purchaser  upon  the 
general  principle  that  anyone  who  is  in  possession  of  real  estate 
with  the  owner's  consent,  no  term  being  fixed,  is  presumptively, 
and  until  the  contrary  appears,  a  tenant  at  will.^^  So,  where  a 
judgment  creditor  bought,  under  execution,  land  belonging  to 
his  judgment  debtor  but,  pending  an  appeal  from  the  judgment, 
expressly  pennitted  the  judgment  debtor  to  remain  in  posses- 
sion, the  latter  is  a  tenant  at  will  of  his  creditor  and  continues 
to  be  so  until  notice  to  quit  is  served.*^"  The  implication  of  a 
tenancy  at  will  under  such  circumstances  is  strengthened  where 
the  purchaser,  being  the  plaintiff  in  execution,  does  not  at  once 
demand  a  deed  from  the  sheriff  but  is  satisfied  with  a  certificate 
of  sale  from  that  official.®^ 

§  146.  The  lessee  of  a  judgment  debtor  holding  over  after  the 
sale  under  the  execution.  Inasmuch  as  the  delivery  of  the  deed 
of  property  which  has  been  sold  under  an  execution  relates  back 
to  and  conveys  the  title  as  of  the  date  of  the  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment, the  execution  of  leased  premises  nullifies,  as  against  the 
purchaser  at  the  sale,  all  liens,  alienations  and  incumbrances 
intermediate  the  judgment  and  the  sale.  Hence  the  rights  of 
a  lessee  who  has  acquired  his  term  after  the  judgment  had  be- 
come a  lien  on  the  demised  premises,  are  totally  divested  by  the 
execution  sale  and  his  continuance  in  possession  after  the  execu- 
tion sale  cannot  properly  be  regarded  as  an  occupancy  under 
his  lease  but  as  a  tenancy  at  will  of  the  purchaser  at  the  execu- 
tion sale  to  whom  he  will  be  liable  for  use  and  occupation.^^ 

might  be  suspended.  Morris  Canal  eo  Dobbins   v.    Lusch,    53    Iowa, 

and  Banking  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  31  N.  304.  309. 

J.  Law,  99,  105.  ai  Munson  v.  Plummer,  59  Iowa, 

59  Dobbins    v.    Lusch,    53    Iowa,  120,  122. 

304,     309.     See,     to     same    effect,  02  Kane  v.  Mink,  64  Iowa,  84,  86, 

Jackson^  v.    Sternbergh,    1    Johns.  19    N.    W.    Rep.    852;    Dobbins    v. 

Cas.   (N.  Y.)   153;   Nichols  v.  Wil-  Lusch,  53  Iowa,  304,  309;    Bittin- 

liiims,  8  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  137;  Bryant  ger   v.    Baker,    29    Pa.   St.   66,   70 

V.  Tucker,  19  Me.  383.  Am.  Dec.  154.     See,  also,  Kline  v. 

Chase,  17  Cal.  596. 


TENANCY  AT  WILU  205 

§  147.  The  determination  of  the  will — In  general.  Upon  a 
perusal  of  the  common  law  authorities  existing  prior  to  the  time 
of  Blackstone,  it  will  be  found  that  there  was  much  discussion 
as  to  what  acts  by  the  landlord  amounted  to  a  determination  of 
the  estate  at  will.  The  abrupt  and  arbiti'ary  ending  of  a  ten- 
ancy at  will  in  a  period  when  the  population  of  England  con- 
sisted almost  wholly  of  small  farmers  holding  their  land  under 
leases  executed  by  the  manor  lords  must  necessarily  in  most 
cases  have  operated  very  unjustly  as  to  the  tenant  and  caused 
him  a  great  inconvenience  and  loss  if  not  actual  and  irretriev- 
able ruin.  This  condition  of  affairs  led  the  English  judges  to 
seek  a  remedy  by  which  a  tenant  holding  under  such  a  precari- 
ous tenure  might  feel  secure  to  some  extent  at  least,  that  he 
would  receive  the  reward  of  his  labor  in  planting  and  tilling  the 
ground  which  he  held.  The  effect  of  this  judicial  legislation 
was  seen  first  in  the  enunciation  of  the  law  relating  to  emble- 
ments in  the  case  of  all  estates  the  duration  of  which  was  uncer- 
tain and  particularly  in  the  case  of  estates  at  will.  At  the  same 
time  by  reason  of  the  inattention  and  often  because  of  the  indul- 
gence of  the  manorial  lords  a  new  kind  of  tenure  or  tenancy  was 
created  which  had  its  origin  in  and  was  wholly  founded  upon 
mere  tenancies  at  will  but  which  differed  from  them  by  reason 
of  its  greater  stability  and  security  to  the  tenant.  This  was 
called  copyhold  tenure  because  the  tenant  was  supposed  to  hold 
his  estate  under  and  by  virtue  of  a  copy  of  the  court  roll  which 
was  filed  or  deposited  in  the  manorial  court.  The  tenant  was 
still  a  tenant  at  the  will  of  the  lord  of  the  manor  but  the  deter- 
mination of  the  lord's  will  was  no  longer  to  be  arbitrary  and 
abrupt  but  exercised  only  according  to  the  customs  of  the  par- 
ticular manor  in  which  the  land  was  located.  The  land  having 
been  held  for  some  time  by  one  lord,  his  acquiescence  in  the 
holding,  with  a  knowledge  on  his  part  of  the  existing  customs 
and  local  rules  by  and  with  reference  to  which  similar  land  of 
his  was  held  was  regarded  as  estopping  him  from  terminating 
'  the  tenancy  except  under  circumstances  which  had  by  custom  be- 
come applicable  to  similar  holdings  under  him.  Inasmuch  as 
the  customs  of  the  manor  differed  according  to  the  humor  and 
temper  of  the  various  lords,  it  followed  that  a  copyhold  tenant's 
estate,  while  always  an  estate  at  will,  might,  in  conformity  with 
local  custom,  be  of  any  quantity  or  duration.     Thus  a  copy- 


206  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

holder  may  in  some  manors  be  tenant  in  fee  simple  or  fee  tail 
or  for  life,  or  by  the  curtesy  or  in  dower,  or  for  a  term  of  years, 
though  he  was  always  liable  to  be  deprived  of  his  estate  w^hat- 
ever  it  might  be,  on  the  concurrence  of  those  circumstances, 
which  according  to  the  immemorial  customs  of  the  manor,  con- 
stituted a  termination  of  the  tenancy,  or  in  other  words,  on  the 
happening  of  that  particular  event  which  justified  the  lord  in 
determining  the  will.  This  in  some  manors  was  the  want  of 
male  issue  to  the  tenant;  in  others,  the  cutting  of  timber  by  the 
tenant,  the  non-payment  of  a  fine  or  some  similar  thing.  The 
cop3^holder,  however,  had  no  freehold  interest  strictly  so  called. 
He  received  no  livery  of  seizin  and  the  freehold  of  the  manor 
continued  in  the  lord  with  the  use  and  occupation  only  granted 
to  the  copyhold  tenant. -'^ 

§  148.  The  termination  of  a  tenancy  at  will  by  the  death  of 
either  party  to  it.  As  a  general  rule  a  tenancy  at  will  is;  termi- 
nated by  the  death  of  either  the  lessor  or  the  lessee.^*  And.  after 
the  death  of  the  tenant  at  will,  the  relation  of  his  successor  to 
the  landlord  is  that  of  a  mere  tenant  at  sufferance.^^  So,  upon 
the  death  of  a  tenant  at  will  his  personal  representative  does  not 
become  a  tenant  at  will  but  in  case  he  enters,  he  is  merely  a 
trespasser  or  a  tenant  at  sufferance.  The  landlord  may  accept 
him  as  a  tenant  at  will  or  as  a  tenant  upon  any  other  sort  of 
tenure  but  this  will  be  a  new  letting,  not  the  continuation  of  the 
former  and  the  term  created  a  new  one.  So,  too,  it  has  also  been 
held  that  a  tenancy  at  will  is,  ipso  facto,  terminated  by  the  death 
of  the  landlord  and  it  would  seem  that  thereafter  the  tenant, 
so  long  as  he  remains  in  possession,  is  merely  a  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance of  the  heir  of  the  landlord  unless  a  new  arrangement  is 
made,®"  and  the  owner  may  enter  or  eject  him  at  any  time  with- 
out notice  to  quit.  The  tenant  at  will  is  no  longer  liable  on  any 
covenant  to  pay  rent  after  the  death  of  his  landlord.    He  is  not 

03  2  Black.  Com.  148.  Stoddard,    27    Ohio    St.    478,    483; 

«■»  Cody    V.    Quaiteiman,    12    Ga.  .Tames  v.   Dean,  11  Ves.   382,  391, 

386;    Manchester  v.    Doddridge,   3  15  Ves.  236,  240,  8  R.  R.  177. 

Ind.    360;    Reed   v.    Reed,    48    Me.  «5  Meier  v.  Thieman,  15  Mo.  App. 

388;    Robie  v.  Smith,  21  Me.  114;  307. 

Paige  V.  Wright,  14  Allen  (Mass.)  «o  joy  v.  McKay,  70  Cal.  445,  11 

182;   Rising  v.  Stannard,  17  Mass.  Pac.  Rep.   763;    Reed   v.  Reed,  48 

282,    284;     Ferrin    v.    Kenney,    12  Me.  388. 
Met.     (Mass.)     294,    296;     Say    v. 


TENANX'V   AT   WILL.  207 

liable  to  the  heir  of  the  landlord  for  rent  aceruinG:  after  the 
death  of  het  landlord.  Hence  in  a  ease  where  the  owner  of  land 
which  is  leased  to  a  tenancy  at  will,  dies,  neither  of  his  heirs  to 
whom  the  land  descends  as  tenants  in  common  can  maintain  an 
action  to  recover  rent  for  the  land  or  to  recover  the  reasonable 
value  of  its  use  and  occupation  after  the  death  of  the  ancestor 
as  the  tenancy  at  will  was  actually  terminated  by  the  death  of 
the  latter.*'^  All  under  tenancies  which  have  been  created  by  a 
tenant  at  will  are  put  an  end  to  by  the  latter 's  death  or  by  the 
death  of  the  primary  landlord.  The  under  tenants  are  not  there- 
after entitled  to  notice  to  quit,°'^  as  they  are  trespassers  and 
not  tenants  of  any  sort  so  far  as  the  original  landlord  is  con- 
cerned. In  England,  however,  the  death  of  the  landlord  is  not 
always  regarded  as  raising  a  conclusive  presumption  of  the  ter- 
mination of  a  tenancy  at  will.  The  facts  attending  the  case  will 
be  inquired  into,  in  order  to  ascertain  if  either  by  word  or  con- 
duct the  heir  or  reversioner  has  manifested  an  intention  to  con- 
tinue the  tenancy  at  will.*^^  Nor  does  the  rule  that  the  death  of 
a  landlord  terminates  a  tenancy  at  will  apply  in  a  case  where 
the  premises  are  owned  by  two  or  more  persons  as  joint  tenant:^ 
for  under  such  circumstances  the  principle  of  sun'ivorship 
among  the  joint  holders  of  the  reversion  is  invoked  and  the  ten- 
ancy at  will  is  not  put  an  end  to  by.  the  death  of  any  of  the 
joint  tenants  but  the  lessee  continues  as  the  tenant  at  will  of  the 
survivor  or  survivors  as  the  case  may  be.^^ 

§  149.  The  partition  of  the  demised  premises  by  tenants  in 
common.  A  partition  of  land  among  the  several  landlords  will 
determine  a  tenancy  at  will  of  land,  the  reversion  of  which  is 
owned  by  tenants  in  common.  Before  the  partition  is  had  each 
joint  owner  or  owner  in  common  has  a  right  to  occupy  any  part 
of  the  land  and  he  may  assign  or  transfer  this  right  by  a  lease  or 
conveyance  to  a  stranger.  But  the  lessee  always  takes  subject 
to  a  partition.  After  a  partition  has  taken  place,  each  co-ten- 
ant holds  only  such  part  of  the  land  as  he  has  taken  in  severalty 
by  the  partition.  And,  as  the  lessor  cannot  on  partition,  with- 
out the  consent  of  his  co-tenants  or  co-owners,  insist  upon  having 
set  off  to  himself  any  particular  portion  he  can  convey  no  such 

c7Eveleth    v.    Sawyer,    96    Me.  ss  Morton  v.  Woods,  L.  R.  4  Q. 

227,  52  Atl.  Rep.  639.  B.  306. 

6-a  Robie  V.  Smith,  21  Me.  214.  ea  Henstead's  Case,  5  Coke,  10b. 


208  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

privilege  to  his  lessee.  In  view  of  these  circumstances  a  volun- 
tary partition  of  land  which  is  owned  in  common  is  in  law  re- 
garded as  such  an  alienation  of  it  as  will  put  an  end  to  a  tenancy 
at  will  existing  when  the  partition  takes  place.'^"  So,  a  convey- 
ance by  three  tenants  in  common  partners  in  business  to  them- 
selves and  a  fourth  person,  reducing  the  shares  of  each  tenant 
in  common  from  a  third  to  a  fourth  is  such  an  alienation  as  will 
determine  an  existing  tenancy  at  will  for  by  this  a  new  owner 
is  created  with  whom  the  tenant  at  will  is  in  uo  wise  connected.'^ 

§  150.  Termination  of  the  tenancy  by  the  surrender  and 
abandonment  of  the  premises.  It  may  be  laid  down  as  a  Avell 
settled  general  rule  that  a  tenancy  at  will  may  be  terminated  by 
a  surrender  of  the  premises  by  the  tenant  and  an  acceptance  of 
possession  by  the  landlord.  Some  cases  dispense  with  the  serv- 
ice of  a  notice  to  quit  by  either  party  upon  the  other.'-  There 
are  other  cases  which  hold  that  a  notice  to  quit  if  required  by 
statute  cannot  be  dispensed  with  in  a  tenancy  at  will  except  by 
an  express  agreement  in  the  lease  between  the  parties  that  the 
tenancy  may  be  terminated  without  notice  to  quit.  In  other 
words  where  a  statute  provides  the  mode  of  determining  the  ten- 
ancy at  will  the  statutory  mode  is  exclusive  of  any  other  unless 
the  parties  at  the  time  of  the  making  of  the  lease  shall  provide 
for  terminating  it  in  some  other  way.'^^  The  parties  to  a  ten- 
ancy at  will  may  expressly  dispense  with  the  service  of  a  statu- 
tory notice  to  quit.  In  all  cases  where  a  notice  to  quit  is  not  re- 
quired by  statute  a  surrender  and  acceptance  by  the  landlord 
terminates  a  tenancy  at  will. 

§  151.  The  termination  of  a  tenancy  at  will  by  the  landlord's 
alienation  of  the  premises.  A  tenancy  at  will  may  be  de- 
termined by  the  landlord  by  his  alienation  of  the  land.  After 
this  has  been  done  the  occupant  who  was  theretofore  a  tenant 
at  will  of  the  grantor  or  vendor  is  merely  a  tenant  at  suffer- 

To  Rising  V.   StannarJ,   17  Pick.  r.  Maxwell,  48  Kan.   142,   29  Pac. 

(Mass.)    282,  284;    Ellis  v.   Paige,  Rep.  147.     See,  Forbes  v.  Smiley, 

1  Pick.  (Mass.)  43.  56  Me.  174;  Warner  v.  Page,  4  Vt. 

71  McFarland   v.   Chase,   7   Gray  291,  24  Am.  Dec.  607. 

(Mass.)  462.  78  Davis   v.   Murphy,   126    Mass. 

72  Currier  v.  Perley,  24  N.  H.  143,  144;  Farson  v.  Gooddle,  8  Al- 
219,  226;  Chalmers  v.  Vignand's  len  (Mass.)  202;  May  v.  Rice,  108 
Syndic,     Mart.   (N.  S.)  189;  Betz  Mass.  150. 


TENANCY  AT  WILL.  209 

ance  of  the  grantee.'*  The  former  tenant  at  will  has  after  the 
sale  of  the  premises  only  the  rights  of  a  tenant  at  sufferance  as 
against  his  former  landlord.  Under  most  circnmstances  the 
motive  of  a  sale  by  the  landlord  of  a  tenant  at  will  is  immater- 
ial. A  sale  and  conveyance  of  the  premises  has  the  same  effect 
upon  the  tenancy  whether  made  bona  fide  to  some  purchaser  in 
good  faith  and  for  a  valuable  consideration  or  merely  and  ex- 
dasively  for  the  purpose  of  terminating  the  tenancy  to  one  who 
has  knowledge  of  the  purpose  of  the  sale.'^  But  where  the  ten- 
ancy at  will  is  expressly  to  endure  until  the  premises  are  sold, 
the  sale  and  conveyance  must  have  been  made  and  executed  in 
good  faith  and  n,ot  merely  to  terminate  the  tenancy."®  In  the 
latter  case  as  the  tenant  has  the  right  of  possession  until  the 
premises  are  sold  he  can  only  be  deprived  of  this  right  by  a  real 
sale  and  conveyance.  Otherwise  the  landlord  might  evict  his 
tenant  by  a  pretended  sale  long  before  the  lease  would  naturally 
expire  by  a  bona  fide  sale  and  the  tenant  would  be  without  a 
remedy.  A  tenancy  at  willis  determined  by  a  mortgage  of  the 
premises  where  knowledge  of  the  mortgage  is  brought  home  to 
the  tenant.  For  a  mortgage  is  an  alienation  of  the  interest  of 
the  landlord  and  brings  the  case  under  the  rule  that  any  aliena- 
tion of  the  landlord's  interest  determines  the  tenancy  at  will, 
which  depends  for  its  continuance  on  the  personal  relation  exist- 
ing between  the  landlord  and  the  tenant.  This  rvile  so  far  as  it 
applies  to  a  mortgage  is  not  affected  by  the  principle  that  the 
mortgagor  still  continues  in  possession  and  continues  to  exercise 
the  rights  and  privileges  of  a  landlord.     After  this  alienation 

74McLeran    v.    Benton,    73    Cal.  v.  Howell,  7  Ired.  L.   (N.  C.)   496; 
329,  14   Pac.  Rep.   879,   883;    Esty  Co.   Litt.   55b,   57a,   1  Cruise   Dig. 
V.  Baker,  50  Me.  325,  79  Am.  Dec.  273,  2  Black.  Com.  150.     The  ten- 
616;    Howard  v.  Merriam,  5  Cush.  ant  cannjot  after  the  grant  main- 
(Mass.)     563,     574;      Behedict    v.  tain   an   action    in   the   nature   of 
Morse,  10  Met.    (Mass.)    223,  229;  qitare  clausum  fregit  against  the 
Lash  V.  Ames,  171  Mass.  487,  50  grantee,  nor  against  one  who  act- 
N.  E.  Rep.  996;    Keay  v.  Godwin,  ing   under    the    directions    of   the 
16  Mass.  1;  Rising  v.  Stannard,  17  grantee    attempts     to    eject    him 
Pick.    (Mass.)    282,    284;    Ellis   v.  from  the  premises.     Curtis  v.  Gal- 
Paige,  1  Pick.   (Mass.)   43;   Curtis  vin^  1  Allen  (Mass.)   215,  217. 
V.    Galvin,   1    Allen    (Mass.)    215;  '^  Curtis     v.     Galvin,     1     Allen 
Rooney     v.      Gillespie,      6     Allen  (Mass.)  215. 
(Mass.)  74;   Dame  v.  Dame,  38  N.  tc  Ela  v.  Banks,  37  Wis.  39. 
H.  429,  75  Am.  Dec.  195;    Howell 

14 


210  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

the  former  tenant  at  will  is  a  tenant  at  sufferance  of  the  mort- 
gagee, who  may  thereafter  make  him  a  tenant  at  will,  if  he  shall 
choose  to  do  so,  but  the  mortgagor  in  possession  cannot  create  a 
tenancy  at  will  under  such  circumstances,  which  shall  be  binding 
on  the  mortgagee.'^^  Inasmuch  as  a  sale  by  the  landlord  termi- 
nating the  tenancy  at  will  is  the  voluntary  act  of  the  landlord 
over  which  the  tenant  has  no  control,  the  property  rights  of  the 
tenant  ought  to  be  protected  so  that  his  loss  may  be  reduced  to  a 
minimum.  In  fairness,  the  tenant  at  will,  however,  must  be 
given  reasonable  notice  by  the  landlord  of  his  intention  to  sell 
the  land  so  that  he  secure  new  premises,  and  he  must  also  have 
a  reasonable  opportunity  to  remove  his  personal  property,  such  as 
trade  fixtures  from  the  premises.'^^  If  the  facts  attending  the 
giving  of  the  notice  of  a  sale  are  undisputed,  the  question  of 
what  is  a  reasonable  notice  and  opportunity  to  remove  the  ten- 
ant's property  is  for  the  court. '^^  What  in  other  cases  is  reason- 
able notice  of  sale  is  a  question  of  fact  where  there  is  a  dispute 
as  to  the  circumstances.  Notice  is  required  to  be  given  by  statute 
in  some  states.  So,  where  the  state  statute  requires  a  notice 
to  be  given  by  either  party  to  the  tenancy  of  an  intention  to  ter- 
minate it  a  conveyance  to  a  person  as  a  trustee  by  the  landlord 
of  premises  which  are  rented  to  a  tenant  at  will,  does  not  end 
the  tenancy,  unlcF^s  notice  to  quit  is  given  to  the  tenant.^"  The 
rule  that  a  sale  of  the  demised  premises  by  the  landlord  deter- 
mines a  tenancy  at  will  is  based  upon  the  fact  that  a  tenancy  at 
will  is  somewhat  of  a  personal  relation.  The  landlord  in  effect 
by  the  sale  and  conveyance  says  to  his  tenant  "It  is  may  will  that 
I  shall  no  longer  be  your  landlord  but  that  you  shall  have  an- 
other landlord."    And  as  a  tenancy  at  will  is  at  the  will  of  both 

77  Doe  d.  Davies  v.  Thomas,  20  (Mass.)  519,  521;   Clark  v.  Wheel- 

L.  J.  Ex.  367,  6  Ex.  854;    Jarman  ock,  99  Mass.  14,  14;  Antoni  v.  Bel- 

V.  Hale,  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  681  (1899),  knap,  102  Mass.  193,  200;  Lash  v. 

1  Q.  B.  994.     Doubtless  the  oppo-  Ames,  50  N.  E.  Rep.  996,  997,  171 

eite  view  of  this  matter  would  be  Mass.  487. 

taken    by    those    courts    where    a  79  Lash  v.  Ames,  171  Mass.  487, 

mortgage    is    regarded    as    simply  50  N.  E.  Rep.  996. 
creating  a  lien  upon  the  premises,  «"  So  held  in   Towa  under  Code, 

and  where  the  mortgagor  l)eing  in  §    2991,    requiring   thirty   days   in 

possession  is  regarded  as  the  true  writing  to  be  given  to  either  party 

landlord.  to   terminate   a   tenancy    at   will. 

7s  Ellis  V.  Paige.  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  German  State  Bank  v.  Herron,  111 

43,  49;    Pratt  v.  Farraj-,  10  Allen  Iowa,  25,  82  N.  W.  Rep.  430. 


TENANCY  AT  WILL.  211 

the  landlord  and  the  tenant,  the  tenant  cannot  become  the  tenant 
at  will  of  the  new  owner  unless  he  shall  accept  him  as  such.  Until 
such  an  acceptance  he  is  a  trespasser  or  at  most  a  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance as  regards  the  grantee.  This  rule  has  been  applied  to  in- 
voluntary conveyances.  So,  where  a  lessor  of  a  tenancy  at  ^\^ll 
becomes  insolvent  the  appointment  of  an  assignee  in  insolvency 
for  him  with  the  knowledge  thereof  by  the  tenant  terminates 
the  tenancy.  The  tenant  remaining  in  possession  thereafter  with 
knowledge  of  the  assignment  becomes  and  continues  a  trespas- 
ser.*^ An  assignment  or  a  conveyance  of  the  reversion  by  the 
lessor  does  not  affect  the  tenant  at  will  unless  or  until  he  has 
notice  or  knowledge  of  it.  Express  notice  to  the  tenant  is  not 
necessary.  It  is  enough  if  the  assignee  of  the  reversion  shall 
inform  him  of  the  assignment  or  the  tenant  acquires  knowledge 
of  it  having  taken  place  in  any  other  way.  So,  though  the  les- 
sor may  terminate  the  tenancy  by  an  entry  during  the  absence 
of  the  lessee,  he  cannot  terminate  the  tenancy  by  words  spoken 
elsewhere  unless  the  tenant  shall  have  notice  of  the  words.  In 
other  words,  the  tenant,  though  absent  from  the  premises  is 
presumed  to  have  knowledge  or  notice  of  what  takes  place  on 
the  land  but  not  of  what  occurs  elsewhere.  So  the  occurrence 
of  anything  of  which  the  tenant  cannot  be  presumed  to  have  no- 
tice does  not  terminate  the  tenancy  until  notice  is  brought  home 
to  the  tenant.*-  And  in  conclusion  it  is  well  settled  that  a  ten- 
ant at  will  may,  during  the  tenancy,  remove  all  structures  which 
he  has  erected  upon  the  land  with  the  consent  of  the  landlord, 
where  the  landlord  determines  the  will  by  selling  the  estate. ^^ 

§  152.  Denial  of  the  title  of  the  landlord  by  a  tenant  at  will. 
In  conformity  with  the  general  rule,  if  the  tenant  at  will  de- 
nies the  title  of  his  landlord  to  the  premises  or  does  any  act 
which  is  inconsistent  with  a  recognition  and  admission  of  the 

81  Doe  d.  Davis  v.  Turner,  6  spoken  from  the  ground  the  will 
Exch.  854.  is  not  determined  until  the  lessee 

82  "If  a  man  lease  a  manor  at  hath  notice."  Co.  Litt.  55&. 
will  whereunto  a  common  is  ap-  ss  Walton  v.  Wray,  54  Iowa,  531, 
pended,  if  the  lessor  put  his  beasts  6  N.  W.  Rep.  472;  Melhop  v. 
to  use  the  common,  this  is  a  deter-  ]\Ieinhart,  70  Iowa,  685,  28  N.  W. 
mination  of  the  will.  The  lessor  Rep.  545;  Mickle  v.  Douglas,  75 
may  by  actual  entry  upon  the  Iowa,  82,  39  N.  W.  Rep.  198;  Wil- 
ground,  determine  his  will  in  the  gus  v.  Gettings,  21  Iowa,  178; 
absence  of  the  lessee,  but  by  words  ISIerchants  National  Bank  v.  Stan- 


212 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


title  by  him  as  by  accepting  a  conveyance  of  the  premise?* 
from  a  person  other  than  the  landlord  and  asserting  his  title 
under  it,  the  tenancy  at  will  is  at  an  end.  The  tenant  is 
then  no  longer  a  tenant  but  a  trespasser,  so  far  as  the  landlord 
is  concerned,  and  the  landlord  may  bring  an  action  to  recover 
the  property  from  him  as  trespasser  or  he  may,  if  he  can 
do  so  without  violence,  repossess  himself  of  the  premises.^* 
So  where  the  tenant  disclaims  or  disavows  the  tenancy,  repu- 
diates the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant,  or  claims  he  holds 
under  another  person  the  tenancy  at  will  is  at  an  end  without 
the  service  of  any  notice  to  quit.^^  If  the  tenant  at  will  claims 
to  hold  the  land  as  his  o^vn  and  so  notifies  his  landlord  his  pos- 
session becomes  adverse  to  his  landlord  from  such  notification. 
The  landlord  is  then  under  the  necessity  of  taking  the  proper 
steps  to  prevent  the  adverse  claim  from  ripening  into  a  good 
title  by  reason  of  peaceable  and  uninterrupted  possession  under 
the  statute  of  limitations.^*'    While  the  tenancy  at  will  exists  tlie 


ton,  55  Minn.  211,  56  N.  W.  Rep. 
821;  Carlin  v.  Ritter,  68  Md.  478, 
13  Atl.  Rep.  376. 

8*  Tillotson  V.  Kennedy,  5  Ala. 
407,  39  Am.  Dec.  330;  Sampson  v. 
Shaefer,  3  Cal.  196,  205;  Simpson 
V.  Applegate,  75  Cal.  342,  17  Pac. 
Rep.  237;  McCarthy  v.  Brown,  113 
Cal.  15,  45  Pac.  Rep.  14;  Fussel- 
man  v.  Worthington,  14  111.  135; 
Farrow's  Heirs  v.  Edmundson,  4 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  605,  41  Am.  Dec. 
250;  Little  v.  Palister,  4  Me.  209, 
211;  Currier  v.  Earl,  13  Me.  216; 
Bodwell  Granite  Co.  v.  Lane,  83 
Me.  168,  172;  Campbell  v.  Proctor, 
6  Me.  12;  Bennock  v.  Whipple,  12 
Me.  346,  28  Am.  Dec.  186;  Apple- 
ton  V.  Ames,  150  Mass.  34,  44,  22 
N.  E.  Rep.  09,  5  L.  R.  A.  206; 
Amick  V.  Brubaker,  101  Mo.  473, 
477,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  627;  Ramsey  v. 
Henderson,  91  Mo.  560,  4  S.  W. 
Rep.  408;  Russell  v.  Fabyan,  34  N. 
H.  218,  223;  Pettengill  v.  Evans,  5 
N.  H.  54;  Love  v.  Edmonston,  23 
N.  Car.  152;   Chamberlain  v.  Don- 


ohue,  45  Vt.  50,  55;  Hall  v.  Dewey, 
10  Vt.  593,  599;  Willison  v.  Wat- 
kins,  3  Peters  (U.  S.)  43.  A  stat- 
ute requiring  the  service  of  a  no- 
tice to  quit  by  the  landlord  has 
been  held  not  to  apply  to  such  a 
termination  of  the  tenancy  as  the 
court  will  regard  this  as  a  sur- 
render. Amick  V.  Brubaker,  101 
Mo.  473,  477,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  627; 
Ramsey  v.  Henderson,  91  Mo.  560, 
4  S.  W.  Rep.  408. 

85  Appleton  V.  Ames,  150  Mass. 
34,  44,  22  N.  E.  Rep.  69,  5  L.  R. 
A.  206.  The  action  of  a  subten^ 
ant  who  upon  the  termination  of 
the  term  of  his  lessor  became  the 
tenant  at  will  of  the  original  land- 
lord in  refusing  to  pay  rent  to  the 
latter  denying  his  title  and  claim- 
ing the  own,ership  in  himself  puts 
an  end  to  the  tenancy  at  will.  Ap- 
pleton V.  Ames,  150  Mass.  34.  22 
N.  E.  Rep.  69. 

88  Hall  V.  Dewey,  10  Vt.  593, 
599. 


TENANCY  AT  WILL.  213 

possession  of  the  tenant  is  the  possession  of  the  landlord.  But 
as  soon  as  the  disclaimer  of  title  or  adverse  claim  by  the  tenant 
}s  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  landlord  or  of  his  agent  who 
is  duly  authorized  to  receive  it  the  statutory  period  of  limita- 
tion begins  to  run  against  the  landlord.  "What  shall  constitute 
notice  to  the  landlord  of  an  adverse  holding  by  the  tenant  de- 
pends on  the  facts  of  each  case.  The  claims  of  ownership  by 
the  tenant  publicly  made,  his  alienation  of  the  land  in  fee,  and 
his  delivering  possession  of  it  to  others  would  be  probably  re- 
garded as  such  acts.^*^  A  mortgage  of  the  fee  of  the  premises 
by  the  tenant  at  will  is  such  a  claim  of  an  adverse  holding  and 
repudiation  of  the  landlord's  title  as  will  determine  the  ten- 
ancy at  will.  And  where  the  mortgage  by  the  tenant  at  will  has 
been  foreclosed  for  a  default  on  the  part  of  the  mortgagor,  and 
the  land  sold  and  bought  by  the  mortgagee  who  has  also  entered 
into  possession  he  as  well  as  the  tenant  may  be  treated  as  a  tres- 
passer and  ousted  by  the  landlord  who  was  not  a  party  to  the 
suit  to  foreclose.^^  Where  a  judgment  debtor  on  the  levy  of  an 
execution  on  land  which  he  held  as  tenant  at  will  points  out  the 
land  as  his  own  property  in  fee  and  aids  in  setting  it  off  for  the 
deputy  sheriff  who  makes  the  lew,  his  acts  will  amount  to  a  de- 
termination of  the  tenancy.  Such  conduct  on  his  part  is  an 
unequivocal  disclaimer  of  his  landlord's  title  and  so  clearly  in- 
consistent with  an  estate  at  will  as  to  put  an  end  to  it.  The  pur- 
chaser at  the  sale  under  the  .judgment  takes  no  title  and  the 
landlord  may  maintain  an  action  against  the  judgment  creditor 
for  his  entry  on  the  land.^* 

^,  153.  The  tenancy  at  will  may  be  determined  by  the  giving 
of  a  new  lease.  A  tenancy  at  will  is  terminated  by  the  landlord 
leasing  the  demised  premises  to  a  third  person  and  the  tenant 
at  vsdll  is  thereafter  a  tenant  on  sufferance  of  his  landlord.^"  The 
tenancy  at  will  is  terminated  by  knowledge  of  the  new  lease  to 

»7  Farrow's    Heirs    v.    Edmund-  Met.      (Mass.)      300;      IMizner     v. 

son,  4  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)   605,  41  Am.  Moore,  10  Gray  (Mass.)  290;  Pratt 

Dec.  2.50.  V.  Farrar,  10  Allen    (Mass.)    519; 

83  Little  V.  Palister,  4  Me.  209.  Pray   v.    Stebbins,   141    Mass.   219, 

50  Campbell  v.  Procter,  6  Me.  12.  4  N.  E.  Rep.  824,  55  Am.  Rep.  462; 

»o  Cunningham  v.  Holton,  55  Me.  Grundy  v.  Martin,  143  Mass.  279; 

33;    Hildreth   v.    Conant.    10    Met.  Cofran  v.  Shepard,  148  Mass.  582, 

(Mass.)    298;    Kelly  v.   Waite,  12  20  X.  E.  Rep.  181. 


214  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

the  third  person  being  given  to  the  tenant  after  which  he  must 
be  allowed  a  reasonable  period  to  remove  his  fixtures.  The  entry 
of  the  new  tenant  is  not  necessary  under  such  circumstances  to 
terminate  the  tenancy  for  the  letting  at  once  terminates  the  ten- 
ancy at  will,  on  notice  to  the  tenant.  For  the  tenant  at  will  is 
not  liable  as  a  trespasser  for  his  occupancy  of  the  premises  sub- 
sequently to  the  determination  of  the  will  by  an  alienation  for 
years  or  in  fee  until  he  shall  have  notice  of  the  alienation.®^ 

Where  the  land  is  owned  by  a  husband  and  his  wife  as  ten- 
ants by  the  entirety  the  husband  has  at  the  common  law  the 
right  to  lease  the  same  which  lease  will  be  valid  and  binding  on 
the  wife  during  the  coverture  but  will  terminate  in  case  she  shall 
sur\-ive  him.  Hence  the  execution  and  delivery  of  a  written 
lease  of  a  wife 's  lands  by  the  husband  during  the  coverture,  will 
determine  an  existing  tenancy  at  will  in  her  lands,  made  by  her 
before  or  after  the  date  of  the  marriage,  and  though  the  lease  was 
made  by  the  w^f  e  with  the  consent  of  the  husband.'-'-  There  must 
however  be  a  new  lease  in  fact  to  a  new  tenant,  i  e..  to  some  third 
person.  A  mere  change  in  the  character  of  the  tenant  at  will 
without  a  corresponding  change  of  person  does  not  terminate  the 
tenancy  at  will.  Thus  a  mere  change  in  the  personnel  of  a  firm 
which  is  a  tenant,  and  its  change  frona  a  partnership  to  a  corpo- 
ration, which  is  acquiesced  in  by  the  lessor  do  not  terminate  a 
tenancy  at  will  where  there  is  no  interruption  of  the  actual  occu- 
pancy.^^ 

§  154,  The  entry  of  the  landlord  on  the  land  as  terminating 
the  tenancy.  At  the  common  law  the  entry  of  the  landlord 
upon  the  land  and  the  doing  by  him  of  any  act  while  there  in 
possession  which  is  inconsistent  with  an  estate  at  will  operate 
as  a  determination  of  the  tenancy.  Thus  if  the  lessor  after  his 
entry  on  the  land  cuts  down  trees,  carries  away  stone.®*  removes 
a  house,  or  makes  a  feoffment  on  the  land  or  a  lease  for  years  to 
commence  at  once  the  tenancy  at  will  is  at  an  end."''     Thus  in 

01  Kelly  V.  Waite,  12  Met.  os  Walker  Ice  Co.  v.  American 
(Mass.)  300;  Howard  v.  IMorris,  Steel  &  Wire  Co.,  1S5  Mass.  463, 
5    Cush.     (Mass.)     5C3;     Distla    v.       70  N.  E.  Rep.  937. 

Ives,  2  Lev.  88.  o*  Turner  d.   Doe  v.   Bennett,   9 

02  Pray   v.    Stebbins,    141    Mass.       M.  &  W.  643. 

219,  224,  4  N.  E.  Rep.  824,  55  Am.  o.^  Moore   v.    Boyd,    24    Me.   242; 

Rpp.  4C2.  Kelly   v.   Waite,   12   Met.    (Mass.) 


TENANCY  AT  WILL.  213 

England  a  feoffment  with  livery  of  seizure  made  on  the  land, 
determines  a  tenancy  at  will  though  the  tenant  at  will  is  not 
present,  and  does  not  assent  to  the  feoffment;  and  feoffee 
may  maintain  trespass  against  the  tenant  at  will,  even  though 
the  latter  had  no  notice  of  the  feoffment.''®  And  though  the  in- 
tent with  which  an  entry  by  the  landlord  is  made  is  usually  im- 
portant, yet  in  the  case  of  a  tenancy  at  will  whatever  may  have 
been  the  intent  of  the  lessor  in  entering  any  act  by  him  which 
would  otherwise  be  a  trespass  on  the  land  determines  the  ten- 
ancy."' So,  also  a  demand  of  possession  made  by  the  landlord 
upon  the  land  of  the  tenant  at  will  or  of  his  lessee  is  a  determi- 
nation of  the  estate  at  will.^*  In  fact  the  landlord's  entry  upon 
the  demised  premises  an.d  his  utterance  of  any  words  there 
clearly  expressive  of  his  present  intention  to  determine  the  estate 
of  the  tenant  constitute  a  termination  of  the  tenancy  at  will."® 
But  in  order  that  the  entry  of  the  landlord  on  the  land  and  his 
utterance  of  words  there  declaring  the  tenancy  to  be  at  an  end 
shall  terminate  the  tenancy  it  is  the  rule  in  this  country  at  least 
that  the  tenant  shall  have  notice  of  such  words/  either  by  his 
being  present  on  the  land  and  hearing  them  when  they  are 
spoken,  or  by  their  utterance  being  subsequently  brought  to  his 

300,  302;    Rising  v.    Stannard,  17  he  would  take  measures  to  obtain 

]\Iass.   282,   286;    Klay  v.   Godwin,  possession.     Doe  d.  Price  v.  Price, 

16  Mass.  1,  4,  2  BL  Com.  146,  150;  2  M.  &  Scott,  464,  9  Bing.  356. 

1  Cruise,  Tit.  9,  c.  1,  §  18;  Co.  Lit.  99  Effect  of  a  demand  of  keys. 

551);    Doe  d.  Davies  v.  Tliomas,  6  Where  a  person,  who  has  had  the 

Exch.  854,  857,  11  L.  J.  Bx.  453.  keys   of  the   house   given  him   to 

96  Ball  V.  Cullimore,  2  C.  M.  &  enable  him  to  examine  the  prem- 

R.  120,  1  Gale,  96,  5  Tyr.  753,  4  L.  ises,  moves  in  his  furniture  and 

J.  Ex.  137,  2  Black.  Com.  146.  family,  he  is  a  tenant  at  will  if 

9"  Turner  v.  Doe  dem.   Bennett,  the   landlord   assents,   and   where 

9  M.  &  W.  643,  646.  the  landlord  afterward  sends  for 

9«  Roe  d.  Blair  v.  Street,  4  N.  &  the  keys  and  upon  the  refusal  of 

M.  42,  2  Ad.  &  El.  329,  4  L.  J.  K.  the  occupant  to  deliver  them  en- 

B.  67;    Howell  v.  Howell,  7  Ired.  ters    himself   and    turns    out   the 

Law  (N.  C.)  496.     See,  also,  as  to  party  and  his  goods  it  was  prop- 

the  effect  of  a  demand  for  posses-  erly  held  that  the  tenancy  at  will 

sion    contained    in    a    letter    sent  was   thus    terminated.     Pollon   v. 

from  the  attorney  of  the  lessor  to  Brewer,  7  Com.  Bench  (N.  S.)  371, 

the  attorney  of  the  lessee,  stating  6   Jur.    (N.   S.)    509. 

that    unless    the    latter    paid    the  i  Cook  v.  Cook,  28  Ala.  6G0. 
lei^sor  what  he  owed  him  for  rent 


216  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

attention.     Then  tenancy  at  will  expires  when  he  receives  notice 
or  knowledge  of  the  entry  and  the  language  of  the  landlord. 

§  155.  Notice  to  quit  when  required  in  tenancies  at  will  at 
common  law.  A  tenancy  at  will  may  be  terminated  at  the  will 
of  either  party  at  common  law  and  neither  party  is  according  to 
the  majority  of  the  cases  in  the  absence  of  statute,  obligated  to 
give  notice  of  a  future  day  on  which  the  tenancy  and  estate  shall 
terminate.-  This  rule  has  been  confined  to  cases  of  a  strict  ten- 
ancy at  will  and  to  those  in  Avliich  the  character  of  the  tenant's 
holding  was  such  that  his  status  closely  approached  that  of  a 
mere  trespass.  In  some  cases  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  pro- 
vision for  notice  to  quit  the  courts  have  stated  that  a  reasonable 
notice  must  be  given  whose  length  is  always  dependent  upon  the 
circumstances  of  each  case  but  in  any  event  to  be  long  enough  to 
enable  the  tenant  to  remove  the  implements,  furniture  and  other 
personal  property.^  As  determining  whether,  in  the  absence  of 
any  statute  expressly  requiring  a  notice  to  quit  to  determine  a 
tenancy  at  will,  such  a  notice  is  indispensable,  some  of  the  cases 
have  turned  upon  a  distinction  which  the  courts  have  made  or 
recognized  between  tenancies  at  will  in  fact,  i.  e.  tenancies  which 
have  been  expressly  created  by  the  intention  of  the  parties  or 
which  have  been  implied  from  their  conduct  and  between  ten- 
ancies which  have  been  declared  to  be  tenancies  at  will  by  virtue 
of  the  Statute  of  Frauds.  In  England  in  the  former  class  of  ten- 
ancies at  will  no  notice  to  quit  has  e.ver  been  required  to  be 
given  either  by  statute  or  at  common  law.*  Cases  where  a  tenant 
is  in  possession  under  a  parol  lease  which  the  Statute  of  Frauds 
has  transformed  into  a  tenancy  at  will  are  on  a  different  basis,  for 
in  the  case  of  such  a  lease  where  it  is  evident  that  the  parties  to  the 
contract  had  intended  to  create  a  tenancy  differing  in  many 
very  material  respects  from  a  tenancy  at  will  and  particularly 

2  Peters  v.   Blake,   170   111.   304,  Donohue,  45  Vt.  50;  Hollingsworth 

48  N.  E.  Rep.  1012;    affirming  68  v.    Stennett,   2    Esp.    717;    Tilt   v. 

111.    App.    587;     Ellis    v.    Paige,    1  Stratton,    4    Bing.    446;    Right   v. 

Pick.  (Mass.)  43;  Davis  v.  Thomp-  Baird,  13  East,  210. 

son,  13  Me.  209;    Moore  v.  Boyd,  s  Ellis  v.  Paige,  1  Pick.  (Mass.) 

24  Me.  243;   Kenin  v.  Guvernator  43. 

(N.    J.   Law)    48   Atl.    Rep.   1023;  *  Right  v.  Beard,  13  East,  210; 

Peer   v.   O'Leary,  28   N.   Y.   Sui)p.  Knight  v.  Quigley,   2  Camp.   505; 

687,  8  Misc.  Rep.  350;  Rich  v.  Bol-  Hollingsworth  v.  Stennett,  2  Esp. 

ton.    46    Vt.    84;     Chamberlain    v.  717. 


TENANCY  AT  WILL. 


217 


where  a  yearly  rent  had  heen  reserved  in  the  invalid  lease,  no 
court  of  justice  would  hesitate  in  endeavoring  to  protect  the 
tenant  from  serious  injustice,  and,  in  order  to  effect  such  pur- 
pose would  require  a  reasonable  notice  to  terminate  the  tenancy 
at  will  created  by  the  express  provision  of  the  statute.  In  other 
words  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  being-  in  derogation  of  the  common 
law  was  strictly  construed.  The  tenant  was  not  permitted  to  be 
deprived  of  any  right  he  might  have  enjoyed  at  common  law  be- 
fore the  passage  of  the  statute  and  among  these  rights  was  the 
right  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  of  receiving  a  reasonable  notice 
to  quit,  usually  of  six  months,  in  the  case  of  tenancies  from  year 
to  year.  Hence  in  all  tenancies  at  will  under  the  statute  reserv- 
ing an  annual  rent,  six  months'  notice  is  required  to  terminate 
the  tenancy  at  will. 


5  Right  V.  Darby,  1  T.  R.  159; 
Share  v.  Parter,  3  T.  R.  13;  Tim- 
mins  V.  Rowlison,  3  Burr.  1603; 
Rising  V.  Stannard.  17  Mass.  282; 
Rich  V.  Bolton,  46  Vt.  84,  89.  "It 
was  determined  very  anciently  at 
tJie  common  law,  upon  principles 
of  jlistice  and  policy  that  estates 
at  will  were  equally  at  the  will  of 
both  parties  and  neither  of  them 
was  permitted  to  exercise  his  will 
in  a  wanton  and  arbitrary  man- 
ner, and  contrary  to  equity  and 
good  faith  but  the3''  could  only  be 
terminated  by  notice  for  a  longer 
or  shorter  period  depending 
usually  upon  the  nature  of  the 
original  demise.  At  first  there 
was  no  other  rule  than  that  the 
notice  should  be  a  reasonable  one. 
Because  of  the  uncertainty  of  this 
rule  the  courts  early  adopted,  as 
far  as  possible,  some  fixed  period 
as  being  reasonable.  In  those  ten- 
ancies, which  from  the  nature  of 
the  original  demise,  they  con- 
strued to  be  tenancies  from  year 
to  j'ear  the  courts  adopted  six 
months  as  a  reasonable  notice 
holding  that  such  tenancies  could 


only  be  determined  by  a  notice  of 
at  least  six  months  terminating  at 
the  expiration  of  the  first  or'  any 
succeeding  year.  And  in  those 
cases  which,  did  not  come  within 
the  class  of  tenancies  from  year 
to  year,  because  by  implication  for 
some  definite  period  less  than  a 
year,  the  rule  was  generally 
adopted  that  the  time  of  notice 
should  be  governed  bj"-  the  length 
of  time  specified  as  the  interval 
between  the  times  of  payment  and 
should  be  equal  to  one  of  these  in- 
tervals, and  must  end  at  the  ex- 
piration thereof.  The  result  was 
that  at  the  common  law  estates  at 
will  in  a  strict  sense  became  al- 
most extinguished  at  a  very  early 
date  under  the  operation  of  ju 
dicial  decisions.  Indeed  it  would 
have  been  difficult  to  conceive  of 
such  a  tenancy,  except  by  the  ex- 
press contract  of  the  parties  to 
that  effect.  But  they  still  re- 
mained substantially  tenancies  at 
uill,  except  that  such  will  could 
not  be  determined 'by  either  party 
without  due  notice  to  quit."  The 
Court  by  Mitchell,   J.,   in  Hunter 


218  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  156.  Notice  to  quit  and  demand  of  possession  as  terminat- 
ing a  tenancy  at  will.  Though  a  very  great  majority  of  the 
cases  hold  that  a  notice  to  quit  is  necessary  to  terminate  a  ten- 
ancy at  will  both  at  common  law  and  under  the  statutes  of  the 
various  states,  there  are  a  few  cases  which  hold  that  the  tenancy 
may  be  ended  instanter  by  a  demand  of  possession  by  the  land- 
lord.^ If  the  tenant  at  will  has  done  or  suffered  anything  to  be- 
done  which  in  law  constitutes  a  termination  of  the  tenancy  at 
will,  he  is  estopped  thereafter  from  claiming  that  the  landlord 
must  serve  a  notice  to  quit  upon  him  before  he  can  be  ousted. 
This  would  be  the  case  where  the  tenant,  pending  a  tenancy  at 
will  disavows  his  landlord's  title  and  alleges  that  a  third  person 
owns  the  property  or  claims  that  he  himself  owns  it,  after  which 
he  of  course  holds  adversely  and  is  a  trespasser  and  not  a  tenant 
at  all  and  not  entitled  to  notice.  Under  such  circumstances  a. 
demand  of  possession  is  usually  sufficient. 

§  157.  Statutory  notice  required  to  terminate  a  tenancy  at 
will.  In  many  of  the  states  it  is  required  by  statutes  that  a 
notice  of  a  length  therein  specified  shall  be  necessary  to  termi- 
nate a  tenancy  at  will.    In  California,^  Maine,^  New  York,®  ]\Iis- 

V.  Frost,  47  Minn.  1,  49  N.  W.  ers  v.  Larabee,  48  Me.  570.  See 
Rep.  327;  and  see,  also,  Tobin  v.  also  as  to  length  of  notice  re- 
Young  (Ind.  1888)  17  N.  E.  Rep.  quired  in  Maine.  Davis  v.  Thomp- 
625,  628.  son,  13  Me.  209;  Sherburne  v. 
eDuane  v.  Trustees,  39  111.  578;  Jones,  20  Me.  70;  Wheeler  v. 
Love  V.  Edmonston,  23  N.  Car.  Cowan,  25  Me.  283.  It  is  said, 
152;  Howell  v.  Howell,  29  N.  Car.  however,  in  Gordon  v.  Gilman,  48 
496,  47  Am.  Dec.  335.  See,  also.  Me.  473,  that  the  rights  of  tenants 
2  Black.  Com.  146.  at  will  to  have  notice  are  deter- 

7  Kuhn  V.  Smith,  125  Cal.  615,  mined  by  the  statute  in  force 
58  Pac.  Rep.  204;  Carteri  v.  Rob-  when  the  question  arises.  A  ter- 
erts,  140  Cal.  164,  73  Pac.  Rep.  818.  mination  of  the  tenancy  by  mu- 
Construing  California  Civ.  Code,  tual  consent  dispenses  with  the 
§§  789,  790,  and  see,  also.  King  v.  service  of  the  statutory  notice. 
Connolly,  51  Cal.  181.  Thomas  v.  Sanford,  71  Me.  548. 

8  Rev.  St.  1858,  c.  94.  §§  1,  2.  04  Rev.  St.  (8th  Ed.)  p.  2457, 
But  it  is  said,  however,  that  this  §  7.  See,  also.  Post  v.  Post,  14 
statute  relates  only  to  the  notice  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  253;  Livingston  v. 
necessary  to  maintain  an  action  of  Tanner,  14  N.  Y.  64;  Burns  v. 
forcible  detainer  and  that  a  land-  Bryant,  31  N.  Y.  453;  Larned  v. 
lord  of  a  tenant  at  will  may  enter  Hudson,  60  N.  Y.  102.  A  persoa 
at  any  time  without  notice.  Gor-  who  holds  the  premises  under  a 
don  V.  Gilman,  48  Me.  473;  With-  mere  license  Is  not  entitled  to  no- 


TENANCY  AT  WILL. 


219 


souri/°  ]\Iichigan/^  Iowa/-  Minnesota,"  New  York/*  a  thirty- 
days'  notice  to  quit  is  required  to  terminate  a  tenancy  at  will. 
The  same  period  is  applicable  in  Delaware  to  estates  at  will.^^  In 
Oregon,  a  notice  equal  to  the  intervals  between  the  pay^ment  of 
rent  is  required.^"  In  Rhode  Island  written  notice  is  required  but 
it  may  be  of  any  length  that  pleases  the  party  giving  it.  It  need 
not  be  a  reasonable  notice.^'  In  New  Jersey  a  three  months'  no- 
tice to  quit  is  required  both  in  tenancies  at  will  and  tenancies  at 
sufferance.^®  In  Michigan  it  is  provided  ^^  that  all  estates  at  will, 
where  the  rent  is  payable  at  periods  less  than  three  months,  may 
be  determined  by  notice  equal  in  time  to  the  inter\'al  between 
the  rental  payments.    In  Vermont  six  months'  written  notice  to 


tice  under  the  New  York  statute 
as  a  tenant  at  will.  Doyle  v. 
Gibbs,  6  Lans.   (N.  Y.)   80. 

10  Rev.  St.  §  3078  construed  in 
Tarlotting  v.  Bokern,  95  Mo.  541, 
8  S.  W.  Rep.  547;  Carby  v.  Mc- 
Spadden,  63  Mo.  App.  648. 

11  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  9257,  con- 
strued in  Simons  v.  Detroit  Twist 
Drill  Co.,  11  Detroit  Leg.  N.  141, 
99  N.  W.  Rep.  862. 

12  Kuhn  V.  Kuhn,  70  Iowa,  682, 
28  N.  W.  Rep.  541;  Burden  v. 
Knight,  82  Iowa,  584,  48  N.  W. 
Rep.  985;  German  Bank  v.  Herron, 
111  Iowa,  25,  82  N.  W.  Rep.  430. 

13  Minn.  Gen.  St.  §  5873;  Grace 
v.  Michaud,  50  Minn.  139.  52  N.  W. 
'Rep.  390;  Eastman  v.  Vetter,  58 
N.  W.  Rep.  989,  57  Minn.  164; 
Hunter  v.  Frost,  47  Minn.  1,  49 
N.  W.  Rep.  327;  Gen.  St.  Minn, 
c.  75,  §  40;  Van  Brunt  v.  Wallace, 
88  Minn.  116,  92  N.  W.  Rep.  521. 

i*Peer  v.  O'Leary,  28  N.  Y.  S. 
687,  8  Misc.  Rep.  350,  59  St.  Rep. 
594,  holding  also  that  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  notice  expire 
at  the  end  of  a  month. 

15  Bonsall  v.  McKay,  1  Houst. 
(Del.)   520. 

10  Forsythe   v.    Pogue,    25   Oreg. 


481,  36  Pac.  Rep.  571;  Hill's  Code, 
§    2987. 

1"  Payton  v.  Sherburne,  2  Atl. 
Rep.  300,  15  R.  I.  213. 

18  Kenin  v.  Guvernator  (N.  J. 
Law),  48  Atl.  Rep,  1023,  constru- 
ing Laws  1898,  p.  556,  §109.  This 
notice,  it  seems,  may  be  oral. 
Kenin  v.  Guvernator  (N.  J.  Law), 
48  Atl.  Rep.  1023.  It  has  also 
been  held  in  New  Jersey  that  a 
half  year's  notice  to  quit  is  requis- 
ite in  all  cases  of  uncertain  tent- 
ancy.  McEowen  v.  Drake,  14  N. 
J.  Law,  523;  Hankinson  v.  Blair, 
15  N.  J.  Law,  181. 

19  How.  Ann.  St.  §  5774. 

20  Barium  v.  Berger,  125  Mich. 
504,  84  N.  W.  Rep.  1070;  Holmes 
V.  Wood,  88  Mich.  435,  50  N.  W. 
Rep.  323;  Huyser  v.  Chase,  13 
Mich.  98.  A  statute  in  Michigan 
is  applicable  to  a  tenancy  void  un- 
der the  Statute  of  Frauds.  Huj-- 
ser  V.  Chase,  13  Mich.  98;  and  to  a 
tenancy  from  month  to  month 
without  an  understanding  that 
the  tenant  would  vacate  when  pos- 
session was  required  by  the  land- 
lord. Woodrow  V.  Michael,  13 
Mich.  1,87.  The  statutory  notice 
which  is  required  in  Michigan  is 


220  LAW  05^  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

quit  is  required.-^  By  some  of  the  cases  it  has  been  held  that 
the  statutory  requirement  that  a  tenancy  at  will  can  only  be  ter- 
minated on  notice,  is  to  be  strictly  complied  with.  It  is  bind- 
ing on  the  tenant  as  well  as  on  the  landlord.  An  implied  sur- 
render will  not  be  recognized  as  notice  as  when  for  example  a 
tenant  at  will,  without  giving  his  landlord  the  statutory  notice 
in  writing  sends  or  hands  the  landlord  the  key  of  the  premises 
or  leaves  it  at  his  of&ce  or  residence  with  a  person  whom  he  finds 
in  charge.--  But  the  acceptance  of  a  surrender  by  the  landlord 
may  dispense  with  notice.  By  very  many  of  the  cases  it  has  been 
held  that  a  statute  requiring  a  notice  to  quit  in  the  case  of  a 
tenancy  at  will  does  not  apply  where  the  tenant  voluntarily  does 
some  act  which  when  it  has  been  assented  to  by  the  landlord  will 
constitute  a  surrender.  Such  statutes  requiring  notice  do  not 
usually  preclude  the  parties  from  terminating  the  tenancy  by 
voluntary  agreement  nor  do  they  prevent  the  tenancy  from  be- 
ing put  an  end  to  by  any  act  which  in  law  will  terminate  the  re- 
lation of  landlord  and  tenant  as,  for  example,  where  the  tenant 
denies  the  title  of  his  landlord  by  holding  adversely  and  the 
landlord  may  then  treat  him  as  a  trespasser.-^  Where  a  statu- 
tory enactment  requires  a  notice  to  be  given  in  order  to  terminate 
a  tenancy  at  will  the  tenancy  of  course  will  continue  until  the 
expiration  of  the  period  mentioned  in  the  notice  and  the  pos- 
session and  occupation  of  the  tenant  are  a  lawful  possession  and 

dispensed  with  in  the  case  of  a  months  a  tenant  is  entitled  to  re- 
tenancy  on  condition  though  it  is  ceive  a  three  months'  notice  to 
required  in  the  case  of  a  tenancy  quit  under  the  Michigan  statute, 
at  will.  But  in  the  latter  case  the  How.  Am.  Statute,  §  5774.  Hoff- 
tenant  is  entitled  to  a  reasonable  mani  v.  Clark,  63  Mich.  175,  29  N. 
notice  and  in  determining  what  a  W.  Rep.  G95. 

reasonable    notice    is    the    courts  21  Blanchard   v.    Powers,   67   Vt. 

will    be    guided   by    the   statutory  403,  31  Atl.  Rep.  848. 

requirements  of  notice  in  the  case  22  Barlow  v.  Wheelwright,  22  Vt. 

of    a   tenancy    at   will.     Shaw    v.  88;    Withers  v.   Larrabee,   48   Me. 

PToffman,  25  Mich.  162.     See,  also,  570,  573. 

Hilsendeger  v.  Scheich,  55  Mich.  23  Jackson  v.  French,  3  Wend. 
468,  21  N.  W.  Re|).  894,  holding  (N.  Y.)  337;  Chamberlain  v.  Don- 
that  a  notice  to  quit  indispensable  ohue,  45  Vt.  50;  Wilson  v.  Wat- 
to  the  recovery  of  the  possession.  kins,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.)  43;  Amick  v. 
In  the  absence  of  any  agreement  Brubacker,  101  Mo.  473,  14  S.  W. 
by  a  tenant  at  will  to  pay  rent  at  Rep.  627. 
shorter      intervals      than      three 


TENANCY  AT  WILL.  22 JL 

occupation  until  that  day  ai'rivca."'  lie  may  enforce  all  liij 
rights  as  a  tenant  against  both  the  landlord  and  strangers  until 
the  expiration  of  the  period  of  the  notice.  And  it  follows  from 
this  the  tenant  will  be  liable  for  rent  during  the  time  of  the 
notice  given  for  the  determination  of  the  estate  whether  he  con- 
tinues to  occupy  the  premises  or  not.-'' 

§  158.  The  termination  of  the  period  of  notice.  A  notice  to 
quit  which  is  required  under  a  statute  in  a  tenancy  at  will  may 
if  served  a  sufficient  time  prior  to  the  commencement  of  pos- 
sessory proceedings  require  the  tenant  to  quit  at  any  day.-®  So, 
a  notice  to  quit  at  the  expiration  of  fourteen  days  is  a  good 
notice  under  a  statute  requiring  a  three  months'  notice  to  quit 
where  no  proceedings  are  instituted  within  three  months.-^ 


24  Smith  V.  Rowe,  31  Me.  312; 
"Withers  v.  Larrabee,  48  Me.  570. 

25  Withers  v.  Larrabee,  48  Me. 
570,  573.  The  contrary  was  held 
in  Betz  v.  Maxwell,  48  Kan.  142, 
29  Pac.  Rep.  147.  In  that  case  a 
tenant  at  will  deserted  the  prem- 
ises which  he  had  under  the  lease 
without  giving  notice  to  quit.  A 
notice  to  quit  was  required  by  the 
statute.  Then  the  landlord  en- 
tered upon  the  premises.  It  was 
held  that  the  giving  of  the  notice 
required  by  the  statute  was  dis- 
pensed with  and  that  the  landlord 
could  not  recover  rent  for  any  por- 
tion of  the  term  which  elapsed 
after  he  took  possession. 

26  Stickney  v.  Burke,  64  N.  H. 
377,  10  Atl.  Rep.  852. 

27  Hogsett  V.  Ellis.  17  Mich.  351. 
"When  tenancies  at  will  are  ter- 
minated by  notice,  the  real  ques- 
tion is  not  how  long  a  notice  shall 
be  given,  or  is  requisite  to  ter- 
minate it.  Notice  to  quit  the  pos- 
session, or  something  equivalent 
to  it,  terminates  it,  and  the  ques- 
tion necessarily  remaining  is  how. 
long  a  time  has  the  tenant  to  va- 
cate the  premises?    Under  a  notice 


to  quit,  or  upon  the  termination  of 
a  tenancy  at  will  in  any  other 
manner,  a  tenant  has  the  right  to 
a  reasonable  time  to  vacate  the 
premises,  depending  upon  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case.  Under  a 
lease  of  agricultural  lands  he  may 
be  entitled  to  emblements,  and  can 
remain  long  enough  after  the 
lease  determines  to  gather  the 
crops  that  he  has  sown,  which 
may  be  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
year.  In  a  lease  of  buildings  the 
tenant,  when  the  lease  ends,  may 
have  nothing  in  them,  and  so 
would  need  no  time  to  vacate 
them.  In  a  case  like  the  one  at 
bar,  where  the  premises  are  used 
for  the  storage  of  heavy  machin- 
ery, the  lessee  should  have  rea- 
sonable time  to  procure  other  ac- 
commodations and  remove  his 
property.  A  case  might  arise 
where  it  would  be  necessary  to 
erect  buildings.  Store-houses 
might  be  plenty  in  the  vicinity  or 
there  might  be  none.  No  rule  can 
be  laid  down  to  apply  to  all  cases." 
The  court,  by  Taft,  J.,  in  Amsden 
V.  Floyd,  15  Atl.  Rep.  332,  60  Vt 
386. 


222  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  159,  The  commission  of  waste  by  a  tenant  at  will.  Volun- 
tary waste  when  it  is  committed  by  a  tenant  at  will  is  ipso  facto 
a  determination  of  the  tenancy  at  will  and  the  tenant  is  there- 
after a  tenant  at  sufferance.  He  has  also  been  said  in  some  case 
to  be  a  trespasser  thereafter  so  that  an  action  in  the  nature  of 
qiiare  clausum  f regit  may  be  maintained  against  him  by  the 
landowner  or  landlord.-^  This  liability  to  a  forfeiture  and  to  an 
action  for  trespass  is  in  theory  based  upon  an  implied  covenant 
on  the  part  of  the  tenant  at  will  to  use  the  demised  premises  in  a 
proper  manner.  He  will  be  liable  accordingly  in  the  case  of  a 
demise  of  a  farm  for  cutting  timber  for  other  purposes  than  the 
repair  of  fences  which  it  is  his  duty  to  keep  in  repair  or  if  he 
allows  a  meadow  to  be  injured  and  fruit  trees  or  other  trees  to 
be  destroyed.-®  In  the  case  of  land  not  intended  to  be  used  for 
farming  purposes  the  same  principle  is  applicable.  The  cov- 
enant to  use  the  demised  premises  in  a  proper  and  suitable  man- 
ner which  is  implied  in  every  lease  is  regarded  as  a  condition  sub- 
sequent in  the  case  of  tenancy  at  will  the  breach  of  which  shall 
operate  as  a  forfeiture.  Wliether  there  has  been  waste  is  deter- 
mined by  general  rules  and  principles.  The  authorities  are  not 
at  all  harmonious  upon  the  question  whether  the  landlord  in  a 
tenancy  at  will  can  terminate  it  because  the  tenant  is  gniilty  of 
permissive  waste  as  distinct  from  voluntary  waste.  Several  of 
the  English  cases  hold  that  the  lessor  cannot  determine  the  ten- 
ancy at  will  on  account  of  permissive  waste  by  the  tenant  for 
the  reason  that  the  provisions  of  the  Statute  of  Gloucester  re- 
quiring the  tenant  to  be  accountable  for  permissive  waste  refer 
only  and  exclusively  to  tenants  for  years.^°  But  on  the  othei- 
hand  it  has  been  held  in  England  that  a  tenant  for  years  may 
recover  against  his  tenant  at  will  for  permissive  waste,  and  this 
rule  is  based  upon  the  reasoning  that,  inasmuch  as  the  tenant  for 
years  is  liable  to  his  landlord  for  the  permissive  waste  of  his  sub- 


2sDanio].s     v.     Bonrl,    21     Pick.  Com.  146;  Co.  Litt.  5.5b;  Countess 

(Mass.)  367,  371,  32  Am.  Dec.  269;  of  Shrewsbury's  Case,  5  Coke,  13b. 

Phillips   V.   Covert.   7    Johns.    (N.  29  Chalmers  v.  Smith,  152  Mass. 

Y.)  1.     See,  also,  Suffern  v.  Town-  561. 

send,  9  .Johns.  (N.  Y.)  3.5;  Wright  so  Pomfret  v.  Ricroft,  1   Saund. 

V.  Rol)erts,  22  Wis.  161;   Pettengill  323a;  Harnett  v.  Maitland,  16  Mce. 

V.    Evans,    5   N.    H.    54;    2    Black.  &  Wei.  256,  262. 


TENANCY  AT  WILL.  223 

tenant,  he  ought  to  have  a  remedy  over  against  the  person  who  is 
in  fact  responsible  for  the  permissive  waste.^^ 

8  160,  The  assignability  of  the  tenant's  interest  in  an  estate 
at  will.  The  proposition  is  sometimes  laid  down  in  the  eases 
very  broadly  that  a  tenant  at  will  cannot  assign  his  term  or  es- 
tate ^^■ithout  the  consent  of  his  landlord.  If  this  be  true  in  its 
general  sense  its  truth  depends  rather  upon  the  character  of  the 
tenant's  interest  or  term  which  is  always  uncertain  and  defeasible 
at  the  will  of  the  landlord,  than  upon  any  inherent  incapacity  in 
the  lessee  to  assign.  Owing  to  this  quasi  lack  of  assignability  of 
the  tenant's  interest  in  a  term  at  will  a  person  who  enters  upon 
the  premises  under  an  assignment  from  the  tenant  at  will  is  a 
disseizor  or  trespasser  so  far  as  the  lessor  is  concerned  and  he 
may  maintain  trespass  against  him  without  giving  him  notice  to 
quit.^^  Hence  from  this  it  follows  that  the  assignment  of  the 
tenant's  interest  does  not  per  se  make  his  assignee  a  tenant  at 
will.^^  If,  however,  the  landlord  sues  the  assignee  of  the  tenant 
at  will  for  rent  or  for  use  and  occupation  and  the  assignee  pays 
the  rent  claimed  or  the  landlord  receives  the  value  of  the  use  and 
occupation  the  assignee  will  be  then  regarded  as  a  tenant  at  will 
and  the  landlord  will  be  estopped  by  his  conduct  to  assert  the 
contrary.'*  An  under  lease  by  the  tenant  at  will  may  have  the 
same  effect  on  the  duration  of  the  tenancy  as  an  assignment.  It 
is  not  material  to  the  general  principle  that  the  attempted  under 
lease  or  assignment  by  the  tenant  at  will  is  void.'^    It  cannot  be 

31  Panton  v.  Isham,  1  Salk.  19;  44,  22  N.  E.  Rep.  69,  5  L.  R.  A.  66; 
Cudlip  V.  Rundle,  Garth.  263.  Cooper  v.  Adams,  6  Cush.  (Mass.) 

32  Cunningham  v.  Holton,  55  Me.  87;  King  v.  Lawson,  98  Mass.  309; 
33,  36;  Reckhow  v.  Schank,  43  N.  Howell  v.  Howell,  29  N.  Car.  496, 
Y.  448;  Austin  v.  Thompson,  45  47  Am.  Dec.  335;  Melling  v.  Leake, 
N.  H.  117.  See,  also,  Cooper  v.  16  Com.  Bench  (N.  S.)  652;  Pin- 
Adams,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  87;  1  horn  v.  Souster  8  Exch.  763.  A 
Cruise  Dig.  244,  tit.  19,  c.  1,  §  7.  tenant  at  will  has  no  estate  which 
As  to  the  non-assignability  of  the  he  can  assign  to  any  other  per- 
interest  of  a  tenant  at  will,  see  son.  Dingley  v.  Buffum,  57  Me. 
further  Packard  v.  Cleveland,  etc.,  581. 

Co.,  46  111.  App.  244,  245;   Whitte-  ss  King  v.  Lawson.  98  Mass.  309. 

more  v.  Gibbs,  24  N.  H.  484,  489;  S4  Cunningham  v.  Holton,  55  Me. 

Dark  v.  Donelson's  Lessee,  2  Yerg.  33. 

{Tenn.)     249,    24    Am.    Dec.    485;  «6  Birch  v.  Wright,  1.  T.  R.  378. 
Appleton  V.    Ames,   150   Mass.   34, 


224  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT, 

said  however  that  the  assignment  or  under  lease  ipso  facto  ren- 
ders the  tenancy  at  will  at  an  end.  For  a  tenancy  is  at  the  will 
of  both  parties  and  if  the  assignment  is  without  the  knowledge 
of  the  landlord  it  does  not  determine  the  will  until  he  knows 
of  it.  Nor  will  the  assignment  work  a  determination  of  the 
will  and  put  an  end  to  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  until 
knowledge  of  it  has  come  to  the  landlord  and  the  latter  has 
done  some  act  which  indicates  his  intention  to  terminate  the 
estate  at  will.  If  the  landlord  shall  expressly  or  by  implica- 
tion elect  to  treat  the  original  tenancy  at  will  as  continuing 
after  the  assignment  he  may  do  so  and  continue  to  hold  the 
original  tenant  liable  for  the  rent.  If  on  the  other  hand  he 
shall  elect  to  regard  the  assignment  or  subletting  as  a  termina- 
tion of  the  tenancy  at  will  the  original  lessee  is  thereafter  free 
from  responsibility  to  him  and  the  landlord  may  either  treat  the 
subtenant  as  a  trespasser  or  as  a  tenant  at  will  unless  he  shall 
proceed  to  enter  into  other  arrangements  with  him  as  to  his  ten- 
ure of  the  premises. ^^ 

§  161.  The  right  of  a  tenant  a  wiU  to  recover  damages  for  an 
injury  to  the  land.  By  virtue  of  the  well-established  rule  that 
any  person  having  an  interest  in  and  a  proprietory  right  to 
the  possession  of  land  may  recover  damages  for  an  injury  to 
his  interest  and  right,  a  tenant  at  will  may  recover  for  a  tres- 
pass on  the  land  or  for  an  eviction  by  a  stranger,  or  for  any 
conduct  on  the  part  of  another  which  prevents  him  from  hav- 
ing the  full  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  land  according  to  the 
amount  and  character  of  his  right.  The  tenant  at  will  has 
such  an  interest  as  will  enable  him  to  maintain  an  action  of 
trespass  against  any  person  who  interferes  with  his  present 
possession  and  enjoyment  of  the  land  and  an  action  of  tres- 
pass on  the  case  or  some  similar  action  in  those  states  which 
have  adopted  the  modern  system  of  code  procedure  against  any 
person  who  injures  him  in  his  possession  and  enjoyment  by  main- 
taining a  nuisance.'*'  And  in  one  case  it  was  held  that  a  tenant 
at  will  may  maintain  trespass  even  against  his  own  landlord 
where  the  latter,  before  the  lease  had  been  legally  determined, 

3' Pinhorn    v.    SouRter,    8   Exch.  (Mass.)   135;   Hilburn  v.  Fogg,  9& 

7C5;    Jones    v.    Clark,    Hard.    47;  Mass.  11;   Bulwer  v.  Bulwer,  2  B. 

IJttle  V.  Palllster,  4  Me.  20!).  &  Ad.  470. 

s-  Foley     v.     Wyeth,     2     Allen 


TENANCY  AT  WILL. 


ilo 


had  entered  upon  the  premises  and  by  his  conduct  caused  dam- 
age to  the  personal  property  of  the  tenant.^*  AVhere  a  stranger 
cuts  timber  on  land  which  is  occupied  by  a  tenant  at  will,  the 
tenant  at  will  as  well  as  the  owner  of  the  reversion  may  re- 
cover damages  according  to  their  respective  interests  in  the  land.^® 
So  an  action  for  damages  for  the  destmction  of  uncut  grass 
may  be  maintained  by  a  tenant  at  will  against  a  railroad  whose 
negligence  *°  caused  the  damage.  Hence  where  grass  growing  on 
land  which  is  occupied  by  one  as  a  tenant  at  wall  is  burned  by 
reason  of  the  negligence  of  a  railroad  company  the  tenant  at  will 
may  recover  for  the  same  though  for  any  permanent  injury  to, 
the  freehold  the  owner  only  could  recover.  The  measure  of  the 
tenant's  damages  will  be  the  difference  between  the  usable  value 
of  the  land  to  him  before  and  after  the  grass  was  burned,  do^^ii 
to  the  time  of  the  trial. '^^ 


38  Foley  V.  Wyeth,  2  Allen 
(Mass.)  135.  "A  tenant  at  will 
has  an  estate,  -which  must  first  be 
terminated,  before  he  will  cease 
to  have  a  right  to  continue  in  pos- 
session. Such  termination  may  be 
brought  about  by  his  surrendering 
his  tenancy,  or  by  any  act  incon- 
sistent therewith  (1  Cruise,  273); 
or  by  the  decease  of  either  party 
(4  Com.  Dig.  Estates,  H.  7);  or 
by  making  a  lease  to  another 
(Co.  Litt.  57a);  or  by  giving  no- 
15 


tice  in  writing  lor  tne  purpose,- 
by  either  party,  thirty  days  at 
least  having  elapsed  thereafter."" 
Wheeler  v.  Wood,  25  Me.  287. 

39  2  Coke  on  Lit.  57a.  See,  also, 
Hayward  v.  Sedgly,  31  Am.  Dec. 
64;  Brown  v.  Bates,  Brayton  (Vt.) 
230. 

40  St.  Louis;  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Hall, 
71  Ark.  302,  74  S.  W.  Rep.  293. 

41  St.  Louis,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Hall,  71 
Ark.  302,  74  S.  W.  Rep.  293. 


CHAPTER  VTII. 

TENANCY  AT  SUP'FERANCB. 

§  162.     The  definition  of  a  tenancy  at  sufferance. 
163.    A  tenancy  at  sufferance  arising  on  the  termination  of  a  ten- 
ancy at  will. 
.    1G4.     A  tenancy  at  sufferance  by  holding  over. 

165.  The  grantor  in  possession  after  the  delivery  of  his  deed. 

166.  A  servant  or  agent  in  the  possession  of  his  employer's  land  after 

the  contract  is  at  an  end. 

167.  Mortgagor  in  possession  after  sale  or  condition  broken. 

168.  When  an  undertenant  becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance. 

169.  Necessity  for  notice  to  quit. 

170.  Right  of  a  tenant  at  sufferance  to  lease. 

171.  The  liability  of  a  tenant  at  sufferance  to  pay  rent. 

172.  Action  of  trespass  by  the  landlord  against  the  tenant  at  suffer- 

ance. 

§  162.  The  definition  of  a  tenancy  at  sufferance.  A  tenancy 
at  sufferance  is  one  which  is  created  by  the  wrongful  holding 
over  and  remaking,  in  possession  of  a  tenant  whose  original  en- 
trance upon  the  land  was  lawful  The  word  wrongful  when 
used  in  this  connection  merely  means  that  the  holding  over  is 
without  any  right  founded  on  contract  or  other  legal  basis.  It  is 
:nearly  equivalent  to  an  illegal  holding  over.  Thus,  a  tenant  at 
sufferance  has  been  defined  to  be  one  who  had  first  come  in  by  a 
lawful  demise  but  who  after  his  estate  is  at  end  wrongfully  or 
without  the  consent  of  the  landlord  holds  over.^  This  estate  is 
iKjt  the  result  of  contract.  It  is  created  solely  by  the  delay  or 
forbearance  of  the  landlord  in  not  ousting  the  tenant  after  the 
expiration  of  the  tenancy.  It  is  the  most  insecure  and  most  in- 
significant of  all  tenures.  The  tenant  at  sufferance  differs  in 
vary  litllc  rcom  a  trespasser.  The  one  fact  that  distinguishes 
him  from  a  trespasser  is  that  his  original  entrance  was  lawful 
while  the  original  entrance  of  the  trespasser  is  unlawful  and  he 
is  a  wrongdoer  from  the  beginning.     Strictly  speaking  tenancy 

iCo.  T.itt.  57b;  4  Com.  Dig.  Estates,  1. 


TENANCY  AT  SUFFERANCE. 


227 


by  sufferance  is  a  mere  fiction  of  law  for  there  can  be  no  true 
tenancy  without  a  contract  which  involves  the  assent  express  or 
implied  of  the  landlord  to  the  possession  of  the  tenant.  The 
tenancy  at  sufferance  was  merely  a  device  of  the  early  common 
law  judges  to  prevent  the  creation  and  running  of  adverse  pos- 
session by  the  tenant  holding  over.  After  the  expiration  of  his 
term  the  tenant  was  in  fact  a  mere  trespasser  or  intruder  and  a 
tenancy  at  sufferance  was  created  to  prevent  the  intruder  from 
disputing  the  landlord's  title  and  holding  adversely.  And  aside 
from  all  this  the  tenant  holding  over  could  not  be  regarded  as  a 
trespasser  until  the  landlord  actually  entered  upon  possession  of 
the  premises  as  the  tenant's  original  entry  had  been  lawful 
though  his  holding  over  was  luilawful.^ 

§  163.  A  tenancy  at  sufferance  arising  on  the  termination  of 
a  tenancy  at  will.  It  is  a  general  rule  that  on  the  termination 
of  a  tenancy  at  will  the  tenant  if  he  remains  in  possession  be- 


2  So  much  of  law  depends  upon 
accurate  definitions  that  it  may 
be  well  to  consider  carefully  the 
following,  as  well  as  all  defini- 
tions: "A  tenant  at  sufferance  is 
one  who  comes  into  possession  of 
land  by  lawful  title,  but  who  holds 
over  by  wrong  after  the  termina- 
tion of  his  term.  Fielder  v.  Childs, 
73  Ala.  567,  577;  Godfrey  v.  Wal- 
ker, 42  Ga.  562,  574;  Hanson  v. 
Johnson,  62  Md.  25,  29,  50  Am. 
Rep.  199;  Kellogg  v.  Kellogg,  6 
Barb.  116,  130;  Rowan  v.  Lytle, 
11  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  616,  618;  Jack- 
son V.  Cairns,  20  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
301,  305;  Emerson  v.  Emerson 
(Tex.),  35  S.  W.  Rep.  425,  426. 
When  a  tenant  has  come  rightfully 
into  possession  of  land  by  permis- 
sion of  the  owner  and  continues 
to  occupy  the  same  after  the  time 
for  which,  by  such  permission,  he 
has  a  right  to  hold  the  same,  he 
is  said  to  be  a  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance. In  the  language  of  the 
elementary  writers  he  is  one  who 
comes  in  by  right  and  holds  over 


without  right."  He  holds  with- 
out right  and  yet  is  not  a  tres- 
passer. Bright  V.  McOuat,  40  Ind. 
521,  525.  And  again,  a  tenant  at 
sufferance  is  one  who  entered  by 
a  lawful  demise  or  title,  and  after 
that  has  ceased  wrongfully  con- 
tinues in  possession  without  the 
assent  or  dissent  of  the  person 
next  entitled.  Willis  v.  Harrell, 
118  Ga.  906,  45  S.  E.  Rep.  794,  795. 
So  tenancy  by  sufferance  is  a  ten- 
ancy of  such  a  nature  that  there 
is  by  necessary  implication  an  ab- 
sence of  any  contractual  relation 
between  the  owner  and  the  ten- 
ant, and  so  if,  during  such  ten- 
ancy, there  be  any  express  permis- 
sion or  assent  given  by  the  owner, 
the  tenancy  becomes  one  at  will. 
Willis  V.  Moore,  59  Tex.  628,  637, 
46  Am.  Rep.  284.  So  it  has  been 
said  that  an  estate  at  sufferance 
is  an  estate  created  not  by  the 
consent  but  by  the  laches  of  the 
owner.  Rowan  v.  Lytle,  11  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  616,  618. 


22S  LAW  OF  L.VNDLOED  ^VIsD  TENANT. 

comes  a  tenant  at  sufferance,  in  tlie  absence  of  an  agreement 
creating  a  tenancy  of  a  different  character.'  It  is  not  material 
for  what  reason  the  tenancy  at  will  is  determined  so  long  as  a 
new  lease  is  not  entered  into,  or  the  premises  are  not  surrendered 
to  and  accepted  by  the  landlord.  Thus  on  the  termination  of  a 
tenancy  at  will  by  the  death  of  the  lessor  the  tenant  at  will  be- 
comes a  tenant  at  sufferance  of  the  lessor's  heirs.*  So,  also,  in 
case  a  tenancy  at  will  is  terminated  by  a  demise  for  years  given 
by  the  landlord  to  a  stranger  the  former  tenant  at  Avill  at  once 
becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance.^  Where  land  which  has  been 
leased  to  a  tenant  at  will  is  sold  under  an  execution  against  the 
lessor  the  tenancy  at  will  is  ipso  facto  at  once  terminated.  The 
tenant  at  will  of  the  former  owner  is  thereafter  a  tenant  at  suf- 
ferance of  the  purchaser  at  the  execution  sale,  being  made  so  by 
the  sale.  The  purchaser  or  his  lessee  may  thereafter  treat  the 
tenant  as  a  tenant  at  sufferance  and  may  after  notice,  when  it  is 
required  by  a  statute,  recover  possession.*'  So,  too,  a  volun- 
tary sale  and  conveyance  of  the  premises  by  the  landlord  termi- 
nating the  tenancy  at  will  converts  the  tenant  at  will  into  a  tenant 
at  sufferance  of  the  vendee,'^  without  any  attornment  or  action 
on  the  part  either  of  vendee  or  vendor. 

§  164.  A  tenancy  at  sufferance  by  holding  over.  A  person 
who,  being  a  tenant  at  will  or  for  a  term  of  years,  holds  over 
after  the  expiration  of  his  term  in  the  absence  of  proof  that  the 

3  Doe  V.  Turner,  7  M.  &  W.  226,  Mass.   54,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  221;   Dil- 

9  M.   W.  643;    Esty  v.   Baker,   50  Ion    v.    Brown,    11    Gray    (Mass.) 

Me.  325,  79  Am.  Dec.   616;    Bene-  179. 

diet  V.  Morse,  1(J  Met.  (Mass.)  223;  «  Marsters    v.    Cling,    163    Mass. 

Keay  v.  Goodwin,  16  Mass.  1;  Ris-  477,  40  N.  E.  Rep.  763,  also  holding 

ing  V.  Stannard,  17  Mass.  282.  that  under  the  statute  a  forcible 

*  Reed    v.    Reed,    48    Me.    688;  entry  or   detainer  by  the   tenant 

Knight  V.   Quigley,  2  Camp.   505;  need  not  be  shown,  nor  need  it  be 

Co.  Litt.  57b.  shown  that  the  occupant  ever  held 

6  Hildreth  v.  Conant,  10  Met.  of,  or  attorned  to,  the  new  owner. 
(Mass.)  298.  A.  verbal  agreement  See,  also.  Lash  v.  Ames,  171  Mass. 
by  the  owner  of  land  that  a  person  487,  50  N.  E.  Rep.  996. 
Is  to  occupy  it  while  he  lives  with-  7  Winter  y.  Stevens,  9  Allen 
out  paying  rent  makes  the  oc-  (Mass.)  526;  Lash  v.  Ames,  171 
fupant  a  tenant  at  will,  and  he  Mass.  487,  50  N.  E.  Rep.  996;  How- 
becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance  at  ard  v.  Merriam,  5  Cush.  (Mass.) 
once  where  the  owner  executes  a  563,  574;  Dallas  v.  Pool,  3  Met. 
lease  of  the  jiremises  for  a  term  to  (Mass.)  350, 
another.      Hooton     v.     Holt,    139 


TENANCY  AT  SUFFERANCE,  229 

landlord  has  consented  to  such  holding  over,  is  a  mere  tenant  at 
sufferance.*  So,  the  tenant  who  holds  over  after  the  termination 
of  his  lease  under  an  agreement  with  a  person  who  had  no  au- 
thority to  permit  him  to  do  so,  is  a  tenant  at  sufferance.  Thus, 
for  example,  a  person  who,  on  the  termination  of  his  lease,  goes 
to  one  whom  he  supposes  to  be  the  agent  of  his  landlord  and  this 
latter  person  states  he  may  continue  in  possession  until  a  lease 
can  be  ai-ranged  for  with  the  landlord,  is  a  tenant  at  sufferance. 
So,  a  tenant  for  the  life  of  another,^  or  the  lessee  for  a  term  of 
years  of  a  tenant  for  life  who  remains  in  possession  after  the 
death  of  the  person  who  is  his  lessor  becomes  a  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance.^" So,  generally  a  tenant  for  years  of  a  tenant  for  life,  who, 
without  the  consent  of  the  remainderman  holds  over  after  the 
termination  by  death  of  his  term,"  or  the  tenant  who  continues  in 
possession  after  the  termination  of  the  lessor's  estate^^  becomes 
thereby  a  tenant  at  sufferance.^^  But  the  general  rule  that  the 
tenant  holding  over  after  the  termination  of  his  estate  is  thereby 
a  tenant  at  sufferance  is  recognized  only  where  the  parties  are 
themselves  silent.  The  presumption  that  the  tenant  holding 
over  is  holding  by  sufferance  may  be  rebutted  though  the  burden 
of  proof  to  do  so  is  upon  the  tenant  holding  over.  He  may  show 
that  the  landlord  has  so  acted  or  has  so  spoken  that  the  tenancy 

sHauxhurst  v.   Lobree,   38   Cal.  o  Allen  v.   Hill,   Cro.   Eliz.    238; 

563;    Sutton  v.   Hiram   Lodge,   83  Co.  Litt.   57b;    Comyns'  Dig.  "Es- 

Ga.  770,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  585,  6  L.  R.  tates."  I. 

A.   703;    Brown  v.    Smith,    83   111.  lo  Co.  Litt.  57b.    And  see  Shields 

291;  Wheeler  v.  Wood,  25  Me.  287;  v.  Atkins,  3  Atl<.  560,  562. 

Keay  v.  Goodv.-in,  16  Mass.  1;  Ris-  "  Roe  v.  Ward,  1  H.  Bl.  96,  99. 

ing    v.    Stannard,    17    Mass.    282;  See  Guthman  v.  Vallery,   51  Neb. 

Finney's   Trustees   v.    City   of   St.  824,  71  N.  W.  Rep.  734;   Tarry  v. 

Louis,  39  Mo.  177;  Russell  v.  Fab-  Tarry.  14  N.  Y.  430,  433;  Co.  Litt. 

van,  34  N.  H.  218;    Livingston  v.  57b. 

Tanner,   14  N.  Y.   64;    Jackson   v.  12  Simkin   v.   Ashurst,   1   Cr.  M. 

McLeod,    12    Johns.    (N.   Y.)    182;  &  R.  261,  4  Tyr.  781. 

Worthington  V.  Globe  Rolling  Mill,  i^-The    lessee   of   the   tenant    in 

9  Am.  Law  Rec.  693,  6  Wkly.  Law  dower    of    by    the    curtesy     who 

Bui.  235,  6  Ohio  Dec.  1038;    Will-  holds  over  without  the  consent  of 

iams  V.  Ladew,  171  Pa.  St.  369,  33  the  remainderman  after  the  death 

Atl.   Rep.   329,   37  W.   N.   C.   100;  of  his  lessor  is  a  tenant  at  suffer- 

Fitzpatrick    v.    Childs,    2    Brewst.  ance.     Miller  v.  Mainwaring,  Cro. 

(Pa.)     365,    23    Leg.    Int.    197,    6  Car.  397;   Guthman  v.  Vallery,  51 

Phila.  135;  McNamara  v.  O'Brien,  Neb.  824,  71  N.  W.  Rep.  734. 
2  Wyo.   447. 


230  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

at  sufferance  was  presumed  uever  to  have  existed,  or  that  it  has 
been  converted  into  some  other  tenancy.^*  The  mere  silence  of 
the  huidlord  for  a  short  time  after  the  expiration  of  the  term, 
while  tile  tenant  is  holding  over  is  not  enough  alone  to  create  affiy 
presumption  that  the  tenant  is  anything  else  but  a  tenant  at  suf- 
ferance. The  presumption  that  the  tenant  holding  over  is  a 
tenant  at  sufferance  implies  or  requires  that  there  shall  be  no 
existing  agreement  or  understanding  between  the  parties  exe- 
cuted or  implied  after  the  holding  has  commenced.  If  on  the 
facts  it  appears  that  the  holding  over  was  with  the  consent  of  tho, 
landlord,  shown  either  by  his  conduct  or  by  his  language,  or  by 
such  a  character  or  degree  of  silence  in  connection  with  the  con- 
duct of  the  tenant,  as  w411  in  equity  and  fairness  estop  the  land- 
lord to  assert  that  the  tenant  is  a  trespasser,  the  tenant  will  be 
thereafter  regarded  as  a  tenant  at  will  and  not  as  a  tenant  at  suf- 
ferance and  the  terms  of  the  prior  lease  may  then  be  considered 
in  relation  to  the  new  tenancy. ^° 

§  165.  The  grantor  in  possession  after  the  delivery  of  his' 
deed.  It  has  been  held  in  a  few  cases  that  a  grantor  of  real 
property  who,  with  the  consent  of  the  grantee,  continues  in  the 
possession  of  the  property  which  he  has  conveyed  after  the  de- 
livery of  his  deed  is  a  tenant  at  will  of  the  grantee.^''  The 
grantor  is  only  a  tenant  at  will  where  he  holds  over  after  the  con- 
veyance with  the  grantee's  consent.  "Where  no  consent  is  shown, 
either  expressly  or  arising  by  necessary  implication,  the  grantor 
in  possession  is  a  mere  intruder.  In.  most  cases  the  grantee  must 
resort  to  an  action  of  ejectment  to  remove  him  from  the  prem- 
ises. In  every  case  it  is  clear  that  the  rehitionship  of  landlord 
and  tfiifiiit  does  not  exist  between  grantee  and  grantor  where  the 
lattei-  holds  over  without  the  consent  of  the  former,  though  it  has 
been  held  in  one  or  two  cases  that  the  grantor  who  agrees  to  de- 
liver the  premises  on  a  certain  date  and  continues  in  possession 
aftci-  Ihal  (hite  ha.s  expired  without  the  consent  of  the  grantee  Is 

i»  Moore  v.  Sniilh,  .'jG  N.  .1.  Law,  of  any  instalment  all  instalments 

446,  448,  29  Atl.  Rep.  159.  shall  be  forfeited  and  the  vendor 

m  A    purchaser    who    enters    on  shall  not  be  compelled  to  convey, 

the  premises  under  an  agreement  is    a    mere    tenant    at    sufferance 

for    the    sale   of    leasehold    prem-  after    default.      Doe    d.    Moore    v. 

ises  which  Is  to  be  paid  In  instal-  Lawder,  1  Stark.  308. 
nients,  with  a  proviso  that  in  the  i<i  Currier  v.   Earl,   13   Me.   216; 

event  of  a  <lel;uilt  in  the  payment  Hennett  v.  Robinson,  27  Mich.  26. 


TENANCY  AT  SUFFERANCE.  231 

a  tenant  at  sufferance  and  that  anj^  person  to  whom  he  has  leased 
the  premises  while  he  possessed  the  right  to  remain  in  them  who 
holds  over  after  the  grantor's  right  is  terminated  is  a  tenant  at 
sufferance  of  the  grantee. ^^  And  it  has  also  been  held  that  an 
equitable  owner  of  land  who  sells  the  land  and  thereafter  pro- 
cures the  owner  of  the  legal  title  to  execute  a  conveyance  to  the 
person  to  whom  he  has  sold  it  is  merely  a  tenant  at  sufferance  of 
the  vendor,  where  without  any  agreement  authorizing  him  to 
remain,  he  continues  in  possession  of  the  land  after  his  sale  and 
conveyanee.^^  In  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary  a  vendor 
of  land  who  continues  in,  possession  after  he  has  delivered  a 
deed  to  his  vendee  will  be  presumed  to  do  so  without  the  consent 
of  the  vendee.  From  this  presumption  of  non-consent  the  fur- 
ther inference  is  drawn  in  some  cases  that  he  is  a  tenant  at  suf- 
ferance. Clearly  the  object  of  the  latter  presumption  is  to  fur- 
nish the  vendee  with  a  ready  and  speedy  remedy  to  obtain  the 
possession  of  the  land  in  place  of  the  tedious  and  expensive  rem- 
edy by  ejectment  which  he  would  be  put  to  if  the  intruder  were 
not  a  tenant  at  sufferance.  The  presumption  of  the  vendee's 
non-consent  may  always  be  rebutted  by  competent  proof,  and,  if 
it  appears  from  the  proof,  that  the  vendee  consented  to  the  hold- 
ing over  by  the  vendor,  his  holding  over  ceases  to  be  wrongful, 
and  he  is  no  longer  a  tenant  at  sufferance  and  may  be  regarded 
as  a  tenant  at  will.^^ 

§  166.  A  servant  or  agent  in  the  possession  of  his  employer's 
land  after  the  contract  is  at  an  end.  A  servant  or  agent  of  the 
owner  of  land  who  as  a  part  of  the  compensation  for  his  services 
rendered  to  the  owner  is  permitted  by  the  owner  to  occupy  prem- 
ises free  of  rent  on  the  termination  of  the  contract  of  agency  or 
employment  becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance  of  the  master.-"  The 
general  rule  is  that  the  holding  over  of  the  agent  or  servant  must 
be  without  the  consent  of  the  master.     The  termination  of  the 

17  Hyatt  V.  Wood,  4  Johns.    (N.  i?Work  v.  Brayton,  5  Ind.  396, 

Y.)    150,    4   Am.    Dec.   258;    Wood  399. 

V.   Hyatt,   4   Johns.    (N.   Y.)    313;  if  Bennett  v.  Robinson,  27  Mich. 

Bennett  v.  Robinson,  27  Mich.  26,  26,    30;    Wolcott   v.    Hamilton,    61 

30.    Also  holding  that  the  fact  that  Vt.  79,  17  Atl.  Rep.  39. 

the  grantee  has  entered  into  a  con-  20  Eichengreen  v.  Appel,  44   HI. 

tract  to  reconvey  in  the  future  on  App.  19;   Bristor  v.  Burr,  120  N. 

certain     contingencies     does     not  Y.  427,  31  N.  Y.  S.  R.  566,  aflBrm- 

alter  the  rule.  ing,  12  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  638. 


232 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


contract  instantly  determines  all  relations  between  the  parties, 
and  the  agent  or  servant's  possession  from  that  minute  is  wrong- 
ful. He  is  not  a  trespasser,  however,  because  his  original  entry- 
was  lawful.  "While  the  contract  of  hiring  exists  a  servant  who 
lives  upon  his  master's  land  may  or  may  not  be  a  tenant  of  the 
master.  The  fact  that  he  occupies  premises  for  the  necessary 
performance  of  his  duty  for  his  employer  does  not  make  him  a 
tenant.  Nevertheless,  if  he  continues  after  his  discharge  from 
the  master's  service  to  oecupy  the  premises  he  must  be  regarded 
as  a  tenant  at  sufferance  for  he  can  under  no  circumstances  be 
treated  as  a  trespasser  because  his  original  entry  was  lawful.-^ 
§  167.  The  mortgagor  in  possession  after  sale  or  condition 
broken.  A  mortgagor  who  is  in  possession  of  the  mortgaged 
premises  after  foreclosure  and  after  the  expiration  of  the  period 
of  redemption,--  or  after  condition  broken^-^  or  who  continues  ia 
possession  after  a  sale  of  the  mortgaged  premises  made  under 
a  power  of  sale  in  the  mortgage  ^*  is  a  tenant  at  sufferance  of 
the  mortgagee  or  of  the  mortgagee's  assignee  before  sale  and 
after  the  sale  he  is  a  tenant  at  sufferance  of  the  purchaser.^* 


21  School  District  No.  11  v.  Bat- 
sche,  106  Mich.  336,  64  N.  W.  Rep. 
196,  29  L.  R.  A.  576.  It  was  con- 
tended by  the  defendant's  counsel 
that  in  order  to  have  a  tenancy 
grow  into  one  by  sufferance  it 
must  have  been  originally  created 
by  an  agreement  for  one  of  the 
parties,  and  that  as  no  agreement 
for  a  tenancy  ever  existed  the  re- 
lation cannot  arise.  But  it  was 
held  that  a  person  in  possession 
of  land  lawfully  who  holds  over 
without  right  becomes  a  tenant  at 
sufferance  if  the  owner  suffers  him 
to  remain  in  possession  a  sufficient 
longth  of  time  to  imply  an  inten- 
tional acquiescence  in  the  occu- 
pancy, and  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  previous  holding  be  that  of  a 
tenant. 

22  Tucker  v.  Keeler,  4  Vt.  IGl. 
22a  Jackson  v.  Warren,  32  111.  31. 

23  Kinsley  v.  Ames,  2  Met. 
(r^Iass.)   29.     See,  also,  .Johnson  v. 


Donaldson,   17   R.    I.    107,   20   Atl. 
242. 

24  Luchs  V.  Jones,  1  MacArthur 
(D.  C.)  345;  Stedman  v.  Gassett, 
18  Vt.  346,  351;  Bodwell  Granite 
Co.  V.  Lane,  S3  Me.  168,  21  Atl. 
Rep.  829;  Doe  v.  Giles,  5  Bing. 
421;  Doe  v.  Maisey,  8  Bar.  &  Ores. 
767.  "We  find  from  the  deed 
l)etween  the  parties  that  the  pos- 
session of  his  estate  is  secured  to 
him  until  a  certain  day,  and  that 
if  he  does  not  redeem  his  pledge 
by  that  day  the  mortgagee  has  a 
right  to  enter  and  take  possession 
From  that  day  the  possession  be- 
longs to  the  mortgagee.  And 
there  is  no  more  occasion  for  his 
requiring  that  the  estate  should 
be  delivered  up  to  him,  before  he 
brings  an  ejectment,  than  for  a 
lessor  to  demand  possession  on  the 
determination  of  a  term.  The  sit- 
uation of  a  lessee  on  the  expira- 
tion  of  a  term,  and  a  mortgagor 


TENANCY  AT  SUFFERANCE.  233 

So  where  a  woman  and  her  husband  enter  into  tlie  possession 
of  his  land,  which  he  mortgages  and  then  absconds,  leaving  her 
in  possession  of  the  land  and  subsequently  he  conveyed  it  to  a 
third  person  and  it  is  ultimately  sold  in  forclosure  she,  after  the 
sale  in  foreclosure,  is  merely  a  tenant  at  sufferance  of  the  pur- 
chaser.-^ 

§  168.  When  an  under  tenant  becomes  a  tenant  at  suflFerance. 
An  under  tenant,  after  the  termination  of  his  lessor's  tenancy 
is  a  tenant  at  sufferance  of  the  original  lessor  in  the  absence  of 
proof  that  he  has  been  accepted  by  the  latter  as  a  tenant.  Hav- 
ing come  into  the  possession  lawfully  by  and  under  his  lease  the 
undertenant  is  not  a  trespasser  as  against  the  original  lessor 
though  the  entry  of  the  latter  without  notice  is  not  wrongful.-^ 
An  under  tenant  who  is  in  possession  at  the  determination  of  the 
original  lease  and  is  pennitted  by  the  landlord  to  hold  over,  is 
quasi  a  tenant  at  sufferance ;  and  the  mere  fact  of  his  continued 
occupation,  coupled  with  the  payment  of  rent  to  the  original 
lessor  for  such  time  of  occupation  does  not  raise  the  presumption 
of  a  new  demise  to  him  for  years  by  the  original  landlord  unless 
there  is  some  evidence  to  show  an  agreement  for  a  demise  for  a 
term  of  years.-'  A  purchaser  of  land  belonging  to  a  married 
woman  under  a  deed  which  is  signed  by  both  husband  and  wife, 
but  which  is  invalid  as  to  the  wife,  though  passing  the  husband 's 
interest  takes  only  the  latter 's  interest.  On  the  death  of  the 
husband  he  becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance  of  the  wife  or  of  her 
heirs  if  she  has  died  before  the  husband.  If  the  husband  shall 
survive  the  wife  his  estate  by  the  curtesy  passes  by  the  deed 
subject  to  the  rights  of  her  heirs.    But  in  no  case  is  the  occupation 

who  has  covenanted  that  the  mort-  I.  215,  2  Atl.  Rep.  300;  Johnson  v. 

gagor  may  enter  on  a  certain  day,  Donaldson,   17   R.    I.    107,    20    Atl. 

is  precisely  the  same."     By  Best,  Rep.  242. 

C.  J.,  in  Doe  d.  Fisher  v.  Giles,  5  26  Evans  v.  Reed,  5  Gray  (Mass.) 

Bing.  421,  on  page  427.  SOS,  309;   Brown  v.   Smith,  S3  111. 

25  Taylor    v.    O'Brien,    19    R.    I.  291;  Wheeler  v.  Wood,  25  Me.  2S7. 

429,  34  Atl.  Rep.  739.    In  this  case  See,  also,   Meier  v.  Thiemann,   15 

it   was   held    that    in    order    that  Mo.  App.  207. 

there  should  be  a  tenancy  at  suf-  27  Simkin  v.  Ashurst,  1  C.  IM.  & 

ferance  it  is  by  no  means  neces-  R.  261,  4  Tyr.  781.    As  to  the  ac- 

sary  that  there  should  have  been  ceptance  of  rent  and  its  effect,  .see 

a  prior  tenancy  between  the  par-  Evans   v.    Reed,    5   Gray    (Mass.) 

ties.    Kenney  v.  Sweeney,  14  R.  I.  308,  309. 
581;    Payton   v.    Sherburne,   15   R. 


23-4  LAW   OF   LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

of  tlie  purchaser  adverse  to  the  wife  or  to  her  heirs  after  her 
death  and  Avhen  the  reversion  vests  in  her  or  in  them  they  may 
assert  their  rights  against  the  purchaser  and  may  treat  him  as 
their  tenant  at  sufferance.-^ 

§  169.  Necessity  for  notice  to  quit.  A  tenancy  by  sufferance 
may  be  terminated  at  any  time  by  the  entry  upon  the  land  of  the 
landlord  without  any  previous  notice  or  demand.  In  the  absence 
of  a  statute  requiring  the  giving  of  a  notice  to  quit  the  tenant  at 
sufferance  is  not  entitled  to  such  notice  nor  even  to  the  demand 
of  possession.-®  Thus,  as  is  elsewhere  explained  the  landlord 
may  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  prohibiting  it  enter  upon  the 
land  and  oust  the  tenant  using  no  more  force  than  is  necessary. 
In  some  of  the  states  of  the  United  States  statutorj^  provisions 
are  made  for  a  notice  to  quit  in  the  case  of  the  tenancy  at  suffer- 
ance. These  statutes  generally  specify  the  period  for  the  notice. 
They  should  be  consulted  as  to  the  procedure.  Under  a  statute 
which  requires  notice  to  quit  in  writing  by  the  owner  in  the  case 
of  a  tenancy  at  sufferance  a  mortgagor  who  has  sold  his  equity 
and  has  thereafter  purchased  the  property  at  the  foreclosure 
sale  must  give  notice  before  he  can  maintain  ejectment  against  a 
tenant  by  sufferance.^" 

28  Griffin    v.    Sheffield,    38    Miss.  v.    Holt,    139    Mass.    54,    29    N.   E. 

359,  390;  Day  v.  Cochran,  24  Miss.  Rep.  221;  Kingsley  v.  Ames,  2  Met. 

261.  (Mass.)   29;   Decker  v.  Adams,  12 

20  Joy  V.  McKay,  70  Cal.  445,  11  N.  J.  Law,  99;  Moore  v.  Smith,  56 

Pac.    Rep.    763;    McLeran   v.    Ben-  N.  J.  Law,  446,  449,  29  Atl.  Rep. 

ton,  73  Cal.  329,  14  Pac.  Rep.  879;  159;  Livingstone  v.  Tanner,  14  N. 

Hauxhurst  v.  Lobree,  38  Cal.  563;  Y.  64;   Torrey  v.  Torrey,  14  N.  Y. 

Lee  Chuck  v.  Quan  Wo  Chong,  91  480;    Anderson    v.    Brewster,    44 

Cal.  593,  28  Pac.  Rep.   45;    Willis  Ohio    St.    576,    9    N    B.    Rep.    683; 

V.    Harrell,  118  Ga.  906,   45   S.   E.  Wallis  v.  Delmar,   21  L.  J.  Exch. 

Rep.   794;    Petty  v.   Malier,   10   B.  276;   Doe  d.  Bennett  v.  Turner,  7 

Mon.    (Ky.)    591;    Robie  v.  Smith,  Mee.  &  Wei.  22G,  235;  Doe  d.  Roby 

21  Me.  114;   Reed  v.  Reed,  48  Me.  v.  Maisey,  6  B.  &  C.  767;    Doe  d. 

388;    Clapp  v.  Plain,   18   Me.  264;  Moore    v.    Lawder,    1    Stark.    308; 

Stockwell    V.    Marks,    17    Me.    455,  Thunder  v.  Belcher,  3  East,  450. 
461;    Wamsganz  v.   Wolff,  86   Mo.  :•<' Johnson   v.  Donaldson,   17  R. 

App.  206;  Howard  v.  Carpenter,  22  I.  107,  20  Atl.  Rep.  242.    As  to  the 

Md.    10;    HolUs    v.    Pool,    3    Met.  sufficiency  of  a  notice  in  Wiscon- 

(Mass.)    350;    Creech   v.  Crockett,  sin,  see  Minard  v.  Burtis,  83  Wis. 

5    Cush.     (Mass.)     133;    Evan.s    v.  267,  53  N.  W.  509. 
Reed,  5  Gray  (Mass.)  308;  Hooton 


TENANCY  AT  SUFFERANCE.  235 

§  170.  Right  of  a  tenant  at  sufferance  to  lease.  A  tenant  at 
sufferance  has  no  interest  which  will  support  a  lease  by  him  ex- 
cept as  against  himself.^^  In  other  words  one  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance cannot  create  another  tenant  at  sufferance  for  this  tenancy- 
is  usually  the  result  of  the  operation  of  rules  of  law  rather  than 
of  the  acts  of  the  parties.  If  he  shall  attempt  to  make  a  lease  his 
so-called  tenant  has  no  other  or  better  right  against  the  original 
landlord  than  the  tenant  himself.^- 

^  171.  The  liability  of  a  tenant  at  sufferance  to  pay  rent. 
At  the  common  law  rent  as  such  is  not  recoverable  by  the  land- 
lord from  tenants  at  sufferance  "because  it  was  the  folly  of  the 
owners  to  suffer  them  to  continue  in  possession  after  the  deter- 
mination of  the  preceding  estate."  ^^  This  reason  for  the  rule  is 
more  fanciful  than  substantial.  The  true  reason  for  the  non- 
liability of  the  tenant  at  sufferance  for  rent  may  be  found  in 
the  absolute  and  utter  absence  of  any  privity  of  contract  be- 
tween the  land  owner  and  the  tenant  at  sufferance  for,  where  he 
is  strictly  a  tenant  at  sufferance,  he  always  holds  without  the 
consent  of  the  landlord  and  often  he  may  claim  to  hold  adversely. 
Hence  even  for  use  and  occupation  no  action  will  lie.  An  illus- 
tration of  such  a  holding  by  a  tenant  at  sufferance  will  be  found 
in  the  case  of  a  vendor  who  is  holding  over  after  the  delivery  of 
a  conveyance  to  the  vendee,  or  a  tenant  at  will  holding  over  after 
he  has  denied  his  lessor's  title.  In  neither  case  is  there  a  trespass 
for  the  entr>'  is  lawful  but  in  both  cases  no  rent  can  be  demanded 
for  there  is  no  privity,  nor  can  an  action  for  use  and  occupation 
be  sustained  as  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  does  not  exist. 
If.  however,  a  tenant  at  suft'erance  is  permitted  to  continue  in 
the  occupation  of  the  premises  by  the  consent  of  the  landlord, 
either  express  or  implied;  he  is  thereafter  liable  for  the  rent 
which  may  be  recovered  at  common  law  by  means  of  an  action 

31  Thunder  v.  Belcher,  3  East,  14  Pac.  Rep.  879,  883;  Dixon  v. 
450;  Shopland  v.  Ryder,  Cro.  Jac.  Haley,  16  111.  145;  Emmons  v. 
5.5.  Scudder,  115  Mass.  367,  371;  Flood 

32  Thunder  v.  Belcher,  3  East,  v.  Flood,  1  Allen  (Mass.)  217; 
450.  Delano     v.     Montague,     4     Cush. 

33  1  Cruise,  Dig.  tit.  9,  c.  2,  §  6;  (Mass.)  42,  45;  Merrill  v.  Bullock, 
4  Kent,  Com.  116;  2  Black.  Com.  105  Mass.  486,  490;  Poole  v. 
151.  See,  as  sustaining  the  text,  Engelcke,  61  N.  J.  L.  124,  125,  38 
Smith    V.    Houston,    16    Ala.    Ill;  Atl.  Rep.  823. 

McLeran   v.    Benton,    73   Cal.    329, 


236  LAW   OF  LANDLORD  .Us^D  TENANT. 

based  on  the  fiction  of  a  implied  promise  on  the  part  of  the  ten- 
ant to  pay  what  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  premises  are 
reasonably  worth  to  him.^*  Some  cases  have  gone  further  than 
this  in  liolding  that  a  tenant  at  sufferance  after  the  landlord's 
demand  for,  and  the  tenant's  refusal  of  possession  becomes  liable 
for  the  rent  or,  at  least,  for  the  reasonable  value  of  the  use  and 
occupation  of  the  premises,^^  thus  creatino^  a  liability  where 
there  is  no  possibility  of  shoAving  an  assent  by  the  landlord  either 
express  or  implied  to  the  holding  over  of  the  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance. In  Massachusetts  it  has  been  provided  by  statute  that  "ten- 
ants at  sufferance  in  possession  of  lands  or  tenements  shall  be 
liable  to  pay  rent  therefor  for  such  time  as  they  may  occupy  or 
detain  the  same,"  and  that  "such  rent  may  be  recovered  in  an 
action  of  contract."^®  This  statute  does  not  define  to  whom  a 
tenant  at  sufferance  shall  be  liable  to  pay  rent,  or  by  whom  he 
may  be  sued.  The  statute  was  clearly  intended  to  confer  an 
action  in  contract  for  the  value  of  the  use  and  occupation  wher- 
ever the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  by  a  lease  for  years 
or  at  will,  or  by  permission  or  assent,  express  or  implied  had  ex- 
isted betwen  the  parties  or  between  the  defendant  and  any  per- 
son with  whom  the  plaintiff  was  in  privity  of  estate,  though  the 
plaintiff  might  not,  but  for  the  statute,  have  been  in  sufficient 
privity  with  the  defendant  to  maintain  the  action.  The  statute 
was  not  meant  to  make  an  occupant  of  land  liable  to  an  action 
of  contract  for  use  and  occupation  by  a  person  whose  title  he  had 
never  admitted,  either  expressly  or  by  implication  but  had  al- 
ways denied  and  whose  tenant  he  had  never  been  in  any  sense.*^ 

3*  Merrill  v.  Bullock,  105  Mass.  sc  Mass.  Rev.  St.  §  23,  and  Gen- 

486,    490;     Keay    v.    Godwin,     16  eral  Sts.  c.  90,  §§  25,  26. 

Mass.  1,  4;  Gould  v.  Thompson,  4  si  Merrill  v.   Bullock,  105   Mass. 

Met.  (Mass.)  224,  228;  Harding  v.  486,    492.      See,    also,    Bunton    v. 

Crethorn,  1  Esp.  57;  Ibbs  v.  Rich-  Richardson,  10  Allen  (Mass.)  260; 

ardson,  9  Ad.  &  El.  849,  1  P.  &  D.  Knowles    v.    Hull,    99    Mass.    562. 

618;    Christy  v.  Tanered,  7  M.  &  Where   a   tenancy  at   will   is   ter- 

W.  127.  9  M.  &  W.  438,  12  M.  &  W.  minated    by    tlie    execution    of    a 

316;    Bayley   v.    Bradley,    5    Com.  lease  of  the  premises  to  a  stranger, 

Bf'nch,  56.  by  which   the  tenant  at  will  be- 

a-'  Smith  v.  Singleton,  71  Ga.  68,  comes  a  tenant  at  sufferance,  the 

71;     Jackson     d.     Livingston     v.  statutory    liability    of   the   tenant 

Niven,    10    Johns.    (N.    Y.)    335;  at  sufferance  is  to  the  new  lessee 

Ilight  d,  Lewis  v.  Beard,  13  East,  alone,  and  no  judgment  in  favor  of 

210.  the  original  lessor  and  the  lessee 


TENANCY  AT  SUFFERANCE.  237 

§  172.  Action  of  trespass  by  the  landlord  against  the  tenant 
at  sufferance.  The  possession  of  the  tenant  at  sufferance  being 
wrongful  and,  inasmuch  as  he  has  no  interest  as  against  the 
landlord,  or  even  as  against  a  stranger,  except  so  far  as  posses- 
sion is  conferred  by  the  delay  of  the  landlord  in  ousting  him,  the 
landlord  may  under  some  circumstances,  at  the  common  law  and 
in  the  absence  of  a  statute  requiring  judicial  proceedings  to  be 
brought,  enter  upon  the  land  and  eject  the  tenant  by  force  pro- 
vided he  uses  no  more  force  than  is  necessar^^^^  He  will  not  be 
liable  in  damages  to  the  tenant  at  sufferance  unless  he  uses  exces- 
sive or  unnecessary  force.  Thus,  a  landlord  who,  after  notice  to 
quit,  enters  the  premises,  while  the  tenant  at  sufferance  was 
temporarily  absent,  by  forcing  the  door  open  and  places  the  ten- 
ant's chattels  outside  and  re-fastens  the  door  is  not  liable  to  the 
tenant  at  sufferance.^^  And  where  the  tenant  at  sufferance  after 
being  thus  ejected  re-enters  and  re-occupies  the  premises,  he  be- 
comes thereby  a  trespasser  from  the  day  of  his  re-entry.  The 
landlord  cannot  bring  an  action  of  trespass  against  his  tenant 
at  sufferance  until  he  shall  by  an  actual  entry  upon  the  land  or 
by  some  other  positive  or  public  act  declare  his  possession  to  be 
wrongful  and  adverse.  For  the  original  entry  of  the  tenant 
at  sufferance  is  lawful  and  hence  he  cannot  be  a  trespasser  while 
he  continues  to  hold  possession  under  his  original  entry.  Thus, 
an  action  of  trespass  cannot  be  maintained  by  the  landlord 
against  the  tenant  at  will  who  becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance  by 
holding  over  after  his  tenancy  at  will  is  determined  by  the  oc- 
currence of  an  event  over  which  the  tenant  at  will  had  no  con- 
as  joint  plaintiffs  can  be  rendered.  sas  the  common-law  rule  has  been 
Cofran  v.  Shepard,  148  Mass.  582,  abrogated  by  Gen.  St.  1901,  §  3S64. 
20  N.  E.  Rep.  181.  In  New  Jersey,  Martin  v.  Allen,  67  Kan.  758,  74 
by  statute,  a  landord  may  recover       Pac.  Rep.  249. 

from    the    tenant   at   sufferance    a  ss  Sampson   v.    Henry,    11    Pick, 

"reasonable  satisfaction  for  the  (Mass.)  379;  Jackson  d.  Stans- 
lands,  tenements  and  heredita-  bury  v.  Farmer,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
ments  held  or  occupied  by  the  de-  20;  Currier  t.  Gale,  9  Allen 
fendant,"  and  when  there  was  a  (Mass.)  522;  Hillary  v.  Gray,  6 
parol  demise  or  agreement  reserv-  Car.  &  P.  284;  Newton  v.  Harland, 
ing  a  certain  rent,  that  rent  is  the  1  M.  &  G.  644;  Taunton  v.  Caspar, 
exclusive  measure  of  the  reason-  7  T.  R.  431;  Taylor  v.  Cole,  3  T.  R. 
able    satisfaction    to    be    obtained.       292. 

Poole  V.  Engelcke,   61  N.  J.  Law,  39  Mussey  v.   Scott,  32  Vt.  82. 

124,  126,  38  Atl.  Rep.  823.    In  Kao. 


238 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


trol  and  of  which  he  was  perhaps  absolutely  ignorant,  at  the 
time  it  happened,  as,  for  example,  the  death  of  his  landlord,  or 
a  lease  of  the  premises  by  his  landlord  to  another.*"  The  estate 
at  will  is  by  the  occurrence  of  this  event  ended,  but  the  tenant 
at  will  is  not  thereafter  a  trespasser  for  the  reason  that  his  orig- 
inal entry  and  possession  were  lawful.  Having  entered  by  a 
lawful  title,  he  will  be  presumed  to  continue  to  hold  under  the 
lawful  title  by  which  he  entered,  and  in  subordination  to  the 
title  of  his  landlord  until  the  landlord,  by  some  unquestionable 
act  or  language,  expressly  disaffirms  the  relationship  which  he 
bears  to  the  tenant.*^ 


«>  In  Rising  v.  Staunard,  17 
Mass.  282,  on  page  286,  the  court 
said:  "It  may  be  fairly  deter- 
mined from  these  principles  that 
when  an  estate  at  will  is  deter- 
mined by  an  event  not  within  the 
knowledge  of  the  tenant  his  hold- 
ing over  will  not  amount  to  a  tres- 
pass. Suppose,  for  example,  that 
the  estate  is  determined  by  the 
death  of  the  lessor  in  a  distant 
country,  or  by  his  conveyance  of 
the  land,  of  which  the  tenant  can 
by  no  possibility  have  notice  at 
the  time  of  such  death  or  convey- 
ance; it  would  hardly  be  con- 
tended that  the  tenant  by  holding 
over  becomes  a  trespasser.  For, 
as  the  law  allows  him  a  reasonable 
time  to  remove  after  notice  given 
him  to  quit,  he  cannot  be  bound 
to  quit  without  notice." 


*i  Rising  V.  Stannard,  17  Mass. 
282;  Coke,  Inst.  57;  2  Black.  Com. 
150.  In  the  case  of  the  sale  of 
a  house  occupied  by  the  tenant 
at  sufferance  the  vendee  may 
remove  the  goods  of  the  tenant 
which  he  finds  in  the  house  after 
giving  him  reasonable  notice  to 
quit,  as  required  by  statute,  and 
no  time  is  specified.  The  vendee 
whose  offer  to  take  the  goods 
wherever  the  tenant  wished  is  re- 
fused by  the  tenant  who  neglects 
to  tell  him  anything  as  to  how 
they  shall  be  disposed  of  may  take 
them  and  store  them  to  the  order 
of  the  tenant.  By  this  action  he 
does  not  render  himself  liable  for 
the  conversion  of  the  chattels. 
Lash  V.  Ames,  171  Mass.  487,  50 
N.  E.  Rep.  996. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES. 

173.  The  definition  of  a  lease. 

174.  Leases  in  reversion.     Inter  esse  termini. 

175.  Formal  and  technical  language  unneceesary. 

176.  Words  proper  to  create  a  lease. 

177.  Whether  a  writing  is  a  lease  or  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease. 

178.  Question  for  court  or  jury. 

179.  The  intention  of  the  parties. 

180.  The  assent  of  the  parties  to  a  lease. 

181.  The  consideration  for  the  lease. 

182.  Some  circumstances  which  tend  to  show  an   instrument  is  a 

lease. 

183.  No  presumption  of  tenancy  from  possession  alone. 

184.  The  length  of  a  term  in  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease. 

185.  The  term  as  stated  in  the  lease. 

186.  Entry  into  possession  as  indicating  a  leases 

187.  The  presumption  of  an  existing  tenancy  from  the  pa>Tnent  of 

money  by  the  occupant  to  the  owner. 

188.  The  necessity  for  the  payment  of  rent. 

189.  The  performance  of  a  contract  to  execute  and  deliver  a  lease. 

190.  The  specific  performance  of  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease. 

191.  The  measure  of  damages  for  a  breach  of  an  agreement  to  make 

a  lease. 

192.  Letters  constituting  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease. 

193.  A  lease  distinguished  from  a  license. 

194.  Agreement  permitting  the  cutting  of  timber. 

195.  The  possession  of  a  tenant  under  a  void  lease. 

196.  A  lease  with  an  agreement  to  sell  the  premises. 

197.  Lease  or  mortgage. 

198.  The  lease  of  space  in  a  department  store. 

199.  A  lease   distinguished  from   a   contract   to   furnish   board   and 

lodging. 

200.  Agreement  to  board  and  care  for  the  owner  of  land. 

201.  An  entry  upon  land  of  another  under  an  option  to   purchase 

from  him. 
201a. .The  mortgagee  of  the  tenant's  chattels  in  possession. 

202.  Future  lease  of  an  unfinished  building. 

203.  Mortgagor  or  his  tenant  and  a  purchaser  at  a  sale  under  fore- 

closure. 

204.  Contracts  for  advertising  space. 


240  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  A2^D  TENANT 

§  205.  A  purchaser  of  a  crop  on  an  execution  sale. 

206.  The  judgment  debtor  holding  over  after  a  sale  on  an  execution. 

207.  Whether  an  instrument  is  a  lease  or  a  partnership  agreement. 

208.  Contracts  for  steam  heating  and  for  steam  and  water  power. 

209.  Miscellaneous  cases. 

210.  Whether  occupant  of  premises  is  servant  or  tenant. 

211.  The  intention  of  the  parties 

212.  Illustrations  of  the  rule. 

213.  The  character  of  the  possession  of  the  premises  as  determining 

whether  an  occupant  is  a  servant  or  a  tenant. 

214.  The  power  of  the  master  to  remove  his  servant  from  the  prem- 

ises. 

215.  Contract  of  hiring  by  a  religious  society. 

216.  A  public  officer  as  a  tenant  of  a  county. 

217.  A  servant  holding  over  after  his  employment  is  at  an  end. 

218.  The  rights  of  third  parties. 

219.  The  distinction  between  croppers  and  tenants. 

220.  The  ownership  of  the  crop. 

221.  The  duties  and  the  rights  of  the  landlord  and  tenant. 

222.  The  remedies  of  the  parties. 

223.  Relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  not  presumed  between  vendor 

and  vendee. 

224.  The  default  or  the  refusal  of  either  party  to  perform. 

225.  An  express  agreement  of  the  vendee  to  pay  rent. 

226.  The  entry  of  a  vendee  under  a  parol  agreement  to  purchase. 

227.  The  vendor  of  land  continuing  in  possession  after  his  convey- 

ance of  the  title. 

§  173.  The  definition  of  a  lease.  Many  attempts  more  or  less 
successful  have  ])een  made  to  define  a  lease.  Some  of  the  defini- 
tions are  too  broad;  others  are  too  narroAv.  Considering  care- 
fully all  the  elements  which  enter  into  the  relationship  of  land- 
lord and  tenant  we  may  safely  define  a  lease  as  a  contract  by 
which  the  owner  of  lands  and  tenements,  surrenders  their  pos- 
session, occupation,  and  enjoyment  for  all  purposes  to  another 
person  for  life  or  for  a  fixed  and  certain  term  of  years  or  during 
the  phi-asure  of  the  parties  in  return  for  a  recompense  in  money, 
goods  or  services  or  some  other  valid  consideration  to  be  ren- 
dered by  tlie  i)ersons  who,  by  the  contract,  become  entitled  to 
the  jjossession,  with  a  reversion  in  the  owner  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  lease.  Other  definitions  will  be  found  in  the  notes. 
Leases  are  divided  into  leases  in  presenti  where  a  present  inter- 
est passe.ss  and  leases  in  reversion.^ 

1  A  lease  Is  a  contract  for  the  tenements  on  the  one  side  and  a 
possession  and  profits  of  lands  and       recompense   of   rent   or   other   in- 


WHAT   CONTRACTS  ARE   LEASES.  241 

§  174.  Leases  in  reversion — Interesse  termini.  All  leases 
which  are  meant  to  commence  at  a  future  day  are  leases  in  re- 
version. AMiere  the  term  is  1o  commence  at  a  future  date  and 
no  present  right  of  possession  is  conferred  upon  the  tenant,  it 
is  a  lease  in  reversion  and  the  estate  which  is  meant  to  be  created 
by  the  lease  is  imperfect  and  incomplete  and  becomes  perfect 
and  complete  only  when  the  date  arrives  on  which  the  term  is  to 
beg-in.  Hence  a  lease  for  a  term  to  begin  in  the  future  and  a 
lease  in  reversion  are  synonymous.  Both  are  leases  which  are  to 
begin  after  the  termination  of  another  and  prior  interest  in  the 
premises  then  existing  in  another  person.-  Leases  in  reversion 
are  unquestionably  valid. "  But  under  such  a  lease  the  lessee 
merely  acquires  an  interesse  termini  until  the  arrival  of  the  date 
when  his  estate  is  to  commence  in  point  of  time.  A  lessor  grant- 
ing a  lease  in  reversion  does  not  part  with  the  reversion  so  as 
to  prevent  him  from  distraining  for  rent  which  may  become  due 
under  the  prior  lease  after  the  lease  in  reversion  has  been  exe- 
cuted.' For  a  grant  of  a  lease  in  reversion  does  not  convey  to 
the  lessee  any  right  to  rent  due  the  lessor  under  a  prior  lease. 
Where  in  a  lease  which  is  to  take  effect  after  the  termination  of 
an  existing  lease,  the  latter  is  recited,  and  the  future  lease  is 
made  to  commence  after  such  prior  lease  has  terminated,  the 

come  on  the  other;  or  else  it  is  a  A  lease  is  defined  to  be  a  species 
conveyance  of  lands  and  tenements  of  contract  for  the  possession  and 
to  a  person  for  life  or  years,  or  profits  of  lands  and  tenements 
at  will,  in  consideration  of  a  re-  either  for  life  or  during  the  pleas- 
turn  of  rent  or  other  recompense.  ure  of  the  parties;  a  contract  by 
4  Cruise's  Dig.  115;  4  Bac.  Abr.  1,  which  one  person  divests  himself 
tit.  "Leases;"  2  Bl.  Com.  317;  of,  and  another  takes  possession 
Shep.  Touchstone,  c.  14.  "A  lease  of,  lands  or  chattels  for  a  term, 
doth  properly  signify  a  demise  or  whether  long  or  short;  a  convey- 
letting  of  land,  rent,  common,  or  ance  of  any  lands  or  tenements 
any  hereditament,  imto  another  made  for  life  or  at  will,  but  always 
for  a  lesser  time  than  he  that  doth  for  a  less  time  than  the  lessor 
let  it  hath  in  it.  *  *  *  This  has  in  the  premises.  Badger  Lum- 
word  also  is  sometimes,  though  her  Co.  v.  Malone.  8  Kan.  App. 
improperly,  applied  to  the  estate,  121.  54  Pac.  Rep.  692. 
t.  e..  the  title,  time,  or  interest  ~  Allen  v.  Calvert,  2  East,  376, 
the  lessee  hath  to  the  thing  de-  383;  Goodtitle  v.  Finucane,  2  Doug, 
mised,   and   then   it   is   rather   re-  565. 

ferred     to     the     thing     taken     or  3  Smith    v.    Day,    2    'M.    &.    Wei., 

demised   and   the    interest   of   the  684,  700. 
taker  therein."     Shep.  Touch.  265. 

16 


242  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  ^VND  TENANT. 

lease  in  reversion  will  take  effect  at  once  after  the  terniiuation  of 
the  prior  lease,  whatever  the  cause  of  the  termination  of  the 
prior  lease.  Hence,  under  such  a  situation  of  affairs,  the  future 
lease  takes  effect  at  once  upon  the  termination  of  the  prior  lease 
by  efflux  of  time,  forfeiture  or  surrender,  although  in  the  hahen- 
dinii  clause  of  the  futura  lease  it  is  expressly  made  to  commence 
ten  or  twenty  veRvs  from  the  expiration  of  the  earlier  lease.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  lease  in  reversion  is  made  to  commence 
say  ten  or  twenty  years  from  a  future  date,  which  is  also  the 
date  of  the  expiration  of  the  earlier  lease,  the  future  lease  will 
only  commence  after  the  earlier  lease  has  expired  or  would  have 
expired  by  efflux  of  time,  though  in  fact  it  has  sooner  expired 
by  another  cause.*  At  the  common  law  an  estate  of  freehold 
could  not  be  made  to  commence  in  futuro  without  some  prior 
estate  of  freehold  to  support  it.  Hence  a  lease  for  lives  could 
not  be  made  in  reversion  unless  it  was  to  begin  after  another 
estate  in  freehold  granted  by  the  same  instrument.  There  was 
never  any  objection  at  the  common  law  to  creating  an  estate  for 
a  term  of  years  to  commence  in  futuro  as  such  an  estate  was 
looked  upon  as  a  mere  chattel  interest  for  which  liveiy  of  seizin 
was  not  required.  In  modern  times  when  the  necessity  for  livery 
of  seizin  no  longer  exists  there  can  be  no  possible  objection  to 
making  a  lease  for  life  to  commence  in  futuro.  By  giving  a 
lease  for  a  term  to  commence  at  a  future  day,  the  tenant  ac- 
quires the  right  to  the  possession  when  the  day  arrives.  In  the 
meantime  should  the  landlord  make  a  lease  to  one  who  enters  and 
gives  him  possession,  the  tenant  may  maintain  an  action  for  dam- 
ages.^ But  a  lease  in  presenti  possession,  to  commence  in  the  fu- 
ture, vests  a  present  interest  in  the  term,  and  the  lessee  at  once 
becomes  I'csponsible  for  the  rent.'' 

§  175.  Formal  and  technical  language  unnecessary.  At  the 
-common  law  the  proper  and  technical  words  of  conveyance  to 
be  used  in  a  lease,  in  order  to  create  a  valid  interest  in  a  term 
were,  "farm  let,"  "betake,"  "demise,"  "grant,"  or  other  sim- 
ilar words  appropriate  to  a  grant. ^  It  is  always  advisable  in 
the  interests  of  certainty  to  employ  some  such  words  in  the 
granting  clause.     But  no  particular  words  technical   or  other- 

*  Woodhouse's  Case,  1  Dyer,  93b;  ^  Becar  v.  Flues,  64  N.  Y,  518. 

Wrottesley  v.  Adams,  2  Dyer,  177b.  s  4  Coke,  Litt.  43b. 

«  Trull   V.   GranRPr,  8  N.  Y.  115. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES,  243 

wise,  or  forms  of  expression  are  necessarj-^  to  constitute  a  lease. 
Any  language  by  which  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  land 
are  granted  for  a  limited  time,  for  a  stipulated  return,  creates  a 
tenancy  and  is,  in  effect,  though  perhaps  not  in  name,  a  lease. 
The  law  will  look  to  the  intention  of  the  parties  rather  than  to 
the  form  of  the  instrument.  In  other  words  if,  from  the  lan- 
guage employed  by  the  parties,  it  is  clear  that  they  meant  that 
one  of  them  shall  part  with  the  possession  and  enjoyment,  and 
that  the  other  shall,  for  a  consideration,  passing  from  him  to 
the  other,  or  to  some  third  person,  enter  into  possession,  it  is  a 
lease  and  the  language  employed  is  wholly  immaterial.®  The 
form  is  of  no  consequence.  Nor  is  it  necessarj^  that  the  word 
lease  shall  be  used.  If  the  words  are  in  form  a  license,  or  cove- 
nant and  other  requisites  of  a  lease  are  present,  the  writing  is 
a  lease.^°  Thus  letters  passing  between  the  parties  which  contain 
all  the  language  necessary  to  a  letting  and  hiring  of  premises  ^^ 
or  a  receipt,^-  may  constitute  a  lease.  On  the  other  hand,  thf, 
fact  that  the  parties  to  a  writing  call  it  a  lease  is  not  conclusive 
that  the  writing  is  a  lease  where  from  the  words  of  the  instru- 
ment it  appears  that  the  parties  meant  that  it  should  be  some- 
thing else  or  it  was  meant  for  some  other  purpose.^^ 

9  Jackson    v.    Hughes,    1    Black.  Rep.  18 ;  Maverick  v.  Lewis,  3  Mc- 

(Ind.)    421;    Mimson   v.    Wray,    7  Cord   (S.  C.)   211;   Mickle  v.  Law- 

Blackf.   (Ind.)   403,  404   (receipt);  rence,  5  Rand.    (Va.)    571;   Mason 

Waller    v.    Morgan,    18    B.    Mon.  v.  Clifford,  4  Fed.  Rep.  177. 

(Ky.)    136,   142;    New   York  C.   &  lo  Moore  v.  Miller,  8  Pa.  St.  272, 

St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Randall,  102  Ind.  283;   Co.  Litt.  45b. 

453,  456,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  122;   Pitts-  n  Ciilton  v.   Gilclirist,   92    Iowa, 

burgh,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Thornburgh,  98  718  61  N.  W.  Rep.  384. 

lud.  201,  205;   Moshier  v.  Reding,  12  Munson     v.     Ray,     7     Black. 

13  Me.  478,  482;  Bacon  v.  Bowdoin,  (Ind.)  403,  404. 

22  Pick.  (Mass.)   401;  Eastman  v.  i"  St.  Joseph  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 

Perkins,   111   Mass.   30;    Boone   v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  135 

Stover,     66     Mo.    430;     Coyne     v.  Mo.     173,     36     S.     W.     Rep.     602. 

Feiner,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  203;  Comp-  "Where  the  conveyance  of  an  es- 

ton  V.  Chelsea,  55  Hun,  G09,  8  N.  tate  in  land  subordinate  to  that  of 

Y.  Supp.  622;  Bussman  v.  Gauster,  the  grantor  is  made  for  a  valuable 

72  Pa.  St.  286;   Miller  v.  McBaier,  consideration    and    for    a    definite 

14  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  385;  Watson  term,  the  instrument  of  convey- 
V.  O'Hern,  6  Watts.  (Pa.)  362,  ance  is  a  lease.  Less  than  this  may 
268;  Pickering  v.  O'Brien,  23  Pa.  be  a  lease;  more  cannot  be  re- 
Super.  Ct.  Rep.  125;  Twiss  v.  quired."  Xev  York,  etc.,  Co.  v. 
Boehmer,    39    Oreg.    359,    65    Pac.  Randall,  102   Ind.   453,  456,  26   N. 


244 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


§  176.  Words  proper  to  create  a  lease.  Words  of  present 
demise  such  as  "doth  let/'  "doth  demise,"  "agrees  to  pay  for," 
"shall  enjoy,"  "hath  set"  and  to  "farm  let."^*  "thereby  set 
and  let,"^^  "agrees  to  lease  and  let,"^**  "agrees  to  let,"" 
"agrees  to  lease  and  let,"^*  "hereby  leases  and  demises,"^* 
and  the  like  will  generally  constitute  a  lease  even  though  the 
execution  of  a  formal  or  future  instrument  appears  to  have  been 
intended.^"    The  test  in  all  cases  seems  to  be  whether  the  parties 


E.  Rep.  122.  In  Louisiana  a  lease 
differs  materially  from  a  usufruct. 
The  latter  is  a  species  of  owner- 
ship, usually  for  life,  with  an  obli- 
gation to  pay  taxes  and  repairs, 
and  it  may  be  mortgaged  or  trans- 
ferred. A  lease  is  a  personal  right, 
giving  only  the  use  of  the  prem- 
ises, without  any  proprietory  in- 
terest. Hoffman  v.  Laurans,  18  La. 
70.  An  agreement  by  a  town  that, 
if  a  person  will  build  a  house  to 
be  used  as  a  market  house  for  the 
town,  he  should  have  the  privilege 
of  using  it  for  a  specified  number 
of  years,  at  the  end  of  which  it 
would  become  the  property  of  the 
town,  is  not  a  lease.  No  interest 
in  land  is  conveyed.  All  that  is 
gi-anted  is  the  right  or  privilege 
of  keeping  this  house  as  a  market, 
in  conformity  with  the  town  ordi- 
nances." Brookhaven  v.  Baggett, 
61  Miss.  383.  390. 

14  Jackson  v.  Kisselbrack,  10 
Johns.   (N.  Y.)   336. 

i"'  Baxter  v.  Browne,  2  W.  Bl. 
973. 

i«  People  v.  St.  Nicholas  Bank, 
3  App.  Div.  544,  38  N.  Y.  Supp. 
379,  affirmed  in  151  N.  Y.  592,  45 
N.  E.  Rep.  1129,  in  which  the  par- 
ties agreed  to  execute  and  ex- 
change leases  prior  to  the  occu- 
pancy of  the  premises,  "such 
leases  to  be  drawn  on,  and  this 
agreement  being  subject  to,  all  the 
Ijrovi.sions  of  the   blank    forms  in 


ase  in"  the  lessor's  building,  etc. 
The  agreement  was  held  a  valid 
lease,  though  the  formal  lease  con- 
templated was  never  executed. 

17  Kabley  v.  Worcester  G.  L.  Co., 
102  Mass.  392;  Western  Boot  & 
Shoe  Co.  V.  Gannon,  50  Mo.  App. 
642;  Hallett  v.  Wylie,  3  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  44,  3  Am.  Dec.  457. 

isAverill  v.  Taylor,  8  N.  Y.  44; 
Hunt  V.  Comstock,  15  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)   665,  667. 

I'j  Weed  V.  Crocker,  13  Gray 
(Mass.)  219,  224;  Bacon  v.  Bow- 
doin,  322  Pick.   (Mass.)   491.   • 

20  Wright  V.  Trevezant,  3  C.  & 
P.  441;  Doe  v.  Groves,  15  East, 
244;  Baxter  v.  Brown,  2  W.  Bl. 
973;  Hand  v.  Hall,  L.  R.  2  Ex. 
Div.  355;  Doe  v.  Benjamin,  9  Ad. 
&  E.  644;  Fiske  v.  Ernst,  62  N.  Y. 
Supp.  429,  96  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  429; 
Ver  Steeg  v.  Becker  Moore  Paint 
Co.  (Mo.),  80  S.  W.  Rep.  346,  351; 
Western  Shoe  Co.  v.  Gannon,  50 
Mo.  App.  642;  Bradley  v.  Metropol- 
itan Music  Co.,  89  Minn.  516,  95 
N.  W.  Rep.  458,  459.  An  agree- 
ment that  one  "hereby  lets,  de- 
mises and  leases,"  to  have  and 
to  hold  for  a  term  ending  on  a 
certain  date  at  a  rent  specified  in 
instalments  "said  rental  to  begin 
when  the  building  hereinafter  de- 
scribed shall  be  ready  for  occu- 
pancy," and  the  other  party  binds 
himself  to  erect  a  building  there- 
on,   is   a   lease    in   presenti   for  a 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE   LEASES. 


245 


have  left  anything  incomplete,  for  if  not,  the  agreement  may 
operate  as  a  present  demise.-^  Thus  if  the  owner  of  the  demised 
premises  agrees  to  make  certain  alterations  and  improvements 
and  the  intending  lessee  agrees  to  take  a  lease  when  the  premises 
shall  be  thus  altered  and  improved,  and  the  term  was  to  begin 
from  the  day  the  improvements  were  completed,  the  writing  is 
an  agreement  for  a  lease  and  not  a  lease^  though  it  contain 
words  of  present  demise.--  An  agreement  for  a  future  formal 
lease  may  be  considered  as  one  circumstance  showing  intention, 
though  it  is  never  when  taken  alone  conclusive  that  the  writing 
is  merely  an  agreement.  If  there  are  apt  words  of  present  de- 
mise, an  agreement  for  a  further  lease  will  not  make  the  instru- 
ment a  mere  agreement  to  execute  a  lease  but  the  agreement 
for  a  formal  lease  will  be  considered  as  in  the  nature  of  a 
covenant  for  further  assurances.^^     If,  however,  there  are  no 


term  to  begin  in  futuro,  the  cer- 
tainty of  the  commencement  of  the 
term  being  satisfied  by  the  subse- 
quent completion  of  the  building. 
Colclough  V.  Carpeles,  89  Wis. 
239,  61  N.  W.  Rep.  836.  See,  also, 
St.  Louis  Brewing  Ass'n  v.  Nie- 
derluecke,  102  Mo.  App.  303,  76  S. 
W.  Rep.  645,  citing  Doe  dem.  Phil- 
lips V.  Benjamin,  9  A.  &  E.  644; 
Chapman  v.  Bluck,  4  Bing.  N.  C. 
187.  The  words  "I  agree  to  let 
and  hereby  do  let"  (People  v.  Kel- 
sey,  38  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  269;  Bacon 
V.  Bowdoin,  22  Pick.  (Mass.)  401, 
and  the  words,  "A.  hath  let"  are 
sufficient  to  create  a  lease.  Liv- 
ingston V.  Kisselbrock,  10  .Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  336.  So  it  has  been  held 
In  England  that  a  covenant  "to 
stand  seized,"  where  it  is  made 
by  the  owner  of  land  or  a  covenant 
of  quiet  enjoyment  (Pritchard  v. 
Dodd,  5  B.  &  Ad.  689),  is  a  lease. 
For  it  has  been  held  in  England 
that  a  covenant  of  this  character 
accompanied  by  an  entry  on  the 
premises  to  which  it  relates  is  a 
lease.     As  soon  as  a  covenant  is 


made  and  accepted  by  the  lessee 
he  has  a  right  to  enter,  which  on 
his  entry  becomes  a  lease.  Capley 
V.  Hepworth,  12  Mod.  1;  Co.  Lift. 
37.  So  the  words,  "shall  have  and 
enjoy,"  amount  to  a  lease  without 
other  words.  Whitlock  v.  Horton, 
Cro.  Jac.  91. 

21  Kabley  v.  "Worcester  G.  L.  Co., 
102  Mass.  392,  395;  Doe  v.  Ries,  8 
Bing.  178.  Where  an  owner  of 
land  "agreed  to  rent  or  lease" 
land  to  a  gas  company  for  the 
storage  of  materials  or  to  erect  a 
building  on  it,  and  at  its  request 
cleared  the  land  of  timber,  it  is  a 
lease,  though  the  gas  company 
never  used  or  occupied  the  land 
in  any  way.  Kabley  v.  Worcester 
G.  L.  Co.,  102  Mass.  392,  395.  See, 
also,  Duncklee  v.  Webber,  151 
Mass.  408,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  1082; 
Charlton  v.  Columbia  R.  E.  Co., 
64  N.  J.  Eq.  631,  54  Atl.  Rep.  444, 
447. 

2"  Jackson  v.  Delacroix,  2  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)   433,  440. 

-■i  Bradley  v.  Metropolitan  Music 
Co.,  89   Minn.  516,  95  N.  W.  Rep. 


246  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

clear,  explicit  or  unequivocal  words  of  present,  demise,  a  pro- 
vision for  the  execution  of  a  lease  in  future  will  usually  be 
regarded   as  raising  a  presumption  that  the  parties  intended 
the  instrument  as  an  agreement  for  a  lease  and  not  as  a  lea.se 
itself.2*     In  all  cases  the  fact  that  the  tenant  has  gone  inta 
the  possession  of  the  demised  premises  as  a  tenant  is  of  great 
force  and  effect  to  show  an  intention  that  the  contract  should 
be  taken  as  a  lease  and  not  as  an  agreement.     It  will  be  diffi- 
cult, if  not  im.possible,  to  find  a  case  where  words  of  present 
demise  followed  by  possession  have  not  been  construed  as  con- 
stituting a  lease. 2=     The  fact  that  the  building,   a  portion  of 
which  one  ''agrees  to  lease,"  is  at  that  time  in  process  of  con- 
struction and  also  that  the  commencement  of  the  lease  is  not 
mentioned  at  all  in  the  agreement  to  lease  does  not  necessarily 
prevent  an  instrument  from  being  a  present  demise  where  such 
is  clearly  the  intent  of  the  parties.    Nor  does  it  alter  the  situa- 
tion of  affairs  under  such  a  contract  that  the  party  who  agrees 
to  lease  had  no  title  when  he  made  the  agreement  to  lease  but 
merely  an  agreement  for  a  future  formal  lease  to  be  executed 
to  him  when  the  building  should  be  completed. ^^ 

§  177.  Whether  a  writing  is  a  lease  or  an  agreement  to  make 
a  lease.  It  is  often  extremely  difficult  for  the  courts  to  distiri- 
guish  between  a  written  lease  and  a  writing  which  is  merely  an 
agreement  to  make  a  lease.     The  distinction  is  always  very  im- 

458,  459;   Jackson  v.  Kisselbrack,  ties  to  be  defined,  and  it  contains 

10  Johns.   (N.  Y.)  336,  337,  6  Am.  apt  words  to  operate  as  a  present 

Dec.  341.  demise,    it   will   be   so   construed. 

24  Goodtitle  v.  Way,  1  T.  R.  735;  Otherwise  it  will  be  regarded  as 
Doe  V.  Clare,  2  T.  R.  739;  Doe  v.  an  agreement  only.  Subsequent  oc- 
Ashbumer,  5  T.  R.  163;  Doe  v.  cupation,  like  other  acts  and  con- 
Smith,  6  East,  530.  See,  also,  Har-  duct  of  the  parties  to  a  contract 
rison  v.  Parmer,  76  Ala.  157,  161;  in  relation  to  its  subject  matter, 
People  ex  rel.  Norton  v.  Gillis,  24  may  aid,  upon  the  question  of  in- 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  201;  People  v.  St.  tention,  in  the  interpretation  of 
Nicholas  Bank,  3  App.  Div.  544,  38  their  agreement,  but  they  cannot 
N.  Y.  Supp.  379.  control  it  against  the  meaning  of 

23  Jackson  v.  Delacroix,  2  Wend.  the  words  used  nor  supply  a  mean- 
(N.  Y.)  433,  440.  "If  the  instru-  ing  which  the  words  will  not  rea- 
ment,  upon  its  face,  puri)orts  to  sonably  bear."  McGrath  v.  Bos- 
be  the  contract  upon  which  the  ton,  103  Mass.  369,  372. 
occupation  la  to  be  enjoyed,  and  20  Western  Boot  &  Shoe  Co.  v. 
the  relations  and  rights  of  the  par-  Gannon,  50  Mo.  App.  642. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  217 

portant  since  the  consequences  of  the  breach  of  a  lease  are  very- 
different  from  the  consequences  of  the  breach  of  an  agreement 
to  make  a  lease.-'  The  distinction  is  important  for  it  may  hap- 
pen that  a  writing  which  one  party  supposed  to  be  merely  an 
agreement  to  make  a  lease  may  turn  out  to  be  a  lease  passing  an 
estate  in  the  land  by  reason  of  which  the  other  party  will  escape 
the  obligation  of  covenants  which  would  have  been  inserted  had 
both  parties  to  the  instrument  understood  the  instrument  to  have 
been  a  lease  and  not  an  agreement  for  one.  The  distinction  is 
also  clearly  manifest  where  we  consider  that  by  a  lease  the  lessee 
acquires  an  actual  interest  in  the  land  called  an  interesse  termini 
which  upon  entry  vests  a  possession  in  him  which  he  may  regain 
if  ousted,  by  ejectment.  Under  an  agreement  for  a  lease  all  he 
has  is  a  cause  of  action  for  any  damages  that  he  may  suffer  in 
the  event  of  the  landlord  's  failure  to  execute  the  lease,-'^  or  he 
may  file  a  bill  in  equity  for  a  specific  performance  of  the  agree- 
ment to  give  a  lease.^*^  "Whether  an  instrument  is  to  be  construed 
as  a  lease,  or  as  an  agreement  for  one,  depends  upon  the  in- 
tention of  the  parties  to  be  collected  from  the  instrument  it- 
self, the  entry  on  the  subject  matter  with  reference  to  extrin- 
sic circumstances  or  the  subsequent  acts  of  the  parties.^^  If 
^e  instrument  apparently  purports  to  create  a  right  to  de- 
mand a  lease  to  be  executed  at  some  time  in  the  future,  it  will 
be  presumptively  a  contract  to  make  a  lease  and  not  a  lease 
itself.  As  is  elsewhere  pointed  out,  everything  depends  upon 
the  intention  of  the  parties  which  must  be  gathered  from 
their  language  as  contained  in  the  writing,  and  construed  in 
the  light  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.  If  the 
instrument,  while  speaking  of  an  intention  to  lease,  leaves 
something  material  incomplete  and  to  be  arranged  in  the  future 
as  where  it  leaves  the  length  of  the  term  to  be  subsequently  de- 
termined, or  fails  to  fix  the  precise  amount  of  rent  payable,  it 
may  be  regarded  merely  as  an  agreement  for  a  lease.  An  agree- 
ment by  which  a  land  owner  agrees  by  parol  that  he  ivill  lease 

27  Donovan    v.    P.    Schoenhofen  29  Western  Boot  &   Shoe   Co.   v. 
Brewing  Co.,  92  Mo.  App.  341.  Gammon,  50  Mo.  App.  642;  Doe  d. 

28  Price   V.  Williams,   1   Mee.    &  Morgan  v.  Powell,  8  Scott  (N.  R.) 
Wei.  6.  6S7,  7  Man.  &  G.  9S0,  14  L.  J.  C.  P. 

z8a  Harrison  v.  Palmer,   76  Ala.       5.   8   Jur.    1123;    S.   P.   Morgan   d. 
157,  161-  Doweling  v.  Bissell,  3  Taunt.  65. 


248  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

another  liis  Lnncl  for  a  terra  at  a  reasonable  rent  which  is  to  ho 
subsequently  agreed  on  by  the  parties:  and  to  be  payable  in 
promissory  notes  to  be  subsequently  executed  and  delivered,  is 
not  a  lease  but  merely  an  executory  agreement  to  make  one.^" 
So,  in  a  case  where  an  agent  has  authority  "to  close  a  lease"  on 
the  part  of  the  lessee  and  he  submits  an  offer  to  the  prospective 
lessor  who  states  that  he  will  accept  it  and  directs  the  agent  to 
prepare  a  lease  and  the  agent  at  once  informs  the  party  he  repre- 
sents of  the  acceptance  and  forthwith  prepares  a  lease  which  is 
never  executed,  the  transaction  is  not  a  lease  but  merely  an 
agreement  to  make  one.'^  So,  an  oral  agreement  suggesting 
the  terms  of  a  lease  which  is  subsequently  to  be  committed  to 
writing  and  executed  by  the  parties  and  containing  nothing 
which  authorizes  the  lessee  to  enter  into  possession,  is  not  a  lease. 
It  is  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease  which  either  party  may  re- 
scind until  it  is  executed  unless  the  owner  has  permitted  the  les- 
see to  go  into  possession,  in  which  event  it  creates  a  tenancy  at 
will.  The  lessee  is  not  entitled  to  possession  under  such  an 
agreement  as  it  is  is  not  a  lease,  but  has  an  action  in  damages 
for  a  breach  of  it,  consisting  of  a  refusal  to  execute  a  lease. 
Thus,  where  an  "agreement"  was  made  by  an  owner  to  lease 
his  premises  and  he  subsequently  thereto  receipted  for  a  sum 
of  money  "on  account  of  an  agreement  for  a  lease,  for  which 
details  are  to  be  settled  on"  and  a  lease  was  thereafter  drawn 
which  contained  terms  which  were  not  contained  in  the  writing, 
there  was  no  lease  but  merely  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease  at 
some  future  date.^^     An  owner  and  another  person  may  make 

30  Gibson  v.  Needham,  9G  Ga.  been  orally  agreed  on  by  the  par- 
172,  174,  22  S.  E.  Rep.  702.  ties.     Martin   v.    Davis,    96    Iowa, 

31  Arnold  v.  R.  Rothschild's  718,  65  N.  W.  Rep.  1001,  where  the 
Sons  Co.,  164  N.  Y.  562,  58  N.  E.  writing  was  as  follows:  "Agree- 
Rep.  1085,  affirming  37  App.  Div.  ment,  this  is  to  certify  that  I  have 
564,  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  161;  Larous-  rented  my  farm  for  the  year  1895 
sini  V.  Werlien,  52  La.  Ann.  424,  for  the  some  of  $300.00  payment 
27  So.  Rep.  89;  Francke  v.  Hewitt,  to  be  stated  in  contract  to  the  said 
56  App.  Div.  497,  501,  68  N.  Y.  D.  (Signed)  L.  M."  and  the  court 
Supp.  968,  in  this  case  the  tenant  refused  to  regard  this  as  a  lease 
being  in  possession  of  the  build-  l)ut  merely  a  memorandum  for  a 
ing  was  told  by  the  landlord  to  go  future  lease. 

ahead   and   make   repairs   and   he  S2  Charlton  v.  Columbia  Real  Es- 

would  prepare  a  lease  according  to  late  Co.,  64  N.  J.  Eq.  631,  54  Atl. 
terms  as  to  rent,  etc.,  which  had      Rep.  444,  in  which  the  court  says 


WHAT   CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES. 


249 


an  agreement  to  execute  a  lease  at  a  future  time  upon  the  con- 
dition of  the  occurrence  of  a  some  future  event.  They  may- 
agree  that  if  a  certain  specified  event  shall  happen  the  owner 
and  the  other  person  shall  make  a  lease  and  they  may  also 
agree  upon  all  the  terms  upon  which  the  future  lease  shall 
be  made.  If  the  event  upon  which  the  making  of  the  lease  is 
conditioned  shall  happen,  the  owner  is  obligated  to  make  the 
lease  and  the  promisee  may  recover  damages  for  his  failure  to 
do  so.  If  the  event  shall  not  happen  there  is  no  duty  upon 
either  party  to  enter  into  a  lease.  Thus  an  agreement  by  an 
owner  to  make  a  lease  to  a  railroad  company  provided  the  road 
shall  be  completed  within  a  year  is  an  agreement  upon  condi- 
tion, to  be  void  if  the  road  is  unfinished,  is  not  a  lease  and  does 
not  create  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  between  the  par- 
ties to  it."  . 


that  it  is  absurd  to  say  the  parties 
have  entered  into  an  agreement 
when  the  only  evidence  of  such 
agreement  is  a  writing  stating 
that  details  are  to  be  settled  at 
some  future  time,  citing  Ridgway 
V.  Wharton,  6  H.  L.  C.  305. 

33  Proctor  V.  Benson,  149  Pa.  St. 
254,  258,  24  Atl.  Rep.  279.  A  writ- 
ing containing  the  language  "I 
hereby  agree  to  give  a  lease"  can- 
not be  construed  as  a  lease  where 
the  circumstances  attending  its  ex- 
ecution show  that  the  parties  to 
it  meant  that  a  formal  lease  in 
writing  was  to  be  executed  before 
possession  was  delivered  to  the 
tenant.  St.  Louis  Brewing  Ass"n  v. 
Niederluecke  (Mo.  App.  1903),  76 
S.  W.  Rep.  645.  "The  general  rule 
is  stated  to  be  that  no  precise 
words  or  technical  form  of  lan- 
guage are  required  to  constitute  a 
present  demise,  and  that  if  there 
are  words  showing  a  present  in- 
tention that  one  is  to  give,  and 
the  other  to  have  possession  for 
a  determinate  term  a  tenancy  is 
created;  and  that  where  there  are 


words  of  present  demise  the  in- 
strument should  operate  as  a  lease, 
and  not  as  an  agreement  for  a 
lease."  By  the  court  in  Colclough 
V.  Carpeles,  89  Wis.  239,  244.  In 
pleading  a  lease  at  common  law  it 
is  a  rule  to  plead  a  lease  accord- 
ing to  its  legal  effect.  If  this  is 
done  and  the  plaintiff  proves  only 
an  agreement  for  a  lease  it  is  a 
material  variance.  Price  v.  Wil- 
liams, 1  Mee.  &  Wei.  6,  13.  In  the 
case  of  Francke  v.  Hewitt,  56  App. 
Div.  497,  the  question  of  contracts 
to  make  leases  was  very  thor- 
oughly discussed.  This  is  an  in- 
teresting case  and  should  be  care- 
fully read.  The  court  held  in  sub- 
stance that  a  tenancy  might  be 
created  where  the  negotiations 
are  in  writing  and  a  formal  writ- 
ten contract  is  stipulated  for  into 
which  the  negotiations  are  to  be 
reduced.  And  if  the  minds  of  the 
parties  meet  upon  all  the  terms  of 
the  future  lease  and  these  terms 
are  in  all  respects  definitely  un- 
derstood and  agreed  upon  the  con- 
tract is  a  complete  lease  though 


250  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT 

§  178.  Question  for  court  or  jury.  Whether  a  writing  con- 
stitutes a  lease  is  a  question  for  the  court  to  determine  as  a  mat- 
ter of  construction.  .  If  an  oral  agreement  is  relied  upon  and  the 
facts  are  undisputed  the  court  may  determine  whether  it  is  a 
lease  without  submitting  the  question  to  the  jury.^*  This  rule 
of  practice  is  based  upon  the  rule  that  the  construction  of  a 
writing  is  a  question  for  the  court.  The  court  may  determine 
that  a  Avriting  is  a  lease  and  at  the  same  time  it  may  require  or 
permit  oral  evidence  of  an  entry  by  the  tenant.  If  there  is  any 
contradiction  as  to  the  entry  and  occupation  by  the  tenant  it  is 
not  error  to  leave  the  question  of  the  existence  of  the  relation- 
ship of  landlord  and  tenant  to  the  juiy  upon  all  the  facts.^^ 
Where  there  is  a  dispute  as  to  the  facts  the  question  whether 
the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  exists  is  one  of  fact  for 
the  jury  to  determine.^® 

§  179.  The  intention  of  the  parties.  The  general  rule  that 
the  nature  of  an  instrument  depends  upon  its  construction  and 
that  this  is  always  a  question  of  the  intention  of  the  parties  is 
applicable  to  a  lease.  Whether  an  instrument  is  or  is  not  a  lease 
always  depends  upon  what  the  parties  intended  it  to  be.  The  in- 
tention under  general  rules  must  be  collected  from  the  whole  in- 
strument regarded  in  the  light  of  the  surrounding  circum- 
stances.^^ The  fact  that  the  parties  called  it  a  lease  is  not  always 
controlling.     The  question  whether  an  instrument  is  or  is  not  a 

the  subsequent  lease  was  never  ex-  119  Pa.  St.  637,  13  AtL  Rep.  632; 
ecuted.  The  court  cited  Wilbur  v.  McKenzie  v.  Sykes,  47  Mich.  294, 
Collins,  4  App.  Div.  418,  in  which  11  N.  W.  Rep.  164;  Chamberlin  v. 
it  was  said  if  the  minds  of  the  par-  Donohue,  44  Vt.  57. 
ties  did  not  meet  as  to  all  essen-  3-  Johnson  v.  Phoenix  M.  L.  I. 
tial  parts  of  the  contract  there  Co.,  46  Conn.  92;  Potter  v.  Mercer, 
was  no  lease.  Of  course,  if  a  writ-  53  Cal.  667,  672;  Bacon  v.  Bow- 
ten  contract  was  subsequently  to  dcin,  22  Pick.  (Mass.)  401,  405; 
bo  drawn  up  and  it  was  left  until  Gibson  v.  Needham,  96  Ga.  172,  22 
then  to  agree  upon  some  of  its  S.  E.  Rep.  702;  Jackson  v.  Dela- 
terms  and  conditions  there  was  no  croix,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  433,  439; 
lease.  Griffin  v.  Knisely,  75  111.  411;  Don- 

s*  Howard  v.  Carpenter,  22  Md.  ovan  v.  P.  Schoenhaefer  Brewing 

10.  Co..  92  Mo.  App.  341;    Salomon  v. 

asBaldwell    v.    Center,    30    Cal.  Weisberg,     61     N.     Y.     Supp.     60; 

539,  89  Am.  Dec.  131.  Thomson  v.  Payne,  5  Johns.   (N. 

?'«Doe  V.  Gray,  2  Houst.    (Drl.)  Y.)    74;   Colclough  v.  Carpeles,  89 

135;  Jackson  V.  Vosburgh,  7  Johns.  Wis.    239,    245;     Shaw    v.    Farns- 

(N.  Y.)    186;   Rothermel  v.  Dunn,  Avorth,  108  Mass.  357. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  251 

lease  is  sometimes  ver^''  important  for  frequently  by  statute  the 
landlord  is  entitled  to  remedies  under  a  lease  which  parties  to 
other  contracts  cannot  enforce.  The  intention  for  this  reason  is 
particularly  important  foV  if  the  parties  did  not  intend  the  in- 
strument to  be  a  leasie  then  it  follows  that  they  did  not  intend  that 
the  owner  of  the  lease  should  have  these  remedies  against  the 
other  parties  to  the  contract  which  the  landlord  generally  pos- 
sesses. As  is  elsewhere  seen  there  are  certain  appropriate  words 
which  are  commonly  used  in  leases.  But  the  instrument  is  not  a 
lease  though  it  contains  the  usual  word  ' '  demise, ' '  if  its  contents 
show  that  the  parties  to  it  did  not  intend  that  it  should  be  a  le.ase.^* 
For  the  court  may  do  violence  to  the  express  language  of  any 
writing  rather  than  nullify  the  intention  of  the  parties  by  con- 
struing it  so  that  the  writing  is  a  lease  where  the  intention  of  the 
parties  was  manifestly  otherwise.^^  The  question  as  to  what  is  the 
instrument,  often  arises  in  attempting  to  distinguish  between  a 
lease  and  an  agreement  for  a  lease.  The  use  of  the  words  ' '  agrees 
to  let,"  or  similar  words  in  the  writing  is  not  alone  conclusive 
if  the  parties  intended  that  the  writing  should  be  merely  an 
agreement  for  a  lease.*"  Such  language  may  constitute  an 
actual  hiring  or  leasing  of  real  property  if  upon  all  the  lan- 
guage of  the  instrument  it  is  apparent  that  the  parties  intended 
to  make  a  lease ;  but  an  express  provision  in  an  instrument  that 
it  shall  not  operate  as  a  lease  but  only  as  an  agreement  for  a 
future  lease  is  conclusive  on  the  court  to  show  the  real  intention 
of  the  parties  in  spite  of  any  inferences  to  the  contrary  that 
may  be  gathered  from  other  p;irts  of  the  same  writing.*^ 

§  180.  The  assent  of  the  parties  to  a  lease.  The  general  rules 
and  principles  which  regulate  and  govern  the  law  of  contracts 
in  relation  to  the  necessity  for  the  assent  of  the  parties  thereto 
are  always  applicable  to  contracts  to  lease.  There  must  be  a 
meeting  of  the  minds  of  the  parties;  that  is,  there  must  be  an 
assent  or  agreement  of  the  persons  who  claim  or  are  claimed  to 
be  landlord  and  tenant  before  there  can  be  a  lease.     In  other 

38  Taylor  v.  Caldwell,  3  B.  &  S.  ^o  Weed  v.  Crocker,  13  Gray 
826,  32  L.  J.  Q.  B.  1G4,  8  L.  T.  (Mass.)  219,  224;  John  v.  Jenkins, 
356,  11  W.  R.  726.  3  Tyr.  177;  Browne  v.  Warner,  14 

39  Jackson      v.      Delacroix,      24  Ves.  156. 

Wend.    (N.  Y.)    433,   439;    Hallett  4i  Perring  v.  Brooke,  1  Mood.  & 

V.  Wylie,  3  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   44.  Ry.  510. 


•2oi  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

words,  as  the  law  is  laid  down  in  the  general  law  of  contracts, 
there  must  be  an  offer  on  the  one  side  and  an  acceptance  on  the 
other,  and  the  lease  is  not  made  until  the  offer  in  all  its  details 
is  met  by  an  acceptance  which  includes  the  whole  of  the  offer/^ 
It  is  immaterial  by  whom  the  offer  is  made  provided  it  be  ac- 
cepted nor  must  the  offer  be  couched  in  express  language  for  an 
offer  may  be  made  by  conduct  as  well  as  by  language.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  acceptance  of  the  offer  may  be  by  conduct,  as 
for  example  by  the  tenant  to  whom  premises  have  been  offered, 
entering  into  the  possession  of  the  same.  The  offer  must  be  ab- 
solutely accepted  in  order  to  make  a  lease  and  the  terms  pro- 
posed by  the  parties  making  the  oft'er  must  be  assented  to  in 
their  entirety.  A  counter-oft'er  rejecting  a  portion  and  accept- 
ing a  portion  of  the  original  offer  is  pennitted,  but  until  this 
counter-offer  is  in  its  turn  accepted,  no  lease  exists.  Thus,  where 
the  landlord  offers  the  premises  to  be  leased  at  a  rental  specified 
by  him,  an  offer  by  the  proposed  tenant  at  a  lower  rental  is  not 
an  acceptance.  And  if  the  so-called  acceptance  of  an  offer  by 
the  landlord  differs  in  the  particulars  from  the  offer  made  either 
in  the  rent  to  be  paid,*^  in  the  character  of  the  premises,  or  in 
their  use;  in  the  length  of  the  term  or  in  any  other  material 
respect;  or  it  attempts  in  any  way  to  vary  the  offer,  there  is 
no  assent  and  consequently  no  lease.  The  person  to  whom  the 
proposal  for  a  lease  is  made  may  either  wholly  accept  or  he 
may  wholly  reject.  Either  of  these  he  will  be  presumed  to  have 
done  for  an  answer  to  offered  terms  suggesting  other  terms  dif- 
fering from  the  offer  is  conclusively  presumed  to  constitute  a 
rejection  of  the  terais  offered.^*    Hence,  where  a  lease  in  writing 

•«2  Ver   Steeg   v.    Becker,    Moore  Rep.  898,  899.     See,  also,  Culton  v. 

Paint  Co.  (Mo.),  80  S.  W.  Rep.  346,  Gilchrist,  92  Iowa,  718,  721,  61  N. 

353;   Wood  v.  Scarth,  2  Kay  &  J.  W.   384,   385;    Jackson  v.  Rode.   7 

33,  1  Jur.  (N.  S.)  1107,  4  W.  R.  31.  Misc.  Rep.  680,  682,  28  N.  Y.  Supp. 

43  Scottish  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Taylor  147;    Smith    v.    Caputo,    14    Misc. 

(Tex.  1905),  74  S.  W.  Rep.  564.  Rep.    9,    10,   35    N.   Y.    Supp.   127; 

•It  Hammond   v.    Winchester,    82  Gramm   v.    Sterling,   8   Wyo.   527, 

Ala.  470,  470,  2  So.  Rep.  892;  Smith  535,   59  Pac.   Rep.  156;    Majors  v, 

V.  InKraiii,  90  Ala.  529,  531.  8  So.  Goodrich    (Tex.),    54    S.    W.    Rep. 

Rei).  144;  Cochiane  v.  .Justice  Min-  919;    Lever  v.   KofHer,  70  Law   J. 

ing  Co.,  16  Colo.  415,  26  Pac.  Rep.  Ch.  395,  (1901)  1  Ch.  543,  84  Law 

780;  Gifford  v.  King,  54  Iowa,  525,  T.  584,  49  Weekly  Rep.  506;  Castro 

529.  6  N.   W.  Rep.  735;    Erickson  v   Gaffey,  96  Cal.  421,  31  Pac.  Rep. 

V.    Wallace,   45   Kan.   430,   25   Pac.  363;   Hill  v.  Coal  Valley  Min.  Co., 


WHAT   CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  253 

was  by  the  lessor  sent  to  the  lessee  for  his  signature,  and  the 
latter,  without  the  consent  of  the  lessor,  put  in  the  lease  a  clause 
giving  him  the  privilege  of  sub-letting  and  binding  the  lessor  to 
keep  in  repair  a  portion  of  the  premises,  there  is  no  acceptance 
of  the  lessor's  offer.  The  alterations  and  insertions  are  a  mate- 
rial variation  from  the  offer.  Unless  they  shall  in  turn  be  accepted 
by  the  lessor  they  are  the  same  as  a  rejection  of  the  lessor's  offer.*^ 
An  offer  to  execi,ite  a  lease  being  without  consideration  is  revoc- 
able any  time  before  its  acceptance.  If  a  time  is  specified  for  the 
acceptance  of  the  offer  by  the  other  party,  the  offer  is  presump- 
tively open  for  acceptance  during  that  period;  and,  if  the  per- 
son who  has  made  the  offer  desires  to  revoke  it  during  that  time 
he  must  notify  the  other  party  of  his  intention  to  do  so.  The 
offer  to  make  a  lease  in  such  case  is  a  continuing  offer  unless  ex- 
pressly revoked  during-  the  time  which  is  limited  for  its  accept- 
ance; it  may  be  accepted  or  rejected  by  the  person  to  whom  it 
is  made  at  any  time  during  the  period  named.  Before  the 
offeree  shall  have  acted  upon  it,  the  person  making  the  offer 
ma}^  revoke  it,  but  after  the  former  has  accepted  it  by  conduct 
or  words,  it  becomes  a  lease.  Before  the  acceptance  there  is 
neither  any  assent  nor  consideration  upon  which  a  valid  and 
binding  lease  could  be  predicated.  The  acceptance  of  the  off'er 
of  a  lease  at  the  same  instant  supplies  both  assent  and  consid- 
eration and  creates  a  contract  of  lease  whose  terms  are  those 
contained  in  the  oft'er.  The  minds  of  the  parties  have  met  upon 
terms  satisfactory  to  both  and  the  acceptance  of  the  offer  by 
the  party  to  whom  it  was  made  is  a  good  and  valid  consideration 
for  the  party  who  has  made  the  offer."*^  The  acceptance  of  the 
offer  to  constitute  a  valid  lease  need  not  be  couched  in  any  par- 
ticular language.  So,  where  an  offer  is  made  to  rent  premises 
and  it  is  neither  expressly  rejected,  nor  declined,  a  subsequent 
inquiry  by  the  prospective  lessee  if  he  could  move  in  to  which 
an  affirmative  answer  is  made  will  constitute  a  lease.*^  So,  the 
acceptance  of  an  oft'er  of  a  lease  made  by  the  owner  may  be  im- 

103  111.  App.  41;   Smith  v.  Colby,  46  Pettibone  v.  Moore,   73   Hun, 

136    Mass.    532;    Highland    Co.    v.  461,  464,  465,  27  N.  Y.   Supp.  455 

Rhoads,  26  Ohio  St.  411.  (lease). 

•*5Ver    Steeg   v.    Becker,    Moore  '"Smith  v.  Ingram,  90  Ala.  529, 

Paint   Co.    (Mo.)     80    S.    W.    Rep.  8  So.  Rep.  144. 
346,  353. 


251 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


plied  from  the  conduct  as  well  as  from  the  language  of  the  ten- 
ant. Thus,  where  an  owner  in  reply  to  an  inquiry  by  a  tenant 
whose  lease  was  soon  to  expire,  informed  the  latter  by  mail  that 
he  expected  to  be  in  their  county  in  a  short  time  but  that  if  the 
tenant  did  not  see  him  or  hear  from  him  in  the  course  of  a  few 
days,  he  might  rely  on  having  the  land  on  terms  mentioned,  the 
action  of  the  tenant  in  holding  over  and  proceeding  to  break 
the  land  and  put  in  a  crop  shows  an  acceptance  of  the  landlord's 
terms."' 

§  181.  The  consideration  for  the  lease.  There  must  also  ap- 
pear some  consideration,  whether  express  or  implied,  in  the 
lease.  It  may  appear  in  the  written  lease  itself  or  it  may  be 
proved  by  parol  evidence.  The  general  rules  of  law  regulating 
the  subject  of  consideration,  so  far  as  they  apply  to  the  law  of 
contracts  are  applicable  to  leases  and  these  rules  as  generally  set 
out  in  the  text  books  and  eases  may  be  consulted.  A  lease  with- 
out any  consideration  is  void.*''  A  promise  by  each  of  the  parties 
to  the  lease  to  the  other  is  the  usual  considcrntion  in  a  lease.    The 


4s  Springer  v.  Cooper,  11  111. 
App.  267.  There  is  no  contract  of 
lease  where  the  negotiations  are 
conducted  entirely  by  letters 
through  the  mail,  and  the  pro- 
posed tenant  requests  to  lease  the 
land  for  five  years  while  the  pro- 
posed landlord  in  reply  states  that 
he  can  have  it  for  three,  but  the 
tenant  does  not  accept  this  propo- 
sition. An  offer  of  one  party  as- 
sented to  by  the  other  will  con- 
stitute a  lease  but  the  assent  must 
comprehend  the  whole  of  the  prop- 
osition. The  assent  must  be  ex- 
actly equal  in  its  extent  and  terms 
and  must  not  qualify  the  accept- 
ance with  new  matter.  Hence,  an 
accei)tance  of  the  offer  on  terms 
varying  for  it  is  certainly  a  re- 
jection. Errickson  v.  Wallace,  45 
Kan.  430-433.  25  Pac.  Rep.  89.8.  A 
lease  is  not  made  where  a  tenant, 
being  in  possession,  another  party 
applies  by  telegram  to  rent  the 
house  for  a  month  and  the  land- 


lord refusing  to  rent  for  a  month 
says  he  may  have  it  for  a  year. 
Gifford  V.  King,  54  Iowa,  525,  530, 
6  N.  W.  Rep.  735.  A  letter  which 
accepted  the  terms  offered  by  the 
landlord  but  also  stated  that  the 
tenant  would  like  to  build  a  cook 
room  wfEh  a  privilege  to  remove 
it  constitutes  a  lease  and  the 
question  in  regard  to  the  cook 
room  is  not  a  variance  of  the 
offer.  Culton  v.  Gilchrist,  92  Iowa, 
718-721,  61  N.  W.  Rep.  384.  It  is 
not  essential  that  the  offer  of  lease 
should  be  accepted  in  writing. 
Moving  into  the  premises  after 
having  asked  by  telephone  whether 
it  would  be  satisfactory  without 
proposing  or  suggesting  any 
change  of  the  terms  is  an  accept- 
ance of  the  landlord's  offer  and  is 
a  sufficient  lease.  Smith  v.  In- 
gram, 90  Ala.  529,  531,  2  So.  Rep. 
892. 

■•o  Rrown  v.  Roberts,  21  La.  Ann. 
508.  510. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  2oO 

•consideration  passing  from  the  tenant  to  the  landlord  is  the 
promise  of  the  tenant  to  pay  rent  to  the  landlord  or  to  some  third 
person  at  his  request.  On  the  part  of  the  landlord  the  considera- 
tion is  his  demise  of  the  premises  for  a  stipulated  term  and  his 
promise  to  give  possession.  This  is  a  good  consideration  on  the 
part  of  the  landlord  though  it  is  not  under  seal.^°  So  an  express 
reservation  of  rent  by  the  landlord,  or  a  promise  to  pay  him 
rent  though  it  is  not  under  the  seal  of  the  tenant,  is  also  a  good 
consideration  for  the  covenants  of  the  landlord,  but  such  a  prom- 
ise is  not  indispensable  in  a  lease  as  it  may  always  be  implied.'^'- 
Other  considerations  by  the  tenant  are  equally  valid.  The  tenant 
may  promise  to  pay  rent  in  goods  or  produce  or  he  may  promise 
to  render  the  landlord  personal  services  for  the  rent,  or  he  may 
promise  to  board  and  maintain  him.  Any  of  these  promises  are 
good  as  a  consideration.  A  new  lease  entered  into  by  the  parties 
to  take  the  place  of  the  old  one  must  be  upon  a  new  consideration 
which  differs  from  the  consideration  in  the  old  lease.  An  agree- 
ment by  a  tenant  who  holds  under  a  lease  by  which  the  rent  is 
payable  monthly  that  he  will  thereafter  pay  rent  semi-monthly 
is  a  sufficient  consideration  on  his  part  for  a  new  lease  at  a  lower 
rental.  The  new  lease  having  been  fully  executed  by  the  tenant 
continuing  in  possession  and  the  rent  paid  by  him  in  accordance 
with  its  terms  while  he  is  in  possession  a  landlord  cannot  there- 
after claim  that  it  is  void  because  without  consideration. ^- 

§  182.  Some  circumstances  which  tend  to  show  an  instru- 
ment is  a  lease.  Various  circumstances  in  connection  with  the 
execution  of  an  instrument  in  writing  concerning  which  the  in- 
quiry is  whether  it  is  a  lease  or  merely  an  agreement  to  make 
one,  have  been  seized  upon  by  the  courts  to  enable  them  to  deter- 
mine the  true  character  of  the  writing.  So,  also,  the  court  will 
always  take  into  consideration  the  mode  in  which  the  parties  are 
to  carry  out  or  perform  the  writing.  The  intention  and  sub- 
stance of  the  writing  will  be  considered  rather  than  its  forni.^-^ 

•■0  Hill  V.  Woodman,  14  Me.  38,  and  even  though  it  contain  a  stip- 

43.  ulation    that    a    formal    lease    in 

51  Chadbourn'     v.      Rahilly,      34  writing  shall  be  subsequently  exe- 

Minn.  346,  2.5  N.  W.  Rep.  643.  cuted.  the  question  has  frequently 

02  Goldsborough  V.  Gable,  36  111.  arisen  whether  the  written  agree- 

App.  363,  369.  ment  operates  as  a  lease  in  pres- 

52a  "When  an   agreement   for  a  enti,  or  only  as  an  agreement  for 

lease  has  been  reduced  to  writing,  a  lease  in  futuro.     In  such  cases 


256 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


The  circnmstance  that  the  tenant  is  let  into  possession  under  the 
so-called  agreement  for  a  lease,  is  often  the  controlling  fact  to 
show  that  the  parties  intended  a  present  lease,^^  but  the  circum- 
stances that  the  tenant  is  in  actual  possession,  and  so  need  not 
be  let  into  possession,  is  not  controlling  if  upon  all  the  facts, 
the  parties  meant  the  agreement  to  be  a  lease."  The  circum- 
stance that  a  tenant  entered  on  premises  under  what  appears  to 
be  an  agreement  for  a  lease  and  expends  a  large  amount  of 
money  in  making  improvements  with  the  knowledge  of  the  land- 
lord, may  indicate  an  intention  that  the  instrument  shall  be  taken 
as  a  lease.  It  is  presumed  that  the  tenant  would  not  have  spent 
the  money  unless  he  believed  that  the  possession  was  secured  to 
him  by  a  lease.^^     An  instrument  containing  words  of  present 


the  rule,  as  established  by  numer- 
ous decisions  is,  First,  that  effect 
will  be  given  to  the  instrument 
according  to  the  intention  of  the 
parties,  to  be  ascertained  from  all 
the  terms  of  the  instrument  itself, 
considered  in  the  light  of  the  sur- 
rounding circumstances.  Second, 
that  if  the  instrument  contain 
Avords  of  a  present  demise,  it  will 
be  deemed  a  lease  in  presenti.  un- 
less it  appear  from  other  portions 
of  the  instrument  that  such  was 
not  the  intention  of  the  parties. 
Third,  that  if  possession  be  given 
under  the  agreement  this  will  be 
a  circumstance  tending  to  prove 
that  it  was  intended  as  a  lease  in 
presenti."  By  the  court  in  Potter 
V.  Mercer,  53  Cal.  667,  673. 

53  Hanerton  v.  Stead,  3  B.  &  C. 
478;  Chapman  v.  Bluck,  4  Bing. 
(N.  C.)  187,  5  Scott,  513,  1  Am. 
l->,  7  L.  .T.  C.  P.  100,  2  Jur.  206. 

51  Doe  d.  Phillips  v.  Benjamin, 
9  A.  &  E.  644,  1  P.  &  D.  440,  8  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  117. 

!■'!■>  Poole  V.  Bentley,  12  Ea.st,  168, 
2  Camp.  286.  The  entry  into  pos- 
session by  a  tenant  under  an 
agreement  for  a  lease  was  held  to 
constitute    a    lease    although    the 


agreement  was  to  execute  a  lease 
in  the  future.  Poole  v.  Bentley,  12 
East,  168,  in  which  case  Lord  El- 
lenborough  said  in  substance  that 
while  the  intention  was  to  con- 
trol, the  fact  that  the  tenant  was 
to  expend  much  capital  upon  the 
premises  during  the  first  four 
years  of  the  term  shows  that  he 
was  to  have  a  present  legal  inter- 
est in  the  term  which  was  to  be 
binding  on  both  parties  although 
after  progress  was  made  in  build- 
ing a  more  formal  lease  in  which 
the  premises  might  be  more  par- 
ticularly described  would  be  exe- 
cuted. This  case  was  cited  in 
Chapman  v.  Bluck,  4  Bing.  (N.  C.) 
187,  195,  where  the  court  said 
that  while  it  was  difficult  to  recon- 
cile all  the  cases  on  the  question 
whether  certain  Instruments  shall 
be  taken  to  operate  as  agreements 
for  leases  or  as  actual  demises, 
the  fact  that  the  tenant  entered 
possession  after  a  correspondence 
between  the  parties  constituted 
him  a  lessee  and  the  landlord  was 
authorized  to  distrain  for  rent. 
For  other  cases  in  which  an  agree- 
ment contained  words  of  present 
(li'niise  has  been  held  to  be  a  lease. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES. 


257 


demise  will  be  construed  as  a  lease,  if  such  is  the  intention  of  tlie 
parties,  though  the  instrument  contains  a  clause  for  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  future  lease.^®  An  agreement  for  a  lease  containing  a 
stipulation  which  provides  for  an  execution  of  a  formal  lease, 
and  that  in  the  meantime  until  such  lease  shall  be  executed,  the 
tenant  is  to  pay  rent  and  to  hold  the  premises  subject  to  the 
covenants  which  are  to  be  inserted  in  the  lease  when  it  is  exe- 
cuted, is  a  lease  and  not  merely  an  agreement  to  make  one.'^^ 

§  183.  No  presumption  of  tenancy  from  possession  alone. 
The  mere  fact  that  one  man  is  in  possession  of  land  owned  by 
another  though  a  circumstance  to  be  considered  in  determining 
whether  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  exists  between  them, 


though  it  contained  a  stipulation 
for  the  execution  of  a  lease  in  the 
future,  see  Pearce  v.  Cheslyn,  5 
N.  &  M.  652,  4  A.  &  E.  225,  1  H. 
&  W.  768,  5  L.  J.  K.  B.  113;  Doe  d. 
Pearson  v.  Ries,  8  Bing.  178,  1  M. 
&  Scott,  259,  1  L.  J.  C.  P.  73;  Chap- 
man V.  Bluck,  4  Bing.  (N.  C.)  187, 

5  Scott,  513,  1  Arn.  15,  7  L.  J.  C.  P. 
100,  2  Jur.  206;  Doe  d.  Phillips  v. 
Benjamin,  9  A.  &  E.  644,  1  P.  & 
D.  440,  2  W.  W.  &  H.  96,  8  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  117;  Curling  v.  Mills,  7  Scott 
(N.  R.)  709,  6  Man.  &  G.  173,  12  L. 
J.  C.  P.  316;  Tarte  v.  Darby,  15  M. 

6  W.  601,  15  L.  J.  Ex.  326;  Wilson 
V.  Chisholm,  4  Car.  &  P.  474. 

50  Poole  V.  Bentley,  12  East,  168, 

2  Camp.  286;  Warman  v.  Faithful, 

3  N.  &  M.  137,  5  B.  &  Ad.  10l2,  3 
L.  J.  K.  B.  114;  Doe  d.  Jackson 
V.  Ashburner,  5  Term  Rep.  163. 

57  Pinero  v.  Judson,  6  Bing.  206, 
3  M.  &  P.  497,  8  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  C.  P. 
19,  31  R.  R.  388;  Hancock  v.  Caf- 
fyn,  1  M.  &  Scott,  521,  8  Bing.  358, 
1  L.  J.  C.  P.  104;  Doe  d.  Walker 
V.  Groves,  15  East,  244.  "There 
may  be  many  things  about  which 
the  parties  may  enter  in  such  a 
case    into    a    written    agreement, 

17 


without  its  being  a  demise,  tak- 
ing it  for  granted  that  a  demise 
already  exists,  or  will  exist.  For 
example,  the  one  party  may  agree 
to  lay  out  money  on  the  premises 
in  consideration  that  the  other 
will  agree  that  he  shall  thereafter 
become  tenant.  This  paper  clearly 
refers  to  some  parol  agreement  be- 
tween the  parties,  containing  some 
other  stipulation.  Where  the  par- 
ties signed  an  agreement  contain- 
ing all  the  particulars  of  a  demise, 
it  may  no  doubt  be  considered 
as  imparting  a  present  interest, 
though  it  contains  words  of  agree- 
ment on  the  part  of  one  of  them 
only.  But  that  is  where  it  con- 
tains all  the  terms  of  the  demise, 
v.-hich  is  not  the  case  here.  There 
is  no  statement  of  the  commence- 
ment or  duration  of  the  tenancy, 
no  stipulation  that  the  party  shall 
occupy  for  a  year  or  a  longer  pe- 
riod, and  nothing  more  than  a 
legal  inference  that  if  he  occu- 
pies for  a  year  he  must  pay  rent 
at  the  rate  therein  mentioned." 
By  Lord  Abinger,  C.  B.,  in  Gore  v. 
Lloyd.  13  L.  J.  Ex.  366,  12  Wm. 
&  W.  463. 


258  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

by  no  means  raises  any  presumption  of  a  tenancy  existing  in 
tlie  absence  of  proof  of  a  letting  and  hiring  express  or  implied.^^ 
If  the  occupant  is  in  possession  without  the  consent  of  the  true 
owner  he  is  merely  a  trespasser  from  whom  no  rent  can  be  col- 
lected and  against  whom  the  only  remedy  is  an  action  of  eject- 
ment or  trespass  as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  may  indicate. 
Even  the  fact  that  the  occupant  is  in  possession  with  the  consent 
of  the  owner  does  not,  taken  in  connection  with  the  possession, 
conclusively  show  that  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant 
exists.  It  must  also  be  shown  that  the  occupant  holds  possession^ 
not  only  with  the  consent  of  the  owner  but  under  and  in  sub- 
ordination to  the  title  of  the  latter.  In  other  words,  the  true 
test  of  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  is  to  ascertain, 
first  whether  the  person  claiming  or  who  is  claimed  to  be  a  ten- 
ant holds  possession  with  the  assent  of  the  owner,  and  second,  if 
such  be  the  case,  whether  he  holds  in  subordination  to  the  title 
of  the  owner.^^ 

§  184.  The  length  of  the  term  in  an  agreement  to  make  a 
lease.  The  parties  to  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease  in  futuro 
must  be  particularly  careful  to  see  to  it  that  the  agi^eement  either 
expressly  states  the  length  of  the  term  which  is  to  be  created  by 
the  lease  or  that  it  states  some  fact  or  circumstance  from  which 
the  length  of  the  term  may  be  ascertained.    The  agreement  must 

c8  Bailey    v.    Campbell,    82    Ala.  Supp.  657,  26  Misc.  Rep.  843;  Har- 

342;    Hardin    v.    Bailey,    79    Ala.  ris  v.  Frink,  2  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  35. 
381;  Carger  v.  Fee,  140  111.  582,  39  sg  Littleton  v.  Wynn,  31  Ga.  583; 

N.     E.     Rep.     93;     Cummings     v.  Turner    v.    Davis,    48    Conn.    397; 

Smith,    114    111.    App.    35;     Pitts-  Loring  v.  Taylor,  50  Mo.  App.  81; 

burgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  v.  Thornburgh,  Chambers  v.  Ross,   25  N.  J.  Law, 

98  Ind.  201;  Hall  v.  .Jacobs,  7  Bush  293;    Twiss  v.   Boehmer,   39  Oreg. 

(Ky.)  505;  Jordan  v.  Mead,  19  La.  359,    65   Pac.   Rep.   18;    Victory   v. 

Ann.  101;   Paige  v.  Scott's  Heirs,  Stroud,   15  Tex.    573;    Heddleston 

12  La.  490;  Fisk  v.  Moore,  11  Rob.  v.    Stoner,   128   Iowa,   525,    105  N. 

(La.)  279;  Curtis  v.  Treat,  21  Me.  W.  Rep.  56;  Page  v.  McGlinch,  63 

525;     Leonard    v.    Kingman,     136  Me.  472,  476;   Lockwood  v.  Thun- 

Mass.  123;    Edmonson  v.  Kite,  43  der  Bay  River  Boom  Co.,  42  Mich. 

Mo.    176;    Williams   v.   Berier,    31  536;     Hogsett    v.    Ellis,    17    Mich. 

Mo.  13;  Dixon  v.  Ahearn,  19  Nev.  351;   Steen  v.  Scheel,  46  Neb.  252, 

422,  24  Pac.   Rep.   337;    Crosby  v.  64    N.    W.    Rep.    957;     Skinner    v. 

Home  &  Danz  Co.,  45  Minn.  249,  Skinner,    38    Neb.    756,    57    N.    W. 

47    N.    W.    Rep.    717;    Stewart    v.  Rep.  534;  Parley  v.  McKeegan,  48 

Finch,   31   N.   .L   Law,   17;    Alt  v.  Neb.  237,  67  N.  W.  Rep.  16L 
Gray,    90   St.   Rep.    657,    56   N.   Y. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  259 

state  both  the  length  of  the  temi  and  the  date  of  its  commence- 
ment, in  order  that  it  may  be  enforceable  in  equity.  Generally 
the  fact  that  a  memorandum  for  a  lease  does  not  contain  the  date 
upon  which  the  term  is  to  commence,  will  prevent  it  from  being 
in  compliance  with  the  statute  of  frauds.^"  Such  an  agreement 
to  make  a  lease  cannot  be  specifically  performed.®^  It  has  been 
held  sufficient  in  one  case  if  the  date  can  be  supplied  by  parol 
evidence.  Though  the  agreement  for  a  lease  may  not  state  the 
date,  it  will  be  sufficient  under  the  statute,  and  for  specific  per- 
formance if  it  refers  to  a  circumstance  from  which  the  date  naay 
be  implied.^-  There  is  no  inference  that  the  term  is  to  commence 
from  the  date  of  the  agreement  where  it  is  not  so  expressly  pro- 
vided. It  is  a  presumption  that  parties  who  agree  to  make  a 
lease  intend  one  to  be  prepared  which  shall  be  dated  on  a  subse- 
quent day  and  possession  is  usually  not  surrendered  to  the  ten- 
ant until  such  a  lease  is  executed  by  both  parties.  There  is  no 
presumption  therefore  that  the  date  of  the  agreement  to  make  a 
lease  is  to  be  the  date  of  the  lease  unless  indeed  the  writing  which 
is  called  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease,  is  a  lease  itself.  Under 
such  circumstances,  the  contract  for  a  lease  being  deficient  in 
certainty,  will  not  be  specifically  enforced.®^  An  agreement 
which  provides  that  a  tenant  is  to  bje  given  possession  within  one 
month  from  its  date  sufficiently  states  the  commencement  of  the 
term,  and  the  lease  is  to  commence  when  possession  is  given. 
Such  a  contract  is  sufficiently  definite  to  warrant  specific  per- 
formance.***  But  an  agreement  containing  proposed  terms  for 
a  future  lease  with  an  acceptance  by  the  lessee  on  condition  the 
premises  are  in  repair,  is  not  a  lease  because  the  time  is  not  fixed 

60  Clarke  v.  Fuller,  16  C.  B.  (N.  fis  Marshall  v.  Berridge,  51  L.  J. 
S.)  24,  12  W.  R.  671;  Marshall  v.  Ch.  329,  19  Ch.  D.  233,  45  L.  T. 
Berridge,  51  L.  J.  Ch.  329,  19  Ch.  599,  30  W.  R.  93,  46  J.  B.  279; 
D.  233,  45  L.  T.  599,  30  W.  R.  93,  Wyse  v.  Russell,  11  L.  R.  Jr.  113; 
46  J.  P.  279;  Oxford  Corporation  Dolling  v.  Evans,  15  W.  R.  394. 
V.  Crow,  3  Ch.  535,  8  R.  279,  69  L.  Compare  Jacques  v.  Millar,  47  L. 
T.  228,  42  W.  T.  200;  Jaques  v.  J.  Ch.  544,  6  Ch.  D.  153,  37  L.  T. 
Millar,  6  Ch.  D.  153,  overruled.  151,  25  W.  R.  846,  which  was  over- 
See,  also.  May  v.  Thomson,  20  Ch.  ruled. 

D.  705.  G4  Marshall   v.   Berridge,   19   Ch. 

61  Blore  V.  Sulton,  3  Mer.  237,  17  D.  '233,  discussed  and  applied; 
R.  R.  74.  Lauder  and  Bagley's  Contract,  In 

62Phelan  v.  Tedcastle,  15  L.  R.  re,  61  L.  J,  Ch.  707,  3  Ch.  41,  67 
Ir.  169.  L.  T.  521. 


2G0  LAW  OF  LANDLOKO  AND  TENANT. 

■when  the  tenancy  is  to  commence.  So,  too,  the  fact  that  though 
signed  by  the  parties,  the  terms  are  only  to  go  into  effect  upon 
the  performance  by  the  landlord  of  certain  things  which  might 
or  might  not  be  done  by  him,  prevents  the  instrument  from  be- 
coming or  being  regarded  as  a  present  lease.*^^ 

§  185,  The  term  as  stated  in  the  lease.  The  term  for  which 
the  premises  may  be  occupied  must  be  certain  and  fixed  by  the 
lease  itself  or  there  must  be  method  indicated  by  the  instrument 
by  which  the  length  of  the  term  may  be  determined.  The  writ- 
ing must  fix  its  commencement,  and  duration,  or  describe  some 
certain  event  upon  the  happening  of  which  it  is  to  commence.^® 
Unquestionably  a  lease  may  be  signed,  the  term  of  which  may 
be  made  to  begin  on  the  occurrence  of  some  event  in  the  future.*^^ 
Thus  a  lease  is  not  invalid  because  of  the  uncertainty  of  the 
term  created  therein  where  the  day  on  which  the  term  is  to 
end  is  specified  and  the  rental  is  to  begin  to  be  paid  when  a 
building  not  in  existence  but  which  the  landlord  agrees  to  erect 
on  the  property  within  a  certain  date  is  ready  for  occupancy.^* 
So,  also,  a  written  lease  of  a  room  in  a  building  in  process  of 
erection  for  five  years  from  the  completion  of  the  building  is  a 
valid  lease  for  a  term  to  begin  in  futuro.  The  certainty  of  the 
term  is  fixed  by  the  completion  of  the  building  and  the  occu- 
pancy of  the  room  and  payment  of  rent  by  the  lessee.  The  ab- 
sence of  an  express  agreement  by  the  lessor  to  complete  the 
building  does  not  render  the  term  uncertain  for  such  an  agree- 
ment will  be  implied  under  the  circumstances.  The  completion 
of  the  building  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the  beginning  of  the 
term  though  the  fact  that  in  some  respects  the  work  was  un- 
satisfactory to  the  lessee  is  not  material  on  his  liability  whe/re  he 
entered,  occupied  and  paid  rent."*  So,  not  only  must  the  begin- 
ning of  the  term  be  ascertained  or  be  ascertainable  by  the  lease 
but  the  end  must  not  be  uncertain.  Thus,  in  a  lease  for  a  year 
which  gave  the  lessee  ''a  privilege  of  longer,"  the  latter  phrase 

6'- Doe  fl.  Wood  V.  Clarke,   7  Q.       v.   Ganster,  72  Pa.  St.   285;    Trull 

B.  211,  14  L.  J.  Q.  B.  233,  9  Jur.  v.  Granger,  8  N.  Y.  115,  118;  Blear 
426.  V.  Flues,  64  N.  Y.  518,  520. 

00  Colclough  V.  Carpeles,  89  Wis.  es  Colclough  v.  Carpeles,  89  Wis. 

239,  245,  24C,  61  N.  W.  Rep.  836.  239,  61  N.  W.  Rep.  836. 

07  See  Wilcox  v.  Bostick,  57   S.  «»  Hammond  v.  Barton,  93  Wis. 

C.  151,  35  S.  P:.  Rep.  496;  Bussman  183,  67  N.  W.  Rep.  412. 


WHAT  CONTBACTS  ARE  LEASES.  2G1 

was  held  to  be  so  indefinite  as  to  time  that  the  tenant  could  not 
remain  in  possession  longer  than  a  year.'" 

§  186.  Entry  into  possession  as  indicating  a  lease.  In  de- 
tennining  whether  a  writing  is  a  lease  or  merely  an  agreement 
for  one,  the  entry  into  possession  of  the  lessee  with  the  consent 
of  the  lessor  is  a  circumstance  which  tends  to  throw  some  light 
on  the  intention  of  the  parties.  The  same  principle  is  true  where 
it  is  necessary  to  ascertain  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  an  oral 
agreement.  But  entry  and  possession  are  never  relevant  unless 
the  intention  is  ambiguous  or  doubtful,  for  if  it  be  clear  from 
the  language  emploj^ed  that  the  agreement  was  to  make  a  lease 
in  futuro,  and  net  a  lease  in  presenti,  the  delivery  of  possession 
is  absolutely  immaterial.  In  other  words,  proof  of  delivery  of 
possession  is  not  received  to  alter,  vary  or  modify  the  intention 
as  shown  by  the  language  of  the  parties,  whether  oral  or  written, 
but  solely  to  show  what  the  intention  is.'^^  The  entry  of  a  per- 
son in  the  capacity  of  a  tenant  on  premises,  who  has  by  parol 
agreed  with  the  owner  to  execute  a  written  lease  is  a  tenancy  at 
wUl.  Where  the  lease  was  to  be  for  a  year,  an  entry  under  an 
agreement  will  be  a  lease  for  one  year  though  the  yearly  lease 
was  never  executed.'- 

70  Howard  v.  Tomicich,  81  Miss.  125,   7   Pac.   Rep.   444;    Jenkins  v. 

703,  33   So.  Rep.  493.     A  mistake  Eldridge,    13    Fed.    Cases,    7268,   3 

as  to  the  termination  of  the  term  Story,  325;   Goldberg  v.  Wood,  90 

of  a  lease,  caused  by  writing  the  N.  Y.  Supp.  427,  428,  45  Misc.  Rep. 

figure    "8"    instead    of    the    word  327. 

"eighty"  before  the  word  "eight"  ~-  Bonaparte  v.  Thayer,   95  Md. 

in  the  date  1888  will  not  defeat  a  548,  52  Atl.  Rep.  496.     The  action 

recovery  on  the  lease.    Nyquist  v.  of  the  landlord  in  permitting  one 

Martin,  35  111.  App.  623.   An  agree-  who  expects  to  be   his   tenant  to 

ment  to  make  a  lease  "for  one  or  go  on  the  premises  to  repair  while 

more  years"  is  sufficiently  certain  negotiations  are  under  way  for  the 

as  to  the  length  of  the  term  to  en-  execution  of  a  long  lease  does  not 

able    the    tenant    to    procure    its  establish  an  oral  lease  for  a  short 

specific    performance,    as    it    has  term.     It  is  very  evident  that  this 

been  construed  that  the  term  "one  was  done  simply  for  the  accommo- 

or  more  years"  means  at  least  two  dation  of  the   prospective  tenant, 

years  and  perhaps  more  in  the  op-  Herbert  v.  Gallatin,  163  N.  Y.  575, 

tion  of  the  tenant.     Boston  Cloth-  57   N.   E.   Rep.   1112,   affirming   22 

Ing  Co.  V.  Solberg    (Wash.  1902),  App.  Div.  623,  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  778, 

68  Pac.  Rep.  715.  779.   A  finding  that  there  had  been 

Ti  Potter  V.  Mercer,  53  Cal.  667,  a  contract  to  lease  the  premises 

672;   Cheney  v.  Newberry,  67  Cal.  for  one  year  is  not  justified  where 


262  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  187.  The  presumption  of  an  existing  tenancy  from  the  pay- 
ment of  money  by  the  occupant  to  the  owner.  The  circum- 
stance that  a  person  in  the  actual  possession  and  occupation  of 
land  pays  money  to  the  owner  is  relevant  to  show  the  relations 
of  the  parties  and,  while  taken  alone  it  may  have  no  significance^ 
yet  in  connection  with  other  circumstances  it  may  raise  a  con- 
clusive presumption  that  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant 
existed  between  the  payor  and  the  payee.  If  upon  all  the  cir- 
cumstances, it  is  apparent  that  the  owner  received  or  claimed  to 
receive  the  payments  as  a  lessor  of  the  premises  and  that  the  oc- 
cupant either  assented  thereto  by  words  or  conduct,  or  remained 
silent  in  reference  to  the  character  in  which  the  lessor  received 
the  money,  then  it  will  be  conclusively  presumed  that  the  rela- 
tion of  landlord  and  tenant  existed  between  the  parties.  The 
presumption  of  the  existence  of  the  relation  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ant arises  from  the  payment  of  money  as  rent  and  if  it  is  proved 
that  the  money  was  paid  as  rent  then  it  is  conclusively  presumed 
that  the  relationship  out  of  which  the  payment  of  rent  alone 
grows,  exists."^  This  presumption  has  been  applied  in  the  case  of 
a  tenant  holding  over.  In  fact  this  is  a  very'  frequent  application 
for  the  whole  doctrine  of  tenancy  by  holding  over  is  based  upon 
the  payment  of  rent.  The  payment  of  rent  creates  a  presump- 
tion of  a  tenancy,  the  term  of  which  depends  upon  the  time  in- 
tervening between  the  rental  payments.     Usually  the  presump- 

the  defendant  after  receiving  a  Fernandez,  1  Rob.  (La.)  260;  En- 
proposition  from  the  plaintiff  as  rich  v.  Stock  Yard  Co.,  86  Md. 
to  leasing  a  coal  yard  for  a  year,  482,  38  Atl.  Rep.  843;  Squire  v. 
occupied  the  premises  for  a  short  Ferd.  Heim  Brewing  Co.,  90  Mo. 
time  without  signing  a  written  App.  462;  Hill  v.  Boutell,  3  N.  H. 
lease  or  coming  to  any  definite  502  (a  promise  to  pay  rent); 
agreement.  Gramm  v.  Sterling,  8  Decker  v.  Hartshorne,  65  N.  J. 
Wyo.  527,  59  Pac.  Rep.  156.  Law,  87,  89,  48  Atl.  Rep.  1117; 
73  Kelly  V.  Eyster,  102  Ala.  325,  Simmons  v.  Pope,  84  N.  Y.  Supp. 
14  So.  Rep.  657;  Rainey  v.  Capps,  973,  974;  Weinhaner  v.  Eastern 
22  Ala.  288;  Barrett  v.  Jefferson,  Brewing  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  Supp.  354; 
5  Houst.  (Del.)  567;  Flagg  v.  Gelt-  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Secor,  32  Barb, 
macher,  98  111.  293;  Voight  v.  (N.  Y.)  469, 473;  Weaver  v.  South- 
Resor,  80  111.  331,  332;  Cressler  v.  ern  Oregon  Co.,  31  Oreg.  14,  48 
Williams,  80  Ind.  366,  368;  Duffy  Pac.  Rep.  167;  Virginia  Mining 
V.  Carman,  3  Ind.  App.  207,  210,  and  Improvement  Co.  v.  Hoover, 
29  N.  E.  Rep.  454;  Andrews  v.  Er-  82  Va.  449,  4  S.  E.  Rep.  680; 
win,  25  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1791,  78  S.  Rraythwayte  v.  Hitchcock,  10  Mee. 
W.    Rep.    902,    903;    Brandagee    v.  &  Wei.  494. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  263 

tion  is  invoked  in  favor  of  the  landlord  against  the  tenant  but 
it  is  of  equal  service  in  favor  of  the  tenant,  that  is,  though  a 
term  is  created  solely  by  payment  of  rent,  the  tenant  is  still  en- 
titled to  notice  to  quit,  and  cannot  be  ousted  except  by  the  proper 
statutorj^  proceedings.  The  fact,  also,  that  one  who  himself  pays 
rent  to  the  owner  of  the  premises  receives  money  for  the  use  of 
the  premises  from  other  persons  who  occupy  them  and  gives  re- 
ceipts in  his  own  name  to  such  persons  may  also  be  considered 
to  show  he  is  a  tenant.  This  presumption  is  rebuttable  only  by 
showing  that  the  money  paid  was  not  paid  as  rent  but  with  some 
other  intention  in  the  minds  of  both  payor  and  payee.''* 

§  188.  The  necessity  for  the  payment  of  rent.  While,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  existence  of  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant 
may  generally  be  implied  from  an  agreement  to  pay  rent  for 
land ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  by  no  means  an  absolute  rule  that 
there  must  always  be  an  express  promise  or  a  contract  to  pay 
and  to  receive  rent  in  order  to  create  the  relationship  of  landlord 
and  tenant.  Indeed,  there  may  be  a  tenancy  where  it  is  abso- 
lutely proved  that  there  was  no  express  agreement  to  pay  rent 
and  where  the  only  basis  for  the  claim  for  rent  on  the  part  of  the 
landlord  is  the  implied  promise  of  the  tenant  to  pay  for  the  use 
and  occupation  of  the  land.  Thus,  a  tenant  holding  over  by  con- 
sent or  at  the  sufferance  of  the  landlord  is  still  a  tenant ;  and  the 
person  of  whom  such  possession  is  held  continues  to  be  the  land- 
lord, though  it  is  understood  between  the  parties  that  the  per- 
son holding  over  is  to  pay  no  rent.  The  landlord  may  pursue 
all  his  ordinary  remedies  against  the  person  holding  over  as  his 
tenant  and  he  need  not  show  that  that  person  has  agreed  to  pay 
rent.'^^  So,  while  mere  possession  alone  given  without  any  ex- 
press agreement  to  pay  rent,  may  not  under  some  circumstances 
create  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant,  still  if  from  the 
language  of  the  agreement  it  is  clear  that  the  parties  intended  by 

74  The    owner    of    the    equitable  gain  time  in  which  the  equitable 

title  of  the  premises  by  once  pay-  owner  might  bring  a  suit  to  estab- 

ing  rent  to  the  holder  of  the  legal  lish  her  equitable  title.   Hudson  v. 

title  does  not  thereby  necessarily  White,  17  R.   I.   519,  23  Atl.  Rep. 

recognize    him    as    her    landlord,  57,  63. 

where    from    the    evidence    it    is  "5  McKissack   v.    Bullington,    37 

clearly    apparent    such    payment  Miss.  535,  538;  Hunt  v.  Comstock, 

was  made  simply  to  prevent  being  15  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  665,  666. 
evicted  from  the  premises,  and  to 


264  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

the  occupation  to  stand  in  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ant to  each  other,  the  fact  that  the  occupant  by  an  express  agree- 
ment is  to  occupy  the  land  rent  free  will  not  alone  be  sufficient  to 
destroy  the  tenancy.^®  The  owner  of  land  may,  as  against  the 
occupant  who  holds  without  his  consent,  create  a  tenancy  by 
notifying  the  occupant  that  if  he  continue  to  occupy  the  land  he 
will  have  to  pay  rent.  Thus,  one  who  continues  to  occupy  prem- 
ises after  he  has  been  notified  that  he  will  be  required  to  pay  rent 
if  he  remains  in  possession  becomes  liable  as  a  tenant  for  the 
rent  though  he  may  not  have  paid  rent  before  the  notification. 
The  notification  of  the  landlord  and  the  action  of  the  occupant 
create  a  lease  the  terms  of  which  as  to  its  duration  and  rental 
periods  will  depend  upon  the  agreement  of;  the  parties  to  be  in- 
ferred from  the  language  of  the  notification,,  and  the  action  of 
the  tenant.  This  rule  applies  to  occupants  who  are  trespassers 
or  tenants  at  will  or  sufferance  but  not  to  those  who  occupy 
premises  under  a  claim  which  is  adverse  and  hostile  to  the 
owner. '^^ 

§  189.  The  performance  of  a  contract  to  execute  and  deliver 
a  lease.  A  formal  lease  properly  executed  and  tendered  by  the 
lessor  in  the  performance  of  his  contract  to  execute  a  lease  must 
in  its  terms  and  its  covenants  substantially  conform  to  the  in- 
tention of  the  parties  as  expressed  in  the  agreement  to  make  a 
lease.  The  lease  ought  to  include  all  the  premises  which  are 
mentioned  in  the  agreement  and  the  term  and  the  rental  pay- 
ment must  be  the  same  in  both  writings  or  tlie  lessee  may  reject 
the  lease  which  he  must  do  within  a  reasonable  time  after  its 
tender.  If  from  the  evidence  it  appears  either  that  the  lessee 
entered  into  possession  or  paid  rent  under  the  lease  which  was 
delivered  him  by  the  lessor,  he  will  be  presumed  to  have  waived 
the  objection  that  the  lease  did  not  cpnform  to  the  agreement 
Proof  that  the  lessee  was  unwilling  t(F  accept  a  lease  from  the 
lessor  in  any  form  is  a  waiver  of  a  tender  of  a  proper  lease  by  the 
lessor.''*     The  lessee  usually  need  not  demand  the  delivery  of  a 

v6  Mitchell  v.  Commonwealth,  37  257,  261,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  226,  26  Am. 

Pa.  St.  387,  192.  St.  Rep.  244,  12  L.  R.  A.  561,  hold- 

77  Biglow  V.  Biglow,  77  N.  Y.  ing  also  that  the  sending  of  a  let- 
Supp.  716;  Hill  v.  Coal  Valley  ter  In  regard  to  the  contract  to 
Min.  Co.,  lO:}  111.  App.  46.  the  lessees  by  the  lessor  and  sub- 

78  Freeland    v.    Ritz,    154    Mass.  sequently    sending    the    lease    to 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  AEB  LEASES.  265 

proper  lease  as  a  condition  precedent  to  bringing  his  action 
though  it  may  be  safer  for  him  to  do  so.'^®  On  the  other  hand,  a 
lessor  cannot  sue  on  an  agreement  to  take  a  lease  "at  a  fair 
rent"  until  he  has  tendered  to  the  lessee  a  lease  on  such,  terms 
unless  the  lessee  by  words  or  action  has  waived  the  tender.*" 

§  190.  The  specific  performance  of  an  agreement  to  make  a 
lease.  An  agreement  in  writing  to  make  a  lease  which  com- 
plies with  the  requirements  of  the  statute  of  frauds  will  be 
specifically  enforced  in  a  court  of  equity  at  the  suit  of  either 
party  to  it.*'^  The  general  requirements  which  are  applicable  to  a 
suit  for  the  specific  performance  of  a  contract  in  ordinary  cases 
must  be  complied  with.  The  agreement  must  contract  words 
from  which  the  court  may  ascertain  the  term  and  the  date  of  its 
commencement.  The  premises  must  be  described  with  a  reason- 
able degree  of  certainty  so  that  their  location  may  be  ascer- 
tained by  the  lessee.  There  must  also  be  a  valid  consideration 
and  the  agreement,  the  enforcement  of  which  is  desired,  must  be 
signed  by  the  party  who  is  to  be  compelled  to  execute  it.*^  Where 
a  memorandum  of  an  agreement  for  a  lease  was  signed  by  the 
lessee,  but  not  by  the  lessor,  and  the  name  of  the  latter  did  not 
appear  in  it^  a  subsequent  letter  signed  by  the  lessor  and  refer- 
ring to  the  memorandum  will  take  the  case  out  of  the  statute.** 
An  agreement  hy  the  lessor  to  make  improvements  made  at  the 
date  of  making  an  agreement  for  a  lease  or  upon  the  renewal  of 
a  lease  is  not  within  the  statute  of  frauds.  An  agreement  by  a 
landlord  with  a  tenant  who  has  land  for  a  term  of  years,  that 
he  will,  for  a  good  consideration  stated  as  part  of  the  increased 
rent,  make  certain  improvements  on  the  land,  is  valid  though  not 
signed  by  the  parties.  It  is  not  a  contract  for  any  interest  in  or 
concerning  lands  within  the  statute  of  frauds.**  A  landlord  or 
a  tenant  who  seeks  the  specific  performance  of  an  agreement  to 

them    for    their    signature    shows  82  Grand   Trunk  "W.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

that  the  lessors  substantially  per-  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  (C.  C.  A.), 

formed  the  contract  to  execute  the  141  Fed.  Rep.  785. 

lease.  '^  Warner      v.      Willington,      3 

79  Manning  v.  "West,  6  Cush.  Drew,  523,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  662,  2  Jur. 
(Mass.)   463.  (N.  S.)   433,  4  W.  R.  531. 

80  Weaver  v.  Wood,  9  Pa.  St.  «4Donellan  v.  Read,  3  B.  &  Ad. 
220.  89^. 

81  Lenderking   r.   Rosenthal,    63 
Md.  28,  33. 


266  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

make  a  lease  must  show  that  he  has  performed  all  conditions 
precedent  on  his  part.^^  A  landlord  who  has  agreed  to  put  the 
property  in  good  repair  before  the  tenant  shall  execute  the  lease 
must  satisfy  the  court  that  he  has  done  so.  A  slight  variance  be- 
tween the  quantity  or  character  of  the  land  as  described  in  the 
agreement  and  that  set  out  in  the  lease  may  be  disregarded.  A 
court  of  equity  will  decree  the  specific  performance  of  a 
contract  for  a  lease  of  land  where  the  only  defense  is  that  the 
quantity  of  land  described  in  the  lease  is  slightly  less  than  that 
contracted  for  if  the  court  is  satisfied  that  the  defendant  would 
thus  receive  substantially  that  which  he  agreed  to  lease,^®  Where 
the  tenant  makes  an  offer  to  rent  a  farm  at  a  specified  sum  per 
annum,  and  the  landlord  accepts  the  otfer  and  it  subsequently 
appears  that  the  landlord  will  be  unable  to  deliver  possession  of 
the  number  of  acres  which  the  tenant  expects  to  receive,  a  decree 
of  specific  performance  will  be  granted  on  the  suit  of  the  tenant 
with  appropriate  abatement  of  the  rent  for  the  actual  number  of 
acres  delivered.  A  parol  agreement  to  accept  a  lease  will  be 
specifically  enforced  in  equity  where  the  tenant  has  entered  in 
pursuance  of  the  parol  agreement.  The  execution  of  a  lease  by 
a  lessee  will  be  compelled  in  equity,  where  he  had  agreed  to  exe- 
cute one,  and  the  lessor,  relying  on  his  promise,  broke  off  ne- 
gotiations for  renting  the  premises  to  others,  and  made  material 
alterations,  in  order  to  adapt  the  premises  to  the  lessee's  use.  The 
lessee  is  estopped  under  such  circumstances,  where  he  had  entered 
into  and  held  possession  for  nearly  half  the  term,  paying  the 
rent  agreed  upon,  but  refusing  to  execute  a  lease.  He  cannot 
abandon  the  premises  and  escape  liability  for  the  rent  upon  the 
plea  that  no  lease  had  been  executed  by  him.'^^  And  as  a  general 
rule,  where  no  lease  was  executed  and  acknowledged  as  required 
by  statute,  but  only  a  contract  for  one,  still  if  possession  is  given 
under  such  contract  and  thereby  improvements  made  by  the  les- 
see upon  the  faith  of  it,  equity  will  consider  the  situation  of  the 
parties  to  be  the  same  as  if  the  leaseihad  been  executed  and  so  long 
as  possession  is  retained  the  rights  of  the  landlord  and  tenant  are 

«!■.  Counter     v.     Maciilicrson,     5  87  McKenzie  v.  Hesketh,  47  L.  J. 

Moore,  P.  C.  83.  Ch.  231,  7  Ch.  D.  675,  38  L.  T.  171, 

80  Bowler  v.  Electric   Light  Co.,       26  W.  R.  189. 
10  Dec.  Rep.  582,  22  Bull.  130.  ss  Seaniiui     v.     Ascheniiaim,    51 

AVis.  078. 


WHAT   CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  267 

to  be  governed  by  the  terms  of  the  proposed  lease. ^^  If  it  ap- 
pears on  a  trial  of  an  action  for  the  specific  performance  of  a 
contract  to  make  a  lease,  that  the  execution  of  the  lease  if  di- 
rected by  the  court  will  not  benefit  the  tenant,  the  court  may  in 
its  discretion  award  him  damages.  This  is  illustrated  where  a 
suit  for  performance  is  begun  when  the  terai  of  the  proposed 
lease  is  nearly  expired.  Under  such  circumstances,  or  where 
for  any  other  reason  the  lease  would  have  but  a  short  time  to  run, 
the  court  will  not  decree  a  specific  performance.®" 

§  191.  The  measure  of  damages  for  a  breach  of  an  agreement 
to  make,  a  lease.  A  mere  agreement  for  a  lease  as  it  creates  no 
interest  in  the  land,  gives  the  tenant  no  remedy  against  a  third 
person  who  wrongfully  holds  possession,  but  the  landlord  is  liable 
in  damages  for  the  period  the  tenant  is  kept  out  of  possession.''^ 
In  an  action  by  a  tenant  against  the  landlord  for  damages  for  a 
breach  of  an  agreeanent  to  lease,  the  measure  of  damages,  where 
there  is  no  fraud  or  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  the  lessor,  is  the 
amount  paid,  or  expenses  incurred  by  the  lessee  in  relying  on  this 
contract,  and  if  there  be  no  expense  or  money  paid  by  him,  he  can 
recover  only  nominal  damages.®-  Tlie  measure  of  damages  in  an 
action  by  the  landlord  against  the  tenant  for  damages  caused  by 
the  breach  by  the  tenant  of  an  agreement  to  take  a  lease  is  the 
loss  of  rent  while  the  premises  remain  unoccupied  at  the  rate 
proposed  in  the  agreement;  and  the  expense  of  any  repairs  or 
improvements  made  by  the  landlord  on  the  premises  at  the  ten- 
ant's request  and  which  would  not  have  been  necessary  to  make 
unless  the  landlord  had  expected  the  tenant  to  go  into  possession. 
In  the  case  of  the  broach  of  an  agreement  to  make 'a  lease,  the 
amount  of  the  proposed  rent  is  not  the  measure  of  damages  where 
the  lease  was  void  under  the  statute  of  frauds.  The  proposed 
rent  is  not  the  measure  of  damage  as  under  such  circumstances 
the  landlord  would  not  receive  any  rent  under  the  lease,  nor  can 
h.e  recover  damages  for  the  loss  of  a  bargain  as  he  has  lost  noth- 
ing by  a  failure  to  make  the  lease  which,  if  made,  he  could  not 

«9  Pugh.  Printing  Co.  v.  Dexter,  oo  Cincinnati    Southern    Ry.    Co. 

8  Ohio  Dec.  557,  5  N.  P.  332;  Pugh  v.  Hoolver,  26  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  392. 
Printing  Co.  v.  Dexter,  61  Ohio  St.  9i  Becker  v.  De  Forest,  1  Swee- 

666;   Hannan  v.  Towers,  3  H.  &  J.      ney  (N.  Y.)  528. 
(Md.)   147.  'J- Wolf  V.  Studebalier,  65  Pa.  St. 

459. 


268  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

enforce.  He  may  perhaps  recover  damages,  if,  by  the  making 
of  the  agreement  for  an  invalid  lease,  he  was  prevented  from 
leasing  the  premises  to  some  other  person  or  was  put  to  an  ex- 
pense induced  by  his  agreement  in  altering  them  or  putting 
material  or  work  upon  them  which  was  not  necessary  for  their 
improvement  or  repair.^^ 

§  192.  Letters  constituting  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease.  A 
series  of  letters  passing  between  the  parties  may  constitute  an 
agreement  to  make  a  lease  which  may  be  sufficient  under  the  stat- 
ute of  frauds.  The  letters  which  constitute  the  correspondence 
will  be  construed  together,  and,  if  from  all  of  them  taken  to- 
gether it  is  apparent  that  the  minds  of  the  parties  met  in  an 
agreement  to  make  a  future  lease  and  if  the  terms  including 
the  length  of  the  term  and  the  date  from  which  the  term  is  to 
commence,  can  be  clearly  ascertained  from  an  inspection  of  the 
letters  the  contract  will  be  specifically  enforced.  Particularly 
must  the  commencement  and  length  of  the  term  appear  or  be 
ascertainable  from  a  construction  of  the  letters  as  a  whole.  It 
is  immaterial  in  what  letter  the  commencement  of  the  term  is 
stated.  It  need  not  be  stated  in  the  letter  which  contains  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  offer  to  make  the  lease.  Wliile  it  is  true  that  an 
agreement  to  make  a  lease  may  consist  of  letters,  and  while  it 
is  equally  true  that,  though  the  commencement  of  the  term  may 
not  be  contained  in  a  letter  of  acceptance,  it  may  be  supplied 
from  a  later  letter  yet  if  the  later  letter  is  in  substance,  a  re- 
jection of  the  offer  or  an  acceptance  of  the  offer  upon  conditions 
which  the  party  making  the  offer  is  not  willing  to  grant,  the  fact 
that  his  letter  supplied  the  date  for  the  commencement  of  the 
term,  is  not  material.  For  where  letters  are  relied  upon  to  con- 
stitute a  contract  of  leasing^  they  must  be  accepted  in  their  en- 
tirety, and  the  party  offering  them  is  not  at  liberty  to  use  as  much 
of  them  as  may  favor  his  case,  and  reject  that  which  is  unfavor- 
able."* Letters  passing  between  the  parties  in  reference  to  the 
assignment  of  a  lease  do  not  constitute  a  contract  in  writing 
which  will  be  enforced  specifically  where  it  is  clear  from  an  in- 
spection of  the  letters  that  the  parties  meant  to  make  and  exe- 
cute a  formal  contract  at  some  future  date.°° 

03  Sausser  v.    Stoinmetz,   88   Pa.  affirming  41  L.  J.  Ch.   551,  L.  R. 

St  324,  327.  7  Ch.  406,  26  L.  T.  568. 

0*  Nesham  v.  Selby,  41  L.  J.  Ch.  ■■>■>  May  v.  Thomson,  51  L.  .J.  Ch. 

173,  L.  R.  13  Eq.  191,  26  L.  T.  145,  917,   20   Ch.   D.  705,   47  L.   T.   295. 


WHAT  CX)NTRACTS  ABE  LEASES. 


269 


5  193.  A  lease  distinguished  from  a  license.  A  license  may 
be  defined  as  an  authority  to  do  some  act  or  a  series  of  acts  on 
the  land  of  another  person  without  acquiring  an  interest  or  ^- 
tate  in  the  land  itself.  Whether  a  contract  is  a  lease  or  a  license 
will  be  determined  not  from  what  the  parties  may  chose  to  call 
it  nor  from  the  language  used  but  from  the  legal  effect  of  its 
provisions.^*  Usually  as  a  license  is  a  permission  to  do  some 
personal  act  it  is  presumed  to  be  founded  upon  the  personal 
confidence  which  the  owner  has  in  the  person  licensed.    Hence, 


"I  think  the  decisions  of  our 
courts  have  gone  far  enough  as  to 
letters;  that  is,  in  the  spelling  out 
of  a  contract  from  letters,  when 
both  parties  intended  a  formal 
contract  to  be  executed.  I  think 
it  very  often  happens  that  both 
parties  use  expressions  in  letters 
which,  read  alone,  would  amount 
to  a  contract  if  we  did  not  laiow 
that  in  fact  neither  of  the  parties 
intended  those  general  expressions 
to  constitute  a  contract.  In  that 
case  if  the  court  lays  hold  of  the 
language  of  the  letters  to  make  a 
contract,  it  makes  a  contract  for 
the  parties  which  the  parties 
never  intended  to  enter  into.  If 
for  instance  both  parties  intended 
that  a  lease  should  be  taken  from 
a  day  to  be  named,  and  the  one 
simply  said  that  he  would  take  a 
lease,  and  the  other  said  he  would 
grant  a  lease,  without  fixing  a 
day,  you  would  be  making  a  new 
bargain  for  the  parties.  If  you 
turn  the  granting  of  a  lease  into 
an  assignment  the  same  intention 
may  be  present.  It  may  be  an  as- 
signment of  a  lease  and  the  good- 
will of  a  business.  Both  parties 
may  understand  that  they  are  to 
have  a  day  fixed  for  the  payment 
of  the  purchase  price  and  the  car- 
rying out  of  the  assignment  and 
that  there  is  to  be  no  final  bar- 
gain  without   it,   yet,    if   they   do 


not  state  it,  the  court,  it  is  said, 
fixes  upon  the  terms  and  makes 
them  a  bargain  for  a  reasonable 
time  to  be  fixed  upon  by  a  jury 
who  may  be  perhaps  not  very  con- 
versant with  the  matter.  We  must 
always  be  on  our  guard  against 
that."  May  v.  Thomson,  51  L.  J. 
Ch.  917,  20  Ch.  D.  705,  47  L.  T. 
295.  A  lease  for  a  term  of  years 
is  not  created  by  a  letter  which 
promises  the  party  to  whom  it  is 
written  a  lease  for  "five  years  or 
maybe  longer"  of  the  writer's  farm 
i?  the  addressee  would  move  onto 
it.  Cunningham  v.  Rinsh,  157  Mo. 
336,  57  S.  W.  Rep.  7G9.  The  own- 
ers of  a  house  and  shop,  in  Sep- 
tember, 1890,  wrote  a  letter  to  the 
person  who  was  then  in  occupa- 
tion, in  the  following  terms:  "We 
hereby  agree  to  let  you  keep  peace- 
able possession  of  your  present 
house  and  shop  in  Strand  Lane 
for  a  term  of  10  years,  on  condi- 
tion that  you  commit  no  nuisance, 
and  pay  us  the  sum  of  9s.  3d.  per 
week  for  rent  thereof.  You  to  pay 
local  board  rates,  and  we  to  pay 
poor  rates  and  water  rates  as 
hitherto."  Held,  that  there  was 
a  demise  of  the  premises  for  a 
term  of  ten  years.  Duxbury  t 
Sandiford,  80  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  552. 
96  Holladay  v.  Chicago  Arc.  L.  & 
P.  Co.,  55  111.  App.  Div.  463,  466. 


270  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AJSTD  TENANT. 

a  license  is  not  usually  assignable.  Thus,  for  example,  the  per- 
mission given  by  a  land  owner  to  another  person  to  hunt  or  fish 
upon  his  land  is  merely  a  license  and  confers  no  interest  in  the 
land  itself  nor  will  it  permit  the  person  to  whom  the  license 
is  given  to  delegate  his  powers  under  it  to  another.  The  li- 
cense may  be  revoked  at  any  time  before  the  licensee  has  entered 
upon  the  land.  A  land  owner  may  forbid  a  licensee  to  go  upon 
the  land  and  if  the  latter  disobey  the  owner  he  is  then  a  tres- 
passer. Another  fact  which  distinguishes  a  lease  from  a  license 
is  that  by  a  license  no  interest  in  the  land  is  conveyed  while  by 
a  lease  the  tenant  is  entitled  to  the  exclusive  possession  and 
enjoyment  of  the  land  from  the  time  of  his  entry.  If  the 
contract  gives  the  exclusive  occupation,  possession  and  enjoy- 
ment for  all  purposes  to  the  occupant,  the  presumption  is  that 
the  instrument  is  a  lease.  This  presumption  is  strengthened 
by  the  fact  that  the  owner  removes  from  the  land  and  sur- 
renders possession  where  he  occupied  it  prior  to  the  contract 
and  by  the  further  fact  that  the  owner  refrains  from  as- 
serting possession  or  the  right  to  possession  during  the  life  of 
the  contract.  A  contract  by  which  the  use,  occupation  and  pos- 
session of  lands  for  all  purposes  not  expressly  forbidden  therein 
is  conveyed,  is  a  lease  and  not  a  license,^^  A  contract  signed  by 
the  owner  which  does  not  confer  the  right  to  full  and  exclusive 
possession  upon  the  other  party  but  which  simply  gives  him  a 
right  to  enter  and  to  hold  possession  of  land  for  a  particular 
purpose,  as  for  example,  to  cut  timber  or  the  like,  is  presumed 
to  be  a  license.    An  agreement  by  which  the  owner  of  a  building 

o"  Crane  v.  Patton,  57  Ark.  340,  its  terms  the  lessee  had  a  right  to 
346,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  466;  Smith  v.  remove  a  proportionate  lot  of  tim- 
Simons,  1  Root,  318,  1  Am.  Dec.  ber  and  if  the  lessor  deprived  him 
48;  Haywood  v.  Fulmer  (Ind.  of  this  right  he  was  liable  in  dam- 
1892),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  574,  18  L.  R.  ages  for  what  the  timber  would 
A  491;  Carey  v.  Richards,  2  Ohio  have  been  worth  when  removed, 
Dec.  630.  In  Crane  v.  Patten,  57  less  the  expense  of  removing  it. 
Ark.  340,  346,  the  paper  was  held  Nor  was  it  necessary  that  this  act 
to  be  a  lease  and  not  a  license  be-  should  have  been  enforced  by 
cause  the  rights  of  the  lessee  were  force  or  violence.  If  the  landlord 
vested  and  were  not  determinable  prevented  the  enjoyment  of  this 
at  the  will  of  the  lessor.  The  sale  privilege  by  inducing  the  servants 
of  the  property  during  the  term  of  the  lessee  to  leave  his  employ- 
would  not  extinguish  the  lease  if  ment,  he  would  be  liable  for  dam- 
the  purchaser  had  notice  of  it.    By  ages. 


WHAT  CONTEACTS  ARE  LEASES.  271 

for  a  consideration,  permits  a  corporation  to  run  electric  wires 
along  the  walls  thereof  "*  which  creates  a  right  of  way  °^  is  a 
license.  So,  an  arrangement  between  a  father  and  his  daughter 
by  which  she  is  to  select  such  land  as  she  desires  and  he  is  to  de- 
vise the  same  to  her  on  his  death,  the  daughter  at  once  to  enter 
into  the  possession  and  control  of  the  same  subject  to  the  right 
of  the  father  to  collect  certain  rents,  is  a  mere  license.  The  re- 
lation of  landlord  and  tenant  does  not  exist  between  them.^  The 
following  examples  illustrate  the  general  rule  and  show  cases  in 
which  upon  the  particular  circumstances,  the  courts  have  held 
that  an  agreement  was  a  license  and  not  a  lease.  Thus,  an  agree- 
ment to  give  a  person  desk  room  in  an  office  is  usually  a  license. 
A  person  who  hires  desk  room  from  the  tenant  of  an  office  or 
other  portion  of  a  building  is  not  himself  a  tenant.  He  has 
merely  the  right  to  use  a  chair  and  a  desk  in  the  office  of  his  les- 
sor while  the  latter 's  tenancy  lasts.  His  right  of  use  is  at  an  end 
with  the  term  of  his  lessor.^  An  agreement  under  seal  by  which 
the  owner  of  a  farm  permits  another  to  live  thereon  for  a  term 
of  years  in  consideration  of  the  latter  clearing  a  part  of  the  same, 
and  putting  certain  buildings  thereon,  the  owner  reserving  the 
use  of  all  the  timber  except  such  as  may  be  necessaiy  for  the 
buildings,  rails,  and  fire-wood  of  the  occupant,  is  not  a  lease  and 
does  not  create  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant.  The  occu- 
pant is  in  under  a  license  only,  and  he  has  no  right  to  the  timber 
cut  on  the  cleared  land,  except  for  the  purpose  of  building,  or 
for  fences,  or  for  fire-wood.^    An  agreement  by  which  the  OAVTier 

9s  Holladay  v.  Chicago  Arc  L.  &  yond  the  seas,  to  hunt  in  a  man's 

P.  Co.,  55  111.  App.  463.  park,  to  come  into  his  house,  are 

89  Thomas    v.    McGuire,    1    Ky.  only    actions    which,    without    li- 

Law  Rep.  65.  cense,    had    been    unlawful.      But 

1  Berry  v.  Potter,  62  N.  J.  Eq.  a  license  to  hunt  in  a  man's  park, 
664,  29  Atl.  Rep.  323.  and  carry  away  the  deer  killed  to 

2  Swart  V.  Western  Union  Tele-  his  own  use,  to  cut  down  a  tree 
graph  Co.,  12  Detroit  Leg.  N.  609,  in  a  man's  ground,  and  to  carry 
105  N.  W.  Rep.  74.  it  away  the  next  day  after  to  his 

3  Callen  v.  Hilty,  14  Pa.  St.  286.  own  use,  are  licenses  as  to  the  act 
"A  dispensation  or  license  prop-  of  hunting  and  cutting  down  the 
erly  passeth  no  interest,  nor  alters  tree,  but  as  to  the  carrying  away 
nor  transfers  property  in  any-  of  the  deer  killed  and  the  tree  cut 
thing,  but  only  makes  an  action  down,  they  are  grants.  So,  to  li- 
lawful,  which  without  it  had  been  cense  a  man  to  eat  my  meat,  or 
unlawful.     As  a  license  to  go  be-  to  fire  the  wood  in  my  chimney,  to 


272  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

of  certain  machines  pays  for  permission  to  place  the  machines  in 
a  factory,  and  for  full  access  to  the  same  for  himself  and  em- 
ployees, for  the  purpose  of  working  them,  the  owner  of  the  fac- 
tory supplying  the  steam  power^  is  not  a  lease  nor  does  the  re- 
lation of  landlord  and  tenant  exist  between  the  parties.*  But 
where  the  owner  of  premises  lets  a  certain  tenant  the  portion  of 
a  room  with  steam  power  for  the  working  of  machines  at  a  cer- 
tain rate  for  the  use  of  the  premises  and  the  power,  it  is  a  lease 
and  the  owner  of  the  premises  may  distrain.^  An  agreement  by 
which  a  person  was  vested  with  the  right  to  use  certain  moorings 
on  a  navigable  river^  for  the  purpose  of  mooring  a  barge  under 
an  agreement  with  the  officials  having  charge  of  the  preservation 
of  the  river,  that  he  would  pay  certain  sums  of  money,  the  agree- 
ment to  be  terminated  on  thirty  days'  notice,  is  a  license  and  not 
a  lease.*  An  agreement  between  a  landowner  and  a  corporation 
by  which  the  former  agrees  to  prepare  his  land  at  his  own  ex- 
pense so  that  it  may  be  used  for  an  athletic  ground  by  the  corpo- 
ration with  the  provision  that  the  owner  is  to  be  compensated  for 
his  improvements  out  of  the  income  is  not  a  lease.  The  corpora- 
tion which  uses  the  ground  after  it  has  been  improved  by  the 
owner  is  responsible  for  any  damages  which  the  owner  may  be 
subjected  to  in  being  deprived  of  the  use  of  his  property.  Inas- 
much as  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  does  not  exist,  the 
owner  cannot  recover  for  the  rental  value  of  his  improvement, 
but  the  corporation  will  be  liable  for  the  reasonable  value  of  the 
use  of  the  ground  upon  the  presumption  that  if  it  had  not  been 
used,  the  owner  might  have  let  it  for  other  purposes.'^  An  agree- 
ment by  which  the  lessee  of  a  theatre  grants  another  person  the 
exclusive  use  of  all  refreshment  bars,  smoking  rooms  and  wine 

warm  him  by,  as  to  the  act  of  (N.  S.)  634,  32  L.  J.  C.  P.  252,  8 
eating,  firing  my  wood,  and  warm-  1j.  T.  429,  11  W.  R.  833. 
ing  him,  they  are  licenses;  but  it  ^  Selby  v.  Greaves,  37  L.  J.  C.  P. 
is  consequently  necessary  to  these  251,  L.  R.  3  C.  P.  594,  19  L.  T. 
actions  that  my  property  may  be  186,  16  W.  R.  1127. 
destroyed,  the  meat  eaten,  and  the  «  Watkins  v.  Milton,  next  Grave- 
wood  burnt.  So,  as  in  some  cases,  send  Overseers,  37  L.  J.  M.  C.  73, 
by  consequent  and  not  directly,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  350,  18  L.  T.  601,  16 
and   as    its    effect   a    dispensation  W.  R.  1059. 

or  license  may  destroy  and  alter  "  Dockstader    v.    Young    Men's 

property."       Thomas     v.     Sorrell,  Christian  Ass'n  (Iowa,  1906),  109 

Vaughan,  351.  N.  W.  Rep.  906. 
*  Harifock    t.    Austin,    14    C.    B. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  AKE  LEASES.  273 

cellars  in  the  theatre  together  with  the  exclusive  right  of  adver- 
tising in  such  place  for  a  term  of  years  for  a  fixed  rent  is  a 
license.  The  fact  that  the  agreement  contains  a  stipulation  that 
the  lessee  of  the  theatre  might  put  it  to  an  end  on  non-payment 
of  rent  and  a  covenant  of  quiet  enjoyment  does  not  change  it 
into  a  lease.^  An  agreement  by  which  a  land-owner  in  England 
granted  shooting  rights  over  his  woods  with  a  yearly  rental  is 
something  more  than  a  mere  license  and  is  not  therefore  revoc- 
able at  will.  If  it  be  assumed  that  it  is  a  tenancy,  it  is  one  from 
year  to  year  though  perhaps  a  shorter  notice  to  quit  would  be  re- 
quired at  common  law  than  in  the  case  of  a  tenancy  of  farm 
land.  The  reason  for  requiring  a  six  months'  notice  to  quit 
which  exists  in  the  case  of  a  lease  of  farm  land,  does  not  exist  in 
the  case  of  a  lease  of  a  right  to  shoot  game  over  another  man's 
land.^ 

§  194.  Agreement  permitting  the  cutting  of  timber. 
Whether  the  agreement  by  one  who  owns  land  that  another  may 
enter  upon  it  and  cut  the  timber  and  remove  it  therefrom  is  a 
lease  or  a  contract  of  sale  depends  upon  the  intention  of  the 
parties.  If  the  permission  to  cut  timber  confers  the  exclusive 
possession  of  the  land  on  which  the  timber  is,  upon  the  person 
to  whom  it  is  granted,  it  is  a  lease.  And  an  instrument  in  writ- 
ing which  confers  upon  the  party  accepting  the  same  the  owner- 
ship of  trees  and  timber  on  a  tract  of  land  may  be  a  lease  though 
no  rent  is  reserved.  The  contract  confers  the  title  to  the  timber 
and  trees  and  it  is  therefore  a  bill  of  sale.    So  far  as  the  land  is 

8  Edwards     v.     Barrington,     85  or  lodger  has  the  exclusive  enjoy- 

Law  T.  650,  50  Wkly.  Rep.  358.  ment  of  the  room,  but  the  owner 

0  Lowe  V.  Adams,   70  L.   J.  Ch.  or  his  servants  have  to  keep  it  in 

783;   (1901)  2  Ch.  598,  85  L.  T.  195,  order   and  have  a  right  of  entry 

50  W.  R.  37.    Other  circumstances  for  that  purpose.     The  actual  oc- 

may    arise    which    will    render    it  cupation  of  the  room  is  therefore 

important  to  determine  whether  a  in  the  owner  of  the  hotel  or  lodg- 

writing  is   a  lease   or  a  mere  li-  ing  house  and  the  agreement  is  a 

cense.     A   very  familiar   example  license.      If,    however,   the   agree- 

of  such  a  case  or  class  of  cases  is  ment    gives    the    exclusive    occu- 

that  of  the   occupation   of   a   fur-  pancy  of  the  room  or  lodgings  to 

nished  room  in  a  boarding  house  the   lodger  and   the   landlord   has 

or  hotel,  where  the  question  may  nothing  to  do  with  the  premises 

arise    whether    the    occupant    is  it  is  very  evident  that  a  lease  was 

such  under  a  lease  or  whether  he  intended, 
is  a  mere  licensee.     The  occupant 
18 


274  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

concerned  it  is  a  lease  because  it  gives  the  exclusive  possession 
and  occupation  of  the  land  to  the  purchaser  of  the  personal 
property  though  only  for  the  single  purpose  of  cutting  down  ^° 
the  timber.  Hence,  the  vendee  on  his  entry  upon  the  land  may 
take  possession  of  the  timber  which  was  lying  on  the  land  when 
he  entered  having  been  cut  down  by  a  trespasser  before  his 
entry.^^  Assuming  that  the  contract  for  the  sale  of  standing  tim- 
ber is  a  lease  it  follows  that  it  must  be  certain  as  to  the  terra. 
If  there  is  any  uncertainty  about  the  duration  of  the  term,  as 
where,  for  example,  the  writing  does  not  state  the  commence- 
ment of  the  term  it  will  be  void.^-  A  writing  which  confers  no 
exclusive  possession  of  the  land  and  merely  gives  the  party  a 
right  to  enter  upon  it  and  to  remove  timber  will  be  regarded  as 
a  license.  Thus,  an  agreement  which  gives  the  right  of  cutting 
and  removing  some  timber  in  each  year  which  is  to  be  paid  for 
in  installments  and  which  agreement  is  renewable  when  it  ex- 
pires, is  a  mere  sale  of  the  timber  with  a  license  to  go  upon  the 
land  and  cut  it,  though  the  parties  call  it  a  lease.  Hence,  it 
follows  from  this  that  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  is  not 
created  and  the  owner  of  the  land  cannot  recover  any  rent  after 
all  the  timber  has  been  removed  from  it.^^  These  rules  and  prin- 
ciples which  we  have  just  stated  are  applicable  with  equal  force 
to  agreements  between  the  owners  of  land  and  other  persons  who 
enter  upon  the  land  to  quarry  stone,  dig  for  mineral  or  bore  for 
oil.  Agreements  by  which  land  owners  permit  other  persons  to 
enter  upon  their  land  and  to  work  mines  where  they  do  not  in- 
volve the  exclusive  possession  of  the  land  itself,  are  licenses  and 
not  leases.^*  But  an  agreement  by  which  a  person  who  is  to  mine 
the  coal  in  land  is  given  the  exclusive  possession  of  the  land  for 


10  Alexander    v.    Gardner    (Ky.  i^  Riddle  v.  Brown,  20  Ala.  412 
1906),  96  S.  W.  Rep.  ^18.  Funk  v.  Haldeman,  53  Pa.  St.  229 

11  Glenwood  Lumber  Co.  v.  Phil-  Caldwell  v.  Fulton,  31  Pa.  St.  483 
lips,  73  L.  J.  P.  C.  62;    (1904)   A.  Gillett   v.   Treganza,   6   Wis.   343 
C.   405,  90  L.  T.  741,  20  T.  L.  R.  Grubb  v.  Bayard,  2  Wall.  Jr.    (U. 
531.  S.)    81;   Dale  v.  Wood,  2  Barn.  & 

12  Gay  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hobbs,  128  N.  Ad.  724;  Wheeler  v.  West,  71  Cal. 
C.  46,  38  S.  E.  Rep.  26.  126,  11  Pac.  Rep.  871;  Inhabitants 

13  Crane  v.  Patton,  57  Ark.  340,  of  Town  of  Rockport  v.  Rockport 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  466;  Baird  v.  Mil-  Granite  Co.,  58  N.  E.  1017,  177 
ford  Land  &  Lumber  Co.,  89  Cal.  Mass.  246,  51  L.  R.  A,  779. 

552,  555,  26  Pac.  Rep.  1084. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  275 

a  term  of  years  is  a  lease. ^^  So,  an  instrument  is  a  lease  by 
which  the  owner  of  a  stone  quarry  agrees  with  a  person  that  the 
latter  shall  take  out  the  stone  and  shall  sell  it,  and  the  owner  is 
to  receive  a  portion  of  the  proceeds.^®  So,  also,  an  instrument 
which  expressly  permits  a  licensee  to  have  the  exclusive  rights  to 
all  gravel  and  sand  for  a  particular  year  and  excludes  all  other 
persons  from  the  premises  is  a  lease.^^ 

§  195.  The  possession  of  a  tenant  under  a  void  lease.  The 
entry  of  a  person  into  possession  with  the  owner's  consent  under 
a  void  lease  constitutes  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant 
between  the  occupant  and  the  owner.^*  A  tenancy  arises  whose 
duration  and  general  character  will  depend  upon  express  con- 
tract if  one  is  subsequently  made;  or  upon  implication  created 
by  the  conduct  of  the  parties. ^'^  In  the  absence  of  this,  such 
holding  is  usually  regarded  as  a  tenancy  at  will.-"  The  payment 
of  rent  for  a  year  at  the  end  of  the  first  year  or  for  a  month  at 
the  end  of  the  first  month  of  the  occupation  would  be  strong 
presumptive  though  not  conclusive  evidence  of  a  lease  from 
year  to  year  or  from  month  to  month.-"^  Aside  from  all  questions 
as  to  the  length  of  the  term  under  such  an  occupation,  it  is  well 
settled  that  the  owner  may  recover  in  an  action  of  assumpsit 
from  the  occupant  under  the  void  lease  the  reasonable  value  of 
the  use  and  occupation  of  the  premises."  And  it  has  also  been 
held  that,  where  the  occupant  of  land  or  a  tenant  is  in  posses- 
sion under  a  lease  which  is  absolutely  void,  the  lease  cannot  be 
resorted  to  or  considered  in  evidence  to  determine  the  amount 
which  shall  be  paid  by  the  occupant  for  use  and  occupation.'^ 

15  Consolidated    Coal   Co.   of   St.  20  See  ch.  — . 

Louis  V.  Peers,  150  111.  344,  37  N.  21  Vinz  v.   Beatty,   61   Wis.   645, 

E.  Rep.   937;    Caldwell   v.   Fulton,  649,   21  N.  W.   Rep.   7S7;    Koplitz 

31  Pa.  St.  475;  Harlan  v.  Coal  Co.,  v.    Gustanes,    48   Wis.   48;    Laugh- 

35  Pa.  St.  287.  ran  v.  Smith,  75  N.  Y.  206;  Huyser 

16  Barry  v.  Smith,  23  N.  Y.  129,  v.  Chase,  13  Mich.  98. 

1  Misc.  Rep.  240,  23  N.  Y.  S.  261,  22  Hays  v.  Garee,  4   Stew.  &  P. 

69  Hun,  88,  53  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  57.  (Ala.)  170. 

iTHazwood  V.  Fulmer  (Md.),  32  23  Vinz  v.   Beatty,    61   Wis.   645, 

N.  E.  Rep.  574.  649,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  787.     See,  also, 

18  Brubaker   v.    Poage,    1    T.    B.  Barry    v.    Ryan,    4    Gray    (Mass.) 
Mon.   (Ky.)   123.  523,  526,  where  the  landlord  suing 

19  Howard  v.  .Tones,  123  Ala.  488,  on    a    lease    whose    execution    he 
26  So.  Rep.  129.  failed    to    prove    was    precluded 


270  LAW  or  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  196,  A  lease  with  an  agreement  to  sell  the  premises.    An 

instrument  may  at  the  same  time  be  a  lease  and  also  a  contract 
to  convey  the  premises  and  enforceable  as  such  by  the  lessee. 
This  would  be  the  case  where  land  is  leased  for  a  term  which  is 
specified  with  a  covenant  by  the  lessor  that,  if  the  lessee  shall 
pay  all  the  rent  under  the  lease  as  it  accrues,  the  lessor  will  at 
some  future  date  convey  the  land  to  the  lessee.  The  promise  to 
convey  is  specifically  enforceable  as  it  is  based  on  a  good  and 
valuable  consideration,  i.  e.,  the  payment  of  the  rent  by  the  les- 
see. Until  the  day  an'ives  when  the  lessee  has  the  right  to  de- 
mand a  conveyance,  the  instrument  continues  to  be  a  lease,  the 
relation  between  the  parties  is  that  of  landlord  and  tenant  and 
the  former  may  oust  the  latter  for  the  non-payment  of  rent  as  in 
the  ordinary  cases  of  landlord  and  tenant.  But  after  alj  the  in- 
stalments of  rent  have  be^n  paid  the  instrument  is  no  longer  exec- 
utory^ but  executed;  and  the  parties  are  no  longer  landlord  and 
tenant  but  are  vendor  and  vendee,  with  a  right  in  the  vendee  to 
procure  a  specific  performance  of  the  agreement  to  convey,  in- 
cluding the  deliver}^  of  a  deed  in  a  court  of  equity  as  against  the 
owner  of  the  land.-^  For  an  option  to  purchase  contained  in  a 
lease  does  not  destroy  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant 
created  by  it,  until  the  option  is  executed.  Thus,  the  fact  that 
a  lease  contains  an  agreement  by  the  landlord  that  he  will  sell 
the  premises  to  the  tenant  for  a  price  agreed  on,  and  that  he 
will  accept  in  part  payment,  the  money  which  may  have  been 
paid  as  rent,  does  not  make  the  writing  an  agreement  to  sell. 
The  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  exists  under  it,  and,  where 
the  tenant  never  pays  any  rent,  the  landlord  may  maintain  a 
proceeding  in  forcible  detainer  or  other  possessory  action  to 
oust  him.^°  Whether  an  instrument  is  a  lease  or  an  agreement 
to  sell  the  premises  is  a  question  of  construction  upon  all  the 
language  of  the  instrument.  The  use  of  the  word  grant  in  an 
instrument  conveying  an  interest  in  land  negatives  an  intent  to 
create  a  lease  and  indicates  that  a  sale  was  intended.  The  word 
is  then  synonymous  with  convey  and  these  words  may  be  used 

from    recovoririK    on  an    implied  Rep.     126;     Thomas    t.     Johnson 

contract  to  pay  rent.  See  use  and  (Ark.  1906),  95  S.  W.  Rep.  468. 
occupation.  2.1  Colored    Homestead   &    Build- 

'-'••  Davis  V.  Robert,  89  Ala.  402,  ing  Ass'n  t.  Harvey,  23  Ky.  Law 

404,    8    So.    Rep.    114,  18    Am.    St.  Rep.  1009,  64  S.  W.  Rep.  676. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ABB  LEASES.  277 

interchangeably.  ITenee  a  grant  of  a  right  of  way  is  not  a  lease 
of  the  ground  but  a  conveyance,  sale  or  transfer  of  an  incorpo-, 
real  easement  and  where  such  a  grant  is  made  to  a  railroad  over 
the  land  of  the  grant  it  will  conclusively  be  presumed  to  con- 
stitute a  perpetual  privilege  though  provision  is  made  for  the 
payment  of  an  annual  rental  for  a  term  of  years.-"  So  in  con- 
elusion,  the  character  of  an  agreement  in  writing  by  which  the 
occupant  of  land  is  to  pay  a  certain  sum  yearly  for  its  use,  is 
not  altered  by  an  agreement  that  if,  within  a  certain  time  the 
amount  paid  by  the  tenant  equals  the  principal  and  interest  of 
a  note  given  by  him,  he  is  to  have  title  to  the  land.-^ 

§  197.  Lease  or  mortgage.  The  question  sometimes  arises 
whether  a  writing  by  which  the  possession  of  premises  is  trans- 
ferred is  a  lease  or  a  mortgage.  In  determining  this  question, 
the  courts  will,  as  in  all  cases  of  construction,  seek  to  ascertain 
the  true  intention  of  the  parties,  and  having  ascertained  this, 
will  seek  to  put  that  intention  in  operation  irrespective  of  the 
technical  language  of  the  instrument.  In  other  words,  in  deter- 
mining whether  an  instrument  was  meant  to  operate  as  a  lease 
or  as  a  mortgage,  courts,  and  particularly  courts  of  equity  in 
which  this  question  most  frequently  arises  owing  to  the  juris- 
diction which  is  exercised  in  equity  over  mortgages  and  trusts 
will  look  to  the  substance  and  not  to  the  mere  form  of  the  in- 
strument. All  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  including  the  situa- 
tion and  relation  of  the  parties  and  of  the  subject  matter  may 
be  considered  by  the  court,-^  for  the  distinction  between  a  lease 
and  a  mortgage  of  real  property  is  a  very  clear  and  important 
one  and  the  effect  and  operation  of  these  two  instruments  quite 
diverse.  In  the  case  of  a  lease  there  is  carved  out  of  the  fee, 
a  more  or  less  lengthy  term,  but  in  no  case  all  that  the  owner 
possessed  or  had  power  to  convey,  usually  with  a  payment  of 
rent  and  an  estoppel  upon  the  parties  to  deny  the  title  of  each 
other.     In  the  case  of  a  mortgage,  the  relation  of  debtor  and 

26  Des  Moines  Co.,  etc..  v.  Tub-  27  Nobles   v.   McCarty,   61   Miss, 

bessing,  87  Iowa,   138,   140,   54  N.  456. 

W.   Rep.    68,   in   which   the   court  ss  Packard    v.    Corporation    for 

saj's    "we    are    unable    to    find    a  Relief   of   Widows,    etc.,   of   Prot. 

single    instance    where    the    word  Epis.  Church  in  Maryland,  77  Md. 

grant  is  construed  as  lease."  240,   247,   26  Atl.   Rep.   411;    Mon- 
tague V.  Sewell,  57  Md.  412. 


278  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

creditor  exists  and  the  instrument  is  executed  not  like  a  lease 
for  the  purpose  of  transferring  possession,  but  as  security  for 
a  debt.  The  fee  is  granted  absolutely  in  form,  with  possession 
retained  in  the  grantor,  and  with  a  proviso  that  the  grant  shall 
be  void  if  the  debt  shall  be  paid.-^  An  agreement  by  which  the 
owner  transfers  to  another  the  possession  of  premises  as  collat- 
eral security  for  a  debt  with  power  to  receive  and  use  the  rents 
and  profits  until  a  certain  date,  though  in  form  a  mortgage,  is  in 
effect  a  lease  and  creates  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant.  It 
is  not  material  that  the  instrument  contains  no  operative  words 
of  grant  or  demise.  The  instrument  transfers  the  possession  and 
the  owner  divests  himself  of  the  possession  and  transfers  it  to 
another  who  being  thereby  his  tenant,  holds  in  subordination  to 
the  owner's  title.  The  latter  may  collect  the  rents  but  must  ac- 
count for  them  to  the  owner.^**  An  owner  of  land  who  raortgages 
it  under  an  agreement  that  he  shall  remain  on  it  and  cultivate 
it,  paying  the  mortgagee  a  certain  sum  each  year,  the  surplus 
of  which  over  the  interest  and  taxes  is  to  be  applied  to  pay  off 
the  mortgage  debt,  is  not  a  tenant  of  the  mortgagee.  It  is  not 
material  that  the  payment  is  called  rent.^^  An  agreement  by  the 
owner  of  the  premises  that  a  mortgagee  may  occupy  it  until  the 
mortgage  is  paid  creates  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant 
between  the  parties.  The  term  expires  by  the  payment  of  the 
mortgage  at  any  time  though  it  may  not  be  due.^-  A  deed  of 
premises  with  a  defeazaiice  endorsed  thereon  providing  for  a 
reconveyance  to  the  grantor  upon  the  latter  paying  a  certain 
sum  named  therein  as  well  as  for  the  use  of  the  farm,  the  grantor 
to  have  the  use  of  the  premises  until  the  sum  is  paid,  is  a  mort- 
gage and  not  a  lease  and  the  parties  do  not  occupy  the  position 

20  In    some    sections    a    ground  has    no    cause    for    complaint    so 

rent  redeemable  at  a  definite  fu-  long  as  the  lessee  shall  pay  the 

ture    date    is   a   common    security  rent.    Packard  v.  Corporation,  etc., 

for   money  loaned,   the   rent   paid  in  Maryland,  77   Md.  240,  247,  26 

being  the   interest   which   is   due.  Atl.  Rep.  411. 

Nevertheless  this   is  a   lease,  not  -io  Wells  v.  Sheerer,  78  Ala.  142, 

a  mortgage,  for  though  the  lessee  145. 

purchases  his  estate  with  the  priv-  'i  Sadler     v.      Jefferson      (Ala. 

ilege  of  his  buying  the  fee  at  some  1906),  39  So.  Rep.  380. 

fixed  future  date  at  a  fixed  price,  ^-  Hunt  v.  Comstock,   15   Wend. 

yet  he  is  not  compelled  to  do  so  (N.  Y.)  CC5. 
and  if  he  does  not  do  so,  the  lessor 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  279 

of  landlord  and  tenant.  Nor  does  the  provision  in  the  deed  rela- 
tive to  the  grantor  pacing  the  grantee  for  the  use  of  the  farm 
make  the  former  a  tenant  of  the  latter,  nor  change  the  character 
of  the  instrument  from  a  mortgage  to  a  lease.^^  A  clause  in  a 
lease  of  real  property  reserving  to  the  lessor  a  lien  for  the  rent 
on  the  goods  and  chattels  of  the  lessee  placed  on  the  premises, 
to  be  enforced  on  the  non-payment  of  rent,  as  in  case  of  a  chat- 
tel mortgage,  by  the  taking  possession  and  the  sale  of  the  prop- 
erty is,  in  its  effect  and  nature,  a  chattel  mortgage,  in  equity  at 
least.  Hence,  for  such  an  instriunent  to  constitute  a  valid  lien 
binding  on  an  innocent  purchaser  of  the  chattels,  it  must  be 
recorded  under  the  statute  as  a  chattel  mortgage.^*  An  instru- 
ment purporting  to  be  an  indenture  which  is  in  its  form  and 
language  a  lease,  but  which  recites  that  the  lessee  has  paid  the 
rent  for  the  term  in  full  and  that  he  "will  reconvey  upon  the  re- 
payment of  said  sum  by  the  lessor,  is  a  mortgage  under  the  gen- 
eral rule  that  any  instrument  conveying  an  estate  in  land  and 
stipulating  that  the  same  shall  be  re-conveyed  on  the  pajTnent 
of  money,  is  a  mortgage.  The  relation  between  the  parties  to 
this  instrument  is  therefore  that  of  mortgagor  and  mortgagee. 
The  mortgagee  being  in  possession  and  receiving  the  rents  and 
profits  must,  on  redemption,  account  therefore  as  payment  first 
to  keep  down  the  interest  and  then  to  credit  upon  the  principal. 
If  the  money  to  be  paid  by  the  mortgagor  is  paid  during  the 
term,  the  condition  is  not  broken  and  the  mortgagor  may  regain 
his  possession.  If  the  money  is  not  so  paid  the  condition  is 
broken  in  law  and  the  mortgagor  has  then  only  an  equity  of  re- 
demption and  must  bring  an  action  to  redeem  his  equity  in  order 
to  obt-ain  possession.  As  soon  as  the  rents  and  profits  received 
by  the  qua^i  lessee  equal  the  debt,  the  latter  is  at  once  regarded 
as  paid  and  the  mortgagor's  right  of  entry-  is  complete.  If  the 
rents  and  profits  exceed  the  debt,  the  balance  in  equity  belongs 

33  Graham  v.  Way,  38  Vt.  19;  Woodin.  65  N.  Y.  459,  22  Am.  Rep. 
Halo  V.  Schick,  57  Pa.  St.  319,  25  644;  Reynolds  v.  Ellis,  34  Hun,  47; 
L.  J,  332.  Nestell  v.   Hewitt,   19   Abb.   N.   C. 

34  Mitchell  V.  Badgett,  33  Ark.  282;  Betsinger  v.  Schuyler,  46 
387;  Merrill  v.  Ressler,  37  Minn.  Hun,  349;  Greeley  v.  Winsor.  1  S. 
82,  33  N.  W.  Rep.  117,  5  Am.  St.  D.  117,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  325,  39  Am. 
Rep.   822;    Johnson  v.  Crofoot,  53  St.  Rep.  349. 

Barb.    (N.  Y.)    574;    McCaffrey  v. 


280  LxlW  OF  LANDLORD  AKD  TENANT. 

to  the  lessor  who  may  recover  the  same  from  the  lessee  by  an 
action  in  assumpsit  for  money  had  and  received.^^  A  creditor 
who  occupies  and  retains  possession  of  the  lands  of  his  debtor 
until  from  the  rents  and  profits  he  shall  have  received  a  sum 
sufficient  to  pay  his  debt  is,  from  the  date  of  taking  possession, 
the  tenant  of  the  debtor,  he  is  liable  to  the  debtor  for  the  rent 
which  accrues  after  the  debt  shall  have  been  paid,  and  the  debtor 
may,  upon  a  failure  to  pay  the  rent,  institute  and  maintain  dis- 
possessory  proceedings.^® 

§  198.  The  lease  of  space  in  a  department  store.  In  modern 
times  it  is  quite  common,  in  the  large  cities  particularly,  for  a 
portion  of  a  building  to  be  sub-let  and  this  rule  finds  frequent 
illustration  in  the  sub-letting  of  floor  space  by  the  proprietor  of 
a  so-called  "department  store"  to  a  merchant  who  wishes  to 
carry  on  a  particular  line  of  business  in  connection  with  other 
departments  in  the  same  building.  Whether  such  an  agreement 
is  a  lease  or  a  mere  license  is  to  be  determined  by  the  general 
rules  elsewhere  stated.^^  If  the  lessee  is  to  have  the  exclusive 
possession  and  enjoyment  of  particular  floor  space  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  lessor,  the  agreement  is  a  lease  and  the  rules  of  law 
which  are  applied  to  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant,  regulate 
the  contract  of  the  parties.  As  a  general  thing,  the  value 
of  a  lease  of  this  character  to  the  tenant  lies  not  so  much  in  the 
area  of  floor  space  which  he  occupies  as  in  the  opportunity  af- 
forded him  to  dispose  of  his  goods.  Of  course,  this  opportunity 
depends  largely,  if  not  wholly,  upon  the  number  of  people  who 
frequent  the  store  and  with  whom  he  will  be  brought  in  contact 
by  reason  of  his  presence  in  the  store.  Hence,  the  representation 
oi  the  lessor  as  to  the  number  and  character  of  the  customers  who 
patronize  his  establishment,  the  amount  he  may  have  spent  in 
advertising,  the  number  of  years  he  has  been  established  in  busi- 
ness, the  amount  of  his  sales  and  general  facts  relating  to  his 
past  business  standing  are  material.  And  if  there  are  any  mis- 
representations by  the  lessor  in  reference  to  these  facts,  the  lease 
may  be  set  aside  ''*  as  having  been  procured  by  fraud  and  deceit. 

88  Nugent     V.      Riley,     1      Met.  as  Ehrich  v.   Winter  &  Co.,   103 

(Mass.)  117,  121.  35  Am.  Dec.  3.55.  N.   Y.   Supp.    1023.    52   Misc.   Rep. 

s«  Wells  V.   Sherer,  78  Ala.   142.  641. 
87  Sec.  193. 


WHAT  CONTEACTS  AEE  LEASES.  281 

§  199.  A  lease  distinguished  from  a  contract  to  furnish  board 
and  lodging.  In  many  cases  it  becomes  of  importance  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  status  of  a  lodger  and  that  of  a  tenant  and 
to  answer  a  question  whether  one  who  occupies  premises  with 
the  consent  of  the  owner  is  a  lodger  or  a  tenant  of  the  owner. 
The  lodger  is  defined  by  the  cases  to  be  one  who  has  only  a  right 
to  inhabit  another  man's  house.  He  has  no  rights  of  a  tenant 
and  usually  is  not  entitled  to  the  same  remedies.  A  lod-ger  is 
a  mere  licensee  whose  right  to  occupy  is  revocable  and  who  has 
no  exclusive  right  to  the  occupation  or  possession  of  any  part 
of  the  premises.  Sometimes  board  is  supplied  with  the  lodging 
and  a  boarder  is  one  who  has  food  or  diet,  either  with  or  without 
lodging,  in  another  man's  house,  for  compensation.  Whether 
an  occupant  of  premises  is  a  lodger  or  a  tenant  depends  on  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.  For  example,  where  a  person  con- 
tracts with  the  keeper  of  a  hotel  for  rooms  and  board,  whether 
for  a  week,  for  a  year  or  for  any  other  certain  period,  the  rela- 
tion of  landlord  and  tenant  is  not  created  between  the  parties. 
The  lodger  acquires  no  interest  in  the  land  and  has  no  right  to 
an  exclusive  possession.  If  he  is  turned  out  of  the  rooms  before 
his  time  expires,  he  cannot  maintain  ejectment  or  trespass.  And 
while  he  remains  as  a  lodger  the  landlord  cannot  collect  rent  in 
arrears  by  distress.^*  If  the  arrangement  between  the  parties 
is  a  lease  and  not  a  mere  contract  to  supply  board  aud  lodging, 
the  rights  and  remedies  of  the  parties  as  against  each  other  are 
very  different.  So,  if  the  occupant  is  a  tenant  and  not  a  mere 
lodger,  the  agreement  between  him  and  the  landlord  is  a  lease^ 
being  a  conveyance  of  an  interest  in  land  or  concerning  land, 
and  where  it  is  for  a  term  of  more  than  a  year  must  usually  be  in 
writing  under  the  statute  of  frauds.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
occupant  of  the  premises  is  a  mere  boarder  or  lodger  and  not  a 
tenant,  then  his  contract  is  not  a  lease  but  merely  an  agreement 
to  furnish  board  and  lodging  or  lodging  only  according  to  the 
circumstances  and  it  need  not  be  in  Avritinsr.'"  Thus  an  agree- 
ment to  pay  a  certain  sum  yearly  for  the  board  and  lodging  of 
two  persons  in  a  boarding  house,  which  agreement  is  terminable 
on  a  quarter's  notice  by  either  party  is  not  an  agreement  for  an 

39  Wilson  V.  Martin,  1  Den.   (N.  ^"1  White  v.  Maynard,  111  Mass. 

Y.)   602.  250. 


282  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

interest  in  real  estate  and  hence  it  is  not  within  the  statute.*^ 
Nor  does  it  signify  that  such  a  contract  is  concerning  an  inter- 
est in  land  because  it  expressly  points  out  and  designates  the 
particular  apartment  or  room  which  the  lodger  is  to  occupy. 
The  technical  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  is  not  created  be- 
tween the  parties  by  a  contract  which  obligates  the  owner  or  oc- 
cupant of  premises  to  furnish  rooms  and  board  whether  for  a 
week,  month,  year  or  longer  period  and  the  lodger  cannot  main- 
tain ejectment  if  he  is  turned  out  of  possession  before  his  term 
is  at  an  end  nor  can  the  hotel  keeper  distrain  for  rent  in  ar- 
rears.*- On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  an  agreement 
to  take  a  certain  apartment  or  rooms  in  a  house  as  lodgings  at 
a  yearly  rent  was  within  the  statute  of  frauds.*^  And  it  is  ob- 
vious that,  if  such  be  the  intention  of  the  parties  clearly  evidenced 
by  their  language  or  actions,  an  entire  floor,  an  apartment,  a 
series  of  rooms,  or  even  one  room  may  doubtless  be  let  for  lodg- 
ings so  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  premises  and  so  completely 
surrendered  to  the  exclusive  control  and  possession  of  the  lodger 
as  to  become  in  law  and  fact  his  separate  tenement  and  he  will 
under  such  circumstances  be  a  lessee.**  A  contract  which  in  its 
terms  purports  to  be  a  lease  and  which  confers  the  right  to  an 
exclusive  occupation  upon  the  occupant  of  certain  particular 
rooms  specified,  for  a  precise  time  and  at  a  definite  weekly  rate, 
such  rooms  being  so  separated  from  all  other  rooms  in  the  house 
as  to  become  in  fact  and  in  law  a  separate  tenement,  is  a  lease 
and  not  a  contract  for  board  and  lodging.  The  fact  that,  on 
leasing  the  rooms,  the  lessor  also  agrees  to  furnish  food  to  the  oc- 
cupant and  to  his  family  is  not  material.*^  The  executors  of  the 
lessee  who  dies  during  the  term,  are  bound  for  the  full  term, 
but  the  lessee's  death  diminishes  the  actual  amount  which  may 

41  Wright  V.  Stavert,  2  E.  &  E.  been   such   that,   if  an   entry  had 

721,  727.  been       made,       it      would      have 

■•s  Wihson  V.  Martin,  1  Denio  (N.  amounted    to    an    actual    lease    of 

Y.)   602.  the  rooms. 

<;' Inman  v.  Stamp,  1  Stark.  12;  4 1  white  v.  Maynard,  111  Mass. 

Edge  V.  Stafford,  1  Tyrwh.  293,  1  250,  254;   Newman  v.  Anderton,  2 

C.  J.  391.   There  is,  however,  noth-  B.  P.  N.  R.  224;   Fenn  v.  Grafton, 

ing  in  the  reports  of  these  cases  2  Bing.    (N.  C.)    617,  3  Scott,  56; 

to  show  that  the  premises  were  in  Monks  v.  Dykes,  4  M.  &  W.  567; 

a   lodging   house,   and   the   agree-  Swain  v.  Mizner,  S  Gray   (Mass.) 

ment  in  each  case  appears  to  have  182. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  283 

be  recovered  thereunder  to  the  extent  of  the  actual  cost  of 
boarding  her  during  the  remainder  of  the  term  after  her  death.**' 
So,  also,  the  fact  that  the  lessor  imposes  certain  restrictions  upon 
the  lessee  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  rooms  are  to  be  occupied 
and  used,  does  not  alter  the  character  of  the  contract,  as  it  is 
still  a  lease.*^ 

§  200.  Agreement  to  board  and  care  for  the  owner  of  land. 
An  agreement  to  board  the  owner  of  land  under  which  the  party 
who  agrees  to  furnish  the  board,  enters  into  possession  of  the 
whole  or  of  a  portion  of  the  premises  may  or  may  not  be  a  lease 
according  to  the  circumstances.  The  presumption  is  against  such 
a  contract  being  a  lease  and  this  presumption  is  very  materially 
strengthened  by  proof  that  the  oAvner  of  the  land  continues  in 
its  possession  and  control  after  the  entrj^  of  the  other  party. 
Another  material  fact  is  that  the  occupation  is  not  for  a  cash 
rent.  Thus,  an  agTeement  by  which  one  enters  upon  the  occu- 
pation of  premises  in  part  and  while  there,  furnishes  board  to 
the  owner,  who  continues  to  occupy  the  remainder  of  the  prem- 
ises upon  a  promise  by  the  owner  that  he  will  devise  the  property 
to  the  person  who  is  boarding  and  caring  for  him,  is  not  a  lease. 
The  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  does  not  exist  between  the 
parties  and  the  party  furnishing  the  board  has  his  remedy  upon 

«  Oliver  v.  Moore,  53  Hun,  472,  B.  (N.  S.)  33,  46.    So,  too,  in  those 

6  N.  Y.  Supp.  413,  affirmed  in  131  English  cases  where  the  question 

N.  Y.  589,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  65.  has  arisen  under  the  English  valu- 

46  Oliver  v.  Moore,  53  Hun,  472,  ation  and  tax  acts  whether  an  oc- 
6  N.  Y.  Supp.  413,  25  N.  Y.  St.  cupant  of  a  house  was  a  tenant  or 
Rep.  37.  See,  also,  S.  C,  39  N.  Y.  a  mere  lodger  it  has  been  held 
St.  Rep.  500,  35  N.  Y".  St.  Rep.  131.  that  there  must  be  an  actual  plac- 

47  Porter  v.  Merrill,  124  Mass.  ing  of  a  person  in  the  exclusive 
534,  541.  See  T\Tiite  v.  Maynard,  possession  of  a  house  or  an  apart- 
Ill  Mass.  250.  In  Fludier  v.  ment  in  a  house  by  the  landlord 
Lombe.  Cas.  Temp.  Hardw.  307,  to  make  him  a  lessee  and  that 
Lord  Hardwick  said:  "A  lodger  merely  admitting  one  as  an  in- 
was  never  considered  by  any  one  mate,  the  landlord  retaining  the 
as  an  occupier  of  a  house.  It  is  legal  possession  and  control  of  the 
not  the  common  understanding  of  whole  house,  constitutes  him  a 
the  word;  neither  the  house,  nor  lodger  only.  Smith  v.  St.  Michael, 
even  any  part  of  it,  can  be  prop-  3  E.  &  E.  3S3;  Stamper  v.  Over- 
erly  said  to  be  in  the  tenure  or  seers  of  Synderland,  L.  R.  3  C.  P. 
occupation  of  the  lodger."  And  388;  The  Queen  v.  St.  George's 
this  definition  was  cited  with  ap-  Union,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  90. 

proval  in  Cook  v.  Humber,  11  C. 


284  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

the  contract  which  has  been  made  to  devise  him  the  property.'*^ 
Under  an  agreement  of  this  kind  an  owner  cannot  enforce  the 
remedies  which  a  landlord  generally  possesses.  Thus,  an  agree- 
ment  that  one  shall  remain  in  a  house,  shall  board  the  owner  and 
keep  the  house  in  repair  during  the  owner's  pleasure  is  not  a 
1-ease;  and  the  owner,  not  being  a  landlord,  cannot  maintain  a 
summary  proceedings  under  the  statute  to  oust  the  other  party 
as  his  tenant.*^  An  agreement  by  a  daughter  binding  herself 
to  board  her  father  several  months  in  each  year  under  which  she 
takes  possession  of  her  father's  farm  and  remains  there  is  not 
a  lease.***  But  an  agreement  by  which  one  of  two  tenants  in  com- 
mon agrees  that  he  will  furnish  a  home  and  support  the  other  in 
consideration  of  his  having  the  whole  portion  of  the  land  is  a 
lease,^^ 

§  201.  Entry  upon  land  of  another  under  an  option  to  pur- 
chase from  him.  A  tenancy  does  not  arise  by  implication  of 
law  between  the  owner  of  land  and  a  person  to  whom  he  has 
given  an  option  to  purchase  the  land  at  a  fixed  price  and  within 
a  certain  time  merely  because  the  person  having  the  option  enters 
on  the  land  to  prospect  for  minerals  or  for  any  other  purpose 
during  the  continuance  of  the  option ;  but  if  he  remains  in  pos- 
session at  the  expiration  of  the  time  without  right  he  becomes  a 
trespasser.*'^  Hence  neither  the  owner  who  has  given  the  option 
nor  his  successor  in  interest  can  eject  such  person  as  a  tenant  at 
sufferance  either  during  the  continuation  of  the  option  or  after 
its  termination.*' 

§  201a.  The  mortgagee  of  the  tenant's  chattels  in  possession. 
The  holder  of  a  mortgage  upon  personal  property  which  is  in 
the  demised  premises  who  takes  possession  of  the  mortgaged 
property  and  of  the  premises  with  the  consent  of  the  mortgagor 
who  is  a  lessee  and  is  permitted  to  sell  the  goods  and  apply  the 
proceeds  to  the  payment  of  the  mortgag-e  debt  is  not  liable  for 
rent  to  the  lessor  of  the  mortgagor.    The  mortgagee  may  under 

*8  Matthews     v.     Matthews,     49  si  Shouse    v.     Krusor,     24     Mo. 

Hun,  346-348,  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  124.  App.  279. 

40  Schreiber  v.  Goldsmith,  70  N.  52  Henry  v.  Perry,  110  Ga.  630, 

Y.  Supp.  236,  35  Misc.  R.  45,  104  36  S.  E.  Rep.  87. 

N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  236.  53  Henry  v.  Perry,  110  Ga.   630, 

5"  Story  V.  Epps,  105  Ga.  504,  31  36  S.  E.  Rep.  87. 
S.  E.  Rep.  190;  Herrel  v.  Sizeland, 
81  111.  447. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  285 

such  circumstances  make  himself  liable  for  rent  to  the  lessor  by 
an  agreement  either  express  or  implied.  Until  he  does  so  he  is 
only  an  occupant  under  the  lessee,  being  in  fact  merely  the  agent 
of  the  lessee  for  the  sale  of  the  mortgaged  goods  and  the  appli- 
cation of  the  proceeds  to  the  mortgage  debt.  The  lessee  con- 
tinued to  receive  the  benefit  of  the  occupation  of  the  premises  and 
he  must  pay  the  lessor  for  the  same.  If.  however,  the  mortgagor 
shall  vacate,  leaving  the  mortgagee  in  possession,  and  the  mort- 
gagee pays  rent  to  the  lessor,  the  mortgagee  may  justly  be  re- 
garded as  the  assignee  of  the  lease  and  is  liable  as  such.^*  Chat- 
tel mortgagees  who  before  they  take  possession  of  personal  prop- 
erty in  demised  premises  promise  a  lessor  to  pay  rent  will  be 
liable  for  rent  while  they  continue  in  possession  for  the  purpose 
of  selling  the  goods.  Subsequent  litigation  brought  by  the 
mortgagor  involving  the  enjoining  of  the  sale  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  receiver  in  an  action  to  set  aside  the  mortgages  do  not 
relieve  the  mortgagees  from  liability  for  rent  during  the  time 
the  action  is  pending.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  chattel  mortgagees 
to  apply  to  the  court  in  such  a  suit  for  an  order  relieving  them 
from  liability  for  rent  or  to  consent  promptly  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  receiver  who  would  then  become  responsible  for  the 
care  of  the  goods.  Having  failed  to  do  this,  the  mortgagees  of 
the  chattels  are  in  the  position  of  assignees  of  the  lessee  and  they 
are  liable  to  the  lessor  for  the  rent  stipulated  to  be  paid  by  the 
lease  and  not  for  use  and  occupation  merely.  Nor  can  they 
avoid  their  liability  by  proving  that  the  lessor  took  no  proceed- 
ings to  oust  them  from  possession  or  to  compel  them  to  remove 
the  mortgaged  goods.  A  court  of  equity  will  on  application  of 
the  lessor,  direct  that  the  rent  for  which  the  mortgagors  are  re- 
sponsible, shall  be  paid  out  of  the  proceeds  of  a  sale  by  the  re- 
ceiver though  the  mortgages  are  decreed  to  be  valid.^^  In  con- 
clusion, a  chattel  mortgagee  who  purchases  the  mortgaged  chat- 
tels, the  sale  being  made  subject  to  the  landlord's  lien,  and  there- 
after enters  on  and  occupies  the  premises,  will  be  liable  for  use 
and  occupation  to  an  assignee  of  the  lessee  whom  he  keeps  out 
of  possession  as  well  as  to  the  lessor  on  the  covenant  to  pay  rent."*" 

B*  Fisher     v.     PfoTzheimer,     93  5c  Bolton  v.  Lambert,   72   Iowa, 

Mich.  650,  653,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  828.       483,  34  N.  W.  Rep.  294. 

65  Hatch  V.  Van  Dervoort,  54  N. 
J.  Eq.  511,  34  All.  Rep.  938. 


286  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  202.  Future  lease  of  an  unfinished  building.  There  can  be 
no  question  as  to  the  validity  of  an  agreement  to  execute  a  fu- 
ture lease  of  an  unfinished  building.  Whether  the  completion 
of  the  building  shall  be  a  condition  precedent  to  the  execution 
of  the  lease  usually  depends  upon  the  exact  wording  of  the  con- 
tract. "Where  it  has  been  agreed  between  the  parties  that  a 
lease  is  to  run  from  the  completion  of  a  building  which  is  in 
course  of  construction,  and  it  is  stated  in  the  lease,  or  in  the 
agreement  for  the  lease,  that  the  building  is  to  be  completed  on 
a  certain  date,  the  latter  statement  is  not  a  covenant  that  the 
building  will  be  completed  on  that  date.^^  A  contract  cannot 
properly  be  called  a  lease  where  the  premises  referred  to  in  the 
same  are  not  in  existence  when  it  is  executed  and  the  lessor 
named  therein  does  not  own  the  land.  It  is  rather  a  contract 
to  build  with  an  agreement  for  a  future  lease  to  begin  as  soon  as 
the  building  is  ready  for  occupancy.  If  the  lessee  so-called 
shall  enter  into  possession  and  sha'l  occupy  the  building  before 
it  'is  complete,  he  becomes  responsible  for  rent  during  his  occu- 
pancy. He  will  be  presumed  to  have  waived  his  right  to  be  re- 
leased from  his  covenant  to  enter  or  to  pay  rent.  If  by  reason  of 
the  delay  in  completing  the  building  he  has  suffered  any  dam- 
ages, he  may  recoup  them  in  an  action  against  him  for  rent,  to 
the  extent  of  the  rent,  and  if  they  exceed  that  amount  he  may  re- 
cover the  excess.^^  An  agreement  by  which  the  owner  of  land 
agrees  to  erect  a  building  on  it  according  to  plans  and  specifica- 
tions to  be  finished  on  a  certain  future  date  with  rent  to  begin 
when  the  building  is  complete  is  a  lease  in  presenti  with  posses- 
sion postponed  to  a  future  date.  The  mere  fact  that  there  is  no 
certain  and  fixed  date  expressly  mentioned  in  the  lease  on  which 
the  term  is  to  begin  does  not  invalidate  such  a  lease  because  the 
term  is  not  definite  and  certain.  It  is  sufficient  if  the  agreement 
shall  specify  when  the  building  is  to  be  completed  and  shall  at 
the  same  time  state  that  th?  lessor  may  have  possession  when  the 

C7  Noyes  v.  Loughead,   9   Wash.  no  title,  is  a  lease  where  it  does 

325,  328,  37  Pac.  Rep.  4.52.  not  in  terms  provide  for  the  sub- 

08  Haven    v.    Wakefield,    39    111.  sequent  execution  of  any  other  in- 

509,   518,   519.     A  contract  which  strument  and   the  tenant  entered 

provides  for  the  letting  of  a  build-  on  the  completion  of  the  building, 

ing     in     course     of     con.struction  Western    Boot    and    Shoe    Co.    v. 

from   the  date  of  its  completion,  Gannon,  50  Mo.  App.  C42. 
the  prospective  lessor  then  having 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  287 

biiiklintr  is  completed.  The  right  of  the  tenant  accrues  on  the 
date  the  building  is  completed.  He  may  then  maintain  eject- 
ment against  an  intruder  and,  on  the  other  hand,  he  is  there- 
after responsible  to  the  landlord  for  the  rent.'*  But  he  is  not 
liable  to  pay  rent  unless  the  building  which  has  been  erected 
substantially  complies  with  the  plans  and  specifications.  He 
may  show  this  in  an  action  against  him  for  the  rent.  He  may 
also  show  that  parts  of  the  building  as  to  which  there  were  no 
plans  and  specifications  have  not  been  constructed  in  a  reason- 
ably safe  and  workmanlike  manner  for  the  known  purpose  for 
which  the  building  was  meant  to  be  used.  If  the  building  is 
not  substantially  adapted  to  his  purpose,  tlie  tenant  is  not  liable 
for  rent  if  he  refuses  to  enter  when  it  is  completed.  He  need 
not  show  that  the  building  is  entirely  unsafe  or  in  danger  of 
falling  down  or  actually  unsafe  for  every  purpose  if  it  be  unsafe 
for  the  known  purpose  for  which  it  was  intended  to  be  used.®** 

§  203.  Mortg-agor  or  his  tenant  and  a  purchaser  at  a  sale  un- 
der foreclosure.  A  purchaser  of  premises  which  have  been 
sold  under  a  foreclosure  does  not  thereby  become  the  landlord 
either  of  the  o^vnaer  of  the  equity  or  of  tenants  holding  under 
leases  from  such  owner,  at  least  where  the  leases  are  dated  sub- 
sequently to  the  date  of  the  mortgage.  The  term  granted  by 
the  lease  after  the  mortgage  has  been  executed  is  carved  out  of 
the  equity  of  redemption  and  is  therefore  subject  to  all  the  in- 
cumbrances which  are  then  upon  the  equity.  The  purchaser  at 
the  mortgage  sale  becomes  the  owner  of  the  fee  subject  to  such 
incumbrances  only  as  were  liens  prior  to  the  execution  of  the 
mortgage.  He  may  accept  as  his  tenants,  persons  who  lease  sub- 
sequent to  his  lien  even  without  an  actual  attornment  or  he  may 

50  Colclough  V.  Carpeles,  89  Wis.  there  was  created  a  term  of  years 

239,  247,  61  N.  W.  Rep.  836.     See  in    the    premises,   with    a    certain 

Bacon     v.     Bowdoin,     22      Pick.  commencement  and  a  certain  ter- 

(Mass.)   401,  where  an  agreement  mination;    in   short,  with  all   the 

to   complete    a   building   and    fur-  requisites  of  a  lease."     See,  also, 

nish  water  power  by  a  future  day  as  to  leases  for  terms  to  begin  in 

was    held    a    lease.      Bussman    v.  futuro.     Chapman  v.  Bluck,  4  Bing. 

Ganster,  72  Pa.  St.  28.5.  in  which  (N.  C.)    187;    Trull  v.  Granger,  8 

Sharswood.   J.,  says:    "It   is  true,  N.  Y.  115,  118;  Becar  v.  Flues,  64 

here  are  no  formal  words  of  de-  N.  Y.  518,  520. 

mise,  but  it  is  very  manifest  that  eo  Colclough  v.  Carpeles,  89  Wis. 

after  the  erection  of  the  building  239,  248,  61  N.  W.  Rep.  836. 


288  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

treat  them  as  trespassers,  and  may  recover  possession  from  them 
by  ejectment  or  an  action  of  forcible  detainer  at  law  or  by  a 
writ  of  assistance  according  to  the  local  practice.®^  Where  the 
purchaser  at  a  foreclosure  sale  evicts  the  tenant  of  the  mortgagor 
who  is  subsequent  to  the  mortgage,  the  tenant  is  not  entitled  to 
emblements.*^  On  the  other  hand,  the  purchaser  at  foreclosure 
cannot  distrain  for  subsequent  or  prior  rent  or  sue  the  tenant 
of  the  mortgagor  holding  over  for  subsequent  or  prior  rent,^^  or 
for  use  and  occupation,**  unless  the  tenant  shall  have  attorned 
to  him  and  he  accepted  him.  So  it  has  been  held  that  a  mere 
notice  by  the  purchaser  at  foreclosure  to  a  tenant  to  pay  rent  t® 
him  which  the  latter  does  not  act  upon  does  not  make  the  tenant 
liable  for  the  rent.  For  if  the  tenant  does  not  attorn  to  the  pur- 
chaser there  is  no  privity  between  them  from  which  the  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant  may  be  implied.  But  the  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant  is  created  where  after  a  sale  under  a  fore- 
closure, the  purchaser  at  the  sale  agrees  with  the  former  owner 
of  the  mortgaged  premises  that  the  latter  may  remain  in  posses- 
sion, paying  him  rent  for  two  years  after  the  expiration  of  the 
time  to  redeem,  with  an  extension  of  the  right  to  redeem  during 
the  years."^ 

§  204.  Contracts  for  advertising  space.  Agreements  by 
which  the  owner  of  land  permits  another  person  to  place  an  ad- 
vertising sign  upon  it  are  becoming  more  common  in  modem 
times.    In  many  eases  the  agreement  permits  the  person  desiring 

61  Downard  v.  Groff,  40  Iowa,  267,  271;  Rogers  r.  Humphreys,  4 
597,  599;  Oilman  v.  Wells,  66  Me.       Ad.  &  El.  299. 

273;    Lane  v.  King,   8  Wend.    (N.  64  Peters    v.     Elkins,     14     Ohio. 

y.)     584;     Jones    v.     Thomas,     8  344,  347. 

Blackf.    (Ind.)    428,  431;    Reed  v.  65  Eldridge  v.   Hoefer,   45  Oreg. 

Bartlett,  9  111.  App.  267;   Bartlett  239,  77  Pac.  Rep.   874.     A  tenant 

V.  Hitchcock,  10  111.  App.  87;   Pet-  of  a  mortgagor  by  a  lease  made 

ers  V.  Elkins,   14   Ohio,   344,   347;  subsequently    to    the    lien    of    the 

Sprague    Nat.    Bank    v.    Railroad  mortgage  does  not  thereby  become 

Co.,  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  65,  22  App.  Div.  a  tenant  of  the  mortgagee    (Brid- 

526;     McKircher    v.    Hawley,    16  well  v.  Bancroft,  2  Ohio  Dec.  697), 

Johns.  (N.  y.)  289.  or    of    his    assignee     (.lackson    v. 

62  .Tones  v.  Thomas,  8  Blackf.  Rowland,  6  Wend.  (N.  y.)  666,22 
(Ind.)  428,  431.  Am.  Dec.  507),  in  the  absence  of 

03  Reed   v.   Bartlett,   9   111.   App.      an   attornment   or   express   agree- 
ment to  that  effect. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ABE  LEASES.  289 

to  advertise  to  erect  or  build  a  wooden  sign  upon  vacant  land. 
The  placing  of  the  sign  involves  the  erection  of  a  more  or  less 
permanent  wooden  structure  which  is  fastened  to  the  land  and 
which  occupies  more  or  less  space  upon  it.  The  making  of  such 
a  contract  creates  by  implication  a  license  on  the  part  of  the 
landowner  for  the  other  party  to  the  contract  to  enter  upon  his 
land  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  the  structure  and  thereafter 
from  time  to  time  to  enter  upon  it  for  the  purpose  of  caring  for 
and  maintaining  it.  It  therefore  follows  that  while  the  sign  is 
on  the  land  there  can  be  no  trespass  where  the  entrance  is  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  carrjnng  out  the  contract.  In  other  cases  the 
sign  is  placed  or  erected  upon  a  building,  sometimes  being 
painted  upon  the  roof,  or  upon  a  wooden  structure  built 
upon  the  roof,  and  sometimes  being  painted  on  the  walls 
on  the  front  or  sides  of  a  house.  The  question  often  arises  be- 
tween the  owner  and  the  other  party  to  the  contract  whether 
such  a  contract  is  a  lease  or  a  license.  Where  there  is  an  actual 
occupancy  and  possession  of  the  land  or  of  a  portion  of  the  prem- 
ises which  excludes  the  landlord  from  his  possession  of  that  por- 
tion, the  agreement  would  be  a  lease.  Thus,  an  agreement  by 
which  a  person  is  to  have  the  use  and  the  possession  of  a  roof 
for  advertising  purposes,  in  order  to  get  the  benefit  of  which  he 
must  build  and  maintain  a  wooden  structure  upon  the  roof,  is 
a  lease  and  not  a  license.^®  So,  it  has  been  held  that  the  hiring  of 
an  outer  wall  of  a  building  for  the  purposes  of  painting  adver- 
tising signs  thereon  is  not  a  license  for  the  use  of  the  wall  but 
it  is  a  lease.  It  involves  the  exclusive  possession  of  the  outside 
of  the  wall.  The  relation  of  the  landlord  and  tenant  is  created 
between  the  owner  of  a  wall  and  the  advertiser.*''  Similar  agree- 
ments have  also  been  held  to  be  licenses.  Thus,  an  agreement 
by  a  lessee  of  a  floor  in  a  building  to  permit  a  third  party,  in 
return  for  an  annual  payment  to  him,  to  hang  a  sign  on  the  outer 
wall  of  the  premises  is  a  license  for  the  reason  that  it  is  merely 
a  permission  to  do  a  particular  act  upon  the  premises.  The 
court  held  it  was  a  license  because  it  was  not  a  conveyance  of  the 
outside  wall  for  all  purposes.  Hence  this  contract  not  being  a 
lease  the  granting  of  this  permission  was  not  a  breach  of  a  cove- 

66  Pocher  v.  Hall,  98  N.  Y.  Supp.  st  Oakford  v.  Nirdlinger,  196  Pa. 

754.  St.  162. 

19 


290 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AJSTD  TENANT. 


nant  by  the  lessee  not  to  underlet.®^  An  agreement  by  which  the 
owner  of  property  permits  another  person  to  place  a  bill-board 
and  advertising  station  on  his  land,  which  is  not  to  touch  or  be 
fastened  to  the  wall  of  the  premises  and  for  which  the  person  re- 
ceiving the  privilege  is  to  pay  an  annual  rent,  is  not  the  lease  of 
the  land,  though  rent  is  spoken  of.  The  agreement  is  a  mere 
license,  and  it  may  be  revoked  by  the  owner  of  the  land  on  a 
reasonable  notice.  Having  in  view  a  quarterly  payment  of  rent, 
the  court  held  a  three  months'  notice  sufficient.*^^ 

§  205.  A  purchaser  of  a  crop  on  an  execution  sale  of  a  tenant. 
One  who  purchases  at  an  execution  sale  a  crop  growing  on  land 
does  not  necessarily  thereby  become  a  tenant  of  the  owner  of  the 
land.  The  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  does  not  exist  between 
the  purchaser  of  the  crop  and  the  owner  of  the  laud  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  express  agreement  to  that  effect  between  the  parties. 


68  Lowell  V.  Strahan,  145  Mass. 
1,  12,  13,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  401,  1  Am. 
St.  Rep.  122. 

69  Wilson  V.  Tavener,  70  L.  J. 
Ch.  263;  (1901)  1  Ch.  578,  84  L. 
T.  48.  The  case  of  Pocher  v.  Hall, 
98  N.  Y,  Supp.  754,  draws  a  clear 
distinction  between  the  construc- 
tion and  maintenance  of  an  ad- 
vertiser's structure  in  reference  to 
signs  placed  upon  the  wall.  Thus, 
a  lessee  of  a  building  is  not  au- 
thorized to  let  out  the  roof  for 
advertising  purposes,  though  he 
has  a  right  to  sublet  other  por- 
tions of  the  building.  O.  J.  Gude 
Co.  V.  Farley,  28  Misc.  Rep.  184, 
in  which  the  court  said  the  pur- 
pose of  a  roof  of  a  building  is 
primarily  to  shelter  it  and  all  of 
its  occupants,  and  the  tenant  of 
the  top  floor  has  no  better  title  to 
the  roof  or  better  right  to  its  use 
for  any  other  purpose  than  shelter 
than  ha.s  the  tenant  of  any  other 
floor.  His  right  to  use  the  roof 
over  him  is  like  his  right  to  use 
the  supporting  walls  of  the  foun- 
dation  when   that  is   essential   to 


the  safety  and  quiet  enjoyment 
of  his  premises.  And  any  exten- 
tion  of  that  right  must  be  by 
agreement  with  or  license  from 
the  owner.  The  court  further  held 
that  a  subsequent  owner  of  the 
premises  might  remove  the  signs 
placed  on  the  roof  by  the  adver- 
tising company  with  the  permis- 
sion of  the  tenant  without  being 
liable  for  trespass.  Where  a  paper, 
though  called  a  lease,  merely  per- 
mits the  person  to  go  on  the  roof 
of  a  building  and  to  place  adver- 
tisements upon  a  structure  already 
erected,  and  conveys  no  interest 
or  any  right  of  possession  in  it 
and  the  sign  on  which  the  adver- 
tisement was  to  be  placed  had 
been  erected  some  time  before  the 
contract  was  executed,  it  is  not  a 
lease  but  a  license.  The  adver- 
tiser cannot  be  held  liable  for  the 
result  of  personal  injuries  where 
the  sign  board  was  blown  down 
into  the  street  by  the  wind.  Rey- 
nolds V.  Van  Beuren,  155  N.  Y. 
120-123,  49  N.  E.  Rep.  7G3,  42  L. 
R.  A.  129. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  291 

All  that  the  jjiirchaser  gets  is  the  right  to  remove  the  crop  with 
the  privilege  of  ingress  and  egress  to  remove  it  which  makes  him 
a  licensee  and  not  a  lessee.  He  is  entitled  to  a  reasonable  time 
after  the  crop  has  matured  to  harvest  it  and  to  remove  it  and  these 
rights  and  privileges  he  enjoys  without  liability  on  his  part  for 
the  reasonable  value  of  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  land.'^° 

§  206.  The  judgment  debtor  holding  over  after  a  sale  on  an 
execution.  There  is  no  implied  promise  on  the  part  of  a  judg- 
ment debtor  holding  over  after  the  sale  of  his  land  under  an  exe- 
cution, to  continue  as  a  tenant  of  the  purchaser  at  the  execution 
sale.  Hence  there  arises  no  implication  of  any  contract  of  lease 
between  him  and  the  purchaser  on  the  execution  and,  as  the  re- 
lation of  the  landlord  and  tenant  is  based  on  contract  express  or 
implied,  no  tenancy  exists  by  implication  from  the  execution 
debtor  holding  over.  He  is  then  merely  a  trespasser  who  may  be 
ousted  at  any  time  by  the  purchaser  on  the  sale  and  from  whom, 
at  the  same  time,  no  rent  can  be  collected  by  the  purchaser  for 
the  period  he  remains  in  possession.'^^  If  however  the  purchaser 
permits  the  judgment  debtor  to  continue  in  possession,  and  a 
fortiori,  if  knowing  who  he  is,  he  receives  rent  from  him  while 
he  holds  over,  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  arises  be- 
tween the  parties  and  a  tenancy  at  will  is  created,  unless  some 
specific  term  shall  be  agreed  upon  by  them.'^^ 

§  207.  Whether  an  instrument  is  a  lease  or  a  partnership 
agreement.  It  sometimes  becomes  important,  in  view  of  the 
difference  which  in  law  exists  betw^een  the  reciprocal  rights  and 

70  Raven tas  v.  Green,  57  Cal.  (Tenn.)  16,  and  Wood  v.  Turner, 
254;  McClellan  v.  Krall,  43  Kan.  7  Humph.  (Tenn.)  517,  it  was 
216,  218,  23  Pac.  Rep.  100;  Crad-  held  that  one  who  is  in  possession 
dock  V.  Riddlesbargar,  2  Dana  when  land  is  sold  by  virtue  of  a 
(Ky.)  205;  Coombs  v.  Jordan,  3  decree  in  chancery  or  under  an 
Bland  Ch.  (Md.)  284,  22  Am.  Dec.  execution  at  law  is  a  quasi  tenant 
260;  Hartwell  v.  Bissell,  17  Johns.  oi."  the  purchaser  at  least  to  the 
(N.  Y.)  128;  Brittain  V.  McKay,  35  extent  of  being  estopped  to  deny 
Am.  Dec.  738;  Smith  v.  Tritt,  28  the  title  of  the  purchaser.  See, 
Am.  Dec.  565;  Whipple  v.  Foot,  2  also,  to  same  effect,  De  Silva  v. 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  418.  Flynn,  9   Civ.   Pro.  Rep.    (N.   Y.) 

71  Tucker  v.  Byers,  57  Ark.  215,  42G. 

21  S.  W.  Rep,  227;  Griffin  v.  Roch-  ■?2  Munson  r.  Plummer,  59  Iowa, 

ester,  96  Ind.  545;   Chalfin  v.  Ma-  120,  12  N.  W.  Rep.  806:    Jackson 

lone,  9  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  496.  In  v.  Sternbergh,  1  Johns.  Cases,  153. 
Siglar     V.     Malone,     3      Humph. 


292  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

duties  of  partners  and  those  of  landlord  and  tenant,  to  determine 
whether  a  writing  is  a  partnership  agreement  or  a  lease.  On  this 
question  no  general  rule  can  be  laid  down  for  each  case  is  a  law 
unto  itself  to  be  determined  according  to  the  intention  of  the 
parties  to  be  gathered  from  the  contents  of  the  writing  and  the 
circumstances  of  the  parties  and  of  the  subject  matter.  That  the 
writing  describes  the  parties  to  it  as  partners  is  not  conclusive 
if  it  is  otherwise  apparent  that  a  lease  was  intended.  So,  an  in- 
strument which  recites  that  the  parties  to  it  are  partners  in  busi- 
ness and  that  they  as  such  own  a  building  but  which  furthermore 
provides  that  one  of  them  is  to  take  charge  of  and  run  the  prop- 
erty as  a  hotel  for  a  term  of  years  and  to  pay  to  the  firm  at  the 
end  of  each  year  a  fixed  sura  is  a  lease  for  a  term  of  years  and 
not  a  partnership  arrangement,  terminable  by  either  party. 
This  is  apparent  not  only  from  the  fact  that  the  entire  posses- 
sion is  transferred  to  a  lessee  but  also  because  there  is  no  provi- 
sion for  a  division  of  either  profits  or  loses.  Hence  the  fact 
that  the  landlord  supported  a  statute  passed  after  the  leasing 
by  the  enactment  of  which  the  profits  of  the  hotel  are  greatly 
diminished  is  no  breach  of  the  lease  entitling  the  tenant  to  ask 
for  a  rescission  as  he  took  the  lease  subject  to  regulation  by  the 
legislature.'^^  An  agreement  which  provides  that  the  occupant 
of  certain  premises  is  to  pay  as  rent  to  the  owner  one  half  of  the 
profits  resulting  from  the  occupant  carrying  on  a  business  in  the 
said  premises  is  a  lease  and  not  an  agreement  of  partnership. 
Leases  providing  for  the  pajrment  of  a  share  of  the  profits  as 
rent  are  by  no  means  uncommon.  The  fact  that  the  agreement 
does  not  provide  for  a  division  of  the  losses,  if  any,  between  the 
parties  is  not  always  material.  And  the  presumption  that  such 
a  writing  constitutes  and  was  intended  by  the  parties  for  a  lease, 
and  not  as  an  agreement  for  a  partnership  would  be  rendered 
almost,  if  not  altogether,  conclusive,  by  the  fact  that  it  speaks 
of  a  yearly  ren1;il  to  be  paid,  provides  for  a  renewal  when  it 
exf)ir(;s  and  confers  on  the  occupant  the  right  to  assign  the  lease- 
hold interest.'^'*  A  Meriting  which  purports  to  be  in  form  at  least 
a  Icjusf,  and  wliich  confers  upon  the  lessee  so-called,  the  entire 
c(H)lrol  of  a  factory  together  with  the  right  to  employ  and  to 
discliarge  persons  working  there,  rejserving  to  the  owner  of  the 

Ts  Baiighman  v.  Partman,  14  S.  74  z.  c.  Miles  Co.   v.  Gordon,  8 

W.  Rc-p.   (Ky.)   342.  Wash.  442,  36  Pac.  Rep.  2G5,  267. 


WHAT  CONTEACTS  AEE  LEASES.  293 

premises  no  powers  as  to  the  management  of  the  business  but 
stipulating  that  the  profits  of  the  business  exceeding  a  certain 
amount  shall  be  paid  to  the  party  owning  the  factory  and  plant 
creates  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  and  not  that  either 
of  partners  or  of  principal  and  agent."^  So,  an  agreement  for 
one  year  by  which,  in  consideration  of  receiving  one  half  of  the 
crop,  the  owner  of  land  permitted  another  to  occupy  it,  each 
party  to  furnish  one  half  the  stock  and  seed,  and  the  lessee  to 
supply  the  farming  implements  and  the  labor  and  also  to  pay 
the  taxes,  and  to  account  at  intervals  for  all  receipts  and  ex- 
penditures, is  a  lease,  and  not  a  partnership  agreement/*  From 
the  cases  cited  it  may  be  gathered  that  a  division  of  the  profits 
between  owner  and  occupant  is  of  very  little  weight  as  raising 
a  presumption  of  a  partnership  where  the  division  is  made  in 
lieu  of  paying  rent.  For  the  money  thus  paid  to  an  owneT 
though  it  may  be  called  a  share  of  the  profits  is  in  reality  rent. 
The  amount  may  fluctuate  but  its  character  as  rent  remains 
fixed.  And  money  paid  and  received  as  rent  does  not  lose  its 
character  as  rent  because  the  parties  to  the  payment  chose  to 
call  it  a  division  of  partnership  profits.  The  real  test  in  all  of 
these  cases  lies  in  the  answer  to  the  question  in  whose  control  is 
the  premises?  And  the  fact  that  the  occupation,  enjoyment  and 
control  of  the  premises  are  wholly  surrendered  by  one  party  and 
exclusively  vested  in  the  other  goes  a  long  way  to  convince  one 
that  a  lease  was  intended. 

§  208.  Contracts  for  steam  heating  and  for  steam  and  water 
power.  Agreements  by  which  owners  of  premises  stipulate 
to  furnish  persons  who  are  their  tenants  with  a  stipulated  steam 
power  are  very  common  and  may  with  some  propriety  be  called 
leases.  Regarding  them  as  leases,  the  general  rules  of  construc- 
tion of  leases  apply.  Some  special  rules  growing  out  of  the  use 
of  steam  for  power  and  out  of  the  character  of  the  means  by 
which  it  is  generated  and  supplied  must  also  be  considered.  In 
construing  a  lease  of  steam  power  in  connection  with  a  lease  of 
the  premises,  the  court  will  consider  the  previous  condition  of 
the  premises  under  the  general  rule  that  a  grant  will  be  con- 

TsAult     Wooden-Ware     Co.     v.  113,  8  W.  N.  C.  475,  37  L.  I.  300, 

Baker,  26  Ind.  App.  374,  58  N.  E.  12  Lane.  Bar.  41,  affirming  Brown 

Rep.  265.  V.  Jacquette,  1  Del.  Co.  297. 

T'.  Brown  v.  Jaquette,  94  Pa.  St. 


294  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

stnied  by  considering  the  condition  of  things  M'hich  were  in  the 
minds  of  the  parties  when  it  was  made.  Hence,  where  a  land- 
lord in  leasing  premises  which  required  the  use  of  steam  power 
for  their  full  enjoyment  confers  on  the  tenant  the  right  to  use 
half  the  power  of  "the  then  present  therein  located  steam  en- 
gine, "  it  is  competent  for  the  lessee  to  show  his  prior  accupancy 
of  the  premises  and  his  manner  of  the  former  use  of  the  power 
supplied  by  the  engine.  The  fact  is  that  the  lessor  when  execut- 
ing the  lease  actually  knew  these  facts  and  therefore  contracted 
with  them  in  view.  And  where  the  lessee  had  used  the  exhaust 
steam  after  it  had  furnished  him  power  and  it  was  absolutely 
necessarj^  for  his  business  for  him  to  continue  to  do  so  a  right 
to  use  it  will  pass  under  "appurtenances"  where  the  "steam 
power"  only  is  demised.''^  "Where  a  lessor  is  bound  to  furnish 
the  necessary  power  to  run  the  lessee's  maehiners",  as  it  was  fur- 
nished when  the  lease  was  executed,  and  a  blast  was  necessary 
to  enable  the  lessee  to  use  his  forges  and  was  when  the  lease  was 
made  and  subsequently  thereto  for  years  actually  supplied,  so 
essential  an  incident  will  be  considered  as  passing  by  the  lease, 
and  it  will  not  be  presumed  to  have  been  held  by  the  lessee,  under 
a  license,  revocable  at  will.'*'  Usually  there  is  no  implied  obliga- 
tion on  the  lessor  to  furnish  the  lessee  with  steam  power.  Thus, 
the  lease  of  a  foundry  with  the  joint  use  of  an  engine  room  by 
the  parties  with  an  agreement  by  the  tenant  to  pay  for  steam 
furnished  by  the  landlord,  in  consideration  of  which  the  landlord 
was  to  have  the  use  of  the  engine  free  of  charge,  does  not  bind 
the  landlord  to  furnish  the  tenant  with  steam.  There  certainly 
is  no  express  obligation  to  do  this  nor  is  there  one  implied  from 
the  terms  of  the  agreement.'^*  An  agreement  by  a  lessee  simply 
to  pay  for  steam  furnished  without  requiring  the  lessor  to  fur- 
nish any,  and  without  the  lessor  agreeing  to  furnish  any,  raises 
no  obligation  to  furnish  or  accept  power.  But  if  the  furnishing 
of  steam  by  the  lessor  was  a  necessary  incident  to  the  use  of  the 
premises  by  the  occupant  and  the  power  had  been  used  by  a 
former  tenant  and  the  lessor  knew  all  this,  there  may  arise  a 
presumption  that  the  lessor  Avas  to  furnish  steam  power.     A 

77  Thomas    v.    Wiggins,    41    111.  to  Penn.   Iron  Co.  v.  Deller,  113 

470.  Pa.    St.    C35,   18  W.   N.   C.  371,  43 

T«  Thrc'iJp  V.  Field,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  L.  I.  499. 
82,  85. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  295 

landlord  of  a  mill  who  leases  a  part  of  the  mill  with  madiiner\' 
and  who  agrees  to  supply  steam  or  other  power  for  working  the 
machinery  is  by  implication  compelled  to  supply  the  power  in 
such  quantity  and  manner  as  will  render  the  working  of  the 
machinery  safe.  If,  owing  to  a  defect  in  the  machinery,  power 
is  supplied  in  such  excess  as  to  break  the  machinery,  and  to  kill 
one  of  the  tenants  working  there,  the  landlord  will  be  liable. 
The  supply  of  the  power  is  not  a  mere  incident  of  the  lease  of  a 
portion  of  the  premises,  but  is  a  substantial  contract  in  itself, 
and  the  tenant  is  not  compelled  to  take  it  when  it  is  furnished  in 
a  careless  and  negligent  manner.  He  may  recover  from  the  land- 
lord upon  the  theory  of  his  negligence  or  upon  an  implied  war- 
ranty of  the  quality  of  the  power,  any  damages  he  may  have 
suffered  by  reason  of  an  improper,  insufficient  or  excessive  sup- 
ply of  steam  or  other  power.^''  A  tenant  who  sues  his  landlord 
for  a  failure  to  furnish  steam  power  which  he  has  contracted  to 
furnish,  it  has  been  held  in  New  York,  cannot  recover  for  loss  of 
profits,  nor  for  the  value  of  materials  lost,  nor  for  losses  by 
reason  of  inability  of  his  workman  to  do  the  amount  of  work 
he  could  have  done  had  proper  steam  power  been  furnished, 
nor  for  repairs  to  his  machinerj-.®^  The  measure  of  his  damages 
is  the  difference  between  the  rental  value  of  the  premises  without 
any  steam  power  and  its  value  with  the  power  which  the  landlord 
has  agreed  to  furnish,  having  relation  to  the  particular  use 
which  was  to  be  made  of  the  building  by  the  tenant.*-  In  ^Nlassa- 
ehusetts,  it  has  been  held  that  the  lessee  may  recover  the  actual 
damages  which  he  has  sustained  in  loss  of  business  hy  reason  of 
the  failure  or  refusal  of  the  lessor  to  furnish  steam  power  which 
he  has  covenanted  to  supply.  An  agreement  by  the  lessor  that 
he  will  not  charge  any  rent  for  the  time  the  lessee  is  deprived 
of  steam  power  by  his  failure  to  supply  it,  does  not  constitute 
a  liquidation  of  the  damages  unless  it  clearly  and  unequivocally 

«o  Bentley  v.  Metcalf,  75  L.  J.  K.  v.   Giblin,  16  Daly,  258,  32  N.  Y. 

B.  891,  (1906)  2  K.  B.  548,  95  L.  T.  St.   Rep.    59,   10   N.  Y.   Supp.   315, 

596,  22  T.  L.  R.  676;  Trenkman  y.  affirming  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  545,  25  N. 

Schneider,    26   Misc.   Rep.   695,   56  Y.  St.  Rep.  827. 
N.  Y.  Supp.  770,  reversing  51  N.  «=  Pewaukee  Milling  Co.  v.  How- 

Y.  Supp.  232,  23  Misc.  Rep.  336.  itt,    86   Wis.   270,    56    N.    W.   Rep. 

81  Manhattan    Stamping    Works  784. 
V.   Koehler,   45   Hun,  150;   Russell 


296  LAW  01''  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

appears  siicli  was  the  intention  of  the  parties.^^  If  the  failure 
to  furnish  steam  power  results  in  the  total  deprivation  of  the 
use  of  the  premises,  it  may  be  regarded  as  an  eviction.  The  fail- 
ure of  the  landlord  to  furnish  his  tenant,  who  is  a  manufacturer, 
employing  steam  with  steam  power,  where  the  lease  stipulates 
that  the  landlord  shall  furnish  a  given  amount  of  power,  by 
reason  of  which  the  tenant's  men.  were  kept  idle,  the  tenant  suf- 
fered great  loss  in  his  business  and  he  was  finally  compelled  to 
surrender  the  premises,  is  a  constructive  eviction  which  may 
be  set  up  by  the  tenant  as  a  defense  in  an  action  to  recover 
rent.^*  A  landlord  who  has  covenanted  in  a  lease  of  a  floor 
space,  that  he  will  furnish  a  certain  quantity  of  power  to  op- 
erate the  machinery  of  his  lessee,  cannot  be  compelled  to  do  so  by 
an  injunction.  Nor  can  he  be  restrained  by  a  court  of  equity 
from  furnishing  a  less  amount  of  power.  This  case  comes  under 
the  rule  that  a  contract  for  service  will  not  be  enforced  by  in- 
junction. The  lessee's  remedy  is  a  legal  one.  He  cannot  in 
equity  procure  a  specific  performance  of  the  contract  of  the 
landlord  to  furnish  steam  power  unless  it  can  be  shown  that 
there  is  an  obligation  on  his  part  to  accept  such  power.  The 
measure  of  his  damages  at  law  would  be  the  direct  loss  to  his 
business  because  of  the  failure  of  the  landlord  to  furnish  steam 
power.^'  The  lease  of  a  factory  operated  by  water  power  not 
containing  an  express  grant  of  such  power  will  convey  a  right 
to  use  the  power  by  implication  so  far  as  the  lessor  possesses 
the  right  but  no  further.  If,  therefore,  the  water  power  was 
but  part  of  a  larger  water  power  in  which  the  lessor  was  a  co- 
tenant  with  others  and  the  lessee  should  use  more  than  his  lessor's 
proportion  of  it,  no  right  of  action  against  the  lessor  could  arise 
in  favor  of  other  co-tenants.®^ 


83  Fisher    v.    Barrett,    4    Cush.  as  to  what  they  were  to  give  and 

(Mass.)   381,  383.  receive,    see    Smith    v.    Werwenz, 

8*Myer   v.   Roberts    (Or.    1907),  185  Mass.  229,  70  N.  E.  Rep.  57. 

89   Pac.  Rep.    1051;    Trenknian   v.  ss  Sipe   v.    Bartlett,    12    Ohio   C. 

Schneider,  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  770,  26  D.  226,  22  R.  230. 

Misc.   Rep.    695,    reversing   order,  so  Wyman  v.  Farrar,  35  Me.  64, 

51  N,  Y.  Supp.  232,  23  Misc.  Rep.  7l,  also  construing  the  words,  "as 

336.     For  a  lease  of  steam  power  now  used,"  in  connection  with  a 

under  very  peculiar  circum.slancos  mill  run  by  water  power. 
of   the   ignorance  of  both  parties 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  AKE  LEASES.  297 

§  203.  Miscellaneous  cases.  There  are  many  sorts  and  kinds 
of  contracts  for  the  use  of  land  the  character  of  which  is  ex- 
tremely doubtful.  Their  construction  is  dependent  upon  the 
particular  circumstances  of  each  case  and  the  language  of  the 
contract.  Thus,  the  question  may  arise  whether  an  instrument 
in  writing  is  a  lease  of  land  or  a  license,  whether  it  is  a  lease  or 
a  contract  of  sale,  or  a  contract  for  the  hiring  of  personal  prop- 
erty. Thus,  for  example,  an  agreement  by  which  the  officials 
of  a  town  confer  an  exclusive  privilege  of  using  a  building  which 
is  erected  by  the  person  who  received  the  privilege  as  a  market 
house  to  keep  the  same  as  a  market  under  a  town  ordinance  re- 
quiring vendors  of  goods  to  rent  a  stall  of  him  in  the  building  at 
prices  fixed  by  the  ordinance  is  not  a  lease  where  the  house  was 
erected  upon  property  w^hicli  the  towTi  did  not  own.  The  fact 
that  no  interest  in  the  land  passess  under  this  instioiment  de- 
prives it  of  the  character  of  a  lease.  The  party  to  whom  the 
privilege  is  granted  has  his  remedy  for  the  breach  of  the  contract 
if  the  town  subsequently  erects,  or  permits  others  to  erect  a  mar- 
ket elsewhere,  but  he  cannot  use  any  remedy  against  the  town 
Avhich  he  might  have  had  if  the  contract  were  a  lease.^  An 
agreement  by  which  a  person  agrees  with  a  corporation  to  place 
on  the  premises  OAvned  by  the  corporation,  electric  lights  at  a 
certain  rental  per  month,  is  not  a  lease,  but  a  hiring  of  personal 
propert}'  by  the  corporation.^^  The  line  between  a  license  and 
a  lease  is  sometimes  difficult  to  distinguish.  "Thus,  a  privilege 
granted  by  a  deed  in  return  for  an  annual  payment  by  which 
the  grantee  is  permitted  to  discharge  the  drainage  of  his  land 
upon  the  lands  granted  in  the  deed,  is  a  lease  and  not  a  license. 
The  occupation  of  the  land  by  the  drainage  is  evidently  suffi- 
cient possession  to  constitute  this  agreement  a  lease.^^  The  sale 
of  lumber  by  a  person  upon  whose  land  it  is  growing  does  not 
alone  constitute  the  vendee  a  tenant  of  the  vendor;  but  an  instru- 
ment executed  by  the  land  o\\'ner  granting  all  the  timber,  grass 
and  berries  that  may  be  found  on  the  land  for  a  term  of  years  and 
giving  him  possession  is  a  lease.     The  grantee  may  sue  there- 

87  Brookhaveu  v.  Baggett,  61  Kittrick  Dry  Goods  Co.,  91  'Mo. 
Miss.  383,  390.  App.  454. 

88  Bruckman    v.    Hargadine -Mc-  89  Morrell  v.  Mackman,  24  Mich. 

279. 


298  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

after  in  his  own  name,  as  a  tenant  of  this  land^  for  trespass  upon 
it  and  for  the  conversion  of  any  of  the  products  of  the  land  dur- 
ing the  term."*'  The  purchaser  of  lumber  growing  on  land  will 
by  implication  have  a  license  to  enter  upon  the  land  to  remove 
it  which  he  must  do  in  a  reasonable  time.  If  he  does  not  remove 
it  in  a  reasonable  time  after  he  is  notified  that  he  must  take  it 
away,  he  will  become  a  tenant  of  the  owner  by  reason  of  his 
delay  in  the  absence  of  an  express  agreement  to  the  contraiy. 
If  the  notice  to  remove  the  lumber  be  accompanied  by  a  state- 
ment that  a  specified  rent  will  be  charged  in  case  of  his  failure 
to  remove  it,  he  will  be  compelled  to  accept  the  term  if  he  per- 
mits the  lumber  to  remain.®^  Contracts  and  agreements  by 
which  owners  of  land  containing  coal  or  other  mineral,  permit 
other  persons  to  enter  upon  the  land,  and  to  dig  mines  thereon 
are  usually  regarded  as  leases.  The  possession  of  the  person 
operating  the  mine  or  quarry  is  the  possession  of  a  tenant.  This 
presumption  is  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  there  is  a  fixed 
sum  payable  as  rent.®-  Thus,  an  exclusive  privilege  for  a  speci- 
fied term  of  years,  allowing  the  party  to  whom  it  is  granted  to 
quarry  and  take  away  all  the  stone  he  may  have  use  for  upon 
paying  the  owner  of  the  land  a  certain  fixed  sum,  according  to 
the  quantity  taken  by  him  is  a  lease.  It  is  binding  as  such  on 
both  parties  where  it  is  clear  from  the  evidence  that  they  in- 
tended that  the  quarry  should  be  actually  w^orked.  It  is  binding 
on  the  lessee  and  he  cannot  treat  it  as  a  mere  option.  He  must 
take  out  a  reasonable  quantity  of  the  stone,  though  he  may  not 
have  use  for  all  he  takes;  and  if  he  fails  to  do  so,  he  is  respon- 
sible in  damages  which  are  to  be  measured  by  the  agreed  amount 
he  was  to  pay.°^  The  giving  of  a  lease  of  a  stall  in  a  market  by 
a  cily  corporation  does  not  deprive  it  of  its  power  to  regulate 
markets.  The  creation  of  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant 
between  a  city  and  a  market  man  does,  however,  limit  the  power 
which  the  city  may  exercise  over  the  market.  Under  such  an 
agreement  it  would  certainly  have  less  power  over  the  use  which 
the  market  man  might  make  of  his  premises  than  where  the  per- 

00  Freeman    v.     Underwood,     66  02  Greenough's  Appeal,  9  Pa.  St. 
Me.  229.  18. 

01  Ducey   Lumber   Co.    v.    Lane,  »3  Watson    v.    A'Hern,    6   Watts 
59  Mich.  521.  (Pa.)   362. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  299 

mission  to  occupy  a  stall  is  a  mere  license.  An  instrument  exe- 
cuted by  a  city  which  confers  upon  the  occupant  of  a  market 
stall  a  right  of  possession  in  exchange  for  the  payment  of  a 
daily  rent  is  a  lease.  Having  granted  a  lease,  the  lessor  cannot 
arbitrarily  prevent  the  tenant  from  using  the  telephone  service 
in  connection  with  his  occupation  of  the  stall,  or  limit  his  occu- 
pation and  enjoyment  of  the  stall  in  an  arbitrary  manner.  No 
such  power  is  conferred  upon  the  city  though  in  its  charter  it 
may  have  an  almost  arbitrary  power  to  regulate  a  public  mar- 
ket. The  lessee,  however,  will  not  be  permitted,  because  he  is  a 
lessee,  to  make  an  unreasonable  use  of  the  premises  which  has 
been  leased  to  him  or  to  use  it  in  such  a  way  that  it  will  inter- 
fere with  the  rights  of  others  in  the  market.  The  lessor  still  has 
the  power  to  make  reasonable  regulations  which  shall  be  appli- 
cable to  all  persons  who  occupy  stalls  in  the  market.^*  A  con- 
tract by  the  owner  of  a  mill  by  which  the  other  contracting 
party  is  to  operate  it  and  manufacture  shingles  from  wood  fur- 
nished by  the  owner  for  which  he  is  to  be  paid  so  much  per 
thousand  out  of  which  he  is  to  pay  for  lumber  and  tools,  is  a 
contract  of  personal  hiring  and  not  a  lease  of  the  mill.®^  And 
in  conclusion,  a  contract  between  the  owners  of  lands  which  are 
adjoining  that  a  third  person  is  to  erect  machinery  with  a  boiler 
to  operate  it  on  the  land  of  one  of  them,  which  machinery  and 
boiler  are  to  be  used  by  both  of  the  contracting  parties,  with  a 
provision  that  the  one  who  makes  the  largest  offer  for  the  share 
of  the  other  should  have  the  first  right  to  buy  it,  and  that  neither 
of  them  would  sell  his  land  without  the  consent  of  the  other,  is 
not  a  lease.  Hence  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  does 
not  exist  between  the  two  parties.^*' 

§  210.  Whether  occupant  of  premises  is  servant  or  tenant. 
The  necessity  of  determining  the  relations  of  the  parties  to  a 
contract  of  hiring  may  arise  where  the  servant  occupies  prem- 
ises belonging  to  the  master.  The  inquiry  may  then  be.  is  the 
servant  a  seiwant  only  or  is  he  also  a  tenant  with  all  the  rights 
of  a  tenant.  The  matter  is  always  one  of  intention  to  be  deter- 
mined upon  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  particular 

fl^  Swayze    v.     City    of    Monroe  »5  Whitney  v.   Clifford,   46    Wis. 

(La.  1906),  40  So.  Rep.  926.  138. 

86  Hill  V.  Hill,  43  Pa.  St.  528. 


300  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

case.    No  general  rule  can  be  laid  down  which  shall  be  decisive 
in  all  cases."^ 

§  211.  The  intention  of  the  parties.  In  determining  whether 
a  contract  is  a  lease  or  one  of  hiring,  it  must  first  be  decided 
whether  the  principal  object  of  the  parties  is  to  treat  and  ar- 
range for.  the  possession  and  occupation  of  the  premises  with  an 
intent  that  the  rent  shall  be  paid  in  labor  by  the  occupant  as  a 
tenant,  so  that  the  services  are  merely  an  incident  of  the  rent- 
ing; or  whether  the  principal  purpose  of  the  parties  was  to  sup- 
ply and  to  procure  labor,,  and  the  possession  and  occupation  of 
the  premises  were  incidental  to  the  labor.  This  is  a  question  of 
law  for  the  court  to  be  decided  upon  the  terms  of  the  contract 
and  all  the  circumstances  of  the  parties  as  they  may  be  deter- 
mined by  the  jury,  with  particular  relation  to  the  character  of 
the  services  which  were  to  be  rendered.  If  the  principal  sub- 
ject of  the  contract  is  labor,  if  that  was  what  the  owner  of  the 
land  was  desirous  of  securing  and  the  occupant  of  supplying, 
then  it  is  a  hiring,  and  not  a  lease,  and  the  occupation  is  the 
occupation  of  a  servant  or  agent  and  not  that  of  a  tenant.''^  For 
the  occupancy  of  the  premises  by  a  servant  where  the  purpose 
of  the  occupancy  is  merely  to  enable  the  servant  the  better  and 
more  conveniently  to  perform  his  services,  does  not  create  the 
relation  of  landlord  and  tenant,  particularly  where  there  is  no 
letting  in  express  terms  and  no  rent  is  reserved  in  money.*^^  In 
other  words,  where  the  occupation  of  the  premises  is  not  the 
principal  thing,  but  where  it  is  merely  an  incident  of  the  em- 

87  A    person    who    occupies    the  relations  of  the  parties  is  deter- 

premises  as  the  servant  or  agent  mined  whenever  the  special  pur- 

of  another  for  the  more  convenient  pose  is  accomplished.     Deutsch  v. 

performances  of  his  duty  acquires  Chemical    Co.,    11   Ohio   Dec.    495, 

no  estate  therein,  and  is  neither  a  8  N.  P.  428. 

tenant  at  will  nor  by  sufferance,  os  Bowman   v.   Bradley,   151   Pa. 

though   he   is   permitted   to   carry  St.  351,  24  Atl.  Rep.  1062,  10G3,  31 

on  an  independent  business  on  the  W.  N.  C.  142,  17  L.  R.  A.  213. 

premises  and  receives  lower  wages  oo  School  District  No.  11  of  Al- 

for  that  reason.     In  such,  and  in-  pine  Tp.  v.  Batsche,  106  Mich.  330, 

deed  all,  cases  where  the  posses-  333,  64  N.  W.  Rep.  196;   Kerrains 

sion  is  given  for  a  special  purpose,  v.   Peoi)le,   60  N.  Y.  221;    State  v. 

the    transaction    is    treated    as    a  Curtis,  4  Dev.  &  B.    (N.  C.)   222; 

license,  not  as  a  lease,  and  does  Re.x  v.  Inhabitants  of  Chesnut,  1 

not  confer  any  estate  In  the  prop-  Barn.  &  Aid.  473 
erty  to  which  it  relates,  and  the 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  AKE  LEASES, 


301 


ployment,  aiid  to  give  the  occupant  a  better  and  fuller  oppor- 
tunity to  perform  the  duties  of  his  contract  of  employment,  the 
occupant  is  a  servant  and  not  a  tenant. 


1  Mayhew  v.  Suttle,  4  E.  &  E. 
347;  Allen  v.  England,  3  F.  &  F. 
49;  Bertie  v.  Beaumont,  16  East, 
229;  Rev  v.  Stock,  2  Taunt.  339; 
Rex  V.  Bardwell,  6  Ad.  &  El.  278; 
Regina  v.  Ponsonby,  3  Ad.  &  El. 
(N.  S.)  14;  Rex  v.  Tynemouth,  12 
Kasl,  46.  A  company  owned  land 
on  which  it  opened  quarries.  On 
the  land  the  company  erected 
buildings  which  were  designed  for 
use  as  boarding-houses  for  em- 
ployees. It  made  a  contract  with 
a  person  to  "run"  these  boarding- 
houses,  by  the  terms  of  which  he 
w^as  to  furnish  all  furniture,  bed- 
ding, etc.,  for  the  houses,  to  board 
the  company's  men  for  so  much 
per  week  and  to  pay  it  so  much 
rent  each  month.  The  company 
deducted  each  man's  board  bill 
from  his  wages  and  paid  the  total 
over  to  the  person,  less  the  rent 
for  the  premises.  The  number  of 
men  employed  by  the  company 
varied  each  week,  and  the  com- 
pany neither  agreed  to  furnish  a 
certain  number  of  boarders  nor 
that  all  their  men  should  board 
with  the  party.  The  latter  gave 
his  time  and  personal  attention 
to  the  supervision  of  the  boarding- 
house.  It  was  held  that  this 
amounted  to  a  lease  of  the  house 
and  created  the  relation  of  land- 
lord and  tenant,  and  not  of  mas- 
ter and  servant,  between  the  par- 
ties. Lightbody  v.  Truelson,  39 
Minn.  310,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  67.  In 
deciding  this  case  the  court  said: 
"A  tenant  may  be  defined  to  be 
one  who  has  possession  of  the 
premises  of  another  in  subordina- 
tion to  that  other's  title,  and  with 


his  consent.  No  particular  form 
of  words  is  necessary  to  create  a 
tenancy.  Any  words  that  show  an 
intention  of  the  lessor  to  divest 
himself  of  the  possession  and  con- 
fer it  upon  another,  but  of  course 
in  subordination  to  his  own  title, 
is  sufficient.  While,  of  course,  the 
existence  of  certain  things  is  nec- 
essary to  constitute  a  lease,  there 
is  no  artificial  rule  by  which  the 
contract  is  to  be  construed.  It  is 
largely  a  question  of  the  intention 
of  the  parties,  to  be  collected  from 
the  whole  agreement.  It  seems 
to  us  that  the  agreement  in  the 
present  case  all  loolcs  to  a  leasing 
of  these  boarding-houses  to  plain- 
tiff, and  not  to  an  employment  of 
him  as  an  agent  to  manage  them 
for  the  company.  Every  provi- 
sion of  the  contract  contemplates 
his  occupancy  as  landlord  or  pro- 
prietor. There  is  nothing  to  in- 
dicate that  his  possession  of  the 
buildings  was  not  to  be  exclusive; 
on  the  contrary,  the  nature  of 
the  business  and  the  manner  in 
which  it  was  to  be  run,  neces- 
sarily imply  that  it  was  to  be  in- 
clusive. He  was  to  run  the  busi- 
ness, not  for  the  benefit  of  the 
company,  but  for  himself;  the 
profits,  if  any,  being  his,  and  the 
losses,  if  any,  he  would  have  to 
stand.  He  took  his  chances  on  the 
number  of  boarders  he  would  get; 
the  company  did  not  obligate 
themselves  to  furnish  any  partic- 
ular number.  He  furnished  the 
house  and  provided  the  supplies 
at  his  own  expense,  just  as  any 
boarding-house  keeper  would  do, 
if  running  the  business  as  princi- 


302  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  212.  Illustrations  of  the  rule.  The  fact  that  the  occupant 
of  land  is  by  a  writing  designated  as  the  servant,  agent  or  sup- 
erintendent of  the  owner  of  the  land,  while  some  evidence,  is  by 
no  means  conclusive.  It  may  be  shown  by  all  the  other  circum- 
stances that  a  lease  was  made  in  which  case  the  occupant  will  be 
a  tenant.^  The  fact  that  one  who  is  acting  as  a  servant  has  given 
him  the  absolute  possession  of  the  premises  for  a  definite  period 
is  a  Y&ry  strong  circumstance  to  show  that  he  is  also  a  tenant.^ 
On  the  question  whether  the  occupant  is  a  servant  or  a  tenant 
the  facts  are  usually  contradictory.  It  is  for  the  jury  to  deter- 
mine. The  absence  of  any  contradiction  as  to  the  facts  makes 
it  a  question  of  law  for  the  court.  A  person  who  acts  as  janitor 
and  occupies  apartments  in  the  building  which  he  rents  from 
his  employer  by  the  month  is  usually  a  tenant.  The  fact  that 
he  deducts  his  salary  from  the  rent  does  not  alter  the  relation- 
ship which  exists  between  him  and  the  owner.*  On  the  other 
hand,  a  man  and  his  wife  who  engage  to  work  for  the  term  of 
a  year  as  a  farmer  and  housekeeper  for  the  owner  of  the  farm 
are  servants  only.  The  fact  that  they  occupy  a  house  on  the 
premises  does  not  alone  make  them  tenants.^ 

§  213.  The  character  of  the  possession  of  the  premises  as  de>- 
termining  whether  an  occupant  is  a  servant  or  tenant.  In  de- 
termining whether  a  writing  is  a  lease  or  a  contract  of  hiring, 
the  court  must  consider  what  possession  and  control  the  occu- 
pant is  to  exercise  over  the  premises.  This  is  material  to  deter- 
mine whether  an  occupant  is  a  servant  or  a  lessee.  A  lease  in- 
volves possession  by  the  lessee  which  during  the  term  is  so  far 
adverse  to  the  lessor  as  to  give  the  lessee  a  right  to  bring  tres- 

pal,  and  not  as  agent  for  another.  were  paid  was  unimportant.    That 

What  was  paid  him  was  for  board-  was  a  mere  question  of  conveni- 

Ing  the  men,  and  not  as  compen-  ence." 

sation  for  services  as  agent.   More-  2  Colcord     v.      Hall,     3     Head 

over,  he  paid  a  fixed  rent  for  the  (Tenn.)   G25. 

use  of  the  buildings,  the  amount  3  Snedaker   v.    Powell,    32    Kan. 

of  which  was  not  at  all  dependent  395. 

upon  the  number  of  boarders  the  *  Anderson    v.    Steinrich,    74   N. 

company  furnished.     It  was  to  be  Y.    Supp.    920.     See,   also.    Ofoch- 

tbe  same  whether  they  furnished  lager  v.   Sinbeck,  50  N.  Y.   Supp. 

one  or  one  hundred.    The  manner  8G2,  22  Misc.  Rep.  595. 

In    which    the    board-ljills    of   the  5  Haywood  v.  Miller,  3  Hill  (N. 

men  or  the  rent  for  the  buildings  Y.)  90 


WHAT  CONTR^VCTS  ARE  LEASES.  303 

pass.®  The  power  of  a  servant  over  the  premises  which  he  occu- 
pies as  to  their  use,  maintenance  and  repair  is  vastly  more  limited 
than  that  of  a  tenant  under  the  same  circumstances.  Thus,  the 
courts  have  considered  that  while  many  provisions  in  a  lease 
have  a  double  aspect  and  may  be  consistently  construed  to  make 
the  occupant  either  a  servant  or  a  tenant,  others  admit  of  only 
one  construction.  Thus  a  provision  that  the  occupant  of  a  fac- 
tory is  to  keep  it  in  repair,  that  he  should  have  possession  of  it 
for  a  particular  use,  that  he  should  employ  and  discharge  ail 
persons  employed  in  the  factory  and  fix  their  wages,  that  he 
should  determine  the  water  power  to  be  used,  that  he  might  use 
the  adjacent  land,  lease  buildings  thereon  and  receive  and  appro- 
priate to  his  own  use  the  rents  for  the  same  being  appropriate 
to  a  lease  and  not  to  a  contract  of  hiring,  admit  of  but  one  con- 
struction and  raise  a  conclusive  presumption  that  the  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant  exists  between  the  parties.'^  So,  where 
the  owner  of  a  hotel  agreed  that  a  party  might  occupy  it  for  a 
term  of  years,  during  which  he  was  to  live  there  with  his  family 
rent  free,  employ  and  discharge  servants  and  manage  and  con- 
trol the  business  and  in  compensation  therefor,  receive  a  stipu- 
lated portion  of  the  net  profits,  the  relation  between  the  parties 
is  that  of  landlord  and  tenant,  not  that  of  master  and  servant.^ 
It  is  quite  different  where  the  occupant  is  the  servant  of  the 
owner.  In  the  latter  case,  he  has  no  possession  of  his  own,  ex- 
cept so  far  as  he  has  a  license  to  remain  on  the  land  which  is  re- 
voked by  his  discharge  as  a  servant.  If  the  occupation  by  the 
servant  is  merely  incidental  to  his  employment,  the  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant  does  not  exist.^  If  the  use  or  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  laud  be  as  a  servant,  the  master  still  has  possession 
inasmuch  as  possession  by  the  servant  is  the  possession  of  the 
master.  As  soon  as  the  servant  is  discharged  he  becomes  a  tres- 
passer as  to  the  master  if  he  remain  on  the  land  and  must,  on 

6  Zinnel  v.  Bergdoll,  9  Pa.  Super.  »  McQuade  v.  Emmons,  38  N.  J. 

Ct.  522,  7  Del.  Co.  R.  369,  44  W.  N.  Law,   397;    Haywood   v.    Miller,   3 

C.  54.  Hill   (N.  Y.)   90;  People  v.  Annis, 

TFiske  V.  Framingham  Mfg.  Co.,  45  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  304;  Bowman  v. 

14  Pick.  491,  493.  Bradley,   151  Pa.   St.   351,   24  Atl. 

8  Page  V.  Street,  Speers   (S.  C.)  Rep.  1062,  31  W.  N.  C.  142,  17  L. 

Eq.  159.     But  see  contra.  State  v.  R.   A.    213;    McCutcheon   v.    Cren- 

Page,  1  Speers  (S.  C.)  408,  40  Am.  shaw,  40  S.  C.  511,  19  S.  W.  Rep. 

Dec.  608.  140. 


3Qi 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


request,  quit  the  premises.  He  may,  it  has  been  held,  be  ejected 
by  the  master  or  at  his  direction  and  for  that  purpose  such  force 
may  be  used  as  is  reasonably  necessary.  And  the  right  of  the 
master  to  eject  his  discharged  servant  in  no  wise  depends  upon 
the  answer  to  the  question  whether  the  ser\^ant  was  rightfully  or 
Avrongfully  discharged.  It  exists  in  the  one  case  as  well  as  in 
the  other;  the  only  remedy  of  the  servant  being  found  in  an 
action  against  the  master  for  damages  for  a  breach  of  the  con- 
tract of  employment.^** 


10  Lightbody  v.  Truelson,  89 
Minn.  310,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  67.  In 
speaking  of  a  farm  servant  the 
court,  by  Williams,  J.,  in  Bowman 
V.  Bradley,  151  Pa.  St.  351,  said: 
"The  labor  was  to  be  performed 
upon  the  land,  in  its  cultivation, 
in  the  care  of  the  cows,  and  the 
delivery  of  the  milk.  As  Bow- 
man was  not  a  cropper,  or  a  ten- 
ant paying  rent,  his  possession  of 
the  land  and  the  cows,  and  the  im- 
plements of  farm  labor,  was  the 
possession  of  his  employer.  The 
barn  was  used  to  stable  the  cattle 
and  store  their  feed.  The  house 
was  a  convenient  place  for  the 
residence  of  the  laborers.  The 
house,  the  barn,  the  land,  the  cat- 
tle, the  farming  tools,  were  turned 
over  to  the  man  who  had  been 
hired  to  care  for  the  property; 
but  he  had  no  hostile  possession, 
no  independent  right  to  posses- 
sion. His  possession  was  that  of 
the  owner  whom  he  represented, 
and  for  whom  he  labored  for  hire. 
This  is  not  denied  as  to  the  farm, 
the  barn,  the  stock,  or  the  tools, 
but  an  attempt  is  made  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  house  and 
everything  else  that  came  Into  the 
powssession  of  the  employee  in  pur- 
suance of  the  contract  of  hiring. 
There  is  no  valid  ground  on  which 
such  a  distinction  can  rest.  If 
the  possession  of  the  house  be  re- 


garded as  an  incident  of  the  hir- 
ing, the  incident  must  fall  with 
the  principal.  .  .  .  His  right 
under  the  contract  of  hiring  was 
like  that  of  the  porter  to  the  pos- 
session of  the  porter's  lodge;  like 
that  of  the  coachman  to  his  apart- 
ments over  the  stable;  like  that 
of  the  teacher  to  the  rooms  he  or 
she  may  have  occupied  in  the 
school  building;  like  that  of  the 
domestic  servants  to  the  rooms  in 
which  they  lodge  in  the  house  of 
their  employers.  In  all  these 
cases,  and  others  that  might  be 
enumerated,  the  occupancy  of  the 
room  or  house  is  incidental  to  the 
employment.  The  employee  has 
no  distinct  right  of  possession,  for 
his  possession  is  that  of  his  em- 
ployer, and  it  cannot  survive  the 
hiring  to  which  it  was  incidental, 
or  under  which  it  is  a  pai-t  of  the 
contract  price  for  the  services  per- 
formed. So  in  this  case,  if  the 
contract  was  simply  a  contract 
for  labor  at  one  dollar  per  day 
and  a  house  to  live  in,  the  plain- 
tiff held  the  house  by  the  same 
title  and  for  the  same  purpose 
that  he  did  the  land  or  the  cattle 
in  the  care  of  which  his  labor  was 
to  be  performed.  When  his  con- 
tract was  ended,  his  rights  in  the 
premises  were  extinguished,  and 
it  was  his  duty  to  give  way  to  his 
successor. 


Y7HAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES,  305 

§  214.  The  power  of  the  master  to  remove  his  servant  from 
the  premises.  The  question  whether  the  occupant  of  premises 
owned  by  another  is  a  servant  or  a  tenant  of  the  owner,  may 
arise  where  the  owner  seeks  to  employ  force  to  remove  the  goods 
of  the  occupant  from  the  premises  and  the  latter  has  resisted 
force  with  force.  If  the  relation  of  master  and  servant  exists 
between  the  occupant  and  the  owner,  it  follows  that  the  legal 
possession  of  the  premises  is  in  the  owner  and  not  in  the  servant 
and  he  would  consequently  have  the  legal  right  to  remove  the 
goods  and  furniture  of  the  occupant  therefrom.  Having  such 
legal  right,  and  the  possession  of  the  servant  being  merely  the 
possession  of  the  owner,  the  latter  is  justified  in  using  the  degree 
of  force  necessary  to  effect  the  removal  of  the  goods  and  the  oc- 
cupant would  not  be  justified  in  using  force  to  prevent  their  re- 
moval unless  the  conduct  of  the  owner  was  such  that,  because 
he  threatened  to  use  a  pistol  or  other  deadly  wer^pon,  the  occupant 
believed  or  had  reason  to  believe  that  his  life  was  in  imminent 
danger.  Under  circumstances  of  this  character  the  occupant, 
though  he  be  a  servant,  would  be  justified  in  using  the  necessary 
force  to  prevent  injury  to  himself  but  no  more.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  occupant  is  holding  the  premises  as  a  tenant  and  not 
as  a  servant  of  the  owner,  he  has  the  legal  right  to  defend  his 
property  and  possessions  by  proper  and  necessary  means  even  to 
the  extent  of  employing  force.  He  can  then  legally  be  ousted 
only  by  some  appropriate  action  provided  by  law,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  transferring  to  the  owner  the  possession  of  the  property. 
If,  however,  being  a  tenant,  he  shall  employ  excessive  or  unneces- 
sary force  in  resisting  the  efforts  of  his  master,  who  is  also  the 
owner  of  the  premises,  to  regain  possession  either  as  to  the 
amount  of  the  force  employed  or  as  to  the  character  of  the  weap- 
ons used,  he  may  make  himself  criminally  liable." 

§  215.  Contract  of  hiring  by  a  religious  society.  A  contract 
by  which  a  religious  society  hires  a  pastor  or  minister  is  in  law 
a  contract  of  master  and  servant.  The  consideration  proceeding 
from  the  society  is  usually  a  salary  and  in  some  cases  the  use 
of  the  parsonage  as  a  residence.  The  occupation  of  the  parson- 
age by  the  pastor  as  a  part  of  his  compensation  does  not  neces- 
sarily make  him  a  tenant  thereof.  The  contract  between  him 
and  bis  employer  is  a  personal  hiring  and  terminates  on  his  death 

11  People  V.  Kerrains,   60  N.  Y.221. 
20 


306  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

because  of  tlie  rule  that  a  contract  personally  to  either 
party  terminates  with  the  death  of  the  party.  Hence,  it  follows 
that  the  personal  representative  of  the  pastor  after  his  death  has 
no  right  to  the  possession  of  the  parsonage,  for  usually  the  pas- 
tor's occupation  of  the  parsonage  being  connected  with  and  in 
consideration  of  his  services  as  pastor  does  not  create  the  rela- 
tion of  landlord  and  tenant,  between  him  and  his  church.^^  So. 
it  is  held  that  the  relationship  which  exists  between  a  bishop  of 
the  Roman  Catholic  church  and  a  priest  of  his  diocese  and  under 
his  jurisdiction  is  that  of  master  and  servant.  In  almost  all 
cases  the  priest  as  a  part  of  his  compensation  occupies  premises 
which  are  owned  by  the  church.  He  is  therefore  on  the  basis  of 
any  other  employee  or  agent  of  the  owner  and  his  possession  is 
the  possession  of  his  employer.  The  fact  that  the  title  of  all 
the  real  property  occupied  by  the  priest  as  a  parsonage  is 
vested  absolutely  in  the  bishop  as  an  individual,  does  not  alone 
establish  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  between  the 
priest  and  the  bishop.  The  contract  of  hiring  is  usually  termin- 
able at  any  time  at  the  election  of  the  bishop  and  after  it  is  ter- 
minated he  may  treat  the  priest  as  an  intruder  where  he  holds 
over  on  premises  belonging  to  the  bishop. ^^ 

§  216.  A  public  officer  as  a  tenant  of  a  county.  It  is  hardly 
necessary  to  say  that  a  public  officer  holding  office  under  a  muni- 
cipal or  county  government  is  not  the  tenant  of  the  building  oc- 
cupied by  him  in  his  official  capacity.  Nor  will  the  fact  that 
he  carries  on  a  private  business  in  connection  with  the  perform- 
ance of  his  official  duties  make  him  a  tenant  of  the  county  and 
city  in  the  absence  of  an  express  agreement  to  that  effect.  Thus, 
the  register  of  deeds  of  a  county  is  not  a  tenant  of  the  county, 
though  under  his  appointment  he  is  entitled  to  the  use  and  pos- 
session of  an  office  in  the  building  owned  by  the  county.  The 
fact  that  while  thus  in  possession  ofticMally  of  the  building  he 
carries  on  a  private  business  does  not  make  him  a  tenant  of  the 
county  nor  raise  any  implied  promise  on  his  part  to  pay  rent. 
The  fact  that  a  person  not  an  official  carries  on  the  deputy  regis- 
ter's private  business  in  the  building  owned  by  the  county  dur- 
ing the  time  the  deputy  is  out  of  office,  together  with  the  fact 

12  East  Norway,  etc.,  Church  v.  i"  Chatard  v.  O'Donovau,  80  lad. 

Frolslie,  37  Minn.  447,  450,  35  N.       20. 
W.  Rep.  260. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  307 

that  the  official  paid  rent  for  the  building  while  ho  was  out  of- 
fice, does  not  make  him  liable  for  rent  after  he  shall  have  been 
restored  to  office.^*  The  relation  between  a  teacher  and  the  pub- 
lic officials  of  a  school  district  by  whom  he  is  employed  is  that 
of  master  and  servant.  The  furnishing  of  living  apartments  by 
the  authorities  for  the  teacher  in  the  school  building  does  not 
make  him  a  tenant.  Of  course,  the  relation  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ant may  be  created  under  such  circumstances  by  express  lan- 
guage, but  the  fact  that  the  occupancy  of  the  school  building 
enables  the  teacher  to  perform  his  duties  more  conveniently  is  a 
very  strong  circumstance  to  show  thi:t  tliere  was  no  intent  on 
the  part  of  either  party  that  there  should  be  a  tenancy.^^ 

§  217.  A  servant  holding  over  after  his  employment  is  at  an 
end.  This  discharge  of  a  servant  who  has  occupied  the  prem- 
ises of  the  master  terminates  his  right  of  occupancy.  If  he  is 
a  servant  merely  and  not  a  tenant,  it  would  seem  that  upon  the 
termination  of  the  hiring  he  would  become  a  mere  trespasser. 
It  has  been  held,  however,  in  one  or  two  instances,  that  having 
been  in  possession  lawfully  he  becomes  a  tenant  at  sufferance 
when  he  holds  over  without  the  right  to  do  so.  But  this  is  true 
only  where  the  master  or  owner  of  the  premises  consents  that 
he  shall  remain  long  enough  to  raise  an  implication  of  acqui- 
esence  in  the  occupancy.^**  If  the  duration  of  the  employment  is 
not  fixed  or  certain,  it  may  be  terminated  by  reasonable  notice. 
On  the  termination  of  the  employment  by  notice  the  tenant  who 
occupies  premises  owned  by  the  master  ought  to  have  a  reason- 
able time  to  remove  and  would  be  regarded  as  a  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance.^^ 

§  218.  The  rights  of  the  third  parties.  "Whether  an  occupant 
of  land  is  a  servant  of  the  owner  or  a  tenant  is  important  to  de- 
termine because  of  the  rights  and  interests  of  third  parties. 
Thus,  where  a  tenant  being  ' '  a  cultivator  of  the  soil ' '  on  shares 
with  the  owner  has  a  right  to  incumber  the  crop  with  liens 
before  its  division,  it  has  been  held  that   a  mere  servant  or 

1*  Board  of  Supervisors  v.  Caw-  106  Mich.  330,  64  N.  W.  Rep.  196; 

gill,  97  Mich.  448,  56  N.  W.  Rep.  People  v.  Annis,  45  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

849.  304. 

15  School  District  v.  Batsche,  it  Eichengreen  v.  Appel,  44  111. 
106  Mich.  330,  64  N.  W.  Rep.  196.  App.  19. 

16  School     District     v.     Batsche, 


308  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TKNANT. 

employee  of  the  owner  cultivating  the  land  on  shares  as  the 
agent  and  not  as  the  tenant  of  the  owner  cannot  dispose  of 
or  incumber  the  crops  until  its  division.  In  determining 
whether  one  is  a  servant  and  employee  or  a  tenant,  stipulations 
in  the  agreement  to  the  effect  that  the  person  who  is  claimed 
to  be  a  servant  was  to  occupy  the  premises,  to  keep  it  in  repair, 
and  that  the  other  party  should  make  advances,  are  material  to 
show  that  he  was  a  tenant.  They  are  in  fact  utterly  inconsis- 
tent with  the  supposition  that  he  was  merely  an  employee.^^  If, 
however,  the  owner  of  the  land  has  the  entire  control  of  the 
time  and  services  of  the  occupant  the  latter  is  a  servant  or 
employee  and  not  a  tenant  and  cannot  create  any  lien  upon  the 
crops  or  productions  of  the  land  which  will  vest  any  rights  in 
third  persons  to  the  prejudice  of  the  owner.^® 

§  219.  The  distinction  between  croppers  and  tenants.  A 
cropper  is  a  person  who  is  hired  by  an  owner  of  land  to  cultivate 
it.  He  receives  as  his  compensation  a  share  of  the  crops.  Sev- 
eral circumstances  distinguish  such  a  person  from  a  tenant.  In 
the  first  place  in  the  case  of  a  cropper,  the  landlord  retains  the 
legal  right  to  the  possession  and  the  ownership  of  the  crop.  The 
cropper  has  no  interest  whatever  in  the  land  or  any  right  to  its 
possession,  except  so  far  as  he  has  a  right  to  be  on  the  land  in 
order  ,to  carry  out  his  agreement.-"  A  cropper's  possession  is 
the  possession  of  a  servant.  Nor  has  he  any  property  in  his 
share  of  the  crops  until  the  division  is  made  between  him  and 
the  owner  of  the  land.  Hence,  he  cannot  maintain  an  action  in 
trespass  for  an  injury  to  the  land,  or  for  damages  to  the  crops 
before  they  are  divided.  Nor  can  a  mere  cropper  convey  an 
interest  in  his  share  of  the  crops,  prior  to  the  division.^^  On 
the  other  hand,  the  relation  between  a  party  who  cultivates  land 
under  an  agreement  with  the  owner  of  the  land  that  they  are  to 
divide  the  crops  between  them  may  be  that  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ant.    If  such  is  the  case,  the  ownership  of  the  crops  is  in  the 

iswhaley  v.  Jacobson,  21  S.  Car.  12;   Adams  v.  McKesson's  Ex.,  53 

51.  Pa.   St.  81,  91  Am.  Dec.  183;    Mc- 

i»Hnff  V.  Watkins,  15  S.  Car.  83.  Neely  v.  Hart,  10  Ired.   (N.  Car.) 

20  Shoemaker  v.  Crawford,  82  Law,  63;  Harrison  v.  Ricks,  71  N. 
Mo.  App.  487.  Car.  11;  Kelly  v.  Rummerfleld,  117 

21  Fry  V.  Jones,  2  Rawle    (Pa.)  Wis.  620,  622. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  309 

tenant  during  the  terra,  and  the  landlord  has  no  right  or  title  to 
his  share  until  they  are  har\-ested  and  divided.  Again,  where  the 
occupant  is  a  tenant  and  not  a  mere  cropper,  he  has  the  exclusive 
possession  of  the  land  during  the  temi;  and  the  landlord's  entry- 
is  a  trespass.  It  will  readily  be  seen  that  any  an-angemeut  to  share 
crops  under  which  either  party  owns  them  until  they  are  actu- 
ally divided  may  work  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  other  party 
to  the  agreement.  The  tenant  who  agrees  with  his  landlord  to 
pay  the  rent  in  a  share  of  the  crops  may  dispose  of  them  and 
abscond  with  the  proceeds;  while  the  landlord  who,  by  an  agree- 
ment with  a  cropper  retains  the  actual  and  absolute  ownership 
of  the  crop  may  oust  the  cropper  and  dispose  of  the  crops,  leav- 
ing the  other  party  to  the  contract  to  an  action  for  damages. 
To  avoid  this  difficulty  a  form  of  contract  which  is  known  as 
the  '  *  cultivation  of  crops  on  shares, ' '  has  been  invented  in  which, 
one  party  supplies  the  land  and  the  other  the  labor  and  material 
for  using  it,  and  both  parties  are,  regarded  £is  tenants  in  com- 
mon of  the  crops  until  the  division  is  had.-^  By  this  contract, 
both  parties  are  protected  and  either  may  dispose  of,  or  encum- 
ber his  share,  but  neither  can  dispose  of  the  share  of  the  other. 
It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  determine  whether  a  person  who  cul- 
tivates the  land  of  another  on  shares  is  a  tenant  in  common  of 
the  crop  with  the  owner  or  a  mere  cropper.  Much  depends  upon 
the  wording  of  the  contract  between  the  parties.-^     Each  case 

22  Smith  V.  Tankersley,  20  -Ala.  N.  W.  Rep.  701 ;  Kamerick  v.  Cas- 

212,   56   Am.   Dec.   193;    Brown   v.  tleman,  23  Mo.  App.  481;   Daniels 

Coats,  56  Ala.  439;  Smith  v.  Rice,  v.   Brown,   34  N.   H.   454,   69   Am. 

56  Ala.   417;    Ponder  v.  Rhea,   32  Dec.  505;   Guest  v.  Opdyck,  31  N. 

Ark.  435;   Rohrer  v.  Babcock,  126  J.   Law,    552;    Foote    v.   Colvin,   3 

111.  222,  56  Pac.  Rep.  537;    Smith  Johns.    (N.  Y.)    216;    Harrower  v. 

V.    Schultz,    89    Cal.    526,    26    Pac.  Heath,    19     Barb.     (N.    Y.)     331; 

Rep.   1087;   Randall  v.  Ditch,   123  Dinehart  v.  "Wilson,  15  Barb.    (N.. 

Iowa,  58,  99  N.  W.  Rep.  190,  191;  Y.)    595;    Wilber  v.   Sisson,  54  N. 

Walker  v.  Fitts,  24  Pick.   (Mass.)  Y.   121;    Bowers   v.   Graves,    8    S. 

191;    Fiquet   v.  Allison,   12   Mich.  Dak.    385,    66    N.    W.    Rep.    931; 

328,  86  Am.  Dec.  54;    Strangeway  Fowles  v.  Martin,   76  Vt.  180,   56 

V.  Eisemman,  68  Minn.  395,  71  N.  Atl.  Rep.  979. 

W.  Rep.  671;  McNeal  v.  Ryder,  79  =3  Kelly     v.     Rummerfield,     117 

Minn.    152,    81    N.    W.    Rep.    820;  Wis.  620,  622,  94  N.  W.  649. 
Loomis  V.  O'Neal,  73  Mich.  582,  41 


310  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

must  bo  decided  upon  the  special  tenns  of  the  agreement,  takino; 
into  consideration  the  subject  matter  and  all  the  circumstances,, 
the  question  being  always  as  to  the  real  intention  of  the  parties.-* 
Generally,  an  arrangement  by  which  one  party  furnishes  the 
land  and  another  the  labor  on  an  agreement  that  the  crop  shall 
be  divided  will  not  be  presumed  to  create  the  relation  of  land- 
lord and  tenant  in  the  absence  of  clear  evidence  to  that  effect.-*^ 
If  there  is  an  indication  that  the  parties  intend  that  the  occu- 
pant shall  have  a  right  to  the  possession  of  the  farm  and  the 
full  power  of  controlling  and  using  it  for  farming  purposes  as 
though  it  were  his  own,  the  contract  is  a  lease.  The  mere  fact 
that  rent  is  payable  in  a  share  of  the  crops  does  not  alone  show 
that  the  agreement  is  not  a  lease.-®  So,  where  an  occupant  of 
land  is  to  pay  rent  either  in  money  or  a  portion  of  the  crops,^^ 
or  in  money  and  a  portion  of  the  crops,^^  the  relation  between, 
the  parties  is  that  of  landlord  and  tenant.  The  same  construc- 
tion was  applied  where  the  occupant  agreed  to  give  the  owner 
one  half  of  the  income  of  the  farm.^^ 

The  circumstance  that  the  lease  contained  the  terms  "lease, 
demise  and  let,"  is  a  strong  fact  to  show  that  the  instrument 
is  a  lease  and  not  a  mere  cropping  contract.^"  But  a  con- 
tract by  which  each  party  is  to  furnish  half  the  seed  and  to 
divide  the  crops  equally  and  both  parties  are  to  reside  on  the 
farm  though  in  separate  houses  makes  the  parties  tenants  in 
common  of  the  crop.^^  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  nothing 
is  said  as  to  the  duration  of  llie  agreement  between  the  parties 
is  a  strong  indication  that  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant 
does  not  exist.^-  So,  too,  an  express  stipulation  that  the  crop  is 
to  remain  the  property  of  the  landlord  until  it  is  harvested  is 

24Moser  v.  Lower,  48  Mo.  504;  27  Taylor  v.  Coney,  101  Ga.  655, 

Johnson  v.  Hoffman,  53  Mo.  504.  2S  S.  E.  Rep.  974. 

2&  Ponder  v.  Rhea,  32  Ark.  435;  2s  Bryant   v.   Pugh,    86  Ga.    525, 

Brown  v.  Coats,  56  Ala.  439.  21  S.  E.  Rep.  927. 

20  Strain    v.    Gardner,    61    Wis.  29  Rowland  v.  Voechting  (Wis.), 

174;   Foley  v.  Southwestern  Land  91  N.  W.  Rep.  990. 

Co.,  94  Wis.  329;    Steel  v.   Frick,  so  Rowland  v.  Voechting  (Wis.), 

56  Pa.  St.  172;  Brown  v.  .Taquette,  9]  N.  W.  Rep.  990. 

94  Pa.  St.  113;  King  v.  Bosserman,  si  Reynolds  v.  Reynolds,  48  Hun, 

13    Super.    Ct.    480;    McClellan    v,  142. 

Whiney.   65  Vt.   510,  27   Atl.   Rep.  S2  Moser  v.  Lomer,  48  Mo.  App. 

117.  85. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  I^ASES 


311 


usually   conclusive  that  the  occupant   or  cultivator  is  a  mere 
cropper.^^ 

§  220.  The  ownership  of  the  crop.  The  phrase  "renting  on 
shares"  implies  that  both  parties  will  share  equally  in  the  prod- 
ucts of  the  land,  to  compensate  the  one  for  his  labor  and  the 
other  for  the  use  of  the  land.  If  the  occupant  of  the  land  is 
more  than  a  mere  cropper  or  servant  of  the  owner,  his  right  in 
the  crop  is  usually  considered  to  be  vested  before  division.  The 
parties  may  expressly  provide  that  the  title  to  the  crop  shall 
remain  in  either  of  them  until  division.  If  the  contract  is  clearly 
one  of  landlord  and  tenant,  the  general  rule  applies  and  title 
to  the  crop  is  in  the  tenant.  But  where  the  owner  and  occupant 
are  to  share  the  crop  it  is  more  difficult  to  determine.  Usually 
where  an  agreement  is  made  that  one  party  is  to  furnish  the 
land  and  the  other  is  to  furnish  the  seed  and  the  tools  for  its 
cultivation,  together  with  the  necessary  labor,  the  crop  to  be 
divided,  the  parties  will  be  regarded  as  tenants  in  common  of  the 
crop,  in  the  absence  of  an  express  agreement  to  the  contrarj'.^* 
It  follows  from  this  that  where  owner  and  occupant  are  tenants 


33  Mammock  v.  Creelonore,  48 
Ark.  264,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  180.  It  is 
sometimes  expressly  provided  by 
statute  that  the  title  to  crops  shall 
rfrmain  in  the  owner  of  the  land 
where  the  land  is  cultivated  by  a 
cropper  on  shares.  De  Loach  v. 
Delk  (Ga.  1904),  47  S.  E.  Rep. 
204;  Parker  v.  Brown  (N.  C.  1904), 
48  S.  E.  Rep.  657.  Where  this  is 
the  case,  a  person  claiming  under 
the  cropper  cannot  maintain  tro- 
ver or  conversion  against  the 
owner  or  against  a  purchaser 
from  him,  nor  can  he  bring  tres- 
pass for  an  entry  on  the  land. 
Farrow  v.  Woley  &  Jordan  (Ala. 
1903),  36  So.  Rep.  384. 

34  Jones  V.  Durrer,  96  Cal.  95,  30 
Pac.  Rep.  1027,  following  Walls  v. 
Preston,  25  Cal.  59,  and  Smith  v. 
Schultz,  89  Cal.  526,  26  Pac.  Rep. 
1087;  Connell  v.  Richmond,  55 
Conn.  401;  Kamerick  v.  Castle- 
man,  23  Mo.  App.  481;   Caswell  v. 


Di£trich,  15  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  379; 
Putnam  v.  Wise,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
234;  narrower  v.  Heath,  19  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  331;  Wilber  v.  Sisson,  54 
N.  Y.  121,  53  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  258; 
Randall  v.  Ditch,  123  Iowa,  582, 
99  N.  W.  Rep.  190,  191;  Strange- 
way   V.    Eisenman,   68   Minn.    395, 

71  N.  W.  671;  Anderson  v.  Listen, 

72  N.  W.  Rep.  52;  Adams  v.  State, 
87  Ala.  89,  6  So.  Rep.  270;  Mc- 
Neal  V.  Ryder,  79  Minn.  152,  81 
N.  W.  Rep.  830;  Rohrer  v.  Bab- 
cock,  126  Cal.  222,  58  Pac.  Rep. 
537;  Loomis  v.  O'Neal,  73  Mich. 
582,  41  N.  W.  Rep.  701;  Doty  v. 
Heth,  52  Miss.  530,  535;  Frost  v. 
Kellogg,  23  Vt.  308;  Leach  v.  Beat- 
tie,  33  Vt.  195;  Sowles  v.  Martin, 
76  Vt.  ISO,  56  Atl.  Rep.  979;  Black 
V.  Golden,  109  Mo.  App.  37,  78  S. 
W.  Rep.  301,  302;  Bernal  v.  Hovl- 
ous,  15  Cal.  544;  Putnam  v.  Wise, 
37  Am.  Dec.  309. 


312  LxVW  OF  LANDLOED  AND  TENANT. 

in  common  of  the  crop  each  has  a  distinct  interest  which  is  not 
subject  to  the  ownership  or  control  of  the  other  and  cannot  be  in- 
cumbered hy  the  other.^^  Either  party  to  the  agreement  may 
sell  his  share  by  parol.^®  A  person  cultivating  land  for  a  share 
of  the  crop,  may  mortgage  his  interest  in  the  crop  before  it  is 
divided.^"  A  direction  by  the  owner  to  pay  the  rent  to  another 
is  an  assignment  of  the  owner 's  share  of  the  crops.  The  owner 's 
share  thus  assigned  cannot  be  subsequently  reached  by  the  levy 
of  an  execution  against  him.^^  And  under  the  rule  that  the 
abandonment  of  work  on  the  farm  by  the  occupant  is  a  breach 
of  the  contract,  a  cropper  loses  his  interest  in  the  crop  where  by 
reason  of  his  abandonment  or  failure  to  perform  his  contract 
the  landlord  is  compelled  to  enter  and  cultivate  the  farm  and 
reap  the  crop.  Wliile  ordinarily  the  parties  to  the  agreement 
to  work  land  on  shares  are  presumed  to  be  tenants  in  common 
of  the  crop  it  is  competent  for  them  to  arrange  for  another  basis 
of  ownership.  They  may,  for  example,  expressly  agree  that 
the  crops  which  are  to  be  planted  and  raised  on  the  farm  by  the 
person  cultivating  it  are  to  remain  the  sole  property  of  the  owaier 
of  the  land  until  the  contract  is  fully  performed,  or  until  a 
division  of  the  crops  provided  for  in  the  contract  shall  have  taken 
place,  or  until  a  certain  specified  date  shall  arrive,  or  until  some 
other  contingency  shall  take  place.  Conditions  that  the  crops 
raised  shall  continue  to  be  the  property  of  the  owner  of  the  land 
until  they  shall  be  divided,  are  very  frequently  met  with  and  no 
reason  can  be  suggested  why  such  a  stipulation  is  not  valid  and 
binding.^^  And  the  general  rule  that  a  tenant  under  a  lease  to 
rent  land  on  shares  may  assign  his  lease,  or  sell  or  mortgage  his 

35  stickney  V.  Stickney,  77  Iowa,  Vt.  G32;   Wentworth  v.  Miller,  53 

699,  42  N.  W.  Rep.  518.  Cal.   9;    Lloyd  v.   Powers,   4   Dak. 

3c  Muernberger  V.  Von  Der  Heidt,  62,  23   N.   W.   Rep.   492;    Moulton 

39  111.  App.  404.  V.  Robinson,  27  N.  H.  550;  Parker 

87  Bourland     v.     McKnlght,     79  v.  Matt,  43  App.  Div.  338,  60  N.  Y. 

Ark.  427,  96  S.  W.  Rep.  179.  Supp.  295;  Consolidated  Land,  etc., 

38  Courtney  v.  Lyndon,  128  Cal.  Co.   v.  Hawley,  7  S.  Dak.   229,  63 

35,  60  Pac.  Rep.  462.  N.  W.  Rep.  904;  Townsend  v.  Isen- 

3»  Sanford    v.    Morline,    51    Neb.  berg,  45  Iowa,   670;    Gray  v.  Rob- 

728,  71  N.  W.  Rep.  740,  742;  Yates  inson    (Ariz.),   33   Pac.   Rep.   712; 

V.  Kinney,  19  Neb.  275,  27  N.  W.  Jordan  v.  Bryan,  103  N.  Car.  59,  9 

Rep.   132;    Sumnierville  v.   Stock-  S.  E.   Rep.   135;    Taylor   v.   Dono- 

ton   M.   Co..   1   Cal.   1904.  76   Pac.  hue   (Wis.  1905),  103  N.  W.  Rep.' 

Rep.    243;    Esdon    v.    Colburn,    29  1099. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  AEB  LEASES  313 

share  of  the  crops  which  he  has  raised  on  the  demised  premises 
without  the  consent  of  his  lessor  unless  expressly  forbidden  by 
the  lease  does  not  apply  to  such  a  case  until  the  moment  arrives 
for  a  division  of  the  crops  for  until  that  moment  the  title  of  the 
tenant  is  incomplete  and  he  may  do  nothing  which  would  inter- 
fere with  the  complete  ownership  of  the  landlord.*"  So,  under  a 
provision  that  the  landlord  is  to  have  the  possession  of  the  crops 
until  complete  performance  by  the  tenant  the  tenant  has  no  in- 
terest in  the  crop  which  can  be  attached  until  he  has  fully  per- 
formed his  contract  and  the  crop  is  ready  for  division.*^  On  the 
other  hand,  in  every  case  where  by  agreement  or  under  the 
statute  the  share  of  the  landlord  in  the  crop  is  not  vested  until 
the  time  has  arrived  for  its  division  he  cannot  maintain  any 
action  against  the  tenant  either  for  liis  rent  or  for  a  share  of 
the  crop/^ 

§  221.  The  duties  and  the  rights  of  the  landlord  and  tenant. 
There  is  an  implied  covenant  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  who  cul- 
tivates land  on  shares  to  cultivate  it  in  a  farmerlike  manner.*^ 
lie  must  also  give  the  fences  and  other  structures  on  the  prop- 
erty, ordinary  care.  He  cannot  charge  for  the  storage  of  the 
share  of  the  crop  belonging  to  the  landlord  unless  the  latter  un- 
reasonably delays  the  moving  of  it.**  A  landlord  who  objects  to 
the  manner  in  which  a  tenant  on  shares  is  cultivating  the  land 
should  do  so  promptly.  An  objection  after  the  crop  has  been 
reaped  amounts  to  nothing.*^  Usually,  where  the  occupant  is  a 
servant  or  cropper  only  there  may  be  circumstances  which  indi- 
cate that  the  owner  hired  the  particular  occupant  because  of  his 
ability  and  skill.  The  owner  is  entitled  to  have  the  farm  culti- 
vated by  the  person  he  has  selected  and  the  latter  cannot  assign 
his  contract  without  the  consent  of  the  owner. ^^  If  the  occupant 
without  cause  abandons  the  land,  the  landlord  may  re-enter  and 
complete  the  cultivation  of  the  crop.    He  may  then  sell  the  crop 

*o  Sanford  v.  Modine,  71  N.  W.  **  Evers   v.    Shumacker,    59    Mo. 

Rep.  740,  51  Neb.  728.  App.  454. 

*i  Pelton  V.  Draper,  61  Vt.  364,  *5  Young    v.    Gay,    41    La.    Ann. 

17  Atl.  Rep.  494.  758,  6  So.  Rep.  608. 

42  Jordan  v.  Bryan,  103  N.  Car.  ■*«  Meyer  v.  Livesley  (Oreg.),  78 
59,  9  S.  E.  Rep.  135.  Pac.  Rep.  670,  where  the  occupant 

43  Cammack     v.     Rogers     (Tex.  was  a  tenant. 
Civ.  App.),  74  S.  W.  Rep.  945 


314  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

and  deduct  his  expenses  from  tlie  cropper's  share.^^  But  the 
landlord  has  no  right  as  long  as  the  tenant  is  in  possession  to 
enter  on  the  land  where  is  appears  that  the  relation  between  the 
parties  is  that  of  landlord  and  tenant.*^  If  being  a  tenant  the 
cultivator  abandons  the  land  the  landlord  may  re-enter.  But 
whether  the  tenant  abandons  the  land  is  in  all  cases  a  question 
of  fact.  The  act  of  the  tenant  in  merely  removing  the  furniture 
from  the  farmhouse  is  not  in  itself  an  abandonment  which  will 
allow  the  o^vner  to  take  possession.*^  The  obligation  of  the  oc- 
cupant of  land  cultivated  on  shares  which  binds  him  to  cultivate 
the  farm  in  a  husbandlike  manner  cannot  be  escaped  from  be- 
cause, by  reason  of  the  failure  of  the  crops,  it  becomes  difficult 
and  expensive  to  reap  a  certain  portion  of  them.^'*  The  tenant 
cannot  abandon  the  land  for  that  reason,  but  he  may  abandon 
the  land  and  refuse  to  reap  the  crop  if  he  can  show  that  the  land- 
lord has  prevented  him  from  doing  so.^^  Thus,  where  the  owner 
of  land  cultivated  on  shares  becomes  very  abusive  and  insulting 
to  the  tenant  the  occupant  may  abandon  the  land  and  the  con- 
duct of  the  owner  is  a  breach  of  the  implied  covenant  of  quiet 
enjoyment.  Under  such  circumstances  the  abandonment  of  the 
land  by  the  tenant  does  not  deprive  him  of  his  right  to  a  share  of 
the  crops.^-  And  a  landlord  who  has  prevented  his  tenant  from 
gathering  the  crops  to  a  share  of  which  he  was  entitled,  cannot 
recover  against  the  tenant  the  expense  of  gathering  his  own 
share.^^  The  tenant  while  in  possession  after  the  end  of  his  term 
is  not  liable  for  trespass  where  the  purpose  of  liis  possession,  was 
the  reaping  of  a  crop.^* 

47  Graves     v.     Walter      (Minn.  398.    Where  a  tenant  plants  a  crop 

1904),  101  N.  W.  Rep.  297.  and    then     voluntarily    abandons 

■*8Kamerick    v.    Castleman,    23  the  farm  he  can  no  longer  claim 

Mo.  App.  481.  any    rights    under    the    contract. 

49  Hough    V.    Brown,    104   Mich.  Having    repudiated    the    contract, 

109,  62  N.  W.  Rep.  143.  he  cannot  claim  his  share  of  the 

!■•(>  .Johnson    v.    Bryant,    61    Ark.  crops.      He    might    abandon    the 

312,  32  S.  W.  Rep.  1081.  farm   and   throw  up   his  contract 

51  Parker  v.  Mott,  43  App.  Div.  the    next    day    after    sowing    the 

338,  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  295.  wheat.     On  his  abandonment,  the 

^2  Reynolds  v.  Reynolds,  48  Hun,  wheat  became  a  part  of  the  land. 

(N.  Y.)   142.  It   might  be   otherwise  where  he 

B3  Garrett  v.  .Jennings,  19  Ky.  S.  sows  a  crop,  sells  to  a  purchaser 

Rep.  1712,  44  S.  W.  Rep.  382.  in  good  faith  and  then  abandons. 

54Toles  V.  Meddaugh,  106  Mich.  Chandler    v.    Thurston,    10    Pick. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ABB  LEASES.  315 

§  222.  The  remedies  of  the  parties.  The  remedies  of  the 
parties  to  an  agreement  to  cultivate  land  on  shares  depend  upon 
the  question  whether  the  title  to  the  crops  is  in  both  of  them 
or  whether  it  is  in  the  landlord  only.  The  tenant  or  cropper 
who  has  faithfully  performed  his  contract^  is  entitled  to  his 
share  of  the  crops  when  it  is  reaped  and  ready  for  market  and 
the  landlord  who  converts  it  and  refuses  to  pay  over  any  part 
of  it  to  the  tenant  may  be  sued  in  conversion.^^  So,  where  the 
tenant  has  mortgaged  his  interest  in  the  crop  and  conferred  au- 
thority upon  the  mortgagee  to  take  possession,  the  latter  may 
replevin  from  the  landlord  the  tenant's  share  of  the  crop.^®  If, 
according  to  the  contract  the  parties  are  tenants  in  common  to 
the  crop  either  may  sue  the  other  in  conversion  before  the  end  of 
the  term.^^  So,  also,  where  an  occupant  cultivating  land  on 
shares,  converts  the  whole  crop  the  landlord  may  sue  in  an  action 
of  assumpsit  and  recover  the  reasonable  value  of  the  use  of  the 
premises.^^  The  landlord  cannot  maintain  an  action  for  conver- 
sion or  a  similar  action  against  a  tenant  while  his  possession  of 
the  crop  is  only  such  as  is  necessary  for  its  cultivation,  and  the 
tenant  does  not  assert  any  exclusive  ownership  or  right  to  the 
possession  of  the  whole  crop.^®  The  tenant  who  is  a  tenant  in 
common  of  the  crop  so  far  as  third  persons  are  concerned  has  the 
same  right  to  recover  for  injuries  to  the  crop  as  he  would  have 
if  he  owned  the  whole  of  it.  He  may  recover  for  damages  to  his 
share  of  the  crop  resulting  from  the  action  of  the  third  person, 
though  his  landlord  may  have  a  lien  for  supplies  and  advances 
on  his  share.  His  right  to  recover  the  dama^-es  is  not  defeated 
by  the  fact  that  he  is  bound  to  pay  these  debts  out  of  his  share 
of  the  proceeds  of  the  crop.''"  It  is  within  the  power  and  jurisdic- 
tion of  a  court  of  cquty  to  adjust  the  rights  of  a  landlord  and 

205;  Kiplinger  v.  Green,  28  N.  W.  80  S.  W.  Rep.  664;   Black  v.  Gol- 

Rep.  121,  61  Mich.  340;  Carpenter  den,   104   Mo.   App.    37,    78    S.    W. 

V.  Jones,  63  111.  517.  Rep.  301,  302. 

55  Northness  v.  Hillstead,  87  ss  Pearce  v.  Pearce,  184  111.  289, 
Minn.  304,  91  N.  W.  Rep.  1112;  56  N.  E.  Rep.  311,  affirming  83  111. 
Parker  v.  Brown,  136  N.  Car.  280,  App.  77. 

48  S.  E.  Rep.  657;  Marlowe  v.  Rog-  »»  Olson  v.  Ausdal,  13   So.  Dak. 

ers,  102  Ala.  510,  14  So.  Rep.  790.  23,  82  N.  W.  Rep.  89. 

56  Alexander  v.  Zeigler  (Miss.),  eo  Parker  v.  Hale  (Tex.  1903), 
36  So.  536.  78  S.  W.  Rep.  555 

57Fagan    v.    Vogt    (Tex.    1904), 


316  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT 

tenant  who  are  tenants  in  common  of  farm  products  where  the 
farm  has  been  rented  on  shares.  If  the  tenant  disposes  of  the 
produce  of  the  farm  he  holds  the  share  of  the  landlord  as  a 
trustee  and  he  must  account  accordingly.  The  fact  that  by  an. 
express  agreement  the  landlord  is  to  have  a  lien  upon  the  entire 
product  of  the  farm  for  advances  and  for  his  share  does  not 
alter  the  relations  of  the  parties.  Any  title  which  the  landlord 
might  have  under  such  a  stipulation  is  equitable  and  for  security 
only  and  if  the  landlord  assumes  to  sell  the  products  he  must  ac- 
count to  the  tenant  as  an  owner  of  an  equal  share.  No  matter 
which  party  disposes  of  the  products  of  the  farm  an  accounting 
may  be  had  in  equity  because  of  the  relation  of  trust  which  exists 
between  them.  If  both  parties  have  sold  to  a  third  person  hav- 
ing knowledge  of  their  mutual  rights  and  obligations  and  the 
third  person  pays  the  whole  proceeds  to  either,  he  is  a  proper 
party  to  an  action  brought  by  either  of  the  tenants  in  common 
against  the  other  for  an  accounting  and  he  may  be  liable  in  case 
he  has  caused  a  loss  to  either  by  paying  the  wrong  person."^ 

§  223.  Relation  of  landlord  and  servant  not  presumed  be- 
tween vendor  and  vendee.  One  who  purchases  land  is  not,  in 
the  absence  of  a  stipulation  to  that  effect,  entitled  to  possession 
until  the  date  which  is  designated  in  the  contract  upon  which  a 
conveyance  is  to  be  made.  If  with  the  consent  of  the  vendor, 
the  vendee  goes  into  possession  before  the  date  for  a  conveyance 
arrives  he  acquires  no  right  to  possession  thereby  and  the  vendor 
may  recover  possession  by  an  ejectment  after  demand.  The 
entry  of  the  vendee  upon  the  land  under  the  contract  to  purchase 
before  conveyance  and  with  the  consent  of  the  vendor  does  not 

«i  Sowles  V.  Martin,  76  Vt.  180,  but   before    it   is   harvested,    suc- 

56  All.  Rep.  979.    The  owner  may,  ceeds  to  his  rights.     He  may  re- 

when  he  can  show  that  there  is  cover  from  the  owner  of  the  land 

imminent   danger   of  the   cropper  in  a  quantum  meruit  the  reason- 

or  tenant  converting  the  crops  to  able  value  of  the  cropper's  share 

his  own  use,  apply  to  a  court  of  of  the  crop.    Parker  v.  Brown  (N. 

equity  for  a  partition  and  the  ap-  Car.  1904),  48  S.  E.  Rep.  657.    A 

pointment  of  a  receiver  during  the  landlord  who  is  entitled  to  an  at- 

pendency  of   the   action.     Baugh-  tnchment    for    rent    may    attach 

man  v.  Reed,  75  Cal.  319,  17  Pac.  crops  in  case  his  rent  is  payable 

Rep.    222.      The    personal    repre-  in  a  share  of  the  crops.     Harmon 

sfntative  of  a  cropper  or  tenant  v.    Payton    (Kan.    1903),    74    Pac. 

who  dies  after  the  crop  is  grown,  Rep.  618 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ABB  LEASEa  317 

make  the  vendee  a  tenant  of  the  vendor  or  create  the  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant  between  the  vendor  and  vendee,  except 
perhaps  from  the  date  when  there  is  a  default  in  the  payment 
of  the  purchase  money.  The  vendee  enters  and  holds  for  him- 
self and  his  title  is  not  subordinate  to  that  of  the  vendor  nor 
can  the  latter  recover  rent  from  him  or  for  the  use  and  occupa- 
tion of  the  premises.®^  From  these  principles  it  follows  that 
where  one  is  let  in  possession  of  land  under  an  oral  contract  of 
sale,  he  is  not  liable  to  the  vendor  for  rent  or  for  damages  for 
use  and  occupation  until  the  contract  is  repudiated  because  such 
liability  only  arises  on  a  contract  express  or  implied  and  pre- 
supposes the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant.  The  fact  alone 
that  one  takes  possession  as  a  vendee  disproves  any  implied  con- 
tract to  pay  rent,  or  to  pay  for  use  and  occupation.  If  the  con- 
tract had  been  void  for  any  reason  the  vendee  would  then  be- 
come a  tenant  at  will  or  at  sufferance  and  liable  for  use  and  oc- 
cupation. It  is  perfectly  proper  for  a  vendor  whose  land  is 
sold  on  credit  to  stipulate  with  the  vendee,  that  the  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant  shall  exist  and  that  the  vendee  shall  enter 
with  such  an  understanding.  Until  the  vendee  shall  pay  for  the 
land  he  is  a  tenant  and  the  vendor  may  treat  him  as  such  upon 
a  failure  to  pay  his  instalments.  There  is  nothing  oppressive 
in  this  so  long  as  the  rent  is  applied  to  the  payment  of  the  pur- 
chase money.  Such  contracts  are  common  where  land  is  sold 
on  credit,  and,  as  they  are  just  and  fair  to  all  parties,  will  not 

82  Bull  V.  Ellis,  1  Stew.  &  P.  Ralston,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  286; 
(Ala.)  294;  Tucker  v.  Adams,  52  Stone  v.  Sprague,  20^  Barb.  (N. 
Ala.  254;  Smith  v.  Maberry,  61  Y.)  509;  Little  v.  Pearson,  7  Pick. 
Ark.  375,  33  S.  W.  Rep.  1068;  Van-  (Mass.)  301,  302;  De  Pere  Co.  v. 
derheuvel  v.  Starrs,  3  Conn.  303;  Raynor,  65  Wis.  271,  22  N.  W.  Rep. 
Redden  v.  Barker,  4  Har.  (Del.)  761,  27  N.  W.  Rep.  155;  Carpenter 
179;  Brown  v.  Persons,  48  Ga.  60;  v.  United  States,  17  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
Miles  V.  Elkin,  10  Ind.  329,  330;  489,  21  Law.  ed.  680;  Watkins  v. 
Kratemeyer  v.  Brink,  17  Ind.  509,  Holman,  16  Pet.  (U.  S.)  26,  10 
511;  Fall  v.  Hazelrigg,  45  Ind.  Law.  ed.  873;  Bradstreet  v.  Hunt- 
576,  15  Am.  Rep.  278;  Gould  v.  ington,  5  Pet.  (U.  S.)  402;  Willson 
Thompson,  4  Met.  (Mass.)  224,  v.  Watkins,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.)  43; 
228;  Lapham  v.  Norton,  71  Me.  Blight  v.  Rochester,  7  Wheat  U. 
83,  88;  Coffman  v.  Huck,  19  Mo.  S.)  453.  Contra,  Kirk  v.  Taylor's 
435;  Kenada  v.  Gardner,  3  Barb.  Heirs,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  62;  Pro- 
(N.  Y.)  5-89;  Smith  v.  Stewart,  6  prietors  of  Township  No.  6  v.  Mo- 
John.     (N.    Y.)     46;     Sylvester    v.  Farland.  12  Mass.  325. 


318  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT 

be  interfered  with  by  the  courts.*'^  On  the  failure  of  the  vendee 
to  pay  rent  his  rights  are  forfeited  and  he  will  lose  what  he  has 
paid  as  rent  unless  some  provision  to  the  contrary  is  made.  He 
has  no  interest  after  his  default  which  can  be  sold  under  an 
execution.*^* 

§  224.  The  default  or  the  refusal  of  either  party  to  perform. 
The  question  whether  a  vendee  in  possession  is  a  tenant  of  the 
vendor  and  thus  is  liable  for  rent  or  in  assumpsit  for  use  and 
occupation,  almost  always  arises  where  either  by  a  refusal  of 
the  vendee  to  pay  or  by  a  refusal  of  the  vendor  to  convey  the 
contract  is  never  performed.  The  majority  of  the  cases  in  de- 
termining that  there  is  no  liability  for  rent  on  the  vendee  do  not 
stop  to  inquire  whether  the  failure  to  perform  the  contract  is 
the  fault  of  the  vendor  or  the  vendee.  If  the  contract  of  sale  is 
voluntarily  rescinded  by  the  parties,  either  waives  all  the  de- 
fault on  the  part  of  the  other.®^  If  the  vendor  is  in  default  in 
conveying  when  the  date  arrives  when  under  the  contract  he 
is  bound  to  give  a  deed,  he  cannot  complain  that  the  vendee  has 
had  the  use  of  the  land  gratis  with  his  consent.  In  justice  and 
fairness  to  the  vendee,  the  loss  of  the  land  through  the  action  of 
the  vendor  in  refusing  to  consummate  the  contract  ought  to 
estop  the  vendor  from  demanding  compensation  for  its  use 
aside  from  the  rule  of  law  which  determines  that  the  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant  never  existed  between  the  parties  in  the 
absence  of  an  express  contract  to  that  effect.®''  Thus  if,  after 
a  vendee  has  occupied  the  land  sold  him,  the  vendor  is  unable 
to  convey  because  he  cannot  give  a  good  title,  or  cannot  give  one 
which  is  free  from  incumbrances,  the  vendee  is  under  no  obli- 

«3Crinkley  v.  Edgerton,  113  N.  Huck,    24    Mo.    496;    Sylvester   v. 

Car.  444,  449,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  669.  Ralston,    31    Barb.    (N.    Y.)    286; 

64  Appeal  of  Chrystie,  85  Pa.  St.  Way  v.  Raymond,  16  Vt.  371,  376; 
463.  Smith  v.  Stewart,  6  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 

65  Mariner  v.  Burton,  4  Har.  46;  Stacy  v.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co., 
(Del.)    69.  32  Vl.   551,   553;    Hough  v.  Birge, 

66  Bell  V.  Ellis'  Heirs,  1  Stew.  11  Vt.  190.  Assumpsit  for  use  and 
&  P.  (Ala.)  294;  Vanderheuvel  v.  occupation  cannot  be  maintained 
Storrs,  3  Conn.  203;  Garvin  v.  (Jones  v.  Tipton,  2  Dana  (Ky.) 
Jennorson,  20  Kan.  371,  372;  .Jones  295;  Stacy  v.  Vermont  Central  R. 
V.  Tipton,  2  Dana  (Ky.)  295;  Lit-  Co.,  32  Vt.  551,  553,  though  the 
tie  V.  Pearson,  7  Pick.  (Mass.)  vendee  alone  is  ajt  fault.  McNair 
301,  19  Am.  Dec.  289;   Coffman  v.  v.  Schwartz,  16  111.  24,  25. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  319 

gation  to  pay  for  .use  and  occupation  prior  thereto."^  The  ven- 
dee should  immediately  surrender  possession  on  the  rescission 
or  abandonment  of  the  contract  of  sale,  for,  if  he  shall  continue 
in  possession  after  a  rescission,  or  after  the  vendor  has  defaulted 
in  the  performance  of  the  contract,  he  will  be  liable  as  a  tenant 
to  the  vendor  from  the  date  of  the  default.®*  Some  authorities 
have  held  that  a  vendee  who  goes  into  possession  under  a  con- 
tract of  sale  will  be  liable  to  pay  the  rent  or  for  the  use  and 
occupation  of  the  premises,  though  there  be  no  express  agree- 
ment to  that  effect,  where  he  subsequently  fails  to  pay  the  pur- 
chase money.  He  is  a  tenant  at  will  and,  as  the  use  of  the  prem- 
ises has  been  beneficial  to  him,  and  the  vendor  is  ready  and  will- 
ing to  perform^  in  order  to  do  justice  between  the  parties,  the 
law,  it  is  said,  will  imply  a  promise  on  the  part  of  the  vendee 
to  pay  what  is  right  in  case  he  is  unable  to  pay  the  purchase 
money  when  it  is  due.®^  The  parties  may  stipulate  in  the  con- 
tract of  sale  that  in  case  the  vendee  shall  default  in  the  pay- 
ment of  the  whole  or  of  any  part  of  the  purchase  money  aftor 
he  has  been  in  possession^  he  shall  thereafter  be  regarded  as  a 
tenant  and  that  what  he  has  paid,  if  anything,  shall  be  regarded 
as  rent.^"  Upon  the  vendee's  default,  but  not  before,  he  be- 
comes a  tenant  of  the  vendor  and  the  contract  of  sale  is  then 
transformed  at  once  into  a  lease,  the  vendor  thereafter  having 
all  the  rights  of  a  landlord  as  regards  the  vendee.'^ 

§  225.  The  express  agreement  of  the  vendee  to  pay  rent.  It 
is  always  competent  for  the  parties  to  a  contract  for  the  sale  of 
land  to  provide  that  the  vendee  shall  enter  before  a  conveyance 

67  Garvin  v.  Jennerson,  20  Kan.  64  Am.  Dec.  10.5,  where  the  vendor 
371;  Bardsley's  Appeal  (Pa.  1887),  failed  to  tender  a  proper  deed. 
10  Atl.  Rep.  39.  The  parties  may,  «»  Patterson  v.  Stoddard,  47  Me. 
upon  the  rescission  of  the  contract  355,  356,  74  Am.  Dec.  490;  Fowke 
of  sale,  agree  that  the  vendee  v.  Beck,  1  Speers  (S.  C.)  291. 
shall  pay  rent  as  a  tenant  for  his  7o  ish  v.  McRae.  48  Ark.  413,  3 
prior  occupation  of  the  premises.  S.  W.  Rep.  440  (agreement  to  pay 
Such  a  contract  is  based  on  a  good  "customary  rent"  on  the  vendee's 
consideration,  and  gives  the  ven-  default).  See,  also.  Hill  v.  Sidie, 
dor  all  the  right  of  a  landlord,  in-  116  Wis.  602,  93  N.  W.  Rep.  446. 
eluding  a  lien  against  the  vendee.  ti  Block  v.  Smith,  61  Ark.  266, 
Powell  V.  Hadden's  Ex'rs,  21  Ala.  32  S.  W.  Rep.  1070;  Oxford  v.  Ford, 
745.  67  Ga.   362.     See  Foster  v.  Good- 

68  Dwlght  V.  Cutler,  3  Mich.  566,  win,  82  Ala.  384,  2  So.  Rep.  895 


320  LAW   OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT 

to  ]iim  and  shall  hold  as  a  tenant  of  the  vendor.  Thus,  the  rela- 
tion of  landlord  and  tenant  exists  where  the  vendee  agrees  to 
pay  the  vendor  a  sum  of  money  for  rent  for  the  use  of  the  prem- 
ises before  conveyance,  if  he  shall  default  in  paying  the  pur- 
chase price.'^^  The  same  construction  is  given  to  a  contract  of 
sale  which  provides  that  if  either  of  the  parties  do  not  consum- 
mate the  sale,  the  money  which  has  been  paid  on  the  purchase 
shall  be  regarded  as  rent/^  If  there  is  an  express  agreement  by 
the  vendee  in  possession  to  pay  rent  until  he  takes  title,'^*  or  to 
pay  rent  until  a  certain  amount  is  paid  by  the  vendee,  upon 
Avhich  the  land  is  to  be  conveyed  by  the  vendor,  the  relation  of 
the  parties  is  that  of  landlord  and  tenant.''^  The  vendee  in 
possession  at  once  becomes  the  tenant  of  the  vendor  where  he 
fails  to  pay  the  first  instalment  of  the  price,  where  there  is  a 
provision  in  the  contract  of  sale  that  on  a  default  he  shall  pay 
rent.''®  But  there  is  no  presumption  in  the  absence  of  a  clear 
understanding  to  that  effect  that  upon  the  default  of  the  ven- 
dee in  possession  to  pay  rent,  he  shall  thereupon  become  a  ten- 
ant of  the  vendor.  The  fact  that  a  note  which  is  given  for  a 
portion  of  the  purchase  money  contains  a  statement  that  it  is 
for  rent  will  not  alone  create  any  presumption  that  the  relation 
of  landlord  and  tenant  existed  between  the  parties.''^  But  the 
fact  that  a  contract  of  sale  speaks  of  a  part  of  the  consideration 
to  be  paid  by  the  vendee  in  possession  as  rent  does  not  neces- 
sarily transform  it  into  a  lease.''^  If  the  vendee  is  let  into  pos- 
session, under  an  a^eement  by  him  to  pay  the  purchase  money 
at  a  future  date,  and  to  pay  rent  in  the  meantime,  the  rent  is 
obviously  more  in  the  nature  of  interest  on  the  purchase  money 
than  rent  and,  as  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  does  not 

72  Foster    v.    Goodwin,    82    Ala.      456,   458.     See  Nestal  v.   Schmid, 
384,    2    So.    Rep.    895.      Compare      39  N.  J.  Law,  686. 

contra.  Green  v.  Deitrich,  114  111.  70  Block  v.   Smith,   61  Ark.  266, 

G36,  642,  3  N.  E.  Rep.  800,  in  which  32  S.  W.  Rep.  1070;   Chambers  v. 

the  language  of  the  contract  was  Irish  (Iowa,  1906),  109  N.  W.  Rep. 

very  peculiar.  787. 

73  Barrett    v.    Johnson,    2    Ind.  7?  Quetermous     t.     Hatfield,     54 
App.  25,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  983.  Ark.  16.  14  S.  W.  Rep.  1096;  Wal- 

74  Jackson    v.   Niven,    10    Johns.  ters  v.  Myer  &  Co.,  39  Ark.  560. 
(N.  Y.)  335.  78  Smith  v.  Mabory,  61  Ark.  515, 

7r.  Nobles   V.    McCarty,    CI    Miss.       33  S.  W.  Rep.  10G8. 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEi^ES.  321 

exist,  the  party  to  whom  it  is  due  cannot  collect  it  by  any  of 
the  usual  methods  for  collecting  rent."^  So,  also,  an  agreement 
between  the  vendor  and  the  vendee  that  the  purchase  money, 
which  is  to  be  paid  in  instalments,  may  be  collected  by  the  ven- 
dor, as  they  become  due,  by  distress  or  otherwise,  does  not  alone 
create  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant.^"  A  vendee  who  goes 
into  possession  with  the  consent  of  the  vendor  under  an  agree- 
ment with  the  latter  that  he  will  pay  him  interest  on  the  pur- 
chase money  at  so  much  per  annum  while  he  is  in  possession  be- 
fore conveyance  and  a  fortion  after  conveyance  does  not  by 
that  fact  alone  become  a  yearly  tenant.  He  may,  however,  be 
regarded  as  a  tenant  at  will  and  on  the  rescission  of  the  con- 
tract because  he  fails  to  pay  the  interest  or  the  purchase  money 
he  may  be  ousted  on  an  entry  or  demand  of  possession.  For 
the  payment  of  interest  under  such  circumstances,  though  yearly, 
is  not  for  the  use  of  the  land  but  for  the  forbearance  of  the 
vendor  in  waiting  for  the  money.  But  where  a  yearly  payment 
other  than  interest  is  made  which  is  to  go  to  the  vendor  as  rent 
in  case  the  contract  of  sale  is  not  consummated,  but  which  is  to 
apply  to  the  purchase  price  if  the  vendee  takes  a  conveyance,  a 
tenancy  from  year  to  year  is  created.*"^  If  the  facts  proved  are 
such  that,  taken  with  the  express  language  of  the  contract,  it  ap- 
pears that  the  relation  between  the  vendee  in  possession  and  his 
vendor  is  that  of  landlord  and  tenant,  the  vendor  has  the  same 
remedies  against  his  vendee  as  a  landlord  will  have  against  a  ten- 
ant. The  vendor  may  then  enforce  a  landlord 's  statutory  lien  for 
rent  on  the  crops  grown  by  his  vendee  while  he  was  in  possession 
of  the  premises.^-  Under  such  circumstances,  the  lien  of  the 
vendor  for  rent  is  superior  to  that  of  the  chattel  mortgagee  or 

79  Walters  v.  Myer  &  Co.,  39  Ark.  "so   much   as   the   one-half   of   all 

560,  567;  Bissell  v.  Erwin's  Heirs,  crops  on   said  land  shall   amount 

10   La.   524;    Quetermous   v.   Hat-  to."   Moen  v.  Lillestal,  5  N.  D.  327, 

field,   54   Ark.    16,   14    S.   W.   Rep.  65  N.  W.  Rep.  694. 
1096.  81  Saunders    v.    Musgrave,    6    B. 

«oSackettv.  Barnum,  22  Wend.  &    C.    524;    Parton    v.    Smith,    66 

(N.  Y.)  605.    The  same  ruling  was  Iowa,  75;    Eaton  v.  Hunt,  20  Ky. 

had   where  the  vendee   in  posses-  Law  Rep.  860.  47  S.  W.  Rep.  763. 
sion   of  land   which   sold  on  long  82  Waite  v.  Corbin,  109  Ala.  154, 

credit  was  bound  to  pay  each  year,  19  So.  Rep.  505. 
in  addition  to  the  purchase  price, 

21 


322  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

judgment  creditor  of  a  vendee  who  is  in  possession  of  the  land 
a^  a  tenant.*^ 

§  226.  The  entry  of  vendee  under  a  parol  agreement  to  pur- 
chase. A  purchaser  under  a  void  parol  contract  to  purchase 
who  is  put  in  possession  of  the  premises  by  the  vendor  is  not 
liable  for  the  rent  until  his  right  to  enforce  the  contract  shall 
have  been  denied  by  the  vendor.  So  long  as  he  holds  posses- 
sion with  the  consent  of  the  vendor,  his  right  to  the  profits  and 
rent  will  be  presumed.^*  A  parol  contract  of  sale  under  which 
the  vendee  has  entered  may  be  valid  as  a  lease  though  unen- 
forcible  as  a  contract  to  convey.^^  The  general  rule  in  all  cases 
of  an  entry  by  the  vendee  under  a  parol  contract  to  sell  land  is 
that  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  does  not  exist  between 
him  and  the  vendor.  The  vendee  in  possession  is  not  therefore 
estopped  to  dispute  the  vendor's  title.^*^  nor  is  he  on  the  other 
hand,  entitled  as  a  tenant  to  a  notice  to  quit.^"^ 

§  227.  The  vendor  of  land  continuing  in  possession  after 
his  conveyance  of  the  title.  The  mere  fact  taken  alone  that  the 
vendor  retains  the  possession  of  the  land  after  he  has  conveyed 
title  to  the  vendee,  does  not,  it  has  been  held,  create  by  implica- 
tion, the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  between  the  parties 
to  the  contract  of  sale  so  as  to  give  the  vendee  the  right  to  re- 
cover from  the  vendor  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  land.*'^ 
There  are,  however,  many  cases  which  hold  to  the  contrary  and 
the  weight  of  the  authorities  is  directly  opposed  to  this  rule. 
So,  it  has  been  held  several  times  that  the  remaining  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  land  by  the  vendor  after  the  conveyance  of  the  title 
by  him  alone  raises  a  presumption  that  he  continues  in  posses- 
sion as  a  tenant  of  the  vendee.^    However,  this  presumption  is 

83  Reddick  v.  Hutchinson,  94  Ga.  sea  Chilton  v.  Niblett,  3  Humph. 
675,  21  S.  E.  Rep.  712.  (Tenn.)   404. 

84  Fox  V.  Longley,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  «7  Greenup  v.  Veruer,  16  111.  26, 
(Ky.)  388;  Kay  v.  Curd,  6  B.  Mon.  27;  Tew  v.  Jones,  13  M.  &  W.  12. 
(Ky.)    100.  ssprichard    v.    Tabor,    104    Ga. 

BoVick   V.   Ayres,    56  Miss.   670,  64,  30  S.  E.  Rep.  415;  Sherebourne 

in    which    the    vendee  expressly  v.  .Tones,   20  Me.   70;    Larrabee  v. 

agreed  to   pay   rent  if  he   should  Lumbert,  34  Me.  79,  80,  81;  Hyatt 

not   pay   the    purchase  money    in  v    Wood,  4  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   150,  4 

one  year.  Am.   Dec.   258;    Wood  v.   Hyatt,  4 

8«  Hough    V.    Dumas,  4    Dev.    &  Johns.    (N.    Y.)     313;     Hodges    y. 

Bat.  L.   (N.  C.)   328.  Gates,  9  Vt.  17 


WHAT  CONTRACTS  ARE  LEASES.  323 

always  rebuttable  by  proof  of  facts  which  show  or  tend  to  show 
an  intention  that  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  shall  not 
exist  between  the  parties.  Thus,  for  example,  the  vendor  con- 
tinuing in  possession  after  his  conveyance  will  be  permitted  to 
prove  that  his  deed,  though  it  was  an  absolute  conveyance  upon 
its  face,  was  in  fact  given  to  secure  his  debt;  that  the  creditor 
or  grantee  in  the  deed  had  refused  to  give  a  bond  to  re-convey 
the  property,  and  that  the  debt  had  been  paid  and  that  hence 
there  should  be  a  re-conveyance.*' 

83  Larrabee  v.  Lumbert,  34  Me.  79,  81;  McCormick  r.  Herndon,  26  "Wis. 
449. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  FOPJM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES. 

228.  The  scope  of  this  chapter. 

229.  The  formal  requisites  of  a  lease 

230.  General  rules  of  the  law  of  contracts  as  to  signatures. 

231.  The  signature  to  a  lease  by  the  tenant  only. 

232.  The  signature  by  the  lessor  only. 

233.  The  signature  to  a  lease  affixed  by  a  surety. 

234.  The  necessity  for  and  the  form  of  seals. 

235.  The  attestation  of  leases. 

236.  The  necessity  for  an  acknowledgment. 

237.  The  description  of  the  premises. 

238.  The  description  of  the  parties. 

239.  The  date  of  the  lease. 

240.  The  date  of  the  commencement  of  the  term, 

241.  The  necessity  of  the  delivery  of  the  lease. 

242.  The  acceptance  of  a  lease. 

243.  The  necessity  for  the  entry  of  the  tenant. 

244.  The  date  upon  which  the  lease  expires. 

245.  The  reversion  in  the  lessor. 

246.  The  approval  of  the  lease  by  the  attorneys  for  the  parties. 

247.  The  responsibility  of  the  tenant. 

248.  A  failure  to  read  the  lease. 

249.  A  mistake  in  the  execution  of  a  lease. 

250.  The  usual  and  customary  covenants  and  provisions. 

251.  Leases  executed  in  duplicate  and  counterpart. 

252.  The  mode  of  proving  a  written  lease. 

253.  Term  expiring  on  the  happening  of  a  contingent  event. 

254.  Leases  terminable  on  the  sale  of  the  premises. 

255.  The  option  of  the  lessee  to  terminate  the  lease. 

256.  Measure  of  the  damages  for  a  failure  to  execute  a  lease. 

257.  The  effect  of  the  statute  of  frauds  on  leases. 

258.  Contracts  concerning  an  interest  in  land. 

259.  Extensions  and  renewals  of  leases. 

260.  Leases  by  parol  which  are  void  under  the  statute. 

261.  The  character  of  the  writing. 

262.  Effect  of  performances  in  taking  the  lease  out  of  the  statute. 

263.  The  recording  of  leases. 

264.  The  construction  of  the  statutes  requiring  the  record  of  leases. 

265.  The  effect  of  recording  a  lease  upon  the  rights  of  a  subsequent 

lessee. 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES.  325 

§  266.     The  effect  of  the  record  as  notice. 

267.  As  against  the  creditors  of  the  lessor  and   persons  claiming 

under  him. 

268.  The  effect  of  recording  a  lease  which  is  not  required  to  be  re- 

corded. 

§  228.  Scope  of  tnis  chapter.  In  this  chapter  it  is  proposed 
to  treat  of  the  execution  of  a  formally  written  lease.  Under 
the  heading  of  execution  will  be  discussed  the  signing,  sealing, 
attestation,  delivery  and  acceptance  of  the  writing.  Inasmuch 
as  a  lease  in  writing  is  merely  a  contract  in  writing  for  the  use 
of  the  parties  concerned,  the  rules  regulating  the  execution  of 
written  contracts  are  usually  to  be  applied  where  the  execution 
of  a  written  lease  is  under  consideration.  The  case  therefore 
that  applies  to  the  execution  of  written  contracts  generally  may 
safely  be  consulted  and  cited  in  all  questions  involving  the  form 
and  execution  of  written  leases.  ^lany  such  cases  have  been 
cited  in  the  notes  which  are  appended  to  the  text  of  this  chap- 
ter, 

§  229.  The  formal  requisites  of  a  lease.  There  are  certain 
elements  which  must  exist  in  every  case  in  order  that  a  writing 
shall  constitute  a  valid  lease.  First,  there  must  be  a  lessor  who 
is  competent  to  make  a  lease,  that  is  to  say,  the  lessor  must  have 
the  same  capacity  to  contract  in  writing  which  is  usually  re- 
quired in  other  cases.  The  capacity  of  the  lessor  to  make  a  lease 
will  be  determined  by  the  same  rules  which  are  recognized  in 
the  case  of  all  other  written  contracts.  Second,  there  must  be  a 
lessee  w^ho  is  capable  to  contract  with  the  lessor.  The  same 
rules  which  are  used  to  determine  the  capacity  of  the  lessor  will 
be  implied  to  determine  the  capacity  of  the  lessee.  Third,  there 
must  be  a  subject  matter  which  is  capable  of  being  leased. 
Usually,  the  subject  of  a  lease  is  land  or  other  things,  and  arti- 
cles of  property  of  a  real  or  personal  nature.  Fmirih,  if,  by 
statute,  the  lease  is  required  to  be  by  deed,  the  execution,  de- 
livery, etc.,  of  the  deed  must  conform  to  the  rules  which  regulate 
the  execution  and  delivery  of  deeds,  that  is  to  say,  the  writing 
must  be  sealed;  must  contain  a  definite  and  certain  description 
of  the  parties  and  of  the  things  demised;  must  be  sealed  and 
delivered,  and,  in  certain  cases,  it  must  be  acknowledged  and 
recorded.  Fifth,  where  a  term  of  years  is  created  by  a  lease, 
the  term  must  have  a  fixed  commencement  and  must  be  definite 


326  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

in  length.  This  need  not  be  expressly  stated  in  the  writing  but 
is  permitted  to  be  ascertained  by  parol  evidence.  Thus,  as  is 
subsequently  explained,  the  term  may  be  for  a  fixed  number  of 
years  or  may  be  for  a  term  not  stated  in  years,  but  determinable 
by  the  happening  of  some  contingent  event.  Sixth,  at  the  com- 
mon law  where  the  lease  was  for  a  freehold,  livery  of  seizin  was 
required  and  where  the  lease  was  for  a  term  of  years,  an  attorn- 
ment was  indispensable  but  these  ceremonies  have  been  abolished 
for  many  years,  and.  in  the  United  States  at  least,  are  not  re- 
quisite in  the  case  of  leases.  Seventh,  there  must  usually  be  an 
acceptance  of  the  term  by  the  lessee. 

§  230.  General  rules  of  the  law  of  contracts  as  to  signatures. 
Aside  from  the  special  topic  of  leases,  it  is  the  rule  in  the  case 
of  a  contract  which  is  not  required  to  be  signed  by  the  party 
to  be  charged  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  that  the  mere  fact 
that  a  party  to  the  contract  has  not  signed  it,  does  not  exempt 
him  from  liability  under  it  where  he  has  received  a  benefit  from 
it.^  The  case  is  much  stronger  against  a  party  where  his  name 
appears  in  the  body  of  the  contract,  as  being  a  party  to  it. 
Even  if  his  name  does  not  appear  in  the  contract,  if  it  appears 
that  he  knew  of  its  terms  and  acted  in  accordance  therewith  he 
will  be  liable.  The  circumstance  that  the  contract  is  in  his 
writing,  together  with  the  appearance  of  his  name  in  it  is  al- 
most conclusive  against  him.^  These  rules  of  the  general  law 
of  contract  as  sustained  by  the  cases  which  are  cited  in  the  notes 
are  all  of  value  in  connection  with  the  construction  of  leases. 
Thus,  a  lease  made  in  writing  which  is  not  required  by  the  stat- 
ute of  frauds  to  be  in  writing,  is  binding  on  a  party  to  it,  though 
he  has  not  signed  it,  if  he  shall,  being  the  landlord,  receive  the 
rent  under  it,  or  being  the  tenant,  he  shall  enter  upon  the 
occupation  of  the  premises.^  For  it  is  a  general  rule  which  is 

1  Henry  v.   Allen,    49   Ark.   122,  Claflin  v.  Hoover,  20  Mo.  App.  5S3; 

4  S.  W.  Rep.  201;    Kieth  v.  Kerr,  Hinsaman  v.  Hinsaman,  52  N.  C. 

17  Ind.  284;  Smith  v.  Morse,  20  La.  f-lO. 

Ann.  220;   Jeffry  v.  Underwood,  1  2  Xoe  v.' Hodges,  22  Tenn.  162; 

Ark.  108;  Pennington  v.  Baehr,  48  Young  v.  Paul,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  401, 

Cal.  565;  Curds  v.  Forts,  9  Ky.  43;  64  Am.  Dec.  456. 

Basham  v.  Commonwealth,  76  Ky.  3  Magoon  v.  Minnesota  Transfer 

36;   Gable  v.  Brooks,  48  Md.  108;  Packing  Co.,  34  Minn.  434,  26  N. 

Rundell  v.  La  Fkur,  88  Mass.  480;  W.  Rep.  235. 
Dodd  V.  Butler,   7   Mo.   App.   583; 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES.  327 

of  particular  value  in  connection  with  leases,  that  a  contract 
which  is  intended  to  be  signed  by  both  parties  but  is  only 
signed  by  one  of  them  becomes  in  all  respects  binding  upon 
the  other  who  accepts  it  by  his  conduct  in  deriving  a  benefit 
from  it  with  knowledge  of  its  existence.*  The  requirement  of 
the  statute  of  frauds  that  a  lease  shall  be  signed  by  the  party 
to  be  charged,  is  satisfied  if  the  lessee's  or  lessor's  name  writ- 
ten by  himself,  appears  in  any  part  of  the  lease,  particularly 
in  the  clause  containing  the  usual  description  of  the  parties.* 
Wbere  a  lease  is  executed  by  two  parties,  and  it  is  retained  by 
the  lessor  to  have  it  also  executed  by  his  wife,  who  subsequently 
refuses  to  sign  it,  and  a  third  person  in  ignorance  of  the  lease, 
purchases  the  farm  as  a  result  of  which  the  unexecuted  lease 
was  destroyed,  the  lease  itself  is  void  for  lack  of  mutuality." 

§  231.  The  signature  to  a  lease  by  the  tenant  only.  "Where 
the  statute  of  frauds  requires  the  lease  to  be  in  writing,  a  lease 
signed  by  the  lessor  only,  if  accepted  and  possession  taken  under 
it  by  the  lessee  against  the  lessor,  is  good.'^  A  lease  signed  by  the 
tenant  only,  if  not  accepted  or  ratified  by  the  landlord  in  writing, 
is  not  binding  on  the  tenant  and  the  landlord  cannot  sue  and 
recover  upon  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  therein  contained.*    If  the 

*  Reedy  v.   Smith,   42   Cal.    245;  accept  it  without  execution  by  the 

Bell  V.  ByersoD,  11  Iowa,  233,  77  wife;     neither    could    the    lessor 

Am.  Dec.  142;    Dows  v.  Morse,  62  have  been  compelled  to  deliver  it — 

Iowa,  231,  17  N.  W.  Rep.  495;  Fair-  it  must  be   mutually   binding  on 

banks  v.  Meyers,  98  Ind.  92;  Young  both     parties     or     neither.     The 

V.   Ward,   33   Me.    359;    GriflSn   v.  lessor  had  a  perfect  right,  when 

Bristol,    39    Minn.   456,   40   N.   W.  his   wife    refused   to    execute    the 

Rep.   523;    Berner   v.   Bagnell,   20  lease  to  cancel  and  destroy  the  im- 

Mo.  App.  543;    Dutch  v.  Mead,  36  strument — if   the   lease    had   been 

N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  427;   Reynolds  v.  a  valid  and  subsisting  lease,  com- 

Welsh,    8    N.    Y.    St.    Rep.    404;  plete  by  delivery,  without  joinder 

Grove  v.  Hodges,  55  Pa.  St.   504;  of  the  wife,  the  destruction  of  it 

Campbell  v.  McFaddin,  71  Tex.  28,  by  the  lessor  could  not  destroy  the 

9  S.  W.  138.  estate  or  term." 

B  Traylor  v.  Cabanne,  8  Mo.  App.  7  Carnegie   Natural    Gas   Co.    v. 

131,  133;    but  see  Combs  v.   Mid-  Philadelphia  Co.,  158  Pa.  St.  317, 

land  Trans.  Co.,  58  Mo.  App.  112,  27  Atl.  Rep.  951,  954;   Bergner  v. 

114    (Cotts.    Missouri    R.    S.    1889,  Palethrop,  2  W.  N.  C.    (Pa.)    297, 

§  6371).  23  Pitts.  L.  J.  103,  8  Leg.  Gaz.  35. 

8  Tatham  v.  Lewis,  65  Pa.  St.  65,  s  Jennings  v.  McComb,  112,  Pa. 

27  L.  I.  77.  "The  lease  was  clearly  St.  518,  4  Atl.  Rep.  812,  17  W.  N. 

not    binding    on    the    lessee.     He  C.  466,  34  Pitts.  L.  J.  75. 
could  not  have  been  compelled  to 


328  LAW  OF  LxVNDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

landlord,  knowing  that  a  person  is  in  possession  of  tlie  premises 
under  the  lease  which  is  signed  by  the  tenant  and  not  by  the 
landlord,  accepts  rent  from  him  as  such  he  cannot  thereafter 
evade  his  responsibility  as  a  landlord  by  showing  that  the  lease 
was  not  signed  by  him.  If  a  landlord  permits  another  person 
to  enter  and  occupy  as  a  tenant,  premises  owned  by  him  and  re- 
ceives rent  from  the  occupant  as  a  tenant  under  a  lease  signed 
only  by  the  tenant  but  which  has  been  brought  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  landlord,  he  is  estopped  to  impeach  the  lease  on  the 
ground  that  he  has  not  signed  it.  On  the  other  hand,  a  lease 
which  is  not  signed  by  the  landlord  is  binding  on  the  lessee  who 
goes  into  possession  under  it.®^  And  the  landlord  may  then  re- 
cover from  him  the  rent  which  he  has  agreed  to  pay.  The  lease 
having  been  executed  by  the  parties,  the  statute  of  frauds  does 
not  apply  to  such  a  case.^^  So,  where  a  lessee  occupies  the  prem- 
ises under  a  written  lease  and  pays  rent  for  several  months  un- 
der the  instrument  which  is  signed  by  himself  and  not  by  his 
lessor,  which  purports  to  be  a  lease  for  one  year,  the  lease  is 
valid  as  a  parol  lease  for  one  year,®^  and  the  tenant  is  a  tenant 
for  one  year,  though  the  rent  is  payable  monthly. 

§  232.  The  signature  by  the  lessor  only.  In  some  cases  it  has 
been  held  that  a  lease  or  any  other  contract  which  is  required 
by  law  to  be  signed  by  the  parties  is  void  if  signed  by  the  lessor 
only.  A  lease  signed  by  the  lessor,  but  not  by  the  lessee  and  not 
accepted  nor  ratified  by  him  in  writing,  is  not  valid  as  against 
the  lessee  where  it  comes  within  the  provision  of  the  statute  of 
frauds,  and  the  lessee  cannot  be  sued  in  covenant  thereon.*  The 
mutuality  of  obligation,  however,  which  is  lacking  where  a  lessee 
has  failed  to  sign  a  lease  may  be  supplied  by  his  conduct  in  re- 
lation thereto.  This  is  the  outcome  of  the  principle  of  estoppel 
by  which  a  party  who  has  voluntarily  derived  benefits  from  a 
contract  which  was  not  legally  binding  on  him  is  denied  the 
right  subsequently  to  repudiate  the  contract.     For  a  lessee  by 

saBaragiano  v.  Villani,  tl7  111.  Barnes,  39  Neb.  103,  57  N.  W.  Rep. 

App..    372;    Evans   v.   Conklin,   71  990. 

Hun,   536,    24    N.    Y.    Supp.    1081;  sc  Nicholls    v.    Barnes,    39    Neb. 

Mayer  v.   Moller,  1   Hilt.    (N.  Y.)  103,  57  N.  W.  Rep.  990. 

491;   Kauer  v.  Leahy,  15  Pa.  Co.  o  .Jennings  v.   McComb,   112  Pa. 

Ct.  Rep.  243.                                  '  St.  518,  4  Atl.  Rep.  812,  17  W.  N. 

«b  Lagerfelt  v.   McKie,  100  Ala.  C.  466,  34  Pitts.  L.  J.  65. 
430,  14  So.  Rep.  281;    Nicholls  v. 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES,  329 

accepting  a  written  lease,  particularly  one  which  is  under  the 
seal  of  the  lessor,  and  entering  into  possession  thereunder,  be- 
comes liable,  if  not  for  rent,^**  then  for  the  value  of  the  use  and 
occupation  of  the  property  for  such  period  as  he  is  in  possession. 
And  apparently  the  lessee,  by  the  acceptance  of  the  lease  and 
possession  under  it,  also  becomes  liable  to  the  lessor  for  all  the 
covenants  which  would  have  been  binding  upon  him  had  he 
signed  the  lease."  Whether  the  tenant  is  liable  for  the  rent  on 
his  covenant,  or  whether  he  is  liable  for  the  use  and  occupation 
of  the  premises  is,  in  modern  practice  at  least,  of  very  little  im- 
portance. The  principal  question  is  one  of  the  election  of  rem- 
edies. If  the  landlord  sues  for  rent  or  for  damages  for  the 
breach  of  any  covenant  alleging  a  written  lease  and  the  proof 
shows  a  lease  signed  by  the  landlord  and  not  by  the  tenant,  the 
landlord  may  be  non-suited.  So,  it  has  been  held  that  an  action 
on  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  will  not  lie  against  the  tenant  on  a 
lease  alleged  to  be  in  writing  but  which  is  sealed  and  subscribed 
by  the  landlord  only.^^  g^^  ^i^q  current  of  the  modem  decisions 
is  certainly  against  this  proposition  and  most  of  the  courts  would 
undoubtedly  hold  in  an  action  brought  by  the  landlord  against 
the  tenant  on  a  written  lease,  that  the  latter  was  estopped  to  al- 
lege or  prove  that  he  was  not  bound  by  the  lease  because  he  had 
not  signed  it,  if  it  appears  that  he  entered  on  the  premises  and 
paid  rent  according  to  its  terms.  For  a  lease  executed  by  the 
lessor  is  not  rendered  invalid  merely  because  it  was  not  signed 
by  the  lessee,  from  the  fact  that  it  contained  independent  cove- 
nants apparently  intended  to  be  assented  to  by  the  lessee's  sign- 

10  Pepper's  Adm'r  v.  Harper,  20  Super.  Ct.  4 ;  Round  Lake  Ass'n  v. 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  837,  47  S.  W.  Rep.  Kellogg,   141  N.  Y.  348,  36  N.  E. 

620.  Rep.  326,  327;   Filton  v.  Hamilton 

iiTrapnall  v.  Merrick,   21  Ark.  City,  6  Nev.  196;    Carnegie  N.  G. 

503;    Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia  Co.,  158  Pa.  St. 

Winslow,  18  App.  D.  C.  438;  Fields  317,  325,  27  Atl.  Rep.  951;  Braman 

V.   Brown,   188   III.   Ill,   58   N.   E.  v.  Dodge,  100  Me.  143,  60  Atl.  Ren. 

Rep.    977;     Henderson    v.    Virden  799;  Bergner  v.  Palethorp,  2  W.  N. 

Coal  Co.,  78  111.  App.  437;   McFar-  C.  297;    23  Pitts.  L.  J.  103,  8  Leg. 

lane  v.  Williams,  107  111.  33,  43;  Gaz.  35;    Jenning  v.  McComb,  112 

Doxey    Estate    v.    Service     (Ind.  Pa.  St.  518,  4  Atl.  Rep.  812;  Tray- 

App.  1902)  65  N.  E.  Rep.  757;  Lib-  lor  v.  Cabanne,  8  Mo.  App.  131. 
bey  V.    Staples,   39    Me.   161,   166;  12  Trustees  of  Section  16  v.  Spen- 

Rice  V.  Brown,  81  Me.  56,  16  Atl.  cer,  7  Ohio,  149. 
Rep.  334;    Zink  v.  Bohm,  3  N.  Y. 


330 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


ing  the  lease  and  the  landlord  may  waive  his  right  to  have  the 
signature  of  the  lessee  to  tlie  lease  and  the  fact  that  he  put  it 
on  record  would  justify  a  presumption  that  he  had  done  so.^^ 
The  owner  of  real  estate  may  transfer  his  land  by  a  lease  exe- 
cuted by  him  alone,  and  the  lease  will  be  effectual,  although  it 
contains  covenants  for  the  execution  of  the  lessee  by  signing  and 
sealing  but  which  are  not  in  fact  signed  by  the  latter.  The  les- 
sor may  waive  the  covenant  in  the  part  of  the  lessee.^* 

§  233.  The  signature  to  a  lease  affixed  by  a  surety.  A  person 
who  signs  a  lease  as  surety  for  the  lessee  is  not  liable  jointly 
with  the  lessee  in  an  action  to  recover  rent  or  to  enforce  a  cove- 
nant of  the  lessee.  He  undertakes  to  pay  rent  or  damages  only 
in  case  the  lessee  does  not  and  his  liability  is  not  contemporane- 
ous with  that  of  the  lessee  but  arises  only  when  the  liability  of 
the  lessee  has  been  fixed.  The  contracts  of  the  two  are  separate 
and  distinct  and  the  general  rules  and  principles  of  sureties  are 
applicable  including  that  section  of  the  statute  of  frauds  which 
requires  the  consideration  in  an  agreement  of  a  surety  to  be  ex- 


13  Libbey  v.  Staples,  39  Me.  166- 
168. 

14  Libbey  v.  Staples,  39  Me.  166; 
Braman  v.  Dodge,  100  Me.  143,  60 
Atl.  Rep.  799.  In  Jennings  v. 
McComb,  112  Pa.  St.  518,  4  Atl. 
Rep.  812,  the  law  is  said  to  be  that 
a  plaintiff  may  sustain  an  action 
of  covenant  on  a  contract  though 
it  be  so  defectively  executed  that 
he  could  not  be  sued  in  covenant 
on  the  lease.  The  basis  of  this 
principle  is  said  to  be  the  general 
rule  that  a  party  who  has  not 
signed  a  contract  makes  himself 
liable  by  accepting  it  when  it  is 
signed  by  the  other  party.  But 
this  does  not  necessarily  mean 
that  both  parties  to  the  contract 
have  the  same  remedy  against  the 
other.  The  one  who  has  signed 
may  be  liable  on  a  covenant.  The 
one  who  has  not  signed  can  only 
be  liablo  in  assumi)sit.  In  the 
case  of  a  lease  not  signed  by  the 
lessor  but  signed  by  the  lessee  it 


was  held  that  the  latter  could  not 
be  sued  on  the  covenant  to  pay 
rent  though  he  had  entered  into 
possession  because  no  term  had 
been  created  to  which  the  cove- 
nan^t  to  pay  rent  is  annexed  and 
during  which  it  operates.  There 
being  no  term  there  can  be  no 
covenant  to  pay  rent.  If  there  be 
no  lease  there  is  no  covenant.  See^ 
also,  Pitman  v.  Woodbury,  3  Exch. 
11. 

A  lessee  is  not  released  from  the 
obligation  of  his  lease  because  he 
does  not  seal  it  where  the  lessor 
signed  and  sealed  it,  or  the  lessee 
signed  it  without  sealing  it.  Such 
a  contract  is  equivalent  to  two 
instruments,  one  containing  cove- 
sants  or  promises  under  seal,  and 
the  other  contaiming  promises  not 
under  seal,  each  being  a  sufficient 
consideration  for  the  other,  each 
would  be  valid.  Rice  v.  Brown, 
81  Me.  56,  62,  16  AU.  Rep.  334. 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OP  LEASES.  331 

pressed.  No  consideration  being  expressed,  tlie  contract  is  void 
and  the  person  who  signed  as  surety  is  bound  neither  as  prin- 
cipal nor  as  surety.^^ 

§  234.  The  necessity  for  and  the  form  of  seals.  By  the  an- 
cient common  law  an  estate  of  freehold  could  be  conveyed  only 
by  livery  of  seizin  or  by  deed,  meaning  thereby  a  writing  under 
seal.  Livery  of  seizin  having  been  abolished  both  in  England 
and  in  America,  the  sole  remaining  method  of  conveying  a  free- 
hold interest  in  land  is  therefore  by  deed.  This  rule  of  the  com- 
mon law  as  to  the  conveyance  of  freehold  estates  has  been  af- 
firmed by  statute  in  many  of  the  states.  Leases  for  years  being 
regarded  as  mere  chattels,  are  valid  when  in  writing  though  not 
under  seal  unless  sealing  is  required  by  the  terms  of  some  stat- 
ute.^® For  in  a  few  of  the  states,  leases  in  excess  of  a  specified 
number  of  years  must  be  under  seal.^^  At  the  common  law, 
where  a  seal  is  required,  it  must  be  of  wax  or  wafer  or  some 
other  adhesive  substance  which  is  capable  of  receiving  an  im- 
pression.^* By  statute  in  many,  if  not  in  all  the  states,  this  re- 
quirement of  the  common  law  has  been  abrogated  so  that  it  has 
come  to  be  the  almost  universal  rule  that  a  stamp  or  impression 
made  upon  the  instrument  itself,  or  a  scroll  or  circle  of  ink,  or 
certain  words  or  letters  w^ritten  therein  is  taken  and  regarded  as 
a  seal.^^     In  two  of  the  states  where  such  statutes  have  been 

15  Evans  v.  Conklin,  71  Hun,  41;  Stoddard  v.  Whiting,  46  N.  Y. 
536,    539,    24    N.    Y.    Supp.    1081;        627.  633. 

Decker   v.   Gaylord,  8   Hun,   111;  i7  Seven  years  in  Massachusetts 

Gould  V.  Maring,  28  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  and  Maryland,  five  years  in  Vir- 

444;   see,  also,  DeRidder  v.  Scher-  ginia,   two  years   in   Florida,   one 

merhorn,   10   Barb.    (N.  Y.)    638;  year   in   Delaware,   Rhode    Islana 

Allen  V.  Fosgate,  11  How.  Pr.  218.  and    Vermont.     In    Wisconsin    a 

16  Crescent  City  Wharf  &  Light-  seal  is  unnecessary  to  a  lease  and 
erage  Co.  v.  Simpson,  77  Cal.  286,  does  not  raise  the  same  above  the 
15  Pac.  Rep.  426;  Lake  v.  Camp-  dignity  of  an  instrument  not  un- 
bell,  18  111.  106;  Borggard  v.  Gale,  der  seal.  Woolsey  v.  Henke,  125 
107  111.  App.  128;  De  Loge's  Adm'r  Wis.  134,  103  N.  W.  Rep.  267. 

V.    Hall,    31    Mo.    473;     Jones    v.  is  Beardsley  v.  Knight,  4  Vt.  471, 

Barnes,  45  Mo.  App.   590;    Gay  v.  479;    Warren  v.   Lynch,  5   Johns. 

Ihm,  3  Mo.  App.  588;  Den  v.  John-  (N.  Y.)    237,  239;    Bank  v.  Gray, 

son.  15  N.  J.  Law,  116;    Fougera  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  227. 

V.  Cohn,  2  City  Ct.  Rep.    (N.  Y.)  is  Bohannous  v.   Lewis,   3   Mon. 

253;    O'Brien  v.   Smith,   13   N.   Y.  (Ky.)    376;    Trasher  v.   Everhart, 

Supp.  408,  410,  34  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  3  Gill  &  J.    (Md.)    234,  246;    Hen- 


332 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  .VND  TEN.VNT. 


enacted  it  must  be  proved  by  the  language  of  the  writing  that 
the  party  meant  the  scroll  or  writing  to  be  his  seal.-"  As  a 
general  rule  at  the  present  time,  where  from  the  attestation 
clause  it  appears  to  have  beien  the  intent  and  purpose  of  the 
parties  to  execute  a  sealed  instrument,  anything  adhering  to 
the  paper  or  any  words  written  upon  it  at  or  near  the  place 
where  the  seal  is  ordinarily  affixed  which  can  with  a  reason- 
ably wide  stretch  of  the  imagination,  be  regarded  as  such,  will 
at  least  prima  facie  be  preisumed  to  be  a  seal  and  to  have  been 
affixed  with  an  intention  to  seal  the  writing.  And  where  several 
persons  execute  a  writing  it  is  not  necessary  that  each  should 
have  a  separate  seal,  though  two  or  more  may  bind  them- 
selves severally  by  one  seal  if  it  shall  appear  that  such  was  their 
intention. ^^ 

§  235.  The  attestation  of  leases.  In  the  absence  of  an  ex- 
press statutoiy  provision  a  written  lease,  though  executed  under 
seal,  is  not  required  to  be  attested  by  subscribing  witnesses. 
Hence  a  lease,  though  under  seal,  is  not  invalid  in  any  way  be- 


dee  V.  Pinkerton,  14  Allen  (Mass.) 
381;  Royal  Bank  v.  Railroad  & 
Depot  Co.,  100  Mass.  444,  445; 
Bates  V.  Boston  &  N.  Y.  R.  R.  Co., 
10  Allen  (Mass.)  251;  Relph  v. 
Gist,  4  McCord  (S.  C.)  267;  Alex- 
ander V.  Jameson,  5  Binn.  (Pa.) 
238,  243,  244;  Bradfield  v.  M'Cor- 
mick,  3  Blackf.   (Ind.)   161,  162. 

20  Austin  V.  Whitlock,  1  Munf. 
(Va.)  487;  Lee  v.  Adkins,  1  Minor 
(Ala.)   187. 

21  Bohannous  v.  Lewis,  3  T.  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  376,  378;  MacKay  v. 
Bloodgood,  9  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  285, 
287;  Yarborough  v.  Monday,  2 
Dev.  (S.  C.)  493;  Townsend  v. 
Hubbard,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.)  351;  Uni- 
versity of  Vermont  v.  Joslyn,  21 
Vt.  52;  Ball  v.  Dunsterville,  4  T. 
R.  313.  By  the  English  statute  8 
&  9  Vict.,  c.  106.  S.  3,  a  lease  re- 
quired by  law  to  be  in  writing,  is 
now  required  to  be  by  deed  and 
otherwise  it  is  void.  In  constru- 
ing the  statute,  it  has  been  held 


that  though  the  lease  being  not 
by  deed  is  void,  yet  it  may  be 
valid  as  an  agreement  indicating 
the  premises  upon  which  the  ten- 
ant holds  as  tenant  from  year  to 
year.  Tress  v.  Savage,  4  El.  &  Bl. 
36,  2  C.  L.  R.  1315,  23  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
339,  18  Jur.  6S0,  2  W.  R.  564; 
Hayne  v.  Cummings,  16  C.  B.  (N. 
S.)  421,  10  Jur.  (N.  S.)  773,  10  L. 
T.  341;  Tidey  v.  Mollett,  16  C.  B. 
(N.  S.)  298,  33  L.  J.  C.  P.  235,  10 
Jur.  (N.  S.)  800,  10  L.  T.  380,  12 
W.  R.  802;  Bond  v.  Rosling,  1  B. 
&  S.  371,  30  L.  J.  Q.  B.  227,  8  Jur. 
(N.  S.)  78,  4  L.  T.  442,  9  W.  R. 
746.  And  the  statute  does  not 
prevent  the  instrument,  which  as 
containing  words  of  present  de- 
mise and  not  being  under  seal  is 
void  as  a  lease  from  being  en- 
forced in  equity.  Parker  v.  Tas- 
well,  2  De  G.  &  J.  559,  27  L.  J. 
Ch.  812,  4  Jur.  (N.  S.)  1006,  6  W. 
R.  608. 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES.  333 

cause  it  is  not  attested  and  it  may  be  enforced  either  at  law  or 
in  equity  on  proof  of  its  execution,  by  any  relevant  evidence. 
The  purpose  of  the  attestation  is  merely  to  provide  a  simple 
method  of  proof,  and  if  the  parties  wish  to  dispense  with  this 
method  of  proof  they  may  do  so.-^  If  a  statute  requires  that 
an  instrument  conveying  land  must  be  attested  by  two  witnesses 
a  lease  attested  by  one  witness  only,  conveys  no  interest  and  is 
not  entitled  to  record.  If  it  is  recorded  without  proper  attesta- 
tion the  record  confers  no  validity  upon  it.^^  In  some  of  the 
states  it  is  expressly  provided  by  statute  that  a  deed  to  be  valid 
must  be  attested  by  at  least  two  witnessess.^*  Hence,  in  these 
states  a  lease  executed  by  deed  would  be  invalid  unless  attested 
according  to  statute.  A  statute  which  provided  that  a  convey- 
ance of  freehold  interest  in  land  must  be  attested  does  not  re- 
quire that  leases  must  be  attested.  The  construction  which 
has  just  been  stated  in  regard  to  the  attestation  of  deeds  will  be 
applicable  to  the  attestation  of  leases.  So,  also,  the  competency 
of  attesting  witnesses  to  leases  is  to  be  determined  by  the  same 
rules  which  apply  to  thd  competency  of  witnesses  to  deeds. 
Thus,  as  the  grantee  in  a  deed  is  not  a  competent  witness  to  the 
deed,  so  by  analogy,  a.  lessee  is  not  a  competent  attesting  witness 
to  the  lessor's  execution  of  a  lease. -^  Usually,  disinterested  per- 
sons are  required  as  attesting  witnesses.^'    The  wife  of  a  lessee 

22Wiswall     V.     Ross,     4     Port  72;     Markley    v.    Swartzlander,    8 
(Ala.)    321;    Cocke    v.    Brogan,    5  Watts     &     S.     172;      Crockett     v. 
Ark.    693;     Jackson    v.    Allen,    30  Campbell,    21    Tenn.    411;    Mauley 
Ark.   110;    Reinliart  v.   Miller,   22  v.   Zeighler,  23  Tex.  88;    Quinney 
Ga.   402,  68   Am.   Dec.   506;    John-  v.    Denny,    18    Wis.    485;    Leinen- 
son  V.  Jones,  87  Ga.  85,  13  S.  E.  kugel    v.    Kehl,    73    Wis.    238,    40 
Rep.    261;     Dundy    v.    Chambers,  N.   W.   Rep.   683. 
23  111.  369;    Fitzhugh  v.  Croghan,  23  Langmede  v.  Weaver,  65  Ohio 
25    Ky.    429,    19    Am.    Dec.    139;  St.  17.  33,  60  N.  E.  Rep.  992. 
Dole    V.    Thurlow,    53    Mass.    157,  24  French  v.  French,  3  N.  H.  234; 
166;    Godfroy  v.  Disprow    (Mich.)  Stone  v.  Ashley,  13  N.  H.  38;  Pat- 
Walk.   Ch.   260;    Price   v.  Haynes,  terson's  Lessee  v.   Pease,   5  Ohio, 
37   Mich.   487;    Pearson   v.    Davis,  190;      Hendricks      v.      Huffmeyer 
41  Neb.  608,  59  N.  W.  Rep.  885;  (Tex),    27     S.    W.     777;     Day    v. 
Forsaith  v.  Clark,  21  N.  H.  409;  Adams,  42  Vt.  510. 
Van    Soligen    v.    Town    of    Harri-  25  Coleman  v.  State.  79  Ala.  49. 
son,   39  N.   J.   Law,   51;    Wood  v.  26  winsted  Saving  Bank  &  Build- 
Chapin,    13    N.    Y.    509;     Long   v.  ing  Ass'n  v.  Spencer,  26  Conn.  195. 
Ramsay  (Pa.)  1  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 


334 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


©r  of  a  lessor  would  not  be  a  competent  witness  to  attest  the 
lease.  ^'^ 

§  236.  The  necessity  for  an  acknowledgment.  As  between 
the  parties  to  it,  and  aside  from  any  question  of  record,  an  un- 
acknowledged lease  is  absolutely  valid  in  the  absence  of  an  ex- 
press statutory  provision  to  the  contrary.^*  So,  generally  a 
lease,  though  it  is  unacknowledged,  is  good  as  against  subsequent 
purchasers,  lessees  or  incumbrancers  with  actual  knowledge  of 
it.^®  If,  however,  a  statute  expressly  requires  that  a  lease  for 
a  term  of  years  shall  be  acknowledged  or  attested,  a  lease  not 
thus  acknowledged  or  attested  is  void.^"    Hence,  where  it  is  ex- 


2T  Corbett  v.  Norcross,  35  N.  H. 
99.  Where  there  are  no  attesting 
witnesses  to  a  lease  the  execution 
may  be  shown  either  by  proof  by 
some  person  who  saw  the  party 
sign  it  or  by  proving  the  party's 
handwriting.  If  the  instrument 
purports  to  have  been  attested,  the 
witnesses  must  be  called  or  their 
absence  accounted  for.  Though  at- 
testation may  be  dispensed  with,  it 
is  proper  to  add  that,  as  it  affords 
such  an  easy  and  effectual  mode 
of  proof  as  may  enable  a  lessee  to 
supply  the  want  of  an  acknowl- 
edgment and  attain  the  recording 
or  registration  of  his  lease,  where 
and  acknowledgment  is  lacking, 
and  adds  so  much  to  the  credit  of 
a  lease  or  deed,  every  conveyancer 
of  common  prudence,  and  every 
lessee  and  grantee  in  the  exercise 
of  due  care,  will  perceive  the  pro- 
priety of  having  his  lease  or  deed 
attested.  Dole  v.  Thurlow,  53 
Mass.  157,  163,  which  cites  Long 
V.  Ramsay,  1  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  72; 
Garrett  v.  Lister,  1  Lev.  25;  Swire 
V.  Bell,  5  T.  R.  371. 

28  Knowles  v.  Murphy,  107  Cal. 
107,  40  Pac.  Rep.  Ill;  Lake  v. 
Campbell,  18  111.  106;  Wiholni  v. 
Mertz,  4  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  54,  55; 
Simpson  V.   Mundoo,   3   Kan.    172; 


Cable  V.  Cable,  146  Pa.  St.  451,  23 
Atl.  Rep.  223,  29  W.  N.  C.  284; 
Clark  V.  Gellison,  20  Me.  18;  Bla- 
zier  V.  Johnson,  11  Neb.  404,  9  N. 
W.  Rep.  543;  Weaver  v.  Coumbe, 
15  Neb.  167,  171,  17  N.  W.  Rep. 
S57;  Stone  v.  Stone,  1  R.  I.  425; 
Town  of  Lemington  v.  Stevens,  48 
Vt.  38;  Buswell  v.  Marshall,  51 
Vt.  87;  McGlanflin  v.  Holman,  1 
Wash.  St.  239,  24  Pac.  Rep.  439; 
Schulte  V.  Schering,  2  Wash.  St. 
127,  26  Pac.  Rep.  78. 

29  Bass  Lake  Co.  v.  HoUenbeck, 
5  Ohio  Cir.  Dec.  242. 

30  A  lease  or  license  of  land  for 
the  production  of  oil  and  natural 
gas  is  within  a  statute  requiring 
certain  leases  of  an  estate  or  in- 
terest in  real  property  to  be  signed 
by  a  lessor,  and  to  be  acknowl- 
edged by  him  in  the  presence  of 
two  witnesses,  who  are  to  sub- 
scribe it  as  attesting  witnesses. 
The  fact  that  taking  natural  gas 
from  land  was  a  new  use  of  land 
arising  since  the  statute  was 
passed  is  not  material.  Such  an 
instrument  being  defectively  exe- 
cuted is  therefore  not  a  lease  at 
all.  It  is  totally  void  and  cannot 
be  given  any  validity  for  a  portion 
of  the  term.  Placing  it  on  record 
gives  the  lessee  no  rights  under  it. 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES.  335 

pressly  provided  by  a  statute  that  instruments  in  writing-  con- 
veying interests  in  land  shall  be  attested  or  acknowledged  by 
the  persons  making  the  same,  an  unattested  or  unacknowledged 
lease  is  void  even  as  between  the  parties  to  it.  Such  a  writing 
conveys  no  interest  to  the  lessee  nor  can  the  lessor  enforce  any 
covenant  therein  as  against  the  lessee.^^  A  statute  which  pro- 
vides that  any  deed  or  other  instrument  in  writing  shall  be 
acknowledged  by  the  maker  in  the  presence  of  witnesses,  in- 
cludes a  lease  which  is  void  and  conveys  nothing  if  it  is  not 
acknowledged.'^  In  Washington,  by  statute  a  lease  in  writing, 
if  unacknowledged,  is  valid  for  one  year  only.  The  part  per- 
formance by  the  lessee  of  a  void  unacknowledged  lease  for  a 
longer  period,  does  not  validate  it.^^  Though  a  lease  is  defective 
under  a  statute  providing  that  it  shall  be  acknowledged,  yet  the 
landlord  may  recover  rent  if  the  tenant  has  entered  and  had 
possession.^*  And  where  a  statute  provides  that  no  estate  in  the 
real  property  of  a  married  woman  passes  by  her  grant  or  by  any 
instrument  unless  the  same  is  acknowledged  by  her,  her  lease 
must  be  acknowledged.^^  A  lease  for  life  of  the  estate  of  a 
married  woman  signed  by  her,  but  not  acknowledged  as  re- 
quired by  statute,  is  void.'®  So  a  deed  by  which  a  husband  and 
his  wife  lease  her  interest  in  land  is  void,  unless  it  is  acknowl- 
edged by  her  where  the  statute  expressly  requires  that  the  wife 

The  record  is  not  notice  to  third  as   the   lessors   shall   continue   in 

parties.     Langmede  v.  Weaver,  65  ownership  does  not  come  within  a 

Ohio  St.  17,  33.  statute  requiring  the  acknowledg- 

31  Richardson  v.  Bates,  8  Ohio  ment  of  an  assignment  of  a  lease 
St.  257,  261;  Johnson's  Lessee  v.  for  a  longer  time  than  one  year, 
Haines,  2  Ohio,  55;  Abbott  v.  Bos-  since  the  lessor  may  remain  in 
worth,  36  Ohio  St.  605  (holding  possession  less  than  a  year.  Rick- 
that  the  lessee  acquires  only  an  ard  v,  Dana  (Vt.),  52  Atl.  Rep. 
equitable  title).     See  Anderson  v.  113. 

Critcher,  11  Gill  &  J.    (Md.)    450,  ss  Carlton    v.    Williams.   77   Cal. 

37    Am.    Dec.    72,    and    Stone    v.  89,  19   Pac.  Rep.   185,   11  Am.   St. 

Stone,  1  R.  I.  425,  428.  Rep.    243.      In    Illinois    under   the 

32  Richardson  v.  Bates,  8  Ohio  statute,  it  has  been  held  that  a 
St.  257,  261;  Ackinson  v.  Dailey,  1  lease  executed  by  a  married  wo- 
Hammond   (Ohio)   367.  man,   though   unacknowledged,    is 

33  Dorman  v.  Plowman,  41  binding  on  her.  Bradshaw  v.  At- 
Wash.  477,  83  Pac.  Rep.  322.  kins,  110  111.  323. 

34  Budgmans  v.  Wells,  13  Ohio.  88  Worthington's  Lessee  T. 
43;    Newstedt   v.    Scarborough.   13  Young,  6  Ohio,  313,  335. 

Ohio  Dec.  327.    A  lease  for  so  long 


336  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

shall  acknowledge  it.'^  Under  the  statute  providing  for  tlie  re- 
cording and  registering  of  deeds,  it  is  usually  absolutely  essential 
that  the  paper  should  be  properly  acknowledged  before  it  can  be 
recorded.  Where  this  is  the  case,  the  record  of  an  unacknowl- 
edged deed  or  other  instrument,  or  of  one  defectively  acknowl- 
edged, does  not  make  the  deed  or  instrument  notice  to  subsequent 
purchasers,  and  hence  the  recording  confers  no  priority 
upon  the  party  claiming  rights  under  the  instrument.'*  A  stat- 
ute which  merely  provides  that  conveyances  of  land  must  be 
acknowledged  in  order  to  be  valid  does  not  affect  a  lease,  for 
the  term  "land"  does  not  comprehend  chattel  interests  as  leases 
for  years.  Such  leases  while  they  are  interests  in  land  are  dis- 
tinct from  it  and  collateral  to  it.^^ 

§  237.  The  description  of  the  premises.  It  is  important  and 
in  fact  in  most  instances  indispensable  that  the  premises  leased 
should  be  properly  described  in  apt  words  and  clear  terms  so 
as  to  be  easy  of  identification.  If  the  description  is  vague  and 
indefinite  or  if  the  premises  are  not  described  with  such  a 
reasonable  degree  of  certainty  that  they  are  capable  of  identi- 
fication, the  lease  may  be  void.*"  Thus,  it  seems  a  description 
of  the  land  leased  by  metes  and  bounds,  but  not  containing  lan- 
guage indicating  the  township,  range,  county,  or  state  in  which 
it  is  located  is  void  for  uncertainty  and  the  lessee  cannot  be 

37  George    v.    Goldsby,    23    Ala.  (Vt.)  235;  Cox  v.  Wayt,  26  W.  Va. 

326.  807. 

3«  Haskill  V.  Sevier,  25  Ark.  152;  ss  See  Stone  v.  Stone,  1  R.  I.  425, 

Herndon  v.  Kimball,  7  Ga.  432,  50  428. 

Am.     Dec.    406;     Wickersham    v.  4o  Dixon   v.    Finnegan,    182    Mo. 

Zinc  Co.,  18  Kan.  481,  2"6  Am.  Rep.  Ill,  81  S.  W.  Rep.  449,  451;  Ding- 

784;    Graves    v.    Graves,    6    Gray,  man  v.  Kelley,  7  Ind.  717;  Reed  v. 

291;    Work    v.    Harper,    24    Miss.  Lewis,  74  Ind.  433,  438;  Bailey  v. 

517;   Heelan  v.  Hoagland,  10  Neb.  Wbite,  41  N.  H.  337;    Goodsell  v. 

511,  7  N.  W.  Rep.  2S2;   Langmede  Rutland-Canadian    R.    Co.,    75    Vt. 

V.  Weaver,  65  Ohio  St.  17,  33,  60  375,   56   Atl.   Rep.  7;    Bingham   v. 

N.  E.  Rep.  992,  996;   Betz  v.  Sny-  Honeyman,  32  Oreg.   129,  51  Pac. 

der,  48  Ohio  St.  492,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  Rep.  735;  Coppinger  v.  Armstrong, 

234;    McKean    and   Elk   Land   Co.  5   111.   App.   637;    Hay  v.   Cumber- 

V.  Mitchell,  35  Pa.  St.  269,  78  Am.  land,  25  Barb.  (N.  Y.)   594;   Patti- 

Dec.  335;    Cannon  v.   Demming,  3  son  v.  Hull,  9  Cow.   (N.  Y.)    747; 

S.  D.  421,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  863;  ?lois-  Proctor   v.   Pool,    4    Dev.    (N.   C.) 

ington     V.     Hoisington,     2     Aiken  370. 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES.  337 

held  for  rent  where  he  has  never  gone  into  possession.'*^  AAliat 
will  constitute  such  an  uncertainty  in  the  description  of  the 
premises  as  will  invalidate  the  lease,  depends  usually  on  the 
languap-e  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  Parol  evidence  is 
received  under  the  general  rules  to  identify  the  premises  which 
are  the  subject-matter  of  the  lease.  A  reference  in  the  descrip- 
tion to  the  premises  as  having  been  used  for  a  particular  busi- 
ness purpose  or  as  having  been  occupied  by  the  lessee  or  other 
person  is  usually  sufficient  to  make  the  description  certain  with 
the  aid  of  parol  evidence.*^  If  the  lessee  enters  into  possession 
under  the  lease,  he  is  liable  for  rent  for  the  period  of  his  occu- 
pation though  the  location  of  the  premises  does  not  appear  in 
the  lease,*^  or  the  description  is  in  some  respects  insufficient.** 
Generally  if  the  description  affords  means  or  suggestions  of 
fact  by  which,  with  the  invocation  and  aid  of  parol  evidence, 
the  premises  may  be  identified,  it  is  sufficiently  certain,  though 
in  minor  details  it  be  erroneous  or  inconsistent.*^  If,  in  the 
description  there  is  sufficient  to  enable  one  to  ascertain  with 
reasonable  certainty  what  premises  the  parties  to  the  instru- 
ment intended  to  lease,  it  will  be  ordinarily  a  sufficient  descrip- 
tion and  that  part  of  the  description  which  is  false  may  be  dis- 
regarded. For  it  is  ordinarily  unwise  to  describe  with  undue  par- 
ticularity and  minute  detail,  the  demised  premises  by  name,  or 
boundary',  or  past  or  present  ownership,  use  or  occupation  for 
where  many  facts  are  enumerated,  false  statements  are  apt  to 
creep  in  or  confusion  to  arise.  Hence,  the  question  may  occur 
to  what  extent  all  these  statements  must  be  consistent  with  one 
another  or  to  what  extent  general  words  of  description  are  to 
give  way  to  particular  words.*^    A  lease  of  "part  of  the  third 

« Bingham     v.     Honeyman,     32  Bulkley  v.  Devine,  127  111.  406,  20 

Oreg.  129,  51  Pac.  Rep.  735.  N.  E.  Rep.  16,  3  L.  R.  A.  330. 

<2  Andrew    v.    Carlilo,    4    Colo.  ^5  Vose    v.    Bradstreet,    27    Me. 

App.  336,  36  Pac.  Rep.  66.  156,  172;    Worthington  v.  Hylyer, 

43  Whipple  V.  Shewalter,  91  Ind.  4    Mass.    196,    205;     Campbell    v. 

114,  119,  also  holding  it  proper  to  Johnson,  44  Mo.  247;  Eggliston  v. 

admit   parol   evidence   to   identify  Bradford,  10  Ohio,  312,  316;    Put- 

the    premises;    Lush    v.   Druse,    4  nam  v.  Bond,  100  Mass.  58;  House 

Wend.   rN.  Y.)  313.  v.   Jackson,   24   Oreg.   29,   32    Pac. 

4'*  Hoyle   V.   Bush,    14    Mo.    App.  Rep.  1027. 
408;  Pierce  v.  Minturn,  1  Cal.  470;  46  where  land  is  leased  in  gross 

22 


338 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


story  and  attic  over  same"  in  an  identified  building  is  not  so  in- 
definite that  it  will  be  void  where  the  tenant  went  into  possession 
and  occupied  a  part  of  the  third  story  marked  off  by  a  partition.*'^ 
So  the  description  of  the  property  demised  as  ' '  314  acres  out  of 
the  southern  part  of "  a  section  is  sufficient  to  convey  the  interest 
in  the  south  half  of  the  survey.*^    A  reservation  or  exception  of  a 


there  can  be  no  question  that  the 
land  was  less  in  quantity  than  is 
mentioned  in  the  lease.  Leavitt  v. 
Murray,  Wright  (Ohio),  707.  In 
Dixon  V.  Finnegan,  182  Mo.  Ill, 
81  S.  W.  Rep.  44^,  451,  a  descrip- 
tion as  "160  acres  of  land  lying 
in  M.  county,  Missouri,  and  situ- 
ated in  sections  3  and  4,  in  town- 
ship 55,  range  8,"  was  held  too 
indefinite  and  the  lease  was  void. 
In  Bingham  v.  Honeyman,  32 
Oreg.  129,  51  Pac.  Rep.  735,  the 
court  said  "to  give  effect  to  a 
lease  of  real  property  it  must  de- 
scribe the  subject  matter  of  the 
demise  with  reasonable  certainty, 
either  by  express  words  or  by  ref- 
erence to  something  by  which  its 
location  can  be  ascertained,  and 
the  want  of  such  a  description 
will  render  the  lease  inoperative. 
No  action  for  rent  can  be  main- 
tained on  such  a  lease  where  there 
Is  no  entry  by  the  tenant.  In  this 
case  the  only  points  named  in  the 
description  were  the  boundary 
lines  of  certain  claims  and  low- 
water  marlc,  the  township  range, 
county  and  state  being  omitted 
with  nothing  in  the  instrument  to 
show  where  the  claims  were  lo- 
cated. And  though  there  is  a  ref- 
erence to  low-water  mark  there 
Is  no  reference  to  any  stream,  lake 
or  other  body  of  water.  If  the 
claims  had  been  designated  as  be- 
ing in  a  certain  county  or  locality 
the  description  might  have  been 
sufficient.   But  as  it  stands  the  de- 


scription is  clearly  insufficient  un- 
der the  principle  that  the  test  for 
determining  the  sufficiency  of  a 
description  is  whether  the  prop- 
erty can  be  identified  with  reason- 
able certainty  by  a  competent  sur- 
vey or  from  tlie  description  given. 
A  lease  of  land  "beginning  80 
yards  easterly  of  the  southwest 
part  of  my  farm"  was  held  void 
in  Goodsell  v.  Rutland-Canadian 
R.  Co.,  75  Vt.  375,  56  Atl.  Rep.  7. 
In  this  case  the  court  took  proof 
of  extrinsic  circumstances  and  the 
lessee  having  taken  possession  of 
land  which  he  supposed  was  in- 
cluded in  the  lease,  the  court  laid 
down  the  rule  that  under  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case  his  pos- 
session was  limited  to  the  part 
actually  occupied. 

47  Appleton  V.  O'Donnell,  173 
Ma:ss.  398,  53  N.  E.  Rep.  882. 

48  Santa  Rosa  Irr.  Co.  v.  Pecos 
River  Irr.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App. 
1906),  92  S.  W.  Rep.  1014.  In  the 
case  of  Crabtree  v.  Miller,  194 
Mass.  123,  80  N.  E.  Rep.  225,  the 
following  clause  descriptive  of  the 
demised  house  was  construed: 
"Buildings  numbered  625  to  631, 
inclusive,  together  with  the  base- 
ment under  said  premises,  mean- 
ing thereby  the  entire  buildings 
containing  stores  and  all  floors 
over  said  stores,  meaning  thereby 
all  the  real  estate  I  now  own  on 
W.  street,  excepting  the  building 
known  as  the  Park  Theater."  In 
this  case  the  landlord  also  owned 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OP  LEASES. 


339 


certain  number  of  acres  out  of  the  total  number  contained  in  a 
farm,  does  not  render  the  lease  void  for  uncertainty  because  the 
acres  accepted  are  not  specified  in  it.  The  right  of  selection  be- 
longs to  the  lessor  though  he  is  bound  not  to  exercise  it  arbitra- 
rily so  as  to  interfere  with  the  beneficial  use  or  enjoyment  of 
the  balance  of  the  farm  by  the  tenant.*^  The  careful  and  cer- 
tain description  of  the  premises  demised  is  absolutely  indispen- 
sable, not  only  for  the  purpose  of  identifying  the  premises,  but 
also  because  of  the  rule  that  nothing  passes  by  a  lease  except 
what  is  expressly  described  in  it,  or  what  is  absolutely  necessary 
to  it.  But  the  rule  that  the  premises  shall  be  described  with  cer- 
tainty does  not  prevent  a  description  which  may  have  to  be  made 
certain  by  the  use  of  parol  evidence.  Thus,  a  description  of  the 
property  leased  as  "being  the  building  now  or  lately  occupied 
by  A,"  or  "the  premises  known  as  A  farm,"  particularly  if  the 
locality  as  the  to^wn  or  city  is  designated  in  which  the  premises 
are  located,  is  sufficiently  certain  because  such  a  description, 
though  vague  furnishes  facts  by  which  the  premises  may  be  as- 
certained with  certainty.     This  is  a  very  familiar  rule  in  the 


several  adjacent  lots  upon  which 
there  were  a  hotel  and  theatre 
with  covered  passage  between  the 
two.  Over  the  passageway  and 
lobby  of  the  theatre  were  rooms 
which  were  used  as  rooms  in  the 
hotel.  There  were  also  other 
rooms  In  the  theatre  which  were 
used  in  connection  with  the  hotel. 
The  passageway  was  also  used  as 
an  exit  from  the  theatre.  The 
court  in  construing  a  lease  of  the 
hotel  by  the  above  description  held 
that  the  tenant  acquired  no  right 
in  the  court  except  to  use  it  as 
an  appurtenance  to  the  hotel. 

*9  Jenkins  v.  Green,  27  Beav. 
437,  28  L.  J.  Ch.  817,  5  Jur.  (N.  S.) 
304,  7  W.  R.  304.  A  description 
of  the  premises  as  "Zeringue's 
Landing  under  Nine  Mile  Point" 
is  sufficient  where  this  name  by 
common  use  has  come  to  desig- 
nate a  particular  place.  Wood  v. 
Sala  y  Fabrigas,  105  La.  1,  29  So. 


Rep.  367.  Thus  a  lease  of  the 
Jackson  Ranch,  situated  in  Sau- 
vies  Island,  and  with  a  reference 
to  deeds  from  A.  to  B.  in  which 
the  premises  had  been  conveyed 
together  with  a  statement  of  the 
quantity  of  land  is  sufficient. 
House  V.  Jackson,  24  Oreg.  89,  32 
Pac.  Rep.  1027.  A  description 
which  bounds  the  leased  premises 
by  a  line  "commencing  at  low- 
water  mark  at  the  lower  mouth  of 
Big  Creek"  and  running  thence, 
etc.,  and  back  to  the  "starting 
point"  is  sufficient.  Fraser  v. 
State,  112  Ga.  13,  37  S.  E.  Rep. 
114.  On  the  other  hand,  a  de- 
scription "beginning  80  rods 
easterly  of  the  southwest  part  of 
my  farm  and  extending  northerly 
to  the  north  line  of  land  owned  by 
me"  renders  the  lease  void  for  un- 
certainty. Goodsell  V.  Rutland- 
Canadian  R.  Co.,  75  Vt.  375,  66 
Atl.  Rep.  7. 


340  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

construction  of  written  instruments.  The  practice  is  to  admit 
parol  evidence  to  show  the  former  or  present  occupancy  of  the 
premises,  or  to  show  the  name  by  which  they  were  known  and 
when  these  facts  are  ascertained  the  description  becomes  certain. 
So,  a  description  of  the  premises  demised  as  certain  premises 
conveyed  to  the  lessor  by  a  person  named  is  good  whether  the 
deed  of  conveyance  is  referred  to  in  the  lease  or  not.  If  the  deed 
is  referred  to  it  becomes  relevant  by  this  reference,  and  is  in 
theoiy  a  part  of  the  lease.  Such  descriptions  are  not,  however, 
advisable,  and  should,  whenever  possible,  be  avoided,  as  they 
have  a  certain  element  of  uncertainty  about  them  which,  under 
some  circumstances  it  may  be  impossible  to  remove.  Thus,  for 
example,  the  description  of  premises  as  having  been  occupied 
by  a  certain  person  located  in  a  certain  town  or  village  may  be 
ambiguous  when  it  is  ascertained  that  the  person  named  occu- 
pied or  occupies  two  separate  dwellings  in  the  same  town.  So, 
where  premises  are  described  as  the  farm  or  building  which 
* '  was  conveyed  to  the  lessor  by  A "  and  located  in  a  certain  town 
and  there  are  several  premises  conveyed  by  A  there  is  a  latent 
ambiguity  which  renders  the  description  very  doubtful.  Where 
a  lease  is  made  of  a  farm  "now  in  the  possession  of  A,"  no  more 
will  pass  than  that  portion  of  the  farm  which  A  was  in  actual 
possession  of  when  the  lease  was  made  and  if  any  part  of  the 
farm  was  reserved  in  A's  lease,  it  will  not  pass  to  the  new  lessee 
though  it  is  not  reserved  in  the  lease  made  to  him  though  such 
reservation  was  not  actually  intended  by  the  parties.^" 

§  238.  The  description  of  the  parties.  The  rule  of  the  law 
of  contracts  that  the  parties  to  the  contract  must  be  certain  or 
ascertainable  is  applicable  to  written  leases.  The  general  rules 
of  law  relating  to  the  parties  to  a  written  contract  require  that 
they  should  be  either  expressly  named  or  indicated  in  such  a 
way  that  their  identity  can  be  ascertained.  Hence,  if  the  par- 
tics  to  a  written  contract  do  not  appear  designated  in  tlie  instru- 
ment itself,  and  if  there  is  nothing  in  the  transaction  which  shows 
who  they  are,  the  writing  is  void.'^^  Hence,  good  practice  re- 
quires the  names  of  the  parties  to  the  lease  to  be  stated  correctly 
and  filled  in  the  body  of  the  instrument,  but  a  mistake  in  the 

fo  Bartlott  v.  Wright,  Cro.  Eliz.  Mayo  v.  Chenewoth,  1  111.  (Breese) 
299.  200;    Brown   v.    Gilman,   13   Mass 

61  Webster  v.  Ela,  5  N.  11.  540;       158;  Ball  v.  Allen,  15  Mass.  433. 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OP  LEASES.  341 

name,  whether  of  the  lessor  or  of  the  lessee  does  not  invalidate 
the  lease  if  the  parties  can  be  ascertained  either  from  the  other 
elements  of  the  description  or  from  parol  evidence.^-  So,  a 
mistake  in  the  name  of  a  party,  whether  of  an  individual  or  a 
corporation,  will  not  invalidate  the  lease.^^  And  even  omitting 
the  name  of  the  lessor  from  the  granting  clause  of  the  lease  may 
be  disregarded  if  it  can  be  ascertained  who  he  is.^*  A  misde- 
scription of  the  lessee  or  lessor  in  a  lease  where  neither  party  is 
misled  thereby  does  not  render  the  instrument  invalid.  Thus  the 
word  ' '  incorporated ' '  inserted  after  the  names  of  the  lessors  who 
were  in  fact  partners  in  business,  does  not  in  any  manner  affect 
the  binding  character  of  the  lease,  where  the  lessors  in  signing 
the  lease  signed  as  partners  and  not  as  a  corporation.  Under 
such  circumstances,  the  lessee  would  be  absolutely  protected  in 
paying  the  rent  to  the  lessors  as  though  they  were  a  firm  and  iu 
taking  receipts  from  them  in  that  capucity.^^  A  contract  which 
firm  would  be  valid  though  only  one  person  constituted  the 
would  include  a  lease,  obtained  in  good  faith  in  the  name  of  the 
firm.^^  The  omission  from  the  lease  of  the  individual  names 
of  the  members  of  the  two  firms  w*ho  are  named  in  the  lease  as 
lessor  and  lessee  is  not  material  nor  are  they  released  from  their 
individual  liability  as  the  partners  may  by  a  subsequent  ratifi- 
cation make  the  lease  binding  on  them  to  the  same  extent  as 
though  their  names  were  written  in  it.^'  Hence,  it  follows  that 
a  party  whose  name  was  intended  to  be  in  the  instrument  but 
which  was  omitted  from  it  may,  by  his  subsequent  conduct  ia 
accepting  benefits  of  it,  become  liable  as  a  party  to  it.  But  on 
the  other  hand,  a  person  whose  name  is  not  in  the  body  of  the 
lease  as  a  party  is  not  personally  liable  thereon  though  he  signed 
the  lease   and  acknowledged   it.^^     Again   where   a   lease   was 

52  Lyon    V.    Kain,    36    111.    362;  si  Schulte  v.  Schering,  2  Wash. 
Montanye  v.  Wallahan,  84  111.  355;  St.  127,  26  Pac.  Rep.  78. 
Medway  Cotton  Co.  v.  Adams,   10  ss  Julicher   v.    Connelly,    102    N. 
Mass.  360;   Dodd  v.  Bartholomew,  Y.  Supp.  620. 

44  Ohio  St.  171,  5  N.  E.  Rep.  866;  se  in  re  Pelican  Ins.  Co.,  47  La. 

In  re  Pelican  Co.,  47  La.  Ann.  935,  Ann.  935,  17  So.  Rep.  427. 

17  So.  Rep.  427;   Games  v.  Stiles,  »"  Golding  v.  Brennan,  183  Mass. 

14  Pet.  (U.  S.)  322.  286.  67  N.  E.  Rep.  239. 

53  McCarthy  v.    Noble,    5   N.   Y.  ss  Barusdall   r.   Boley,   119   Fed. 
380;  Hacket  v.  Marmet  Co.,  8  U.  S.  Rep.  191,  195. 

App.    150,   52   Fed.   Rep.    268,   273, 
3  C.  C.  A.  76. 


342 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


sigrned  by  a  person  whose  name  was  not  on  the  lease  at  all  nor 
even  in  the  attestation  clause,  he  was  held  not  to  be  liable  for 
the  rent  as  a  lessee  though  if  he  had  accepted  the  benefits  con- 
ferred by  the  lease  he  would  unquestionably  be  precluded  from 
denying  his  liability  by  showing  that  his  name  was  signed  to 
the  lease.^^  Inasmuch  as  the  law  recognizes  only  one  christian 
name,  the  insertion  or  omission  of  a  middle  name  of  a  party  is 
immaterial.^"  Finally,  it  may  be  said  that  if  there  is  nothing 
in  the  language  of  the  lease  or  provable  from  the  circumstances 
of  the  case  which  will  indicate  who  is  mentioned  by  the  imper- 
fectly expressed  name,  the  lease  may  be  declared  void  for  un- 
certainty.^^ 

.  §  239.  The  date  of  the  lease.  At  a  common  law,  that  is  to 
say,  in  the  absence  of  any  statute  requiring  a  written  contract 
to  be  dated,  an  instrument  in  writing  including  a  deed  was  valid 
though  the  date  of  its  execution  was  omitted  from  it.®^  So,  also, 
the  omission  of  a  date  from  the  acknowledgment  which  is  at- 


59  Evans  v.  Conklin,  24  N.  Y. 
Siipp.  1081,  71  Hun,  536,  54  N.  Y. 
St.  Rep.  915.  For  the  general  rule 
of  the  law  of  contracts  under 
which  the  signing  of  a  contract 
by  one  not  named  therein  It  ren- 
ders him  liable.  Kendall  v.  Ken- 
dall, 7  Me.  171;  Staples  v. 
Wheeler,  38  Me.  372;  Clarke  v. 
Rawson,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.)  135; 
Thompson  v.  Goble,  16  Pac.  Rep. 
713.  Contra,  Lancaster  v.  Rob- 
erts, 144  111.  213,  33  N.  E.  Rep. 
27;  Evans  v.  Conklin,  71  Hun,  536, 
21  N.  Y.  Supp.  1081,  54  N.  Y.  St. 
Rep.  915. 

«o  Games  v.  Stiles,  14  Pet.  (U. 
S.)  322;  Lyons  v.  Kain,  36  111. 
362. 

91  Webster  v.  Ela,  5  N.  H.  540; 
Marshall  v.  White's  Creek  Turn- 
pike Co..  7  Cold.  (Tenn.)  252.  In 
r.arnsdall  v.  Boloy,  119  Fed.  Rep. 
191,  it  was  held  that  a  lease  signed 
by  the  lessor  but  which  did  con- 
tain his  name  in  the  body  of  it 
was  void  and  created  no  terra  for 


no  one  can  be  bound  by  a  leas^ 
who  is  not  a  party  to  it  and  no 
one  can  be  a  party  to  a  lease  who 
is  not  mentioned  and  referred 
therein,  citing  Adams  v.  Medsker, 
25  W.  Va.  127;  Bell  v.  Allen's 
Adm'r,  3  Munf.   (Va.)  118. 

62  Seldonridge  v.  Connoble,  32 
Ind.  375;  Pierce  v.  Richardson,  37 
N.  H.  306;  Dean  v.  De  Lezardi, 
24  Miss.  424;  Fash  v.  Blake,  44 
111.  302  (lease);  Thompson  v. 
Thompson,  9  Ind.  323;  Lee  v.  Mas- 
sachusetts Ins.  Co.,  6  Mass.  208; 
Banning  v.  Eades,  6  Minn.  402; 
.Jackson  v.  Schoonmaker,  2  Johns. 
.(N.  Y.)  230,  234  (lease);  Center 
V.  Morrison,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  155; 
Giles  V.  Bourne,  6  M.  &  S.  73;  Sol- 
oman  v.  Evans,  3  McCord  (S.  C.) 
274;  Simmons  v.  Trumbo,  9  W. 
Va.  358;  Fournier  v.  Cyr,  64  Me. 
32;  Supreme  Council  Catholic 
Knights  of  America  v.  Fidelity  & 
Ca.sualty  Co.,  63  Fed.  Rep.  48,  ll 
C.  C.  A.  90,  22  U.  S.  App.  439. 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES, 


343 


taohecl  to  a  lease  may  be  disregarded  and  will  not  invalidate  the 
writing  nor  authorize  a  recording  officer  to  refuse  to  place  it 
on  record  providing  the  date  can  be  supplied  by  parol  evidence.®^ 
A  lease  which  has  no  date  in  it  and  which  also  fails  to  state 
when  the  lessee  goes  into  possession  or  which  bears  a  date  on 
which  it  is  impossible  that  it  should  have  been  executed,  as  for 
example,  where  it  is  dated  the  30th  day  of  February,  will  oper- 
ate from  its  delivery.®^^  All  written  instruments  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  executed  and  written  upon  the  day  of  the 
date  which  appears  in  them,  though  this  presumption  may  be  re- 
butted by  showing  that  that  date  is  an  error. "^^^  Parol  evidence 
is  also  receivable  to  show  that  a  date  inserted  in  a  lease  or  other 
writing  is  erroneous. ^"^ 

§  240.  The  date  of  the  commencement  of  the  term.  It  is  al- 
ways advisable  to  specify  explicitly  in  the  lease  the  date  upon 
which  the  term  is  to  begin.  If  no  term  is  mentioned  in  the  lease 
and  is  not  ascertainable  by  constniing,  the  lease  will  be  held 
void  for  uncertainty.^*    If,  from  the  lease  or  by  construction,  it 


63  Rackleff  V.  Norton,  19  Me. 
274;  Wickes  v.  Caulk,  5  H.  &  H. 
(Md.)  36;  Huxley  v.  Harrold,  62 
Mo.  516;  Lea  v.  Polk,  etc.,  Co.,  21 
How.  (U.  S.)  493. 

C3a  4  Coke  Litt.  46  B;  Keys  v. 
Dearborn,  12  N.  H.  52;  Trustees, 
etc.,  V.  Robinson,  Wright  (Ohio) 
436;  Jackson  v.  Schoonmaker,  2 
Johns,  (N.  Y.)  231;  Church  v.  Gil- 
man,  15  Wend.   (N.  Y.)   656. 

63b  Overton  v.  Matthews,  35 
Ark.  147,  37  Am.  Rep.  9;  Inglish 
V.  Breneman,  5  Ark.  377,  41  Am. 
Dec.  96;  Le  May  v.  Williams,  32 
Ark.  166;  Billing  v.  Stark,  15  Fla. 
297;  Hamilton  v.  Wood,  70  Ind. 
306;  Bank  of  Commonwealth  v. 
McChord,  4  Dana  (Ky.)  191;  Lisle 
V.  Rogers,  18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  528; 
Cutts  V.  York,  etc.,  Co.,  18  Me. 
190;  Harrison  v.  Phillips  Acad- 
emy, 12  Mass.  456;  Smith  v.  Por- 
ter, 10  Gray  (Mass.)  66;  Gardener 
V.  Webber,  17  Pick.   (Mass.)    407; 


Aubuchon  v.  McKnight,  1  Mo.  312, 
13  Am.  Dec.  502;  Britton  v.  Dier- 
ker,  46  Mo.  591;  Crawford  v.  West 
Side  Bank,  100  N.  Y.  50;  Meadows 
V.  Cozart,  76  N.  C.  450;  Brown  v. 
Straw,  6  Neb.  5S6;  Stephen  v.  Gra^ 
ham,  7  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  505,  10  Dec. 
Am.  485;  Heffner  v.  Wenrich,  32 
Pa.  St.  432;  Wood  v.  Steele,  6 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  80;  Outhwaite  v. 
Luntley,  4  Camp.  179;  Walton  v. 
Hastings,  4  Camp.  223,  1  Starke  R. 
215;  Cardwell  v.  Martin,  9  East, 
180;  Master  v.  Miller,  4  T.  R.  320, 
2  N.  Bl.  140:  Vance  v.  Lowther,  45 
L.  J.  Ex.  200,  L.  R.  1  Ex.  D.  176; 
Sinclair  v.  Baggley,  4  M.  &  W.  312. 

c3c  Nail  V.  Cazenove,  4  East,  477. 
See  Stele  v.  Martin,  4  B.  &  C.  273; 
Cooper  V.  Robinson,  10  M.  &  W. 
•  694 ;  Jaynes  v.  Hughes,  10  Ex. 
430;  Rex  v.  Flintshire,  3  Dowl.  & 
L.  537;  Reffel  v.  Reffel,  1  L.  R. 
P.  &  D.  139. 

64  Kirsley  v.  Duck,  2  Vern.  684. 


344  L.VW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

cannot  be  ascertained  when  the  term  begins  the  lease  will  be 
void.  For  in  order  that  a  written  instrument  shall  be  valid  as  a 
lease  it  must  be  for  a  term  which  is  certain  or  which  can  be  as- 
certained. Hence,  a  writing  which  conveys  the  right  to  mine 
until  all  mineral  shall  be  exhausted  is  not  a  lease  because  it  is 
impossible  to  ascertain  when  the  mineral  shall  be  exhausted." 
The  date  upon  which  the  term  is  to  begin  may  be  shown  by  any 
parol  evidence  which  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  the 
lease.  An  instrument  is  not  invalid  as  a  lease  because  the  term 
is  not  specified  in  definite  language  if  the  beginning  or  duration 
of  the  term  can  be  ascertained  by  parol  evidence.'^®  Thus,  for 
example,  where  there  is  a  manifest  clerical  error  in  the  lan- 
guage of  the  lease  by  which  the  length  of  the  term  is  made  to 
appear  ambiguous,  a  counterpart  of  the  lease  may  be  looked  at 
by  the  court  to  ascertain  where  the  mistake  is,  and  the  counter- 
part will  be  controlling  providing  it  is  clear  and  free  from  am- 
biguity.®^ The  difficulty  is  usually  not  so  much  in  ascertaining 
the  length  of  the  tenn  but  is  ascertaining  the  date  upon  which 
the  term  begins.  If  the  date  upon  which  the  term  is  to  begin 
can  be  ascertained  from  the  lease  or  from  parol  evidence,  it  is 
clear  that  the  length  and  the  date  of  the  expiration  of  the  term 
can  usually  be  very  easily  ascertained  with  all  the  elements  of 
vagueness  and  uncertainty  removed.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  a 
rule  that  where  the  parties  in  the  lease  have  not  specified  the 
date  upon  which  the  term  is  to  begin  with  the  date  on  which  the 
lessee  entered  into  possession,  will  be  the  first  day  of  the  term.^* 
Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  valid  lease  for  a  term  commencing  in  the 
future  where  the  date  of  the  beginning  of  the  future  term  is 
not  mentioned,  the  necessary  element  of  certainty  in  the  com- 
mencement of  the  future  term  is  met  by  the  tenant  going  into 
possession  and  paying  rent  under  the  lease.  And  the  tenant 
cannot  thereafter  assert  that  his  term  was  uncertain.*^"  So, 
where  a  tenant  moved  in  and  paid  five  months'  rent  in  advance 
and  which  the  landlord  received  under  an  oral  agreement  for  a 

«■'.  Hobart     v.     Murniy,     54     Mo.  P.  115,  2  C.  P.  D.  88.  35  L.  T.  690, 

App.  249.  25  W.  R.  334. 

«<;  Lovelock  v.  Franklyn,  8  Q.  B.  csEberlien  v.  Abel,  10  111.  App. 

371,    16   L.    J.   Q.    B.    182.    11    Jur.  626. 
1035.  GO  Hammond  v.  Barton,  93  Wis. 

67  Biircholl  V.  Clark,  46  L.  J.  C.  183,  67  S.  W.  Rep.  412. 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES. 


345 


lease  for  a  term  of  years,  but  which  fixed  no  date  for  the  com- 
mencement of  the  term  of  years,  it  was  held  that  the  term  began 
when  the  tenant  moved  in/''  So,  the  day  possession  was  given 
is  the  date  from  which  the  lease  was  to  commence,  under  an 
agreement  for  a  lease  of  a  public  house  which  provided  for  a 
term  of  three  years  with  an  option  to  renew  for  another  seven 
years  and  for  possession  to  be  given  "within  one  month  from 
this  date."  ^^  The  circumstance  that  a  lessee  took  possession  of 
the  premises  on  the  day  from  which  the  computation  of  the  term 
is  made,  is  a  very  strong  indication  that  the  term  was  to  begin 
on  that  day  and  was  to  expire  the  midnight  of  the  day  preced- 
ing that  date  in  some  subsequent  year  when  the  lease  is  for  . 
term  of  years.'-  In  determining  when  an  oral  lease  is  to  com- 
mence, the  juiy  may  take  into  consideration  the  time  when  the 
lessee  went  into  possession,  the  time  from  which  he  paid  rent, 
and  all  other  circumstances  in  connection  with  the  lease  which 
throw  any  light  upon  the  question  of  when  the  term  is  to  com- 
mence.''    Thus,  if  the  rent  is  to  be  paid  in  advance  on  the  tiret 


70  Fegreisen  v.  Sanchez,  90  111. 
App.  105. 

Ti  In  re  Lander's  Contract 
(1S92),  3  Ch.  41. 

72  Buchanan  v.  Whitman,  151 
N.  Y.  253,  45  N.  E.  Rep.  556,  557, 
3  Ann.  Cases,  349,  affirming  76 
Hun,  67,  59  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  619,  27 
N.  Y.  Supp.  604. 

T3  Pendill  v.  Neuberger,  67  Mich. 
562,  35  N.  W.  Rep.  249.  See,  also, 
Meeks  v.  Ring,  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  117, 
119,  51  Hun,  329.  The  parties  may 
agree  among  themselves  what 
meaning  to  give  a  lease  or  a  term 
which  begins  from  the  date  of  the 
lease.  Where  the  term  extends  to 
one  "year  from  the  date  thereof," 
the  fact  that  the  parties  took  pos- 
session on  that  date  is  a  construc- 
tion of  the  lease,  and  is  conclusive 
that  they  intended  that  it  should 
begin  on  that  date  and  conclude 
at  midnight  on  the  preceediug  day 
of   the   next   year.      Buchanon   v. 


Wliitman,  151  N.  Y.  253,  256,  3 
Ann.  Cases,  349,  45  N.  E.  Rep.  556, 
affirming  76  Hun,  67,  27  N.  Y. 
Supp.  604,  59  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  619. 
The  term  of  a  tenant  under  an 
agreement  that  he  shall  quit  at 
three  months'  notice,  commences 
on  the  date  when  he  enters,  in  the 
absence  of  any  provision  expressly 
fixing  the  day  upon  which  the 
term  commences.  So,  where  he 
enters  under  such  an  agreement 
at  the  middle  of  one  of  the  usual 
quarters  his  term  begins  from  that 
day  and  his  tenancy  can,  under 
such  circumstances  be  terminated 
by  the  landlord  giving  a  notice  to 
quit  which  expires  on  that  day  of 
the  year,  or  some  other  quarter 
day  computed  from  that  date.  The 
court,  in  laying  down  these  rules, 
applied  it  generally  to  all  parol 
leases,  under  which  it  said  that 
no  interest  exists  until  the  tenant 
went  into  possession,  particularly 


346  LAW  OP  lANDLOED  AND  TENANT. 

day  of  the  term  or  of  each  month  or  quarter  it  will  be  readily 
presumed  that  in  the  case  of  a  lease  to  begin  on  the  first  day  of 
a  month  stated  the  first  day  is  included  in  the  termJ*  But  it 
has  also  been  held  that  where  the  lease  itself  fijxes  no  day  upon 
which  the  term  is  to  begin,  that  it  begins  at  the  date  of  the  in- 
strument/^ or  from  its  delivery."^^^  In  a  case  of  a  tenancy  from 
month  to  month  where  a  tenant  who  goes  into  possession  during 
the  month  pays  rent  to  the  first  day  of  the  following  month,  his 
tenancy  will  be  deemed  to  commence  with  the  day  to  which  he 
has  paid.'®  It  may  sometimes  be  necessary  in  determining  the 
commencement  of  the  term  to  draw  a  line  of  distinction  between 
the  time  when  the  enjoyment  and  occupation  of  the  premises 
is  to  begin  and  the  time  from  which  the  instrument  itself  is  to 
run.  The  two  are  not  always  synonymous.  Thus,  the  posses- 
sion may  be  expressly  agreed  upon  to  begin  on  a  day  in  the  fu- 
ture though  running  in  computation  of  time  from  a  present  or 
past  day.  Thus,  a  lease  may  be  given  to  have  and  to  hold 
from  the  first  day  of  January  next  for  the  term  of  ten  years, 
the  term  to  begin  from  the  date  of  the  lease  or  from  a  prior 
date  thereto.'^  In  the  case  of  a  lease  dated  on  one  day, 
habendum  from  a  day  preceding,  the  term  begins  from  the  date 

where  the  lease  is  invalid  under  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  231.  A  lease  for 
the  statutes  of  frauds.  If  a  parol  a  term  of  years  "next  ensuing  the 
lease  is  valid  the  landlord's  only  day  written,"  commences  on  the 
remedy  upon  it  is  where  the  ten-  day  and  date  of  the  lease,  and  a 
ant  has  not  entered  an  action  notice  of  the  election  of  the  ten- 
upon  the  agreement  to  pay  rent.  ant  to  terminate  the  lease  given 
If  the  tenant  neglected  to  pay  rent  on  the  same  day  of  the  month,  a 
before  entering  the  landlord  may  year  later,  is  too  late,  as  the  sec- 
put  an  end  to  the  lease  by  taking  ond  year  has  begun  for  the  rent 
possession  of  the  premises,  or  he  of  which  the  tenant  may  be  held, 
may,  at  his  election,  let  them  lay  Nesbit  v.  Godfrey,  155  Pa.  St.  251, 
idle  and  vacant  and  sue  for  the  25  Atl.  Rep.  621,  following  Lysle 
rent.  Kemp  v.  Derritt,  3  Camp.  v.  Williams.  15  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  136; 
510.  Marys  v.  Anderson,  24  Pa.  St.  272. 

74  Meeks  v.  Ring,  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  7«  Ver     Steeg     v.     Becker-More 

117,  119,  51  Hun,  329.  Paint    Co.,   106    Mo.   App.    257,    SO 

TBKeyes  v.   Dearborn,  12  N.  H.  S.  W.  Rep.  346,  351;  Doe  v.  John- 

52;  Enys  v.  Donnithorne,  2  Burr.  son,  6  Esp.  10. 

1197;     Rowe     v.     Huntington,     1  773    Bac.    Abr.    425;    Rol.    Abr. 

Vaughan,  73.  350;  Engs  v.  Donnithorne,  2  Burr. 

76a  Jackson    v.    Schoonmaker,    2  1190. 


FORM  AND  EXECUTION  OF  LEASES.  347 

though  the  lessee  had  a  right  to  an  earlier  possession.'"  A  lease 
for  a  term  of  years  of  a  building  in  process  of  construction  and 
which  the  lease  recites  is  to  be  completed  on  a  day  therein  speci- 
fied, does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  term  is  to  begin  upon 
the  day  on  or  by  which  the  building  is  to  be  completed  and  that 
if  the  building  is  not  completed,  the  lease  shall  not  bind  the  les- 
see. The  recital  of  the  date  upon  which  the  building  was  to  be 
completed  may  be  presumed  to  be  mere  matter  of  description 
pointing  out  what  property  is  to  be  leased  leaving  the  com- 
mencement of  the  term  to  be  determined  by  the  jury  from  all 
the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.  And  where  in  the  lease 
itself  or  in  some  other  instrument,  the  lease  is  spoken  of  as  com- 
mencing on  the  completion  of  the  building  and  running  for  a 
specified  period  thereafter,  the  term  will  commence  upon  the 
completion  of  the  demised  premises  and  not  upon  any  date  speci- 
fied by  the  parties  when  that  event  shall  take  place.'*  In  deter- 
mining the  exact  day  or  date  upon  which  a  term  begins  and 
ends,  the  courts,  in  modem  times  at  least,  are  not  guided  or  do 
not  recognize  any  express  rule  or  presumption  of  law,  or  any 
particular  or  technical  meaning  of  the  word  "day"  or  "date," 
but  are  guided  rather  by  the  language  of  the  lease  which  is  as- 
sumed to  express  all  the  intention  of  the  parties;  and  by  the 
facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.^°  In  the  absence  of  any 
particular  expression  of  an  intention  to  the  contrary,  if  a  lease 
for  years,  or  from  year  to  year,  bearing  a  certain  date,  is  to 
run,  or  "to  have  and  hold"  from  that  date,  the  term  usually 
begins  on  the  day  following  that  date,  and  the  day  of  the  dat« 

T8  Mayn  v.  Beak,  Cro.  Eliz.  515.  the  day  of  the  date  of  the  lease 
This  is  a  subject  on  which  a  great  was  included  in  computing  the 
diversity  of  opinion  is  prevalent.  time  and  the  court  took  into  con- 
Lord  Mansfield  in  Pugh  v.  Duke  sideration  in  thus  construing  the 
of  Leeds,  Cowper,  714,  says  that  lease  that  rent  was  made  payable 
"from  the  date"  meant  either  in-  on  the  first  days  of  April,  July, 
eluding  or  excluding  the  day  ac-  October  and  January,  in  each 
cording  to  the  context  and  subject  year.  Deyo  v.  Bleakley,  24  Barb, 
matter.     In  other  words  the  com-  (N.  Y.)  9. 

putation    of    time    should    always  "o  Noyes  v.   Longhead,   9  Wash, 

conform  to  the  manifest  intention  325,  329,  37  Pac.  Rep.  452,  453. 

of    the    parties.      Thus,    where    a  so  Pugh  v.  Duke  of  Leeds,  Cowp. 

term  was   granted   for  five   years  714:   Ackland  y.  Lutley,  9  Ad.  & 

from  the  first  day  of  April,  1S53,  E.  879. 


348  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

is  excluded  in  computing  the  duration  of  the  term.--  On  the 
other  hand,  where  the  intention  of  the  parties  clearly  called  for 
such  a  construction,  it  has  been  held  that  a  lease  to  run  from 
a  particular  day  specified  included  tliat  date.^^  An  agreement 
for  a  future  lease  in  a  building  which  was  not  completed,  for  a 
term  of  five  years  from  the  completion  of  the  building,  is  defi- 
nite, and  the  term  begins  when  the  building  is  complete.  There 
need  be  no  covenant  in  the  lease  that  the  lessor  shall  complete 
the  building,  for  the  completion  of  the  building  is  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  commencement  of  the  term.  The  fact  that  the 
lessee  goes  into  possession  and  pays  rent  indicates  that  the  par- 
ties have  agreed  that  the  building  is  complete  and  there  is  no 
objection  to  the  lease  on  the  ground  of  mutuality.^ 

§  241.  The  necessity  of  the  delivery  of  the  lease.  Inasmuch 
as  a  deed  takes  effect  only  from  its  delivery  by  the  maker  to  the 
grantee,  or  to  some  person  authorized  by  the  grantee  to  receive 
the  deed  where  a  lease  is  made  by  writing  under  seal,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  its  validity  as  a  lease,,  that  it  shall  be  delivered  either 
to  the  lessee  or  to  his  authorized  agent.  The  general  rules  of 
law  which  involve  the  delivery  of  deeds  are  applicable  to  a 
written  lease  under  seal  and  will  be  found  cited  in  the  notes.^' 

82Goode  V.  Webb,  52  Ala.   452;  hereof,  was  held  to  expire  on  April 

McGlynn    v.    Moore,    25    Cal.    384;  7th    of    the    next    year.      A    lease 

Kendall  v.  Kingsley,  120  Mass.  94;  which  is  to  operate  from  the  mak- 

Atkins  V.  Sleeper,  7  Allen  (Mass.)  ing    thereof,    or    from    henceforth 

487;  Thornton  v.  Payne,  5  Johns.  will  prima  facie  be   presumed  to 

(N.   Y.)    74;    Wilcox   v.   Wood,   9  operate  from  the  date  of  its  deliv- 

Wend.   (N.  Y.)  346;  Marys  v.  An-  ery.     4   Coke  Lit.  46b.     Where  a 

derson,  24  Pa.  St.  272,  276,  2  Grant  lease   was   dated   March   25,    1783, 

Cases,  446;    Lysle  v.  Williams,  15  and  habendum  "from  the  13th  of 

S.  &  R.  (Pa.)   135;  Nesbit  v.  God-  March    now    last    past,"    and    the 

frey,  155  Pa.  St.  251,  25  Atl.  Rep.  deed  was  not  executed  until  scme- 

621;  Wilkinson  v.  Gaston,  9  Q.  B.  time  after  the  date,  the  term  com- 

137;    Pellew  v.  Wonford,  9   Barn.  menced    on    the    25th    of    March, 

&  Cress.  134;  Webb  v.  Fairmaner,  1783,    and    not    on    the    25th    of 

3  Mee.  &  Wei.  473;   4  Coke,  46&.  March,  1782.     Stule  v.  Mart,  6  D. 

8:iFox  V.  Nathans,  32  Conn.  348;  &  R.  392,  4  B.  &  C.  272,  28  R.  R. 

Deyo  V.  Bleakley,  24  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  256. 

9;   Trull  v.  Granger,  8  N.  Y.  115.  84  Hammond  v.  Barton,  93  Wis. 

It  was  held  in  Buchanan  v.  Whit-  183,  67  N.  W.  412. 
man,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  604,  76  Hun,  sr,  Frisbie  v.  McCarty,  1  Stew.  & 

67,  where  a  lease  dated  April  8th,  P,  56;   Stetson  v.  Briggs,  114  Cal. 

to    run    one    year    from    the    date  511,  515;  Oneto  v.  Restano,  89  Cal. 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES, 


349 


Thus  where  a  lease  was  signed  by  lessees  but  never  delivered 
by  them,  but  they  assigned  it  at  the  request  of  the  lessor  and  de- 
livered it  to  the  agent  of  the  lessor  and  the  lessor  then  collected 
the  first  instalment  of  rent  from  the  assignee,  it  was  held  that 
there  was  no  delivery  of  the  lease  to  the  lessor.  An  actual 
manual  delivery  of  the  lease  by  the  lessor  to  the  lessee  is  not 
essential  and  may  be  dispensed  with,  if,  from  the  circum- 
stances, it  may  be  fairly  inferred  that  a  delivery  of  the  lease 
was  intended  by  the  parties.^^a  of  course,  if  the  lessor  actually 
retains  the  lease  in  his  possession  though  it  has  been  signed  by 
the  lessee,  there  can  be  no  delivery  to  the  lessee.  For  it  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  a  valid  delivery  that  the  lessor  should  part 
with  the  control  of  the  written  lease.  The  delivery  of  a  lease  is 
complete  as  soon  as  the  lessor  has  done  something  with  the  lease 
which  prevents  his  regaining  possession  and  control  of  it.  Thus, 
where  a  lease  was  signed  by  both,  parties  and  was  left  with  an 
attorney  to  have  a  copy  made  of  it,  its  delivery  to  the  lessee 
was  presumed.^®  A  lease  under  seal  or  other  sealed  instruments 
will  be  presumed  to  have  been  delivered  upon  the  day  of  its 


63,  26  Pac.  Rep.  788;  Rittmaster 
V.  Brisbane,  19  Colo.  371,  35  Pac. 
Rep. 736,  740;  Speed  v.  Brooks,  30 
Ky.  119;  Ford  v.  Gregory's  Heirs, 
49  Ky.  175;  Maddox  v.  Gray,  75 
Ga.  452;   Dearmond  v.  Dearmond, 

10  Ind.  191;  Pike  v.  Letter,  26  111. 
App.  530;  Leiter  v.  Pike,  127  111. 
287,  20  N.  E.  Rep.  23;  Dickerson 
V.  Merriman,  100  111.  342;  Robrn- 
pon  V.  Robinson,  116  111.  250,  5  N. 
E.  Rep.  IIS;  Howard  v.  Carpenter, 

11  Md.  259-277;  Rhome  v.  Gale,  12 
Minn.  54;  Jackson  v.  Sheldon,  22 
Me.  569;  Egery  v.  Woodard,  50 
Me.  45;  Maynard  v.  Maynard,  10 
Mass.  456,  6  Am.  Dec.  146;  Fay  v. 
Richardson,  24  Mass.  91;  Thatcher 
V.  St.  Andrew's  Church,  37  Mich. 
263;  Robinson  v.  Noel,  49  Miss. 
253;  Jelks  v.  Barrett,  52  Miss.  315; 
Crawford  v.  Bertholf,  1  N.  J.  Eq. 
458;  Black  v.  Shreve,  13  N.  J. 
Eq.  455;  Church  v.  Gilman,  15 
Wend.    (N.  Y.)    656,  30  Am.  Dec. 


82;  Fogal  V.  Pirro,  23  N.  Y.  Super. 
Ct.  100;  Morrow  v.  Williams,  14 
N.  C.  264;  Green's  Trustees  v. 
Robinson  (Wright),  Ohio.  436; 
Kelsey  v.  Tourtelotte,  59  Pa.  St. 
184;  Hammell  v.  Hammell,  19 
Ohio,  17;  Arthurs  v.  Bascon,  28 
Leg.  Int.  (Pa.)  284;  Coin  v.  Coin, 
24  S.  C.  596;  Alexander  v.  Bland, 
3  Tenn.  431;  Stiles  v.  Brown,  16 
Vt.  564;  Dwinell  v.  Bliss,  58  Vt. 
363,  5  Atl.  Rep.  317. 

s-^'a  McClure  v.  Colelough,  17 
Ala.  89;  Rivard  v.  Walker,  39  111. 
413;  Walker  v.  Walker,  42  111.  311, 
89  Am.  Dec.  445;  Mallett  v.  Page, 
8  Ind.  364;  Crawford  v.  Bertholf, 
1  N.  J.  Eq.  458;  Goodrich  v.  Wal- 
ker, 1  Johns.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  250; 
Lore's  Heirs  v.  Truman,  1  Ohio 
Dec.  510,  10  West.  Law  J.  250; 
Farror  v.  Bridges,  24  Tenn.  411. 

^c  Reynolds  v.  Greenbaum,  80 
111.  416. 


350  Ijaw  of  landlord  and  tenant. 

date,  notwithstanding  that  the  date  of  the  acknowledgment  to 
the  instrument  is  subsequent  to  the  date  in  the  body  of  the  writ- 
ing.*^ There  are  cases  which  sustain  a  contrary  rule,  the  sub- 
stance of  which  is  that  where  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  the 
date  of  the  instrument  and  the  date  in  the  acknowledgment,  de- 
livery will  be  presumed  to  have  taken  place  upon  the  date  of  the 
acknowledgement.^'  So,  the  presumption  that  a  lease  or  in- 
strument under  seal  was  delivered  upon  the  day  of  its  date  is 
never  conclusive,  and  the  fact  that  it  was  delivered  upon  some 
other  day  may  always  be  proved  by  parol  evidence.^^  The  gen- 
eral rules  defining  what  shall  constitute  the  delivery  of  a  deed 
are  ordinarily  applicable  to  leases  under  seal,  A  distinction, 
however,  should  be  noted.  A  deed  conveying  the  fee  is  ordi- 
narily valuable  solely  to  the  grantee  and  its  maker  has  no  fur- 
ther interest  in  retaining  it  after  he  has  received  the  purchase 
money.  A  lease  is  very  different,  for  under  it  the  lessor  has 
frequently  as  much  interest  as  the  lessee  and  consequently  he 
may  be  justified  to  a  certain  extent  in  retaining  it  in  his  posses- 
sion. Leases  are  usually  executed  in  duplicate,  each  party  keep- 
ing a  copy.  But  when  this  is  not  done,  the  retention  of  the 
lease  by  either  party,  wath  the  consent  of  the  other,  does  not 
necessarily  indicate  that  the  lease  has  not  been  delivered.  If 
both  parties  know  that  a  lease  has  been  executed  and  that  it  is 
in  operation,  its  retention  by  the  lessor  is  immaterial  on  the 
question  of  delivery.  The  entry  of  the  lessee  and  the  payment 
and  receipt  of  rent  then  raise  a  conclusive  presumption  of  de- 

87  .Tayne  v.  Gregg,  42  111.  413;  inson,  Wright  (Ohio),  436.  This 
Robinson  v.  Gould,  26  Iowa,  89;  presumption  is  not  recognized  in 
Ford  V.  Gregory,  10  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  New  York  in  respect  to  all  deeds 
75;  Sweetser  V.  Lowell,  33  Me.  446.  not    acknowledged    or    witnessed; 

88  Blanchard  v.  Taylor,  12  Mich.  and  o  fortiori  is  rebuttable  by 
339;  Loomis  v.  Pingree,  43  Maine,  showing  that  the  deed  or  lease 
299;  Fountain  v.  Boatmen's  Sav-  was  in  the  possession  of  its  maker 
iugs  Institution,  .57  Mo.  553.  or    the    lessor    subsequent    to    its 

8B  Treadwell  v.  Reynold^s,  47  Gal.  date.     Elsey  v.   Metcalf,   1   Denio, 

171;   Barry  v.  Hoffman,  6  Md.  78;  323;   or  by  the  fact  that  the  date 

Fairbanks  v.  Metcalf,  8  Mass.  230;  of  the  acknowledgment  is  subse- 

Harrison  v.  Phillips'  Academy,  12  quent  to  the   date   of  the   instrn- 

Mass.  426;    2  Bl.  Com.  307;   Good-  ment.     Mclntyre  v.  Strong,  48  N. 

rich  V.  Walker,   1    .Tohn.   Cas.    (N.  Y.  127. 
Y.)   250;  Green's  Trustees  v.  Rob- 


FORM   AXD   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES. 


351 


livery  to  fhe  lessee.^"  On  the  otlier  hand,  the  placing  of  a  lease 
in  the  hands  of  the  lessee  is  not  alone  a  sufficient  delivery  if 
such  was  not  the  intention  of  the  parties.  This  would  be  the 
case  where  a  lessee  was  handed  a  lease  for  the  purpose  of  having 
a  guarantee  of  the  rent  endorsed  thereon."^  A  question  whether 
a  lease  has  been  executed  and  delivered  to  a  lessee  where  there 
is  a  conflict  in  the  evidence  has  to  be  detei-rained  by  the  jury.®- 
§  242.  The  acceptance  of  a  lease.  The  delivery  of  a  lease  by 
the  lessor  to  the  lessee,  whether  express  or  implied,  may  be  dis- 
regarded if  there  is  no  acceptance  by  the  lessee.  In  the  ease  of 
deeds,  generally  the  law  will  imply  an  acceptance  by  the  grantee 
upon  the  ground  that  the  deed  is  beneficial  to  the  grantee.®^ 
Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  in  the  case  of  deeds,  the  actual 
Imowiedge  by  the  grantee  of  the  conveyance  is  not  essential  be- 
cause his  assent  to  the  delivery  will  be  presumed  upon  the  bene- 
ficial chai-acter  of  the  conveyance,  and  this  presumption  can  be 
overcome  by  proof  of  dissent,  since^  if  this  be  not  the  case,  there 


soOneto  v.  Restano,  89  Cal.  63, 
26  Pac.  Rep.  788. 

91  Jordan  v.  Davis,  108  111.  336. 
So  the  delivery  of  a  lease  may  be 
in  escrow  as  where,  after  its  exe- 
cution, it  is  left  in  the  hands  of  a 
third  person  to  be  given  to  the 
lessee  as  soon  as  he  shall  pay  the 
rent  for  the  first  month  of  the 
term.  Witthaus  v.  Starin,  12  Daly 
(N.  Y.)  226.  See,  also,  as  to  de- 
livery of  a  lease,  Hayes  v.  Lawver, 
83  111.  182;  Garsuch  v.  Rutledge, 
79  Md.  272,  17  Atl.  Rep.  76. 

S2  Miltown  V.  Groodman,  Ir.  R.  10 
C  L.  27;  Hastings  v.  Vaughn,  5 
Cal.  315;  Bensley  v.  Atwill,  12  Cal. 
231;  Brann  v.  Monroe,  11  Ky.  Law 
Rep.  324;  Hurlburt  v.  Wheeler,  40 
N.  H.  73;  Grain  v.  Wright,  36 
Hun,  74,  114  N.  Y.  307,  21  N.  E. 
Rep.  401;  Fisher  v.  Keane,  1 
Watts  (Pa.)  278;  Stoney  v.  Win- 
terhalter,  11  Atl.  Rep.  (Pa.)  611; 
Shaw  V.  Cunningham,  16  S.  C. 
631;    Lindsay  v.   Lindsay,   11   Vt. 


621;  Dwinell  v.  Bliss,  58  Vt.  353, 
5  Atl.  Rep.  317.  The  question  of 
delivery,  being  one  of  the  inten- 
tions of  the  parties  to  be  inferred 
from  all  the  circumstances,  is  usu- 
ally a  question  of  fact  and  not  of 
law.  So  the  question  whether  a 
deed  or  a  lease  was  executed  and 
delivered  at  the  date  in  the  lease 
is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury. 
Center  v.  Morrison,  31  Barb.  155. 
93  Treadwell  v.  Reynolds,  47 
Cal.  171;  Billings  v.  Starke,  1.5 
Fla.  297;  Fash  v.  Blake,  44  111. 
302;  Scobey  v.  Walker,  114  Ind. 
254,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  674;  Faulkner 
v.  Adams,  126  Ind.  459,  26  N.  E. 
Rep.  170;  Alexander  v.  De  Ker- 
nel, 81  Ky.  345;  Sweetser  v.  Low- 
ell, 33  Me.  446;  Smith  v.  Porter, 
76  Mass.  66;  Saunders  v.  Blythe, 
112  Mo.  1,  20  S.  E.  Rep.  319;  Rob- 
inson V.  Wheeler,  25  N.Y.  252; 
Hall  V.  Benner,  1  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.) 
403,  21  Am.  Dec.  394;  Raines  v. 
Walker,  77  Va.  92. 


352  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

can  be  no  delivery  in  law  of  a  deed  to  an  infant.^*  In  the  case 
of  leases,  under  some  circumstances,  the  same  presumption  or 
implication  of  an  acceptance  by  the  lessee  where  the  lease  is 
executed  by  both  parties  and  delivered  to  him  will  be  recog- 
nized. The  beneficial  character  of  a  lease  so  far  as  the  tenant 
is  concerned,  is  not  so  apparent  as  furnishing  a  basis  for  the 
presumption  of  its  acceptance  by  him  as  it  would  be  in  the  case 
of  a  deed  of  the  fee  simple.  The  conveyance  of  the  fee  of  real 
estate  by  a  deed  may  be  based  upon  a  good  consideration,  as  for 
example,  the  love  and  affection  which  the  grantor  has  for  the 
grantee.  This  is  so  in  many  instances.  On  the  other  hand, 
leases  are  contractual  in  their  nature  and  as  contracts  are  merely 
promises  to  perform  on  the  part  of  both  parties.  But,  unques- 
tionably, there  is  some  presumption  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
lease  on  the  part  of  a  lessee.®^  For  unquestionably,  the  delivery 
of  a  lease  may  be  of  benefit  to  the  lessee.  The  beneficial  char- 
acter of  a  lease  so  far  as  the  lessee  is  concerned  is  not  always 
to  be  determined  by  the  term  which  it  purports  to  create.  The 
nature  and  circumstances  of  the  parties  and  the  title  of  the  les- 
see must  be  considered ;  and,  where  at  the  date  of  the  execution 
of  the  lease,  the  lessor  had  no  title  to  the  premises,  while  the 
lessee  had  a  claim  of  title  based  on  several  years  of  uninter- 
rupted possession,  no  presumption  of  benefit  to  the  lessee  will 
arise. ''^  A  lessee  who  accepts  a  lease  executed  by  and  delivered 
to  him  by  his  landlord  without  the  lessor's  consent  cannot  qual- 
ify his  acceptance  and  modify  the  terms  of  the  writing  by  parol ; 
he  must  either  accept  the  lease  or  reject  it  absolutely  and  cannoi 
accept  it  on  condition.  Hence,  where  a  lessor,  in  fulfilling  his 
covenant  to  renew  a  lease,  executed  and  sealed  a  lease  which  he 
then  sent  to  the  lessee,  the  signing  of  the  lease  by  the  lessee  and 
the  return  of  a  duplicate  to  the  lessor  are  not  a  rejection  of  the 
lease  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  lessee  sends  to  the  lessor  a 
letter  denying  the  lease  bound  him  to  pay  the  rent  named  in 
it.*^     Hut  an  acceptance  may  be  given  on  condition  that  the 

04  Mitchell   v.  Ryan,  3  Ohio   St.  Hatch,    9    Mass.    307;    Jackson   v. 

377;  Falk  v.  Varn,  9  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  Dunlap,    1   Johns.    Cases    (N.    Y.") 

C.)  303;  Wall  v.  Wall,  30  MLss.  91;  114;    Jackson   v.  Bodle,   20  Johns. 

Robinson  v.  Gould,  26  Iowa,  89,  93.  (N.  Y.)  184. 

85  Maynard      v.      Maynard,      10  "c  Camp  v.  Camp,  5   Conn.   291, 

Mass.    456;     Hedge     v.    Drew,    12  200,  13  Am.  Dec.  60. 

Pick.      (Mass.)      141;      Hatch      v.  ot  Leiter  v.  Pike,  127  111.  287,  20 


FORM   AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  353 

lease  shall  be  valid  if  the  parties  shall  consent  thereto."^  The 
retention  of  a  lease  by  the  lessee  which  has  been  executed  by  a  les- 
sor and  sent  to  a  lessee,  may,  as  we  have  seen,  raise  a  presump- 
tion that  the  lessee  has  accepted  it.  The  payment  of  rent  may 
also  raise  an  implication  of  tne  acceptance  of  a  lease  by  a  lessee. 
Where  a  lessee  executed  leases,  tendered  him  by  the  lessor  in 
duplicate  on  a  parol  agreement  by  the  latter  to  repair  the  prem- 
ises, and,  at  the  same  time,  pays  a  sum  of  money  down,  it  was 
held  that  the  pajonent  down  was  not  an  acceptance  of  the  lease 
by  the  lessee  where  the  owner  retained  both  copies.""  The  ques- 
tion of  the  acceptance  of  the  tenant's  otfer  by  the  landlord  may 
be  material.  The  landlord's  acceptance  of  the  tenant's  offer  must 
be  clear  and  unequivocal.  The  acceptance  of  the  landlord,  like 
that  of  the  tenant  must  also  be  unconditional.  The  sending  of 
a  draft  lease  by  the  lessor  to  a  lessee  who  had  signed  a  memoran- 
dum agreement  which  was  in  its  character  an  offer  to  take  a 
lease  accompanied  by  his  references,  where  the  lessor  does  not 
accept  the  oft'er  either  in  writing  or  by  parol,  is  not  such  an  un- 
conditional acceptance  of  the  proposed  lease  as  will  enable  the 
lessee  to  obtain  specific  performance  for  the  reason  that  the  ac- 
ceptance of  a  written  proposal  must  be  an  unambiguous  act. 
This  cannot  be  said  of  the  sending  of  a  draft  lease  w^hieh  might 
have  been  sent  to  save  time  and  without  any  intention  on  the 
part  of  the  lessor  of  accepting  the  proposal.  So,  also,  an  accep- 
tance of  a  proposal  for  a  lease  must  be  unconditional.  The 
sending  of  a  draft  lease,  if  it  is  an  acceptance  at  all,  is  an  ac- 
ceptance upon  the  condition  that  the  lessee  is  satisfied  with  it.^ 
So,  a  memorandum  of  an  agreement  for  a  lease,  which  is  signed 
by  the  intended  lessee,  and  which  contains  his  references,  but 
which  is  not  signed  by  the  lessor,  and  which  does  not  contain  in 
any  portion  of  it,  the  name  of  the  lessor,  is  not  binding  on  the 

N.   E.  Rep.  23,  33,  afBrming  Pike  which  he  did.    It  was  held  that  the 

V.  Leiter,  26  111.  App.  520.  acceptance   was    conditional   on   a 

sf*  Shelton    v.    Durham,    76    Mo.  correction  of  the  defects. 

434,  437,  where  it  appears  that  the  99  Flommerfeldt     v.     Englander, 

lessee,  after  the  execution  of  the  61  N.  Y.  Supp.  1S7.  29  Misc.  Rep. 

lease,    having    learned    of    certain  655;    Witthaus  v.   Starin,  12  Daly 

defects  in  its  execution  which  in-  (N.  Y.)   226. 

validated  it,  refused  to  receive  it  i  Warner  v.  Willington,  3  Drew, 

and   the  lessor  agrees   to   remedy  523,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  662,  2  Jur.  (N.  S.) 

the  defects  if  he  would  accept  it  433,  4  W.  R.  53 

23 


354  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

lessee  as  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease,-  unless  the  name  of  the 
intended  lessor  can  be  ascertained  from  some  other  writing 
which  is  sufficiently  connected  with  the  memorandum  by  clear 
reference  to  cure  the  omission  from  the  memorandum.  So,  if 
the  memorandum  of  lease  refers  to  the  conditions  named  in  an- 
other paper  or  refers  to  a  writing  containing  the  name  of  the  les- 
sor or  the  lessee  writes  a  letter  containing  the  name  of  the  les- 
sor, the  defect  will  be  cured.  The  presumption  that  arises  from 
the  record  of  an  instrument  that  it  has  been  delivered,  may  be 
rebutted  by  proof  of  a  contrary  intention.  Thus,  where  the 
assignment  of  a  lease  was  recorded  after  the  death  of  the  lessor, 
and  it  was  shown  the  writing  had  never  been  in  the  hands  of  the 
lessee,  but  that  a  notary  had  under  the  lessor's  instructions,  re- 
tained it  in  his  possession  for  the  lessor  until  he  died,  when  he 
recorded  it ;  it  was  held  that  there  had  been  no  delivery  ^  by  the 
lessor.  And  it  was  also  held  in  the  same  case  that  payment  of 
rent  by  the  assignee  while  he  was  in  possession  of  the  demised 
premises  and  his  rental,  that  the  lease  had  been  assigned  to  him, 
would  not  estop  him  to  assert  that  there  had  been  no  delivery 
to  him. 

§  243.  The  necessity  for  the  entry  of  the  tenant.  By  the 
common  law,  livery  of  seizin  or  the  actual  entry  of  a  grantee 
upon  the  land  was  necessary  to  the  validity  of  every  grant  of 
land  for  life  or  of  an  estate  of  inheritance.  This  was  not  neces- 
sary in  the  case  of  grants  of  terms  of  years.  In  England  and  in 
most  of  the  states  of  the  Union,  the  distinction  has  been  abolished 
and  the  estate  vests  in  the  grantee  upon  the  delivery  of  the  deed 
or  lease  whether  it  is  an  estate  for  life,  in  fee,  or  for  years.'^  In 
the  case  of  a  lease,  all  that  is  vested  in  the  lessee  down  to  the 
date  he  goes  into  possession  is  the  right  of  possession.  This 
vests  in  the  lessee  before  the  delivery  to  him  of  the  lease.  And 
at  common  law  it  was  said  that  the  lessee  under  a  lease  had  only 
the  interessee  termini  until  he  entered  into  possession,  and  it 
followed  therefore,  that  he  could  not,  until  he  had  entered  into 
possssion,  maintain  trespass  against  an  intruder.''     The  execu- 

2  Champion  v.  Plummer,  1  N.  R.  Higher  v.  Rice,  5  Mass.  344;   Mat- 

252.  thews  v.  Ward,  10  G.  &  J.    (Md.) 

sCanale  v.  Copello,  137  Cal.  22,  443;   Bryan  v.  Bradley,  116  Conn. 

09  Pac.  Rep.  098.  474. 

4  Flint  V.  Shf3ldon,  13  Mass.  443;  s  Co.     Litt.     296b;     Harrison     v. 


FORM   AXD   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  355 

tion  and  delivery  of  a  lea.se  give  the  tenant  the  right  to  the  pos- 
session and  a  right  of  action  against  the  landlord  for  damages, 
if  the  landlord  fails  to  deliver  possession,  but  they  do  not  give 
the  tenant  any  right  to  maintain  an  action  against  a  third  party 
either  to  recover  damages  for  trespass  or  to  oust  a  third  party 
who  has  taken  possession  of  the  premises.  The  tenant  who  has 
signed  the  lease  may  be  released  by  the  landlord  from  his  cove- 
nant to  pay  rent  before  he  has  entered  into  possession,  and  the 
lessee  on  the  other  hand  before  he  has  entered  may  assign  his 
lease,  and  his  a&signee  will  take  under  it,  not  the  possession,  but 
the  right  to  the  possession.  The  death  of  the  lessor  before  the 
entry  of  the  lessee  does  not  determine  the  latter 's  right  to  enter 
under  the  lease.  The  lessee  may  enforce  his  right  of  entry  and 
recover  damages  for  its  denial  from  the  heirs  of  the  lessor.  So, 
also,  when  the  lessee  dies  before  entiy,  his  heirs  or  personal 
representative  may  enter.  So,  also,  if  the  lease  is  made  to  two 
jointly,  either  may  enter  on  the  death  of  the  other.*' 

§  244.  The  date  upon  which  the  lease  expires.  The  date 
upon  which  the  term  created  by  the  lease  expires  is  to  be  deter- 
mined by  computing  the  time  from  the  date  upon  which  the 
term  commences.  AVhether  or  not  the  date  upon  which  the  term 
commences  is  or  is  not  to  be  included  in  this  computation  is 
elsewhere  considered.  Generally  it  is  unnecessary  to  mention 
the  date  upon  which  the  lease  terminates.     If  the  date  of  the 

Blackburn,  17  C.  B.   (N.  S.)    678;  etc.,  Co.,  5  Exch.  932.     In  Ryan  v. 

Wheeler  v.  Montefiore,  2  Q.  B.  133;  Clark,  14  Q.  B.  65,  the  court  said: 

Co.    Litt.    296b;     Comyn's    Digest,  "It  is  distinctly  laid  down  in  Wil- 

Trespass  B.  liams  v.  Bosanquet,  1  Brod.  &  B. 

6  It    is    firmly    settled     that    a  238,  3  J.  B.  Moore,  500,  that  entry 

lessee  or  the  assignee  of  a  lease  or  is  not  necessary  to  the  vesting  of 

a  mortgagee  before  entry  cannot  a  term  of  years  in  the  lessee;  the 

maintain   trespass   since   that   ac-  interest  and  the  legal  right  of  pos- 

tion  is  always  based  on  actual  pos-  session,  where  the  term  is  to  com- 

session.      Harrison    v.    Blackburn,  mence    immediately,    and    not    in 

17  Com.  Bench    (N.  S.)    678,   692.  the  future  vests  in  the  lessee  be- 

See,  also,  on  the  necessity  for  an  fore    entry,    and,    of    course,    the 

actual  entry  to  maintain  trespass,  right  of  possession  in  the  lessor  is 

Ryan  v.  Clarke,  14  Q.  B.  73.     So  gone,   though   for   the   purpose  of 

one  who  takes  a  lease  for  years  as  maintaining  an  action  of  trespass 

a    security   by   way   of   mortgage  the  lessee  must  enter,  for  that  ac- 

cannot  bring  trespass  unless  he  has  tion  is  founded  on  the  actual  pos- 

possession.   Wheeler  v.  Montefiore,  session." 
2  Q.  B.  133;   Turner  v.  Camerous, 


356  LAW  OF  L^VNDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

termination  of  the  lease  is  inserted  in  it  and  this  is  ineonsi.->tent 
with  the  length  of  the  term  measured  from  the  date  stated  for 
the  eonuneneement  of  the  lease,  the  court  will  correct  the  error 
which  is  apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  lease.  Thus,  where  the 
lease  was  for  the  "term  of  six  months  from  the  6th  day  of  De- 
cember, 1881,  which  term  will  end  on  the  sixth  day  of  May, 
1882,"  the  court  corrected  the  error  which  was  clearly  an  error 
in  computation  by  making  it  read  the  "6th  day  of  June,  1882."  '^ 
"Where  the  term  is  to  end  on  a  specified  date,  as  for  example, 
"twenty  years  from  the  25th  day  of  next  March,"  the  term  is 
not  complete  nor  is  it  ended  until  the  last  moment  of  the  25th 
day  of  March  in  the  last  year  of  the  term.^'  If,  from  the  lan- 
guage of  the  lease,  it  is  uncertain  and  doubtful  upon  what  date 
the  term  is  meant  to  expire,  the  tenant,  it  seems,  and  not  the 
landlord,  may  elect  to  terminate  it  upon  that  date  which  is  most 
beneficial  to  him.^  If  the  day  upon  which  the  tenant  is  bound 
to  vacate  the  premises  according  to  the  date  of  the  expiration  of 
the  term  as  set  forth  in  the  lease,  falls  upon  a  Sunday,  the  ten- 
ant has  until  the  following  Monday  at  12  o  'clock  to  move.  The 
respect  which  the  law  has  for  the  first  day  of  the  week,  both  as 
a  religious  day  and  as  a  day  for  necessary  rest,  will  prevent  the 
landlord  from  compelling  his  tenant  to  vacate  upon  that  day 
where  the  removal  of  the  tenant  involves  also  the  performance 
of  manual  labor  in  removing  his  personal  belongings.  The  re- 
tention of  the  possession  by  the  tenant  until  the  following  Mon- 
day after  the  Sunday  on  which  his  term  has  expired,  is  not  there- 
fore such  a  holding  over  as  will  entitle  the  landlord  to  continue 
to  regard  him  as  a  tenant.^" 

7  Nindle   v.    Bank.    13   Neb.   245,  following  May  at  12  M.     Marsh  v. 

247.  Masterson,  3  N.  Y.  Supp.  414,  415; 

^Ackland  v.  Lutley,    1  P.  &  D.  Wilcox  v.  Wood,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

636,  9  A.  &  E.  879,  8  L.  J.  Q.  B.  346,  and  it  has  been  the  immemo- 

164.  rial  usage  to  exchange  possession 

»  Murrell  v.  Lyon,  30   La.   Ann.  at  12  o'clock  noon.     See  as  to  the 

255.  same     custom     in     Pennsylvania, 

10  See  Salter  v.  Burt,  20  Wend.  Marys  v.  Anderson,  24  Pa.  St.  272, 

(N.  Y.)    205;    Jones  v.   Shears,   4  276;    Insurance    Co.    v.    Myers,    4 

Ad.  &  El.  832.     In  New  York,  by  Lane.  Bar.  151.     In  People  ex  rel. 

custom    which    has    acquired    the  Elston  v.  Robertson,  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

force    of    law    all    tenancies   com-  9,    17,   a   distinction   is   made   be- 

mtncing  on  May  1st  for  one  year  tween   a  lease   to  end   on   the   1st 

terminate  on  the  flrst  day  of  the  day  of  May  and  a  lease  to  the  1st 


FORM   AND   EXECUTION   OF   LEASES.  357 

§  245.  A  reversion  in  the  lessor.  In  order  that  an  instrument 
shall  be  regarded  as  a  lease,  there  must  be  a  reversion  in  the  les- 
sor. The  instniment  need  never  expressly  state  that  there  is  a 
reversion  in  the  lessor  as  this  may  be  sho^\^l  by  parol  evidence. 
It  follows  from  this  that  the  instrument  which  is  a  lease  must 
convey  a  less  estate  that  the  landlord  possesses.  If  the  instru- 
ment conveys  all  the  interest  of  the  landlord,  it  is  an  assignment 
and  not  a  lease.  The  words  which  are  employed  in  the  instru- 
ment itself  are  not  always  conclusive  upon  the  question  whether 
it  is  a  lease  or  an  assignment  of  a  lease.  Hence,  where  a  lessor 
parts  with  his  whole  interest  to  another,  it  is  an  assignment 
though  he  may  call  the  instrument  which  conveys  his  interest  a 
lease.  So  the  fact  that  a  lessor  uses  the  word  "demise"  in  as- 
signing his  lease  does  not  change  the  effect  of  the  writing  for  the 
reason  that  the  word  "demise"  is  often  used  in  a  general  way  as 
the  equivalent  of  the  word  "convey,"  and  may  properly  be  ap- 
plied to  the  conveyance  of  an  estate  in  fee  or  other  freehold  es- 
tate as  well  as  to  the  lease. ^^  So,  if  a  lessee  for  three  years  ex- 
pressly demises  his  term  for  four  years,  it  is  not  in  any  sense 
of  the  word  a  lease,  but  is  in  its  operation  a  fixed  and  valid  as- 
signment of  all  his  premises.^^ 

§  246.  The  approval  of  the  lease  by  the  attorneys  for  the 
parties.  It  is  sometimes  customary  to  insert  in  an  agreement  to 
make  a  written  lease,  a  provision  that  the  writing  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  the  approval  of  the  attorneys  of  the  respective  parties. 
The  insertion  of  a  clause  providing  for  the  approval  of  attorneys 
or  solicitors  does  not  necessarily  prevent  informal  writings  from 
being  regarded  as  a  lease  or  indicate  that  a  formal  lease  is  to 
be  executed.  The  insertion  of  the  words  "to  be  approved  by  me 
and  my  solicitor"  in  a  letter  offering  to  make  a  lease  where  the 
offer  was  accepted  in  writing  by  the  other  parties,  does  not  pre- 
vent these  letters  from  being  considered  as  a  complete  contract 
to  make  a  lease. ^'''  AYliere  an  intended  lessee  writes  a  letter  which 
contains  all  the  language  necessary  to  a  contract  with  a  provision 

day  of  May.     It  is  there  held  that  n  2  Inst.  483. 

the   term    created   by   the    former  i^  Hicks     v.     Downing,     1     Ld. 

lease  ends  on  the  1st  day  of  May  Rayd.  99. 

at  12  M.,  while  the  latter  expires  i3  Eadie  v.  Addison,  62  L.  J.  Ch. 

at    12    o'clock    on    the    nig'ht    of  SO,  47  L.  T,  543,  31  W.  R.  320. 

April    30th. 


358  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

"tBat  such  lease  is  to  be  approved  in  the  customary  way  by  my 
solicitor,"  and  the  offer  in  the  letter  is  accepted,  there  is  a  com- 
plete and  binding"  contract  which  may  be  specifically  enforced 
though  the  solicitor  of  the  lessee  refused  to  approve  the  lease  or 
to  complete  it.  The  meaning  of  the  provision  for  the  approval 
of  the  solicitor  was  that  he  was  to  see  to  it  that  nothing  irregular 
informal  or  unusual  was  inserted  in  the  lease,  which  was  to  be 
executed  to  carry  out  this  agreement.^*  Under  an  agreement  for 
a  lease  which  is  to  be  approved  by  the  parties'  attorneys,  the  at- 
torneys have  no  right  arbitrarily  to  refuse  to  approve  it.  The 
refusal  of  either  to  be  effective  to  release  his  principal  from  the 
obligation  to  execute  the  lease  must  be  based  on  reasonable 
grounds.  For,  presumptively  at  least,  the  approval  must  be 
prior  to  or  contemporaneous  with  the  execution  of  the  lease 
by  the  parties  and  not  subsequent  thereto.  If  both  attorneys 
approve  tlie  proposed  lease,  their  clients  are  bound  to  exe- 
cute it  or  accept  the  consequences.  If  either  attorney  arbi- 
trarily and  without  a  good  and  sufficient  reason  refuses  to 
approve  the  lease  according  to  the  agreement,  his  client  is  in 
default  and  the  other  party  to  the  agreement  may  sue  for 
damages  or  to  compel  a  specific  performance  of  the  contract  to 
make  a  lease  without  a  tender  of  an  executed  lease  on  his  part. 
Nor  need  he  ask  a  court  of  equity  to  reform  the  agreement  so 
as  to  dispense  with  the  approval  of  the  attorney.  It  is  for  him 
to  show  that  the  approval  was  unjustly  refused  and  if  he  shall 
do  this,  the  giving  of  the  approval  may  be  dispensed  with  under 
the  equitable  rule  that  equity  will  presume  that  thing  to  have 
been  done  which  ought  to  have  been  done.^^    If  the  parties  to  an 

11  Chipperfield   v.   Carter,    72    L.  certain   point  tlie   terms   shall   be 

T.  4S7.  the  terms  of  the  contract,  but  that 

i'>  Pittsburgh  Amusement  Co.  v.  the  minor  terms  shall  be  slibmit- 
Ferguson,  100  App.  Div.  453,  457.  ted  to  a  solicitor  and  shall  be 
91  N.  Y.  Supp.  427;  Sibbald's  such  as  are  approved  of  by  him, 
Case,  83  N.  Y.  384.  "If  in  the  then  there  is  no  contract  because 
case  or  a  proposed  sale,  or  lease  all  the  terms  have  not  been  set- 
of  an  estate  to  persons  agreeing  tied.  Now  with  regard  to  the  con- 
to  all  the  terms,  and  saying  'we  struction  of  letters  which  are  re- 
will  have  the  terms  put  into  lied  upon  as  construing  a  contract, 
form,'  then  all  the  terms  being  I  have  always  thought  that  the  au- 
put  into  writing  and  agreed  to,  thorities  are  too  favorable  to  spe- 
there  is  a  contract.  If  two  per-  cific  performance.  When  a  man 
sons  agree  in  writing  that  up  to  a  agrees  to  buy  an  estate  there  are 


FORM   AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES. 


359 


agreement  for  a  lease  actually  enter  into  such  an  agrreement,  the 
mere  fact  that  they  sent  it  to  a  solicitor  or  an  attorney,  with  in- 
structions to  prepare  more  formal  documents  is  immaterial. 
The  agreement,  though  informal,  will  be  treated  as  final,  and  its 
character  as  a  final  agreement  will  not  be  destroyed  nor  its  va- 
lidity as  a  writing  upon  which  specific  performance  may  be  pro- 
cured affected  by  the  fact  that  a  solicitor  is  to  recast  its  form. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  parties  in  negotiating  use  letters,  or 
if  they  have  made  a  memorandum  of  an  agreement  which  in  either 
case  is  not  signed  by  both  of  them,  or  from  some  circumstance 
appearing  in  the  evidence,  is  not  shown  to  be  an  agreement  to 
make  a  lease,  the  mere  fact  that  they  sent  the  papers  to  a  solic- 
itor to  have  them  put  in  a  form  which  is  to  be  afterguards  ap- 
proved by  them,  is  some  evidence  that  they  do  not  regard  the 
memorandum  as  final  and  do  not  bind  themselves  by  a  lease,  or 
an  agreement  to  make  one  until  it  is  reduced  to  a  proper  form. 


a  great  many  more  stipulations 
wanted  than  a  mere  agreement  to 
buy  the  estate,  and  the  amount  of 
purchase  money  that  is  to  be  paid. 
.  .  .  When  therefore  you  see  a 
stipulation  as  to  a  formal  agree- 
ment put  into  a  contract,  you  may 
say  it  was  not  put  in  for  nothing, 
but  to  protect  the  vendor  against 
that  very  thing.  Indeed,  notwith- 
standing protective  conditions  the 
vendor  has  not  unfrequently  to 
allow  a  deduction  from  the  pur- 
chase money  to  induce  the  pur- 
chaser not  to  press  a  requisition 
which  the  law  allows  him  to 
make.  All  this  shows  that  con- 
tracts for  the  purchase  of  lands 
contain  something  more  than  can 
be  found  in  the  short  and  meager 
form  of  an  ordinary  letter.  When 
we  come  to  a  contract  for  a  lease, 
the  case  is  still  stronger.  When 
you  bargain  for  a  lease  simply, 
it  is  for  an  ordinary  lease,  and 
nothing  more;  that  is,  a  lease  con- 
taining the  usual  covenants  and 
nothing  more;   but  when  the  bar- 


gain is  for  a  lease  which  is  to  be 
formally  prepared  in  general  no 
solicitor  would,  unless  actually 
bound  by  the  contract,  prepare  a 
lease  not  containing  other  cove- 
nants besides,  that  is,  covenants 
which  are  not  comprised  in  or  un- 
derstood by  the  terms  'usual  cove- 
nants.' It  is  then  only  rational  to 
suppose  that  when  a  man  says 
there  shall  be  a  formal  contract 
approved  for  a  lease,  he  means 
that  more  shall  be  put  in  the  lease 
than  the  law  generally  allows. 
Now  in  the  present  case,  a  plain- 
tiff says  in  effect:  'I  agree  to  grant 
you  a  lease  on  certain  terms,  but 
subject  to  something  else  being 
approved.'  He  does  not  say: 
'Nothing  more  shall  be  required 
beyond  what  I  have  already  men- 
tioned,' but  'something  else  is  re- 
quired,' which  is  not  expressed. 
That  being  so,  the  agreement  is 
uncertain  in  its  terms,  and  con- 
sequently cannot  be  sustained." 
By  Jessel.  M.  R.,  in  Winn  v.  Bull, 
7  Ch.  Div.  29,  31. 


360  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

In  each  case,  however,  the  intention  of  the  parties  is  a  question 
of  fact  upon  all  the  circumstances.^® 

§  247.  The  responsibility  of  the  tenant.  The  landlord,  if  he 
is  wise,  will,  before  executing  a  lease,  ascertain  that  he  is  deal- 
ing with  a  responsible  tenant.  He  may  make  the  condition  that 
prior  to  the  execution  of  the  lease,  the  tenant  shall  show  that  he 
is  financially  responsible.  The  landlord  must  be  allowed  a 
reasonable  time  to  look  up  the  references  given  him  by  his  pros- 
pective tenant.  On  the  other  hand,  he  must  use  due  diligence 
in  making  his  inquiries  regarding  the  financial  condition  of  his 
tenant.  If  negotiations  for  a  lease  are  pending  and  the  minds 
of  the  parties  have  met  on  the  terms  of  the  lease,  and  negotia- 
tions are  suspended  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  landlord  to 
ascertain  whether  the  tenant  is  responsible,  the  landlord  cannot 
prolong  his  investigation  for  an  unreasonable  period.  If  he 
shall  do  so,  he  is  alone  to  blame  if  the  tenant  shall  treat  his 
silence  and  delay  as  a  refusal  to  give  the  lease.  The  tenant  is 
entitled  to  know  within  a  reasonable  time  whether  or  not  his 
references  are  satisfactory  and  what  shall  be  a  reasonable  time 
depends  upon  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  as  for  example,  the 
difficulty  that  the  landlord  may  have  in  ascertaining  the  facts 
which  will  enable  him  to  accept  or  reject  the  tenant.  If  he  finds 
the  references  are  unsatisfactory,  he  must  reject  promptly.  The 
landlord  cannot  also  arbitrarily  declare  that  references  furnished 
to  him  are  insufficient  if,  in  fact,  they  ought  to  satisfy  him.  The 
question  whether  references  are  sufficient,  and  whether  the  ten- 
ant is  a  responsible  person  is  for  the  jury  to  determine.  If  the 
information  which  the  landlord  obtains  from  the  parties  to  whom 
the  tenant  referred  should  satisfy  a  reasonable  man  in  view  of 
all  the  circumstances  that  the  tenant  was  responsible,  the  land- 
lord ought  to  be  satisfied  and  if  such  is  the  case,  then  he  is  liable 
to  the  tenant  for  an  arbitrary  refusal  to  permit  him  to  have  the 
lease.  In  an  action  by  the  tenant  for  damages  for  the  landlord's 
failure  to  execute  a  lease  which  was  agreed  upon,  subject  to  the 
result  of  inquiries  as  to  the  tenant's  responsibility,  the  jury 
should  find  for  the  tenant,  if  they  find  that  the  landlord  ought 
to  have  been  satisfied,  and  as  a  part  of  this  they  may  find  on  all 

iBRifigway  V.  Wharton,  6  IT.  L.  Cas.  238,  27  L.  J.  Ch.  46,  4  Jur.  (N.  S.) 
173,  5  W.  R.  804. 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION    OP    LEASES.  361 

the  evidence  tliat  the  tenant  was  a  responsible  person  and  ought 
to  have  been  accepted  by  the  landlord. ^^ 

§  248.  A  failure  to  read  the  lease.  As  a  general  rule  of  the 
law  of  contracts,  it  is  well  settled  that  where  a  person,  having 
the  ability  to  read  a  written  contract,  signs  it  without  reading  it, 
and  without  requesting  it  to  be  read  to  him,  and  no  fraud  or 
trick  is  used  upon  him  to  prevent  him  from  reading  it,  he  is 
bound  thereby  to  the  same  extent  as  though  he  were  familiar 
with  its  contents.^®  This  rule  is  applicable  to  written  leases. 
If  the  parties  can  read,  each  ought  to  read  it  for  himself. 
If  one  or  both  cannot  read,  it  should  be  read  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  illiterate  party  or  parties  to  it.  Neither  party,  being 
himself  unable  to  read,  has  a  right  to  rely  upon  the  other  reading 
it  for  him ;  nor  should  he  accept  any  statements  of  the  other  as 
to  the  contents  of  the  lease,  unless  some  relation  of  trust  or  con- 
fidence exists  between  them.^^  And  where  a  lessor  does  not 
occupy  such  a  position  of  trust  or  confidence  to  the  lessee  as  will 
entitle  the  latter  to  rely  upon  the  representations  of  the  lessor, 
the  fact  that  the  lessee,  being  illiterate,  is  induced  to  execute  a 
written  lease  by  the  lessor  suppressing  certain  parts  in  it  in 
reading  it  which  are  material,  does  not  justify  the  rescission  of 
the  lease  by  the  lessee  for  the  fraud  of  the  lessor.-°    If  the  les- 

17  Ward  V.   Smith,   11   Price,  19.  inson  v.  Glass,  94  Ind.  211;  Webb 

IS  McKinney.     v.      Herriclc,      66  v.  Corbin,  78  Ind.  403. 

Iowa,  414,  23  N.  W.  Rep.  767;  Gul-  20  Binford     v.     Bruso,     22     Ind. 

liher  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  App.   512,   54   N.   E.   Rep.   146.     A 

59  Iowa,  416,  13  N.  W.  Rep.  429;  contract    just    and    reasonable    in 

Watson  V.  Planters'  Bank,  22  La.  its  stipulations  between  competent 

Ann.   14;    Allen  v.   Whetstone,   35  parties  is  not  void  solely  because 

La.  Ann.  846;  Sanborn  v.  Sanborn,  one  of  the  parties  who  signed  it 

104  Mich.  180,  62  N.  W.  Rep.  371;  did  not  when  he  signed  know  its 

Quimby  v.  Shearer,  56  Minn.  534,  contents   in  the   absence  of  fraud 

58   N.   W.   Rep.   155;    Robinson   v.  on    the    part   of   the    other.      New 

Jarvis,  25  IMo.  App.  421;    Penn  v.  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  8  Ohio 

Brashear,  65   Mo.   App.   24,   2   Mo.  Cir.     Ct.     Rep.     593.       See,     also, 

App.  Rep.  1132;   WTieeler  v.  Mow-  Krause  v.  Stein.   173   Pa.   St.  221, 

ers,  74  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  950,  16  Misc.  33  Atl.  Rep.   1031.     In  opposition 

Rep.    143,    38    N.    Y.    Supp.    950;  to  the  rule  of  the  text  that  neither 

Bellinger   v.    Gillespie,   118    N.    C.  party  has  a  right  to  rely  upon  the 

737,  24  S.  E.  Rep.  538.  reading  to  him  of  the  lease  by  the 

19  Lindley    v.    Hoffman,    22    Ind.  other  party,    it   has  been  held   in 

App.  237,  53  N.  E.  Rep.  471;  Rob-  some   cases   that   a   tenant   is   au- 
thorized  to    rely    upon   the    land- 


362  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

sor,  knowing  that  the  lessee  cannot  read,  reads  the  lease  for  him, 
he  will  be  held  to  the  strictest  good  faith,  and  if  he  misrepre- 
sents its  provisions  either  by  omitting  to  read  clauses  which  are 
actually  in  it  or  pretends  to  read  from  it  clauses  which  are  not 
in  it  so  that  the  lessee  is  deceived  thereby,  and  by  reason  thereof 
executes  the  lease  relying  upon  the  landlord  reading  it,  the 
lease  is  void  for  fraud,  and  if  the  tenant  has  entered,  he  cannot 
be  held  under  the  written  lease,  but  is  simply  a  tenant  at  will 
under  an  agreement  for  a  lease.^^  The  omission  of  a  lessee  to 
read  the  lease  before  he  executes  it,  does  not  prevent  him  from 
obtaining  reformation  of  it,  if  he  could  read  little  English  him- 
self and  relied  upon  some  other  person  to  read  it  for  him.^- 

§  249.  A  mistake  in  the  execution  of  a  lease.  Courts  of 
equity  have  a  general  and  broad  jurisdiction  to  correct  mistakes 
which  occur  in  the  preparation  and  execution  of  written  instru- 
ments which  in  its  more  minute  details  and  application  to  the 
affairs  of  men  is  more  properly  to  be  discussed  in  a  work  treat- 
ing of  equitable  remedies  than  in  this  place.  Here  it  may  suffice 
to  say  that  a  lease  will  be  rescinded  for  mistake  only  where  the 
mistake  is  as  to  some  fact  which  is  material  to  the  transaction 

lord's  statements  of  the  contents  procured  by  fraud,  deceit  and  mis- 

of  the  lease  where  the  latter  has  representation,   and    (2)    that   the 

prepared  it  or  procured  it.    Powell  party  executing  it  must  have  been 

V.  Lynde  Co.,  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  153,  free    from   negligence    in    affixing 

155,  49  App.  Div.  286;    Grosvenor  bis   signature  thereto.     It  is   not 

V.  Green,  28  Law  J.  Ch.  173;  Wil-  enough   that   he   executes   the   in- 

son  V.  Hart,  1  Ch.  App.  463.  strument  when  he  thought  and  be- 

21  Knoepker  v.  Redel,  116  Mo.  lieved  that  he  was  executing  an 
App.  62,  92  S.  W.  Rep.  171.  entirely  different  one,  but  he  must 

22  Silbar  v.  Ryder,  63  Wis.  106,  be  induced  to  execute  it  by  fraud, 
23  N.  W.  Rep.  106.  The  rules  in  deceit,  etc.,  and  he  must  be  free 
regard  to  the  reading  of  a  written  fi'om  laches  and  negligence  on  his 
instrument  for  the  benefit  of  il-  Part.  If  he  can  read  he  must  read 
literate  parties  are  thus  summed  it  for  himself.  If  he  cannot  read, 
up  in  Lindley  v.  Hoffman,  22  Ind.  he  must  have  some  one  upon 
App.  237,  53  N.  E.  Rep.  471.  "It  whom  he  can  rely  to  read  it  for 
will  be  observed  in  all  cases  cited  him  if  that  is  possible;  for  as  a 
where  this  general  rule  has  been  general  rule,  as  we  shall  presently 
discussed  the  decisions  have  been  show,  he  has  no  right  to  rely  upon 
grounded  on  two  basic  proposl-  the  adverse  party  to  read  it  for 
tions:    (1)   That  the  execution  of  him." 

the    in.strument    must    have    been 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION    OP   LEASES.  3G3 

and  which  affects  the  interests  of  lessor  and  lessee  in  some  sub- 
stantial manner.  If  the  mistake  was  as  to  some  trivial  or  unim- 
portant matter,  a  court  of  equity  will  not  interfere  between  the 
parties  to  the  lease  to  give  relief.  So,  too,  the  mistake  must 
have  been  mutual  as  would  be  the  ease  where  both  the  parties 
to  a  lease  had  agreed  by  parol  upon  all  its  terms  and  in  commit- 
ting these  terms  to  writing  and  on  executing  the  writing,  some- 
thing material  and  important  previously  agreed  on  had  been 
omitted  by  the  scrivener  from  the  written  lease  without  the 
knowledge  of  either  party.  In  such  a  situation  of  affairs,  equity 
will  insert  and  supply  what  the  parties  have  omitted  in  order 
to  effectuate  their  real  intention.  For  the  mistake  must  have 
been  unintentional  as  well  as  mutual  and  the  party  who  is  seek- 
ing to  have  it  corrected  must  show  that  he  was  free  from  negli- 
gence in  considering  the  language  of  the  writing  he  wishes  to 
have  corrected  or  in  his  understanding  of  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances of  the  case.^^  These  rules  regulate  the  remedy  in  cases 
of  a  mistake  of  fact  and  it  is  often  said  that  only  mistakes  of 
fact  will  be  relieved  against.  This  statement  is  correct  if  the 
mistake  of  law  consists  only  and  exclusively  in  a  misunder- 
s-tanding  of  the  legal  effect  of  a  transaction  by  a  party  who  has 
a  full  and  intelligent  knowledge  of  all  the  facts.  But  a  mistake 
of  law  which  would  be  relieved  against  occurs  where  the  parties 
have  fully  agreed  by  parol  upon  the  terms  of  a  lease  or  other 
writing,  without  any  mistake  of  law  or  fact  and  they  themselves 
or  their  agent  in  reducing  the  lease  to  writing,  use  words  and 
phrases,  whether  technical  or  not,  under  a  mistake  as  to  their 
legal  effect  and  which  do  not  represent  the  intention  of  the  par- 
ties as  embodied  in  their  oral  agreement.  Equity  will  relieve 
against  a  mistake  of  this  sort  occurring  in  a  lease  though  it  be 
called  a  mistake  of  law,  for  the  contract,  as  written,  does  not 
represent  the  true  intention  of  the  parties.  But  where  the  par- 
ties have  accurately  expressed  their  final  intentions  in  the  lease 
and  there  is  no  mistake  of  fact  in  the  preliminary  negotiations, 
equity  will  not  relieve  against  a  mistaken  interpretation  of  its 
language  by  a  party  to  it  which  has,  without  any  fraud  on  the 
part  of  the  other,  resulted  in  injury  to  him. 

23Bluestone  Coal  Co.  v.  Bell.  38       Irick    v.    Fulton's    Ex'r,    3    Gratt 
W.  Va.  297,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  493,  497;        (Va.)   191 


364  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  250.  The  usual  and  customary  covenants  and  provisos.  A 
contract  to  make  a  lease,  which  states  only  that  the  lease  is  to 
contain  the  "usual  covenants,"  means  thereby  that  such  cove- 
nants shall  be  comprised  in  the  lease  as  are  fit  and  proper  ac- 
cording to  the  nature  of  the  lease  which  is  to  be  made.  Though 
the  contract  does  not  stipulate  for  the  "usual  and  proper  cove- 
nants, ' '  yet  certain  covenants  will  be  inserted  or  implied.  What 
shall  be  considered  usual  covenants  depends  upon  the  circum- 
stances, that  is  to  say,  upon  the  nature  of  the  property  itself  and 
upon  the  use  which  is  to  be  made  of  it  and  also  upon  the  cus- 
toms of  that  portion  of  the  country  where  that  property  is  lo- 
cated. "VNHiere  the  parties  have  expressly  stipulated  for  the 
usual  covenants,  what  are  usual  covenants  is  a  question  of  fact 
to  be  determined  from  the  circumstances.  The  court  will  al- 
ways receive  parol  evidence  to  determine  the  meaning  of  these 
words.^*  If  the  agreement  for  a  lease  does  not  require  the  usual 
covenants  to  be  inserted,  it  is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court  to 
determine  what  covenants  the  parties  are  entitled  to.  In  con- 
struing a  stipulation  for  usual  covenants,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  lessor  cannot  compel  the  insertion  of  covenants  in  restraint 
of  trade  where  the  premises  are  located  in  a  business  section.^^ 
Nor  can  he  require  a  restriction  in  the  lease  against  a  particular 
trade  where  the  agreement  for  a  lease  contained  no  stipulation 
for  such  a  covenant.^**  A  covenant  on  the  part  of  a  tenant  to 
keep  premises  insured  is  not  a  usual  covenant  nor  is  it  a" usual 
covenant  for  the  landlord  to  agree  to  rebuild  in  case  the  prem- 
ises are  destroyed  by  fire  with  a  stipulation  that  the  rent  shall 
cease  on  his  failure  to  do  so.-^  A  covenant  to  pay  taxes  is  in 
England  a  common  covenant  in  a  lease  which  reserves  a  net  rent, 
and  a  provision  that  upon  the  breach  of  such  a  covenant  in  the 
lease  of  a  pu])lic  house,  the  landlord  may  re-enter  for  a  breach  of 
such  a  covenant  is  also  usual. -^  Under  an  agreement  to  lease 
premises  by  a  lease  to  contain  all  usual  and  necessary  cove- 

24  Bennett  v.  Womack,  3  C.  &  P.  27  Doe  v.  Sandham,  1  T.  R.  70&; 
96,  98.                                                           Medwin    v.    Sandham,    3    Swanst. 

25  Wilbrahani      v.     Livesey,     18       6S5. 

Beav.    206,    2    W.   R.   281 ;    Van    v.  2s  Bennett   v.    Womack,   7    B.    & 

Corpe.  3  Myl.  &  K.  269,  6  L.  J.  Ch.  C.  627,  1  M.  &  Ry.  644,  3  Car.  & 

208,  1  Jur.  101,  149.  P.  96,  6  L.  J.    (O.   S.)    K.  B.  175, 

26  Prospect  V.  Parker,  3  Mylne  &  :U  R.  R.  270. 
K.  280. 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  365 

nants,  it  has  been  held  that  a  covenant  not  to  assign  is  a  usual 
and  customary  covenant.-^  But  there  are  many  cases  which 
hold  that  a  covenant  not  to  assign  without  the  landlord's  consent 
or  license  is  not  a  usual  covenant.^"  Thus,  it  will  be  seen  on 
comparing  the  cases  on  and  for  this  proposition  that  the  weight 
of  the  decisions  is  decidedly  on  the  side  of  the  latter  proposition. 
Whether  under  a  provision  in  an  agreement  for  a  lease  that  the 
usual  covenants  are  to  be  inserted  in  the  lease,  the  lessor  shall 
be  entitled  to  have  a  power  of  entry  upon  the  breach  by  the  les- 
see of  a  covenant,  has  been  differently  decided.  It  has  been  held 
that  a  lease  ought  to  contain  a  power  of  re-entry  on  the  lessee 
becoming  bankrupt. ^^  But  it  has  also  been  held  that  such  a 
power  of  entry  is  unusual  and  that  an  intended  assignee  of  a 
lease  is  not  bound  to  accept  a  lease  containing  such  a  provision  un- 
less he  has  expressly  agreed  to  do  so.^-  And  it  has  also  been  held 
that,  as  a  general  rule,  a  landlord  is  not  entitled  to  have  a  pro- 
vision for  re-entry  inserted  in  the  lease  as  a  usual  and  customary 
provision  on  the  breach  of  any  covenant  in  the  lease,  except  for 
the  breach  of  the  covenant  to  pay  rent.^^  An  agreement  for  a 
lease  to  contain  the  usual  and  necessary  covenants  and  particu- 
larly to  contain  a  covenant  by  the  tenant  to  keep  the  premises 
in  good  repair,  requires  that  he  shall  covenant  to  repair  generally 
without  any  exception  therein  of  damages  by  fire  or  tempest.^* 

29  Morgan  v.  Slaughter,  1  Esp.  Lander  and  Bagley's  Contract,  In 
8,  5  R.  R.  715;  Haberdashers'  Co.  re,  61  L.  J.  Ch.  707;  (1892)  3  Ch. 
V.  Isaac,  3  Jur.  (N.  S.)  611,  af-  41,  67  L.  T.  521,  following  Header- 
firmed  5  W.  R.  855;    Folkingham  son  v.  Hay,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  632. 

V.  Croft,  3  Anstr.  700,  4  R.  R.  844.  si  Haines   v.    Burnett,    27    Beav. 

30  Hampshire  v.  Wickens.  47  L.  500,  29  L.  J.  Ch.  289,  5  Jur.  (N.  S.) 
J.  Ch.  243,  7  Ch.  D.  555,  38  L.  T.       1279,  1  L.  T.  18,  8  W.  R.  130. 

408,    26    W.   R.    491;    Bucldand   v.  32  Hyde  v.  Warden,  47  L.  J.  Ex. 

Papillon,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  477,  12  Jur.  121,  3  Ex.  D.  72,  37  L.  T.  567,  26 

(N.  S.)   155,  affirmed  36  L.  J.  Ch.  W.  R.  201. 

81,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  67,  12  Jur.  (N.  S.)  as  Hodgkinson  v.  Crowe.  44  L.  J. 

992.   15   L.   T.    378,   15   W.   R.   92;  Ch.  680,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  622,  33  L.  T. 

Browne  V.  Raban,  15  Ves.  528;  Bell  38S,  23  W.  R.  885;    Anderton  and 

V.  Barchard,  16  Beav.  8,  21  L.  J.  Milner,  in  re,  59  L.  J.  Ch.  765,  45 

Ch.  411;  Henderson  v.  Hay,  3  Bro.  Ch.    D.   476,   63   L.   T.   332,   39   W. 

C.  C.  632;  Hampshire  v.  Wickens,  R.  44. 

7  Ch.  D.  555,  followed  in  Bishop  v.  34  Sharp    v.    Milligan,    23    Beav. 

Taylor,  60  L.  J.  Q.  B.  556,  64  L.  T.  419;    S.  C,  Nom.  Thorpe  v.  Milli- 

529,   39  W.   R.   542,   55   J.   P.   695;  gan,  5  W.  R.  336. 


366  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  "TENANT. 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  said  that  the  usual  tenant's  covenants  are 
(1)  to  pay  rent;  (2)  to  pay  taxes,  except  those  expressly  made 
payable  by  the  landlord;  (3)  to  keep  and  deliver  in  repair; 
(4)  to  permit  the  landlord  to  enter  and  view  the  premises.  But 
in  the  United  States,  a  covenant  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  to  pay 
taxes  would  not  be  a  usual  covenant. 

§  251.  Leases  executed  in  duplicate  and  counterpart.  Writ- 
ten leases  of  which  there  are  two  copies,  one  signed  by  each  party 
to  it,  are  as  binding  upon  the  other  to  the  same  extent  as  though 
there  had  been  only  one  copy  of  the  agreement  or  lease  and  both 
parties  had  signed  it.^^  The  mere  fact  that  the  parties  to  a  lease 
have  agreed  to  call  one  contract  "an  original"  and  one  "a  du- 
plicate," does  not  affect  the  force  or  relevancy  of  the  duplicate 
copy.^®  Where  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  the  original  lease 
and  its  duplicate  or  counterpart  which  cannot  be  explained  or 
which  is  not  shown  to  be  a  mistake  of  the  person  who  wrote  it, 
the  lease  will  have  precedence  over  the  counterpart.  This  rule 
applies  only  to  cases  where  there  is  an  inconsistency  between  the 
counterpart  and  the  original  and  not  to  a  case  where  the  terms 
of  the  lease  itself  are  inconsistent.^^  Wherever  it  shall  happen 
that  there  is  a  difference  in  the  language  between  the  two  copies 
of  a  lease,  parol  evidence  is  received  to  show  the  cause  of  the  er- 
ror. The  party  to  the  lease  against  whom  the  inconsistent  copy 
is  offered  may  of  course  show  that  the  difference  or  inconsistency 
between  the  copy  produced  in  evidence  against  him  and  the  copy 
which  he  has  in  his  possession  was  the  result  of  an  error  in  copy- 
ing, or  that  an  alteration  was  made  after  he  had  executed  the 
lease.  Where  a  lease  is  executed  in  counterpart,  the  question  may, 
arise  who  is  to  retain  the  ownership  and  possession  of  the  orig- 
inal 1-ease  and  who  is  to  have  the  copy  or  counterpart.     Prima 

35  Morris  v.  McKee,  96  Ga.  Gil,  or  of  a  lease  signed  by  both  par- 
24  S.  E.  Rep.  142.  ties  with  the  attorney  of  one  of 

36  Crane  v.  Partland,  9  Mich.  them  for  the  sole  purpose  of  hav- 
493.  It  has  been  held  that  a  con-  ing  a  duplicate  prepared  is  no  de- 
tract which  was  signed  by  both  livery.  Lamar  Milling  &  Elevator 
the  parties  and  left  at  the  office  Co.  v.  Craddock,  5  Colo.  App.  203, 
of  an  attorney  to  have  a  duijlicate  37  Pac.  Rep.  950. 

executed     was     sufIif;iontly     deliv-  3^  Burchcll  v.  Claris,  46  L.  .T.  C. 

ercd.      Blanchard    v.    Blackstone,  P.  115,  2  C.  P.  D.  88,  35  L.  T.  690, 

103  Mass.  343.    On  the  other  hand,  25  W.  R.  334. 
the  leaving  of  a  copy  of  a  contract 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION   OP   LEASES.  361 

facie,  the  property  in  the  original  indenture  of  lease  is  in  the 
lessee  and  that  of  the  counterpart  is  in  the  lessor.  If  there  is 
an  original  and  a  duplicate  lease,  the  original  should  be  deliv- 
ered to  the  lessee.  The  property  of  the  lessee  in  the  original 
lease  is  absolute.  The  expiration  of  the  term  by  efflux  of  time  or 
by  forfeiture  on  the  part  of  the  lessee  confers  no  title  to  the  orig- 
inal lease  on  the  lessor  as  against  the  lessee.  The  lessee's  right 
to  retain  the  original  lease  after  the  expiration  of  his  term  is 
principally  based  upon  the  right  he  may  have  to  sue  on  his  lease 
after  the  term  has  expired  to  recover  damages  for  the  breach  of 
a  covenant  occurring  before  the  expiration  of  the  tenn.^^  So  a 
lessor  who  has  determined  a  lease  by  re-entry  for  breach  of 
covenant  has  no  title  to  the  lease  as  against  the  lessee.^^  But 
as  against  a  stranger  to  the  term,  a  lease  and  counterpart  would 
doubtless  be  regarded  as  one  instrument  and  both  would  belong 
to  the  lessor.*" 

§  252.  The  mode  of  proving  a  written  lease.  "Where  a  plain- 
tiff sues  on  a  written  lease,  the  rules  of  evidence  applicable 
to  the  proof  of  handwriting  are  of  service.  If  the  lease  was 
signed  in  counterpart,  either  party  may  rely  upon  the  counter- 
part which  is  in  his  possession.  Under  the  general  rules,  the 
signature  may  be  proved  either  by  producing  an  attesting  wit- 
ness, or  by  producing  a  witness  who  was  present  and,  though  not 
an  attesting  witness,  saw  the  lease  signed,  or  by  the  evidence  of 
some  person  who  is  familiar  with  the  handwriting  of  the  party 
who  is  to  be  charged.  If  a  lease  is  a  conveyance  within  the 
statute  it  may  be  proved  under  the  statute  providing  a  convey- 
ance or  a  transcript  thereof,  duly  certified  and  acknowledged, 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law  to  entitle  it  to  be  recorded,  is 
evidence  without  further  proof.*^     Where  the  plaintiff  is  not 

38  Hall  V.  Ball,  3  Man.  &  G.  242,  against  the    tenant   for  the   rent. 

3  Scott  (N.  R.)  577.  Houghton  v.  Koenig,  18  C.  B.  235, 

39Elworthy  v.  Sandford,  3  H.  &  25  L.  J.  218;  Roe  d.  West  v.  Davis, 

C.  330.  34  L,  J.  Ex.  42,  10  L.  T.  7   East,   363.     The   lease   and   the 

654,  12  W.  R.  1008.  counterpart    ought    always    to    be 

<oyear  Book,  38  Hen.  VI,  fol.  24,  read  together  and  treated  as  one 

pi.    1.      The    counterpart    of    the  instrument    for    the    purpose    of 

lease  in  the  pos.session  of  the  ten-  determining     their     construction, 

ant  has  been  held  in  England  to  Spyvy  v.  Topham,  3  East.  115. 
be  of  equal  strength  as  proof   in  *i  Goodman  v.  Greenberg,  103  N. 

an  action  brought  by  the  landlord  Y.  Supp.  779. 


368  LiVW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

suing  on  the  written  lease,  the  relation  of  landlord  may  be 
proved  by  parol  evidence.  Such  parol  evidence  would  consist 
in  the  admission  of  the  party  or  in  proof  of  the  payment  of  rent 
by  the  tenant.''-  And  where  the  plaintiff  is  not  suing  to  enforce 
a  right  under  a  written  lease,  parol  evidence  is  received  to  show 
the  fact  of  tenancy,  though  it  appears  that  there  was  a  written 
lease.  Thus,  where  a  third  party  brings  an  action  against  a  ten- 
ant for  personal  injuries  sustained  by  the  tenant's  negligence, 
it  may  be  proved  by  parol  tliat  he  was  a  tenant  of  a  certain  per- 
son.*^ In  a  case  where  the  plaintiff  relies  upon  a  written  lease, 
the  lease  itself  is,  of  course,  the  best  evidence  and  ought  usually 
to  be  produced.  Secondary  evidence  of  the  contents  of  a  writ- 
ten lease  will  be  received  where  it  appears  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  court  that  the  lease  was  destroyed;  but  secondary  evidence 
will  not  be  received  merely  because  the  party  who  had  the  lease 
in  his  possession  testifies  that  he  has  misplaced  it,  but  cannot 
swear  positively  that  it  is  lost  or  destroyed.**  A  lease  for  years 
which  has  expired,  where  the  possession  acquired  under  it  has 
been  surrendered,  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  destroyed  par- 
ticularly after  the  lapse  of  a  number  of  years.  Its  contents  may 
thereafter  be  proved  by  parol  evidence.*^  So,  where  a  witness 
testifies  that  he  has  unsuccessfully  sought  to  find  a  lease  among 
his  papers,  and  that  it  was  his  custom  to  destroy  all  leases  to  get 
rid  of  them,  the  court  will  accept  secondary  evidence  of  the  lease 
particularly  in  an  action  between  third  parties.*^  An  unexpired 
lease  may  be  presumed  to  have  been  destroyed  where  reasonable 
diligence  has  been  unsuccessfully  used  to  secure  its  production.*'^ 
§  253.  Term  expiring  on  the  happening  of  contingent  event. 
A  term  may  be  created  by  the  consent  of  the  parties,  the  dura- 
tion of  which  shall  depend  upon  the  happening  of  some  contin- 
gent and  collateral  event.  The  term  will  then  continue  until  the 
happening  of  such  event  when  it  will  at  once  cease  and  the  les- 
sor will  be  entitled  to  immediate  possession  and  the  lessee  may 

42  Hearn  v.  Gray,  2  Houst.  (Del.)  ^r  Hinton  v.  Fox,  13  Ky.  380. 

135.  4G  Kane  v.  Metropolitan  El.  Ry. 

4-- Central  Railroad  Co.  v.  White-  Co.,   15   Daly,   294,   6   N.   V.   Supp. 

head,  74  Ga.  441;    Rayner  v.  Lee,  526. 

20   Mich.   384;    Thompson    v.   Mat-  ■•t  Doe    d.    Manton    v.    Austin,    2 

thews,  61  N.  C.  15.  M.  &  Scott,  107,  9  Bing.  41,  1  L.  J. 

■»<  Riirke  v.  Bragg,  89  Ala.  204,  7  C.  P.  152. 
So.  Rep.  156. 


FORM   AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES. 


369 


vacate  the  premises  without  the  ser\'ice  by  him  of  any  notice  to 
quit.*^  "When  a  lease  depends  upon  the  happening  of  a  contin- 
gent event,  the  tenant  as  well  as  the  landlord  is  bound  to  watch 
for  the  happening  of  that  event  and  to  surrender  the  lease  as 
soon  as  it  shall  happen/^  for  by  the  happening  of  such  an  event, 
the  whole  interest  of  the  tenant  is  terminated  and  the  lessor  be- 
comes at  once  vested  with  the  right  of  entry.^°  Thus,  a  lease 
may  create  a  term  which  shall  expire  when  another  term  created 
by  a  separate  instrument  shall  cease,^^  which  shall  last  during 
the  whole  time  the  lessee  may  be  postmaster,^^  which  shall  ter- 
minate in  case  the  machinery  in  the  demised  premises  shall 
break  down,°^  w^hich  shall  terminate  when  another  building, 
which  is  in  process  of  construction,  shall  be  completed,^^^  or 
which  shall  last  so  long  as  a  co-partnership  continues,^*  which 
shall  continue  until  the  lessor  sells  the  property,"  or  until  the 
lessee  finds  another  place,^^  or  until  the  lessor  who  is  a  mortgage 
debtor  of  the  lessee,  shall  pay  him  what  he  owes."  The  term 
is  contingent  and  uncertain  where  it  is  made  for  a  particular 
number  of  years,  or  in  the  alternative  for  the  life  of  the  lessee 


48  Snook  &  Austin  Furniture  Co. 
V.  Steiner  &  Emery,  117  Ga.  363, 
43  S.  E.  Rep.  775;  Scott  v.  Willis, 
122  Ind.  1,  22  N.  E.  Rep.  786; 
Horner  v.  Leeds,  25  N.  J.  Law, 
106;  Russel  v.  McCartney,  21  Mo. 
A  pp.  544;  Aydlett  v.  Pendleton, 
114  N.  C.  1.  18  S.  E.  Rep.  971; 
Aydlett  v.  Neal,  114  N.  C.  7,  18  S. 
E.  Rep.  973. 

40  Clark  v.  Rhoads,  79  Ind.  342, 
344. 

50  Chretien  v.  Doney,  1  N.  Y. 
419,  422.  A  lease  in  writing  may 
be  made  to  depend  upon  a  contin- 
gency, and  when  this  happens  it 
is  valid  as  to  all  its  conditions. 
Insurance  &  Law  Bldg.  Co.  v.  Na- 
tional Bank  of  Missouri,  5  Mo. 
App.  333. 

51  Eubank  v.  May  &  Thomas 
Hardware  Co.,  105  Ala.  629,  17  So. 
Rep.  109. 

r.2  Easton  v.  Mitchell,  21  111.  App. 
189. 

24 


5.<!  Scott  V.  Willis,  122  Ind.  1,  22 
N.  E.  Rep.  786. 

53aD'Arcy  v.  Martin,  63  Mich. 
602,  30  N.  W.  Rep.  194. 

04  Russell  V.  AlcCartney,  21  Mo. 
App.  544. 

55  Clark  V.  Rhoads,  79  Ind.  343, 
344. 

50  Hoffman  v.  McCallum,  93  Ind. 
326. 

57  Hunt  V.  Comstock,  15  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  665,  669.  Where  a  land- 
owner agrees  his  creditor  may  oc- 
cupy premises  belonging  to  him 
for  one  year  and  until  he  pays  a 
mortgage  which  the  creditor  holds, 
it  is  at  the  election  of  the  owner 
to  put  an  end  to  the  term  at  any 
time  after  the  first  year  by  pay- 
ing or  tendering  payment  of  the 
debt,  though  the  money  is  not  due, 
according  to  the  terms  of  the 
mortgage  for  four  years.  Hunt  v. 
Comstock,  15  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  665, 
669. 


370  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

or  lessor  or  of  some  other  person.  Just  what  such  a  limitation 
means  in  a  lease  is  a  question  of  construction  to  be  determined 
by  the  exact  words  which  are  employed.  A  lease  "for  the  space 
of  twenty  years  or  during  the  natural  life  of  the  lessee,"  was 
held  not  to  extend  longer  than  twenty  years  in  any  case.  It 
was  to  be  contingent  upon  the  life  of  the  lessee,  and  if  the  lessee 
died  before  the  twenty  year  period  expired,  the  lease  was  then 
to  come  to  an  end.  But  if  he  should  survive  the  twenty  year 
period,  then  the  term  was  to  expire  at  the  end  of  twenty  years.^^ 
A  lease  to  a  partnership  of  a  building  owned  by  one  of  the  part- 
ners for  the  use  of  the  firm  for  the  period  for  which  the  partner- 
ship is  to  continue  is  contingent  upon  the  continued  existence 
of  the  partnership.  If,  therefore,  the  partnership,  for  any  rea- 
son such  as  by  death  of  either  partner,  is  dissolved,  the 
term  is  at  an  end  though  by  the  articles  of  co-partnership  the 
firm  was  to  exist  for  a  specified  and  certain  number  of  years.^" 
Where  property  is  leased  for  a  term  of  years  to  expire  at  the 
same  time  as  another  lease  for  a  term  held  by  the  lessee,  it  will 
be  presumed  that  the  expiration  of  the  second  lease  referred  to 
is  its  expiration  by  efflux  of  time  or  by  the  mutual  consent  of 
the  parties  to  it.  The  tenant,  therefore,  cannot  give  up  the 
one  lease  at  any  time  he  may  choose,  as  for  example,  as  soon  as 
he  discovers  it  is  not  binding  on  him  because  it  is  invalid  under 
the  statute  of  frauds  and  thus  secure  his  release  from  the  other 
lease  by  reason  of  such  action  on  his  part.*'*'  A  lease  to  a  rail- 
road company  of  land  "so  long  as  the  same  shall  be  used  for  rail- 
road purposes"  and  which  recites  that  the  lessee  is  "now  en- 
gaged in  altering  and  improving  the  railroad  depot ' '  for  the  pur- 
pose of  more  conveniently  transacting  the  business  of  said  com- 
pany "and  for  the  better  accommodation  of  the  public,"  contin- 
ues only  while  the  land  is  used  "for  public  railroad  purposes." 
On  the  lessee  conveying  the  land  to  an  individual  and  the  use  of 
it  for  private  railroad  purposes,  the  lessor  can  recover  posses- 
sion."^ A  lease  of  land  for  th(>  purpose  of  enabling  the  tenant  to 
remove  timber  therefrom  may  be,  under  some  circumstances,  re- 

f'«  Sutton  V.  Hiram  Lodge,  83  Ga.  co  Kubank     v.     May    &    Thomas 

770,  10   S.  E.  585.  Hardware  Co.,  105  Ala.  G29,  17  So. 

•"'f  Johnson  v.  Hartshorne,  52  N.  Rep.  109. 

Y.  173,  177;  Doe  v.  Miles,  1  Stark,  «'  Kugel  v.  Painter,  IGG  Pa.  St. 

181  Doe  V.  Black,  8  C.  &  P.  464.  592,  31  Atl.  Rep.  338. 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  371 

garded  as  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  the  timber  and  not  as  a  mere 
lease  of  land  npon  which  the  timber  is  located.  If  the  principal 
object  of  the  parties  is  the  removal  and  sale  of  the  timber,  the 
writing  will  be  regarded  as  a  sale  and  not  as  a  lease  and  the  rights 
of  the  parties  will  be  adjusted  accordingly.  Thus,  where  a  con- 
tract leased  land  with  the  privilege  in  the  tenant  to  remove  the 
timber  therefrom  and  where  it  was  apparent  that  the  principal 
purpose  of  the  parties  was  the  purchase  and  sale  of  the  timber  and 
not  the  free  occupation  and  enjoyment  of  the  land,  it  was  held 
that  where  the  timber  was  all  removed  from  the  land  before  the 
end  of  the  term  specified  in  the  lease,  the  right  of  the  lessor  to  col- 
lect rent  was  at  end.  It  would  appear  that  from  the  intention  of 
parties  in  such  an  agreement,  the  term  itself  would  come  to  an 
end  when  the  purpose  of  the  so-called  lease  was  accomplished, 
but  even  where  the  term  is  expressly  extended  so  that  the  lessee 
may  remain  in  possession  if  he  desires  to  do  so,  the  lessor  cannot 
after  the  timber  is  all  cut  collect  rent  from  the  lessee  for  the 
balance  of  the  term,  though  the  latter  may  still  remain  in  posses- 
sion of  the  land.^- 

§  254.  Leases  terminable  on  the  sale  of  the  premises.  Terms 
for  years  are  not  ordinarily  terminable  by  the  sale  of  the  prem- 
ises by  the  lessor  though  a  contrary-  rule  is  applicable  to  leases 
at  will.  It  is  competent  for  the  parties  to  a  lease  for  years  to 
provide  by  express  agreement  that  the  term  shall  be  ended  by  a 
sale  of  the  premises  by  the  lessor.  Such  a  provision  is  frequently 
very  advantageous  to  a  lessor  inasmuch  as  he  is  thereby  enabled 
to  lease  for  a  long  term  without  any  danger  to  himself  that  he 
will  be  prevented  from  selling  his  property  whenever  he  may 
chose  to  do  so  because  of  its  occupation  by  a  tenant  having  a  long 
lease.  On  the  other  hand,  such  a  provision  may  be  very  disad- 
vantageous to  a  tenant  abruptly  shortening  his  term  at  a  mo- 
ment perhaps  when  his  occupation  had  become  very  valuable, 
while  during  its  existence  he  will  be  deterred  from  making  im- 
provements because  of  the  uncertain  character  of  his  tenancy. 
Hence,  in  justice  to  the  tenant  in  all  cases  where  his  lease  is 
terminable  by  a  sale  of  the  premises,  the  lessor  will  be  held  to  the 
utmost  good  faith  in  making  the  sale.  Unless  fraud  is  proved,  on 
the  part  of  the  lessor,  or  in  other  words,  unless  it  shall  appear 

62  Baird    v.    Milford    Land,    etc., Co.,  89  Cal.  552,  26  Pac.  Rep.  1084, 


372  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

that  the  sale  is  a  mere  pretence  to  oust  the  tenant,  mere  inade- 
quacy of  price  will  not  render  the  sale  ineffectual.  The  landlord 
may  sell  at  any  price  and  to  any  person,  and  while  these  facts 
may  be  taken  into  consideration  with  other  facts  in  the  case  to 
detennine  whether  the  sale  was  hona  fide  they  are  never  con- 
clusive.^^ But  where  it  shall  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
court  from  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  that  the  sale  by  the 
landlord  was  merely  going  through  a  form  of  sale  without  any 
valid  transfer  of  the  legal  title  for  a  valuable  consideration,  but 
merely  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  the  lease  to  an  end,  the  sale 
will  not  terminate  the  lease.®*  As  in  all  questions  of  good  faith 
or  fraud,  the  range  of  the  evidence  to  determine  the  presence  of 
fraud  is  a  wide  one.  The  court  ought  to  have  before  it  all  the 
circumstances,  as  for  example,  the  relation  of  the  parties  who  pur- 
chase to  the  landlord;  the  consideration  paid,  the  nature  of  the 
use  to  which  the  purchaser  is  to  put  the  premises,  and  the  state- 
ments and  declarations  of  the  parties  to  the  sale.  If  the  sale  is 
made  with  the  intention  to  defraud  the  lessee  it  is  not  necessary 
to  show  that  the  purchaser  was  a  party  to  the  fraud.  It  is  enough 
to  defeat  the  sale  to  show  that  it  was  prompted  by  an  attempt  to 
defraud  on  the  part  of  the  landlord.  Under  a  lease  which  pro- 
vides that  the  sale  of  the  land  by  the  lessor  in  good  faith  shall 
terminate  the  lease,  the  lease  is  at  once  brought  to  an  end  as 
soon  as  the  land  is  sold.  The  tenant  is  thereafter  a  tenant  at 
sufferance  or  at  will  and  is  liable  to  the  landlord  as  such.  The 
landlord  may  treat  him  as  a  trespasser  and  oust  him  by  proper 
proceedings.  The  purchaser  may,  as  against  the  tenant,  take 
immediate  possession  of  the  premises  though  he  must  allow  the 
tenant  a  reasonable  time  to  remove  his  fixtures  therefrom.    No- 

c:i  Dunn  v.  Jaffray,  36  Kan.  408,  were  not  a  mere  subterfuge  to 
13  Pac.  Rep.  781;  Wallace  v.  Bahl-  bring  the  lease  to  an  end.  The 
horn,  68  Mich.  87.  35  N.  W.  Rep.  fact  that  the  sale  was  for  a  nomi- 
834.  A  firm  composed  of  several  nal  consideration  was  not  conclu- 
members  owning  premises  leased  sive,  though  the  smallness  of  the 
the  same  "for  the  term  of  and  un-  consideration  was  a  circumstance 
til  said  premises  are  disposed  of  which  might  be  considered  in  Con- 
or sold  by  the  said  firm."  It  was  nection  with  the  other  evidence 
held  that  the  landlord  might  put  to  show  the  faith  of  the  landlord, 
an  end  to  the  lease  by  the  sale  of  Dunn  v.  Jaffray,  36  Kan.  408,  13 
the  premises  in  good  faith  to  one  Pac.  Rep.  408. 
of  the  members  of  the  firm,  if  this  64  Ela  v.  Bankes,  37  Wis.  89. 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  373 

tice  neerl  not  be  given  by  the  purchaser  to  the  tenant,  but  a  no- 
tice by  him  that  he  has  bought  the  land,  that  the  lease  is  thereby 
terminated  and  that  he  takes  possession  is  sufficient.®^ 

§  255.  The  option  of  the  lessee  to  terminate  the  lease.  A 
lease  which  is  determinable  only  at  the  option  of  the  lessee  and 
which,  consequently,  may  continue  with  his  consent  and  against 
a  protest  of  the  lessor  is  valid.®®  Thus,  a  lease  fpr  the  term  of 
five  years  and  as  much  longer  as  the  lessee  desires,  confers  the 
right  upon  the  lessee  to  continue  to  occupy  the  premises  so  long 
as  he  wishes  to  do  so,  and  providing  he  fulfils  the  conditions  of 
the  lease,  he  may  continue  during  his  life  time  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  five  years.®^  Such  leases  as  this  are  not  open  to  the 
objection  that  they  are  without  consideration  on  the  part  of  the 
lessee  as  to  the  period  during  which  he  elects  to  remain.  The 
rent  received  by  the  lessor  during  that  period  is  the  considera- 
tion for  the  promise  of  the  lessor  to  permit  the  lessee  to  remain 
in  possession.  These  leases  are  somewhat  in  the  nature  of  leases 
at  will,  and  the  time  or  period  during  which  the  lessee  may  con- 
tinue need  not  be  fixed  but  may  be  wholly  at  his  option.  So,  a 
lease  of  land  for  the  manufacture  of  salt  ''for  any  term  of  years 
the  lessee  may  think  proper  from  date,"  ®*  or  as  long  as  certain 
salt  works  erected  thereon  should  be  used  for  that  purpose,®^  or 
as  long  as  a  lessee  should  keep  a  furnace  and  buildings  on  the 
land,'"  is  unquestionably  valid.  In  some  cases,  from  the  terms  of 
the  lease  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  option  to  continue  the  term 
is  with  the  landlord  or  with  the  tenant.  This,  of  course,  is  al- 
ways an  important  question.  No  general  imle  can  be  laid  down 
by  which  it  can  be  determined.  "Whether  the  option  is  with  the 
landlord  or  with  the  tenant  is  a  matter  of  construction,  though 
the  presumption  in  most  cases,  is  that  the  option  is  with  the 
tenant.  Thus,  an  agreement  that  a  house  shall  be  leased  for  a 
term  of  thirty-one  years  with,  liberty  to  have  the  same  ended  at 
the  end  of  any  third  year  should  it  be  so  desired  in  which  case 

65  Aydlett  v.  Pendleton,  114  N.  ss  Harner  v.  Leeds,  25  N.  J.  Law, 
C.  1,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  971.  106. 

66  Effinger  v.  Lewis,  32  Pa.  St  <ii>  Hurd  v.  Gushing,  7  Pick. 
367;   Myers  y.  Kingston  Coal  Co.,  (Mass.)  169. 

17  Atl.  Rep.  891,  126  Pa.  St.  582,  to  Cook     v.     Bisbee.     18     Pick, 

24  W.  N.  C.  223.  (Mass.)   527. 

6T  Sweetser  v.  McKeney,  65  Me. 
225,  227. 


374  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

six  months'  notice  to  quit  is  to  be  given,  and  if  the  tenant  desires 
to  have  a  lease  executed  for  the  remainder  of  the  term,  it  was  to 
be  given,  confers  the  option  of  determining  the  tenancy  on  the 
tenant  and  not  on  the  landlord.'^  Thus,  it  is  a  well  settled  rule 
of  law  that  an  agreement  for  a  lea^e  for  a  term  of  seven  or  four- 
teen years  means  that  the  lessee  may  have  a  lease  for  fourteen 
3^ears  which  shall  be  determinable  at  his  option  at  the  expiration 
of  seven  years,  not  at  the  option  of  the  landlord.'-  Wliere  a 
lease  is  granted  for  seven,  fourteen  or  twenty-one  years,  the 
lessee  only  has  the  option  to  determine  at  which  of  the  above 
periods  the  lease  shall  come  to  an  end.'^  A  lease  for  seven,  four- 
teen or  twenty-one  years  as  the  lessee  shall  think  proper,  is  a 
good  lease  for  seven  years,  whatever  it  may  be  for  the  fourteen 
or  twenty-one  years.'^*  Under  some  circumstances  and  by  par- 
ticular language  a  lease  may  be  made  to  terminate  at  a  particular 
period  or  at  one  of  several  particular  periods,  by  the  joint  ac- 
tion of  the  parties.  If  no  mention  is  made  as  to  who  shall  have 
the  option,  the  option  is  usually  with  the  lessee.  A  lease  for 
twenty-one  years  determinable  at  the  end  of  seven  or  fourteen, 
if  the  parties  so  think  fit,  is  determinable  only  by  the  joint  as- 
sent of  both  parties.^^  If  the  party  who  has  the  option  exercises 
it,  the  lease  is  at  an  end  at  once  for  all  purposes  and  the  other 
party  is  released  and  any  one  who  may  have  been  a  surety  is  also 
released.  Where  a  lease  was  granted  for  fourteen  years  with  a 
stipulation  that  the  landlord  might,  if  he  so  desired,  terminate 

Ti  Fallon  V.  Robins,  16  Ir.  Ch.  R.  the  intention  of  the  parties  from 

422.  the  word  used  by  them.     "Where 

T2  Powell  V.  Smith,  41  L.  J.  Ch.  the    lease    is    granted    for    seven, 

734.  L.  R.  14  Eq.  85,  20  W.  R.  602.  fourteen  or  twenty-one  years,  with- 

■••'i  Dann    v.    Spurrier,    3    Bos.    &  out  mentioning  at  whose  option  it 

P.    390,   442,    7   R.    R.    797,    802,    7  is    determinable,    it   has    been    de- 

,  Ves.    231,    6    R.   R.    119;    Price    v.  cided  that  the  option  is  with  the 

Dyer,  17  Ves.  363,  11  R.  R.  102.  lessee  where  the  lease  mentioned 

74  Ferguson  v.  Cornish,  2  Burr.  both  parties,  but  it  is  not  stated 

1032,  2  Term  Rep.  403,  n.  whether   the   option    of   determin- 

"'•  Towell  V.  Tranter,  3  H.  &  C.  ing     it     is     in     either     party,     or 

458,  34  L.  J.  Ex.  C,  11  L.  T.  317,  whether  both  parties  are  required 

13  W.  R.  145,  in  which  the  court  to   consent  for   that   purijose.     It 

said   that   it  was   likely  that  the  is  certainly  open  to  contend  that 

parties    meant    that    only    one    of  both  are  mentioned  in  order  that 

them  should  have  the  option,  but  (he  landlord  may  have  an  ootion 

that  the  court  would  have  to  take  as  well  as  the  tenant." 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  37i) 

it  at  the  end  of  seven  years,  on  his  giving  notice  of  his  desire  to 
do  so  in  writing,  and  he  gave  notice  to  quit  not  expressing  his 
desire  to  terminate  the  tenancy  under  the  proviso  referring  to 
the  lease,  it  was  held  that  the  lease  was  at  an  end  under  the  pro- 
viso, and  that  a  surety  of  the  tenant  who  had  joined  in  the  cove- 
nant was  thereby  released.''®  It  is  very  probable  that  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  express  provision  annexing  the  option  to  continue  the 
lease  to  the  land  an  option  in  a  tenant  to  extend  a  lease  or 
to  continue  a  lease  would  be  regarded  as  a  personal  cove- 
nant which  he  could  not  assign.  Thus,  if  the  lease  provided  that 
it  M-ould  continue  for  a  certain  fixed  term  of  years  and  so  long 
thereafter  as  the  tenant  desired  to  occupy  the  premises,  or  so 
long  as  he  should  desire  to  carry  on  a  certain  business  in  the 
premises,  the  option  would  be  personal  to  the  tenant  and  could 
only  be  exercised  by  the  tenant  himself.  Such  an  option,  how- 
ever, may  be  made  assignable  or  transferable  by  express  lan- 
guage. Accordingly,  a  provision  that  if  either  of  the  parties 
shall  desire  to  extend  the  lease  or  to  terminate  at  a  specified  date, 
it  shall  be  lawful  for  them  or  either  of  them  or  their  executor 
or  administrator  to  do  so  includes  not  only  a  personal  repre- 
sentative of  the  lessor  but  one  to  whom  he  has  devised  the  prem- 
ises.'^ A  lease  which  gives  to  the  tenant  an  option  to  continue 
its  term  after  a  specified  date  must  be  reasonably  certain  in  its 
language  as  to  the  extent  of  the  extension  or  it  will  not  be  en- 
forced in  equity  by  a  decree  of  specific  performance.  A  letting 
to  a  yearly  tenant  and  if  he  should  wish  a  lease  that  the  lessor 
will  grant  him  one  for  seven,  fourteen  or  twenty-one  years  at  the 
same  rent,  is  sufficiently  certain  for  specific  performance,  and 
will  be  considered  an  optional  lease  for  twenty-one  years  from 
the  date  of  its  making  determinable  at  the  end  of  seven  or  four- 
teen years  at  the  option  of  the  tenant.  The  landlord  has  a  right 
to  call  on  the  tenant  to  exercise  his  option  and  in  default  of  his 
doing  so,  the  landlord  may  determine  the  tenancy.'^  A  lessee 
of  a  coal  mine  for  a  term  of  years  who  has  a  right  to  terminate 
the  lease  in  a  certain  time  by  the  giving  of  a  written  notice  and 
on  the  expiration  of  the  period  of  notice  the  lease  is  to  become 

-«  Giddens  v.  Dodd,  3  Drew,  485,      Hayley,  12  East,  464,  470,  11  R.  R. 
492,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  451,  4  W.  R.  377.       455. 

77  Roe     lessee    of    Bamford,    v.  7s  Hersey  v.  Gibbletts,  18  Beav. 

174,  23  L.  J.  Ch.  818,  2  W.  R.  206. 


376 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


void  provided  all  arrears  of  rent  shall  have  been  paid  and  all 
agreements  and  covenants  performed  by  the  lessee  must  fully 
perform  all  covenants  as  such  performance  of  covenants  by 
him  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the  exercise  of  his  right  to  de- 
termine the  lease.'®  Notice  given  under  a  provision  in  a  lease 
for  determining  it  at  a  certain  period  must  agree  with  the  notice 
required  in  the  provision.  A  substantial  compliance  is  all  that 
is  required.  It  is  not  necessary  that  it  shall  follow  the  precise 
language  of  the  lease  if  the  notice  given  is  not  contrary  to  it.  A 
notice  which  expressly  states  the  desire  of  the  lessee  or  lessor 
to  determine  the  lease  at  the  end  of  a  specified  period  will  un- 
questionably be  sufficient.  But  if  the  notice  is  such  that  from 
its  language  it  may  be  inferred  that  the  intention  of  the  person 
giving  it  is  to  terminate  the  lease  under  his  option  it  may  be 
sufficient.  Hence,  a  mere  notice  to  quit  the  premises  which  reads, 
"determinable  as  therein  mentioned,"  is  usually  sufficient.®" 


79  Friar  v.  Grey,  5  Ex.  597,  15 
Jur.  814,  affirmed  4  H.  L.  Cases, 
565,  18  Jur.  1036. 

80  Giddens  v.  Dodd,  3  Drew,  485, 
402,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  451,  4  W.  R.  377. 
The  cases  in  England  which  have 
placed  the  option  in  the  hands  of 
the  lessee  are  based  on  the  rule 
of  law  that  the  lease  shall  be 
taken  l:  stronger  against  Che  les- 
sor, as  laid  down  in  Bath's  Cases, 
6  Co.  Rep.  35b.  If  a  contract  is 
made  to  make  a  lease  for  seven, 
fourteen  or  twenty-one  years, 
there  must  be  an  option  in  some 
one  to  determine  the  length  of  the 
lease.  Under  the  rule  just  stated 
that  a  lease  is  to  be  construed 
most  favorably  to  the  lessee  it 
cannot  possibly  be  considered  that 
the  option  shall  be  in  the  lessor. 
If  the  provision  is  made  in  the 
lease  that  it  shall  be  determined 
at  the  option  of  either  party,  the 
lessor  would  be  entitled  to  take 
advantage  of  the  option,  but, 
where  no  such  provision  is  in  the 
kase,    the    usual    construction    Is 


that  the  lessee  alone  is  entitled  to 
continue  the  term  which  is  most 
beneficial  to  him.  Dann  v.  Spur- 
rier, 3  Bos.  N.  P.  399-442.  In  the 
case  of  Roe,  lessee  of  Bamford  v. 
Haley,  12  East,  464,  the  court  evi- 
dently regarded  this  option  to  pro- 
cure an  extension  of  the  lease  as 
running  with  the  land.  The  court 
said:  "The  covenants  by  a  lessor 
that  he  would  renew  at  the  end 
of  his  term  has  been  adjudged  to 
run  with  the  land,  and  to  bind  the 
grantee  to  the  reversion.  There 
is  no  substantial  difference  in 
point  of  construction  between  the 
stipulation  for  extending  the  term 
and  the  stipulation  for  shorten- 
ing it.  So  a  covenant  to  renew 
at  the  request  of  the  lessee  has 
been  held  in  equity  to  run  with 
the  estate,  and  to  oblige  the  lessor 
to  renew  at  the  request  of  the 
lessee  or  executors,  there  being 
nothing  in  the  lease  to  show  that 
the  renewal  was  intended  to  be 
confined  personally  to  the  lessee, 
and   it  being  considered  that  the 


FORM   AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  377 

§  256.  Measure  of  the  damages  for  a  failure  to  execute  a 
lease.  The  lessee  may  recover  as  damages  for  the  owner's  fail- 
ure to  execute  and  deliver  a  lease  as  agreed  on,  the  difference  be- 
tween the  rent  agreed  on  and  the  actual  rental  value  of  the 
premises.^^  The  lessor  may  recover  as  against  the  lessee  for  the 
failure  of  the  latter  to  accejot  a  proper  lease  tendered,  the  fair 
and  reasonable  value  of  the  use  of  the  land  for  the  term,  less 
all  revenue  or  income  the  lessor  may  have  derived  from  his  own 
use  of  the  land,  or  which  he  might  have  secured  by  the  use  of 
ordinary-  care  and  effort  in  letting  it  to  another.*^  The  lessee 
can  recover  only  such  damages  for  a  failure  on  the  part  of  the 
lessor  to  execute  the  lease  as  he  can  prove  in  money.  He  must 
prove  some  pecuniary  loss  due  to  the  breach  of  the  contract  and 
cannot  recover  for  his  disappointment,  or  for  the  trouble  and  in- 
convenience in  securing  other  premises.^^  A  sum  of  money  paid 
to  the  lessor  by  the  lessee  at  the  commencement  of  the  negotia- 
tions for  a  lease  as  evidence  of  good  faith  on  the  part  of  the  les- 
see must  be  returned  to  him  when,  after  an  inspection  of  the 
premises,  he  refuses  to  execute  a  lease  and  the  minds  of  the  par- 
tics  have  never  met  on  the  terms  of  the  proposed  lease.**  A  de- 
posit thus  paid  may  be  recovered  by  a  lessee  as  special  damages 


executors  were  identified  with  the  in  it  and  given  to  a  mere  stranger 
lessee.  If  the  proviso  in  this  case  having  no  interest  in  it  whatever/' 
is  to  be  construed  literally,  what  si  Knowles  v.  Steele,  59  Minn, 
will  be  the  consequences?  If  the  452,  61  N.  W.  Rep.  557;  North 
lessee  or  his  executors  assign,  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Le  Grand  Co., 
such  assignee  cannot  give  the  no-  95  111.  App.  435. 
tice,  because  he  is  not  within  the  82  stoker  v.  Wilson  (Tex.  1885), 
words,  but,  if  any  notice  is  to  be  Civ.  Cas.  Ct.  Ap.  §  10;  Massie  v. 
given .  on  his  part,  he  must  pro-  State  Nat.  Bank,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
cure  it  to  be  given  by  the  lessee  280,  32  S.  W.  Rep.  797.  Only 
or  his  executors.  And  for  the  nominal  damages  can  be  recov- 
same  reason  if  the  lessor  dies,  his  ered  by  either  party  under  a  con- 
heir  or  devisee  cannot  give  it,  but  tract  to  make  a  lease  if  the  con- 
if  any  notice  in  such  cases  is  to  tract  is  unenforceable  under  the 
be  effectual  it  must  be  from  the  statute  of  frauds.  Sausser  v. 
executors  or  administrators  of  the  Steinmetz,  88  Pa.  St.  324,  326. 
lessor.  Now  it  never  could  be  in-  83  D'Orval  v.  Hunt,  Dud.  Law 
tended  that  the  right  of  determin-  (S.  C.)   180. 

ing    the    terms    should    be    taken  s*  Equelina  v.  Provident  Realty 

from    the    only    person    interested  Co.  of  New  York,  84  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1014. 


378  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

in  addition  to  tlie  general  damages  if  it  is  alleged  as  special 
damages. 

§  257.  The  effect  of  the  statute  of  frauds  on  leases.  The  exe- 
cution of  leases  is,  in  some  cases,  regulated  by  the  provisions  of 
the  Statute  of  Frauds.  The  English.  Statute  of  Frauds  so  far 
as  it  concerns  leases,  has  been  substantially  re-enacted  in  some 
of  the  states.  In  that  statute  it  is  provided  that  a  parol  lease 
not  to  exceed  a  period  of  three  years  from  the  making  thereof 
shall  be  valid.  In  some  states  no  lease  for  a  longer  period  than 
one  3^ear  shall  be  valid  unless  in  writing.  Under  the  English 
Statute  in  which  it  is  expressly  provided  that  the  period  of  the 
lease  shall  be  measured  from  the  making  thereof  leases  in  futuro 
have  been  held  valid  though  for  a  longer  period  than  three  years 
if  the  time  between  the  making  and  entry  be  included.  The  same 
rule  has  been  generally  recognized  in  the  United  States.  Thus,  a 
parol  contract  for  a  lease  for  a  term  of  one  year  to  begin  in  the 
future,^^  has  been  held  not  to  be  within  the  statute.  Very  much 
depends  upon  the  language  of  the  local  statute.  In  the  American 
Statutes  the  expression  "from  the  making  thereof"  is  usually 
omitted.  This  is  the  case  in  New  York  where  by  the  statute  a 
parol  lease  for  a  term  exceeding  one  year  is  void.  In  that  state 
it  has  been  held  that  a  parol  lease  for  a  year  to  commence  in  the 
future  is  not  an  executory  contract,  but  vests  a  present  interest 
in  the  term,  and  that,  this  being  the  case,  and  the  time  inter- 
mediate the  making  of  the  lease  and  its  taking  effect  in  posses- 
sion, being  no  part  of  the  term,  a  lease  for  one  year  to  commence 
in  the  future  need  not  be  in  writing.^^  So  it  has  been  held  where 
the  statute  provides  that  no  action  could  be  maintained  on  any 
lease  for  a  longer  term  than  one  year  or  upon  any  agreement 

85  Parker  v.  Mollis,  50  Ala.  411;  Ohio   St.    427,   54   N.  E.  Rep.   473, 

Atwood    V.    Norton,    31    Ga.    507;  71  Am.  St.  Rep.  724;  Pinto  v.  Rin- 

Stackberger    v.    Mosteller,    4    Ind.  tleman  (Tex.  1906),  92  S.  W.  Rep. 

461;   Wolf  V.  Dozer,  22  Kan.  436;  1033. 

Thomas  v.  McManus,  64  S.  W.  Rep.  ««  Ward    v.    Hasbrouck,    169    N. 

446,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  837;  Taylor  Y.  407,  62  N.  E.  Rep.  434,  affirming 

V.  Kincaid,  4  Ky.  Law  Rep.  837;  52  App.  Div.   627,  65  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Whiting   V.   Olhert,   52   Mich.   462,  200;    Newton  v.  Musen,   61   N.   Y. 

18  N.  W.  Rep.  219;  .Jud  v.  Arnold,  Supp.  61;  Becar  v.  Flues,  64  N.  Y. 

31  Minn.  340,  IS  N.  W.  Rep.  151;  518;  Jones  v.  Marcy,  49  Iowa,  188; 

Briar   v.   Robertson,   19   Mo.   App.  Sears  v.  Smith,  3  Colo.  287;  Huff- 

56;   Bieler  v.  Devoll,  40  Mo.  App.  man  v.  Stark,,  31  Ind.  474 
251;     Gladwell    v.     Holconibo,     60 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  379 

which  is  not  to  be  perforaied  within  the  space  of  one  year  from 
the  making  thereof  that  an  oral  lease  for  a  year  to  be  begun  in 
the  future  is  valid. '^' 

§  258.  Contracts  concerning  an  interest  in  land.  The  Eng- 
lish Statute  of  Frauds  provides  that  "no  action  shall  be  brought 
whereby  to  charge  any  person  upon  any  contract  or  sale  of  lands, 
tenements  or  hereditaments,  or  any  interest  in  or  concerning 
them,  unless  the  agreement  upon  which  such  action  is  brought, 
or  some  memorandum  or  note  thereof,  shall  be  in  writing  and 
signed  by  the  party  to  be  charged  therewith,  or  some  other  per- 
son thereunto  by  him  lawfully  authorized."  The  expression 
"interest  in  land"  as  used  in  the  Statute  of  Frauds  has  been  fre- 
quently construed  in  connection  with  contracts  for  the  leasing 
of  land.  Thus  a  contract  to  grant  a  lease  of  a  furnished  flat  is  a 
contract  concerning  an  interest  in  land,  and  the  part  payment  of 
the  rent  is  not  such  performance  (unless  possession  is  also  taken 
by  the  tenant)  as  will  take  the  case  out  of  the  statute.^*  The  ma- 
terial part  of  the  contract  is  the  occupation  of  the  premises  and 
the  hiring  of  the  personal  property  is  an  incident  thereto.  So  a 
contract  to  lease  a  house,  to  make  alterations  therein  and  to  sell 
the  occupant  the  furniture  and  fixtures,  is  a  contract  relating  to 
an  interest  in  the  land.  The  object  of  the  contract  is  the  occu- 
pation of  the  premises,  and  the  sale  of  the  personal  property  and 
the  agreement  to  make  alterations  are  only  incidental  to  it.  For 
these  latter  things  are  valuable  only  so  far  as  they  make  the  occu- 
pation of  the  house  desirable  and  convenient.^'-*  But  an  agree- 
ment by  the  landlord  with  his  tenant  that  the  tenant  may  erect 

87  Bateman  v.   Maddox,   86   Tex.  to  pay,  the  landlord  cannot  main- 

546,  26  S.  W.  Rep.  51.     Contra,  in  tain  an  action  against  the  tenant 

Emery    v.    Boston    Terminal    Co.  for  a  breach  of  contract  to  take 

(Mass.  1901),   59  N.  B.  Rep.  763.  the  lease   or  to   recover  what  he 

An  agreement  by  which  one  of  the  has  spent  in  purchasing  the  land 

parties  is  to  purchase  land  and  on  and    material     for    the    building. 

i^t   erect   a   warehouse   which   the  Bacon  v.  Parker,  137  Mass.  309. 

other  is  to  hire  for  a  term  of  years  ss  Thursby  v.  Eccles,  70  Law  J. 

at  a  rent  which  is  to  be  a  certain  Q.  B.  91,  49  Wkly.  Rep.  281;  Edge 

percentage    of    the    value    of    the  v.  Strafford,  1  Cromp.  Jer.  391,  1 

house  is  a  lease  within  the  Stat-  Tyr.  293;  Inman  v.  Stamp,  1  Stark, 

ute  of  Frauds.     Hence,  where,  in  N.  P.  126. 

the  course  of  building  certain  ad-  &»  Vaughan  v.  Hancock,  3  C.  B. 

ditions  and  alterations  were  made  766,  16  L.  J.  C.  P.  1. 
in  it  for  which  the  tenant  agreed 


380  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

buildings  on  the  premises  wMcli  are  to  be  paid  for  by  the  hind- 
lord  at  the  end  of  the  term  being  in  substance  a  sale  of  fixtures 
which  are  personal  property  is  not  an  agreement  in  respect  to,  or 
concerning  an  interest  in  land  within  the  statute.""  The  mere 
license  to  use  premises  for  a  particular  purpose  is  not  within  the 
statute.  Thus,  an  agreement  by  which  the  owner  of  a  hall  per- 
mits it  to  be  used  for  theatrical  or  other  entertainments,  he  re- 
taining the  full  control  of  the  hall  and  premises,  in  which  it  is 
located  .is  a  license  and  not  a  contract  for  the  leasing,  sale  and 
conveyance  of  an  interest  in  the  land."^  An  agreement  by  which 
an  owner  permits  another  person  to  live  rent  free  on  his  land  on 
condition  that  the  owner  should  have  a  share  of  the  crops  is  not 
an  agreement  concerning  interest  in  land."-  An  agreement 
by  which  an  owner  of  a  dock  permits  the  same  to  be  let  to  parties 
requiring  the  same  for  repair  of  vessels,  on  the  payment  of  en- 
trance money  for  the  use  of  the  dock,  which  is  to  be  forfeited  if 
the  vessel  does  not  enter  at  the  date  specified,  is  not  an  interest 
in  land  under  the  statute  and  is  not  required  to  be  under  seal.®' 
The  assignment  of  a  parol  lease  from  year  to  year  must  be  in 
writing."*  And  a  contract  to  procure  an  assignment  of  a  lease  of 
a  house  is  a  contract  for  an  interest  in  land  and  is  within  the 
statute  though  it  was  made  by  one  who  was  neither  a  lessee  nor 
had  any  interest  under  the  lease.  "^  An  agreement  by  which  the 
tenant  was  to  surrender  his  tenacy  to  another,  and  to  prevail 
upon  the  landlord  to  accept  the  other  as  his  tenant  is  the  sale  of 
an  interest  in  the  land."^    A  covenant  restricting  the  use  of  land 

90  South  Baltimore  Co.  v.  Muhl-  &  P.  397;   Waddington  v.  Briston, 

bach,  69  Md.  395,  IG  Atl.  Rep.  117,  2  Bos.  &  P.  452,  2  N.  R.  355. 
119.  03  Wells    V.    Kingston-upon-Hull- 

81  Johnson     v.     Wilkinson,     139  Corporation,    44    L.    J.    C.   P.    257, 

Mass.  3,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  62.     As  to  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  402,  32  L.  F.  615,  23 

the  sale  of  fixtures  not  being  with-  W.  R.  562. 

in  the  statute,  see  Hullen  v.  Run-  »*  Botting    v.    Martin,    1    Camp. 

der,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  266,  275;  Lee  v.  318;    Doe   d.   Hughes   v.   Jones,   9 

Gaskell,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  700;   Greene  Mee.  &  Wei.  372,  1  D.  (N.  S.)  352, 

V.  Cole,  2  Wm.  Saund.  259c,  259d.  12  L.  J.  Ex.  265,  6  Jur.  302. 
So  a  contract  by  a  tenant  to  erect  o^  Horsey   v.   Graham,   39   L.   J. 

imjirovoments    on    land    being    a  C.  P.  58,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  9,  21  L.  T. 

contract  for  labor  and  materials  is  530,  18  W.  R.  141. 
not  within  the  statute.    Pinner  v.  o"  Cocking  v.  Ward,  1  C.  B.  868, 

Arnold,  2  C.  M.  &  R.  613.  5  L.  J.  C.  P.  24.5. 

»2  Poulter  V.  Killingbrick,  1  Bos. 


FORM   AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  381 

is  within  the  statute  of  frauds.  An  agreement  the  sole  object  of 
which  is  the  creation  of  such  a  covenant,  would  therefore  be  in- 
valid unless  in  writing.  So,  too,  an  agreement  to  make'  a  lease 
in  the  future,  the  intention  of  which  is  that  there  shall  be  in- 
serted in  the  lease  a  covenant  which  in  effect  shall  provide  that 
the  lessee  shall  sell  only  the  goods  produced  by  the  lessor,  is 
within  the  statute  and  if  in  parol,  is  not  enforcible.*^  A  contract 
by  a  landlord  who  has  leased  his  premises  in  writing  to  lay  out 
certain  money  in  making  improvements  upon  them,  the  tenant  to 
pay  an  increased  rent,  is  a  mere  collateral  agreement.  It  is  not  a 
contract  concerning  or  relating  to  an  interest  in  land;  because  the 
tenant  by  it  receives  no  additional  interest  in  the  land.  All  the 
landlord  agrees  to  do  is  to  remove  certain  articles  of  personal 
property  and  substitute  others  in  their  place  in  the  way  of  alter- 
ation. Nor  does  the  agreement  that  the  tenant  is  to  pay  an  addi- 
tional sum  w^hich  is  called  rent  alter  the  case,  for  this  is  not  rent 
in  the  legal  sense  inasmuch  as  it  could  not  be  distrained  for  nor 
could  the  landlord  re-enter  for  its  non-payment.  The  court 
also  held  that  there  was  no  presumption  that  the  parties  by  this 
agreement  intended  to  make  a  surrender  of  the  old  lease  and  to 
grant  a  new  lease  but  that  all  they  meant  was  making  a  personal 
contract  to  pay  and  receive  a  certain  sum  per  year.^*  So  upon 
the  same  principle  where  the  premises  at  the  time  of  the  execu- 
tion of  a  written  lease  are  in  bad  repair  and  the  landlord  agrees 
to  put  them  in  a  condition  fit  for  habitation  his  oral  promise  is 
collateral  to  the  writing  and  it  is  not  an  agreement  for  or  con- 
cerning an  interest  in  the  land.^^  So,  in  general  it  may  be  laid 
down  as  a  rule  that  all  contracts  to  repair  or  to  furnish  a  house 
which  are  collateral  to  a  written  lease  and  which  are  made  sub- 
sequent thereto,  and  for  which  the  written  lease  is  a  consideration 
are  not  within  the  statute.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  they  did 
not  convey  an  interest  in  the  land  because  the  tenant  has  al- 
ready acquired  all  the  interest  in  the  land  which  he  had  agreed 

9T  Mausert  v.   Christian   Peigen-  term  of  years  must  be  in  writing, 

span,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  671,  63  Atl.  Rep.  King  v.  Kaiser,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  21, 

610,  64  Atl.  Rep.  801.     A  parol  con-  3  Misc.  523,  52  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  487. 

tract  to  make  a  lease  for  years  is  as  Donellan  v.  Read,  3  B.  &  Ad. 

within     the     statute     of     frauds.  899. 

Smith  V.  Phillips  (N.  H.),  43  Atl.  so  Mann  v.  Nunn,  43  L.  J.  C.  P. 

Rep.  183.     An  assignment  of  rent  241,  30  L.  T.  526. 
due   under  a   written  lease   for  a 


382 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


to  receive  and  these  subsequent  contracts  are  usually  made 
merely  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  him  more  conveniently  to 
enjoy  that  interest.^  The  question  has  been  agitated  v^^hether  an 
oral  lease  which  is  good  under  the  second  section  of  the  statute 
is  valid,  under  the  fourth  section  which  refers  to  contracts  ' '  con- 
cerning an  interest  in  land."  It  cannot  be  denied  that  a  lease 
is  a  contract  concerning  an  interest  in  land,  and  hence,  if  the 
fourth  section  is  applicable  parol  leases  for  any  term  are  void 
though  by  the  second  section  of  the  statute  parol  leases  not  ex- 
ceeding three  years  are  valid.  The  result  of  this  construction 
would  be  that  a  lease  which  would  be  valid  by  one  section  would 
be  void  by  another.  In  endeavoring  to  reconcile  this  apparent 
inconsistency  the  English  courts  have  held  that  parol  leases  not 
exceeding  three  years  from  the  making  were  valid  and  that  they 
might  be  sued  upon  under  their  character  of  leases  but  that  be- 
fore the  entry  of  the  tenant  they  did  not  confer  the  right  on  the 
lessor  to  sue  for  damages  for  not  taking  possession.-     The  dis- 


1  Morgan  v.  Griffiths,  23  L.  T. 
783,  L.  R.  C.  Exch.  70;  Angel  v. 
Duke,  44  L.  J.  Q.  B.  78,  L.  R.  10 
Q.  B.  174,  32  L.  T.  23,  23  W.  R. 
307.  See,  also,  to  the  same  effect, 
Hoby  V.  Roebuck,  2  Marsh.  433, 
7  Taunt.  157,  17  L.  R.  477;  Nach- 
bour  V.  Wiener,  34  111.  App.  237. 
The  following  agreements  have 
been  held  to  be  contracts  con- 
concerning  an  interest  in  land:  An 
agreement  to  build  a  store  and 
have  it  ready  for  occupancy  on  a 
certain  date  and  then  to  lease  it 
for  a  term  of  years.  Eaton  v. 
Whitaker,  18  Conn.  222,  44  Am. 
Dec.  586;  Bacon  v.  Parker,  137 
Mass.  309.  An  agreement  that  a 
party  should  occupy  a  meadow  for 
three  years  as  a  compensation  for 
clearing  it.  Scoten  v.  Brown,  4 
Har.  (Del.)  324.  A  written  con- 
tract to  sell  a  stock  of  goods,  the 
seller  agreeing  orally  to  give  the 
buyer  a  three  years'  lease  of  the 
store  room.  Strehl  v.  D'Evers,  66 
111.  77.     A  contract  conveying  the 


right  to  use  for  the  purpose  of 
worship  a  church  edifice  when  the 
same  is  not  used  by  the  church. 
Brumfield  v.  Carson,  33  Ind.  94, 
5  Am.  Rep.  184.  A  contract  for  a 
pew  in  a  church  for  a  period  ex- 
tending beyond  one  year.  First 
Baptist  Church  v.  Bigelow,  16 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  28.  The  following 
contracts  have  been  held  not  to 
relate  to  an  interest  in  land:  A 
contract  with  an  owner  to  work 
land  for  a  part  of  the  proceeds. 
Himesworth  v.  Edwards,  5  Har. 
(Del.)  376.  A  contract  giving  the 
right  to  use  land  as  a  play-ground 
in  connection  with  a  school  liouse, 
so  long  as  the  school  house  should 
stand.  District  Township  of  Cor- 
win  V.  Morehead,  43  Iowa,  466. 
An  oral  agreement  to  pay  for 
board  and  lodging.  White  v.  May- 
nard,  111  Mass.  250,  50  Am.  Dec. 
28. 

-  Edge  V.  Strafford,  1  Cromp.  & 
Jer.  391. 


FORM   AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  383 

tinction  is  of  no  value  because  a  lease  after  the  lessee  enters  is 
just  as  much  an  interest  in  land  as  it  was  before.  And  if  it  is 
invalid  in  part  it  must  be  totally  invalid.  The  true  construction 
of  the  statute  seems  to  be  a  parol  lease  not  exceeding  three  years 
is  good  from  its  beginning  and  will  support  an  action  against  the 
lessee  for  rent  though  no  entry  has  been  made  upon  it.^ 

§  259.  Extensions  and  renewals  of  leases.  A  tenant  who  has 
the  right  to  a  renewal  of  his  lease  must  exercise  that  right  accord- 
ing to  the  provisions  of  his  lease.  His  right  to  a  renewal  is  a 
part  of  his  original  contract.  Though  it  is  called  a  right  to  a  re- 
newal it  is  not  strictly  speaking  a  right  to  create  a  new  lease  but 
a  right  to  extend  the  old  lease.  Hence,  if  the  tenant  exercises  his 
right  to  a  renewal  according  to  the  provisions  of  his  lease  his 
term  is  extended  so  as  to  bind  the  lessor  without  any  action, 
affirmance  or  extension  on  the  part  of  the  lesvsor.  And  the  ex- 
tension is  by  virtue  of  the  original  lease.  There  can  be  no  ques- 
tion of  the  application  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds  under  such  cir- 
cumstances. The  holding  under  the  new  lease  is  protected  by  the 
fact  that  the  old  lease  is  in  writing.  The  original  lease  creates 
and  defines  the  term!  If  the  tenant  elects  not  to  exercise  his 
right  to  extend  the  lease  then  the  term  is  at  an  end.  If  he  elects 
to  extend  the  lease  then  the  extension  is  merely  a  prolongation  of 
the  term  of  the  first  lease,*  and  not  the  creation  of  a  new  term. 
Thus,  it  has  been  held  in  connection  with  a  holding  over  after 
the  tenant  has  given  a  notice  of  an  intention  on  his  part  to  renew 
that  the  notice  itself  is  not  the  instrument  under  which  he  holds 
but  that  the  tenant  is  holding  under  the  original  lease.^  If,  how- 
ever, during  the  term  or  at  the  termination  of  a  lease,  even 
though  the  lease  gives  the  tenant  an  option  for  an  extension,  the 
parties  shall  make  a  new  or  supplemental  lease,  the  possession 
under  the  former  lease  will  not  take  the  new  lease  out  of  the 
statute."  "Where  the  tenant  holds  over  after  the  expiration  of  a 
written  lease  it  will  be  presumed  that  his  holding  over  is  under 
the  former  lease.     If  the  new  lease  is  void  because  in  parol  the 

s  Bolton  V.  Tomlin,  5  Ad.  N.  E.  Sheppard  v.  Rosenkrans,  1(J9  Wis. 
856.  58,  85  N.  W.  Rep.  199. 

4  Norton  v.  Gale.  95  111.  533.  35  s  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  West, 

Am.  Rep.  173;  McClelland  v.  Rush,  57  Ohio  St.  161.  49  N.  E.  Rep.  344. 
150  Pa.   St.   57.  24  Atl.  Rep.  354;  e  Gladwell  v.   Holcomb.  60  Ohio 

St.   427.   54  N.   E.   Rep.   473. 


384  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AJN^D  TENANT. 

landlord  may  treat  him  as  a  tenant  at  will  or  sufferance  and  liis 
possession  will  not  take  the  new  lease  out  of  statute/  and  the 
fact  that  the  parties  in  making  a  new  lease  called  it  an  extension 
of  the  former  lease  does  not  alone  take  the  case  out  of  the  stat- 
utes. Thus,  where  a  lease  was  made  between  parties  to  an  ex- 
isting lease  by  which  the  terms  of  the  lease  were  changed  the  old 
lease  was  not  referred  to  and  portions  of  land  included  in  it 
were  not  included  in  the  new  lease  and  the  terms  and  privileges 
were  entirely  different  it  was  held  that  this  was  not  an  extension 
of  the  lease  but  a  new  contract  and  being  in  parol  it  was  within 
the  statute  and  it  was  not  binding  unless  signed  by  the  lessor.* 
But,  an  agreement  for  the  leasing  of  premises  for  a  period  short 
of  a  year  with  an  option  in  the  tenant  for  an  extension  or  re- 
newal of  the  lease  for  a  period  exceeding  a  year  not  evidenced 
by  writing,  is  not  within  that  clause  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds 
which  renders  invalid  a  contract  in  parol  not  to  be  performed 
within  a  year.® 

§  260.  Leases  by  parol  which  are  void  under  the  statute. 
By  the  Statute  of  Frauds  in  many  of  the  states  leases  for  a  term 
exceeding  one  year  not  executed  in  writing  are  void.^°  Hence,  if 
the  lease  is  for  a  term  short  of  a  year  it  is  valid  though  not  evi- 
denced by  a  writing.  An  agreement  to  lease  property  with  the 
privilege  of  a  renewal  for  two  years  not  in  writing,  is  void,  un- 

7  Crawford  v.  Wick,  18  Ohio  St.  Rep.  51;   Leavitt  v.  Stern,  55  111. 

190,  90  Am.  Rep.  103.  App.    416;     Butler    v.     Threlkeld, 

«Bulles  V.   Noyes,   75   Tex.   540,  117  Iowa,  116,  90  N.  W.  Rep.  584; 

12  S.  W.  397.  Creighton  v.  Sanders,  89  111.  543; 

9  Ward  V.  Hasbrouck,  169  N.  Y.  Ragsdale  v.  Lander,  80  Ky.  61 ; 
407,  62  N.  E.  Rep.  434,  affirming  Hand  v.  Osgood,  107  Mich.  65,  64 
65  N.  Y.  Supp.  200,  52  App.  Div.  N.  W.  Rep.  867,  30  L.  R.  A.  379; 
627.  Phipps  V.  Ingraham,  41  Miss.  256; 

10  Hammond  v.  Winchester,  82  Herrmann  v.  Hydeman,  74  N.  Y. 
Ala.  470,  2  So.  Rep.  892;  Hosli  v.  S.  862;  Geiger  v.  Braun,  6  Daly 
Yokel,  57  Mo.  App.  622;  Leavitt  (N.  Y.)  506;  Wilder  v.  Stace,  15 
V.  Stem,  55  111.  App.  4l6;  McCroy  N.  Y.  S.  870,  61  Hun,  233;  Id.,  16 
V.  Toney,  66  Miss.  233,  5  So.  Rep.  N.  Y.  S.  382,  GO  Hun,  582;  Briles 
392,  66  Miss.  233;  Carney  v.  v.  Pace,  13  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  579; 
Mosher,  97  Micfi.  554,  56  N.  W.  Wallace  v.  Scroggins,  17  Oreg.  476, 
Rep.  953;  Hayes  v.  Arrington  21  Pac.  Rep.  558;  Sausser  v.  Stein- 
(Tenn.),  68  S.  W.  Rep.  44;  Ganter  metz,  88  Pa.  St.  324;  Porter  v. 
V.  Atkinson,  35  Wis.  48;  Bateman  Groden,  5  Yerg.  (Tenn.)   100. 

V.  MaJdox,  86  Tex.  &46,  26  S.  W. 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  385 

der  the  statute."  Elsewhere  it  is  provided  by  the  statute  that 
a  lease  for  more  than  three  years  must  be  in  writing,  and  hence, 
a  parol  lease  for  five  years  is  invalid. ^^  Though  a  parol  lease  for 
more  than  three  years  is  void,  a  lessee  who  enters  becomes  a 
tenant  at  w'ill  for  the  first  year  and  after  that  on  payment  of 
rent  by  the  year,  a  tenant  from  year  to  year."  Parol  leases  for 
terms  less  than  three  years  from  the  making  thereof  are  valid 
under  the  statute  of  frauds  and  either  party  can  pursue  any 
remedy  thereunder  which  may  be  conferred  upon  him  by  virtue 
of  their  character  as  leases.  They  do  not,  however,  confer  upon 
the  lessor  the  right  to  sue  the  lessee  for  damages  for  not  taking 
possession,  and  prior  to  the  entry  upon  the  premises  by  the  les- 
see, the  whole  estate  and  right  of  possession  remain  in  the  lessor, 
the  lessee  having  merely  an  interesse  termini  and  nothing  more.^* 
The  operation  of  the  statute  of  frauds  as  to  the  duration  of 
leases  is  prospective.  The  statute  regards  only  the  time  which 
the  lease  has  yet  to  run.  Thus,  where  a  lease  is  to  run  from  year 
to  year,  so  long  as  all  the  parties  please,  although  when  six  or 
seven  years  are  past  it  may  be  said  to  be,  looking  backward,  an 
oral  lease  for  that  number  of  years,  still  the  lease  is  good,  as  the 
statute  has  reference  only  to  oral  leases  for  a  certain  and  defi- 
nite number  of  years  to  come.^^  But  this  rule  does  not  apply  to 
leases  from  year  to  year,  for  and  during  a  fixed  period  of  time 
which  exceeds  the  statutory  limit.^® 

11  Rosen  v.  Rose,  2  Ann.  Cases,      son  v.  Albertson,  51  Minn.  333,  53 
194,  68  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  370,  34  N.  Y.       N.  W.  Rep.  642. 

Supp.    467,    13    Misc.   Rep.    565,   2  "  Edge   v.    Stafford,   1   Cr.  &  J. 

Ann.  Cases,  194,  68  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  391;    Ryley  v.  Hicks,  1   Str.   651; 

370.  Union  Banking  Co.  v,  Gittings,  45 

12  Crosby  v.  Wadsworth,  6  East,  Md.  181,  197. 

602,   2    Smith,    559,    8   R.   R.    556;  i^  Legg    v.    Strudwick,    2    Salk. 

McClelland    v.    Rush,    11    Pa.    Co.  414;  Birch  v.  Wright,  1  T.  R.  378; 

C.  R.  188.  Raynor  v.  Drew,  72  Cal.  307;  Robb 

"Richardson  v.  Gifford,  3  N.  &  v.   San  Antonio  St.  Rep.,  83  Tex. 

M.  325,  A.  &  E.  52,  3  L.  K.  J.  B.  392,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  707. 

122;  Beale  v.  Sanders,  3  Bing.  N.  i«  An     assignment     of     a    lease 

C.  850,  5  Scott,  58,  3  Hodges,  147,  v/hose    unexpired    term    is   longer 

6  L.  J.  C.  P.  283,  1  Jur.  1083.    But  than  a  year  is  within  the  statute, 

it  has  been  held  that  a  lease  void  Chicago  Attachment  Co.  v.  Davis 

under  the  statute  cannot  be  used       Sewing  Machine  Co.  111.  , 

for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  31  N.  E.  Rep.  438.     An  oral  lease 

tenancy  from  year  to  year.    John-  of  farm  land  which  requires  the 


386  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  261.  The  character  of  the  writing.  The  writing  which  is 
required  to  take  the  case  out  of  the  statute  need  not  have  been 
executed  contemporaneously  with  the  transaction/"  Any  writ- 
ing executed  by  either  of  the  parties  intended  to  establish  a 
contract  may  be  given  in  evidence  as  a  memorandum  under  the 
statute  with  parol  evidence  of  conversations  between  the  parties 
to  the  lease  so  far  as  is  necessary  to  explain  the  subject  matter.^' 
Thus,  where  the  parties  to  a  proposed  lease  have  been  negotiating 
for  some  time  and  the  purpose  of  the  use  of  the  ground  was  for 
strawberry  culture,  a  letter  written  by  the  tenant  to  the  land- 
lord asking  whether  he  could  have  the  land  on  the  terms  offered, 
to  which  the  landlord  replied,  "set  your  strawberries,"  was 
held  to  be  a  sufficient  memorandum  to  take  the  case  out  of  stat- 
ute.^' So,  also,  letters,-''  and  telegrams,-^  if  signed  by  the  parties 
to  be  charged  may  be  sufficient  evidence  of  a  written  contract 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  though  they  may  have  to  be 
supplemented  by  parol  evidence  or  by  the  proof  of  other  writing 
not  signed.--  The  writing,  however,  in  order  to  be  operative  as 
a  memorandum,  must  be  something  more  than  a  mere  proposal 
for  a  tenancy.  The  writing  must  describe  the  property  with 
reasonable  certainty,-^  the  duration  of  the  term,-*  the  rent  to 

tenant  to  sow  it  in  wheat,  whose  v.    Marquette,   etc.,   Co.,   32    Mich, 

term  is  one  year  from  the  spring,  274;  White  v.  Hay,  72  L.  T.  281. 
is  invalid  on  account  of  the  fact  21  Palmer  v.  Marquette,  etc.,  Co., 

that   the   tenant   has   the   implied  32  Mich.  274. 

right  to  enter  on  the  land  three  22  Loomer    v.    Dawson,    Cheeves 

months  after  the  end  of  the  year  (S.  Car.)   68;   Buxton  v.  Rust,  L. 

to     reap     the     crop.       Carney     v.  R.  7  Exch.  1;    Barker  v.  Allen,  5 

Mosher,   97    Mich.    564,    56    N.    W.  H.  &  N.  61;  Smith  v.  Neale,  2  Com. 

Rep.  935.  Bench  (N.  S.)  67;  Reuss  v.  Picks- 

17  Learned    v.    Wannemacher,    9  ley,  L.  R.  I.  Exch.  342;  Warner  v. 

Allen   (Mass.)   416.  Willington,  3  Drew,  523,  25  L.  J. 

i«  Shippey  v.  Derison,  5  Esp.  10;  Ch.  662,  4  W.  R.  531,  2  Jur.    (N. 

T.owther  V.  Carll,  1  Vem.  221;  Sul-  S.)    433;    Felthous   v.   Bindley,   11 

h van's  Estate,  23  L.  R.  Ir.  255.  C.  B.   (N.  S.)   869;   Gibson  v.  Hol- 

19  Lindley    v.    Tibbal,    40    Conn.  land,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  1. 

522.  23  Lancaster  v.   De  Trafford,   31 

20  Alabama  Gold  L.  L  Co.  v.  L.  .L  Ch.  554;  Dolling  v.  Evans, 
Oliver,  82  Ala.  417,  2  So.  Rep.  443;  15  W.  R.  394;  Ogilvie  v.  Foljambe. 
Tallman    v.    Franklyn,    14    N.    Y.  17  R.  R.  13,  3  Mer.  53. 

584;    Parkhurst  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  2+ Bayley  v.  Fitzmaurice,  9  H.  L. 

14   .Johns.    (N.   Y.)    15;    Gibson   v.      Cas.  78,  6  .Tur.  (N.  S.)  124.  3  L.  T. 
Holland,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.   1;    Palmer      69.  8  E.  &  B.  664;  Clinan  v.  Cook, 


FORM    AXD   EXECUTION   OF   LEASES.  387 

be  pa.id,-^  and  the  names  of  the  parties.-®  Though  parol  evidence 
will  be  received  in  connection  with  the  writing  in  order  to  ex- 
plain it  by  showing  the  facts  or  circnmstances  by  which  its  exe- 
cution was  surrendered,  yet  the  terms  necessary  under  the  stat- 
ute to  be  inserted  in  the  memorandum  cannot  be  supplied  by 
parol.  A  memorandum  of  this  character  to  take  the  case  out  of 
the  statute,  must  be  wholly  in  writing  and  cannot  be  shown 
partly  in  writing  and  partly  by  parol.-'  Letters  and  other  com- 
munications passing  between  the  parties  during  the  negotiations 
for  a  lease  may  be  connected  by  parol  evidence  even  where  they 
do  not  refer  to  one  another  and  where  they  are  thus  connected 
they  may  constitute  a  sufficient  memorandum  in  writing  of  an 
agreement  to  make  a  lease  to  satisfy  the  statute  of  frauds. ^^ 
Thus,  a  letter  which  stated  that  the  term  was  to  be  for  twelve 
years  but  not  mentioning  the  date  of  its  commencement  and  sug- 
gesting certain  covenants  to  be  similar  to  those  conditions  in 
another  lease  is  not  sufficient  as  a  memorandum.-^  For  an  exec- 
utory contract  for  a  lease  does  not  satisfy  the  provisions  of  the 
statute  of  frauds,  unless  it  can  be  collected  from  it  on  what  date 
the  term  is  to  begin.  There  is  no  presumption  that  the  term  is 
to  commence  on  the  date  of  the  agreement  in  the  absence  of 
proof  to  that  effect.^"  If  the  commencement  of  the  term  can  be 
gathered  from  the  agreement  considered  as  a  whole,  which  may 
be  supplemented  by  evidence  of  the  date  when  the  tenant  went 
into  possession,  the  memorandiun  may  be  sufficient  to  satisfy  the 
statute."^  The  statute  requires  signing,  but  its  requirement  is 
complied  with  by  the  insertion  of  the  name  in  the  instrument 
in  any  portion  of  it  in  such  a  manner  as  to  authenticate  it.'- 

1  Sch.  &  Lef.  22;  Hughes  v.  Parker.  2-  stead  v.  Dowker,  10  Ad.  &  El. 

8    Mee.    &    Wei.    244;     Gordon    v.  57. 

Trevelyan,  1  Price,  64;  Dolling  v.  s'^  Bauman  v.  James,  L.  R.  3  Ch. 

Evans,    15    W.   R.   394;    Phelan   v.  508,  18  L.  T.  424,  16  W.  R.  877. 

Tedcastle,  15  L.  R.  Ir.  169.  -'^  Cartwright  v.  Millar,  36  L.  T. 

25  Wain  V.  Warlters,  5  East,  10.  398. 

28  Champion  v.   Plummer,  5  Esp.  -^^  Marshall  v.  Berridge,  51  L.  J. 

240;   Lang  v.  Henry,  54  N.  H.  57;  Ch.   329,   19  Ch.  D.   233,  45  L.  T. 

Williams  v.  Lake.  2  E.  &  E.  349;  599,  30  W.  R.  93,  46  J.  P.  279. 

Williams  v.  Jordan,  46  L.  J.  Ch.  si  Lander  v.    Bagley's   Contract, 

681,   6   Ch.  D.   517,   26   W.  R.   230;  61  L.  J.  Ch.  707,  1892,  3  Ch.  41,  67 

Warner    v.    Willington,    3    Drew,  L.  T.  521. 

523.  32  Ogilvie  v.  Foljambe,  3  Mer.  53. 


388 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


But  the  mere  insertion  of  a  name  of  a  party  being  written  in 
the  body  of  an  instrument  by  himself  is  not  a  sufficient  signing 
under  the  statute,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that  proves  he  in- 
tended ^^  this  insertion  of  his  name  to  be  a  signature.^*  An 
agreement  for  a  lease  though  signed  by  both  parties  is  not  valid 
under  the  statute  of  frauds,  so  that  it  can  be  specifically  per- 
formed where  it  was  not  intended  to  be  a  final  contract  and  so 
expressly  given,  "subject  to  the  preparation  and  approval  of  a 
formal  contract. ' '  ^^ 

§  262.  Effect  of  performance  in  taking  tlie  lease  out  of  the 
statute.  A  part  performance  of  an  oral  lease  by  the  lessee  by 
his  entry,  making  improvements  and  paying  rent,  will  take  the 
case  out  of  the  operation  of  the  statute  of  frauds  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent. The  entry  of  the  tenant  under  a  lease  which  is  invalid 
under  the  statute  of  frauds  creates  a  lease  at  will  which  is 
turned  into  a  lease  from  year  to  year  upon  the  landlord's  accept- 
ing rent  by  the  year.^®  So  the  payment  of  rent  by  a  tenant  in 
possession  at  an  increased  rate  is  a  sufficient  part  performance 


17  R.  R.  13;    Caton  v.   Caton,   56 
L.  J.  Ch.  886,  L.  R.  2  H.  L.  Cases, 
127,  6  W.  R.  1. 
»3  Stokes  V.   Moore,  1  Cox,   219. 

34  Under  the  English  statute  of 
frauds  an  agreement  to  make  a 
lease  must  be  signed  at  the  end 
thereof  (Selby  v.  Selby,  3  Mer.  2, 
17  R.  R.  1),  or  the  name  of  the 
party  to  be  charged  must  have 
been  inserted  in  some  place  in  the 
instrument  in  such  a  way  as  to 
authenticate  it.  Ogilvie  v.  Fol- 
jambe,  3  Mer.  53,  17  R.  R.  13; 
Propert  v.  Parker,  1  Russ.  &  M. 
625;  Caton  v.  Caton,  36  L.  J.  Ch. 
886,  L.  R.  2  H.  L.  Cas.  127,  16  W. 
R.  1. 

35  Winn  V.  Bull,  47  L.  J.  Ch.  139, 
7  Ch.  D.  29,  26  W.  R.  230.  Where 
the  statute  requires  "an  agree- 
ment made  in  writing  signed  by 
the  parties  thereto,"  a  writing 
which  is  not  signed  is  invalid. 
Combs    V.    Midland    Transfer    Co., 


58  Mo.  App.  112.  A  writing  which 
is  subsequently  amended  by  parol 
in  respect  to  its  details  does  not 
comply  with  the  statutes.  Wiess- 
ner  v.  Ayer,  176  Mass.  425,  57  N. 
E.  Rep.  672. 

36  stantz  V.  Protzman,  84  111. 
App.  434;  Donovan  v.  Brewing 
Co.,  102  Mo.  App.  427,  429,  76  S. 
W.  Rep.  175;  Bless  v.  Jenkins,  129 
Mo.  647;  Nelson  v.  Brown,  140  Mo. 
580;  Hosli  v.  Yokel,  58  Mo.  App. 
169;  Tiefenbrine  v.  Tiefenbrine, 
68  Mo.  App.  253;  Davis  v.  Bald- 
win, 66  Mo.  App.  577;  William 
Wicke  Co.  v.  Kaldenburg  Man- 
ufacturing Co.,  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  937, 
21  Misc.  Rep.  79;  Clarke  v.  Cin- 
cinnati, 1  Ohio  Dec.  10,  1  Jo.  53; 
Grant  v.  Ramsey,  7  Ohio  St.  157; 
Moore  v.  Beasley,  3  Ohio,  294; 
Wallace  v.  Scoggin,  17  Oreg.  476, 
21  Pac.  Rep.  5.^>8;  Doe  d.  Brammell 
v.  Collinge,  7  C.  B.  939,  18  L.  J. 
C.  P.  305,  13  Jur.  791 


FORM   AND   EXECU-nON   OP    LE.^ES.  389 

on  an  agreement  for  a  lease  to  satisfy  the  statute  of  frauds."  In 
any  ease  the  performance  which  will  take  a  parol  lease  out  of 
the  statute  of  frauds  and  make  it  a  valid  lease  so  far  as  it  has 
been  performed,  must  be  a  performance  as  will  prevent  the  per- 
forming party  from  being  placed  in  his  former  position.^®  A 
lease  which  is  within  the  statute  of  frauds,  executed  by  an  agent 
without  authority  in  writing,  may  be  ratified  by  the  owner,  but 
to  avoid  the  operation  of  the  statute  of  frauds,  the  ratification 
ought  to  be  in  writing.  It  seems  that  the  mere  knowledge  of  the 
principal  that  the  property  has  been  leased  by  an  agent  for  a 
term  which  is  within  the  statute,  or  his  action  in  receiving  rent, 
or  permitting  improvements  to  be  made  by  the  tenant,  is  not  suf- 
ficient to  take  the  lease  out  of  the  statute.  But  the  oral  ratifi- 
cation of  the  lease  of  an  agent  made  without  authority,  gives  the 
tenant  an  estate  at  will  which  under  the  general  rule  becomes 
an  estate  from  year  to  year  by  possession  from  year  to  year,  and 
the  payment  of  a  yearly  rent.'''  The  receipt  of  rent  by  the  bene- 
ficiary of  a  trust  after  the  expiration  of  the  lease  which  gave  the 
tenant  a  right  to  renew  is  not  binding  on  the  trustee.  The  ac- 
tion of  the  beneficiary  is  not  such  a  performance  of  the  covenant 
to  renew  as  will  take  the  case  out  of  the  statute  if  it  be  held 
that  the  statute  applies.  Particularly  would  this  be  true  where 
the  trustees  had  refused  to  renew  the  lease  and  her  action  was 
without  their  knowledge  or  authority.*" 

§  263.  The  recording  of  leases.  In  almost  every  state  of  the 
Union  it  is  required  by  statute  that  transfers  of  land,  or  of  any 
interest  therein,  including  leases,  except  for  certain  short  terms, 
shall  be  recorded  in  the  county  in  which  the  premises  are  located. 
These  statutes  also  provide  that  no  instrument  unless  it  is  ac- 
Imowledged,  shall  be  admitted  to  record.  Their  object  is  to  se- 
cure to  the  person  claiming  under  the  recorded  instrument  the 
priority  over  subsequent  purchasers  or  incumbrancers  to  which 

37  Nunn  V.  Fabian,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  ss  Merchant's     State     Bank     of 

App.  35;   Miller  v.  Sharp,  6S  Law  Fargo  v.  Ruettel,  12  N.  D.  519,  97 

J.  Ch.  322,  1  Ch.  622,  80  L.  T.  N.  N.  W.  Rep.  853,  855. 

S.    77,    47    Wldy.    Rep.    268.     The  •■?9  McDowell  v.  Simpson,  3  Watts 

contrary  has  been  held,  however,  (Pa.)  129. 

in  the  case  of  a  tenant  who  pur-  .^o  Winslow    v.    Baltimore    &    O. 

chases  the  land  occupied  by  him  R.  Co.,  188  U.  S.  646,  23  Sup.  CL 

by  a  contract  in  parol.     Lewis  v.  443,  47  L.  ed.  635. 
North  (Neb.),  87  N.  W.  312. 


390 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT 


he  is  entitled  and  at  the  same  time  to  protect  subsequent  bona 
fide  purchasers  for  value  against  secret  liens  and  contracts  of 
Avhich  they  have  no  knowledge.  If  a  lease  required  by  the  stat- 
ute to  be  recorded  is  not  recorded,  it  is  void  as  against  all  sub- 
sequent purchasers  in  good  faith  and  for  value,  not  having  ac- 
tual notice  of  its  existence,  whose  conveyances  are  duly  recorded 
before  it.  The  terms  of  the  statute  differ  in  respect  to  the  leases 
which  must  be  recorded.'*^  In  some  of  the  states  it  has  been  ex- 
pressly provided  that  no  estate  in  land  exceeding  in  duration  a 
period  specified  shall  pass  unless  the  conveyance  thereof  shall 
be  acknowledged  and  recorded.*-  In  the  absence  of  such  a  stat- 
ute an  unrecorded  lease,  otherwise  valid,  is  good  between  the 
parties  to  it.*^    For  the  recording  is  no  part  of  the  execution  of 


41  In  California  all  leases  for 
more  than  one  year  (Odd  Fellows' 
Sav.  Bank  v.  Banton,  46  Cal.  603; 
Jones  V.  Marks,  47  Cal.  242)  must 
be  recorded.  In  Kentucky  five 
years.  Locke  v.  Coleman,  4  T.  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  315.  In  Louisiana  an 
agreement  not  to  sublet  must  be 
recorded.  Arent  v.  Bone,  23  La. 
Ann.  387,  388.  In  Massachusetts, 
by  Pub.  St.  c.  120,  §  4,  a  lease  for 
seven  years  or  more.  Collins  v. 
Piatt  (Mass.  1902),  63  N.  E.  Rep. 
946;  Chapman  v.  Gray,  15  Mass. 
439,  444;  Toupin  v.  Peabody,  1G2 
Mass.  473,  39  N.  E.  Rep.  280.  In 
New  Jersey  leases  for  two  years 
or  more.  Lembeck  Co.  v.  Kelly, 
63  N.  J.  Eq.  402.  In  New  York 
lor  three  years  and  upwards. 
1  R.  S.  762,  §  38;  Jokinsky  v.  Mil- 
ler, 88  N.  Y.  Supp.  928;  Beebe  v. 
Coleman,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.)  392.  In 
Pennsylvania  leases  for  less  than 
twenty-one  years,  if  accompanied 
by  possession,  need  not  be  re- 
corded. Williams  v.  Downing,  18' 
Pa.  St.  60.  See  City  Council  of 
Charleston  v.  Page,  S.peers  (S. 
Car.)  Eq.  159.  In  Vermont  a  lease 
for  more  than  one  year.  Buswell 
V.  .Marshall,  51   Vt.  87.     In  Wa.sh- 


ington  an  assignment  of  a  lease 
need  not  be  recorded.  Tibbals  v. 
Iffland,  10  Wash.  451.  A  term  to 
begin  in  futuro,  though  for  less 
than  seven  years,  is  within  a  stat- 
ute requiring  leases  for  more  than 
seven  years  to  be  recorded  if  the 
tei-m  is  to  endure  "for  more  than 
seven  years  from  the  making 
thereof."  Chapmon  v.  Gray,  15 
Mass.  439,  444.  By  statute,  in 
Ohio,  leases  of  surplus  water  of 
the  canals  and  of  land  connected 
therewith  must  be  deposited  and 
recorded  in  the  office  of  the  board 
of  public  works.  Emmitt  v.  Lee, 
50  Ohio  St.  662,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  794. 
A  lease  for  a  term  of  ten  years 
must  be  recorded  under  the  stat- 
ute. Westchester  Trust  Co.  v. 
Plobby  Bottling  Co.,  185  N.  Y.  577, 
78  N.  E.  Rep.  1114,  affirming  102 
App.  Div.  464,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  482. 

42  Van  Ness  v.  Hyatt,  28  Fed. 
Cas.  16,867,  5  Cranch,  C.  C.  127, 
affirmed  in  13  Peters  (U.  S.)  294, 
10  Law.  ed.  168;  Anderson  v. 
Critcher,  11  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  450, 
32  Am:   Dec.   72. 

43  Barnum  v.  Landon,  25  Conn. 
137,  149;  Johnson  v.  Phoenix  Life 
Ins.    Co.,    46    Conn.    92;    Lake    v. 


FORM   AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES. 


391 


the  leaso  but  is  only  a  precaution  which  is  intended  to  protect 
those  who  may  be  injured  by  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the  par- 
ties to  it.^*  An  unacknowledged  and  unrecorded  lease  may  be 
valid  as  against  persons  not  parties  to  it  if  they  shall  have  actual 
or  constructive  notice  of  it.  The  possession  of  the  lessee  under  an 
unrecorded  lease  is  constructive  notice  not  only  of  possession  but 
of  the  title  and  rights  of  the  lessee  to  an  intending  lessee  or  pur- 
ichaser.*^  AVhere  a  statute  requires  actual  notice  of  a  lease  to  be 
given,  constructive  notice  is  not  enough.  In  such  a  case,  by  ac- 
tual notice  is  meant  express  information  communicated  to,  or 
personal  service  of  a  copy  of  the  lease  upon  the  person  inter- 
ested.^® 

§  264.  The  construction  of  the  statutes  requiring  record  of 
leases.  These  statutes  are  remedial  in  their  character,  and 
upon  general  rules  and  principles  of  statutory  construction,  ap- 
plicable to  remedial  statutes  their  general  puipose  and  intention 
are  to  be  given  etfect  to  in  all  cases  which  are  reasonably  within 
their  terms.     The  inclination  of  the  courts  is  to  extend  their 


Campbell,  18  111.  106;  Wilhelm  v. 
Mertz,  4  G.  Greene  (Iowa>  54; 
Anthony  v.  New  York  P.  &  B.  R. 
Co.,  162  Mass.  60,  61,  37  N.  E.  Rep. 
780;  Bramhall  v.  Hutchinson  (N. 
J.  1886),  7  Atl.  Rep.  573;  Thomas' 
Lessee  v.  Blackemore,  5  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  113;  Buswell  v.  Marshall, 
51  Vt.  87;  Smythe  v.  Sprague,  149 
Mass.  10;  Earle  v.  Fiske,  103 
Mass.  491;  Ladnier  v.  Stewart 
(Miss.  1905)    38  So.  Rep.  748. 

44  Barnum  v.  Landon,  25  Conn. 
137,  149.  A  statute  providing  that 
unrecorded  deeds  of  lease  shall 
be  Invalid  as  to  parties  without 
notice  does  not  invalidate  them 
between  the  parties,  or  against  a 
person  not  claiming  an  interest 
in  the  land.  Anthony  v.  New 
York  P.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  162  Mass. 
60.  37  N.  E.  Rep.  780.  In  :\Iassa- 
chusetts  it  seems  to  have  been  a 
rule  of  practice  that  a  deed  must 
be  recorded  to  be  admissible  in 
evidence.      Where    there    was    no 


evidence  of  actual  possession  it 
was  held  in  an  action  of  trespass 
that  an  unrecorded  deed  of  wild 
land  was  not  such  evidence  of 
possession  as  would  enable  the 
plaintiff  to  maintain  his  action. 
Estes  V.  Cook,  22  Pick.  (Mass.) 
293.  AVhere  a  lessee  under  a  lease 
for  a  term  sued  a  railroad  com- 
pany for  damages  caused  by  the 
destruction  of  building  by  fire 
caused  by  sparks  from  the  defend- 
ant's locomotives,  record  at  any 
time  before  the  trial  was  finished, 
or  perhaps  before  judgment  was 
rendered,  is  sufficient.  Anthony 
v.  New  York,  etc.,  Co.,  162  Mass. 
60,  62,  37  N.  E.  Rep.  780. 

■T.  Wilhelm  v.  Mertz,  4  G.  Greene 
(Iowa)  54,  55;  Uhl  v.  May,  5  Neb. 
157;  Weaver  v.  Coumbe,  15  Neb. 
167,  170. 

■""'  Hoping  V.  Burnam,  2  G. 
Greene  (Iowa),  39:  Wilhelm  v. 
Mertz,  4  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  54,  56. 


392 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


operation  so  far  as  may  be  consistent  with  sound  principles  of 
construction.*''  The  term  of  years  mentioned  in  a  statute  leases 
for  wliich  must  be  recorded  means  not  only  the  term  directly 
created  ah  initio  by  the  lease  but  also  any  possible  term  which 
may  be  created  by  an  extension,  or  a  renewal  or  otherwise.*^  A 
lease  for  a  term  of  years  is  a  conveyance  of  lands  to  a  purchaser 
of  the  same  which  is  entitled  and  required  to  be  recorded.  A 
lessee  is  unquestionably  a  purchaser,  for  there  are  but  two  ways 
in  which  a  right  to  the  possession  of  land  can  be  acquired,  viz., 
either  by  descent  or  by  purchase.  Obviously  a  lessee  does  not 
take  by  descent  but  by  purchase  which  occurs  where  a  man  takes 
land  or  an  interest  in  land  by  his  own  act  or  agreement.**  So, 
in  construing  statutes  which  permit  or  require  "conveyances" 
to  be  recorded,  it  has  generally  been  held  that  leases  for  terms 
of  years  which  by  the  statute  of  frauds  are  required  to  be  in 
writing  are  "conveyances"  within  the  meaning  of   the  statutes.^'' 


*7Toupin  V.  Peabody,  162  Mass. 
473,  476,  39  AtL  Rep.  280. 

*8  A  statute  which,  provides  that 
a  lease  for  seven  years  from  the 
making  must  be  recorded  means 
the  utmost  term  which  the  lessee 
can  claim  under  the  lease  whether 
the  instrument  directly  demises 
a  term  for  seven  years  or  longer 
than  seven  years,  or  provides  for 
its  indirect  creation  by  an  agree- 
ment for  a  renewal  at  the  option 
of  the  lessee.  The  intention  of 
the  statute  is  that  a  1)0710  fide  pur- 
chaser may  rely  with  certainty 
upon  the  fact  that  no  instrument 
which  does  not  appear  of  record, 
and  of  which  he  does  not  have  ac- 
tual notice,  can  give  a  lessee  the 
right  to  any  longer  term  than 
seven  years  from  the  mailing  of 
the  instrument.  A  lease  for  five 
years  with  the  privilege  of  a  re- 
newal for  five  years  more  is  as 
much  within  the  purview  of  the 
statute,  and  of  the  mischief  which 
it  was  meant  to  remedy,  as  a  lease 
for  a  term   of  ten   years  and  the 


reasons  for  requiring  the  latter 
to  be  recorded  apply  equally  to 
the  former  so  far  as  the  renewal 
term  is  concerned.  Hence  it  fol- 
lows that  any  extension,  or  second 
term,  or  an  agreement  for  a  re- 
newal which  will  carry  the  pos- 
session of  the  lease  to  more  than 
seven  years  from  the  making  of 
the  instrument,  is  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute.  Toupin 
V.  Peabody,  162  Mass.  473,  476,  39 
N.  E.  Rep.  280. 

■in  Spielmann  v.  Kleist,  36  N.  J. 
Eq.  199,  202.  See  also,  Milliken 
V.  Faulk,  111  Ala.  658,  660,  20  So. 
Rep.  594.  And  see  contra,  Bram- 
hall  V.  Hutchinson  (N.  J.),  7  Atl. 
Rep.  873. 

60  Jones  V.  Marks,  47  Cal.  242; 
Commercial  Bank  v.  Pritchard, 
126  Cal.  600;  Garber  v.  Gianella, 
98  CaL  527;  Talley  v.  Alexander, 
10  La.  Ann.  627;  Summer  v.  Clark, 
30  La.  Ann.  436;  Chapman  v.  Gray, 
15  Mass.  439;  Toupin  v.  Peabody, 
162  Mass.  473,  476,  39  Atl.  Rep. 
280;   Spielmann  v.  Kleist,  36  N.  J. 


FORM   AXD   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  3'93 

Accordingly  it  is  apparent  that  the  word  "deeds"  in  a  statute 
which  enacts  that  deeds  shall  be  invalid  or  void  as  to  subsequent 
purchasers  or  incumbrances  unless  they  are  recorded,  evidently 
includes  all  instruments  by  which  an  interest  in,  or  the  title  to 
land,  may  be  in  any  way  affected  either  in  law  or  in  equity.  But 
the  word  does  not  include  wills  or  leases  which  are  by  implica- 
tion exempt  from  the  necessity  of  being  recorded  by  statut^.'^^ 

§  265.  The  effect  of  recording  a  lease  upon  the  rights  of  a 
subsequent  lessee.  A  recorded  lease  is  constructive  notice  to  a 
subsequent  prospective  lessee  of  the  premises  in  his  dealings  with 
the  lessor  to  the  same  extent  and  with  the  same  effect  as  in  the 
case  of  any  other  purchaser.  So,  too,  a  lessee  may  acquire  such 
actual  notice  of  a  prior  unrecorded  lease  as  will  estop  him  to 
dispute  the  rights  of  a  lessee  in  possession  and  this  notice  will 
have  precisely  the  same  effect,  so  far  as  he  is  concerned,  as 
would  the  lease  being  recorded.^-  The  subsequent  lessee  who 
finds  a  person  in  possession  claiming  as  a  lessee  is  at  once  put 
upon  inquiry  to  ascertain  the  occupant's  rights  and  he  will  be 
presumed  thenceforth  to  have  notice  of  all  facts  which  he  might 
have  ascertained  by  inquiry  of  the  lessor  with  whom  he  is  dealing 
or  by  inquiry  of  the  person  claiming  as  a  lessee.  Where  a  les- 
see executes  a  written  lease,  which  in  express  terms  is  made  sub- 
ject to  the  rights  af  a  prior  lessee  and  he  also  knows  what  the 
latter 's  rights  were,  the  lessee  takes  his  lease  subject  to  all  the 
rights  of  the  prior  lessee,  including  his  right  to  a  renewal.^' 
And  though  the  later  lessee  himself  have  no  knowledge  of  the 
existence  of  a  prior  unrecorded  lease,  he  will  be  presumed  to 
have  actual  notice  of  it  and  of  its  contents  where  these  are 
brought  to  the  knowledge  of  his  agent  acting  for  him  in  the 
transaction.^* 

Eq.   199,   203;    Lucas  v.   Sunbury,  the  prior  lease  provides  for  a  writ- 

etc,  R.   Co.,  32  Pa.   St.  458.     See  ten    notice    to    renew,    the    subse- 

Northwestern    Ohio    Natural    Gas  quent  lessee  cannot  require  it  of 

Co.  V.  Tiffin,  50  Ohio  St.  420,  as  to  the  prior  lessee. 
lease  of  natural  gas  land.  -i  Thompson  v.  Christie,  13S  Pa. 

BiAmes  v.  Miller,  65  Neb.   204,  St.  230,  248,  20  Atl.  Rep.  434,  11 

91  N.  W.  Rep.  250.  L.  R.  A.  236,  27  W.  N.  C.  7.     In 

62  Weaver   v.    Coumbe,    15    Neb.  this  case  a  lessee   holding  under 

167.  an   unrecorded  lease   entered   and 

53  Clarke  v.   Mitchell,   51   N.   H.  made  improvements  by  drilling  an 

415,  418,  holding  also  that  unless  oil  well.     Subsequently  the  land- 


394  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  266.  The  effect  of  the  rscord  as  notice.  Notice  of  a  lease 
derived  from  its  record  is  notice  of  its  contents.  As  soon  as  one 
acquires  constructive  notice  of  a  lease  which  has  been  recorded, 
he  is  presumed  to  have  notice  of  every  word  which  is  written  in 
it.^^  Thus  a  purchaser  of  the  premises  from  the  lessor  is  bound 
by  a  covenant  to  renew  contained  in  a  lease  which  was  recorded 
prior  to  his  purchase  and  when  the  time  has  arrived  when  the 
lessee  shall  have  the  right  to  a  renewal,  he  is  bound  to  grant 
j^  56  rpj^^  failure  to  copy  the  lease  in  the  record  does  not  destroy 
the  effect  of  the  recording  as  constructive  notice.  A  lease,  if  it 
has  been  properly  acknowledged  and  delivered  to  the  recording 
officer  for  record  is  thereafter  constructive  notice  to  everyone, 
though,  through  the  neglect  of  a  clerk  or  copyist,  it  was  never 
actually  copied  into  the  records.  It  is  an  incumbrance  which  a 
purchaser  at  a  foreclosure  sale  under  a  mortgage  executed  sub- 
sequently to  the  lease  is  bound  to  take  notice  of." 

§  267.  As  against  the  creditors  of  the  lessor  and  persons 
claiming  under  him.  By  the  operation  of  the  various  statutes 
in  the  several  states  of  the  Union  requiring  conveyances  of  land 
or  of  interests  therein  to  be  recorded,  unrecorded  leases  are  void 
as  against  creclitors  of  the  lessor.^*    So,  too,  under  these  statutes 

lord,  acting  on  his  attorney's  ad-  delinquent  or  careless  purchaser 
vice,  made  another  lease  of  the  or  mortgagee  shall  be  assumed  to 
premises  to  the  law  partner  of  the  know  what  he  would  have  learned 
attorney,  which  lease  was  re-  had  he  explored  those  sources  of 
corded.  The  court  held  that  the  knowledge  which  the  law  has  pro- 
first  lessee  could  not  be  ousted  in  vided  for  his  information.  The 
ejectment  by  the  second  lessee,  fact  that  the  term  granted  by  the 
who  had,  by  construction  of  law,  lease  had  expired  before  the  de- 
knowledge  or  notice  of  all  the  fendant  took  her  mortgage  can- 
facts  which  had  been  brought  to  not.  in  my  judgment,  change  the 
the  attention  of  his  partner  during  rights  of  the  parties.  The  record 
the  transaction.  of    the    lease    was    an    important 

•"■•'•  Spiclmann  v.  Kleist,  36  N.  J.  link  in  the  chain  of  title."    By  the 

Eq.  199,  206.  court,   in   Spielmann  v.   Kleist,  36 

r-o  Taylor  v.  Stibbert,  2  Ves.  439;  N.  J.  Eq.  199,  on  page  206. 

Hall  V.  Smith,  14  Ves.  426.    "Con-  'm  Reid  v.  Town  of  Long  Lake, 

structive  notice,   under  the   regis-  89  N.  Y.  Supp.  993,  44  Misc.  Rep. 

try   acts,    is   as   efficacious   as   ac-  370. 

tual  notice.     The  purpose  of  those  ss  Clift  v.  Stockdon,  4  Lift.  (Ky.) 

acts   Is   to   make   such    notice   the  215,  216;  Flower  v.  Pearce,  45  La. 

equivalent    in    all    respects   of   ac-  Ann.  853,  13  So.  Rep.  150.     Where 

tual  notice.     They  declare  that  a  Ihe  statute  invalidates  a  lease  for 


FORM    AND   EXECUTION    OF   LEASES.  395 

unrecorded  leases  which  come  within  their  operation  are  void  as 
against  mortgagees  of  the  lessor,'^^  or  as  against  his  vendor  or 
other  purchaser  for  value  in  good  faith  who  buys  without  actual 
notice.®"  The  record  of  the  lease,  in  order  to  constitute  a  valid 
constructive  notice  of  the  rights  of  the  lessee  under  it,  to  crops 
growing  or  to  be  grown  on  the  land  during  the  existence  of  the 
lease  as  against  a  subsequent  chattel  mortgagee  of  crops  must 
definitely  describe  the  land  leased.*'^ 

§  268.  The  effect  of  recording  a  lease  not  required  to  be 
recorded.  The  recording  of  a  lease  which  is  not  by  the  statute 
entitled  or  required  to  be  recorded  is  a  mere  voluntarj^  act  which 
is  m  no  way  effective  to  give  constructive  notice  to  parties  sub- 
sequently dealing  with  the  premises.''-  The  record  of  a  lease 
not  permitted  to  be  recorded  does  not  make  it  an  incumbrance 
upon  the  premises  of  which  a  subsequent  purchaser  is  bound  to 
take  notice.  But  the  possession  of  the  tenant  under  the  lease 
not  entitled  to  record  is  actual  notice  to  the  purchaser,  whether 
he  be  a  lessee  or  vendee,  and  he  will  be  bound  by  all  the  facts 
he  shall  ascertain  upon  inquiry  or  which  he  might  have  obtained 
where  he  fails  to  make  a  reasonable  inquirj'.®^ 

more  than  five  years  when  unre-  N.  E.  Rep.  280;  Belding  v.  Flynn 
corded,  a  lease  for  ten  years  is  (Ark.),  15  S.  W.  Rep.  184;  Ken- 
totally  invalid,  and  is  not  good  dall  B.  &  Shoe  Co.  v.  Bain,  55  Mo. 
as  against  a  creditor  of  the  lessor,  App.    264. 

where  it  has  less  than  five  years  <''i  Thurlough  v.  Dresser,  98  Me. 

to  run.     Clift  v.  Stockdon,  4  Litt.  161,  56  Atl.  Rep.   654. 

(Ky.)    215,   216.  e- Spielmann  v.  Kleist,  36  N.  J. 

59  City  Council  of  Charleston  v.  Eq.  199,  203;  Graves  v.  Graves,  6 

Page,  Speers   (S.  C.)   Eq.  159.  Gray  (Mass.)  391;  Villard  v.  Rob- 

eoMilliken    v.    Faulk,    111    Ala.  erts,  1  Strob.  Eq.  (S.  Car.)   393. 

658,    20    So.    Rep.    594 ;    Brown    v.  «•'!  Griffin    v.    Baust,    50    N.    Y. 

Matthews,  3  La.  Ann.  198;  Toupin  Supp.  905,  26  App.  Div.  553. 
V.  Peabody,  162  Mass.  473,  476,  39 


CHAPTER  XI. 
THE  PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE. 

§  270.  The  scope  of  this  chapter. 

271.  Property  included. 

272.  The  privileges  of  a  tenant  of  a  part  of  a  building. 

273.  Description  of  leased  premises  by  street  number. 

274.  Exclusive  right  of  the  lessee  of  a  hotel  to  use  a  particular  name. 

275.  The  tenant's  right  to  light  and  air  coming  through  his  front 

and  rear  windows. 

276.  Rights  as  to  the  use  of  light  and  air  as  between  the  proprietors 

of  adjoining  premises. 

277.  The  right  of  a  tenant  to  use  outside  walls. 

278.  The  use  of  roof  for  advertising  purposes. 

279.  Tenant's  right  to  show  windows. 

280.  Easements  of  egress  and  ingress. 

281.  Tenant's  right  to  use  of  stairways  and  halls. 

282.  The  right  to  use  an  elevator. 

283.  Electric  light  as  an  appurtenant, 

284.  Easement  of  water  supply. 

285.  The  riparian  rights  of  the  lessee. 
28G.  Right  of  the  tenant  to  accretion. 

287.  Ice  forming  on  land  demised. 

288.  Lease  of  a  mill  or  of  a  mill  privilege. 

289.  Action  for  damages  for  the  violation  of  an  easement. 

290.  The  protection  of  the  tenant's  easements  by  an  injunction 

291.  Construction  of  the  word  "appurtenances."    The  general  rule. 

292.  Things  which  have  been  held  not  to  pass  as  appurtenances. 

293.  Meaning  of  the  word  "half." 

§  270.  The  scope  of  this  chapter.  In  this  chapter  will  be 
considered  the  extent  of  the  rights  of  the  tenant  in  connection 
with  the  use  which  he  shall  make  of  the  demised  premises.  The 
numerous  benefits  which  are  comprised  in  the  tenant's  enjoy- 
ment of  the  premises  will  be  distinguished  and  analyzed  and  the 
extent  and  character  of  these  benefits  determined.  Under  this 
head  will  come  the  various  easements  which  are  so  frequently 
connected  with  the  enjoyment  of  the  possession  of  real  estate, 
such  as  the  right  to  light  and  air;  the  right  to  use  water;  rights 
of  way,  and  certain  other  rights  which  are  peculiarly  modern. 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN   THE  LEASE.  397 

In  determining  these  rights  as  regards  to  tenant's  possession, 
many  cases  will  be  cited  which  have  not  arisen  between  landlord 
and  tenant.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  the  section  where 
the  meaning  of  the  word  "appurtenance"  is  discussed,  for  it  is 
considered  important  in  connection  with  the  above  topics  to  dis- 
cuss at  length  the  meaning  which  the  courts  by  construction  and 
interpretation  have  given  to  this  word  which  is  of  such  frequent 
use  in  connection  with  the  renting  of  real  property. 

§  271.  Property  included.  A  lease  of  a  building  eo  nomine 
is  a  lease  of  the  land  on  which  the  building  stands.^  So,  the 
lease  of  a  building  conveys  the  lands  under  its  eaves  and  projec- 
tions,^^ and  to  the  middle  of  a  private  way  in  the  rear  the 
fee  of  which  is  in  the  owner.^^  But  by  a  lease  of  apartments  or 
a  floor  in  a  town  for  trade  purposes  or  dwelling,  the  lessee  takes 
only  such  interest  in  the  subjacent  land  as  depends  upon  his  en- 
joyment of  the  premises  rented  and  necessary  thereto.^  The 
word  premises  used  in  a  lease  may  have  various  meanings  ac- 
cording to  the  circumstances.  In  a  contract  to  sell  premises 
known  by  street  number,  it  would  presumptively  include  the 
land.  Its  meaning  in  a  lease  must  be  determined  from  the  con- 
text and  the  character  of  the  property.  Thus  a  lease  of  the 
premises  shown  by  the  street  number  which  apparently  includes 
the  whole  house  is  a  lease  of  the  land  and  of  the  yards  and  gar- 
dens appurtenant  if  any  there  be.  But  a  lease  of  the  premises 
described  as  the  first  or  second  floor  or  the  like  is  not  a  lease  of 

1  McMillan  v.  Solomon,  42  Ala.  2  McMillan   v.  Solomon,   42  Ala. 

Sf.G,  94  Am.  Dec.   654;    Hosher  v.  356,   94   Am.    Dec.    654;    Seidel   v. 

Hestermann,     58     111.     App.     265;  Bloeser,  77  Mo.  App.  172.     A  lease 

Sherman   v.    Williams,    113   Mass.  of    a    dwelling    house     or    other 

481,  484,  18  Am.  Rep.  522;    Bacon  building    carries    with    it    to    the 

V.  Bowdoin,  22  Pick.   (Mass.)  401;  tenant  the  right  to  use  the  land 

Hooper  v.  Farnsworth,  128  Mass.  which   lies   under   the   eaves   and 

487,    488;     Lanpher    v.    Glenn,    37  projection  of  the  building  if  that 

Minn.  4,  33  N.  W.  Rep.  10.  land  is  owned  by  the  lessor  an)d 

la  St.  Louis  Public  Schools  v.  where  the  lessor  under  such  cir- 
Hillingsworth,  34  Mo.  191;  Sher-  cumstances,  subsequently  consent- 
man  V.  Williams,  113  Mass.  481,  ed  to  the  erection  of  a  wall  thereon 
18  Am.  Rep.  522.  or  to  any  use  of  it  by  another  it 

lb  Hooper    v.    Farnsworth,    128  is  an  eviction  so  far  as  the  tenant 

^lass.   487,   488;    Rogers  v.   Snow,  is    concerned.     Sherman    v.    Wil- 

118  Mass.  118;  Gear  v.  Barn um,  37  liams,  113  Mass.  481,  484. 
Conn.  229. 


398 


LAW  OF  LAND1X)RD  AND  TENANT. 


any  land  and  when  the  premises  are  destroyed,  the  term  is  at  an 
end.^  And  where  the  premises  leased  in  a  lease  of  city  property 
is  described  by  street  number  "including-  certain  stories  over  the 
same  with  the  buildings  in  the  rear,"  it  is  a  lease  of  buildings 
and  the  lessee  takes  no  interest  or  estate  in  the  land.*  The  lease 
of  a  barn  without  language  added  to  it  to  extend  its  meaning, 
passes  only  the  land  upon  which  the  bam  stands.  It  will  not 
pass  a  lot  surrounding  the  barn  containing  several  acres,  where 
the  occupation  of  the  lot  was  not  necessary  to  the  full  enjoy- 


3  Snook  &  Austin  Furniture  Co. 
V.  Steiner,  117  Ga.  363. 

4  Snook  &  Austin  Furniture  Co. 
V.  Steiner,  117  Ga.  363,  43  S.  E. 
Rep.  775.  An  agreement  in  writ- 
ing to  lease  for  a  term  "ttie  Adams 
House,  situate  on  Washington 
Street  in  Boston/"  may  be  proved 
by  parol  to  have  been  meant  to 
include  only  so  much  of  the  build- 
ing as  was  fitted  up  as  a  hotel,  by 
the  name  of  the  "Adams  House," 
and  not  the  separate  shops  which 
occupied  the  whole  of  the  ground 
floor  except  the  entrance.  The 
question  is  what  was  included  in 
the  words  "Adams  House?"  It 
was  not  described  as  a  hotel,  nor 
does  the  fact  that  it  was  built  on 
the  site  of  a  former  tavern  show 
that  it  was  such.  There  is  no 
ambiguity  on  the  face  of  the  con- 
tract. But  an  ambiguity  is  at 
once  raised  when  it  is  shown  in 
order  to  identify  the  subject  mat- 
ter that  there  is  an  Adams  House 
and  that  a  part  of  it  has  been 
used  for  hotel  purposes  and  that 
certain  other  parts  have  been  % 
used  as  shops,  let  to  separate  ten- 
ants, with  no  interior  connection 
or  any  <omniunication  with  the 
part  of  the  building  occupied  and 
used  as  a  hotel  except  that  all  are 
under  one  roof.  To  say  that 
'"house"  means  the  whole  of  the 


house  would  be  plausible  if  the 
term  were  used  in  its  generic 
sense  as  "my  house,  situated  in" 
such  a  street  or  town.  Here  the 
word  is  used  as  a  part  of  a  proper 
name.  If  it  were  a  conveyance 
in  fee  of  the  "Adams  House"  the 
implication  would  be  very  strong 
that  every  thing  placed  upon  its 
site  was  included.  But  a  lease  is 
a  different  matter  and  raises  an- 
other question  as  the  hotel  part 
may  be  leased  and  used  to  advan- 
tage independent  of  the  stores  and 
vice  versa.  This  is  very  frequently 
done  in  cities.  The  case  is  one  of 
a  latent  ambiguity.  Where  the 
very  concise  and  plain  description 
of  the  property  in  the  lease  was 
applied  to  subject  it  was  found 
there  were  two  subjects,  viz.,  the 
site  and  the  house  built  on  it  and 
also  a  tenement  consisting  of 
suites  of  apartments  constituting 
the  hotel  proper  and  excluding  the 
stores  not  leased  or  used  with  it 
down  to  this  date.  Parol  evidence 
was  admissible  to  show  that  the 
stores  were  wholly  detached  with- 
out any  interior  communication 
with  the  whole  and  built  under 
and  not  in  that  portion  of  the 
structure  which  had  been  used 
and  occupied  as  a  hotel  under  the 
name  "Adams  House."  Sargent  v. 
Adams,  69  Mass.  72,  80. 


PROPERTY   WHICH   IS  INCLUDED   IN   THE   LEASE. 


399 


ment  of  the  use  of  the  baiii.^  The  demise  of  a  "furnished  house 
and  premises  with  gardens,  pleasure  grounds,  coach  house  and 
stable  thereto  belonging"  does  not  include  a  meadow  adjoining 
the  premises."  A  garden  or  court  yard  is  usually  considered  an 
incident  or  appurtenant  of  the  house.  Hence,  by  the  demise  or 
lease  of  the  house  as  such,  a  garden  or  courtyard  will  pass  to 
the  tenant.  He  will  be  permitted,  however,  to  use  the  garden  or 
courtyard  only  for  such  purposes  as  are  proper  and  appropriate 
to  them.  He  may  use  all  the  garden  as  a  garden  as  well  as  for 
a  passage  to  other  parts  of  the  premises,  but  he  cannot  divert  the 
garden  or  courtyard  from  its  former  or  proper  use  by  build- 
ing upon  it,  nor  on  the  other  hand,  can  the  lessor  build  upon  it 
while  it  is  in  the  possession  of  the  tenant.^     A  lease  of  certain 


5  Bennet  v.  Bittle,  4  Rawle  (Pa.) 
339. 

6  Minton  v.  Geiger,  28  L.  T.  449. 
-  Doyle  V.   Lord,   64  N.   Y.  432; 

Kidder  v.  West,  3  Lev.  167;  Bet- 
tisworth's  Case.  2  Co.  32a;  Co. 
Litt.  5b;  Com.  Dig.  Grant  E.  6; 
Shep.  Touch.  94;  Clements  v.  Col- 
lins, 2  T.  R.  502.  Upon  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  use  of  a  yard 
and  its  conveniences  passes  by  a 
demise,  see  construed  in  Hebbert 
V.  Thomas,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  861,  5  Tyr. 
503,  1  Gale,  53.  A  very  curious 
case  arose  in  England  under  the 
following  circumstances.  Certain 
land  had  been  leased  to  a  gas  com- 
pany for  use  in  its  business  and 
while  it  was  in  their  hands  and 
being  iised  by  them  there  was 
found  buried  in  the  land  an  an- 
cient boat  of  rather  rude  construc- 
tion, which,  in  the  opinion  of  per- 
sons qualified  to  know,  was  up- 
ward of  2,000  years  old.  From 
the  facts  and  situation  of  the  boat 
it  had  evidently  been  abandoned 
by  its  original  owners  on  the 
banks  of  a  river  and  had  become, 
in  the  course  of  time,  buried  in 
the  earth  and  had  so  remained  for 
many  centuries  until  dug  out  by 


the  employees  of  the  gas  company 
who  was  the  tenant  of  the  land. 
The  tenant  claimed  it  on  the 
ground  that  it  had  become  a  min- 
eral, but  the  court  in  determining 
the  case  treated  this  claim  as  ab- 
surd. On  the  other  hand,  the 
court  treated  with  equal  indiffer- 
ence the  claim  that  it  nad  become 
a  fixture  by  having  become  a  part 
of  the  land  and  said  very  justly 
that  although  it  had  become  im- 
bedded in  the  land  it  had  not  be- 
come a  part  of  the  land  but  al- 
ways remained  distinguished  from 
it.  The  owner  of  the  land  claimed 
title  to  it  upon  the  ground  that  it 
had  become  a  fixture  on  his  land, 
under  the  rule  that  if  a  man 
places  chattels  on  the  land  of  an- 
other, such,  as  for  example,  stones 
or  bricks  for  the  purpose  of  build- 
ing thereon,  they  become  the  prop- 
erty of  the  person  who  owns  the 
land.  In  repudiating  the  claim  of 
the  owner  of  the  land  that  this 
boat  was  a  chattel,  the  court  cited 
several  instances  of  certain  ar- 
ticles, such  as  coins,  and  lamps 
of  Roman  manufacture  which 
were  found  in  the  land  and  be- 
came  the   property  of  the  finder, 


400  LAW  OF  LAITOLOED  AND  TENANT, 

lands,  "being  all  that  part  of  the  park  called  B,  situate  and  be- 
ing in  the  county  of  0,  and  now  in  the  occupation  of  S^  lying  be- 
tween certain  other  properties  described  in  the  lease  as  adjoining 
thereto,"  "with  all  the  houses,  etc.,  now  in  the  occupation  of  S," 
passes  a  house  within  the  boundary,  though  not  in  the  occupation 
of  S.^  A  house  described  as  in  the  occupation  of  a  certain  person 
will  pass  though  it  is  in  the  occupation  of  a  tenant  of  that  per- 
son.*  The  fact  that  in  the  lease  of  a  farm  or  land,  any  particu- 
lar buildings  are  described,  does  not  exclude  from  the  lease  other 
buildings  which  are  actually  on  the  land  though  not  expressly 
described.^" 

§  272.  The  privileges  of  a  tenant  of  a  part  of  a  building-. 
The  lease  of  a  part  of  a  building  carries  with  it  for  the  beneiit 
of  the  tenant  everything  which  is  necessarily  used  with  or  which 
is  reasonably  necessary  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  particular  por- 
tion which  he  occupies.^^  As  against  his  landlord,  the  tenant  of 
a  portion  of  a  building  has  the  same  right  to  its  free  and  unin- 
terrupted use,  both  for  himself  and  his  visitors,  as  though  he  oc- 
cupied the  whole  building.  The  right  to  occupy  a  separate  part 
of  a  building  carries  with  it  the  right  to  use  the  means  of  access 
and  all  other  conveniences  which  are  used  in  connection  with 
the  apartment  when  he  leased  it.  As  against  tenants  of  other 
portions  of  the  building,  he  is  entitled  to  uninterinipted  posses- 

btit  in  deciding  the  case  the  court  of  the  execution  of  the  lease,  he, 

placed  no  reliance  on  any  of  these  as  against  the  tenant,  was  owner 

theories   and   said   that   the   only  of  the  boat  and  it  made  no  differ- 

question  in  the  case  was  whether  ence  under  these  circumstances  if 

the  boat  belonged  to  the  landlord  the  landlord  had  not  been  aware 

at  the  date  of  the  lease.  The  court  of  the  existence  of  the  boat  when 

held  that  it  did,  irrespective  of  the  he     made     the     lease.     Bwees     v. 

fact  as  to  whether  it  was  a  min-  Briggs  Gas  Co.,  55  L.  T.  831. 

eral  or  a  part  of  the  soil.    ,If,  on  s  jack  v.  Mclntyre,  12  CI.  &  F. 

the  one  hand,  it  became  a  part  of  151;  Hay  v.  Cumberland,  25  Barb, 

the  soil   it   certainly   belonged   to  (N.  Y.)  594. 

the  landlord;  and,  if  it  were  not  a  »  Burton  v.  Brown,  Cro.  Jac.  643. 

part  of  the  soil,  but  a  chattel  then  lo  Hay  v.  Cumberland,  25  Barb, 

it  belonged  to  him  for  the  reason  (N.  Y.)   594. 

that  he  owned  not  only  the  sur-  n  Kitchen    Bros.    Hotel    Co.    v. 

face  but  everything  that  lies  un-  Philbin,    2    Neb.    (unof.)    340,    96 

der  the  surface.     He  also  had  pos-  N.  W.  Rep.  487,  488;   Geneva  Min- 

session  of  the  boat  and  for  these  eral  Springs  Co.  v.  Coursey,  61  N. 

reasons  that  both  possession   and  Y.  Supp.  98,  45  App.  Div.  268. 
property  were  iu  him  at  the  time 


PROPEETY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN   THE  LEASE.  401 

sion  of  every  right  and  privilege  which,  are  necessary  to  confer 
upon  him  the  complete  and  full  enjoyment  of  the  premises  which 
he  occupies. ^^  Thus,  for  illustration,  the  lease  of  a  room  on  the 
ground  floor  of  a  hotel  to  a  ticket  broker  for  the  purpose  of 
carrjnng  on  his  business  as  such  carries  with  it  the  use  for  the 
customers  of  the  tenant  of  the  door  and  hallway  leading  from 
any  portion  of  the  building  which  is  necessary  for  the  tenant's 
use.^^  But  no  interest  in  the  leased  premises  passes  to  the  ten- 
ant of  an  apartment  which  is  not  directly  connected  with  the 
use  which  he  makes  of  the  apartment.^*  And  an  express  agree- 
ment entered  into  by  the  landlord  with  the  tenant  of  an  apart- 
ment by  which  he  is  given  the  use  or  possession  of  another  por- 
tion of  the  premises  in  which  the  apartment  is  located  will  be 
strictly  construed  and  will  be  regarded  as  a  license  rather  than 
as  a  lease.  Being  a  license,  it  may  be  revoked,  and  the  tendency 
is  to  construe  all  such  extra  privileges  and  rights  which  are  not 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  particular  offices, 
flat  or  apartment  in  a  restrictive  sense.  Thus,  a  clause  in  the 
lease  of  a  loft  that  a  tenant  is  to  have  the  privilege  of  storing  a 
reasonable  number  of  cases  of  goods  in  the  basement  of  the 
building  in  which  the  loft  is  located,  being  vague  as  to  the 
quantity  and  space  to  be  occupied  by  the  tenant  and  as  to  the 
number  of  cases  to  be  stored,  does  not  constitute  a  lease  of  any 
part  of  the  basement.^^  A  tenant  of  a  cellar  is  entitled  to  the 
free  and  uninterrupted  use  of  the  entrance  thereof  on  the  street, 
but  where  the  platform  covering  the  outlet  of  a  cellar  was  not 
mentioned  in  the  lease  of  a  cellar  and  the  use  of  the  platform 
was  not  indispensable  to  the  use  of  the  cellar,  the  tenant  has  no 
implied  right  to  the  platform.^''  The  lease  of  a  floor  in  a  build- 
ing conveys  to  the  lessee  the  right  t-o  use  the  front  wall  of  that 
part  of  the  building  for  his  o^ti  exclusive  use  for  the  purpose  of 
placing  signs  thereon.  He  may  use  it  himself  or  permit  another 
person  to  use  it  for  that  purpose  and  his  permission  to  another 
person  to  use  it  is  a  mere  license  and  not  a  lease  and,  eouse- 

12  Section  .  is  Cluett    v.    Sheppard,    131    111. 

13  Kitchen    Bros.    Hotel    Co.    v.  636,  639,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  5S9. 
Philbin.,  2  Neb.  (unof.)  240,  96  N.  is  Hill   v.   Shultz,   40   X.   J.   Eq. 
W.  Rep.  487,  488.  164. 

14  Seidel  v.  Bloeser,  97  Mo.  App. 
172. 

26 


402  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

quently,  does  not  constitute  a  breach  of  a  covenant  against  the 
subletting.  The  o"v\Tier  of  a  building  letting  it  out  in  separate 
floors  may,  by  express  terms,  except  the  use  of  the  outside  of  the 
building  and  forbid  his  tenants  from  placing  signs  thereon.  In 
the  absence  of  such  a  prohibition  or  exception  the  right  of  the 
tenant  to  place  signs  thereon  is  unlimited,  except  by  the  rules 
of  public  policy  which  prevent  the  exhibition  of  signs  calculated 
to  corrupt  the  public  morals  or  encourage  a  breach  of  the  peace. 
In  the  same  case  in  vi^hich  the  above  was  held  the  court  construed 
the  meaning  of  the  word  "floor"  and  held  that  the  "first  floor" 
of  a  building  meant  the  floor  of  the  first  story.  Hence,  a  lease 
of  the  first  floor  in  a  building  apparently  means  a  cutting  out  of 
the  section  of  the  building  as  a  distinct  tenement  by  an  upper  and 
lower  boundary  which  are  indicated  by  the  words  "first  floor." 
So  far  as  the  lateral  boundaries  are  concerned  the  lease  of  a  floor 
presumptively  includes  the  front  or  side  walls  by  which  it  is 
bounded.  So  probably  the  lease  of  a  floor  would  include  all 
rooms,  passageways  and  closets  within  the  four  walls  surround- 
ing the  same  from  the  exterior  of  said  walls  in  both  directions.  A 
lease  of  a  "room"  as  such  is  somewhat  different.  The  word 
"floor"  means  a  section  of  the  building  between  horizontal  planes 
and  the  words  "in  a  building"  attached  to  the  word  "floor" 
shows  that  a  section  of  the  whole  building  is  meant  and  not 
simply  a  part  of  it.  The  word  "room"  on  the  other  hand  indi- 
cates a  quantity  of  space  inclosed  by  walls,  possibly  within  the 
house  itself,  as  well  as  by  the  separate  horizontal  planes.  The 
word  "room"  or  "rooms"  presumptively  excludes  the  outside 
of  the  side  or  front  walls,  in  the  absence  of  express  language  and 
particularly  where  the  front  walls  constitute  the  walls  of  another 
room.  Thus,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  right  to  the  use  of  the  walls 
by  the  tenant  of  a  part  of  the  premises  depends  to  a  large  extent 
upon  the  part  he  occupies.  If  he  occupies  a  floor  then  the  pre- 
sumption is  strongly  in  his  favor  that  he  has  the  use  of  the  out- 
side wall  but  if  he  only  occupies  a  room  the  presumption  is  the 
other  way.' ^ 

i^  273.  Description  of  leased  premises  by  street  number. 
Where  the  premises  are  described  in  a  lease  by  the  numbers  which 
are  over  the  outside  door  opening  on  a  street  the  presumption 

17  Lowell  V.  Strahan,  14.^>  Mass.  1,  12  N.  K.  Rep.  401. 


PROPERTY    WlllCn   IS   INCLUDED   IN    THE   LEASE.  403 

which  is  always  rebuttable,  is  that  the  building  is  meant  access  to 
which  may  be  had  from  the  street  by  means  of  these  doors.  Hence 
if  a  building  has  a  solid  partition  wall  extending  from  cellar  to 
roof  which  practically  makes  it  two  structures,  a  tenant  whose 
lease  describes  it  by  street  numbers  cannot  claim  that  the  lease 
covers  a  portion  of  the  building  not  accessible  by  the  outside 
doors.  And  it  is  not  material  that,  for  the  convenience  of  a  prior 
tenant  a  passageway  has  been  cut  in  the  partition  wall  of  the  ftrst 
floor.^®  The  lease  of  land  by  street  numbers  in  the  absence  of  an 
express  provision  to  the  contrary'  conveys  the  use  of  all  land  en- 
trance to  which  may  be  had  from  the  street.  It  includes  not  only 
the  front  but  the  rear  of  the  lot  as  well.  The  lessee  will  by  impli- 
cation have  the  right  to  use  all  stables  and  outhouses  upon  the 
rear  of  the  lot,  access  to  which  may  be  had  by  a  door  over  which 
the  number  is  placed.  But  this  rule  does  not  apply  to  corner  lots 
in  the  business  portion  of  a  city  fronting  on  two  streets  on  which 
are  situated  dwelling  and  business  houses,  which  are  separate  and 
distinct.^**  Where  there  is  nothing  in  the  lease  to  indicate  an  in- 
tention to  limit  the  lessee's  occupancy  to  buildings  a  lease  of  city 
premises  by  street  number  conveys  an  interest  in  the  yard,  gar- 
den and  subjacent  land  which  the  lessee  retains  after  the  build- 
ings have  been  destroyed  or  removed.-"  Where  a  lease  of  a  houst 
by  a  street  number  does  not  in  terms  convey  the  right  to  use  a 
passage  on  the  same  lot  beside  it  or  to  use  the  land  in  the  rear 
to  which  it  leads,  all  that  the  tenant  holds  is  the  right  to  use  the 
passage  way  if  its  use  is  necessary  to  the  complete  en.joyment  of 
the  building  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  rented  and  whether 
the  use  of  the  passageway  is  necessary  is  a  question  of  fact.-^ 

18  Houghton  V.  Moore,  141  Mass.  the  structure  two  teaements  as 
437,  6  N.  E.  Rep.  517.  distinctly    as    if    they    had    been 

19  Hosher  v.  Hostermann,  58  111.  built  on  separate  blocks.  When 
App.  265.  a  house  or  building  is  described 

20  p.  H.  Snook  &  Austin  Furni-  in  a  lease  by  street  numbers  over 
ture  Co.  V.  Steiner  &  Emery.  113  the  outside  doors  the  inference  is 
Ga.  363,  43  S.  E.  Rep.  775,  777.  that  a  building  is  intended  access 
The  fact  that  a  building  has  a  to  \vhich  is  reached  by  these  doors, 
solid  brick  partition  in  it  from  Houghton  v.  Moore,  141  Mass.  437, 
cellar    to    roof    without    door    or  6  N.  E.  Rep.  517. 

passageway    in    it    raises    an    un-  21  Patterson  v.  Graham,  140  111. 

avoidable    presumption    that    the  531,  535,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  460,  affirm- 

different    parts    were   to    be   sepa-  ing  40  111.  App.  399. 
rately  occupied.     The  wall   makes 


404  LAW  OP  LA2JDLQRD  AND  TENANT. 

The  presumption  that  a  lease  by  street  mimber  includes  only  such 
buildings  as  are  located  upon  the  lot  thus  numbered  is  not  rebut- 
ted by  a  clause  granting  to  the  lessee  "all  the  buildings,  out- 
houses and  premises  of  said  place  with  the  appurtenances"  ;where 
it  appears  that  the  lot  in  question  was  wholly  occupied  by  the 
demised  premises  and  that  the  outbuildings  were  upon  an  ad- 
joining lot  also  owned  by  the  lessor.-- 

§  274.  Exclusive  right  of  the  lessee  of  hotel  to  use  a  particu- 
lar name.  Where  the  proprietor  of  a  hotel  or  boarding  house, 
whether  lessee  or  owner  of  the  building  has  by  close  attention  to 
the  needs  and  comfoi-ts  of  his  guests,  and  by  his  superior  indus- 
try and  skill  given  his  establishment  a  wide  popularity  under  a 
distinctive  name,  and  made  it  under  such  name  a  desirable  resort 
for  lodgers  and  travelers  he  has  acquired  an  exclusive  right  to 
and  property  in  such  name  which  equity  will  protect.  In  fairness 
and  justice  to  the  person  whose  labor  has  given  the  name  value 
and  in  order  to  protect  the  public  from  fraud  and  imposition  any 
other  person  using  such  name  while  conducting  a  hotel  in  the 
.same  town  will  be  enjoined  from  continuing  to  do  so.-^  The  right 
to  use  the  name,  being  a  property  right,  may  be  transferred. 
Thus  a  lessee  of  a  hotel  in  assigning  his  term  or  in  subletting  may, 
where  he  has  acquired  a  right  to  use  a  peculiar  and  distinctive 
name,  transfer  such  right  to  his  assignee  or  sub-tenant.  Or  he 
may  stipulate  that  he  will  not  carry  on  the  same  business  in  the 
same  place  for  a  specified  term  of  years  in  which  case  the  right  to 
the  exclusive  use  of  the  name  maj  pass  to  and  vest  in  the  assignee 
by  implication.  A  mere  assignment  of  the  term  will  not,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  express  language  to  that  effect,  confer  upon  the  assignee 
the  right  to  use  the  name  in  which  the  assignor  has  property 
rights  with  the  consent,  express  or  implied,  of  the  latter.  And 
unless  the  person  who  by  his  industry  and  skill  has  acquired  the 
exclusive  right  to  use  a  particular  designation  for  his  hotel  or 
boarding  house,  has  transferred  it  to  one  to  whom  he  has  assigned 
or  sublet  the  premises  with  which  the  designation  was  connected 
the  latter  cannot  enjoin  him  from  using  it  in  the  same  business.^* 

22  Morris  v.  Kettlo,  56  N.  J.  Eq.  also,  Knott  v.  Morgan,  2  Keen.  213. 
826,  34   Atl.  Rop.   376.  219. 

23  Wilcoxen  v.  McCray,  38  N.  J.  24  Wilcoxen  v.  McCray,  38  N.  J. 
Eq.    466,    469;     Howard    v.    Hen-  Eq.  466,  469. 

riques,  3  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  725.     Se«* 


PROPEItTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE-  405 

§  275.  The  tenants  right  to  light  and  air  coming  through  his 
front  and  rear  windows.  The  abutting  owner  of  laud  at  com- 
mon law  has  a  right  to  the  street  or  highway  for  light  and  air  and 
for  access,  ingress  and  egress,  subject  only  to  the  easement  in  the 
public  to  use  the  highway  and  the  rights  of  the  municipality  in 
which  his  land  is  situated.  These  rights  constitute  particularly 
in  crowded  business  streets  the  most  valuable  portion  of  his 
property  so  that  to  deprive  him  of  it  will  in  most  cases  greatly 
diminish  its  value.-^  These  advantages  belong  to  and  are  a  part 
of  the  property  and  are  absolutely  essential  to  its  full  use  and  en- 
joyment and  they  pass  to  a  lessee  unless  specially  reserved  to  the 
owner  or  some  other  person  in  the  instrument.-*'  A\"here  an  owner 
lays  out  land  and  on  the  map  thereof  designates  certain  streets 
and  roads  as  giving  access  to  the  lots  upon  the  map,  and  subse- 
quently leases  such  lots  on  long  leases,  the  action  of  the  owner  in 
platting  the  land  amounts  to  a  dedication  of  such  streets  and 
roads  to  the  use  of  the  lessees.-'^  Hence  the  lessees  are  absolutely 
entitled  to  have  these  streets  and  roads  kept  during  the  term  of 
the  lease  -®  and  also  to  eveiy  incidental  right  flowing  out  of  the 
existence  of  such  public  streets  and  highways.    The  tenant  of  a 

25  Branahan  v.  Hotel  Co.,  39  from  that  of  the  general  public. 
Ohio  St.  333;  Brayton  v.  Fall  It  includes  not  only  the  right  to 
River,  113  IMass.  218;  Pratt  v.  use  the  street  for  passage  but  for 
Lewis,  39  Mich.  7;  Edmison  v.  light  and  air,  access,  ingress  and 
Lowry,  3  S.  D.  77,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  egress  at  all  times  subject  to  the 
583,  17  L.  R.  A.  275,  44  Am.  St.  public  easement.  The  right  to  an 
Rep.  774.  unobstructed  street  constitutes  the 

26  Edmison  v.  Lowry,  3  S.  D.  77,  most  valuable  part  of  the  prop- 
84,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  583,  17  L.  R.  A.  erty,  particularly  in  crowded  thor- 
275,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  774;  holding  oughfares  and  business  streets. 
also  that  the  depositing  of  stone  Such  rights  constitute  property 
and  lumber  by  the  landlord  in  and  cannot  be  taken  for  public  use 
front  of  the  leased  premises  which  without  just  compensation.  These 
resulted  in  the  tenant  being  de-  rights  of  the  owner  of  abutting 
prived  of  access  for  three  months  property  pass  to  a  lessee,  and  the 
was  an  eviction  which  justified  lessee  therefore  acquires  all  right 
the  tenant's  refusal  to  pay  rent.  to  use  the  street  in  front  of  his 

27  Thousand  Island  Park  Asso-  premises,  including  the  right  to 
ciation  v.  Tucker,  173  N.  Y.  203,  air  and  light,  access,  ingress  and 
65  N.  E.  Rep.  975;  reversing  69  egress  incident  to  the  property 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1149.  not  only  as  against  the  public  but 

28  The  right  of  the  abutting  against  the  lessor  as  well.  Hence 
owner  In  land  of  a  street  is  a  pe-  the  right  of  the  lessee  to  the  use 
culiar,  distinct  and  separate  right  of  the  street  for  the  approach  of 


406  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

portion  of  floor  in  a  building  whose  windows  open  npon  the 
street  or  highway  has  the  same  right  to  the  light  and  air  which 
pass  through  these  windows  as  against  his  landlord  as  the  ten- 
ant of  the  whole  building  woiild  have.  Thus  a  lease  of  several 
front  rooms  on  an  upper  floor  of  a  building  carries  Avith  it  the 
implied  right  as  against  the  landlord  to  have  an  unobstructed 
view  of  the  street.  So  the  lessor  cannot  shut  off  such  view  or  im- 
pair the  tenant's  easements  of  light  and  air  by  adding  to  the 
front  of  the  building.-^  One  who  leases  the  whole  building  and 
su])lets  the  several  floors  to  separate  tenants  owes  each  of  them 
the  duty  of  refraining  from  obstructing  their  several  easements 
of  light  and  air.  His  liability  to  his  subtenants  in  this  respect  is 
precisely  the  same  in  extent  and  degree  as  is  that  of  the  owner  of 
the  fee.  The  right  of  a  tenant  whether  of  the  wdiole  building  or 
of  only  one.  floor  to  light  and  air  coming  through  the  rear  win- 
dows of  his  premises  will  be  protected  to  the  same  extent  is  in  the 
case  of  front  w^indows.  So,  in  a  case  w^here,  during  the  term  of  a 
lease  of  a  second  story  apartment  in  a  building  whose  rear  abut- 
ted upon  a  yard,  the  landlord,  without  the  consent  of  the  ten- 
ant, erected  an  extension  of  the  building  which  occupied  the  yard 
so  as  to  cut  off  the  tenant's  light  and  air  it  was  held  that  a  man- 
datory injunction  would  issue  to  compel  the  landlord  to  remove 
so  much  at  least  of  the  extension  as  obstructed  the  tenant's  light 
and  air  by  being  in  front  of  or  above  the  rear  windows  of  the  ten- 
ant."" Though  it  is  the  wtII  established  rule  that  where  premises 
are  hsased  with  windows  opening  upon  a  vacant  lot  detached  from 
the  premises  a  grant  of  light  and  air  is  not  implied  to  the  lessee, 
yet  where  a  lease  is  made  of  a  part  of  a  building  with  a  window 
opening  into  a  yard  connected  witji  building  so  that  if  the 
lessee  had  leased  the  whole  building  the  yard  would  have  passed 
as  an  appurtenant  to  the  demised  building,  the  lessee  acquires  a. 
right  to  have  the  w'indow  left  unobstructed  at  least  when  it  is 
n(;cessary  for  the  use  of  the  premises  for  the  purpose  for  which 
it  was  let.^^    As  between  the  several  tenants  of  a  building  which 

express     wagons,     carriages     and  obstructed  than  the  other.     Edmi- 

other  vehicles  is  as  full  and  com-  son  v.  Lowry,  "3  S.  D.  77,  .S4. 

plete  as  his  right  to  the  occupa-  2»  Brande    v.    Grace,    154    Mass. 

tion     and     use     of     the     demised  210,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  633. 

building    itself,   and   his   right  to  fo  Stevens  v.  Salamon,  31  Misc. 

the  one  can  no  more  be  lawfully  Rep.  19,  79  N.  Y.  Supp.  136. 

31  Doyle  V.  Lloyd,  04  N.  Y.  432, 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  IXCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE. 


407 


is  let  out  in  separate  apartments  each  has,  as  against  all  the 
others,  an  unlimited  right  to  the  light  and  air  necessary-  to  make 
his  apartments  habitable  and  which  he  receives  through  the  front 
and  rear  windows  in  existence  when  he  takes  the  premises.    The 


436,  439.  In  this  case  the  Court 
by  Earl,  J.,  said:  "If  the  plain- 
tiffs had  hired  the  whole  build- 
ing with  the  appurtenances,  their 
right  to  the  yard  could  not  have 
been  questioned.  The  yard  be- 
longed to  the  building  and  was 
appropriate  to  its  use,  and  would 
pass  under  a  lease  of  the  premises 
demised.  The  lease  would  have 
such  effect,  because  it  would  be  the 
presumed  intention  of  the  parties. 
In  Sheppard's  Touchstone,  94,  it 
is  said  that  the  grant  of  a  mes- 
suage or  a  messuage  with  the  ap- 
purtenances will  pass  the  dwelling 
house,  barn,  adjoining  buildings, 
orchard,  curtilage,  and  garden.  In 
Comyn's  Digest  (Title,  Grant  E  6) 
it  is  said,  'by  the  grant  of  a  mes- 
suage or  house,  the  garden,  or- 
chard, or  curtilage  pass.'  In  T\Tait- 
ney  v.  Olney,  3  Mason  (U.  S.)  208, 
it  was  held  that  a  devise  of  a  mill 
with  appurtenances  conveyed  not 
the  buildings  merely,  but  the  land 
under  and  adjoining,  which  is  nec- 
essary to  the  use  and  actually 
used  with  it.  In  United  States  v. 
Appleton.  1  Sumn.  (U.  S.)  492, 
Judge  Story  said,  "The  general 
rule  of  law  is,  that  where  a  house 
or  store  is  conveyed  by  the  owner 
thereof  everything  then  belonging 
to  and  in  use  for  the  house  or 
store,  as  an  incident  or  appurte- 
nant, passes  by  the  grant.  It  is 
implied  from  the  nature  of  the 
grant,  unless  it  contains  some  re- 
striction, that  the  grantee  shall 
possess  the  house  in  the  manner 
and  with  the  same  beneficial 
rights   as    were    then    in    and   be- 


longed to  it.  In  the  case  sup- 
posed, the  yard  would  have  passed 
with  the  store,  not  by  force  of  the 
word  "appurtenances"  but  as  por- 
tions of  the  premises  demised. 
Riddle  v.  Litchfield,  53  N.  H.  503. 
If  all  the  rooms,  in  .the  building 
had  at  the  same  time  been  rented 
to  different  persons,  each  taking 
the  room  with  the  appurtenances, 
and  no  mention  had  been  made  of 
the  yard,  a  different  case  would 
have  been  presented.  The  demise 
of  a  room  in  the  building  would 
pass  no  portion  of  the  yard.  Each 
tenant  would  take  only  the  room 
•  which  he  had  hired,  and  would 
take  no  other  portion  of  the  prem- 
ises. Whatever  else  he  took  would 
be  by  virtue  of  the  word  "appur- 
tenances." That  word  would  give 
him  whatever  was  attached  to  or 
used  with  the  premises,  or  inci- 
dent thereto  an,d  convenient  or 
essential  to  the  beneficial  use  and 
enjoyment  thereof,  and  he  would 
take  any  easement  or  servitude 
used  or  enjoyed  with  the  demised 
premises.  2  Wash,  on  Seal  Prop. 
667.  It  would  give  him  no  inter 
est  in  the  yard  as  a  portion  of 
land,  because  land  cannot  pass 
as  appurtenant  to  land,  but  it 
would  give  him  easement  in  the 
yard  in  common  with  all  the  other 
tenants,  for  all  purposes  for  which 
it  could  be  used  in  common — for 
access  to  the  privies,  for  a  play- 
ground for  children,  and  for  light 
and  air  for  rooms  in  the  rear  of 
the  building.  If  the  different 
rooms  were  leased  at  different 
times  with  the  appurtenances,  the 


408  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

same  rule  applies  to  all  windows  in  the  separate  apartments  open- 
ing on  any  passageway  which  is  wholly  within  the  building  itself, 
as  a  hall  or  corridor.  A  tenant  of  one  portion  of  the  premises 
whose  full  and  unobstructed  use  of  a  front  or  rear  window  is 
prevented  by  or  through  tenants  of  other  parts  of  the  house, 
placing  showcases  in  front  of  it,  may  maintain  an  action  of  tres- 
pass against  the  trespasser,  and  may  legally  remove  the  obstruc- 
tions themselves.^-  If  the  tenant  of  one  part  of  the  premises  ob- 
structs the  windows  of  another  tenant  by  the  direction  or  with  the 
express  consent  of  the  landlord  the  tenant  w^ho  is  thus  annoyed 
or  inconvenienced  may  treat  the  obstruction  as  a  constructive 
eviction  and  he  may  act  accordingly  so  far  as  the  abandonment  of 
his  apartments  is  concerned.  An  owner  of  premises  leased  the  up- 
per part  of  the  same  the  windows  of  which  looked  out  upon  an 
open  space.  He  then  leased  the  whole  building  subject  of  course 
to  the  prior  lease,  but  also  giving  the  second  lessor  permission  to 
erect  an  electric  plant  and  to  build  a  chimney  for  the  same.  The 
second  lessee  having  erected  a  chimney  which  obscured  the  win- 
dows through  which  the  first  lessee  received  light  and  air  it  was 
held  that  the  first  lessee  had  a  right  of  action  against  the  land- 
lord though  the  lease  contained  no  express  covenant  of  quiet  en- 
joyment.^^ A  covenant  by  the  lessor  that  he  will  not  object  to  any 
"works"  on  the  adjoining  premises  which  may  be  sanctioned  by 
his  landlord,  applies  only  to  buildings  which  are  in  actual  contact 
with  the  demised  building.  Hence  the  tenant  is  not  precluded 
from  preventing  his  landlord  from  building  so  as  to  obstruct  his 
light,  where  his  lease  conveyed  to  him  all  lights,  easements  and 
appurtenances  belonging  to  the  premises  which  he  leased,  where 

same  result  would  follow.  Each  occupied  when  plaintiff  took  the 
tenant  would  have  an  easement  in  lease  no  tenant  thereof  could  well 
the  yard.  Such,  in  the  absence  of  dispense  with  the  use  of  the  yard, 
restrictive  words,  would  be  the  The  building  was  so  constructed 
manifest  intention  of  the  parties  and  arranged  that  all  the  tenants 
and  no  rule  of  law  stands  in  the  had  access  to  the  yard  and  there 
way  of  giving  effect  to  such  in-  was  no  other  apparent  purpose  to 
tcntion.  The  yard  was  attached  which  the  yard  could  be  sub- 
to  and  appropriated  for  the  use  of  jected." 

the    building.     The    privies    were  32  Whitohouse   v.   Aiken    (Mass. 

built  for  the  use  of  the  occupants  1906)    77  N.   E.  Rep.  499. 

of  the  building  and  the  yard  was  33  Case  v.  Minot,  158  Mass.  557, 

essential     to    the    beneficial     use  33  N.  B.  Rep.  700 
thereof,  and  as  the  building  was 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  409 

the  buildings  which  are  being  erected  by  the  landlord  are  located 
on  ground  which  actually  touches  the  ground  occupied  by  the 
tenant.^* 

§  276.  Rights  as  to  the  use  of  light  and  air  as  between  the 
proprietors  of  adjoining  premises.  In  England  it  is  the  general 
rule  that  a  person  may  acquire  the  right  to  an  easement  of 
light  and  air  as  against  an  adjoining  o\vner  by  the  uninter- 
rupted enjoyment  of  such  right  for  a  period  of  twenty  years.  By 
such  right  the  adjoining  owner  is  prevented  from  stopping  up 
the  windows  of  the  person  who  has  the  right  by  the  erection  of 
buildings  on  his  own  land.  So  if  one  who  has  a  house  with  win- 
dows looking  out  to  his  own  vacant  land  shall  sell  it  he  may  not 
thereafter  build  a  structure  upon  the  vacancy  which  he  still  owns 
which  shall  deprive  the  house  he  has  sold  of  its  light.^^  This  rule 
for  a  prescriptive  right  or  easement  however,  in  the  use  of  light 
and  air  which  may  be  acquired  by  uninterrupted  use  is  not  gener- 
ally recognized  in  the  United  States.'®  In  the  cases  cited  the 
question  of  an  easement  of  light  and  air  over  adjoining  land  has 
almost  universally  arisen  between  the  grantor  of  the  fee  and  his 
grantee,  and  no  English  case  has  been  found  where  the  rule  was 
applied  between  a  lessee  and  a  lessor  who  was  the  owner  of  ad- 
joining land.  The  basis  of  the  rule  which  is  recognized  in  Eng- 
land is  not  very  clearly  pointed  out  in  the  cases.  As  between  the 
grantor  and  grantee  the  rule  may  in  theory"  be  based  on  an  im- 

34  White  V.  Harrow,  86  L.  T.  4,  len  v.  Strieker,  19  Ohio  State, 
50  W.  R.   2.59.  135,   2  Am.  Rep.   379;    Haverstick 

35  Moore  v.  Rawson,  3  Bar.  &  C.  v.  Sipe,  33  Pa.  St.  368;  McDonald 
332,  340;  Palmer  v.  Fletcher,  1  v.  Bromley,  6  Phila.  (Pa.)  302. 
Lev.  132;  Aldred's  Case,  9  Rep.  24  Leg.  Int.  157;  King  v.  Large,  7 
58b.  For  a  full  citation  of  the  Phila.  (Pa.)  282,  27  Leg.  Int.  149; 
English  cases  see  Washburn  on  Klein  v.  Gehrung,  25  Tex.  232; 
Easements  and  Servitudes,  mar.  Hubbard  v.  Town,  33  Vt.  283;  Tur- 
p.  492.  et  seq.  ner  v.  Thompson,  58   Ga.  268,   24 

38  Ward    V.    Noel,    37    Ala.    500;  Am.  Rep.  497;   Guest  v.  Reynolds, 

Western  Granite  &  Marble  Co.  v.  68  111.  478,  18  Am.  Rep.  570;  Dex- 

Knickerbocker,    103    Cal.    Ill,    37  ter  v.  Tree,  117  111.  532,  6  N.  E. 

Pac.  Rep.  192;    Lapere  v.  Luckey,  Rep.  506;    Stein  v.  Hauck,  56  Ind. 

23    Kan.    534,    33    Am.    Rep.    196;  65,    26    Am.    Rep.    10;     Cherry    v. 

Richardson  v.  Pond,  81  Mass.  387,  Stein,  11  Md.  1;   Parker  v.  Foote, 

389;     Carrig     v.     Dee,     14     Gray  19  Wend.    (N.  Y.)    309;    Powell  v. 

(Mass.)    5S3;    Haydeu  v.  Dutcher,  Simms,  5  W.  Va.  1,  13  Am.  Rep. 

31   N.  J.  Eq.  217;    Sweeney  v.  St.  629. 
John,   28  Hun    (N.  Y.)    634;    Mul- 


410  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

plication  that  the  premises  to  which  it  is  claimed  the  easements 
attached  would  be  rendered  more  valuable  thereby,  and  that  for 
that  reason  the  grantee  of  the  premises  paid  more  for  them  than 
he  would  otherwise  have  done.  As  between  grantor  and  grantee 
it  may  possibly  be  assumed  that  the  easement  arises  as  soon  a?  the 
grant  is  made.  If  this  be  assumed  then  the  easement  is  not 
created  by  prescription  nor  by  adverse  use  for  a  specific  period 
which  might  apply  in  other  eases,  but  by  the  fiction  of  an  implied 
contract.^"  No  doubt  the  English  cases  determining  this  question 
between  a  grantor  and  grantee  would  be  applicable  in  those  juris- 
dictions where  the  English  rule  is  followed  to  a  case  where  a  les- 
sor owning  adjacent  lots  by  building  upon  one  of  them  obstructs 
the  light  and  air  of  his  lessee.  The  prevalent  rule  in  the  United 
States  is  that  an  easement  in  the  unobstructed  passage  of  light 
and  air  cannot  be  acquired  by  prescription  alone.^®  And  it  is  also 
a  general  rule  to  which,  however,  exceptions  are  made  in  some 
states  that  a  grant  of  the  right  to  light  and  air  will  not  be  created 
by  implication  from  the  conveyance  of  a  house  whose  windows 
overlook  other  land  retained  by  the  grantor.  Nor  will  a  grant  of 
an  easement  of  light  and  air  be  implied  in  such  case  from  the 
nature  or  use  of  the  building  on  the  land  conveyed  or  from  the 
necessity  of  such  an  easement  to  the  convenient  use  and  enjoy- 
ment of  the  property.^^  So,  a  person  who  rents  the  second  story 
of  a  building  for  a  business  *'.  e.,  photography  which  requires  un- 
obstructed light,  has  no  cause  of  action  against  an  owner  of  an 

37  Mr.  Washburn  in  his  Treatise  3G5,  33  Atl.  Rep.  390,  29  L.  R.  A, 
on  .Easements  bases  the  claim  to  .582;  Keiper  v.  Klein,  51  Ind.  316; 
light  and  air  upon  what  he  calls  Morrison  v.  Marquardt,  24  Iowa, 
the  familiar  rule  of  law  that  if  35,  92  Am.  Dec.  444;  White  v. 
one  grant  an  estate  to  which  cer-  Bradley,  66  Me.  254;  Collier  v. 
tain  apparent  and  continuous  sub-  Pierce,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  18,  66  Am. 
jects  of  enjoyment  belong  and  are  Dec.  453;  Randall  v.  Sanderson, 
used  therewith  he  cannot  there-  111  Mass.  114;  Keats  v.  Hugo,  115 
after  derogate  from  the  benefit  of  Mass.  204;  Burr  v.  Mills,  21  Wend, 
his  own  grant  by  interfering  (N.  Y.)  290;  Shipman  v.  Beers,  2 
therewith.— p.  492.  Abb.  N.  C.  435;  Haverstick  v.  Sipe, 

38  Keating  v.  Springer,  146  111.  33  Pa.  St.  368;  contra  James  v. 
481,  492,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  805,  37  Am.  .lenkins,  34  Md.  1,  6  Am.  Rep. 
St.  Rep.  175,  22  L.  R.  A.  544;  300;  Turner  v.  Thompson,  58  Ga. 
Keats  V.  Hugo,  115  Mass.  204;  Mul-  26S,  24  Am.  Rep.  497;  Taylor  v. 
len  V.  Strieker,  19  Ohio  St.  135;  Boulware,  35  La.  Ann.  469;  Cherry 
Guest  V.  Reynolds,  68  111.  478  v.  Stein,  11  Md.  1;    Green  v.  Me- 

•■!!'  Robinson   v.   Clapj),   65   Conn.       tor,  54  N.  J.  Eq.  270.' 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE. 


411 


adjacent  lot  who  siibseqnenlly  erects  a  biiildincj  thereon  and  oh- 
stmcts  the  tenants'  windows  though  the  same  person  owned  the 
demised  premises  and  the  strip  of  land  npon  which  the  wall  was 
located.*"  It  follows  therefore  in  conformity  with  this  general 
rule  that  a  landlord  will  not  be  liable  for  obstructing  his  tenant's 
light  and  air  by  building  on  the  adjoining  land  owned  by  him  in 
the  absence  of  any  covenant  or  agreement  in  the  lease  forbidding 
it.*^  Of  course  the  right  to  have  light  and  air  come  through  a 
window  over  the  adjoining  premises  may  be  conveyed  in  a  lease 
by  express  covenant  or  agreement. *^^  So,  if  buildings  are  erected 
occupying  the  four  sides  of  an  open  court,  or  occupying  three 
sides  of  a  court  or  alleyway  which  opens  into  a  public  highway 
with  an  open  space  in  the  middle  for  light  and  air  which  is  free 
to  the  occupants  of  the  rooms  in  the  adjoining  buildings,  with  a 


40  Lindsey  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
115  N.  Car.  553,  20  S.  E.  Rep.  621, 
in  which  the  court  said:  "Whether 
the  plaintiffs  leased  the  second 
story  room  for  the  purpose  of  tak- 
ing photographs  therein,  or  with 
some  other  object  in  view,  they 
contracted  in  terms  only  for  the 
use  of  the  apartments  occupied 
by  them,  and  not  for  an  unob- 
structed light  passing  through  a 
certain  window  or  windows  in  ad- 
dition. They  might  maintain  an 
action  for  any  trespass  upon  the 
premises  rented  by  them.  But 
conceding  that  the  lessors  were 
the  owners  of  the  eighteen  inches 
of  land  just  outside  the  wall 
which  was  in  dispute,  it  was  not 
contended  that  they  had  entered 
into  any  stipulations,  so  far  as  we 
can  ascertain  from  the  testimony, 
that  the  lease  of  the  plaintiffs 
should  extend  beyond  the  wall. 
Consequently  the  lessors  could 
have  purchased  the  land  of  the 
coteimiuous  proprietor  and  have 
erected  a  structure,  one  wall  of 
which  would  have  shut  out  the 
light  from  the  windows  of  the  de- 
mised  premises,    without   subject- 


ing themselves  to  liability  on  an 
action  of  trespass  brought  by 
their  tenants.  They  could  have 
conveyed  to  another  this  narrow 
strip  of  land  and  have  vested 
their  grantee  with  the  same 
power,  their  lessee  having  ac- 
quired in  the  absence  of  special 
stipulation  no  right,  title  or  in- 
terest in  it.  Whether  the  lessors 
allowed  the  adjacent  owner  to 
build  a  wall  upon  it  under  a  ver- 
bal license  or  left  him  unmolested 
when  he  built  without  license  or 
not  the  lessees  had  no  remedy 
against  the  latter  in  any  event, 
and  could  maintain  an  action 
against  the  former  only  by  show- 
ing a  breach  of  some  special  con- 
tract in  reference  to  the  lights. 

•*i  Keating  v.  Springer,  146  111. 
481,  493,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  805,  37 
Am.  St.  Rep.  175,  22  L.  R.  A.  544; 
Myers  v.  Gemmell,  10  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  537,  545;  Palmer  v.  Wetmore, 
2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  316,  2  Woodf. 
Landlord  &  Ten.,  p.  703,  note. 

^ui  Milliard  v.  Gas  Coal  Co..  41 
Ohio  St.  662,  667;  Brooks  v.  Reyn- 
olds, 106  Mass.  31;  Hazlett  v.  Pow- 
ell, 30  Pa.  St.  293. 


412  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

common  entrance  to  all,  and  separate  apartments  are  then  let  out 
to  different  tenants,  the  owner  may  conclusively  be  considered 
to  have  dedicated  that  open  space,  like  a  yard,  for  the  benefit  of 
his  tenants.*^ 

§  277.  The  right  of  a  tenant  to  use  outside  walls.  One  who 
leases  business  property  takes  by  implication  in  the  absence  of 
an  express  reservation  in  the  lease  the  rig-ht  to  use  the  outside 
wall  or  walls  for  placing  his  signs  or  other  advertising  matter 
thereon,*^  unless  it  appears  that  the  walls  of  the  portion  of  the 
premises  leased,  were  already  occupied  by  signs  to  such  an  extent 
as  to  be  notice  to  the  tenant,  that  his  advertising  privilege  was  to 
be  restricted.**  This  right  passes  as  an  incident  of  the  leasing 
being  necessary  to  the  full  and  proper  enjojonent  of  the  demised 
premises.  Hence  as  against  the  tenant  in  possession  the  landlord 
cannot  lease  the  right  to  use  the  outside  walls  to  a  third  per- 
son,*^ and  if  he  shall  attempt  to  do  so,  the  third  person  may  be 
enjoined  from  placing  signs  or  notices  thereon  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  tenant.*^  The  tenant  however  has  no  right  to  use  for 
any  purpose  any  portion  of  the  outside  wall  not  enclosing  his 
part  of  the  premises.  The  tenant  of  a  store  on  the  ground  floor 
cannot  interfere  vdth  the  landlord  who  lets  the  wall  of  an  upper 
story  to  another.*^  The  question  of  the  right  to  use  an  outside 
wall  as  space  for  signs  and  advertisements  may  arise  and  cause 
some  difficulty  where  several  tenants  occupy  separate  premises 
on  the  same  floor.    A  provision  in  a  lease  to  the  effect  that  "the 

*2  Myers  v.   Gemmell,   10   Barb.  (N.  Y.)   3.o5.     A  lessee  of  the  first 

(N.  Y.)   537,  p.  546,  citing  Story  story  and  basement  of  a  building 

T.   Odini,   12   Mass.   157,   in   which  will  be  protected  against  his  les- 

case  houses  facing  on  three  sides  sor   by    an    injunction,   where    he 

of  a  court  were  sold.  has  painted  on  the  outer  wall  of 

43  Riddle  V.  Littlefield,  53  N.  H.  his  story,  in  good  style,  certain 
.o03,  16  Am.  Rep.  388;  Baldwin  v.  pictures,  signs,  and  devices,  suita- 
Morgan,  43  Hun  (N.  Y.)  355;  Law  ble  and  proper  for  advertising  his 
V.  Haley,  9  Ohio  Dec.  785,  17  business,  where  the  signs  do  not 
Wkly.  Law  Bui.  242;  Carlisle  Cafe  extend  bejond  the  premises  leased 
Co.  V.  Muse,  67  L.  J.  Ch.  53,  77  to  him,  and  the  lease  corutains  no 
L.  T.  (N.  S.)  515.  restriction  upon  putting  signs  on 

44  Scott  V.  Fox  Optical  Co.,  3S  the  front  of  the  building.  Bald- 
Pitts.  L.  J.  368.  But  see  Hele  v.  win  v.  Morgan,  43  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
Stewart,   19  W.  N.  C.    (Pa.)    120.  355. 

45  Lowell  V.  Strahan,  145  Mass.  47  Booth  v.  Gaither,  58  111.  App. 
1,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  401.  203.     And  may  be  restrained  from 

4»  Baldwin   v.    Morgan,    43    Hun       doing  so  by  an  injunction. 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE. 


413 


lessee  may  have  the  right  to  place  signs  upon  the  outer  walls" 
does  not  where  there  are  several  tenants  give  him  an  exclusive 
right  to  do  so  but  is  to  be  construed  in  reference  to  the  condition 
of  the  premises  at  the  time  it  was  written  especially  as  affected 
by  licenses  to  older  tenants.*^  But  where  a  building  is  let  out  in 
floors  to  separate  lessees  each  one  has  the  exclusive  right  to  place 
signs  upon  the  outer  wall  so  far  as  it  forms  an  enclosure  to  his 
premises."     The  right  of  a  tenant  in  a  large  business  building 


*i  Pevey   t.    Skinner,    116    Mass. 
129. 

■»9  Lowell  V.  Strahan,  145  Mass. 
1,  12  N.  R  Rep.  401,  1  Am.  St. 
Rep.  422;  Riddle  v.  Littlefield,  .53 
N.  H.  503,  16  Am.  Rep.  388; 
Law  V.  Haley,  9  Ohio  Dec.  785,  17 
Wkly.  Law  Bui.  242;  see,  also, 
Snyder  v.  Hersberg,  33  Leg.  Int. 
158.  A  tenant  will  not  be  en- 
joined pending  an  action,  by  his 
landlord  to  compel  him  to  remove 
a  sign  on  his  premises,  where  the 
sign  is  not  forbidden  by  the  lease, 
and  it  does  not  appear  that  it 
caused  irreparable  injury  to  the 
landlord.  Stim  v.  Nash,  19  Civ. 
Pro.  R.  (N.  Y.)  184,  12  N.  Y.  Supp. 
431.  Now,  it  will  hardly  be  con- 
tended that  the  outside  wall  of  a 
store  or  house  is  not  essential 
for  the  reasonable  and  proper  en- 
joyment of  the  interior  of  the 
building.  The  outer  side  of  tjie 
wall  is  but  one  side  of  the  same 
wall  that  has  an  inner  side;  the 
removal  of  the  wall  removes  both 
sides.  If,  then,  a  lessee  or 
grantee  may  have  the  wall  which 
he  pays  for,  it  would  seem  that 
he  should  be  entitled  to  the  use 
of  it.  Not  only  for  purposes  in^ 
dispensable  to  the  occupation  of 
the  building,  but  also  for  any  pur- 
pose of  service  or  profit  not  in- 
consistent with  the  lawful  and 
reasonable  enjoyment  of  the  prop- 
erty.    If  he  uses  the  tenement  for 


a  store,  he  would  ordinarily  be 
entitled  to  affix  his  signs  to  the 
outer  wall;  an  awning  also  if 
such  appendage  should  be  deemed 
necessary  or  convenient.  He  may 
suspend  his  wares  upon  the  build- 
ing if  no  one  is  inconvenienced 
thereby  and  he  may  cover  the 
outer  walls  with  his  advertise- 
ments of  the  merchandise  which 
he  keeps  for  sale  within,  if  he 
does  not  injure  the  building,  nor 
obstruct  the  public  passage,  nor 
offend  the  public  eye  and  taste  by 
unseemly  exhibitions  or  otherwise 
violate  the  laws.  And  if  he  may 
thus  incumber  and  cover  the  ex- 
terior walls  of  his  store,  clearly 
his  lessor  cannot  do  the  same 
thing  at  the  same  time.  The  oc- 
cupation by  both  parties  to  the 
lease  for  incongruous  purposes  is 
impossible.  If  the  premises  are 
leased  for  a  clothing  store,  for  ex- 
ample, the  lessor  cannot  use  for  a 
bulletin  board  the  space  which  the 
lessee  may  reasonably,  properly, 
conveniently  and  profitably  oc- 
cupy with  the  ready-made  gar- 
ments which  he  thereby  suspends 
for  exhibition  and  sale.  *  *  * 
The  lessee  who  affixes  his  signs 
and  advertisements  upon  the 
wall,  or  thereupon  suspends  his 
wares,  does  so  in  order  to  attract 
custom,  and  thereby  increase  the 
profit  derived  from  the  use  of  the 
demised  premises.  The  outer  wall 


41-1  LAW  OF  LANDL(3RD  AND  TENANT. 

which  is  rented  to  many  tenants  carrying-  on  various  trades  or 
avocations,  to  have  his  sign  stating  his  name  and  the  nature  of 
his  business  displayed  in  a  prominent  place  at  the  entrance  from 
the  street  is  an  important  one.  The  matter  is  usually  regulated 
either  by  the  terms  of  the  lease  or  by  regulations  made  by  the 
landlord  for  the  management  of  the  property  to  which  the  tenant 
is  required  to  conform.  Where  the  matter  is  not  thus  expressly 
regulated  the  right  to  have  a  sign  at  the  common  entrance  to  this 
building  will  pass  as  an  appurtenance  to  the  premises  demised. 
A  tenant  cannot  however  arbitrarily  place  his  sign  in  a  particu- 
lar locality  at  the  entrance  as  against  older  tenants.  Nor  will 
equity  protect  him  from  having  his  sign  removed  to  another  place 
unless  it  shall  appear  that  he  has  exhausted  all  means  within  his 
reach  to  come  to  an  arrangement  with  the  landlord  and  the  other 
tenants.'^"  But  a  tenant  of  the  upper  floors  of  a  building  to 
whom  has  been  given  the  privilege  of  putting  signs  on  or  near 
the  stairway  can  prevent  a  tenant  of  a  lower  floor  from  covering 
up  his  signs,  whether  by  reason  of  his  tenancy  or  by  authority 
from  the  landlord.^^  Tenants  who,  by  the  terms  of  the  lease,  are 
not  permitted  to  use  the  outside  walls  of  the  premises  for  adver- 
tising purposes  cannot  prevent  the  use  of  such  walls  by  their 

is  to  him  a  source  of  legitimate  iug  for  the  purposes  of  trade 
Ijrofit.  And  as  the  lessor  does  not  might  occupy  the  outer  walls  of 
ordinarily  prescribe  the  uses  to  the  same  building  for  displaying 
which  the  interior  of  the  store  the  advertisements  o'f  a  rival 
shall  be  devoted — provided  only  trade  but  this  result  might  very 
the  use  be  not  offensive,  improper  probably  follow,  if  the  lessee 
or  illegal  so  he  may  not,  other-  might  not  control  the  use  of  the 
wise  than  with  the  same  proviso,  e.xterior  walls.  Riddle  v.  Little- 
prescribe  the.  uses  to  which  the  field,  53  N.  H.  .503,  510. 
outer  walls  may  be  devoted  by  his  •'"'O  Knoepfel  v.  Kings  County 
lessee.  If  the  lessee  deems  it  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  66  N.  Y.  639,  48  How. 
more  advantageous  to  employ  the  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  208,  7  J.  &  S.  553. 
Avails  for  advertising  the  goods  or  and  compare  Law  v.  Haley,  17 
business  of  others  receiving  pay-  Wkly.  Law  Bui.  242,  where  a  prior 
ment  therefor,  than  to  advertise  tenant  having  appropriated  a 
or  expose  his  own  goods,  upon  the  space  for  his  sign  an  inijunclion 
wall,  it  is  none  of  the  landlord's  was  refused  a  subsequent  tenant 
business,  unless  he  has  restricted  to  prevent  him  from  continuing 
and    forbidden    such    use    of   the  to  occupy  it. 

premises,  or  inserted  in  his  lease  m  Miller      v.      Fitzgerald      Dry 

a  covenant  against  the  lotting  of  Goods  Co.,  62  Neb.   270,  86  N.  W. 

them.     It  would   be  singular   if  a  Reu.  1078. 
landlord,  who  had  leased  a  build- 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  415 

landlord  for.advortising  purposes  on  the  ground  that  the  adver- 
tisements painted  by  the  landlord  upon  the  outside  walls  offend 
their  esthetic  tastes  and  dim  the  lustre  of  the  advertising  signs  of 
the  tenants  which  they  have  caused  to  be  placed  upon  their  win- 
dows. They  mu.^t  show  some  actual  damage  and  injuiy  to  their 
business.^"  A  sign  which  has  for  some  years  been  attached  to 
premises  owned  by  the  landlord  other  than  that  demised  but  ad- 
jacent to  it,  and  which  indicated  the  locality  of  the  demised 
premises,  and  the  business  of  its  occupant,  the  lessee,  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  a  parcel  of  the  said  premises,  and  the  landlord  will 
be  enjoined  from  removing  it.'^^ 

§  278.  The  use  of  roof  for  advertising-  purposes.  The  very 
common  use  of  roofs  for  the  display  of  large  advertising  signs 
render  some  consideration  of  this  topic  necessaiy  so  far  as  it  re- 
lates to  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant.  Under  a  lease  by 
which  the  tenant  receives  the  exclusive  possession  and  control  of 
the  demised  premises  he  would  doubtless  have  the  right  to  sub- 
let the  roof  for  advertising  puipose  unless  expressly  forbidden 
to  do  so  by  a  provision  in  the  lease.  In  doing  so  he  may  be  liable 
to  his  landlord  for  any  injury  to  the  building  resulting  from  the 
erection  of  signs  on  the  roof  irrespective  of  whether  such  damage 
was  or  was  not  the  outcome  of  negligence.  He  may  be  liable  for 
his  failure  to  restore  the  premises  to  their  original  condition 
after  the  structure  placed  upon  the  roof  for  advertising  purposes 
is  removed.  The  landlord  who  retains  to  himself  the  exclusive 
control  of  the  roof,  particularly  of  premises  leased  to  several 
tenants  in  floors  may  lease  the  roof  to  a  stranger  or  ase  it  for  his 
own  advertising  purposes,  unless  forbidden  to  do  so  by  the  lease. 
His  liability  to  his  tenants  to  keep  the  roof  in  a  reasonable  state 
of  repairs  will  extend  to  and  include  any  signs  or  other  structures 
placed  on  his  roof  by  himself  or  others  with  his  permission. 

§  279.  Tenant's  right  to  show  windows.  The  display  and 
public  exhi])ition  of  goods  exposed  for  sale  in  stores  constitute  a 
very  important  part  of  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  business  prem- 
ises. "Where,  at  the  time  of  the  letting,  there  are  show  windows  in 
a  store,  they  aiv  included  as  an  appurtenance  of  the  premises,  and 
the  tenant  has  the  full  right  to  use  them  for  the  display  of  his 

•"•2  Fuller  V.  Rose,  110  Mo.  App.  ss  Francis  v.  Hayward,  52  L.  J. 

344,  85  S.  W.  Rep.  931.  Ch.   291,   22  Ch.   D.   177.  48  L.  T. 

297,  31  W.  R.  488,  47  J.  P.  517. 


416  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AJSTD  TENANT. 

goods.^*  The  extent  of  the  tenant's  right  to  make;  a  display  of 
merchandise  sold  by  him  depends  altogether  upon  the  language 
of  the  lease  and  the  facts  of  each  case.  His  rights  are  obviously 
greater  in  the  case  of  business  premises  than  in  the  case  of  a 
dwelling  house.  But  even  though  he  may  have  an  absolute  right 
to  use  show  windows  existing  in  the  premises  at  the  date  of  the 
lease  he  will  not  be  permitted  to  put  in  new  windows  for  exhibit- 
ing his  wares  without  the  consent  of  his  landlord.  Such  conduct 
on  his  part,  effecting  a  material  alteration  in  the  premises,  is 
waste  from  the  landlord's  standpoint  and  will  be  enjoined  as 
such  in  equity.  And  his  use  of  existing  show  windows  must  be 
a  proper  and  legal  use  for  if  he  shall,  by  exhibiting  anything 
therein  during  his  term,  create  a  nuisance  which  shall  tend  to  in- 
jure the  reversion  he  may  be  enjoined  by  his  landlord. 

§  280.  Easements  of  egress  and  ingress.  A  demise  of  land 
in  general  terms  without  any  express  mention  of  the  use  of  a 
right  of  access  thereto  conveys  the  right  to  use  all  ways  giving 
access  to  the  premises  which  are  appurtenant  to  the  land  or 
which  are  necessary  for  its  convenient  use  by  the  tenant.  If  the 
right  of  way  is  in  fact  appurtenant  it  has  passed  with  the  gen- 
eral demise  whether  the  word  appurtenant  is  or  is  not  used.^"^ 
"Whether  a  right  of  way  is  or  is  not  an  appurtenance  depends 
mainly  upon  the  determination  of  the  question  whether  it  has  or 
has  not  been  used  by  the  former  tenants  or  has  been  enjoyed  by 
them  in  connection  with  their  use  of  the  building  demised.  This 
is  always  a  very  material  inquiry  irrespective  of  whether  the 
word  appurtenance  is  employed  in  the  lease  or  not.  A  right  of 
way  to  the  demised  premises  not  strictly  appurtenant  will  not 
pass  under  a  clause  leasing  the  premises  "with  all  roads,  ways, 
rights  of  road,  paths,  passages,  etc.,  to  the  premises,  or  in  any 
way  appertaining"  unless  the  parties  to  the  lease  appear  to 
have  intended  to  use  these  words  in  a  sense  which  is  larger  and 
more  inclusive  than  their  ordinary  sense.^''^     The  better  practice 

•'■'4  Herpolsheimer       v.        Funke  172;    Kitchen    Bros.   Hotel   Co.   v. 

(Neb.)    95  N.  W.  Rep.  688.  Philbin,  2  Neb.   (unof.)   340,  96  N. 

B5  Skull    V.   Gleni.ster,   11   W.   R.  W.  Rep.  487;  Doyle  v.  Lord,  64  N. 

368;    Snook   &  Austin  Fur.   Co.  v.  Y.  432,  21  Am.  Dec.  629. 
Steiner,  113  Ga.  303,  43  S.  E.  Rop.  coa  Barlow  v.  Rhodes,  1  C.  &  M. 

775,    777;     Patterson    v.    Graham,  439.     See,  also,  Hinchcliffe  v.  Earl 

140    111.    531,   30   N.    E.   Rep.    460;  of  Klnnoul,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  1. 
Seidel    v.    Bloesser,    77    Mo.    App. 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LE.\SE.  417 

in  conveying  the  right  to  use  roads,  ways  or  passages  to  a  tenant 
to  whom  lands  or  buildings  are  leased  is  to  describe  the  roads  or 
ways  which  are  meant  to  be  transferred  "as  having  been  used  by 
the  former  tenants"  or  as  "having  been  enjoyed"  in  connection 
with  the  possession  of  the  premises.^®  For  a  lease  of  premises 
"together  with  all  ways  appertaining  or  that  in  any  parts  thereof 
are  used  or  enjoj^ed,"  carries  a  right  of  way,  though  it  is  not 
expressly  mentioned  in  the  lease  if  it  were  used  with  the  prem- 
ises at  the  time  the  lease  was  made."  The  absence  of  the  word 
appurtenances  is  not  material,  though  its  presence  strengthens 
the  construction.  A  lease  of  a  house  with  all  the  rights  "be- 
longing or  appertaining  or  therewith  usually  held,  used,  occu- 
pied, or  enjoyed  and  their  appurtenances"  embraced  and  con- 
veyed a  right  of  way  which  had  been  held  with  the  principal 
estate.^^  So,  where  premises  were  let  with  certain  specified 
rights  of  ingress  and  "all  other  ways  and  easements  to  the  said 
premises  belonging  and  appertaining,"  the  latter  words  were 
held  to  pass  a  right  of  way  over  the  lessor's  own  premises,  which 
he  used  for  access  to  the  premises  demised.^®  The  right  to  use 
a  certain  way  to  gain  access  to  the  demised  premises  may,  under 
certain  circumstances,  pass  to  the  lessee,  though  it  is  not  strictly 
an  appurtenant  and  though  it  has  never  been  used  or  enjoyed 
by  any  former  tenant  of  the  premises.  For  example,  where  a 
landowner   demised  a  portion  of  his  land  which  he  cuts  out  of  a 

56  Morris  v.  Edington,  3  Taunt.  The   court  said   there   is   a   great 

24,  27;   Barlow  v.  Rhodes,  1  C.  &  difference  to  be  observed  in  con- 

M.  439;   Harding  v.  Wilson,  2  B.  struing  a  grant  or  lease  with  ease- 

&  C.  96.     Under  these  words  any  ments  over  another's  land  and  one 

right  of  way  used  and  enjoyed  by  where   the   easements   are   in   the 

the  tenant  when  the  lease  was  ex-  lessor's  land.     Morris  v.  Edington, 

ecuted  would  pass.     The  rule  that  3  Taunt.  24,  31. 

no  easement  can  exist  in  land  in  57  Kooystra  v.  Lucas,  1  D.  &  R. 

which  there  is  a  unity  of  posses-  506,  5  B.  &  Aid.  830,  24  R.  R.  575; 

sion    has    an    exception    where    a  Harding  v.  Wilson,  3  D.  &  R.  287, 

lessor     having     used     convenient  2  B.  &  C.  96,  1  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B. 

ways  over  his  own  adjoining  land  238.  26  R.  R.  287;  Morris  v.  Eding- 

leases  land  with  all  ways  appur-  ton,   3   Taunt.   24,   12   R.    R.    579; 

tenant.    The  convenient  ways  used  Crisp  v.  Price,  5  Taunt.  548. 

by    him    over    his    own   land   will  ss  James  v.   Plant,  4  Ad.   &  El. 

pass  to  his  lessee  though  technic-  749. 

ally  speaking  they  are  not  appur-  59  Morris  v.  Edington,  3  Taunt, 

tenant    unless    it    be    shown    that  24,  12  R.  R.  579 
there    was    a    way    appurtenant. 


418  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

large  tract  so  that  the  demised  land  is  surrounded  by  other  land 
of  the  lessor  occupied  by  the  lessor  or  by  other  tenants,  there 
arises  by  implication  in  the  tenant  of  the  inner  portion  of  the  land 
a  right  of  way  by  implication  of  law  and  by  necessity,  over  the 
adjoining  land  owned  by  the  landlord.  But  aside  from  rights 
of  way  which  are  in  fact  appurtenant  to  the  land  demised  or 
which  arise  from  necessity,  no  easement  of  access  over  other 
lands  is  conveyed  to  a  tenant  by  a  general  demise  of  land  or  of 
a  building.  In  other  words,  rights  of  access  to  the  demised 
premises  cannot  be  claimed  by  a  tenant  merely  because  his  con- 
venience will  be  advanced  thereby,  in  the  absence  of  an  express 
grant.  Hence,  as  a  rule  the  lessee  of  land  which  is  accessible 
from  the  public  road  has  no  right  to  use  a  shorter  way  across 
other  lands  of  his  lessor  without  the  permission  of  the  lessor, 
either  express  or  implied;  and  if  this  permission  can  be  implied 
from  his  use  of  the  shorter  route  without  objection,  it  is  only  a 
parol  license  and  revocable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  lessor.®*^  So, 
also,  the  lessee  of  a  part  of  a  building  cannot  claim  a  right  of  ac- 
cess to  his  premises  through  a  portion  leased  to  another,  where 
such  access  is  not  granted  in  the  written  lease,  and  there  are 
other  means  of  access  to  the  leased  premises,  merely  because  this 
method  of  access  would  be  more  convenient  for  him.  If  the 
access  through  the  other  portion  of  the  premises  were  an  ease- 
ment whi(!h  attached  to  his  use  of  his  premises,  or  if  it  were  the 
only  means  of  access  to  the  portion  of  the  building  occupied  by 
the  tenant  before  his  term  it  might  be  claimed  by  him  as  neces- 
sarily appurtenant  to  his  premises.  The  case  is  very  different 
where  its  use  is  a  mere  convenience  to  him,  but  a  serious  injury 
to  the  rental  value  of  other  portions  of  the  house."^  The  tenant 
in  taking  a  lease  of  land,  must  inquire  and  ascertain  for  him- 
self the  means  of  access.  The  mere  silence  of  the  landlord  as 
to  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  a  road  by  which  access  to  the 
land  may  be  had,  is  not  fraud.  If  the  lessor  asserts  that  there  is 
a  road  by  which  access  to  the  premises  may  be  had,  it  is  fraud  on 
his  part  if  the  assertion  is  false.  The  lessee  Avill  not  be  justified 
in  assuming  that  there  is  an  established  road  to  the  premises,  be- 
cause there  may  be  signs  of  travel.  lie  must  look  to  it  himself, 
and,  if  he  sluill  lease  a  tract  of  land  to  which  there  is  no  access, 

80  Motes  V.  Bates,  4  Ala.  371.  "'  Ward  &  Co.  v.  Robertson,  77 

Iowa,  159,  161. 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  419 

the  lessor's  subsequent  promise  to  build  a  road  is  not  supported 
by  the  consideration  that,  witliout  the  road,  the  lessee  will  not 
be  able  to  pay  his  rent.  The  mere  fact  that  the  lessee,  relying 
upon  the  promise  of  the  lessor  to  build,  a  road,  omitted  to  do  so 
himself,  and  thereby  failed  to  get  his  crops  in  season,  is  not 
such  a  disadvantage  as  would  constitute  a  consideration  for  a 
promise  by  the  lessor.  To  have  that  effect,  it  must  appear  that 
•the  disadvantage  was  suffered  at  the  request  of  the  promisor,  ex- 
pressed or  implied.*'-  But  a  covenant  in  the  lease  by  the  lessor 
that  he  will  build  a  road  or  provide  access  where  none  exists  is 
valid  and  enforeible  by  the  tenant.  A  covenant  by  the  lessor 
that  he  "will  provide  a  suitable  right  of  way  to  get  to  and  from" 
the  premises  which  are  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  land  of  others 
than  the  lessor  is  not  a  mere  warranty  that  there  existed  a  right 
of  way  by  necessity  over  the  land  of  others.  It  is  therefore  not 
performed  by  showing  that  such  a  mode  of  access  exists  and  evi- 
dence to  that  effect  is  therefore  inadmissible.  The  covenantor 
agrees  to  do  something  for  the  lessee.  He  must  by  purchase  or 
otherwise  secure  a  right  of  way  over  the  land  of  adjacent  pro- 
prietors and  if  he  fails  to  do  this  he  is  liable  to  the  lessee  for 
what  the  latter  has  had  to  pay  to  owners  of  other  land  for  a 
suitable  right  of  way  over  it.**^ 

§  281.  Tenant's  right  to  use  of  stairways  and  halls.  A  land- 
lord who  lets  rooms,  apartments  or  offices  on  the  upper  floor  of 
a  dwelling  house  or  other  building,  covenants  by  implication, 
that  the  lessee  shall  have  a  free  and  uninterrupted  use  of  the 
stairway,  halls  and  entrances,  both  for  himself  and  his  visitors. 
The  right  of  the  lessee  under  such  circumstances  is  in  the  nature 
of  an  easement,  to  the  use  of  the  entry-way.  hall  and  stairways 
leading  to  the  floor  or  apartments  occupied  by  him.®*    Thus,  in 

C2  Handrahan     v.     O'Regan,     45  not  shown  that  the   passage  way 

Iowa,  298,  300.  had  been  in  the  exclusive  occupa- 

63  Bunker  v.   Pines,  86  Me.  138,  tion  of  A.     Dyne  v.  Nutley,  14  C. 

140,  29  Atl.  Rep.  959.     A  means  of  B.  122,  2  C.  L.  R.  81. 
access  through  the  demised  prem-  e4  Weil  v.  Munro,  3  N.  Y.  Supp. 

ises  to  other  property  of  the  les-  25;  Miller  v.  Fitzgerald  Dry  Goods 

sor,  which  had  always  been  used  Co..    62   Neb.    270,   86   N.    W.   Rep. 

by    tenants    of    such    other    prop-  1078;    Chase  v.  Hall,  41  Mo.  App. 

erty,  does  not  pass  by  a  demise  of  15;  Cowan  v.  Truefitt,  67  L.  J.  Ch. 

a   tenement   "now   of   late   in  the  695,  2  Ch.  551.  79  L.  J.  (N.  S.)  348, 

occupation    of    A,"    where    it    was  47  Wkl.  Rep.  29. 


420  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENAJSTT. 

an  English  ease,  it  was  held  that  a  tenant  who  rented  two  rooms 
on  the  second  floor,  had  an  absolute  right  to  the  use  of  the  door 
bell,  the  knocker,  a  skylight  which  lighted  the  stairway,  the  stair- 
way itself,  a  closet  in  the  hallway  and  of  all  other  conveniences 
in  the  building  necessary  to  the  proper  and  comfortable  enjoy- 
ment of  the  part  leased  by  him.^^  An  action  by  the  tenant  will 
lie  against  the  landlord  either  in  damages  for  removing  such 
conveniences  or  in  equity  for  an  injunction  to  restrain  the  land- 
lord from  interfering  with  them.*'^  So,  too,  the  tenant  of  a  lower 
floor  cannot,  either  under  his  lease  or  by  the  direction  and  au- 
thority of  the  lessor,  obstruct  the  stairways  or  halls,  or  the 
means  of  access  thereto,  so  as  to  prevent  or  impede  access  to  the 
rooms  of  a  tenant  on  an  upper  floor,^^  for  if  there  are  several 
tenants  in  the  building,  entrance  to  which  is  through  a  single 
door  and  hallway,  the  right  of  all  and  any  of  them  to  use  the 
premises  is  subject  to  the  right  of  all  the  others  to  make  an 
equal  use  of  the  common  entrance  and  no  one  of  them  has  an 
exclusive  right  to  such  use.^^  For  it  is  well  settled  that  the  right 
of  a  tenant  to  use  an  exit  or  egress  to  and  from  the  portion  of 
the  premises  occupied  by  him,  whether  for  himself,  his  visitors 
or  his  goods,  must  be  used  so  as  not  to  inconvenience  the  other 
tenants  unnecessarily.®®  The  right  to  use  closets  contiguous  to 
rooms  rented  in  an  office  building  and  the  wash  basins  therein 
and  the  elevators,  hallways,  stairs  and  entrances  to  the  building 
are  included  in  the  lease,  even  though  they  are  not  specially 
mentioned. ■'^  Nor  can  the  landlord  by  reason  of  an  express  cove- 
nant permitting  him  to  alter  or  repair  the  stairway,  so  materi- 
ally alter  its  location  that  the  access  of  the  tenant  of  the  upper 
floor  is  materially  affected.     And,  if  by  altering  the  entrance 

60  Underwood  v.  Burrows,  7  Car.  68  Misc.  Rep.  123,  77  N.  Y.  Supp. 

&  P.  26.  91.      In   Hamilton   v.   Graybill,    19 

06  Miller  v.  Fitzgerald  Dry  Goods  Misc.    Rep.    521,    43    N.    Y.    Supp. 

Co.,   62   Neb.   270,   86   N.   W.   Rep.  1079,  the  right  of  a  tenant  to  use 

1078.  a   water   closet   on   his   floor  was 

«7  Miller  v.  Fitzgerald  Dry  Goods  decided,  and  it  was  said  that  the 

Co.,   62   Neb.   270,   86  N.  W.  Rep.  existence  of  the  closet  "may  have 

1078.  been   materially   persuasive   upon 

08  Perry    v.    Skinner,    116    Mass.  the  respondent  when  he  accepted 

129.  the  lease  of  the  rooms,  and  which 

Of  Browning  V.  Dalosme,  5  N.  Y.  because     not     expressly     excluded 

Super.  Ct.  13,  195.  passed  with  the  demise,  although 

70  Hall    V.    Irwin,    78   App.    Div.  not   particularly   alluded    to." 
107,  79  N.  Y.  Supp.  614,  reversing 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  421 

and  hallway  the  landlord  gains  a  larger  hallway,  he  cannot  ob- 
struct it,  if  by  so  doing,  he  deprives  his  tenant  of  the  convenient 
access  that  he  had  beforeJ^  While  the  tenant  is  entitled  to  the 
free  use  of  all  exits  and  means  of  going  upon  the  demised  prem- 
ises which  exist  when  he  takes  the  lease,  he  may  not  be  entitled 
to  the  benefit  of  doorways  and  entrances  created  by  the  landlord 
subsequently  thereto  and  which  are  not  absolutely  necessary  to 
him  for  the  proper  enjoyment  of  the  demised  premises.  Thus, 
where  a  doonvay  was  cut  by  the  landlord  which  leads  into  the 
demised  premises  (a  saloon)  from  a  hotel  adjacent,  after  the 
lease  had  been  made  and  the  lease  contained  no  covenant  con- 
cerning the  use  of  such  doorway,  the  landlord  is  not  necessarily 
bound  to  keep  it  open  for  the  benefit  of  the  tenant  and  its  use 
by  the  tenant,  when  permitted  by  the  landlord,  may  be  revoked 
by  him  at  any  time.'-  Thus,  to  sum  up,  the  rule  is  that  the  ten- 
ant is  entitled  to  access  to  his  premises  and  if  he  has  this,  he 
cannot  extend  it  beyond  what  he  had  when  he  entered  into  pos- 
session. Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  has  the  landlord  a  right  to 
curtail  the  means  of  access  which  existed  when  the  term  began. 
One  who  rents  a  lower  floor  knowing  that  the  upper  stories  are 
to  be  used  for  purposes  which  render  the  use  of  a  stairs  and  ele- 
vator necessary,  takes  his  apartments  subject  to  the  right  of  the 
tenant  upstairs  to  use  the  stairway  and  elevator  and  to  have  ac- 
cess to  the  same  through  a  hall  on  the  lower  floor.'^  As  between 
the  tenants  of  upper  and  lower  floors  it  is  obviously  out  of  the  na- 
ture of  things  that  the  latter  must  in  very  many  cases  submit  to 
inconvenience  in  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  his  premises  in  order 
that  the  foi-mer  may  have  proper  and  convenient  access  to  his 
premises.  This  should  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  and  while  the 
tenant  of  the  upper  floor  must  use  the  means  of  access  on  the 
the  lower  floor  so  as  to  inconvenience  the  lower  tenant  as  little 
as  possible,  the  latter  must  not  obstrux3t  such  means  of  access. 
As  against  his  landlord  a  tenant  has  an  absolute  right  to  access 
where  the  only  means  of  access  to  the  second  story  of  the  build- 

71  Lindblom     v.     Berkman,     43  or  hallway  gives  him  no  right  to 

Wash.  356,  86  Pac.  Rep.  567.     The  impede  it. 

stairway  being  the  only  means  of  •-  Shaft  v.  Carey,  107  Wis.  273, 

egress   passed   to    the   tenants   of  83  N.  W.  Rep.  288. 
the   upper    floors   as    an    appurte-  73  Benedict  v.   Barling,   79  Wis. 

nance.    The  fact  that  the  landlord  551,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  670. 
increases  the  size  of  the  stairway 


422  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AXD  TENANT. 

ing  was  a  temporary  stairway  which  was  partially  bnilt  over  a 
stranger's  property.  The  tenant  on  the  removal  of  this  stairway 
has  a  right  to  construct  another  on  the  premises  of  the  land- 
lord, though  by  doing  so  he  may  injure  the  occupant  of  a  lower 
story.  On  the  other  hand,  the  landlord  under  such  circum- 
stances is  entitled  to  have  his  convenience  and  interest  taken  into 
account  in  the  selection  of  the  mode  of  constructing  the  new 
stairAvay,  and  the  place  where  it  shall  be  put.'^*  Generally  an 
express  stipulation  for  access  to  an  upper  floor  will  be  construed 
liberally  in  favor  of  the  tenant.  A  provision  in  a  lease  of  upper 
rooms  in  two  adjoining  houses  that  the  tenant  shall  have  free 
and  unobstructed  use  of  a  stairway  in  one  of  them  will  permit 
him  to  use  a  stairway  in  the  other  house,  which  is  the  only  means 
of  access  to  both  his  apartments."'^  The  tenant's  use  of  the  stairs 
and  entryways  must  be  reasonable.  He  can  use  them  for  exit 
and  egress  not  only  for  himself  and  family,  but  for  his  guests 
and  business  callers.  He  cannot  use  them  for  storage  purposes 
nor  as  a  loitering  place  to  indulge  in  social  intercourse.  The 
right  of  a  tenant  to  the  use  of  a  hallway  or  alley  to  gain  admit- 
tance to  the  premises  for  ordinai'y  housekeeping  purposes,  does 
not  permit  him  to  use  the  same  as  an  entrance  to  a  gymnasium 
connected  with  a  boys'  school.  Nor  can  he  use  the  common 
means  of  access  to  his  apartments  and  that  of  others  in  such  a 
way  as  to  be  objectionable  to  other  tenants  without  their  con- 

'*  Chase  v.  Hall,  41  Mo.  App.  15.  ate  easements  in  favor  of  a  ten- 
The  lease  of  rooms  in  an  upper  ant,  and  in  case  of  necessity  an 
floor  includes  as  an  incident  easement  may  be  implied.  Neithisr 
everything  necessarily  used  with  the  landlord  nor  any  other  ten- 
or reasonably  necessary  to  the  use  ant  either  by  virtue  of  the  ten- 
thereof.  If  there  is  no  access  to  ancy  or  by  authority  of  the  land- 
the  upper  rooms  except  through  lord  has  any  right  to  obstruct  the 
the  entryway  and  stairway  an  entry  or  passageway  so  as  to  im- 
easement  In  the  same  for  the  ten-  pede  access  to  rooms  occupied  by 
ant  and  for  his  customers  and  other  tenants  and  any  obstructions 
visitors  will  be  clearly  presumed  are  nuisances  and  may  be  re- 
from  the  circumstances  and  from  moved.  Miller  v.  Fitz  Gerald  Dry 
the  obvious  intent  of  the  landlord  Goods  Co.,  62  Neb.  270,  272,  86  N. 
in   constructing  the  building   and  W.  Rep.  1078. 

leasing  it  in  the  way  he  did.     A  fr  Cowen  v.  Truefitt,  67  L.  J.  Ch. 

tenant  may   not  acquire  an   ease-  095;    (1898)    2   Ch.    551,    79  L.   T. 

ment  by   prescription   against  his  348,  47  W.  R.  29. 
landlord.    But  a  landlord  may  ere- 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  423 

sent.''®  The  landlord's  implied  oblifration  to  furnish  means  of 
access  is  confined  to  the  ordinary  means  as  afforded  by  stairs, 
hallways  and  doors  suited  to  the  ordinary  demands  of  modern 
life.  The  landlord  is  under  no  implied  obligation  to  the  tenant 
to  furnish  him  fire-escapes  even  where  the  duty  is  imposed 
upon  him  specifically  by  statutory  regulation.  The  owner  of  a 
theatre  is  not  bound  to  the  lessee  thereof,  to  provide  it  with  addi- 
tional exits  for  use  in  case  of  fire  as  required  by  statute  where 
he  has  only  covenanted  to  keep  the  premises  in  ordinary  repair 
or  to  maintain  the  property  in  a  suitable  condition  for  use.  His 
failure  to  do  so  when  requested  by  the  tenant  is  not  a  breach  of 
a  covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment. ^^  The  owner  of  a  building  let 
out  in  separate  offices  or  lofts  for  business  purposes  is  by  im- 
plication bound  to  afford  means  of  access  to  and  from  the  sev- 
eral apartments  or  offices  at  all  reasonable  times  and  under  all 
reasonable  eircumsatnces.  He  would,  for  example,  be  bound  to 
keep  the  front  door  of  the  building  unlocked  during  the  hours 
that  the  several  offices  or  lofts  would  be  in  use  according  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  tenant's  occupation.  If  he  knew  that  a 
tenant  hired  offices  with  an  intent  to  use  them  daring  the  night 
as  well  as  during  the  day,  he  would  be  under  the  necessity  of 
affording  him  access  after  dark.  But  in  the  case  of  a  building, 
the  offices  in  which  are  let  mainly  to  lawyers,  the  landlord  is 
under  no  implied  obligation  to  keep  the  front  door  open  and  un- 
locked during  the  night  or  upon  a  Sunday  or  a  holiday  Avhich  is 
dies  iion  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement  by  him  to  that  effect. 
His  failure  to  do  this  does  not  render  him  liable  to  a  tenant  for 
damage  caused  to  the  property  of  his  tenant  by  reason  of  an 
unusual  and  unprecedented  fire  which  took  place  upon  a  Sunday, 
because  the  tenant  was  not  able  to  remove  his  personal  property 
through  the  front  door  A\hich  was  closed  and  locked.''* 

"c  Gooch  V.  Furman,  62  111.  App.  used  they  greatly  obstruct  access 

340.  to    the    premises    on    the    upper 

77  Taylor  v.  Finnigan,  189  Mass.  floors   occupied   by  other   tenants. 

568,    573.    76   N.   E.    Rep.    203.     A  The  tenant  on  the  first  floor  must 

lease  of  the  first  story,  basement  not,    however,    use    or    keep    the 

and     cellar     "with     the     appurte-  hatchway  open  unnecessarily,  but 

nances"  give  a  lessee  the  right  to  must    use    it   only    in    good    faith 

use  a  hatchway,  tackle  and  fall  to  to    let    down    or    hoist    up    goods, 

deposit  his  goods  in  the  cellar  or  Browning  v.  Delasme,  5  N.  Y.  Su- 

to  hoist  them  to  the  second  fioor,  per.  Ct.  13,  IS. 

though  while  they  are  being  thus  7s  Whitcomb  v.  Mason,   102  Md. 


424  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  282.  The  right  to  use  an  elevator.  Growing  out  of  the 
proposition  that  where  a  tenant  hires  a  room  or  a  floor  in  a 
building  the  right  to  use  all  apparent  means  of  access  and  exit 
passes  to  him  as  an  appurtenant,  it  may  safely  be  said  that  in 
some  cases  an  absolute  right  to  the  use  of  an  elevator  would  be 
implied  in  favor  of  a  tenant.  It  is  obvious  that  in  modern  build- 
ings of  very  great  height  which  are  leased  in  separate  apart- 
ments or  offices  to  separate  tenants,  the  use  of  the  stairway  and 
halls  affords  a  very  insufficient  and  inadequate  means  of  access. 
In  such  buildings,  as  is  well  known,  elevators  for  freight  and 
passengers  are  usually  installed.  If,  at  the  time  of  the  hiring 
it  should  happen  that  there  is  no  elevator  in  the  building,  and 
the  tenant  hires  knowing  this  fact,  it  may  well  be  doubted,  in 
the  absence  of  an  express  agreement,  whether  the  landlord  owes 
any  duties  to  the  tenant  to  install  an  elevator  for  his  use.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  location  of  the  premises  which  have  been 
hired  is  such  that  access  by  way  of  the  stairway  is  extremely  in- 
convenient and  particularly  if  it  were  the  custom  in  the  city 
where  the  building  is  located  to  have  elevators  in  buildings  of 
the  character  in  question,  an  agreement  might  be  implied  on  the 

275,  62  Atl.  Rep.  749.  "The  rea-  building  on  Sunday  as  shown  by 
sonable  use  of  the  outer  doors,  the  evidence,  through  the  open 
halls  and  stairways  of  such  a  door  and  hallway  on  the  ground 
building  so  located  so  far  at  least  floor,  which  connected  with  the 
as  related  to  the  lawyers'  oflfices  stairway,  was  in  our  opinion  rea- 
required  that  they  should  be  kept  sonable  and  adequate  for  all  ordi- 
open  and  free  from  improper  ob-  nary  occasions.  As  illustrating 
struction  during  such  hours  of  the  the  principles  of  the  text  it  may 
day  and  evening  as  the  tenants  be  well  to  cite  certain  cases  where 
and  persons  having  business  with  the  use  of  halls  and  stairways  was 
them  might  reasonably  be  expected  involved  as  between  owners  and 
to  desire  access  to  the  offices.  But  not  as  between  landlord  and  ten- 
such  use  did  not  require  that  the  ant.  Thus,  we  have  the  case  of 
doors,  halls,  etc.,  should  be  kept  one  building  being  erected  on  sev- 
in  that  condition  throughout  the  eral  lots,  each  of  which  lots  are 
entire  night,  nor  on  Sunday,  owned  by  separate  owners,  with 
which  is  dies  non  when  secular  one  stairway  giving  access  to  the 
avocations  are  presumed  to  be  building.  In  such  cases  each 
suspended.  It  certainly  did  not  ov/ner  would  have  the  right  to  use 
require  the  outer  doors  to  be  Jvcpt  the  stairway  and  hall  in  common 
open  on  Sunday  to  such  an  extent  which  were  passed  by  the  convey- 
as  to  admit  of  the  removal  by  the  anc^  of  his  lease."  Pierce  v.  Cle- 
tenants  of  large  pieces  of  furni-  land,  133  Pa.  St.  189,  19  Atl.  Rep. 
ture.     The  access  afforded   to  the  352. 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LE.VJSE.  425 

part  of  the  landlord  to  install  one.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  is  an  elevator  in  active  operation  when  the  office  in  the 
building  is  leased,  it  will  unquestionably  be  implied  that  the 
landlord  agrees  to  maintain  it  and  to  permit  it  to  be  used,  if  its 
use  is  reasonable  and  necessary  for  the  beneficial  occupancy  of 
the  rooms  which  have  been  let,  and  if  from  the  construction  of 
the  elevator  and  of  the  passageways  in  the  building,  it  was  ap- 
parent that  the  elevator  was  intended  for  the  general  use  of  the 
tenants.  But,  where  the  elevator  is  not  intended  to  be  used,  by 
the  occupants  of  any  particular  part  of  the  building,  the  mere 
fact  that  it  might  be  convenient  for  them  to  use  it  does  not  imply 
any  easement  in  its  use  where  suitable  means  of  access  were  fur- 
nished by  the  halls,  passageways  or  doors.  "Where  a  person  be- 
came the  tenant  of  a  basement  which  was  entered  from  the  street 
by  doors  and  steps  in  front  of  the  building  and  which  was  sep- 
arated from  the  elevator  by  a  solid  brick  partition  so  that  there 
was  at  no  time  access  to  the  elevator  from  the  basement,  the  ten- 
ant is  not  entitled  to  use  the  elevator  for  hoisting  goods  from  the 
basement  to  the  sidewalk  and  lowering  them  from  the  sidewalk 
to  the  basement.  The  fact  that  while  the  tenant  occupied  rooms 
on  an  upper  floor  of  the  building  in  addition  to  occupying  the 
basement,  the  landlord  stipulated  in  the  lease  that  he  might  use 
the  elevator  to  convey  his  goods  to  the  basement  from  the  upper 
floor  gives  him  no  right  to  use  the  elevator  after  he  has  ceased 
to  occupy  the  upper  floor.'^^ 

T9  Cummings  v.  Perry,  169  Mass.  ants  to  use  it,  we  assume,  may  be 
150,  38  L.  R.  A.  149,  47  N.  E.  Rep.  implied  if  this  is  reasonably  nec- 
618,  in  which  the  court  by  Field,  essary  for  the  beneficial  occupa- 
C.  J.,  says:  "It  is  true  that,  when  tion  of  the  rooms  let,  and  if  from 
a  person  hires  a  room  in  a  build-  the  construction  of  the  elevator, 
ing,  a  right  to  use  the  apparent  and  of  the  passageways  it  is  ap- 
means  of  access  and  exit  often  parent  that  the  elevator  was  in- 
passes  as  appurtenent  to  the  prem-  tended  for  the  use  of  the  tenants, 
ises  hired.  In  modern  buildings  But  in  this  case  it  is  apparent  that 
of  great  height  this  doctrine  we  the  elevator  was  not  intended 
assume  may  be  applied  to  eleva-  originally  to  be  used  by  the  occu- 
tors.  Whether  an  active  duty  to  pants  of  the  basement  room,  that 
maintain  an  elevator  for  the  use  although  it  might  have  been  con- 
of  tenants  can  be  implied  may  be  venient  for  them  to  use  it  in  con- 
open  to  question,  but  if  an  ele-  nection  with  the  sidewalk,  yet 
vator  is  in  fact  maintained  by  the  suitable  means  of  ingress  and 
landlord,  the  duty  to  permit  ten-  egress  had  been  furnished  by  the 


426  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  283.  Electric  light  as  an  appurtenant.  Under  the  rule  that 
whatever  is  neeessar^^  or  essential  to  the  proper  enjoyment  of 
the  term  granted  to  the  tenant  may  be  regarded  as  and  will  pass 
as  an  appurtenant,  a  landlord,  who  during  the  term,  has  fur- 
nished electric  lighting  for  rooms  in  the  building  leased  by  him 
may  be  compelled  to  continue  to  do  so.  Undoubtedly  he  would  be 
compelled  to  do  this  upon  an  express  contract  to  furnish  the  light 
where  he  or  his  agent  in  leasing  the  rooms  had  informed  the  les- 
see, expressly  or  by  implication  that  the  supplying  of  electricity 
for  illumination  was  an  appurtenance  of  the  premises  and  would 
be  included  in  the  lease  as  such,  and  the  incoming  lessee  made 
the  lease  in  reliance  upon  such  statement.  The  tenant's  case 
would  be  greatly  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  the  character 
of  the  business  of  the  lessee  was  known  to  the  lessor  or  to  his  agent 
to  be  such  that  electric  lighting  was  indispensable.  For,  if  the 
incoming  tenant  is  lead  to  expect  the  electric  lighting  of  his 
rooms  at  the  cost  of  the  landlord,  it  may  fairly  be  assumed  that 
the  latter  is  to  be  compensated  for  it  by  a  larger  rent  than  he 
would  otherwise  receive.  The  tenant  has  a  right  to  this  species 
of  illumination  of  which  he  cannot  be  deprived  by  the  substitu- 
tion of  an  inferior  lighting  method.  Such  deprivation  might 
under  some  circumstances  amount  to  an  eviction  though  not 
necessarily  an  eviction  under  other  circumstances.^**  And  these 
rules  which  are  applicable  to  the  gas  or  electric  lighting  may 
apply  with  equal  cogency  to  other  and  similar  modern  improve- 
ments such  as  steam  heating  and  the  like  which,  in  accordance 
with  the  present  method  of  living,  in  flats  and  apartments,  are 
regarded  as  indispensable  to  a  complete  and  adequate  enjoy- 
ment   of  them  by  those  who  occupy  them  as  lessees. 

§  284.  Easement  of  w^ater  supply.    As  a  general  rule  it  may 

be  said  that  it  is  not  the  duty  of  the  landlord  to  furnish  water 

for  the  tenant  to  be  used  for  drinking  or  cleaning  purposes  un- 

'  less  he  has  expressly  or  by  implication  agreed  to  clo  so.    Nor  is 

he  under  any  obliiration  to  supply  pipes  or  faucets  for  the  dis- 

steps    and    door.s    from    the    base-  room;    and   the  way  through  the 

ment   room   into  the  street;    that  engine  and  boiler  room  was  not  a 

at  no  time  was  there  any  access  common  passage  way." 

from    the    elevator    directly    from  «p  Parish  v.  Vance,  110  111.  App. 

the  basement  room;    that  the  ele-  50,  55 

vator  did  not  adjoin  the  basement 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  427 

tribntion  of  water  unless  by  agreement,  express  or  implied.*^ 
This  general  rule  must  be  qualified  by  the  circumstances  of  some 
cases.  Thus  if  at  the  date  of  the  execution  of  the  lease  the 
premises  are  supplied  with  water  by  a  system  of  pipes  and  fau- 
cets which  has  either  been  installed  therein  by  the  landlord  him.- 
self,  or  by  his  predecessor  in  interest,  and  if  prior  to  the  date  of 
the  lease  the  landlord  has  paid  the  water  rates  and  taxes  for 
the  premises,  the  water  together  with  the  means  by  which  it  is 
distributed  throughout  the  building  and  utilized  by  the  tenants 
will  pass  as  an  appurtenance,  being  an  incident  of  the  building 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  landlord  and  essential  to  its  convenient 
enjoyment  and  use  by  the  tenant.  Under  such  circumstances, 
nothing  short  of  an  express  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  tenant 
to  furnish  water  and  the  apparatus  for  its  distribution  at  his 
own  expense  would  justify  the  landlord  in  discontinuing  to  pay 
the  water  rates  or  in  removing  the  apparatus  for  its  supply  and 
distribution.  But  the  rule  of  caveat  emptor  as  applied  to  ten- 
ants may  be  invoked  in  the  case  of  the  quality  or  quantity  of 
water  which  is  supplied.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  tenant  of  a 
dwelling  or  slore  to  ascertain  the  condition  and  quantity  of 
water  supplied  and  the  condition  of  the  pipes  by  which  it  is 
supplied  to  the  house  and  distributed  through  it.  If  he  fails  to 
do  this  at  the  date  of  the  lease,  he  cannot  hold  the  landlord  re- 
sponsible for  a  deficiency  in  the  quality  or  quantity  of  the  water 
and  refuse  to  pay  rent  because  he  cannot  procure  water  on  the 
premises  except  in  the  case  of  material  misrepresentation  by 
the  latter.*-  In  regard  to  the  water  supply,  a  tenant  is  not 
justified  in  removing  from  the  premises  and  refusing  to  pay 
rent  for  the  reason  that  the  water  gives  out  or  has  become 
unfit  for  use  where  it  appeared  that  he  had  examined  the  water 
supply  before  making  the  lease,  going  over  the  property  in  com- 
pany with  one  of  the  lessors  and  then  knew  that  the  premises 
were  supplied  vnih  water  by  a  cistern  only,  the  supply  depend- 
ing wholly  upon  the  rainfall,  that  the  lessor  had  only  recently 
acquired  the  ownership  and  that  what  he  said  to  the  lessee  about 
the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  water  was  merely  a  repetition 

81  Sheldon  v.  Hamilton,  22  R.  I.  S2  Lewis   v.    Clark.    S6   Md.    327, 

2S0,  233,  47  Atl.  Rep.  316;   White-       330,  37  Atl.  Rep.  1035. 
head  v.  Comstock  &  Co.,  25  R.  I. 
423,  427,  56  Atl.  Rep.  446,  448. 


428 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


of  what  a  former  owner  had  told  him  and  that  the  lessee  knew 
this  when  he  executed  the  lease. ^^  In  modem  times  the  presence 
of  apparatus  and  i^ipes  for  the  supply  of  water  together  in  build- 
ings in  towns  and  cities  by  which  the  tenants  occupying  such 
buildings  are  supplied  with  water  for  drinking  and  washing  pur- 
poses is  so  well  nigh  universal  that  ordinarily  such  a  supply  of 
water  with  the  apparatus  and  pipes  would  be  considered  an  ap- 
purtenance in  case  the  demised  premises  were  in  the  city.  A 
very  different  rule  would  obtain  where  the  premises  were  in  a 
small  village  or  were  a  farm.  If  running  water  is  an  absolute 
necessity  for  the  tenant  to  have  in  order  that  he  may  use  the 
premises,  a  right  to  use  the  running  water  which  is  in  the  prem- 
ises will  pass  as  an  appurtenance  to  the  premises.  The  character 
of  the  prior  use  of  the  building  is  always  material.  Thus,  a 
lease  of  a  factory  which  at  the  date  of  the  lease  contained  mach- 
inery operated  by  water  power  by  implication  conveys  the  right 
to  use  water  which  is  under  the  control  of  the  lessor.®*  The 
designation  in  the  lease  of  the  pui-pose  for  which  the  demised 
premises  is  to  be  used  is  also  material.     If  the  future  use  of  the 


83  It  is  not  the  duty  of  a  land- 
lord to  furnish  water  for  the  use 
of  a  tenant  unless  he  has  agreed 
to  do  so.  The  pipes  and  fixtures 
are  appurtenances  of  the  house,  as 
gas  pipes  and  fixtures  in  place  at 
the  time  of  the  letting  are,  and 
the  use  of  them  necessarily  passes 
"With  the  tenement.  But  the  water, 
like  gas,  is  a  commodity,  and  in  no 
way  attached  to  the  realty  not 
the  property  of  the  landlord,  but 
to  be  furnished  for  a  price  by  a 
third  party.  It  was  not  the  duty 
of  the  landlord  to  keep  the  pipes 
in  repair  even  (McKeon  v.  Cutler, 
156  Mass.  296),  much  less  to  keep 
them  filled  with  water.  An  agree- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  landlord 
to  pay  water  bills  or  gas  bills  may 
be  implied  from  circumstances, 
but  the  fact  alone  that  the  house 
is  provided  with  pipes  and  fixtures 
is  not  sufficient.  McCarthy  v. 
Humphrey,  105  Iowa,  535.     By  the 


court  in  Sheldon  v.  Hamilton,  22 
R.  I.  230,  233,  also  holding  that 
an  implied  obligation  on  the  part 
of  the  landlord  to  pay  for  water 
used  by  his  tenant  might  arise 
from  a  general  custom  which  the 
law  would  attach  to  the  lease  but 
the  custom  would  have  to  be  uni- 
versal and  reasonable.  In  the  ju- 
risdiction where  this  case  was  de- 
cided water  was  supplied  to  be 
paid  for  either  by  meter  measure- 
ment by  the  cubic  foot  or  at  a 
fixed  sum  for  each  faucet,  bath 
tub,  etc.  In  the  latter  case  the 
landlord  knows  in  advance  what 
he  will  have  to  pay  and  the  infer- 
ence that  he  has  agreed  to  pay 
it  and  has  charged  it  in  the  rent 
is  stronger  than  where  the  amount 
is  unknown  and  may  by  the  ten- 
ants waste  be  very  great  if  it  is 
to  be  paid  according  to  a  meter." 
84  Wyman  v.  Farrar,  35  Me.  64. 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INa.UDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  429 

building  by  the  tenant  requires  the  supply  of  running  water,  the 
right  to  have  the  water  kept  running  by  the  landlord  will  pass 
as  an  appurtenance  without  express  words.  So  a  lease  of  a  por- 
tion of  a  building  "to  be  used  as  a  bakery"  includes  the  right 
to  water  as  belonging  and  necessary  to  enable  the  lessee  to  carry 
on  the  business  of  a  baker.^^  One  of  several  tenants  to  whom  a 
building  is  let  in  separate  apartments  may  not  use  water  run- 
ning in  the  apartment  of  another  tenant  unless  by  an  express 
agreement  of  the  landlord  and  the  consent  of  the  tenant  he  is  al- 
lowed to  do  so.  The  entrv'  of  one  tenant  into  the  apartment  of 
another  without  the  consent  of  the  latter,  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
curing water  is  a  trespass  and  intrusion  which  the  law  does  not 
countenance.  "Where  a  building  is  let  in  separate  apartments 
to  several  tenants,  each  of  them  has  the  absolute  right  as  an  ap- 
purtenance to  that  portion  which  is  demised  to  him  to  use  the 
toilet  and  running  water  in  a  portion  of  the  building  which  is 
Tinder  the  exclusive  control  of  the  landlord.  It  does  not  matter 
whether  the  right  to  the  use  of  water  is  conferred  by  an  express 
provision  of  the  lease  or  not.  If,  when  the  lease  of  the  separate 
apartment  is  made,  the  tenants  of  the  building  have  a  right  to 
use  the  water  and  the  toilet  which  is  located  in  a  portion  of  the 
same  under  the  exclusive  control  of  none  of  them,  that  right  will 
unquestionably  pass  as  an  appurtenant.  But  the  right  of  a  ten- 
ant to  use  a  toilet  and  running  water  in  that  portion  of  a  build- 
ing which  is  not  leased  to  him  and  which  is  conferred  upon  him 
by  an  express  provision  of  the  lease,  will  be  protected  by  an  in- 
junction, and  the  landlord  will  be  restrained  from  obstructing 
the  tenant's  enjoyment  of  this  right  by  closing  a  passage  way, 
though  there  were  other  means  of  reaching  the  running  water.^® 
A  lease  of  the  ' '  north  side  "  of  a  building  ' '  consisting  of  a  store- 
room, and  five  rooms  on  second  and  third  floors  of  the  same,  to- 
gether with  access  to  the  same  through  the  hallway  and  porch," 
does  not  give  the  lessee  the  exclusive  privilege  of  using  a  bath 
room  on  the  north  side  which  was  in  common  use  by  all  ten- 
ants.®'' A  landlord  who  agrees  with  his  tenant  "to  furnish  the 
necessary  seed  rice  and  the  water  for  irrigation  of  the  rice  crop 

85  Gans    V.    Hughes,    14    N.    Y.  s-  Needy  v.  Middlekauff,  102  Md. 

Snpp.  930,  931.  181,  62  Atl.  Rep.  159. 

8R  Cooley  V.  Cummings,  16  N.  Y. 
St.  Rep.  947. 


430  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

or  SO  much  water  as  can  be  furnished  by  the  irrigation  well  on 
the  land"  is  not  absolutely  bound  to  supply  irrigation  for  the 
Avhole  crop.  His  obligation  is  measured  by  the  capacity  of  the 
well  and  if  the  well  flows  sufficiently  he  must  furnish  water  for 
the  whole  crop.  He  is  bound  to  do  what  he  has.  agreed  to  do  in 
all  respects  and  he  will  not  be  excused  for  failure  to  do  so 
though  he  may  have  used  ordinary  care  and  diligence  to  supply 
the  water. ^^ 

§  285.  The  riparian  rights  of  the  lessee.  In  treating  of  the 
rights  of  a  tenant  who  has  leased  lands  which  front  or  face  upon 
a  river,  lake  or  stream  whether  navigable  or  not,  it  will  be  im- 
possible owing  to  the  limits  of  space  and  indeed  out  of  place  in 
a  treatise  of  this  character,  to  give  any  exhaustive  or  extended 
consideration  to  the  general  law  of  waters  or  water  courses.  In 
determining  the  rights  of  a  lessee  of  riparian  lands  to  the  use 
of  the  water  or  of  the  land  under  water,  the  first  thing  to  be 
determined  is  the  character  and  extent  of  the  rights  of  his  les- 
sor in  the  waters  or  in  the  land  under  water.  As  regards  the 
ownership  of  land  under  water,  it  may  be  said  that  so  far  as 
non-navigable  streams  are  concerned,  each  riparian  proprietor 
owns  the  land  under  water  down  to  the  thread  or  center  line 
of  the  stream  in  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary.  Prima 
facie,  therefore,  a  conveyance  of  land  bounded  by  a  non-navi- 
gable stream  makes  the  grantee  the  proprietor  of  half  the  land 
covered  by  the  stream  ad  medium  filiim  aquae.  So,  a  demise  of 
land  "bounded  on  the  west  by  the  river,"  in  the  absence  of  any- 
thing to  the  contrary,  conveys  therein  to  the  lessor  one-half  of 
the  bed  of  the  soil  of  the  river  to  the  middle  of  the  stream.^^ 
The  lessee  of  riparian  land  is  clothed  with  all  the  rights  which 
were  enjoyed  by  his  lessor  in  the  land  under  water.  He  may 
erect  piers  upon  land  under  water  for  his  own  personal  use  or 
for  the  use  of  the  public  with  his  permission.  He  may  erect  a 
mill  and  employ  the  force  of  the  running  water  to  operate  and 
propel  the  machinery  in  it.  He  may  prevent  the  diversion  of 
the  water.  For  a  lessee  of  riparian  land  is  clothed  with  the 
same  rights  as  an  owner  in  possession  to  prevent  a  threatened 
diversion  of  water.""    A  lease  of  land  having  a  frontage  on  the 

«8  Duson    V.    Dodd,    101    S.    W.  «"  Dwyer  v.  Rich,  Ir.  R.  6  C.  L. 

1040.  144. 

8"  Crook  V.  Hewit,  4  Wash.  749. 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  431 

water  confers  upon  the  lessee  by  implication  the  right  to  a  free 
and  unrestricted  access  to  the  shore  from  the  water  and  to  the 
water  from  the  land,  in  the  absence  of  express  restrictions.  The 
tenant  therefore,  has  a  right  to  moor  his  boats  at  the  shore  and 
to  permit  others  to  do  so  and  to  erect  and  maintain  wharves.  It 
is  immaterial  whether  the  word  "appurtenances"  is  in  the  lease 
or  not.  So,  when  a  boat  club  leased  land  fronting  on  a  river  with 
all  the  benefits  and  privileges  thereunto  belonging,  the  action 
of  the  landlord  in  mooring  a  boat  in  front  of  the  leased  land 
is  unlawful  and  so  far  as  it  cuts  off  the  boat  club  from  using  the 
water  front  it  is  an  eviction."^  So,  a  lessee  of  water  front  prop- 
erty is  entitled  to  the  use  of  a  dock  attached  to  the  water  front 
for  a  permanent  purpose  and  connected  with  it  by  a  permanent 
staging.®-  So.  also,  a  lessee  of  riparian  land  has  the  right  to  all 
the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  stream  flowing  in  its 
natural  course  over  and  past  his  land,  and  to  use  the  stream  as 
he  pleases  for  any  purpose  of  his  own  which  is  not  inconsistent 
with  similar  rights  in  the  proprietors  or  occupants  of  riparian 
lands,  below  or  above.  This  rule  as  to  the  use  of  flowing  streams 
is  applicable  both  to  navigable  and  non-navigable  streams.  None 
of  the  proprietors  or  occupants  of  land  under  or  facing  on  water 
can  legally  diminish  the  quantity  or  injure  the  quality  of  the 
water  which  would  otherwise  naturally  descend,  nor  can  any 
proprietor  or  occupant  of  land  throw  back  the  water  without 
the  license  or  grant  of  the  proprietor  above.^^    So,  where  a  lease 

01  Pridgeon  v.  Boat  Club,  66  same  unobstructed."  See,  also, 
Mich.  326,  33  N.  W.  Rep.  502,  Hooper  v.  Farnsworth,  128  Mass. 
where  the  court  says:  "The  sub-  4S7;  Underwood  v.  Stuyvesant,  19 
ject  cannot  be  discussed,  except  in  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  181,  10  Am.  Dec. 
connection  with  the  object  and  215;  Newman  v.  Metropolitan  El. 
purpose  for  which  the  lot  was  R.  Co.,  10  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  12;  Oliver 
rented  and  occupied.  The  dis-  v.  Dickinson,  100  Mass.  114. 
turbance  of  the  lessee's  beneficial  92  Cochran  v.  Ocean  Dry  Dock 
enjoyment  of  the  water  front  of  Co.,  30  La.  Ann.  1365,  1366. 
the  premises  amounts  to  an  evic-  o?.  Merritt  v.  Brinkerhoff,  17 
tion,  actual  if  any  exists  and  not  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  306,  320;  Hetrick 
constructive.  The  right  to  enter  v.  Deutschler,  6  Pa.  St.  32;  Wood- 
up  the  land  leased  was  of  no  in-  bury  v.  Short,  17  Vt.  387;  Wallace 
terest  or  benefit  to  the  defendant,  v.  Drew,  59  Barb.  (N.  Y. )  413, 
only  as  it  furnished  a  water  front  423;  Acquackanonk  Water  Co.  v. 
upon  which  the  club  could  store  Watson,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  366;  Mason 
its  boats  and  launch  and  land  the  v.  Hill,  5  B.  &  Aid.  1,  24;   Wright 


432  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

conveyed  the  riglit  to  draw  a  certain  quantity  of  water  from  a 
canal  owned  by  the  lessor  to  the  mills  of  the  lessees,  and  con- 
t-ained  a  raservation  excepting  and  reserving  to  the  said  lessors 
the  control  of  the  water  in  the  said  river  and  in  all  mill  ponds, 
bays,  lakes  and  reservoirs  at  and  above  said  premises  with  the 
right  of  holding  back  and  retaining  and  discharging  the  water 
therefrom  at  their  pleasure,  it  was  held  that  the  lessors  could  not 
at  their  pleasure  erect  a  barrier  to  prevent  the  flow  of  water 
into  their  canal  and  in  such  way  terminate  the  lease  where  such 
course  was  not  necessary  in  their  general  control  and  manage- 
ment of  the  Avater."*  Every  tenant  or  occupant  of  riparian  land 
has  a  right  to  the  use  of  water  flowing  by  his  land  for  his  domes- 
tie  purposes  as  for  watering  his  cattle.  He  may  divert  the  stream 
for  the  purpose  of  irrigating  his  land  provided  he  does  not 
thereby  interfere  with  the  rights  of  proprietors  below  or  above 
him.*^'  So,  also,  a  tenant  may  divert  the  water  of  a.  flowing  stream 
and  he  may  by  machinery  pump  up  the  water  and  convey  it  by 
pipes  to  a  tank  or  reservoir  and  thence  into  his  bams  or  dwel- 
ling house  and  there  use  it  for  his  domestic  purposes.  Priority 
of  occupation  and  use  of  water  by  a  mill  owner  give  him  no 
right  to  make  an  unreasonable  use  of  the  water  by  which  the 
owners  above  or  below  him  will  be  deprived  of  the  beneficial  use 
of  the  water.  He  simply  acquires  the  right  to  use  the  water*  in 
its  natural  flow.  The  lessee  of  a  mill  site  has  no  greater  right 
tx)  use  the  water  than  the  lessor  would  have.®^ 

V.  Howard,  1  Sim.  &  Stu.  190,  203;  tion  or  alteration.  No  proprietor 
Acton  V.  Blundell,  12  M.  &  W.  348,  has  a  right  to  use  the  water  to 
349.  the  prejudice  of  other  proprietors 
64  Cole  V.  Lake  Ck)mpany,  54  N.  above  or  below  him,  unless  he  has 
IL  242.  a  prior  right  to  divert  it  or  a  title 
»s  Blanchard  v.  Baker,  8  Me.  2&8.  to  some  exclusive  enjoyment.  He 
86  The  elementary  and  estab-  has  no  property  in  the  water  It- 
lished  principles  of  law  relating  self,  but  a  simple  usufruct  while 
to  the  use  of  running  waters  as  it  passes  along.  Agua  currit  et 
set  out  by  Chancellor  Kent  in  his  debet  currere  ut  currere  solebat 
Commentaries,  vol.  Ill,  §  52,  are  is  the  language  of  the  law. 
as  follows:  "Every  proprietor  of  Though  he  may  use  the  water 
lands,  on  the  banks  of  a  river,  has  while  it  runs  over  his  land,  as  an 
naturally  an  equal  right  to  the  use  incident  to  the  land  he  cannot  un- 
of  the  water  which  flows  in  the  reasonably  detain  it,  or  give  it 
stream  adjacent  to  his  lands,  as  it  another  direction,  and  he  must  re- 
was  wont  to  run,  without  diniinu-  turn    it    to    its    ordinary   channel 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE. 


433 


§  286.  Right  of  the  tenant  to  accretions.  It  is  a  general  rule 
that  accretion  by  alluvion  belongs  to  the  owner  of  the  adjacent 
soil.  In  other  words,  one  who  owns  land  M^hich  borders  upon 
waters,  whether  navigable  or  non-navigable,  acquires  title  to  all 
additions  to  the  land  which  are  caused  by  the  gradual  deposit 
of  particles  of  soil,  which  deposit  is  called  alluvion,  irrespective 
of  the  fact  that  such  deposit  was  or  was  not  the  result  of  natural 
causes.  Deposits  made  upon  the  sea  shore  are  usually  the  result 
of  the  natural  action  of  the  winds  and  waves.  In  the  case  of 
streams  and  rivers,  the  accretions  may  result  from  natural 
causes,  as  the  washing  down  of  silt  from  up  stream  by  the  opera- 
tion of  the  current,  or  from  artificial  causes,  as,  when  a  dam  is 
erected  by  which  the  volume  of  the  water  is  diminished,  or  its 
course  deflected.  In  either  case  provided  the  growth  of  the  addi- 
tion is  so  slow  as  to  be  imperceptible,  the  added  land  belongs 
to  the  owner.  He  takes  it,  however,  subject  to  the  interests  of 
any  person  to  whom  he  has  granted  an  estate  in  the  land  border- 
ing upon  the  water.  Thus,  a  lease  for  a  long  period  of  years  of 
a  tract  of  land  described  as  bounded  bv  the  banks  of  a  river  con- 


when  it  leaves  his  estate.  Without 
the  consent  of  the  adjoining  pro- 
prietors he  cannot  divert  or  di- 
minish the  quantity  of  water 
which  would  otherwise  descend  to 
the  proprietors  below,  nor  throw 
the  water  back  upon  the  proprie- 
tors above,  without  a  grant  or 
an  uninterrupted  enjojTnent  of 
twenty  years  which  is  evidence 
of  it.  The  owner  must  so  use  and 
apply  the  water  as  to  work  no 
material  injury  or  annoyance  to 
his  neighbor  below  him,  who  has 
an  equal  right  to  the  use  of  the 
same  water.  Streams  of  water  are 
intended  for  the  use  and  comfort 
of  man  and  it  would  be  unreason- 
able and  contrary  to  the  universal 
sense  of  mankind  to  debar  every 
riparian  proprietor  from  the  ap- 
plication of  the  water  to  domestic, 
agricultural  and  manufacturing 
purposes,  provided  the  use  of  it 
28 


be  made  under  the  limitations 
which  have  been  mentioned,  and 
there  will  no  doubt  inevitably  be, 
in  the  exercise  of  a  perfect  right 
to  the  use  of  the  water,  some  evap- 
oration and  decrease  of  it,  and 
some  variation  in  the  weight  and 
velocity  of  the  current.  But  de 
minimis  non  curat  lex  and  a  right 
of  action  by  the  proprietor  below 
would  not  necessarily  flow  from 
such  consequences,  but  would  de- 
pend upon  the  nature  and  extent 
of  the  complaint  or  injury.  All 
that  the  law  requires  of  the  party 
by  or  over  whose  land  a  stream 
passes  is  that  he  should  use  the 
water  in  a  reasonable  manner, 
and  so  as  not  to  destroy  or  render 
useless  the  application  of  the  water 
by  the  proprietors  above  or  below 
the  stream."  Acquackanonk  Wa- 
ter Co.  V.  Watson,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  366, 
370. 


434  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

fers  the  right  upon  the  tenant  to  occupy  land  which  is  created 
by  accretion  during  the  term.®'  And  a  lease  of  accretion  created 
after  the  land  to  which  it  has  been  added  had  been  leased  and 
before  a  grant  in  fee  to  the  first  lessee,  does  not  convey  the  re- 
version in  fee  in  the  accretion  to  the  second  lessee  but  the  fee  is 
conveyed  to  and  becomes  vested  in  the  first  lessee  by  the  subse- 
quent grant  to  him.®^  But  when  the  lease  has  expired,  the  par- 
ties may  make  a  new  contract  which  may  or  may  not  include  the 
land  which  has  formed  by  accretion.  And  where  under  a  long 
lease  the  rental  of  the  land  is  to  be  determined  by  an  ap- 
praisal of  its  value  at  intervals,  the  lessor  is  entitled  to  have 
accretions  which  have  been  formed  by  the  rescission  of  a  river 
taken  into  account.^®  The  same  principles  and  rules  are  appli- 
cable to  reliction  which  is  the  increase  of  land  by  the  retreat  or 
recession  of  water  from  the  shore  of  a  lake,  river  or  sea.  The 
owner  of  property  which  is  stranded  upon  the  land  of  another  by 
a  flood  or  by  the  gradual  flow  of  a  stream  does  not  thereby  lose 
title  to  it.  It  does  not  thereby  become  the  property  of  the  owner 
■of  or  of  the  occupant  of  the  land.  The  owner  of  the  stranded 
property  may  abandon  it  or  not  as  he  may  elect.  He  may  enter 
upon  the  land  to  remove  his  property  and  his  refusal  or  neglect 
to  do  so  does  not  confer  title  upon  the  occupant  or  owner  of  the 
land.  The  landowner  may,  after  notice  to  the  owner  of  the 
stranded  goods,  cast  them  back  into  the  water.  As  against  a 
landlord  owning  riparian  land  and  his  tenant,  the  tenant  may 
hold  stranded  property  which  is  cast  upon  the  demised  premises 
though  his  possession  thereof  confers  no  title  upon  him  as  against 
the  true  owner.^ 

§  287.  Ice  forming  on  land  demised.  Ice  which  forms  on  the 
surface  of  a  non-navigable  stream  is  the  property  of  the  owner 
of  the  bed  of  the  stream  or  pond.^    Hence,  the  landowner  or  his 

oT  Rutz  V.  Kehn,  143  111.  558,  20  Foster   v.   Juniata    Bridge  Co.,   16 

N.  E.  Rep.  553,  following  Cobb  v.  Pa.  St.  393,  55  Am.  Dec.  506;   Et- 

Lavalle,   89    111.  331,    335,   31   Am.  ter  v.  Edwards,  4  Watts  (Pa.)  65; 

Rep.  91.  Berry   v.   Carle,    4    Greenl.    (Me.) 

08  Rutz  V.  Kehn,  143  111.  558,  29  269;    Treat   v.   Lord,   42   Me.    552; 

N.  E.  Rep.  553.  Carter  v.  Thurston,  58  N.  H.  104, 

no  Allen  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  42  Am.  Rep.  584;  Sheldon  v.  STier- 

R.  Co.,  137  Mo.  205,  38  S.  W.  Rep.  man,  42  N.  Y.  484;  Brown  v.  Chad- 

957.  bourn,  31  Me.  9,  50  Am.  Dec.  641. 

1  Upon    the    general    topic    see  ~  State  v.  Pottmeyer,  33  Ind.  402, 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE. 


435 


assigns  liave  the  right  to  harvest  it  and  dispose  of  it  subject  to 
the  rights  of  other  riparian  owners.  The  lessee  of  the  land  upon 
which  the  ice  forms  has  generally  and  in  the  absence  of  an  ex- 
press reservation  in  favor  of  the  lessor  the  same  right  to  dis- 
pose of  the  ice  as  his  lessor  would  have  had  but  for  the  lease.^ 
Ice  on  leased  land  as  soon  as  harvested,  is  the  personal  property 
of  the  tenant.*  Hence,  a  mortgagee  who  purchases  land  on  fore- 
closure is  not  entitled  to  ice  cut  by  a  tenant  of  the  mortgagor 
before  foreclosure,  though  the  pond  from  which  it  was  cut  and 
the  house  in  which  it  is  stored  are  covered  by  and  sold  under 
the  mortgage.^  It  follows  from  this  that  ice  unharvcsted  but 
on  the  land  at  the  time  of  sale  under  the  foreclosure  passes 
to  the  purchaser  as  against  a  lessee.®  We  must  now  consider 
the  case  of  ice  which  forms,  not  upon  water  which  covers 
all  or  a  portion  of  the  leased  premises,  but  which  forms  on 


5  Am.  Rep.  424;  Brockville,  etc., 
Co.  V.  Butler,  91  Ind.  134,  46  Am. 
Rpp.  5S0;  Marsh  v  McNider,  88 
Iowa,  390,  395,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  469, 
45  Am.  St.  Rep.  240,  21  L.  R.  A. 
333;  Richards  v.  Gauffret,  145 
Mass.  486;  Higgins  v.  Kusterer,  41 
Mich.  318,  32  Am.  Rep.  160;  Bige- 
low  V.  Shaw,  65  Mich.  341,  32  N. 
W.  Rep.  800;  Myer  v.  Whitaker,  55 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  376;  Reysen  v. 
Roate,  99  N.  W.  Rep.  599,  92  Wis. 
543. 

3  A  lease  of  an  artificial  pond 
to  a  manufacturing  company  oper- 
ating a  steam  plant  "to  be  used 
for  flowage  purpose  only,  with  the 
exclusive  right  to  flow,  store  and 
use  water  in  the  said  pond,"  to  a 
certain  amount,  the  lease  also  con- 
taining a  reservation  to  the  owner 
of  the  exclusive  right  to  take  ice 
from  the  pond  does  not  confer  the 
right  upon  the  lessee  to  flow  into 
the  pond  and  store  therein  hot 
water  so  as  to  melt  the  ice,  even 
though  It  appear  that  the  original 
purpose  of  the  establishment  of 
the  pond  was  manufacturing  and 


the  taking  of  ice  therefrom  had 
always  been  merely  incidental. 
Walker  Ice  Co.  v.  American  Steel 
&  Wire  Co.,  185  Mass.  463,  70  N. 
E.  Rep.  937. 

4  Ward  V.  People,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
144;  Gregory  v.  Rosenkrans,  72 
Wis.  220. 

5  Gregory  v.  Rosenkrans,  72 
Wis.  220. 

G  The  annual  ice  crop  on  a  pond 
which  may  or  may  not  form  every 
year,  and  which  if  not  removed 
would  perish  or  melt  away,  is  the 
most  ephemeral  of  any  of  the  nat- 
ural products  of  land.  The  cases 
applicable  to  the  cutting  of  timber 
by  a  tenant  do  not  apply  at  all. 
The  ice  crop  may  be  likened  to 
grass  or  cranberries  or  other  un- 
cultivated fruits  which  grow  nat- 
urally from  the  soil;  or  to  the  an- 
nual crops  raised  by  agriculture; 
but  less  than  any  of  these  so  far 
as  its  removal  would  be  an  injury 
to  the  freehold  or  affect  the  value 
of  the  land.  Gregory  v.  Rosen- 
krans, 72  Wis.  220,  224. 


436  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

water  npon  which  the  leased  premises  abuts.  Though  lui- 
harvested  ice  is  more  readily  secured  and  controlled  than  the 
water  which  forms  it,  the  rules  which  govern  the  rights  of 
the  riparian  owner  to  water  are  applicable  to  it.  The  use  of 
the  water  is  appurtenant  to  the  land  which  it  covers  and  this 
right  passes  to  the  lessee  to  vest  in  him  during  the  continuance  of 
the  lease.  He  may  cut  the  ice  not  only  for  his  own  use  in  con- 
nection with  the  enjoyment  of  the  land  but  for  the  purpose  of 
selling  it  to  others  as  well.^  But  a  lease  of  land  on  the  edge  of 
a  mill  pond  but  including  no  part  of  the  pond,  "for  the  purpose 
of  building  and  maintaining  an  icehouse  thereon"  and  providing 
for  a  forfeiture  if  it  should  be  occupied  for  another  purpose  is 
not  by  implication  a  lease  of  the  pond  nor  does  it  confer  a  right 
upon  the  lessee  to  harvest  ice.*  And  the  fact  that  a  tenant  of 
riparian  land  bordering  on  a  lake  or  pond  was  permitted  by  his 
landlord  to  take  ice  from  the  pond,  does  not  of  necessity  establish 
his  right  to  take  ice.  The  permission  of  one  w^ho  owns  land  cov- 
ered by  water  that  another  may  cut  and  take  ice  is  a  mere  license 
which  may  be  revoked  at  any  time.  And  it  is  not  material  for 
how  many  years  the  owners  permit  another  to  cut  and  take  ice 
when  the  permission  is  a  license  merely.  The  right  to  cut  and  re- 
move ice  may  be  leased  by  the  riparian  proprietor  aside  from  a 
lease  of  the  land  itself.  And  the  lessee  may  enjoin  or  maintain 
an  action  at  law  against  a  subsequent  purchaser  or  lessee  of  the 
land  attempting  to  cut  ice  thereon."  A  right  to  cut  and  take  ice 
is  perhaps  more  in  the  nature  of  a  profit  a  prendre  than  of  an 
easement,  though  it  may  come  within  the  definition  of  an  easement 
under  certain  circumstances.^"    But  whether  the  right  to  cut  ice 

■  Marsh    v.    McNider,    88    Iowa,  riparian  lands  was  not  to  enjoy  the 

390,   396,   55   N.    W.   Rep.    469,   45  right  to  harvest  ice. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  240,  21  L.  R.  A.  333.  s  Oliphant  v.  Richman,  67  N.  J. 

This  would  doubtless  be  the  rule  Eq.  286,  59  Atl.  Rep.  241. 

where  the  lease  contains  no  reser-  9  Oliver  v.  Olmstead,  112  Mich, 

vation  of  the  ire  which  forms  on  4S3.     See,  also,  Larman  v.  Benson, 

the    water    upon    which    the    land  8    Mich.    18,    77    Am.    Dec.    435; 

abuts    There  may  be  circumstance  Grand  Rapids,   etc.,  Co.  v.   South 

when  from  the  use  for  which  the  Grand  Rapids  Co.,  102  Mich.  227. 

land  is  leased  or  from  the  circum-  lo  Walker   Ice  Co.  v.   American 

stances  of  the  parties  a  presump-  Steel   &  Wire  Co.,  185  Mass.   463, 

tion  would  arise  that  the  lessee  of  466. 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  437 

De  an  easement  or  not,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  it  may  be  ex- 
pressly or  by  necessary  implication  attached  to  a  demise  of  land.^^ 
§  288.  The  lease  of  a  mill  or  of  a  mill  privilege.  In  a  lease 
of  a  mill  or  a  mill  privilege,  or  mill  site,  these  words,  and  similar 
expressions  will  be  construed  by  substantially  the  same  rules  as 
will  apply  in  the  ease  of  a  sale  of  a  mill.  Usually  the  expres- 
sions, ''mill  dam,-'  "mill  privilege,"  "mill  site"  and  other 
similar  terms,  will  be  construed  to  include  the  land  upon  which 
the  mill  is  located,  and  the  buildings,  machinery  and  other  fix- 
tures necessary  or  proper  to  be  used  in  connection  therewith  as 
well  as  the  right  to  use  the  water,  where  the  machinery  is  pro- 
pelled by  water  power,  to  the  same  extent  as  it  was  used  at  the 
making  of  the  lease. ^'  Thus,  a  mill  site  or  the  privilege  of  a 
mill  includes  not  only  the  site  of  the  mill  buildings  but  also  the 
use  of  the  water  power  connected  therewith  for  milling  pur- 
poses.^^  In  other  words,  a  demise  or  a  grant  of  a  mill  carries 
also  the  use  of  the  power  of  water  in  the  stream  adjacent  thereto, 
so  far  as  the  same  is  necessary  to  its  enjoyment,  with  all  of  the 
incidents  and  appurtenances  so  far  as  the  grantor  or  lessor  had 
any  right  to  convey  them.  For  the  water  power  which  has  ordi- 
narily been  used  with  the  mill  is  an  absolute  necessary  incident 
to  the  mill  and  is  therefore  an  appurtenance  and  will  pass  as 
such  even  though  the  word  "appurtenance"  is  not  mentioned  in 
the  conveyance.^*    The  lessee  may  use  the  water  power  and  all 

11  Where  the  owner  of  land  con-  mond  v.  Green  Bay,  etc.,  Canal 
taining  a  pond  leased  it  to  an-  Co.,  35  Wis.  41,  45,  46;  Moore  v. 
other  without  reserving  the  right  Fletcher,  16  Me.  63,  65,  33  Am. 
to  cut  ice  thereon,  which  she  had  Dec.  633,  634;  Farrar  v.  Cooper, 
previously  leased  to  a  third  party,  34  Me.  394,  397;  Howard  v.  Wads- 
it  was  held  that  the  lessor  of  the  worth,   3   Me.   471,   473. 

land,  having  been  the  agent  of  the  i*  Curtis  v.  Smith,  35  Conn.  156, 

owner  to  collect  rents  and  having,  158;    Stackpole   v.   Curtis,   32   Me. 

in    such   capacity,    collected    rents  383,   385;    Binney's  Case,  2   Bland 

for  the  owner  from  the  lessee  of  (Md.)   114. 

the  right  to  cut  ice,  it  would  be  1 4  Hammond    r.    Woodman,    41 

presumed  from  this  fact;   at  least  Me.    177,    66    Am.    Dec.    219,    223; 

where   the   lease   was   silent   that  Farrar  v.  Cooper,  34  Me.  394,  397; 

the  parties  to  the  lease  of  the  land  Blake  v.  Clark,  6  Me,  436;   Moore 

did  not  reserve  the  right  to  cut  v.  Fletcher,  16  Me.  63;   Crosby  v. 

Ice.    Myers  v.  Bolton,  89  Hun,  342,  Brodbury,  20  Me.  61;   Richardson 

35  N.  Y.  Supp.  577,   70  N.  Y.  St.  v.  Bigelow,  15  Gray   (Mass.)    154, 

Rep.  198.  156;    Prescott  v.   White,   21   Pick. 

12  Anderson's  L.  Diet.  675;   Ari-  (Mass.)    341;    Church    v.    Walker, 


438  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

its  incidents  in  the  mode  it  has  been  used  before  he  enters. 
So,  where  the  owner  of  an  ancient  mill  to  which  there  has  been 
attached  a  raceway  or  artificial  canal  for  carrying  off  the  water 
froin  the  mill  and  without  the  free  and  uninterrupted  current 
of  which  the  mill  could  not  be  worked  and  such  canal  or  raceway 
has  from  time  immemorial  passed  through  the  land  of  another 
and  there  is  no  grant  or  contract  regulating  the  rights  of  the 
parties,  the  lessee  of  the  mill  will  have  the  right  during  the  term 
to  enter  on  the  land  through  which  the  raceway  flows  and  to 
clear  out  obstructions  therefrom,  in  the  usual  and  ordinary  man- 
ner in  which  such  canals  are  cleaned.^^  The  lease  of  a  mill  or  a 
lease  of  land  on  which  a  mill  is  situated,  or  is  to  be  situated,  car- 
ries with  it,  as  incidents  of  the  mill,  the  right  to  raise  the  mill 
pond,  and  to  flow  the  lands  above  the  mill  as  high  as  the  dam 
has  been  usually  kept  up,  to  maintain  the  dam  and  flume  which 
are  necessary  to  support  the  water  at  that  height,  and  to  support 
and  use  the  penstocks,  aqueducts  and  channels  which  are  neces- 
sary to  convey  the  water  to  the  mill,  and  the  channels  and  race- 
ways which  are  necessary  to  conduct  the  water  from  the  mill  to 
the  stream  below  in  the  manner  in  which  they  have  been  kept 
and  used  immediately  prior  to  the  conveyance,  so  far  at  least 
as  the  lessor  has  a  right  to  convey  such  privileges.^'  For,  by 
a  lease  of  a  mill  privilege,  particularly  where  it  is  mth  ail  the 
appurtenances  of  the  same,  there  passes  all  the  privileges  and 
easements  which  had  prior  thereto,  become  attached  to  the  same. 
The  lessee  has  the  right  to  erect  and  maintain  a  dam,  to  erect 
mills,  to  flow  water  upon  the  lands  of  the  lessor  or  others  so  far 
as  may  be  necessary  for  his  purpose,  to  lay  logs  or  lumber  on 
the  land  or  under  Avater  and  to  build  and  maintain  a  mill  yard.^'' 

124  Mass.  69;  Otto  v.  Kreiter,  110  (N.  Y.)   290;  Oakley  v,  Stanley,  5 

Pa.  St.  370,  378;   Peters  v.  Grubb,  Wend.    (N.    Y.)    523;    Kilgour    v. 

21  Pa.  St.  455;  Swartz  v.  Swartz,  4  Ashcomb,   5  H.  &  .J.   82;    Canham 

Pa.  St.  353,  359,  45  Am.  Dec.  697.  v.   Fisk,   2    Cromp.   &   J.   126.     A 

16  Prescott    V.    White,    21    Pick.  lease   of  premises  to   be   used   as 

(Mass.)  341,  342.  a  tan  yard,  bordering  on  a  stream, 

icDunklee  v.  Wilton  R.  Co.,  24  flowing   over   land   owned   by   the 

N.  H.  489,  495;   Pettee  v.  Hawes,  landlord,     does     not     confer     the 

13  Pick.  (Mass.)  323,  327;  Gurney  right   upon    the    tenant   to   throw 

V.  Ford,  2  Allen  (Mass.)  576,  578;  tan  bark  into  the  stream.    Howell 

Gibson  v.  Brockway,  8  N.  H.  465,  v.  McCoy,  3  Rawle  (Pa.)  256. 
471;    Leroy  v.  Piatt,  4  Paige    (N.  i7  Thompson  v.  Banks,  43  N.  II. 

V.)    77;    Burr   v.   Mills,   21    Wend.  nw. 


:  PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  439 

So.  the  lease  or  a  grant  of  a  "mill  site"  will  be  construed  to 
include  all  the  land  on  the  stream  upon  which  the  mill  is  actual- 
ly situated,  or,  if  there  is  no  mill  then  existing,  it  will  include 
such  quantity  of  land  as  will  be  proper  and  necessary  for  the 
purpose  under  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case,  the 
most  material  of  which  is  the  right  of  the  lessee  to  avail  himself 
of  the  full  enjoyment  and  possession  of  the  water  power.  As 
generally  kno-^ii  under  such  circumstances,  the  use  of  the  soil 
on  the  banks  of  the  stream  and  under  the  water  is  the  principle 
thing  granted  and  it  will  be  implied  that  the  lessee  or  grantee 
shall  have  full  power  to  use  any  portion  of  the  soil  for  any  pur- 
poses consistent  with  operating  the  mill.  So,  also,  words  of 
description  in  a  demise  of  a  mill  site  and  of  a  water  power  are 
not  given  a  restrictive  meaning  but  are  usually  broadly  con- 
strued so  that  the  lease  of  a  mill  and  water  power  for  use  in  a 
saw  mill  would  not  of  necessity  restrain  the  lessee  to  such  use. 
He  might  use  it  for  any  legitimate  mill  purpose. ^^ 

§  289.  Action  for  damages  for  the  violation  of  an  easement. 
At  the  common  law  an  action  on  the  case  could  be  maintained  to 
recover  damages  for  an  injury  to  the  enjoyment  of  a  right  of 
way.^®  And  it  was  also  settled  that  a  tenant  could  maintain  an 
action  where  the  injury  to  the  easement  resulted  in  a  direct  loss 
or  inconvenience  to  him.  If  the  injury  to  the  easement  results  in 

18  Ashley  v.  Pease,  18  Pick.  is  Wetmore  v.  Robinson,  2 
(Mass.)  268,  275.  "Where  a  party  Conn.  529;  Martin  v.  Bliss,  5 
has  erected  a  mill  on  his  own  Blackf.  35,  32  Am.  Dec.  52;  Hinks 
land,  and  cut  an  artificial  canal  v.  Hinks,  46  Me.  423;  Wright  v. 
for  a  raceway  through  his  own  Freeman,  5  Har.  &  J.  467;  Cush- 
land,  and  then  sells  the  land  with-  ing  v.  Adams,  18  Pick.  110;  Bow- 
out  the  land  thi'ough  which  such  ers  v.  Suffolk  Mfg.  Co.,  4  Cush. 
raceway  passes,  the  right  of  such  (Mass.)  332;  Smith  v.  Wiggin,  48 
raceway  shall  pass  as  a  privilege  N.  H.  105;  Carelton  v.  Cate,  56  N. 
annexed  de  facto  to  the  mill  and  H.  130;  Osborne  v.  Butcher,  26 
necessary  to  its  beneficial  use.  N.  J.  Law,  308;  Lambert  v.  Hoke, 
Johnson  v.  Jordan,  2  Met.  (Mass.)  14  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  383;  Greenwalt 
234,  37  Am.  Dec.  85;  Blake  v.  v.  Horner,  6  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  70; 
Clark,  6  Me.  436;  Nichols  v.  Luce,  Shroder  v.  Brenneman,  23  Pa.  St. 
24  Pick.  (Mass.)  102,  35  Am.  Dec.  348;  Jones  v.  Park,  10  Phila.  (Pa.) 
302."  By  Tenney,  J.,  in  Hammond  165;  Shafer  v.  Smith,  7  Har.  &  J. 
V.  Woodman,  41  Me.  177,  66  Am.  67;  Marshall  v.  White,  Harp.  122; 
Dec.  219,  223.  See,  also.  New  Ips-  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  2  Vt.  68 
wich  Factory  v.  Batchelder,  3  N. 
H.  190,  14  Am.  Dec.  346. 


440  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

a  damage  to  tlie  inheritance  by  affecting  its  permanent  value 
then  the  landlord  can  sue.-°  If  the  injury  to  the  easement  is 
only  temporary  and  is  simply  an  inconvenience  and  annoyance 
to  the  tenant  and  simply  reduces  the  benefit  which  he  derives 
from  the  use  of  the  premises  during  the  term  when  the  landlord 
cannot  sue  but  the  tenant  can  sue.^^  A  tenant  at  will  may  main- 
tain an  action  for  the  interruption  of  a  passageway  to  the  use 
of  which  he  is  entitled  and  which  is  indispensable  to  him  for  the 
full  enjoyment  of  his  land.^^ 

§  290.  The  protection  of  the  tenant's  easements  by  an  in- 
junction. The  owner  of  property  in  whose  favor  an  easement 
has  been  created,  whether  by  implication  or  by  an  express  agree- 
ment will  be  protected  in  equity  against  any  infringement  of  his 
beneficial  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  same.  An  anticipated  en- 
croachment upon  his  rights  in  the  easement  will  be  enjoined 
whether  the  encroachment  is  by  the  creator  of  the  easement  or  by 
some  other  person.  This  is  the  general  rule  in  equity  and  is 
recognized  because  of  the  fact  that  in  most  cases  the  remedy  at 
law  will  be  inadequate  to  protect  the  person  whose  rights  are  in- 
fringed.-^ This  rule  by  which  equitable  protection  is  given  to 
the  enjoyment  of  easements  has  been  applied  by  the  courts  to  the 
protection  of  rights  of  way  both  of  a  public  or  private  character. 
Thus,  if  there  is  an  obstruction  placed  or  erected  in  the  way  or 
road  which  prevents  its  use  the  obstruction  will  be  regarded  as  a 
nuisance  and  its  continuance  will  be  enjoined  on  the  application 
of  the  person  injured.-*     In  all  such  cases,  however,  the  party 

20  Hamilton  v.  Dennison,  56  Weber  v.  Gage,  39  N.  H.  182;  Shaf- 
Conn.  359,  15  Atl.  Rep.  748,  1  L.  fer  v.  State  Nat.  Bank,  37  La.  Ann. 
R.  A.  287;  Gushing  v.  Adams,  18  242;  Johnson  v.  Shelter  Island 
Pick.  (Mass.)  110;  Hasting  v.  Liv-  Grove  Camp  Meeting  Ass'n,  122  N. 
ermore,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  194.  Y.  330,  25  N.  E.  Rep.  484,  26  N.  E. 

21  Foley  v.  Wyeth,  2  Allen  Rep.  755,  affirming  47  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
(Mass.)  135;  Avery  v.  New  York  374;  Haby  v.  Koenig  (Tex.),  2 
Central  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  Posey,  Unrep.  Case,  439;  Berkley 
Supp.  341.  V.  Smith,  27  Grat.  (Va.)  892;  San- 

22  Foley  V.  Wyeth,  2  Allen  derlin  v.  Baxter,  76  Va.  299,  44 
(Mass.)    135;    Hamilton  v.  Denni-  Am.  Rep.  165. 

son,  56  Conn.  359,  15  Atl.  Rep.  748,  24  Stallard   v.    Cashing,    76   Cal. 

1  L.  R.  A.  287.  472,  18  Pac.  427;    Swift  v.  Coker, 

23  Wheeler  v.  Bedford,  54  Conn.  83  Ga.  789,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  442.  20 
244,  7  Atl.  Rep.  22;  Henry  v.  Koch,  Am.  St.  Rep.  347;  Shipley  v.  Cap- 
80    Ky.    391,    44    Am.    Rep.    484;  les,  17  Md.  179;   Schaidt  v.  Blaul, 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE. 


441 


whose  use  of  the  right  of  way  is  prevented  must  establish  his 
legal  title  to  the  easement  in  an  action  of  law  before  he  can  ob- 
tain equitable  relief.  So,  also,  equity  will  protect  the  easement 
of  light,  air  and  view,  in  favor  of  the  owner  of  the  land  to  which 
they  are  attached.^^  The  protection  which  is  thus  given  to  the 
owner  of  property  in  equity  may  be  taken  advantage  of  by  a 
tenant.  Upon  the  making  of  a  lease  whether  of  the  whole  prem- 
ises or  of  a  part  thereof,  the  right  of  the  landlord  to  the  enjoy- 
ment of  any  easements  which  may  belong  to  the  building  at  the 
date  of  the  execution  of  the  lease  passes  to  his  tenant  so  far  as  the 
possession  of  such  rights  are  necessary  to  the  full  and  complete 
enjoyment  of  the  premises  by  the  tenant.  And  if  during  the 
the  term  the  lessor  attempts  to  deal  with  premises  in  such  a  way 
as  to  deprive  his  tenants  of  the  use  of  any  easement  to  which  he 
is  entitled  he  will  be  enjoined  from  further  interference  with 
them  and  compelled  to  remove  any  obstruction  already  erected.^' 


G6  Md.  141,  6  Atl.  Rep.  639;  Bean 
V.  Coleman,  44  N.  H.  539;  Bechtel 
V.  Carslake,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  500;  Bai- 
ley V.  Schnitzlus,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  235, 
22  Atl.  Rep.  732,  32  Atl.  Rep.  219; 
Wheeler  v.  Gilsey,  35  How.  Prac. 
(N.  Y.)  139;  Herman  v.  Roberts, 
119  N.  Y.  37,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  442,  16 
Am.  St.  Rep.  800;  Deer  v.  Doherty, 
26  Pittsb.  Leg.  J.  (Pa.  N.  S.)   104. 

25  Clawson  v.  Primrose,  4  Del. 
Ch.  643;  Gwin  v.  Melmoth,  1 
Freem.  Ch.  505;  Robeson  v.  Pit- 
tenger,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  57.  32  Am.  Dec. 
412;  Dill  V.  School  Board  of  City 
of  Camden,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  421,  20 
Atl.  Rep.  739,  10  L.  R  A.  276;  Hag- 
gerty  v.  Lee,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  1,  15  Atl. 
Rep.  399;  Lattimer  V.  Livermore, 
72  N.  Y.  174. 

26  As  illustrating  the  protection 
which  a  tenant  will  receive  in 
equity,  the  following  cases  may 
be  cited,  although  in  them  the  re- 
lief was  granted  to  the  owner  of 
the  fee  of  the  property.  The  owner 
of  property  was  enjoined  from  en- 
closing a  portion  of  a  public  park 


on  which  his  land  abutted  where 
his  action  destroyed  the  use  of  the 
park  by  his  neighbor.  Wheeler  v. 
Bedford,  54  Conn.  244,  7  Atl.  Rep. 
22.  The  removal  of  a  stairway 
from  a  passageway  was  also 
brought  about  by  an  injunction. 
Stallard  v.  Gushing,  76  Gal.  472, 
18  Pac.  Rep.  427.  So  also  where 
the  owner  of  premises  had  the 
right  to  use  certain  land  as  an 
alley,  giving  access  to  another 
owner  taking  title  from  the  same 
source  was  enjoined  from  ob- 
structing the  alley  by  building  a 
wooden  frame  across  it  and  put- 
ting up  hooks  to  hang  meat  on. 
Swift  v.  Coker,  S3  Ga.  789,  10  S. 
E.  Rep.  442,  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  347. 
For  another  case  in  which  an  alley 
was  obstructed  and  the  obstruc- 
tion removed  by  equity,  see 
Schaidt  v.  Blaul,  66  Md.  141,  6 
Atl.  Rep.  669.  The  action  of  the 
defendant  in  obstructing  a  water 
course  so  that  the  water  backed 
up  and  rendered  an  alley  impass- 
able,  was  ground   for  the   injunc- 


442 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 


§  291.  Construction  of  the  word  appurtenances.  The  gen- 
eral rule.  The  word  "appurtenances"  which  in  former  times 
at  least  was  so  geneally  employed  in  deeds  and  leases  is  derived 
from  the  word  appaHe^iir  which  is  Norman  French  and  means 
to  belong  to.  Speaking  broadly,  the  word  means  anything  cor- 
poreal or  incorporeal  which  is  an  incident  of,  and  belongs  to 
some  other  thing  as  prineipal.^'^  At  a  time  when  the  construc- 
tion of  written  conveyances  was  of  a  more  technical  character 


tion.  Bailey  v.  Schnitzius,  53  N. 
J.  Eq.  235,  22  Atl.  Rep.  732.  The 
right  to  use  a  private  carriageway 
will  be  protected,  by  an  injunc- 
tion. Herman  v.  Roberts,  119  N. 
Y.  37,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  442,  16  Am. 
St.  Rep.  800.  Ordinarily,  an  in- 
junction will  not  be  granted  to 
tenants  to  prevent  an  adjoining 
owner  building  his  house  so  near 
the  dividing  line  as  to  obstruct 
the  passage  of  light  and  air.  But 
a  grantor  who  has  reserved  the 
right  to  light  and  air  from  prem- 
ises sold  by  him  may  enjoin  his 
grantee  from  building  thereon  if 
he  can  show  that  it  would  result 
in  a  substantial  loss  to  him.  Hag- 
erty  v.  Lee,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  1,  15  Atl. 
Rep.  399. 

*7  Bouvier,  Law  Dictionary; 
Bloom  V.  West,  3  Colo.  App.  212, 
32  Pac.  Rep.  846;  Scheldt  v.  Belz, 
4  111.  App.  431;  Badger  Lumber 
Co.  V.  Marion  Water  Sup.  Co.,  48 
Kan.  182,  184,  29  Pac.  Rep.  476, 
30  Am.  St.  Rep.  301,  15  L.  R  A. 
652;  Riddle  v.  Littlefield,  53  N.  H. 
503,  508,  10  Am.  Rep.  388;  Doyle 
v.  Lord,  64  N.  Y.  432,  437,  21  Am. 
Dec.  629;  Gullman  v.  Sharp,  81 
Hun,  4C2,  465,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  1036; 
Meek  v.  Breckinridge,  29  Ohio  St. 
642,  648;  Miller  v.  Fitzgerald  Dry 
Goods  Co.,  62  Neb.  270,  86  N.  W. 
Rep.  1078;  Peters  v.  Grubb,  21  Pa. 
St.  455;  Stevens  v.  Taylor,  97  N. 
Y.  Supp.  925;    Kooystra  v.  Luca.s, 


1  D.  &  R.  506,  5  B.  &  Aid.  830,  24 
R.  R.  575;  Harding  v.  Wilson,  3 
D.  &  R.  287,  2  B.  &  C.  96,  1  L.  J. 
(O.  S.)  K.  B.  238,  26  R.  R.  287; 
Morris  v.  Edington,  3  Taunt.  24, 
12  R.  R.  579;  Crisp  v.  Price,  5 
Taunt.  548;  Jarvis  v.  Seele  Mill- 
ing Co.,  173  111.  192;  Parish  v. 
Vance,  110  111.  App.  50,  57;  Snook 
&  Austin  Fur.  Co.  v.  Steiner,  113 
Ga.  363,  43  S.  E.  Rep.  775,  777; 
Patterson  v.  Graham,  140  111.  531, 
30  N.  E.  Rep.  460;  The  Ottumwa 
AVoolen  Mill  Co.  v.  Hawley,  44 
Iowa,  57,  60,  24  Am.  Rep.  719; 
Seidel  v.  Bloesser,  77  Mo.  App. 
172;  Rutherford  v.  Wabash  R.  Co., 
147  Mo.  441,  48  S.  W.  Rep.  924; 
Riddle  v.  Littlefield,  53  N.  H.  503, 
16  Am.  Rep.  388;  Ogden  v.  Jen- 
nings, 66  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  301,  307; 
City  of  Lincoln  v.  Lincoln  St.  R. 
Co.  (Neb.),  93  N.  W.  Rep.  766,  772; 
Newport  Illuminating  Co.  v.  As- 
sessors, etc.,  19  R.  I.  632,  638,  36 
Atl.  Rep.  426,  36  L.  R.  A.  266; 
Johnson  v.  Nasworthy  (Tex.),  16 
S.  W.  Rep.  758,  759,  4  Willson,  Civ. 
Cases,  §  107;  Farmers'  Loan  & 
Trust  Co.  V.  Commercial  Bank,  11 
Wis.  207,  210;  Investment  Co.  of 
Philadelphia  v.  Ohio  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  41  Fed.  Rep.  3S7,  380;  Scheel 
V.  Alhambra  Mining  Co.,  79  Fed. 
Rep.  821,  823;  Harris  v.  Elliott, 
10  Pet.  (U.  S.)  25,  54,  9  Law.  ed. 
333;  Humphreys  v.  McKissock,  140 
IT.  S.  304,  n  Sup.  Ct.  779,  781. 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  4-13 

than  it  is  at  present  the  word  was  considered  of  much  greater 
importance  than  it  is  now  and  it  was  considered  that  in  its  ab- 
sence from  a  lease  or  other  conveyance  a  very  restricted  meaning 
should  attach  to  the  words  of  description  of  the  premises  con- 
vej'cd.  But  at  the  present  time  very  little  importance  is  attached 
to  its  use  in  view  of  the  fact  that  leases  are  so  often  drawn  up  or 
prepared  by  persons  who  are  not  skilled  in,  or  accustomed  to 
the  use  of  technical  language.  Hence  with  a  few  exceptions  those 
things  which  are  incident  to  the  principal  thing  will  pass 
though  the  word  appurtenances  is  not  used.  The  word  unques- 
tionably has  a  technical  meaning  but  this  meaning  is  not  inflex- 
ible and  the  word  will  be  construed  in  connection  with  the  prin- 
cipal thing  conveyed.^^  and  keeping  in  mind  also  the  general  in- 
tent apparent  in  the  instrument  in  Avhich  it  was  emploj^ed  as  evi- 
denced by  the  context  and  by  all  the  circumstances.^^  The  word 
as  it  is  used  in  a  lease  may  have  a  very  different  meaning  to 
what  it  would  have  if  employed  in  a  will  or  in  a  deed  conveying 
a  fee  simple.  For  the  use  to  which  the  principal  thing  conveyed 
is  to  be  put  by  the  grantee,  devisee  or  lessee  usually  is  very  ma- 
terial in  determining  the  meaning  of  the  word.  The  presump- 
tion that  a  lessor  intended  that  something  not  enumerated  should 
pass  as  an  appurtenant  to  the  principal  thing  conveyed  is  -very 
strong  when  the  lessee  will  be  deprived  of  the  complete  and  full 
enjoyment  of  the  thing  demised  unless  the  thing  which  is  incident 
to  it  is  regarded  as  an  appurtenant  and  impliedly  conveyed  by 
the  same  instrument.  In  short  if  the  thing  which  is  claimed  to  be 
an  appurtenant  belongs  to  the  principal  thing  and  at  the  same 
time  is  reasonably  essential  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  principal 
thing  it  will  pass  as  appurtenant  to  it,^°  even  though  the  word 
appurtenance  be  not  used."      The   fact  that  a  certain  thing 

28  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mof-  the  accessary  or  adjunct,  which  is 
fitt,  94  Mo.  &6,  60  S.  W.  Rep.  600.  to  be  ascertained  by  considering 

29  The  word  has  a  technical  sig-  whether  they  so  agree  in  nature 
nification,  and  when  strictly  con-  or  quality  as  to  be  capable  of 
sidered,  is  employed  in  leases  for  union  without  incongruity."  Rid- 
the  purpose  of  including  any  ease-  die  v.  Littlefield,  53  N.  H.  503,  50S, 
ments  or  servitudes   used   or  en-  10  Am.  Rep.  388. 

joyed  with  the  demised  premises.  so  Riddle  v.  Littlefield,  53  N.  H. 

"When  thus  used  to  constitute  an  503,  508.  16  Am.  Rep.  388. 

appurtenance  there  must  exist  a  3i  Jarvis    v.    Seele   Milling    Co., 

propriety  of  relation  between  the  173  111.  192,  195. 
principal  or  dominant  subject  and 


444  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

which  is  claimed  to  be  appurtenant  to  the  principal  thing  is 
used  with  it  is  in  most  cases  veiy  material  ;nd  may  be  con- 
clusive upon  the  question  whether  the  thing  is  appurtenant.  But 
the  use  in  connection  with  the  principal  thing  is  not  always  con- 
clusive for  the  thing  to  be  an  appurtenant  must  not  only  be  used 
with  the  principal  thing  but  must  also  be  a  part  and  parcel  of  it. 
Thus  the  mere  fact  that  a  stable  has  been  used  in  connection  with 
the  occupation  of  the  demised  premises  does  not  make  the  stable 
an  appurtenant  of  the  premises  where  the  stable  is  not  physically 
connected  with  the  premises  and  has  no  open  communication  wdth 
it  differing  in  character  from  other  buildings.^-  The  necessity 
that  the  tenant  shall  use  the  thing  which  is  claimed  to  be  an 
appurtenance  is  a  very  strong  circumstance.  So,  where  certain 
parts  of  a  building  were  leased  with  the  "appurtenances,"  a 
furnace  which  constituted  the  only  available  means  for  heating 
the  premises  was  included  in  the  word,  though  there  were  grates 
on  the  floors  and  the  grates  were  out  of  repair.''^  And  as  a  gen- 
eral rule  it  may  safely  be  said  that  what  in  any  case  shall  pass  as 
appurtenant  to  the  leased  premises,  depends  not  upon  the  tech- 
nical construction  of  the  rule  but  upon  the  particular  circum- 
stances of  each  case,  the  most  material  and  important  of  which 
are  the  character  and  use  of  the  premises  which  have  been  leased 
and  whether  or  not  the  thing  or  right  which  is  claimed  to  be  an 
appurtenance  to  the  premises  is  calculated  to  advance  the  use 
of  the  premises  in  the  hands  of  the  tenant.  In  any  case,  the 
safest  rule  is  that  everything  will  pass  which  is  necessary  for 
the  complete  use  of  the  premises,  but  things  which  render  the 
use  of  the  premises  more  convenient  or  agreeable  are  not  neces- 
sarily appurtenances,  for  the  premises  can  be  used  for  the  pur- 
poses of  the  tenant  without  them.  We  must  always  bear  in 
mind  that  the  w^ord  "appurtenances"  is  not  applied  to  the  thing 
which  is  the  principal  object  of  the  lease  but  rather  to  those 
things  which  are  incidental  and  inferior  to  the  principal  thing. 
So,  where  a  railroad  company  leased  a  part  of  its  right  of  way 

32  Maitland   v.    McKinnon,   1   H.  v/as  immaterial  as  the  tenant  had 

&  C.  607.  that  right  by  implication.    Having 

"^  Stevens  v.  Taylor,  97  N.  Y.  this  right  by  implication  the  ten- 
Supp.  925.  The  court  also  hold  ant  has  the  right  to  use  the  heat- 
that  the  fact  that  the  lease  was  ing  apparatus  he  finds  in  the 
silent  as  to  heating  the  premises  house. 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  445 

described  by  metes  and  bounds  on  whicli  there  were  certain 
structures  connected  with  the  tenant's  coal  mine  and  it  was 
provided  that  the  lessor  should  be  exempted  from  liability  for 
damages  by  fire  to  any  structures  that  may  be  erected  on  the 
land  leased  or  their  appurtenances  or  contents,  the  word  "ap- 
purtenances" did  not  include  the,  coal  mine,  pit  heads  or  other 
parts  of  the  mining  property  outside  of  the  land  mentioned  in 
the  lease  but  that  the  tenant's  property  inside  the  mining  prop- 
erty was  appurtenant  to  his  mine  outside  the  limits.^*  It  is  a 
disputed  question  whether  the  conveyance  of  land  "with  the 
appurtenances"  will  create  an  easement  in  the  land  where 
none  existed  before.  On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  said  that 
the  conveyance  of  land  specifically  described  "with  all  appur- 
tenances thereof,"  will  not  create  a  right  of  way  over  the  other 
land  of  the  grantor  unless  the  creation  of  such  a  right  of  way 
is  absolutely  necessary  to  give  the  grantee  access  to  his  land.*' 
The  mere  fact  that  such  a  right  of  way  makes  access  to  the 
land  more  convenient  is  not  controlling.  On  the  other  hand 
it  has  been  expressly  held  that  the  word  "appurtenance,"  par- 
ticularly where  it  is  used  in  connection  with  other  words  of 
similar  meaning  may  be  sufficient  not  only  to  convey  the  existing 
easement  but  also  create  one.^° 

34  Rutherford  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  pass  by  the  use  of  the  word  "ap- 
Co.,  147  Mo.  441,  48  S.  W.  Rep.  924.  purtenances"  depends  largely  upon 

35  Oliver  v.  Hook,  47  Md.  301,  the  construction  of  the  leasa  The 
309;  Gayetty  v.  Bethune,  14  Mass.  following  cases  which  are  cited  to 
49,  7  Am.  Dec.  188;  Grant  v.  illustrate  the  use  of  the  word  in- 
Chase,  17  Mass.  443,  9  Am.  Dec.  volved  the  construction  of  deeds, 
161;  Miller  v.  Bristol,  29  Mass.  but  it  is  believed  that  they  are 
550;  Bonelli  v.  Blakemore.  66  valuable  as  showing  the  meaning 
Miss.  136,  5  So.  Rep.  228;  Barker  which  the  courts  would  place  upon 
V.  Clarke,  4  N.  H.  380.  17  Am.  Dec.  the  word  "appurtenances"  in  the 
428;  Stuyvesant  V.  Woodruff,  21  N.  case  of  a  lease.  In  these  cases  a 
J.  Law,  133,  47  Am.  Dec.  146;  Par-  right  of  way  was  held  to  pass  by 
sons  V.  Johnson,  68  N.  Y.  62,  23  the  use  of  the  words  "with  the 
Am.  Rep.  149;  Kenyon  v.  Nichols,  appurtenances."  Peck  v.  Loyd,  38 
1  R.  I.  411.  Conn.  566;  Chicago,  S.  F.  &  C.  R. 

36  Knowles  v.  Nichols,  14  Fed.  Co.  v.  Ward,  128  111.  349,  18  N.  E. 
Cas.  No.  7,897;  Molitor  V.  Sheldon,  Rep.  828;  Mendel  v.  Delano,  48 
37  Kan.  246,  15  Pac.  Rep.  231.  Mass.  176;  Foote  v.  Manhattan  Ry. 
Whether  the  easement,  such  as  a  Co.,  58  Hun  (N.  Y.)  478,  12  N.  Y. 
right  of  way  or  a  right  of  access  Supp.  516;  Kenyon  v.  Nichols.  1 
or  any  other  similar  privilege,  will  R.  I.  411.     On  the  other  hand,  it 


446 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


§  292.  Things  which  have  been  held  not  to  pass  as  a.ppnrte- 
nances.  The  term  "appurtenances"  as  it  is  used  in  conveyances 
usually  is  intended  to  include  nothing  but  the  land  and  such 
easements  as  belong  thereto  and  which  are  a  part  of  the  land.^'^ 
The  word  as  used  in  a  deed  or  lease  does  not  usually  convey  cor- 
poreal things  but  only  incorporeal  things  such  as  privileges 
and  easements.^^'  For  example,  the  word  will  not  pass  an  arti- 
cle of  personal  property  which  is  in  no  wise  connected  with  the 
premises  demised  and  which  is  not  indispensable  to  its  full  use 
and  enjoyment  by  the  lessee,  though  the  thing  may  have  been 
used  in  connection  with  the  premises.^^  And  it  is  very  well  set- 
tled that  by  the  use  of  the  word  appurtenance,  one  piece  of  land 
will  not  pass  as  an  appurtenance  to  another  piece  of  land.*" 


has  been  held  that  a  right  of  way 
does  not  pass  under  the  term  of 
"appurtenance"  if  it  is  not  a  parcel 
of  the  premises  and  necessary  for 
their  use  and  enjoyment  May  v. 
Smith,  3  Mackey,  55;  Grant  v. 
Chase,  17  Mass.  443,  9  Am.  Dec. 
161;*Lankin  v.  Terwillinger,  22 
Oreg.  97,  29  Pac.  Rep.  268.  Gener- 
ally an  easement  will  not  pass  un- 
der the  use  of  this  word  unless  it 
was  actually  annexed  to  the  princi- 
pal thing.  Spaulding  v.  Abbott,  .55 
N.  H.  423;  Parsons  v.  Johnson,  68 
N.  Y.  62,  63  Am.  Rep.  149;  Longen- 
dyke  v.  Anderson,  101  N.  Y.  625, 
4  N.  E.  Rep.  629;  Swansey  v. 
Brooks,  34  Vt.  451.  In  Oliver  v. 
Hook,  47  Md.  301,  on  page  309,  the 
court  said:  "If  there  was  a  way 
belonging  to  the  estate  as  a  pre- 
existing easement,  such  way 
would  pass  by  force  of  these 
terms,  or  even  without  the  use 
of  them;  but  such  terms  used  in  a 
conveyance  of  part  of  a  tract  of 
land,  as  in  this  case,  will  not  cre- 
ate a  new  easement,  nor  give  a 
right  to  use  A  way  which  had  been 
used  with  one  part  of  the  land 
over  another  part  while  both  parts 
belonged  to  the  same  owner,  and 


constituted  an  entire  estate.  A 
party  cannot  have  an  easement  in 
his  own  land  as  all  the  uses  of  an 
easement  are  fully  comprehended 
and  embraced  in  his  general  right 
of  ownership." 

S7  Ottumwa  Woolen  Mill  Co.  v. 
Hawley,  44  Iowa,  57;  Meek  v. 
Breckinridge,  29  Ohio  St.  642,  648. 

38  Co.  Litt.  121;  Scheldt  v.  Belz, 
4  111.  A  pp.  431;  Buszard  v.  Capel, 
6  Bing.  151,  161,  8  B.  &  C.  141- 
150. 

30  Scheldt  V.  Belz,  4  111.  App. 
431;  Barrltt  v.  Bell,  82  Md.  110, 
52  Am.  Rep.  361. 

40  The  following  cases  sustain 
the  proposition  that  land  will  not 
pass  as  an  appurtenant.  Ogden  v. 
Jennings,  62  N.  Y.  526,  531; 
Holmes  v.  Seeley,  19  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  507;  Oakley  v.  Stanley,  5 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  523;  Voorhees  v. 
Burchard,  55  N.  Y.  98;  Wilson  v. 
Hunter,  14  Wis.  683.  Some  Eng- 
lish cases  are  Nicholas  v.  Cham- 
berlain, Cro.  Jac.  131;  Pierce  v. 
Sellick,  18  C.  B.  321;  Tyrring- 
ham's  Case,  4  Coke,  37a;  Hill's 
Case,  Plowden,  168a;  Smith  v. 
Martin,  3  Saund.  400.  In  Tyrring- 
ham's   Case,    4   Coke,    37a,    it   Avas 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  447 

Hence,  it  follows  that  where  there  is  a  conveyance  or  a  written 
lease  of  land  in  which  the  premises  are  described  by  well  defined 
boundaries,  so  that  it  is  clearly  to  be  understood  how  much  land 
the  grantor  or  lessor  intended  to  convey,  the  addition  of  the 
word  appurtenances  will  not  pass  land  not  included  in  the 
boundaries.  Thus,  the  lease  of  a  building  described  by  a  par- 
ticular name  does  not  pass  as  an  appurtenance,  any  interest  in 
the  land  adjoining  the  land  on  which  the  building  is  located  or 
any  interest  in  an  outbuilding  on  such  land,  though  the  out- 
building might  have  been  used  with  the  demised  premises.*^ 
So,  where  in  a  lease,  land  is  demised  as  the  "Bell  house  with  all 
the  appurtenances  thereunto  belonging,"  for  the  purpose  of  a 
hotel,  it  was  held  that  a  kettle  situated  upon  an  adjoining  lot 
which  was  not  indispensable  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  hotel  prop- 
erty, although  it  was  very  convenient  for  the  use  of  the  tenant, 
did  not  pass  as  an  appurtenant  to  the  hotel,  and  the  situation 
was  not  altered  by  the  fact  that  the  lessor  of  the  hotel  had  used 
the  kettle  in  connection  with  his  hotel  business.*^  And  generally 
the  word  "appurtenances"  will  not  carry  to  the  lessee  the  use 
of  any  building  or  structure  which  is  not  on  the  premises  de- 
mised though  this  building  belonged  to  the  landlord  and  was 
used  by  him  in  his  business  in  connection  with  the  premises.*'' 
The  demise  of  a  house  with  the  appurtenances  will  pass  the 
house,  with  the  orchards,  yards  and  curtilage  and  garden  but 

said  "prescription  doth  not  make  Doyle  v.  Lord,  64  N.  Y.  432,  437, 

a     thing     appendant     unless     the  21  Am.  Rep.  629. 
thing   which    shall   be   appendant  *-  Barrett   v.   Bell,   82    Mo.   110, 

agrees   in   quality   and   nature   to  114. 

the  thing  to  which  it  shall  be  ap-  43  Frey  v.  Drahos,  6  Neb.  1,  29 
pendant  as  a  thing  corporate  can-  Am.  Rep.  353;  Grant  v.  Chase,  17 
not  be  appendant  to  a  thing  cor-  ]\Iass.  443;  Spaulding  v.  Abbott,  55 
porate."  N.  H.  423;  Barber  v.  Clark,  4  N. 
41  Oliver  v.  Dickinson,  100  Mass.  H.  380;  Coolidge  v.  Hagar,  43  Vt. 
114,  117  (a  lease).  See,  also,  New  9;  Swazey  v.  Brooks,  34  Vt.  451; 
York  Cen.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  B.,  N.  Y.  Seavey  t.  Jones,  43  N.  H.  441; 
&  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  Jackson  v.  Strieker,  1  Johns.  Cases 
501,  505  (a  lease  of  a  railroad);  (N.  Y.)  284;  Jackson  v.  Hatha- 
Harris  v.  Elliott.  10  Pet.  (U.  S.)  way,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  447;  Bet- 
25,  55,  56;  Leonard  v.  White,  7  tisworth's  Case,  2  Coke.  516;  Bus- 
Mass.  6,  8,  9;  Jackson  v.  Hatha-  zard  v.  Capel,  8  B.  &  C.  141.  G  Blng. 
v/ay,   15   John.    (N.  Y.)    447,   454;  150;   Ogden  v.  Jennings,  62  N.  Y. 

52G. 


448  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

not  the  land  especially  if  it  be  at  a  distance  though  occupied 
with  the  house ;  so,  a  demise  of  a  house  with  appurtenances  will 
not  pass  an  adjoining  building  which  is  not  accounted  parcel 
of  the  house,  although  held  with  it  for  many  years.**  A  lease  of 
a  house  with  all  the  rooms  and  chambers,  with  all  the  appurte- 
najices  belonging,  or  in  any  way  appertaining  thereto  does  not 
pass  the  use  of  a  room  formerly  occupied  with  the  rest  of  the 
house  with  which  the  room  had  communicated  by  means  of  a 
door  which  had,  however,  been  closed  by  a  wooden  partition  for 
many  years  before  the  execution  of  the  demise.*^  It  should  be 
said,  however,  that  the  rule  above  stated  to  the  effect  that  land 
will  not  pass  as  an  appurtenance  of  land,  has  some  exceptions. 
These  exceptions  occur  principally  in  cases  of  the  lease  or  convey- 
ance of  land  fronting  on  streams  or  other  bodies  of  water.  Where 
riparian  land  is  conveyed  or  is  demised  without  or  with  the  use  of 
the  word  "appurtenances"  in  connection  therewith,  it  is  usually 
considered  that  the  land  under  water,  adjoining  the  land  de- 
mised, passes  with  the  demised  land  as  being  absolutely  indis- 
pensable to  the  full  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  land  located  on  the 
margin  of  the  stream.  Thus,  flats  necessary  to  the  use  of  a 
wharf  will  pass  as  appurtenances  in  a  conveyance  or  lease  of 
a  wharf.*®  So,  a.lso,  under  a  lease  of  a  wharf,  the  land  upon 
which  the  wharf  is  built,  and  the  tide  and  shore  land  adjoining 
to  the  wharf  will  pass  as  an  appurtenance  though  not  men- 
tioned.*^ And  an  addition  formed  by  the  extension  of  a  pier  line 
the  result  of  an  accretion  by  alluvion,  will  pass  as  an  appurte- 
nance to  a  pier.*^  And  generally  by  a  demise  of  a  mill  or  mill 
privilege,  not  only  the  mill  itself,  but  also  the  land  on  which  it 
stands  and  all  the  land  adjoining  and  surrounding  it  both  above 
and  below  water  including  a  sufficient  portion  of  the  bed  of  the 
stream  to  erect  a  dam  upon  will  pass  as  an  appurtenance.*^  An 
exception  to  the  rule  occurs  where  the  question  arises  as  to  the 
right  of  the  lessee  to  have  the  premises  which  he  has  leased  sup- 
ported by  the  land  upon  which  it  is  built  and  by  land  which  ad- 

**  Bryan    v.    Weatherhead,    Cro.  *^  Brown  v.   Carkeek,  14  Wash. 

Jac.  17.  443,  44  Pac.  Rep.  889. 

45  Kerslake   v.   White,    2    Stark.  *»  Williams    t.    Baker,    41    Md. 

508.  523,  528. 

40  Doane    v.    The    Broad    Street  <o  Whitney    v.    Olney,    3    Mason 

Ass'n,  6  Mass.  332.  (U.  S.)  280. 


PEOPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  LN  THE  LEASE. 


449 


joins  it.  "VVTiere  the  lease  is  of  the  buildings  only  and  neither 
land  nor  any  interest  in  the  land  is  mentioned^  no  estate  in  the 
land  is  created  in  the  lessee.  Still,  though  the  tenant  may  have 
no  estate  in  the  land,  he  has  as  an  appurtenant  and  incident  of 
his  possession  of  the  buildings,  such  an  interest  in  the  land  as 
is  necessary  to  support  the  premises.  The  lessee's  right  to  the 
support  of  the  subjacent  land  exists  only  while  it  is  necessary 
to  enable  him  to  enjoy  the  full  possession  of  the  building  upon 
it  and  when  the  building  is  destroyed  or  removed,  the  right 
passes  to  the  lessor.^"  The  question  whether  a  particular  place 
is  a  part  of  the  demised  premises  does  not  depend  solely  and  ex- 
clusively upon  how  the  premises  are  bounded  in  the  lease,  but  also 
upon  the  intention  of  the  parties,  which  may  be  determined  by 
proving  such  extrinsic  facts  explanatory  of  the  subject  and  of 
the  circumstances  of  the  parties  as  will  show  the  meaning  of  the 
instrument  and  the  real  intention  of  the  parties  to  it.^^  So,  also, 
it  may  be  admitted  that  it  is  a  well  established  principle  that 
any  privilege  or  easement  which  is  necessary  to  the  enjoyment 
of  the  demised  premises  will  pass  to  the  lessee  as  an  appurte- 
nance thereof,  though  it  is  not  true  that  by  the  use  of  the  word, 


60  Snook  V.  Steiner,  117  Ga.  363, 
43  S.  E.  Rep.  775,  777. 

61  Trimble's  Heirs  t.  "Ward,  14 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  8.  The  privilege 
of  using  a  well  in  an  adjacent  lot 
so  long  as  it  shall  remain  does  not 
raise  an  implied  covenant  that  it 
shall  remain.  The  use  of  the  well 
is  not  an  appurtenant  as  it  is  not 
absolutely  essential  to  the  full  en- 
joyment of  the  demised  premises 
and  the  lessor  may  therefor  deter- 
mine how  long  the  well  shall  re- 
main. Basserman  v.  Society  of 
Trinity  Church,  39  Conn.  137. 
"Appurtenances"  in  a  lease  of  a 
hotel  does  not  include  a  kettle  for 
heating  water  located  in  an  adja- 
cent lot,  though  it  has  been  used 
by  the  lessor  in  connection  with 
the  hotel.  Barrett  v.  Bell,  82  Mo. 
no,  52  Am.  Rep.  361.  A  restau- 
rant conducted  by  a  lessor  in  an- 

29 


other  part  of  the  demised  prem- 
ises is  not  an  appurtenance,  not 
being  indispensable  to  the  full  en- 
joyment of  the  demised  premises, 
and  consequently  may  be  discon- 
tinued or  removed  at  any  time 
during  the  term  by  the  lessor. 
Gale  V.  Heckman,  16  Misc.  Rep. 
370,  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  85.  The  rights 
of  the  lessor  which  arise  out  of 
his  merely  personal  agreement 
with  a  third  party  do  not  pass  as 
appurtenant.  So  the  lessor's  right 
to  lay  a  railroad  track  on  a  public 
highway  under  a  municipal  ordi- 
nance to  connect  his  premises  with 
a  railroad,  and  his  contract  with 
such  railroad  not  being  attached 
in  any  way  to  the  land  demised, 
do  not  pass  to  the  lessee  in  the 
absence  of  express  agreement. 
People,  etc.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  W. 
Co.,  57  III.  43G,  410. 


450  r,AW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

whatever  is  convenient  for  the  use  of  the  premises  passes.  There 
is  a  great  difference  in  meanings  between  convenience  and  neces- 
sity and  no  privilege  will  pass  to  the  lessee  unless  it  is  expressly 
granted  merely  because  it  is  convenient  for  him  to  enjoy  it. 
Thus,  though  the  right  to  use  a  stream  will  pass  to  the  lessee  of 
a  mill  privilege  as  a  necessary  appurtenance  thereto,  he  will 
only  have  the  right  to  use  it  in  a  necessary  and  proper  manner. 
And  he  will  not  be  penuitted  to  defile  the  stream  by  casting 
waste  or  rubbish  into  it  merely  because  this  use  of  the  stream  will 
promote  his  convenience.^-  Wliere  a  lease  is  renewed  with  the 
intention  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  to  continue  the  use  of  the 
building  for  the  same  purpose  as  he  had  heretofore  used  it,  the 
character  of  his  tenancy  under  the  old  lease  may  be  proved  for 
the  purpose  of  determining  whether  a  certain  privilege  passed 
to  him  under  the  new  lease  as  an  incident  to  it.  Thus,  where 
a  landlord  had  leased  a  portion  of  his  building  a  part  of  which 
was  occupied  by  him,  and  had  agreed  to  permit  the  tenant  to 
have  a  half  of  the  steam  power  which  was  generated  by  the  en- 
gine owned  by  the  landlord ;  and  it  appears  in  the  evidence  that 
the  tenant  had  occupied  the  same  premises  and  had  the  use  of 
the  same  engine,  that  the  use  of  steam  was  necessary  to  the  ten- 
ant, and  that  he  had  been  using  it  right  along,  it  was  held  that 
the  use  of  the  steam  passed  as  an  incident  of  the  new  lease.  Un- 
der such  circumstances,  the  tenant  may  enjoin  the  landlord  from 
depriving  him  of  the  use  of  the  steam.^^ 

62  Howell    V.    McCoy,    3    Rawle  ha-s  a  technical   signification,  and 

(Pa.)   256,  271.  when   strictly    considered,    is    em- 

53  Thomas    v.    Wiggins,    41    111.  ployed   in   leases   for  the  purpose 

471.     "Appurtenances  are  defined:  of    including    any    easements    or 

'Things     belonging      to      another  servitudes   used   or   enjoyed  with 

thing,  as  principal,  and  which  pass  the  demised  premises.     Where  the 

as  incident  to  the  principal  thing.'  term  is  thus  used,  in  order  to  con- 

Bouv.    Law    Die.     Another    defini-  stitute     an     appurtenance     there 

tion   is:    'A   thing  used  with   and  must  exist  a  proi)riety  of  relation 

related  to  or  dependent  upon  an-  between   the   principal   and   domi- 

other    thing    more    worthy,    and  nant   thing  or  subject,  the  acces- 

agreeing  in  its  nature  and  quality  sary  or  adjunct,  which  is  to  be  as- 

with    the    thing    whereunto    it    is  certained  by  considering  whether 

appendant      or      appurtenant.'      3  they  so  agree  in  nature  and  qual- 

Washb.  Real  Prop.  620,  627;  Com.  ity  as  to  be  capable  of  union  with- 

Dig.  Appendant  and  Appurtenant  out    incongruity.      These    distinc- 

(A).     The    word,    'appurtenances,'  tions  are  refined,  and  in  the  com- 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE. 


451 


§  293.  Meaning  of  the  word  half.  The  word  ''half"  in  a 
lease  of  laud  as  in  a  deed  as  used  in  the  expression  "half  of  a  lot," 
means  half  in  quantity  in  the  absence  of  a  coatext  or  of  facts 
from  which  a  different  meaning  may  be  inferred.^^  Thus,  two 
parts  of  a  farm  or  other  piece  of  land  separated  by  a  road  or 
stream  may  be  called  halves  without  regard  to  their  quantity 
and  in  such  cases  the  word  half  will  not  have  its  primary  mean- 
ing but  the  circumstances  and  the  customs  of  the  parties  in  using 
the  word  will  be  taken  into  account  to  ascertain  what  meaning 
the  parties  attached  to  it.^^  But  the  mere  fact  that  a  land  front- 
ing on  a  meander  lake  is  to  be  used  for  mining  purposes  by  the 
lessees  of  separate  halves  and  that  either  may  desire  to  mine 
under  the  lake  does  not  vary  the  primary  meaning  of  the  word 
half.^^  The  terms  section,  half  section  or  quarter  section  prop- 
erly mean,  and  are  so  construed  by  the  general  land  department, 
the  land  in  the  sectional  and  subdivision  lines  and  not  the  exact 
quantity  which  a  perfect  measurement  of  an  unobstructed  sur- 
face would  show.^" 


mon  practice  of  modern  convey- 
ancing are  not  much  regarded — 
the  term,  'appurtenances,'  in  a 
Tast  majority  of  cases  in  deeds 
and  leases,  having  in  fact,  I  pre- 
sume, no  meaning  whatever  in  the 
minds  of  the  contracting  parties, 
who  append  the  necessary  formula 
by  force  of  custom  and  example 
which  has  for  so  long  a  time  ap- 
plied it  to  grants  and  leases  of  a 
principal  thing,  to  which  no  in- 
ferior easement  or  servitude  what- 
ever, in  fact,  belongs.  If  employed 
in  its  true  and  technical  sense,  it 
may  sometimes  have  such  mean- 
ing and  importance  that,  if  omit- 
ted, an  appurtenance  will  not 
pass.  And  the  use  of  such  super- 
fluous formula  is  ordinarily  harm- 
less and  will  seldom  lead  to  con- 
fusion or  misunderstanding.  But, 
ordinarily,  whatever  easements 
and  privileges  legally  appertain  to 
property  pass  by  a  conveyance  of 
the  property  itself  without  addi- 
tional   words.      The    grant    of    a 


thing  passes  the  incident  as  well 
as  the  principal,  though  the  lat- 
ter only  is  mentioned,  and  the 
effect  cannot  be  avoided  without 
an  express  reservation.  Thus,  a 
garden  is  parcel  of  a  house  and 
passes  without  the  addition  of  the 
word  "appurtenance."  Taylor's 
Landlord  &  Tenant,  sec.  161.  A 
grant  of  a  thing  will  include  what- 
ever the  grantor  had  power  to 
convey  which  is  reasonably  neces- 
sary to  the  enjoyment  of  thing 
granted."  By  the  court  in  Riddle 
V.  Littleton,  53  N.  H.  503,  508,  509. 

^•tAngres  Boom  Co.  v.  Whitney, 
26  Mich.  52;  Dart  v.  Barbour,  32 
Mich.  271;  Heyer  v.  Lee,  40  Mich. 
353;  Jones  v.  Pashby,  62  Mich. 
614. 

■■•'•  .Jones  V.  Pashby,  48  Mich.  614, 
634. 

r<3  Hartford  I.  M.  Co.  v.  Cam- 
bria Mining  Co..  80  Mich.  491,  499, 
45  N.  W.  Rep.  851. 

57  Brown  v.  Hardin,  21  Ark.  325. 


CHAPTER  Xn. 

THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  LEASES. 

§  294.  T^Tiat  law  governs. 

295.  The  construction  of  the  language  of  written  leasee* 

296.  The  lease  construed  by  the  conduct  of  the  parties. 

297.  Writings  will  be  construed  together. 

298.  Merger  in  lease  of  all  preliminary  conversations. 

299.  The  meaning  of  technical  terms  in  a  lease. 

300.  When  parol  evidence  is  received  in  the  case  of  leases. 

301.  When  parol  evidence  is  not  received  in  the  case  of  leases. 

302.  Parol  evidence  of  custom  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a  lease, 

303.  The  modification  of  the  lease  by  the  parties. 

§  294.  What  law  governs.  The  general  rule  that  the  law  of 
the  place  where  land  is  situated  determines  all  questions  as  to 
the  mode  or  legality  of  its  transfer  is  applicable  to  leases.^  This 
rule  is  not  confined  to  the  formal  execution  of  the  lease  but  ex- 
tends to  all  questions  as  to  its  construction  and  interpretation. 
And  not  only  must  the  court  invoke  the  law  of  the  place  where 
the  land  is  to  determine  the  validity  and  construction  of  the 
contract  but  also  to  determine  whether  the  subject  matter  is 
real  or  personal  property.^  Thus,  for  example,  a  court  in  the 
state  of  New  York  construing  a  so-called  lease  of  coal  in  Penn- 
sylvania buried  beneath  the  surface  of  the  earth  and  forming  a 
part  of  it,  held  that  the  coal  was  land  and  followed  the  law  of 
Pennsylvania  which  regards  a  lease  of  all  coal  on  premises  therein 
described  with  the  right  to  take  it  exclusive  of  the  grantor  as 
in  legal  effect  a  grant  in  fee  of  the  coal  as  land  and  vests  the 
fee  thereof  in  the  so-called  lessee.'  The  rights  of  the  parties  to 
a  lease  will  be  construed  and  regulated  by  the  law,  either  com- 
mon or  statute,  which  existed  at  the  date  of  its  execution  and  the 

1  Genet  v.  Del.  &  Hudson  Canal  2  Chapman      v.      Robertson,      6 

Co.,    13    Misc.    409,   421.   25   N.   Y.       Paige   (N.  Y.)   627,  620. 
Supp.  147.  3  Genet  v.  Delaware  &  Hudson 

Canal  Co.,  13  Misc.  409,  424,  425. 


.    CONSTRUCTION  OF  LEASES.  453 

rights  whicli  have  thus  vested  will  not  be  in  any  way  divested 
or  affected  by  the  repeal  or  modification  of  such  law.* 

§  295.  The  constniction  of  the  language  of  written  leases. 
The  general  rules  governing  and  regulating  the  construction  of 
written  contracts  when  involved  in  litigation  are  usually  appli- 
cable to  the  construction  of  leases  in  writing.  Inasmuch  as  a 
detailed  discussion  of  these  rules,  however  appropriate  it  may 
be  in  a  work  treating  of  the  law  of  contracts,  would  be  mani- 
festly out  of  place  in  these  volumes,  where  only  a  very  minute 
portion  of  the  general  law  of  contracts  is  under  consideration, 
no  lengthy  discussion  of  such  general  principles  may  be  ex- 
pected in  this  treatise.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  a  general  rule 
that  in  the  construction  of  a  lease,  the  intent  of  the  parties  must 
be  reached  by  an  examination  of  the  whole  instrument,  and  such 
construction  adopted  as  will  earr\'  out  the  intent,  though  a  single 
clause  would  lead  to  a  different  construction.^  In  construing 
a  lease  where  the  language  is  ambiguous,  the  courts  will  en- 
deavor to  ascertain  the  intention  of  the  parties  and  when  as- 
certained, to  give  effect  to  it,  but  where  the  language  is  unam- 
biguous, though  the  parties  may  have  failed  to  express  their  real 
intention  in  the  lease,  there  is  no  room  for  constniction,  and 
the  legal  effect  of  the  lease  must  be  enforced.®  The  provisions 
of  a  lease  will  not  be  extended  by  construction."^  As  a  rule  the 
construction  of  the  language  of  a  written  lease  is  a  matter  of  law 

4  Swan  v.  Kemp,  97  Md.  686,  55  s  Harlow  v.  Lake  Superior  Iron 

Atl.   Rep.    441,    443;     Appeal    Tax  Co.,    36    Mich.   105;    Union   Water 

Court  of  Baltimore  City  v.  West  Power  Co.  v.  Lewiston,  95  Me.  471, 

Md.    R.   R.    Co.,   50   Md.    274,   295.  49    Atl.    Rep.    878;     City    of    New 

Thus   in   a   case   where   a  statute  York  v.  United  States  Trust  Co., 

providing  that  leases  of  land  for  101  N.  Y.  Supp.  574;    Johnson  v. 

more  than  15  years  might  be  re-  Kindred  State  Bank,  96  N.  W.  Rep. 

deemable  after  the  term  of  15  years  588,    589;     Seaman    v.    Civill,    45 

had  expired  at  the  option  of  the  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    267,  s.  c.  31   How. 

tenant  was  modified  and  affirmed  Pr.    (N.   Y.)    52;    Orphan  Asj^lum 

by    a    subsequent    statute    which  Society  v.  Waterbury,  8  Daly   (N. 

merely  altered  it  in  some  imma-  Y.)   35. 

terial  particulars,  leases  executed  s  Walker  v.  Tucker,  70  111.  527, 

between  the  passage  of  the  origi-  532;     Thompson,    v.     Stewart,    60 

nal   act  and   the  ameniiatory   act  Iowa,  223,  225,  14  N.  W.  Rep.  247. 

are   within   the   operation    of   the  7  Windsor    Hotel    Co.    v.    Hawk, 

first  act.     Swan  v.  Kemp,  97  Md.  49  How.  Pr.    (N.  Y.)    257. 
686,  55  Atl.  Rep.  441. 


454  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

for  the  court  and  not  for  the  jury.^  Ajad  if  the  terms  of  an  oral 
lease  are  doubtful,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  what  they  are 
upon  all  the  evidence.^  As  a  general  rule,  where  a  lease  is 
susceptible  of  two  constructions,  the  one  most  favorable  to 
the  lessee  must  prevail.^"  This  rule  does  not  apply  to  the 
construction  of  the  lease  where  the  intention  of  the  parties 
is  clearly  apparent  from  the  lease,  when  it  is  examined  in 
the  light  of  surrounding  circumstances.^^  "Where  a  provision 
of  a  lease  stipulating  damages  for  holding  over  is  highly  penal 
and  almost  unconscionable  and  the  lease  admits  of  two  construc- 
tions as  to  the  time  such  damages  would  accrue,  the  construction 
which  is  most  favorable  to  the  lessee  ought  to  be  had.  The  court 
must,  if  possible,  avoid  a  harsh  and  oppressive  construction  of 
the  lease.^^  It  is  contrary  to  the  well-settled  rules  of  construc- 
tion to  give  the  language  of  a  lease  a  narrow  and  technical  in- 
terpretation which  is  based  upon  some  particular  word  or  clause 
contained  in  it.  The  intention  of  the  parties  must  be  taken 
from  the  lease  as  a  whole  and  such  a  construction  must  be  had 
as  will,  if  possible,  render  all  its  clauses  consistent  and  har- 
monious." Where  a  lease  contains  both  written  and  printed 
provisions,  etfect  is  to  be  given  to  both  if  they  are  not  incon- 

8  Needy  v.  Middlekauff,  102  Md.  to  the  tenant.     If  the  duration  ap- 

181,   62   Atl.   Rep.   159;    Brown  v.  pears    to    be    optional    with    some 

Schiappacassee,  115  Mich.  47,  72  N.  one,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the 

W.  Rep.  1096;  Newman  v.  Tolmie,  tenant    is    to    have    the    option. 

80  N.  Y.   Supp.  990,  81  App.  Div.  Comm.    v.    M'Neile,   8    Phila.    438, 

111;   Dumn  v.  Rothermel,  112  Pa.  26  L.  I.  205,  3  Brewst.   (Pa.)  537. 

St.  212,  17  W.  N.  C.  292,  43  L.  I.  Gas  and  oil  leases  are  construed 

376,  3  Atl.  Rep.  800.  and    regulated    generally    by    the 

»  State  V.  Forsythe,  89  Mo.  667,  same  rules  of  law  as  are  applicable 

1  S.  E.  Rep.  834.  to  leases  of  farm  lands.     Kelley  v. 

10  Doe  V.  Dixon,  9  East,  15;  Oil  Co.,  57  Ohio  St.  317,  49  N.  E. 
Cook  V.  Bisbee,  18  Pick.  (Mass.)  Rep.  399,  affirming  Ohio  Oil  Co. 
.^)27,  529;  Commonwealth  v.  Sher-  v.  Kelley,  6  Ohio  Ct.  Dec.  470,  9 
iff,  3  Brewst.   (Pa.)    537;    Presby-  R.  511. 

terian   Church   v.   Pichet,  Wright  12  Klingle  v.  Ritter,  58  111.  140, 

(Ohio)    57;    Windsor  Hotel  Co.  v.  141. 

Hawk,  49  How.   Pr.    (N.   Y.)    257,  i-i  Harlow  v.  Iron  Co.,  36  Mich. 

262.  105,  117;  Pendill  v.  Maas,  97  Mich. 

11  Pere  Marquette  R.  Co.  v.  Wa-  215,  220;  Berridge  v.  Glassey,  112 
bash  R.  Co.  (Mich.  1906)  104  N.  Pa.  St.  442,  455,  3  Atl.  Rep.  583, 
W.  Rep.  650.     Leases  of  doubtful  56  Am.  Rep.  322. 

duration   are   construed   favorably 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  LEASES.  455 

sistent.  A  printed  clause  providing  that  if  default  shall  be 
made  in  performing  any  of  the  covenants,  then  it  shall  be  law- 
ful for  the  landlord  to  re-enter,  applies  to  a  written  provision 
that  the  lessee  shall  pay  all  taxes  and  assessments  assessed  dur- 
ing the  term  before  they  become  delinquent.^*  If  the  printed 
and  the  written  provisions  of  a  lease  cannot  be  reconciled,  the 
written  provisions  should  prevail  as  being  presumptively  ex- 
pressive of  more  deliberate  intention  of  the  parties.^^  "Where 
the  language  of  the  operative  part  of  a  lease  is  of  doubtful 
meaning,  the  recitals  preceding  the  operative  part  may  be  used 
as  a  test  to  discover  the  intention  of  the  parties  and  fix  the  true 
meaning  of  the  words.  When  the  words  in  the  operative  part 
of  the  lease  are  clear  and  unambiguous,  they  cannot  be  con- 
trolled by  the  recitals  in  the  lease.  Where  the  recitals  do  not 
express  all  that  is  included  in  the  operation  of  the  lease,  they 
cannot  be  regarded  as  a  full  and  clear  expression  of  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties.^^  A  material  word  which  has  been  appar- 
ently omitted  from  the  lease  by  mutual  mistake  will  be  inserted 
in  construing  a  lease  where  the  lease  contains  other  words  which 
cannot  have  their  proper  effect  unless  that  word  is  introduced, 
though  the  particular  clause  in  the  lease  where  the  word  ought 
to  be  conveys  a  sufficiently  definite  meaning  without  it.^"  Gen- 
erally the  construction  of  the  covenants  of  a  lease  must  be  the 
same  in  equity  as  they  are  in  law.  In  spite  of  this  fact  there  are 
circumstances  where  in  equity  a  covenant  will  be  reformed  either 
because  of  accident  or  mistake,  and  by  this  process  practically 
a  new  covenant  will  be  made.  But  this  new  covenant,  after  it 
has  been  made,  will  be  construed  in  equity  by  the  same  rules 
as  it  would  be  construed  in  a  court  of  law.^' 

§  296.  The  lease  construed  by  the  conduct  of  the  parties. 
"Where  the  language  of  the  lease  is  ambiguous  so  as  to  leave  the 
intention  of  the  parties  to  the  lease  in  doubt  and  different  inter- 
pretations are  permissible,  recourse  may  be  had  to  the  conduct 
of  the  parties  and  to  the  circumstances  surrounding  them  when 

1*  Heiple  v.  Reinhart,  100  Iowa,  ic  Walker  v.  Tucker,  70  111.  525, 

525,  69  N.  W.  Rep.  871.  527. 

15  Seaver  v.  Thompson,   189   III.  it  Dodd  v.  Mitchell,  77  Ind.  388, 

158,  59  N.   E.  Rep.  553,  affirming      392. 

91  111.  App.  500.  IS  Eaton  v.  Lyon,  3  Ves.  692;   Ig- 

gulden  V.  May,  9  Ves.  329,  334. 


456 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


tile  lease  was  signed  and  to  the  construction  which  they  have 
placed  upon  the  lease  in  order  to  ascertain  their  intention.^^ 
The  conduct  of  the  parties  from  which  an  intent  may  be  implied 
must  be  wholly  free  from  mutual  mistake  or  the  influence  of 
fraud  for  the  conduct  of  one  who  is  acting  under  a  mistake  of 
law  or  of  fact  furnishes  no  proper  basis  for  an  implication  that 
he  understands  the  writing  and  acts  as  he  does  with  an  intent 
to  perform  it.  Thus,  there  is  not  such  a  construction  of  the  lease 
by  the  parties  as  will  bind  the  court,  where  under  a  mistake  of 
law,  the  lessee  of  a  gas  lease  paid  an  annual  rental  higher  than 
that  provided  by  the  plain  terms  of  the  lease. -°  In  other  words, 
no  intent  will  be  inferred  from  the  conduct  of  the  parties  which 
is  contradictory  to  the  plain  language  of  the  lease.  So,  though 
a  lease  made  on  Simday  is  void  under  the  statute  and  confers 
no  contractual  rights  on  either  party  to  it,  it  may  be  read  by 
the  court  in  connection  with  other  circumstances  to  explain  the 
character  of  a  lessee's  possession  and  to  account  for  the  con- 
duct of  both  parties  in  relation  to  the  land.  It  may  be  regarded 
as  a  declaration  or  admission  constituting  a  part  of  the  res  ges- 


19  Hall  V.  Harton,  79  Iowa,  352, 
357,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  569;  Sargent 
V.  Adams,  3  Gray  (Mass.)  72,  79; 
Doe  V.  Burt,  1  T.  R.  701;  Siegel  v. 
Colby,  61  111.  App.  315;  Frigeris 
V.  Stillman,  17  La.  Ann.  23;  Ru- 
bens V.  Hill,  213  111.  523,  72  N.  E. 
Rep.  1127,  affirming  115  111.  App. 
565;  Hasbrouck  v.  Paddock,  1 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  615,  638;  Wood  v. 
Sharpless,  174  Pa.  St.  588,  595,  34 
Atl.  Rep.  319,  38  W.  N.  C.  153; 
Anzolone  v.  Paskusz,  96  App.  Div. 
188,  89  N.  Y.  Supp.  203;  Woods  v. 
Edison  Electric  111.  Co.,  184  Mass. 
523,  69. N.  E.  Rep.  364.  In  deter- 
mining what  the  1-ights  of  the  suc- 
cessors of  a  lessee  are,  the  court 
will  take  into  consideration  the 
construction  placed  on  the  provi- 
sions of  the  lease  by  the  parties 
themselves.  Coatsworth  v.  Schoell- 
kopf,  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  753,  37  App. 
Div.  295.  For  the  construction 
by  the  parties  as  to  the  length  of 
the  term  see   Siegel  v.  Colby,   61 


111.  App.  315.  In  Coatsworth  v. 
Schoellkopf,  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  753,  it 
is  said:  "The  original  parties  to 
this  lease  have  long  since  de- 
parted this  life,  and  their  heirs, 
assigns  and  successors  in  interest 
have  continued  peaceably  to  carry 
out  the  provisions  of  the  lease 
until  the  service  of  the  defective 
notice  to  which  we  have  referred. 
These  successors  in  interest  have 
thus  admitted  that  the  liabilities 
and  rights  under  the  lease  of  the 
original  parties  devolved  upon 
them  and  this  is  a  practical  con- 
struction on  their  part  in  favor  of 
the  position  here  taken  that  the 
covenant  as  to  the  buildings  runs 
with  the  land;  and,  when  the 
words  of  a  grant  are  ambiguous 
the  courts  will  call  in  aid  the  acts 
done  under  it  as  a  clue  to  the  in- 
tentiorf  of  the  parties." 

20  Diamond  Plate-Glass  Co.  v. 
Terrell,  22  Ind.  App.  346.  52  N. 
B.  Rep.  168. 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  LEASES.  457 

ta-e.^'^  Thus,  where  injuries  by  "reasonable  use"  were  excepted, 
it  is  proper  in  determining  the  meaning  of  the  word  "reason- 
able," which  is,  under  the  circumstances  ambiguous,  to  consider 
the  condition,  situation  and  adaptation  of  the  land  for  any  par- 
ticular use,  the  statements  of  the  parties  as  to  the  use  to  which 
it  had  been  put,  and  was  to  be  put  by  the  lessee,  and  that  it  had 
no  rental  value  for  any  other  purpose,  all  of  which  may  be 
proved  by  parol.-' 

§  297.  Writings  will  be  constmed  tog-ether.  Where  the 
terms  of  an  agreement  between  the  lessor  and  the  lessee  are  con- 
tained in  two  or  more  writings  each  of  which  is  incomplete  in 
itself,  though  all  taken  together  constitute  a  lease,  all  the  writ- 
ings will  be  construed  together  in  order  to  ascertain  the  real 
intention  of  the  parties  to  the  lease.^  A  prior  or  contempo- 
raneous writing  may  be  incorporated  into  a  written  lease  by  a 
reference  to  it  in  the  lease  if  referring  to  the  same  property  and 
if  it  recites  it  as  in  existence  when  the  lease  is  executed.  But 
two  leases  of  different  dates  of  distinct  pieces  of  property, 
though  between  the  same  parties,  neither  of  which  refers  to  the 
other,  cannot  be  construed  together  but  must  be  treated  as  sep- 
arate instruments.^*  But  two  or  more  leases  are  not  necessarily 
construed  together  merely  because  they  relate  to  the  same  prem- 
ises. It  must  appear  that  the  parties  considered  and  treated 
them  as  one  instrument,  the  best  evidence  of  which  intention  is 
that  one  of  them  refers  to  the  other.^^ 

§  298.  Merger  in  lease  of  all  preliminary  conversations.  The 
general  rule  is  firmly  settled  that  where  parties  have  entered 
into  a  written  contract,  all  previous  conversations,  negotiations 
and  propositions,  whether  oral  or  written,  are  to  be  regarded  as 
merged  in  the  final  and  definite  agreement  in  writing.-®     In 

21  Rainey  v.  Caps,  22  Ala.  288.  them  and  a  third  person.    Eubank 

22  Bartel  v.  Brain,  13  Utah,  162,  v.  May,  etc..  Hardware  Co.,  105 
44  Pac.  Rep.  715.  Ala.    629,    17    So.    Rep.    109.     See, 

23  Cadwallader  v.  United  States  also,  Putnam  v.  Stewart,  97  N.  Y. 
Exp.  Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  455,  23  Atl.  411,  414. 

Rep.  T75,   29  W.  N.  C.   504;    Con-  2&  Anderson  v.  Winton„  136  Ala. 

solidated   Coal    Co.   v.   Peers,    150  422,  34  So.  Rep.  962,  965. 

111.  344,  37  N.  E.  Rep.  537.  ze  Ruse  v.  Mutual  Benefit  L.  Ins. 

24  Anderson  v.  Winton,  136  Ala.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  516;  Bailey  v.  Sny- 
422,  34  So.  Rep.  962.  If  its  terms  der,  13  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  160;  Hay- 
are  known  to  all,  the  parties  to  a  cock  v.  Johnston  (Minn.)  83  N.  W. 
lease  may  adopt  by  reference  the  Rep.  494;  King  t.  Enterprize  Ins. 
terms    of    a    prior    lease    between  Co.,  45  Ind.  43;    Grand  Trunk  W. 


458  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

theory  and  logically  it  must  be  assumed  that  the  writing  when 
executed  constitutes  the  consummated  intention  of  the  parties 
and  that  by  signing  it  they  have  at  least  tacitly  agreed  to  dis- 
card and  forget  everything  which  preceded  it  and  w^hich  has 
not  by  them  been  embodied  in  the  instrument  they  have  signed. 
The  intention  of  the  instrument  was  to  avoid  future  controversy 
as  to  the  things  agreed  to  in  it  and  to  hold  that  prior  conversa- 
tions can  be  proved  to  enlarge  or  contradict  is  to  open  wide  the 
door  for  future  litigation.  These  considerations  are  applicable 
to  the  lease  and  to  the  preliminary  negotiations  which  lead  up 
to  its  execution.  For  a  lease,  it  is  clear,  is  a  contract  prescribing 
the  rights,  duties  and  liabilities  of  lessor  and  lessee  and  if  full 
and  apparently  complete  in  itself,  may  with  reason  be  assumed 
to  contain  the  full  expression  of  the  intention  of  the  parties  as 
to  the  extent  and  character  of  such  rights,  duties  and  liabilities. 
In  other  words,  a  lease  as  executed  absorbs  and  incorporates  all 
that  has  preceded  it  between  the  parties  and  in  the  absence  of 
fraud,  accident  or  mistake  may  be  conclusively  presumed  to 
represent  the  ultimate  and  final  deliberation  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ant.*' Hence,  it  cannot  be  shown  by  parol  that  the  landlord 
agreed  not  to  erect  a  new  building  adjacent  to  that  leased  and 
which  would,  to  a  certain  extent,  interfere  with  the  tenant's  en- 
joyment of  the  leased  premises  unless  such  an  agreement  has 
been  inserted  in  the  lease.^* 

Ry.  Co.  V.  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  R.  whole  engagement  of  the  parties 

Co.,  141  Fed.  Rep.  78.5.  and    the    extent    and    manner    of 

27  Phillbrook  v.  Emswiler,  92  their  undertaking  are  embraced 
Ind.  590,  591;  Ranalli  v.  Zeppetelli,  in  the  writing.  This  rule  has 
94  N.  Y.  Supp.  561;  New  York  v.  been  repeatedly  applied  to  cases 
Mason,  9  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  282;  Gerry  like  the  present,  where  tenants 
V.  Siebrecht,  88  N.  Y.  1034,  1037.  have  set  up  oral  agreements  or 
(Construing  words  "ready  for  oc-  promises  alleged  to  have  been 
oupancy.")  made    by    the    landlord,    at    the 

28  Haycock  v.  Johnston,  81  Minn.  time  of,  or  before,  the  execution 
49,  83  N.  W.  Rep.  494.  of  the  lease,  and  as  an  inducement 

Merger.    Where  the  terms  of  a  thereto.     The     alleged      promises 

lease   are   in   writing,   the   rights  have  in   most   cases  been   to   put 

and  duties  of  the  parties  depend  the  premises  in   repair  but  they 

upon   the   terms   or   legal   intend-  have  uniformly  been  held  to  have 

ment   of   the    lease    itself,    or   as  been    merged    in    the    lease.     By 

otherwise    expressed,    that    it    is  Rapallo,  J.,  in  Wilson  v.  Deen,  74 

conclusively    presumed    that    the  N.     Y.     531,     on     p.     534,     citing 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  LEASES.  459 

§  299.  The  meaning  of  technical  terms  in  a  lease.  Tech- 
nical terms  of  law  or  of  commerce  used  by  the  parties  in  tlie 
lease  will  ordinarily  be  presumed  to  have  been  employed  in  their 
primary  sense.  Thus,  where  a  purely  technical  term  is  found  in 
the  quaint  language  of  ancient  leases,  it  will  be  presumed  that 
the  parties  to  the  lease  used  it  in  its  strict  common  law  meaning 
in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary'.  This  is  especially 
true  where  the  lease  was  prepared  by  a  person  learned  in  the 
law.-"  There  is  no  ]iresumption  of  law,  where  the  parties  to  the 
lease  use  a  technical  word,  that  they  use  it  in  any  restricted  or 
secondary  sense:  or  that  they  use  it  according  to  the  peculiar 
sense  in  wliich  it  is  understood  in  the  neighborhood  where  the 
premises  are  located.  If  there  is  disputed  evidence  of  the 
meaning  of  a  technical  word,  its  sense  is  for  the  jury.^°  Parol 
evidence  Avill  be  received  to  explain  the  meaning  of  a  technical 
word  used  in  a  lease  where  the  word  has  two  or  more  meanings 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  what  rights  passed  by  the  use  of 
such  word.^^ 

§  300.  When  parol  evidence  is  received  in  the  case  of  leases. 
There  are  some  exceptions  to  the  rule  by  Avhich  parol  evidence 
is  excluded  in  case  of  a  written  lease,  "^'hile  the  lease  cannot 
be  varied  or  contradicted,  parol  evidence  may  be  received  in 
connection  with  it  for  certain  purposes.  Thus,  parol  evidence 
is  receivable  to  show  that  the  execution  of  a  written  lease  was 
procured  by  false  and  fraudulent  representations.^^  The  repre- 
sentations, though  by  word  of  mouth,  may  be  proved,  and,  if 
they  are  sufficient  and  material,  the  lease  will  be  set  aside.  Parol 
evidence  is  also  received  to  prove  an  oral  contract  which  was 

Cleves  V.  Willoughby,   7   Hill    (N.  29  Michaels  v.  Fishel,  169  N.  Y. 

Y.)    83;    Speclvels  v.  Sax,  1  E.  D.  381,  62  N.  E.  Rep.  425. 

Smith    (N.    Y.)    253;     Howard    v.  30  Clayton    v.    Greyson,    6    N.    & 

Thomas,    12    Ohio    St.    201;    Brig-  M.  694,  5  A.  &  E.  302. 

ham  V.  Rogers,  17  Mass.  571;  Re-  3i  Tudgay  v.  Sampson,  30  L.  T. 

nard   v.    Sampson,   12   N.   Y.   561;  262;    Clayton  v.  Greyson,  6   H.   & 

Ruse  V.  Mutual  B.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  N.  694,  5  A.  &  E.  302. 

23  N.  Y.  516;    Johnson  v.  Oppen-  32  Hultz  v.  Wright,  16   S.  &  R. 

heim,  55  id.  293.     See,  also,  Carey  (Pa.)    345;    Lansdale   v.   Richard- 

V.  Kreiger,  57  N.  Y.  Supp.  79;  Mc-  son,  1  W.  N.  C.   (Pa.)   413;   Wolfe 

Lean  v.  Nicol,  43  Minn.  169,  45  N.  v.  Arrott,  109  Pa.  St.  473,  16  W.  N. 

W.  Rep.  15.  C.  565,  33  Pitts.  L.  J.  427,  1  Atl. 

Rep.  333. 


460  LAW  OF  LxVNDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

the  consideration  for  the  written  lease.^^  Tlius,  where  the  lessee 
accepts  a  lease  of  a  farm  upon  the  landlord's  oral  promise  that 
he  would  build  a  bam  on  it  by  a  certain  date,  the  tenant  has  the 
right  to  prove  the  oral  promise  to  show  why  he  executed  the 
written  lease.  He  may  also  sue  on  the  oral  agreement  for  dam- 
ages, though  the  lease  as  written  contained  no  provisions  respect- 
ing the  bam.**  But  parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  show  that 
before  the  execution  of  a  lease  in  writing,  the  landlord  promised 
the  tenant  that  he  would  put  water  and  gas  in  the  premises  dur- 
ing the  term.  Such  an  agreement  is  not  a  collateral  agreement, 
but  is  an  agreement  between  the  parties  to  do  something  directly 
concerning  the  premises;  it  is  on  the  same  basis  as  would  be  a 
covenant  by  the  landlord  to  make  repairs.^^  On  the  other  hand, 
a  collateral  agreement  may  be  shown.  Thus,  for  example,  an 
oral  agreement  by  the  landlord  t-o  destroy  all  game  on  the  de- 
mised premises,  which  is  collateral  to  a  written  lease  in  which 
the  tenant  promises  not  to  kill  or  destroy  game,  and  in  which 
the  right  to  hunt  game  on  the  premises  was  reserved  to  the 
landlord  may  be  proved.^®  Under  the  general  rule,  parol  evi- 
dence is  always  admissible  to  explain  the  lease  or  to  correct  an 
error  in  it,  to  describe  the  subject  matter  and  to  show  facts  and 
circumstances  surrounding  its  execution.  Thus,  an  error  in  the 
statement  of  the  rent  may  be  corrected  by  parol.^^  The  time 
when  the  rent  is  payable  by  a  written  lease  may  be  shown  by 
parol  where  the  lease  itself  is  silent.^^  And  where  there  is  any 
indcfiniteness  as  to  the  premises  which  are  leased,  parol  evidence 
may  be  received  to  make  their  description  more  definite  and  more 
certain.*^    The  character  in  which  the  lessee  or  the  lessor  signed 

83  As  an  oral  agreement  by  the  Ch.  849,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  756,  29  L.  T. 

leBPor     to     repair.     Clenighan     t.  234,  21  W.  R.  802. 

McFarland,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  719.  S7  Snyder  v.  May,  19  Pa.  St.  235. 

8*  Shughart  v.  Moore,  78  Pa.  St.  But  if  the  rent  is  falsely  stated  in 

469,  1  W.  N.  C.  598,  23  Pitts.  L.  J.  the  lease   for   the  purpose   of  de- 

15,  32  L.  J.  336.  frauding  a  stranger  to  it  the  real 

so  McLean    v.    Nicol,    43    Minn.  amount  cannot  be  shown  by  parol 

169,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  15.  as  between  the  parties.     Delama- 

86  Morgan   v.   Griffith,    40   L.    J.  ter  v.  Bush,  63  Barb.  168. 

Ex.   46,  L.  R.  6  Ex.   70,   23   L.  T.  as  Hartsell    v.    Myers,    57    Misc. 

783,    19    W.    R.    957;     Erskine    t.  135. 

Adeane,  Bennett's  Claim,  42  L.  J.  so  Heyward  v.  Wilmarth,  84  N. 

Y.   S.  75,   87   App.   Div.   125. 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  LEASES.  461 

the  lease  may  be  explained  by  parol  evidence.  Thus,  it  may  be 
shown  that  although  the  lease  was  signed  by  an  individual,  yet 
it  was  in  fact  signed  by  him  on  behalf  of  a  partnership  of  which 
he  was  a  member.*"  And  where  the  question  is  whether  a  land- 
lord after  the  expiration  of  the  written  lease  recognized  his  ten- 
ant as  such,  parol  evidence  may  be  received  to  show  the  rela- 
tions of  the  parties  continued  to  be  the  same  after  the  lease  as 
they  were  before  its  expiration.*^  It  is  also  competent  to  prove 
an  oral  agreement  modifying  the  lease  under  seal  if  the  agree- 
ment is  based  on  a  good  consideration,  and  is  not  required  to  be 
in  writing  under  the  statute  of  frauds.*^  Thus,  it  may  be  proved 
by  parol  evidence  that  the  parties  to  a  written  lease  orally  agreed 
to  reduce  the  rent  when  the  rent  as  reduced  was  paid  by  the 
tenant  and  receipted  for  in  full  by  the  landlord.*-*  Such  an  agree- 
ment is  a  good  defense  in  a  subsequent  action  by  the  landlord 
to  recover  the  amount  of  rent  agreed  to  be  paid  by  the  lease. ^^ 
Parol  evidence  is  always  admissible  to  show  that  a  mistake  was 
made  in  the  rent  as  stated  in  the  lease.**  Where  the  lease  pro- 
vides for  a  consent  by  the  landlord  to  some  action  on  the  part 
of  the  tenant,  it  is  always  admissible  to  prove  by  parol  that  the 
consent  was  given  unless  the  lease  expressly  required  consent  to 
be  in  writing.*^  So,  parol  evidence  may  be  received  to  show 
that  the  lease  was  made  for  illegal  purposes,*^  or  to  show  that 
the  element  of  fraud  entered  into  its  execution,  and  generally  to 
show  that  the  lease  is  void  and  of  no  effect.  Under  the  rule  that 
parol  evidence  is  receivable  to  show  what  property  was  intended 
to  be  included  in  the  lease  but  not  to  extend  the  description 
it  has  been  held  that  where  the  lease  was  for  the  "Adam's  house, 
situated  on  Washington  street,  Boston, ' '  it  might  be  proved  what 

*o  Woolsey  v.   Henke,   125   Wis.  42a  "Wilson     Gas     Company,     89 

134,  103  N.  W.  Rep.  207.  Pac.  Rep.  897. 

■41  Amaden    v.    Atwood,    38    Atl.  <3  McKenzie  v.  Harrison,   24  N. 

Rep.  263,  69  Vt.  527.  E.  Rep.  458,  120  N.  Y.  260. 

42  Wilgus    V.    Whitehead,    8    Pa.  •**  sire  v.  Rumbold,  39  N.  Y.  St. 

St.  131,  6  W.  N.  C.  537,  26  Pitts.  Rep.  85,  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  925. 

L.  J.  202.     The  question  whether  o  Palmer    v.    Sanders,    49    Fed. 

there  was  a  parol  modification  of  Rep.  144. 

the  lease  constituting  a  new  con-  *q  Doe  v.  Allen,  8  T.  R.  148;  Rex 

tract    is    for    the    jury.     Evers    v.  v.  Northwingfleld,  1  B.  &  Ad.  912; 

Shumaker,  57  Mo.  Ap.  454.  Lightfoot  v.  Tenant,  1  Bos.  &  Pul. 

555. 


462  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

the  parties  intended  by  these  words.*^  So,  where  the  lease  de- 
mised "a  house  and  lot  containing  three  acres  more  or  less," 
and  the  lessee  claiming  seven  acres,  all  of  which  was  in  one  lot 
not  divided  by  any  fences,  it  was  permissible  to  prove  by  parol 
that  the  original  lot  connected  with  the  house  contained  only 
three  acres,  and  that  the  lessor  had  subsequently  purchased  four 
acres  and  occupied  the  whole  tract  at  the  time  of  the  lease  and 
that  the  lease  was  intended  by  the  parties  to  cover  only  the  orig- 
inal three  acre  lot.*^  If,  however,  the  description  of  the  lease 
is  intelligible  and  offers  sufficient  means  of  ascertaining  exactly 
what  the  parties  intended  to  lease,  it  cannot  be  extended  by 
parol  evidence  to  include  other  premises.*®  On  the  other  hand, 
parol  evidence  has  been  received  to  show  that  the  cellar  of  an 
adjoining  house  had  been  occupied  by  the  lessee  with  the  prem- 
ises to  which  the  lease  applied  and  was  necessary  for  the  carry- 
ing on  of  the  lessee's  business  in  a  case  where  the  question  was 
as  to  the  renewal  of  the  lease.^"  So,  also,  where  a  lessor  after  the 
execution  of  the  lease  gave  a  new  lease  of  adjoining  lands  and 
agreed  to  renew  this  lease,  parol  evidence  was  received  to  show 
the  intention  of  the  parties  as  to  the  inclusion  of  the  adjoining 
land  in  the  renewal  lease.^^  So,  when  there  was  a  clause  in  a 
lease  "that  the  lessee  is  to  have  all  the  personal  property  on  the 
farm,"  parol  evidence  was  received  on  the  question  whether  this 
clause  meant  that  he  should  have  merely  the  use  of  such  prop- 
erty or  that  it  should  be  his  absolutely.^-  So,  in  England,  if  a 
party  grant  a  manor  by  particular  name  and  he  has  two  man- 
ors of  that  name,  parol  evidence  is  received  to  show  which  of 
them  was  meant.  So.  parol  evidence  of  usage  has  been  received 
to  show  that  a  room  which  had  not  been  occupied  in  certain 
premises  did  not  in  fact  pass  under  a  demise  of  these  premises 

47  Sargent    v.    Adams,    3    Gray  gleston  v.  Bradford,  10  Ohio,  312; 

(Mass.)   72.  Campbell  v.  Johnson,  44  Mo.  247; 

48 Chamberlain  v.   Letson,   5  N.  Bratton  v.  Clamson,  3  Strobh.  (S. 

J.  Law,  152.  Car.)    135. 

49  Vose    V.    Bradstreet,    27    Me.  co  Crawford  v.  Morris,   5  Gratt. 

1.56;  Norwood  V.  Byrd,  1  Rich.  (S.  (Va.)   90. 

Car.)   13.5;   Phillips  v.  Castley,  40  oi  Midlothian   &  Co.   v.   Finney, 

Ala.   486;    Todd   v.   Phllhower,    24  19  Gratt.    (Va.)    304. 

N.    J.    Law,    796;     McLaughlin    v.  g2  Wing  v.  Gray,  36  Vt.  261. 
Bishop,    nr,    N.    J.    Law,    512;    Eg- 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  LEASES.  463 

together  with  all  rooms,  chambers,  and  appurtenances  thereto 
belonging.*' 

§  301.  When  parol  evidence  is  not  received  in  the  case  of 
leases.  In  the  absence  of  fraud,  accident  or  mistake  evidence 
of  parol  agreements  made  at  the  time  of  execution  or  before  the 
lease  was  executed,  is  not  admissible  to  contradict  or  vary  the 
terms  of  a  written  lease.^*  Thus,  as  a  general  rule,  parol  evidence 
is  not  received  for  the  purpose  of  diminishing  the  sum  agreed 
to  be  paid  for  rent  unless  in  case  of  accident,  fraud  or  mistake." 
So,  where  there  is  no  ambiguity  in  the  description  of  the  prem- 
ises comprised  in  the  lease,  parol  evidence  is  not-  received  to  aid 
in  the  construction  of  the  lease.^^  If  the  language  of  the  lease 
is  clear  and  intelligible,  parol  evidence  is  rejected.  Thus,  parol 
evidence  was  rejected  to  show  that  the  lessee  explained  the 
meaning  of  the  forfeiture  clause  to  the  lessor  and  that  the  latter 
agreed  with  him  in  the  explanation  which  he  gave."  So,  where 
a  lease  is  silent,  it  will  not  be  permissible  to  prove  by  parol  that 
the  lessor  stated  the  house  was  in  good  sanitary  condition  unless 
the  element  of  fraud  or  the  falsity  of  statement  is  involved.^® 
So,  where  there  is  an  agreement  between  the  lessor  and  the  lessee 
which  is  complete  and  intelligible  upon  its  face,  parol  evidence 
wiU  not  be  received  to  show  that  a  different  agreement  was  made 

53Kerslake   y.   White,    2    Stark.  144    Fed.    Rep.    64;     McQuire    v. 

508.  Gerstley,  26  App.  Div.  193;   Green 

54Snead   v.    Tietjen    (Ariz.)    24  v.  Dodge   (Vt.  1906)    64  Atl.  Rep. 

Pac.  Rep.  324;    Cozens  v.   Steven-  499. 

son,  5  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  421;   Hertzler  ss  William  v.  Kent,  67  Md.  350, 

V.  Worman,  1  W.  N.  C.  (Pa.)  153;  10    Atl.    Rep.    228;     Patterson    v. 

Ker  V.    Hunt,   1   W.    N.   C.    (Pa.)  O'Hara,  2  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.)  58; 

115;    Hood  V.  McDonald,  1  W.  N.  Butler    v.     Smith's     Homeopathic 

C.    (Pa.)    299;    Loley  v.   Heller,   1  Pharmacy,  5  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  685; 

W.    N.    C.    (Pa.)    613;     Taylor    v.  Taylor  v.  Goding  (Mass.)  65  N.  E. 

Goding  (Mass.)  65  N.  E.  Rep.  64;  Rep.  64. 

Patterson     v.     O'Hara,     2     E.     D.  5«  Ballance  v.  City  of  Peoria,  54 

Smith     (N.     Y.)     58;     Butler    v.  N.  E.  428,  180  111.  29,  70  111.  App. 

Smith  Pharmacy,  5  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  546. 

885;  Tait's  Exr.  v.  Central  Lunatic  bt  Hall   v.   Phillips,   1G4   Pa.    St. 

Asj'lum,  84  Va.   271,  4  S.   E.   Rep.  494,  30  Atl.  Rep.  353. 

697;  Tyler  v.  Giesler,  85  Mo.  App.  68  Stevens   v.   Pierce,   151    Mass. 

278;  Brown  v.  Schiappacassee,  115  207,  23  N.  E.  1006. 

Mich.    47,    72    N.    W.    Rep.    1096;  59  Snowhill  v.  Reed,  49  N.  J.  L. 

Madden   v.    McKensie    (C.   C.   A.)  292,  10  Atl.  Rep.  737. 


464  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

which  was  not  included  in  the  lease.^®  Thus,  where  the  lease 
provided  for  its  surrender  upon  a  certain  event  happening,  it 
will  not  be  allowable  to  prove  that  this  contract  for  a  surrender 
did  not  contain  all  the  terms  which  had  been  agreed  upon  be- 
tween the  parties.  And  where  the  lease  is  silent  the  lessee  is 
not  permitted  to  show  by  parol  that  at  the  date  of  its  execution 
he  bought  the  business  carried  on  by  the  lessor  in  the  premises, 
and  the  lessor  agreed  not  to  carry  on  that  business  so  as  to  com- 
pete with  him.  Such  evidence  is  not  admissible  when  offered 
by  the  lessee  in  an  action  against  him  for  the  rent  though  he 
may  recover  damages  thereon  against  the  lessor  in  another  ac- 
tion."" So,  where  the  lease  is  silent,  parol  evidence  is  not  ad- 
missible to  prove  that  the  landlord  had  agreed  that,  in  case  of 
the  destruction  of  the  premises  by  fire,  the  rent  should  cease 
where  this  evidence  is  offered  in  an  action  on  an  absolute  note 
given  for  the  rent.®^  So,  an  agreement  by  the  lessor  extending 
the  term  of  the  lease  and  providing  that  fixtures  shall  become 
the  property  of  the  landlord  which  is  written  on  the  back  of  the 
written  lease,  cannot  be  varied  by  parol.*'-  So,  parol  proof  is 
not  received  to  show  the  use  to  which  the  landlord  said  the  build- 
ing was  to  be  put,  where  the  lease  itself  is  silent  on  this  point.^^ 
Parol  evidence  is  inadmissible  to  contradict  an  agreement  in  the 
lease  by  which  the  buildings  on  the  premises  were  at  the  date  of 
the  expiration  of  the  tenn  to  become  the  property  of  the  lessor.^* 
Parol  evidence  has  been  rejected  to  show  that  the  landlord  repre- 
sented that  the  premises  were  in  good  condition  or  fit  for  occupa- 
tion,®^ or  to  show  that  an  assignee  of  a  lessee  agreed  to  pay  the 
accrued  rent  due  by  his  assignor.®®  So,  where  the  lease  of  a 
coal  mine  contained  no  agreement  as  to  how  much  coal  was  to 
be  mined,  but  fixed  a  certain  royalty  per  bushel,  it  cannot  be 
shown  by  parol  that  the  lessee  agreed  to  dig  any  particular 
quantity  of  coal.®''  The  time  fixed  in  the  lease  for  the  payment 
of  an  instalment  of  rent  cannot  be  contradicted  by  parol  evi- 

60  Scholtz   V.    Dankert,    69   Wis.  c4  Tait's  Ex'r  v.  Central  Lunatic 

416.  34  N.  W.  Rep.  394.  Asylum,  84  Va.  271,  4  S.  E.  Rep. 

05  Stafford   v.    Staunton,    88    Ga.  697. 

298,  14  S.  E.  Rep.  479.  65  Button    r.    Gerrish,    9    Gush. 

02  Walsh  V.  Martin,  69  Mich.  29,  (Mass.)   89. 

37  N.  W.  Rep.  40.  os  Graves  v.  Porter,  11  Barb.  (N. 

63  Bristol   Hotel  Co.   v.  Pegram,  Y.)  192. 

98  N.  Y.  Supp.  512.  o"  Lyon  v.  Miller,  24  Pa.  St.  392. 


CONSTRUCTION  OP  LEASES.  465 

dence.^®  The  description  of  the  lease  cannot  be  extended  by 
parol.*"  Nor  can  it  be  shown  that  the  lease  was  to  be  commenced 
at  a  later  date  than  that  s.pecified  in  it.''"  And  where  the  tenant 
alleged  that  there  has  been  a  parol  extension  of  the  lease,  the 
burden  of  proof  is  upon  him  to  show  such  an  extension.'^^ 

§  302.  Parol  evidence  of  custom  to  aid  in  the  construction  of 
a  lease.  A  lease  is  always  open  to  explanation  by  parol  as 
between  the  parties  to  it  where  it  is  ambiguous  or  unintelligible, 
by  proof  of  custom  and  usage  prevalent  generally  in  the  country 
or  in  the  district  in  which  the  premises  are  located.  The  lan- 
guage of  the  lease  cannot  be  varied  by  parol  proof  of  custom/^ 
Thus,  evidence  of  custom  was  rejected  where  it  was  offered  to 
prove  that  a  right  to  the  furnishing  of  steam  and  forced  air 
passed  under  the  lease  as  appurtenances.^^  In  order  that  the 
custom  shall  be  received  in  evidence,  it  is  necessary  to  show  that 
such  custom  was  general  and  was  known  to  the  parties  who  con- 
tracted in  a  lease.'^*  Proof  of  custom  is  admissible  in  respect 
to  all  matters  upon  which  the  parties  are  silent  as  to  their  inten- 
tion so  far  as  the  written  lease  is  concerned.''^  Thus,  proof  of 
custom  will  be  received  to  show  that  a  crop  growing  on  the  land 
was  regarded  as  personal  property  and  was  meant  to  be  re- 
served to  the  lessee.^*  On  the  other  hand,  proof  of  custom  preva- 
lent in  the  vicinity  has  been  received  to  show  that  the  tenant  has 
a  right  to  remove  the  crop  or  fixtures  at  the  end  of  the  term. 
So,  evidence  of  custom  is  admissible  where  a  house  is  let  to  a 
tenant  at  will  to  show  that  in  such  case  the  lessor  attends  to  the 
outside  repairs,  but  it  is  not  admissible  to  prove  that  the  land- 
lord had  control  of  the  outer  walls,  yard  and  roof  of  the  house.''^ 

68  Barton    v.    Dawes,    10    C.    B.  ts  Watkins  v.  Green,  46  Atl.  Rep. 

261;   Mees  v.  Aneell,  3  Wils.  275;  38,  22  R.  I.  34. 

Norton  v.  Webster,  12  Ad.  &  El.  74  Whipple    v.    Tucker,    123    111. 

442;    Hope  v.  Atkins,  1  Price,  143.  App.  223. 

60  Carpenter      v.      Shanklin,      7  75  Cochrane  v.  Justice  Min.  Co., 

Blackf.    (Ind.)    308.  16    Colo.    415,    26    Pac.    Rep.    780; 

70  Henson    v.   Cooper,    3    Scott's  Van  Ness  v.  Pacard,  2  Pet.  (U.S.) 

N.  R.  48.  137,  148,  7  Law.  ed.  374;   Duncan 

7iLutz   V.   Wainwright,    44    Atl.  v.  Blake,  9  Lea  (Tenn.)    534,  537. 

Rep.  565,  193  Pa.  St.  541.  76  Youmans  v.  Caldwell,  4  Ohio 

72  Whipple    V.    Tucker,    123    111.  St.  71. 

App.- 223;  Werner  v.  Footman,  54  77  shute  v.  Bills.  191  Mass.  433, 

Ga.  128.  78  N.  E.  Rep.  96,  which  was  a  case 

30 


466  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

In  England,  it  has  been  held  that  where  rent  has  been  made 
payable.  "Lady  day"  parol  evidence  of  custom  was  received  to 
show  what  day  was  meant.'^  And  it  has  also  been  held  in  Eng- 
land that  evidence  of  a  custom  in  a  particular  trade  which  was 
carried  on  in  the  premises,  might  be  received  to  show  the  length 
of  the  term  where  the  lease  was  silent  or  ambiguous  as  to  the 
length  of  the  term.^^  Thus,  where  the  question  was  on  the 
obligation  of  the  lessee  to  pay  interest  on  an  instalment  of  rent, 
it  may  be  shown  that  it  was  the  custom  of  the  lessor  to  receive 
instalments  of  rent  within  ninety  days  after  they  had  become 
due.«° 

§  303  The  modification  of  the  lease  by  the  parties.  A  lease, 
whether  in  writing  or  in  parol  may  always  be  modified  as  to  its 
terms  by  the  consent  of  the  parties  on  a  good  consideration.*^ 
If  the  lease  is  by  parol,  a  modification  by  parol  is  unquestionably 
valid.  Where  the  lease  is  under  seal  and  the  modifying  agree- 
ment is  not,  the  rule  is  not  so  clear.  By  the  ancient  common  law 
an  instrument  under  seal  could  not  be  modified  or  discharged 
except  by  an  instrument  of  equal  solemnity  and  dignity,  i.  e., 
by  a  writing  also  under  seal.  This  is  still  recognized  as  a  valid 
rule  of  law  in  many  of  the  states  of  the  Union  so  far  as  writing-s 
of  a  contractual  nature,  executed  under  seal  are  concerned,  in 
which  class,  leases  under  seal  would  be  included.*"  In  other 
jurisdictions,  it  has  been  held  that  a  contract  in  writing,  though 
it  was  executed  under  seal  may  be  modified  as  to  any  or  all  of 
its  terms  by  parol  or  by  a  writing  without  seal  if  the  modifying 
contract  is  based  upon  a  valid  consideration  and  is  carried  into 

where  it  was  attempted  to  hold  a  si  Hanson  v.  Hellen  (Me.  1886), 

landlord   liable   for    injuries   aris-  6  Atl.  Rep.  837. 

ing  from  a  hidden  defect  on  the  82  in  the  following  cases  the  rule 

outside  of  the  house.  of  the  text  was  applied  to  leases: 

78  Doe  V.  Hall,  Benson,  4  B.  &  Palmer  v.  Sanders,  49  Fed.  Rep. 
Aid.  588;  Denn  d.  Peters  v.  Hop-  144;  Barnett  v.  Barnes,  73  111.  216; 
kinson,  3  D.  &  R.  507.  Goldsbrough  v.  Gable,  36  111.  App. 

79  In  re  Stroud,  8  C.  B.  502,  503,  363;  Flarsheim  v.  Dullaghan,  58 
19  L.  J.  C.  P:  117;  Brincefield  v.  111.  App.  626;  Volge  v.  Ronalds, 
Allen  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  60  S.  S3  Hun,  114,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  353; 
W.  Rep.  1010.  Street     R.     R.     Co.     v.     Morrison, 

80  Thomas  v.  Railway,  10  Ohio  Adams  &  Allen  Co.,  160  111.  280, 
Fed.  Dec.  544,  81  Fed.  Rep.  911.  303,  43  N.  E.  Rep.  393;    Knefel  v. 

Daly,  91  111.  App.  32L 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  LEASES. 


467 


effect.  Where  the  modifying  agreement  is  by  parol,  it  must  be 
valid  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  or  it  must  be  wholly  executed, 
before  it  will  be  recognized  by  the  law  as  a  valid  modification 
of  the  written  contract.^^ 


83  The  rule  of  the  text  was  ap- 
plied to  a  lease  in  Chamberlain 
V.  Iba,  181  N.  Y.  486,  74  N.  B.  Rep. 
481,  reversing  87  App.  Div.  632,  84 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1120.  See,  also,  Hast- 
ings V.  Lovejoy,  140  Mass.  260, 
265,  2  N.  E.  Rep.  776,  54  Am.  Rep. 
762;  Munroe  v.  Perkins,  9  Pick. 
(Mass.)  298;  Mill  Dam  Foundry 
V.  Hovey,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  417; 
Blasdell  v.  Souther,  6  Gray 
(Mass.)  149.  For  the  application 
of  the  rule  to  leases  see  Hyler  v. 
Humble,  101  Ind.  38;  Prior  v. 
Kiso,  81  Mo.  241;  Evers  v.  Shu- 
maker,  57  Mo.  App.  454;  Horgan 
V.  Krumweide,  25  Hun,  116;  Mc- 
Kenzie  v.  Harrison,  120  N.  Y.  260, 
263,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  458,  8  L.  R.  A. 
257,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  638.  "The 
reason  of  the  rule  was  founded 
upon  public  policy.  It  was  not  re- 
garded as  safe  or  prudent  to  per- 
mit the  contract  of  parties  which 


had  been  carefully  reduced  to 
writing  and  executed  under  seal 
to  be  modified  or  changed  by  the 
testimony  of  witnesses  as  to  the 
parol  statements  or  agreements  of 
parties.  Hence  the  rule  that  tes- 
timony of  parol  agreements  shall 
not  be  competent  as  evidence  to 
impeach,  vary  or  modify  written 
agreements  or  covenants  under 
seal.  But  the  parties  may  waive 
this  rule  and  carry  out  and  per- 
form the  agreements  under  seal 
as  changed  or  modified  by  the 
parol  agreement,  thus  executing 
both  agreements,  and  when  this 
has  been  done  and  the  parties 
have  settled  with  a  full  knowl- 
edge of  the  facts,  and  in  the  ab- 
sence of  fraud,  there  is  no  power 
to  revoke  or  remedy  reserved  to 
either  party."  By  the  court  in 
McKenzie  v.  Harrison,  120  N.  Y. 
260,  on  pp.  263,  264. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

FRAUD  AND  DURESS  IN  PROCURING  THE  LEASE. 

§  304.  General  rules  as  to  duress  and  fraud  in  relation  to  contracts. 

305.  The  effect  of  delay. 

306.  Fraud  in  the  procurement  of  a  lease. 

307.  The  cancellation  of  the  lease  for  duress  or  inadequacy  of  the 

consideration. 

308.  Leases  between  persons  occupying  confidential   relations  with 

the  lessee. 

309.  The  elements  which  must  co-exist  in  the  case  of  fraud. 

310.  The  fraud  of  the  tenant. 

311.  The   tenant   who   has   been   defrauded   need   not  abandon   the 

premises. 

§  304.  General  rules  as  to  duress  and  fraud  in  relation  to 
contracts.  The  fact  that  the  execution  of  a  contract  is  pro- 
cur  d  by  duress  or  fraud  may  be  used  as  a  defense  in  an  action 
at  law  brought  by  the  party  who  has  been  guilty  of  the  fraud 
or  duress,  or  it  may  furnish  the  basis  of  a  suit  in  equity  brought 
by  the  party  who  has  executed  the  contract  to  set  it  aside.  Du- 
ress by  threats  must  be  of  siuch  a  character  as  to  create  in  the 
person  upon  whom  it  is  practiced  a  fear  of  some  grievous  wrong 
or  of  great  bodily  harm  or  of  unlawful  arrest  or  imprisonment. 
The  threats  must  be  of  such  a  character  as  would  be  likely  to 
overcome  a  person  of  average  firmness  of  mind.  A  threat  to  do 
some  act  which  is  lawful  to  be  done,  as  for  example,  a  threat  to 
sue,  or  to  attach  property,  or  to  arrest  a  person  in  a  civil  pro- 
ceeding does  not  necessarily  amount  to  duress.  On  the  other  hand, 
a  threat  to  make  an  unlawful  arrest  and  to  put  the  person 
threatened  in  jail,  or  to  keep  him  in  imprisonment  unlawfully, 
constitutes  duress  where  the  person  thus  threatened  bj'-  weakness 
of  mind  or  body  or  by  reason  of  ignorance  of  his  rights  executes 
a  contract.  So,  too,  though  a  person  is  arrested  by  a  legal 
process,  it  is  a  clear  case  of  duress  if  the  arrest  by  legal  process 
is  employ(!d  for.  and  results  in  the  procuring  of  an  execution  of 
the  contract  by  the  person   arrested  which  he  would  not  have 


FRAUD  AND  DURESS  EN  PROCURING  LEASB.  469 

executed  if  he  liad  not  been  arrested.  But,  duress  may,  and 
usually  does  occur  under  circumstances  where  no  arrest  is  im- 
minent or  threatened.  The  case  of  the  procuring  of  a  contract 
by  threats  of  grievous  harm  made  to  a  person  of  weak  mind 
would  be  an  example  of  duress.  The  rules  above  stated  are  ap- 
plicable to  contracts  of  all  sorts  and  hence  may  be  applied  to 
leases.  "We  are,  however,  without  very  many  cases  in  the  books 
or  in  the  reports  where  leases  have  been  actually  procured  by 
duress  but  where  such  cases  exist  the  eases  cited  under  the  fol- 
lowing sections  may  be  of  service. 

§  305.  The  effect  of  delay.  If  a  lessee  desires  to  avoid  or  re- 
scind a  lease  for  fraud  or  misrepresentation  or  for  a  mutual  mis- 
take, he  must,  upon  his  discovery  of  the  facts,  act  promptly.  He 
should  notify  the  other  party  of  his  purpose  and  intention  and 
having  done  this,  he  must  adhere  to  his  purpose.  By  remaining 
silent  and  treating  the  lease  as  valid  after  he  has  discovered  the 
fraud  or  mistake,  it  will  be  presumed  that  he  has  waived  his 
rights ;  he  will  thereby  be  bound  by  the  lease  to  the  same  extent 
as  though  no  fraud  or  mistake  had  occurred.^  The  failure  of  the 
lessee  for  an  unreasonable  period  to  bring  a  suit  to  rescind  the 
lease  after  he  has  discovered  the  fraud  which  has  been  committed 
by  the  lessor,  is  an  election  by  the  lessee  to  continue  the  lease; 
he  will  therefore  be  liable  to  his  lessor  on  the  covenant  for  rent 
and  on  all  other  covenants,  though  he  has  an  action  at  law  against 
his  lessor  for  damages  for  deceit.^  A  lessee,  who  in  equity  de- 
mands the  cancellation  of  his  lease  should  either  promptly  sur- 
render possession  or  tender  a  surrender  to  his  lessor,  and  having 
surrendered  possession,  he  will  be  compelled  to  continue  out  of 
possession.  Thus,  a  lessee  who  surrendered  possession  of  the 
premises  because  they  were  out  of  repair  and  uninhabitable, 
loses  all  rights  to  have  his  lease  rescinded  in  equity  because 
of  the  landlord's  fraud  where,  after  having  left  the  premises,  he 
re-enters  upon  them  and  continues  to  hold  them.'  The  unreason- 
able delay  of  the  tenant  in  asking  equity  to  rescind  the  lease 

1  Grymes  v.  Sanders,  93  U.  S.  55,  Baker,  43  Minn.  86,  44  N.  W.  Rep. 

23  Law.  Ed.  798;   Oppenheimer  v.  676. 

Clunie,  142  Cal.  313,  75  Pac.  Rep.  2  Little  v.  Dyer,  35  111.  App.  85. 

399;  Commissioner  V.  Younger,  29  s  Blake   v.    Dick,   15    Mont    236, 

Cal.   177;    Ginch   v.    Causey    (Va.  38  Pac.  Rep.  1072. 
1907),  57  S.  E.  Rep.  562;    Bell  v. 


470  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

will  be  laches  and  will  defeat  his  suit.  It  is  for  the  court  to  de- 
termine upon  all  the  facts  of  each  case  what  delay  is  unreason- 
able.* In  one  case  it  was  said  that  a  rescission  or  an  attempt  to 
rescind  a  lease  made  a  month  after  the  tenant  had  entered  upon 
the  premises  was  in  season,  though  he  had  ascertained  the  facts, 
showing  the  falsity  of  his  landlord's  statements  as  to  the  condi- 
tion of  the  premises  immediately  after  taking  possession ;  this 
would  be  the  case  where  the  tenant  was  free  from  delay  in  noti- 
fying his  landlord.^  A  tenant,  who  after  he  has  discovered 
the  fraud  of  his  landlord  in  procuring  him  to  execute  a  lease, 
continues  in  the  possession  of  the  premises  and  pays  rent  regu- 
larly dviring  the  greater  portion  of  the  term,  is  thereby  barred 
from  alleging  or  proving  that  the  execution  of  the  lease  was 
procured  by  fraud  where  his  landlord  sues  to  recover  rent  for 
the  remainder  of  his  term.®  The  defense  that  a  lease  was  ob- 
tained by  duress  interposed  by  a  tenant  has  no  merit  where  it 
appears  he  has  held  over  after  the  expiration  of  the  term.  If 
the  execution  was  in  fact  under  duress  by  the  lessor,  the  lessee 
is  conclusively  estopped  to  plead  it  by  his  acceptance,  of  the  pos- 
session and  by  holding  over  after  the  term  is  ended.  In  such  a 
case  the  lessor  might  have  disregarded  the  lease  altogether  and 
sued  for  use  and  occupation  for  which  in  fairness  and  equity  the 
lessee  is  bound  to  pay.'^ 

§  306.  Fraud  in  the  procurement  of  a  lease.    A  lease  like 
every  other  contract,  is  voidable  for  fraud  in  its  procurement.' 

4  Barker  v.  Fitzgerald,  68  N.  E.  ceived  thereby.     He  must  also  al- 
430,  204  111.   325.  lege    and    prove    that    the    lessor 

5  Cunningham  v.  Wathen,  43  N.  knew     the     representations     were 
Y.  Supp.  886.  false.      Bauer    v.    Taylor,    4    Neb. 

oBell   V.  Baker,   44  N.   W.   Rep.  (Unof.)    701,   96   N.   W.  Rep.   268. 

676,  43  Minn.  86.  A    defense    in    an    action    by    the 

7  Andrew  v.  Carlile,  4  Colo.  App.  landlord    for    his    rent    that    the 

336,  36  Pac.  Rep.  66,  67.     The  ten-  lease  was   obtained   by   duress   is 

ant  who  alleges  fraud  in  the  pro-  not   sustained   by   proof   that   the 

curement  of  a  lease  as  a  set  off  landlord  told  the  tenant  he  must 

or  defense  in  an  action  to  recover  pay    rent   or    vacate,    particularly 

the  rent  has  the  burden  of  proof.  as  there  is  no  allegation  or  proof 

He  must  allege  the  fraud  specific-  that  the  tenant  did  not  understand 

ally    and    also    where    he    alleges  the  terms  of  the  lease  which  he 

false     representations     that     they  executed.      Andrew    v.    Carlile,    4 

were  made  with  an  intent  to  de-  Colo.  App.  336,  36  Pac.  Rep.  66. 
ceive   him    and    that   he   was    de-  s  As    to    leases,    see    Haines    v. 


FRAUD  AND  DURESS  IN  PROCURING  LEASE,  471 

So,  a  lea-se  which  has  been  obtained  by  fraud  and  circumvention 
from  a  landlord  who,  when  he  executed  it,  wa.s  in  a  state  of  in- 
toxication, is  void.®  The  presumption,  however,  is  always  in 
favor  of  the  good  faith  of  the  lease.  The  parties  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  competent  to  contract  and  the  lease  will  be 
presumed  to  be  free  from  fraud  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence 
to  the  contrary.  It  will  be  presumed  that  the  landlord  spoke  the 
truth  as  to  the  condition  of  the  premises  and  as  to  the  rent  which 
he  was  receiving  for  their  use.  In  order  to  persuade  a  court  of 
equity  to  set  aside  a  lease  for  fraud,  there  must  be  satisfactor\' 
evidence  of  fraud.  Proof  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  is  not  re- 
quired but  in  every  case  the  proof  must  be  such  that  it  shall 
create  something  more  than  a  mere  probability  that  fraud  was 
employed  in  procuring  the  lease  or  that  the  landlord  spoke 
falsely.^"  The  party  to  the  lease  alleging  fraud  has  the  burden 
of  proof  and  fraud  must  always  be  shown  by  clear  and  satisfac- 
tory evidence."  ^Wtat  in  any  case  shall  constitute  fraud  w^hich 
will  justif}^  the  rescission  of  the  lease  depends  in  all  eases  upon 
the  peculiar  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  Merely  mis- 
representating  the  legal  effect  of  the  language  of  a  written  lease 
is  not  fraud. "^  Fraud  in  procuring  the  execution  of  a  lease  may 
be  committed  by  either  party.  It  is  fraud  in  the  lessee,  justify- 
ing the  rescission  of  a  lease  by  the  lessor  for  the  lessee  to  state 
falsely  that  he  is  solvent,  has  paid  his  rent  promptly  to  other 
landlords  and  has  considerable  personal  property  which  he  will 
pledge  as  security  for  the  rent,"  or  for  a  lessee  to  misrepresent 

Downey,  86   111.  App.  373;   Fry  v.  W.  Rep.  105;    Lynch  v.   Sauer,  37 

Day,  97  Ind.  348;  Martin  v.  Davis,  N.  Y.  Supp.  666,  13  Misc.  Rep.  1. 

96  Iowa,  718,  720,  65  N.  W.  Rep.  »  Butler  v.  Mulvihill,  1  Bligh.  137. 

1001;  Ball  V.  Lively,  4  Dana  (Ky.)  lo  Smith    v.    Collins    (Ala.),    41 

369;     Christie    v.    Blakeley     (Pa.  So.    Rep.    825;     Abel     v.     Collins 

1888),  15  Atl.  Rep.  874;    Lock  v.  (Ala.),  41  So.  Rep.  826. 

Frasher's  Adm'r,  79  Va.  409;  Hur-  n  Wolfe  v.   Arrott,   109   Pa.   St. 

liman    v.    Seckendorf,    18    N.    Y.  473.    1    Atl.    Rep.    333;    Ringle    v. 

Supp.  756,  46  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  301;  Quigg    (Kan.   1906),   87  Pac.   Rep. 

Pursel  V.  Teller.  10  Colo.  App.  488,  724. 

51  Pac.  Rep.  436;   Powell  v.  F.  C.  iiaFry  v.  Day,  97  Ind.  348,  350, 

Linde   Co.,    64    N.    Y.    Supp.    153;  in  which  the  lessee  told  the  lessor 

Haines    v,    Downey,    86    111.   App.  that  the  lease  was  a  receipt  and 

373;    Cunningham    v.   Wathen,    43  he  signed  it  in  that  belief. 

N.  Y.  Supp.  886,  14  App.  Div.  553;  i- Martin  v.  Davis,  96  Iowa,  718, 

Newcome  v.    Emery    (Ky.),   42   S.  720,  65  N.  W.  Rep.  1001. 


472  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

the  terms  of  a  lease  to  his  lessor  who  cannot  read.^'^  But  mere 
promises  by  the  lessee  that  he  will  do  something  in  the  future 
by  reason  of  which  the  lease  is  executed  by  the  lessor  is  not 
fraud.  Thus  statements  by  the  lessees  that  a  corporation  was 
soon  to  be  formed  in  which  they  would  be  interested  and  that 
operations  on  the  demised  premises  would  be  begun  at  once  do 
not  constitute  fraud.^^  Fraud  by  the  lessor  is  more  often  met 
with  than  fraud  by  the  lessee.  The  lessor's  fraud  may  consist 
in  a  wilful  misrepresentation  of  the  condition  of  the  premises  in 
some  material  respect  and  with  knowledge  that  he  is  speaking 
falsely.^* 

§  307.  The  cancellation  of  the  lease  for  duress  or  ftiadequacy 
of  the  consideration.  A  lease  will  be  cancelled  in  equity  upon 
the  suit  of  either  party  to  it  for  inadequacy  of  consideration. 
But  mere  inadequacy  of  consideration  alone  will  not  justify  a 
court  of  equity  in  cancelling  the  lease  unless  the  inadequacy  is 
so  great  as  to  furnish  some  indication  of  fraud  on  the  part  of 
the  party  against  whom  the  action  is  brought. ^"^  For  an  owner 
of  land  has  an  absolute  right  to  lease  it  for  any  consideration 
which  may  be  satisfactory  to  him,  however  small.  Hence,  it  fol- 
lows that  the  smallness  of  the  rent  in  comparison  to  the  rental 
value  of  the  land  will  not  alone  justify  the  landlord  in  having 
a  lease  set  aside  although  this  may  be  a  fact  to  be  considered. 
The  landlord  must  tender,  or  offer  to  tender,  and  pay  into  court 
what  he  has  received  upon  the  lease  where  he  moves  in  equity 
to  set  aside  a  lease  because  it  was  obtained  by  collusion  between 
the  tenant  and  the  agent  of  the  landlord  for  an  inadequate  con- 

12a Christie     v.     Blakeley     (Pa.  of  the  chancellor's  foot  the  meas- 

]888),  15  Atl.  Rep.  874.  ure    of     individual     rights.      The 

13  Love  V.  Teter,  24  W.  Va.  741.  greatest    liberty    of    making    con- 

14  Supra,  §  306.  Wolfe  v.  Arrott,  tracts  is  essential  to  the  inter- 
109  Pa.  St.  473,  478,  1  Atl.  Rep.  ests  of  the  country.  In  general, 
333.  "The  power  to  cancel  a  con-  the  parties  must  look  out  for 
tract  is  a  most  extraordinary  themselves."  Colton  v.  Stanford, 
power.  It  is  one  which  shall  be  82  Cal.  398,  23  Pac.  Rep.  28,  16 
exercised  with  great  caution —  Am.  St.  Rep.  137,  quoted  with  ap- 
nay  I  may  say  with  great  reluc-  proval  in  Oppenheimer  v.  Clunie, 
tance — unless  in  a  clear  case.     A  142  Cal.  313,  75  Pac.  Rep.  899. 

too  free  use  of  this  power  would  is  Smith    v.    Collins    (Ala.),    41 

render  all  business  uncertain,  and.       So.  Rep.  825. 
as  has  been  said,  make  the  length 


FRAUD  AND  DURESS  IN  PROCURING  LEASE.  473 

sideration.*'  In  determining  the  inadequacy  of  rent  or  other 
consideration  proceeding  from  a  lessee  in  a  case  where  it  is  at- 
tempted by  a  lessor  to  set  it  aside  for  fraud,  the  court  may  con- 
sider the  value  of  the  land  in  the  open  market  and  also  what  it 
would  rent  for,  or  if  it  is  cultivated  farm  land,  what  crops  it 
would  produce.  The  inadequacy  of  the  rent  which  is  to  be  paid 
in  cash  in  proportion  to  the  actual  rental  value  of  the  land  or  of 
similar  land  in  its  neighborhood  is  relevant.  The  character,  oc- 
cupation and  financial  standing  of  the  lessee  and  his  ability  to 
perform  his  covenants  may  also  be  considered.  Thus  a  covenant 
by  him  to  pay  taxes  and  keep  fences  in  repair  and  to  make  cer- 
tain specified  improvements  will  certainly  not.  augment  the  con- 
sideration where  the  lessee  is  insolvent.  And  while  the  covenants 
of  a  responsible  and  solvent  lessee  to  make  substantial  improve- 
ments on  the  premises  which  are  to  become  the  property  of  the 
lessor  may  be  evidence  showing  a  valuable  consideration,  a 
covenant  of  such  a  lessee  to  make  trivial  repairs  adds  very  little 
to  the  benefit  the  lessor  will  receive."  A  lease  may  be  cancelled 
in  equity  or  reformed  for  a  mistake  made  in  its  terms,  but  a 
lease  will  not  be  reformed  for  mistake  as  to  the  amount  of  rent 
which  is  to  be  paid  thereunder  unless  it  shall  appear  to  the  sat- 
isfaction of  the  court  that  the  mistake  was  mutual.  This  is  the 
general  rule,  but  it  has  been  held  that  a  court  of  equity  will  not 
allow  the  intending  lessee  to  take  advantage  of  the  lessor  in  stat- 
ing the  rent  in  an  agreement  for  a  lease  and  compel  the  lessor 
to  insert  the  mistaken  rent  in  the  lease.  Thus,  where  the  parties 
to  the  lease  signed  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease  at  a  certain  fixed 
rent,  and  the  lease,  when  it  was  executed  by  them  by  mistake  of 
the  lessor  stated  a  much  lower  rate  of  rent,  the  court  assumed 
that  the  lessee  had  noticed  the  mistake  and  had  kept  silence  with 
the  intention  of  gaining  an  undue  advantage  over  the  lessor  on 
account  of  the  error.  In  this  ease  it  was  held  that  although  the 
lessor  was  not  entitled  to  have  the  lease  reformed  in  equity  be- 
cause the  mistake  was  not  a  mutual  mistake  yet,  the  lessee  not 
being  without  fault  though  innocent  of  any  fraud,  should  be 
compelled  to  take  a  lease  with  the  correct  rent  stated  in  it,  but 
he  might,  if  he  did  not  care  to  do  this,  surrender  the  premises 
upon  paying  the  lessor  for  their  use  and  occupation  for  the  pe- 

16  Abingdon  v.  Butler,  2  Cox,  260,  i"  Dickson     v.     Kempinsky,     96 

3  Bro.  C.  C.  112,  1  Ves.  Jun.  206.      Mo.  252,  9  S.  W.  Rep.  618,  621. 


474  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

riod  he  had  been  in  possession  of  them  at  the  rate  of  rent  stated 
in  the  agreement  for  the  lease. ^®  So,  where  a  mistake  in  stating 
the  rent  in  a  lease  did  not  appear  to  be  mutual  but  the  lessee  had 
accepted  the  lease  with  the  knowledge  of  the  mistake  the  reforma- 
tion of  the  lease  was  denied,  though  the  court  directed  the  lease 
and  the  agreement  for  the  lease  to  be  delivered  up  and  can- 
celled.^" Under  certain  circumstances  and  particularly  where 
equitable  remedies  are  recognized  in  a  court  of  law,  the  lessee 
may  be  granted  a  reformation  of  the  lease  in  an  action  against 
him  for  the  rent.  This  rule  was  laid  down  in  a  case  where,  through 
a  mistake  in  drawing  the  lease,  a  covenant  by  the  lessor  to  make 
repairs  was  omitted,  and  the  lessee  having  made  repairs  en- 
deavored to  off-set  his  damages  in  an  action  against  him  for  the 
rent  due  in  his  covenant.^"  The  fact  that  premises  had  always 
been  leased  for  a  larger  rent  than  is  named  in  the  lease  and  that 
a  tenant  is  a  complete  stranger  to  the  landlord  at  the  date  of  the 
execution  of  the  lease  is  strong  corroboration  of  the  evidence  of 
a  landlord  that  the  rent  reserved  in  a  written  lease  was  under- 
stated by  a  mutual  mistake  of  the  parties.^^ 

§  308.  Leases  between  persons  occupying  confidential  rela- 
tions with  the  lessee.  Leases,  the  parties  to  which  stand  in  con- 
fidential relations  to  each  other,  like  other  contracts  between 
such  persons,  are  regarded  with  careful  scrutiny  by  the  courts. 
The  mere  fact  of  the  confidential  relationship  may  not  alone 
subject  a  lease  to  suspicion.  Hence,  it  follows  that  leases,  the 
parties  to  which  stand  in  the  relation  of  principal  and  agent; 
attorney  and  client;  trustee  and  beneficiary,  and  the  like,  are 
not  in  themselves  invalid.  Thus,  the  agent  may  as  lessee  take  a 
lease  from  his  principal  if  he  shall  prove  that  the  lease  was 
made  after  the  principal  had  received  from  the  agent  full 
knowledge  of  all  the  circumstances  relating  to  it  and  that  the 
lease  was  entered  into  in  perfect  good  faith. -^  But  a  lease  which 
is  procured  by  an  agent  or  an  attorney  to  himself  as  lessee  for  an 
inadequate  consideration,  and  particularly  where  the  lessor  is 
in  embarrassed  circumstances,  may  be  rescinded  if  the  circum- 

18  Garrard  v.  Frankel,  30  Beav.  21  Garrard  v.  Frankel,  30  Beav. 

445,  31  L.  J.  Ch.  604,  8  Jur.  (N.  S.)  445,   451,  31  L.   J.  Ch.   G04,   8   Jur. 

985.  (N.  S.)   985. 

10  Gun  V.  McCarthy,  13  L.  R.  Ir.  22  Molony    v.    Keruan,    2    Dr.    & 

304.  War.  31. 

20  Thomas  v.  Conrad.  24  Ky.  Law 
Rep.  1630.  71   S.  W.  903. 


FRAUD  AND  DURESS  IN  PROCURING  LEASE.  475 

stances  are  such  that  duress  or  fraud  may  reasonably  be  infer- 
red. In  the  case  of  a  confidential  relationship  between  the 
lessor  and  the  lessee  a  lower  degree  of  proof  of  fraud  or  duress 
is  required  than  in  ordinary  circumstances.^^  If  the  whole  lease 
is  tainted  with  fraud,  duress,  or  undue  influence  it  may  be 
wholly  set  aside  and  cancelled;  but  if  it  appears  from  the  evi- 
dence that  a  portion  of  it  only  is  the  result  of  fraud  the  lessee 
may  have  a  reformation  of  the  lease  as  to  the  portion  which  is 
fraudulent.  Thus,  where  a  landlord  who  was  not  accustomed  to 
transacting  business  agreed  with  a  professional  friend  that  he 
would  let  his  friend  have  a  part  of  the  premises  owned  by  him 
on  a  lease  and  the  friend  at  once  drew  a  lease  for  a  term  of  five 
years  with  a  privilege  of  a  renewal  for  a  further  term  of  fifteen 
years,  and  which  took  in  a  greater  tract  of  land  than  the  owner 
said  he  would  lease,  the  lease  was  reformed  in  equity  as  being  a 
fraudulent  contract  and  as  procured  by  an  abuse  of  the  confi- 
dence which  the  landlord  had  in  the  lessee  ^*  as  his  friend  and 
adviser. 

§  309.  The  elements  which  must  co-exist  in  the  case  of  fraud. 
In  order  that  a  court  of  equity  may  be  justified  in  setting  aside 
a  lease  at  the  suit  of  the  lessee  on  the  ground  that  it  was  ob- 
tained by  fraudulent  representations  made  by  the  landlord,  it 
must  be  shown  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence ;  iirst,  that  the 
landlord  made  representations  in  regard  to  some  material  fact 
in  connection  with  the  premises ;  second,  that  this  representation 
was  false;  third,  that  the  representation  was  known  to  be  false 
by  the  landlord  or  at  least  that  he  had  no  reasonable  grounds  for 
believing  it  to  be  true ;  fourth,  that  the  representation  was  made 
with  the  intention  on  the  part  of  the  landlord  that  it  should  be 
believed  and  acted  on  by  the  tenant ;  fifth,  that  it  was  acted  on 
by  the  tenant  to  his  damage;  and  sixth,  that  in  so  acting  on  it 
the  tenant  was  ignorant  of  its  being  false  and  believed  it  to  be 
true  or  had  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  it  to  be  true.-°  The 
false  representation  must  be  as  to  a  material  fact.  A  false  repre- 
ss Ward  V.  Hartpole,  3  Bligh.  quoting  Southern  Development  Co. 
470.  V.  Silver,  12&  U.  S.  250,  8  Sup.  Ct. 

24Bowen  v.  Wolff,   23  R.  I.   56,       881,    31    Law    ed.    678;    Bayles    v. 
49  Atl.  Rep.  395.  Clark,  100  N.  Y.  Supp.  586;  Haines 

25  Oppenheimer    v.    Clunie,    142      v.  Downey,  8G  111.  App.  373. 
Cal.    313,    75    Pac.    Rep.    899,    901, 


476  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

sentation  as  to  some  collateral  or  independent  fact  wliicli  has  no 
bearing  on  the  procurement  of  the  lease,  will  not  justify  a  find- 
ing of  fraud.  The  representation  is  material  as  regards  the  ques- 
tion of  fraud,  when  it  is  of  such  a  character  that,  if  it  had  not 
been  made,  the  lease  would  not  have  been  entered  into.  But 
though  the  misrepresentation  which  is  used  as  a  basis  for  a  charge 
of  fraud  must  be  material  it  need  not  have  been  the  sole  cause  of 
the  making  of  the  lease,  though  it  must  always  be  of  such  a  na- 
ture, weight  and  force  that  the  court  can  fairly  say  without  this 
representation  the  lease  would  not  have  been  entered  into  by  the 
other  party.-®  If  the  landlord  for  the  purpose  of  inducing  the 
making  of  the  lease  states  of  his  personal  knowledge  that  a  mate- 
rial fact  in  relation  to  the  condition  of  the  premises  does  or  does 
not  exist,  without  having  knowledge  whether  his  statement  is  true 
or  false,  and  without  having  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  it  to  be 
true,  he  is  liable  for  fraud,  if  the  lessee  relies  upon  his  statement 
and  it  is  subsequently  found  to  be  false,  though  the  landlord  did 
not  actually  know  the  statement  was  untrue."^  If  the  lessor  has 
knowledge  of  defects  in  the  premises  which  are  not  discoverable 
by  the  tenant  upon  practical  examination,  and  which  will  imperil 
his  person  or  property  a  liability  arises  from  the  fraudulent  con- 
cealment of  such  defects  and,  in  the  application  of  this  rule,  the 
terms  fraud,  fraudulent  concealment,  constructive  fraud  and 
deceit  are  synonymous.  ^^  Thus,  for  example  a  wilful  misrepre- 
sentation of  the  condition  of  the  premises  by  the  lessor  in  some 
material  respect  and  with  a  knowledge  on  his  part  that  he  is 
speaking  falsely  is  sufficient.-''  But  a  landlord  cannot  be  held 
to  be  guilty  of  fraud  in  procuring  the  execution  of  a  lease  where 
he  remains  silent  as  to  the  condition  of  the  buildings.^"  The  ten- 
ant must  investigate  for  himself.  He  is  put  upon  inquiry  as  to 
those  matters  in  relation  to  the  premises  upon  which  he  can  in- 
form himself  by  the  use  of  ordinary  diligence  and  care  and,  as 
to  such  matters,  the  silence  of  the  landlord  raises  no  presump- 

20  Colton  V.  Stafford,  82  CaL  399,  28  Shinkle    v.    Birney,    68    Ohio 

23  Pac.  Rep.  28,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  St.  328,  334,  67  N.  E.  Rep.  715. 

137.  29  Wolfe   V.   Arrott,    109    Pa.    St. 

zTDaly  V.  Wise,  132  N.  Y.  306,  473,  478,  1  Atl.  Rep.  333. 

30  N.  E.  Rep.  837,  16  L.  R.  A.  236;  so  Blake  v.  Dick,   15  Mont.   236, 

Prahar   v.   Tousey,    93    App.    Div.  241,  38  Pac.  Rep.  1072,  48  Am.  St. 

507,  87  N.  Y.   Supp.  845;    Haines  Rep.  671. 
V.  Downey,  SG  111.  App.  373. 


FRAUD  AND  DURESS  IN  PROCURING  LEASE. 


477 


tion  of  fraud.'^  Thus,  where  the  tenant  inspects  the  buildings 
before  he  leases  it  the  silence  of  the  landlord  as  to  the  fact  that 
the  cellar  is  liable  to  become  flooded  in  case  of  rain  does  not  con- 
stitute fraud  on  the  part  of  the  landlord.^-  But  where  the  land- 
lord knows  the  use  to  which  the  building  is  to  be  put  by  the  ten- 
ant, and  knows  a  secret  defect  in  the  building  which  renders  it 
unfit  for  this  use,  and  he  fraudulently  conceals  that  defect  the 
tenant  may  obtain  a  rescission  of  the  lease  for  fraud. '^  The  les- 
sor who  makes  any  statement  which  is  material  to  the  premises 
in  question,  aside  from  a  mere  expression  of  his  opinion,  is  bound 
to  speak  the  truth.  If  he  makes  any  statement  as  to  the  condition 
of  the  premises  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  lease  which  is 
an  inducement  leading  the  lessee  to  execute  the  lease  he  must 
speak  the  truth  or  take  the  consequences  of  his  misrepresenta- 


31  Schermerhorn  v.  Gouge,  13 
Abb.  New  Cases  (N.  Y.)  315; 
Keates  v.  Cadogan,  10  C.  B.  591, 
70  E.  C.  L.  591. 

32  Blake  v.  Dick,  15  Mont.  236, 
38  Pac.  Rep.  1072. 

33  Haines  v.  Downey,  86  111. 
App.  373;  Bauer  v.  Taylor,  4  Neb. 

(Unof.)  710,  98  N.  W.  Rep.  29, 
modifying  96  N.  W.  Rep.  268; 
Minor  v.  Sharon,  112  Mass.  477, 17 
Am.  Rep.  122;  Cesar  v.  Karutz,  60 
N.  Y.  229;  Myers  v.  Rosenback, 
25  N.  Y.  Supp.  521,  5  Misc.  Rep. 
337,  11  Misc.  Rep.  116,  31  N.  Y. 
Supp.  993,  affirmed  in  13  Misc.  Rep. 
145,  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  63.  See,  also, 
14  Misc.  Rep.  638,  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  7. 
In  Milliken  v.  Thorndike,  103 
Mass.  382,  385,  the  lessees  on  say- 
ing to  the  lessor  they  were  not 
satisfied  with  the  way  the  store 
was  built,  that  it  had  settled  and 
was  not  safe,  were  told  by  him 
that  it  was  built  according  to  the 
plans  In  every  particular,  which 
was  not  true,  the  drains  being 
improperly  placed.  The  court  said 
by  Colt,  J.:  "It  is  objected  that 
the  evidence   did  not  justify  this 


finding,  because  it  is  apparent 
from  the  subject-matter,  that  the 
representation  made  was  intended, 
and  should  have  been  understood 
by  the  defendants,  as  only  an  ex- 
pression of  a  strong  belief.  If  a 
statement  is  honestly  made  as  a 
matter  of  opinion,  judgment  or 
estimate  it  is  not  in  law  a  false 
representation,  though  the  matter 
thus  stated  should  turn  out  to  be 
untrue.  But  if  a  fact  which  is 
susceptible  of  knowledge  is  stated 
by  a  party  as  of  his  own  knowl- 
edge, and  such  representation  is 
relied  upon  as  the  basis  of  a  con- 
tract, and  damage  results  to  the 
party  deceived,  it  is  a  legal  fraud, 
the  consequences  of  which  must 
be  born  by  him  who  makes  the 
statement.  The  representation  in 
this  case  was  of  the  latter  descrip- 
tion. It  was  of  a  fact,  the  exist- 
ence of  which  was  not  open  and 
visible,  of  which  plaintiff  (the 
landlord)  had  superior  means  of 
knowledge  and  the  language  in 
which  it  was  made  contains  no 
words    of   qualification  or   doubt." 


478  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

tion.-^*  So  where  the  lessor  tells  an  incoming  lessee  that  the 
plumbing  in  the  demised  premises  is  perfect  and  that  they  are 
free  from  sewer  gas  and  the  lessee  relying  on  these  promises  en- 
tered into  the  lease  the  tenant  may  have  the  lease  rescinded  for 
the  landlord's  fraud.^^  So,  where  a  landlord  makes  a  false  state- 
ment that  he  has  in  times  past  received  a  certain  rental  for  the 
premises  which  is  in  excess  of  the  rental  which  the  lessee  agrees 
to  pay,  and  the  lessee  relies  on  these  statements,  signs  the  lease 
and  enters  into  the  premises,  he  may,  when  he  subsequently  finds 
these  statements  to  be  false  rescind  the  lease  for  fraud.^*^  But  the 
fact  that  the  landlord's  agent  falsely  stated  the  amount  of  rent 
which  the  landlord  had  received  and  also  the  quantity  of  the 
land  which  the  lease  was  to  include,  by  reason  of  which  the 
lessee  took  the  lease  at  a  higher  rent,  is  not  sufficient  to  enable 
him  to  defend  upon  the  ground  of  fraud  where  he  could  have 
easily  ascertained  the  facts  in  the  case.^^  So,  also,  under  the 
rule  that  the  assignee  of  a  lease  is  chargeable  with  knowledge  of 
its  contents  an  assignee  cannot  take  advantage  of  misrepresenta- 
tion as  to  its  contents  made  by  the  assignor,  or  by  the  lessor  who 
induced  him  to  take  the  assignment,  or  who  induced  him  to  take 
a  new  lease  from  the  lessor  when  the  lease  which  has  been  as- 
signed has  expired.^^  And  the  question  of  the  exercise  of  due 
diligence  by  the  lessee  in  examining  the  premises  before  he  signs 
the  lease  is  one  for  the  jury  to  determine  upon  all  the  facts. ^^ 
So,  generally  statements  by  the  lessee  or  by  the  lessor  which  are 
merely  in  the  character  of  promises  without  consideration  to  do 
something  in  the  future  or  the  opinions  upon  which  the  other 
party  had  no  right  to  rely  do  not  constitute  fraud.  Thus,  where 
the  landlord  represents  to  the  tenant  while  they  were  examining 
the  premises  that  the  floor  and  the  light  would  be  all  right,  and 
that  the  light  would  be  sufficient  and  the  rooms  comfortable  and 
convenient  when  certain  partitions  were  removed  there  is  no 

34  Haines    v.     Downey,     86     111.  ^'^  Merritt    v.    Dufur,    99     Iowa, 

App.  373.  211,  68  N.  W.  Rep.  553. 

3!-.  Pursel  V.  Teller,  10  Colo.  App.  38  Powell  v.  F.  C.  Linde  Co.,  29 

488,  51  Pac.  Rep.  436.  Misc.  Rep.  419,  60  N.  Y.  S.  1044; 

38  Powell  V.  F.  C.  Lynde  Co.,  64  Clemens  v.  Knox,  31  Mo.  App.  185. 

N.  Y.  Sui)p.  1.^.3,  49  App.  Div.  286,  39  Ladner   v.    Balsey,    103    Iowa, 

reversing  60  N.  Y.  Snpp.  1044,  29  674,  72  N.  W.  789;  Gee  v.  Moss,  68 

Misc.  Rep.  419.  Iowa,  318,  27  N.  W.  Rep.  268. 


P^RAUD  AND  DURESS  EN  PROCURING  LEASE.  479 

fraud  sufficient  to  rescind  the  lease.*"  So,  the  landlord  of  a 
farm  leased  for  the  purpose  of  raising  stock  stating  that  the  land 
would  afford  sufficient  water  for  the  purposes  intended  by  the 
lessee  does  not  constitute  fraud.*^  And,  it  is  not  possible  for  the 
lessor  to  obtain  cancellation  of  the  lease  because  one  of  the  sev- 
eral lessees  failed  to  purchase  goods  from  the  lessor  as  the  lessees , 
had  agreed  to  do  in  order  to  procure  the  lease.*^ 

§  310.  The  fraud  of  the  tenant.  The  landlord  may  claim 
fraud  or  misrepresenation  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  in  procuring 
him  to  execute  a  lease  and  he  may  have  the  same  set  aside  in 
equity  if  he  shall  prove  facts  which  would  enable  the  tenant  to 
have  the  lease  set  aside  as  against  the  landlord.  Thus,  where  a 
lease  was  drawn  by  a  tenant  who,  on  presenting  it  to  the  land- 
lord for  his  signature,  misrepresented  its  terms  on  reading  it  to 
the  landlord  who  was  unable  to  read,  and  the  landlord  relying 
upon  the  tenant  signed  it,  he  may  have  it  set  aside.*^  The  land- 
lord should  act  promptly  on  the  discovery  of  the  fraud.**  Thus, 
on  the  discovery  by  the  lessor  that  a  guarantee  which  was  en- 
dorsed on  the  lease  is  a  forgeiy  committed  by  the  lessee,  the  land- 
lord may  elect  either  to  treat  the  lease  as  invalid  by  reason  of 
the  fraud  or  he  may  affirm  it  and  sue  for  the  rent.*'  For  he  has 
the  same  right  to  elect  or  affirm  the  lease  as  the  tenant.  If  he 
shall  deem  it  to  liis  interest  to  disregard  the  fraud  of  the  tenant 
and  affirm  the  lease  it  becomes  binding  upon  him  in  all  respects 
and  the  tenant  may  thereafter  enforce  any  remedies  which  he 
may  have  under  the  lease  against  the  landlord.  The  landlord 
cannot,  however,  grant  a  lease  for  a  term  under  which  the  ten- 
ant enters  into  possession  of  the  premises  and  have  it  set  aside 
for  fraudulent  statements  by  the  tenant  as  to  matters  which 
were  collateral  to  the  lease.  Thus,  for  example,  the  landlord 
cannot  have  the  lease  set  aside  because  the  tenant  represents 
that  he  is  a  respectable  person  and  falsely  states  to  the  landlord 
that  he  means  to  use  the  premises  to  carry  on  a  respectable 

•*o  Boyer    v.    Commercial    Build-  ^'^  Christie  v.  Blakely   (Pa.  St.), 

ing  Inv.  Co..  110  Iowa,  491,  81  N.  15  Atl.  Rep.  874. 

W.  720.  "Donegal    (Marquis)    v.    Grey, 

4iBowen    v.    Hatch    (Tex.    Civ.  13  Ir.  Eq.  R.  12;  Davies  v.  Oliver, 

App.),  84  S.  W.  Rep.  336.  1  Ridgw.  P.C.I;  Long  v.  Fletcher, 

42  Hill    V.    Rudd.    18    Ky.    Law  2  Eq.  Abr.  5. 

Rep.  55,  35  S.  W.  Rep.  270.  *5  Brooks    v.    Allen,    146    Mass. 

201,  202,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  584. 


480  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

business  even  though  it  appears  that  the  lessee  at  the  date  of 
the  execution  of  the  lease  intended  to  use  the  premises  for  an 
immoral  and  illegal  purpose.*^  But  under  such  circumstances 
there  would  be  no  necessity  for  the  landlord  to  resort  to  equity 
for  the  rescission  of  the  lease  as  the  contract  itself  would  be 
void  and  uninforceable  so  far  as  the  tenant  is  concerned  be- 
cause of  the  immoral  use  which  the  tenant  would  make  of  the 
premises, 

§  311.  The  tenant  who  has  been  defrauded  need  not  aban- 
don the  premises.  A  tenant  who  is  induced  to  take  a  lease  by 
fraud  or  duress  must,  as  soon  as  he  discovers  the  fraud,  prompt- 
ly repudiate  the  lease  or  surrender  or  offer  to  surrender  the 
premises.*'^  He  cannot  imder  ordinary  circumstances,  remain 
in  possession  of  the  premises  after  he  has  discovered  the  fraud 
and  set  up  the  fraud  as  a  defense  to  an  action  to  recover  the 
rent.*^  This  rule,  however,  has  been  sustained  in  only  one  or 
two  of  the  states.  In  the  majority  of  the  states  it  has  been 
held  that  a  tenant  who  is  induced  to  make  a  lease  by  fraudu- 
lent representations  is  not  bound  to  give  up  the  premises  on 
his  discovery  of  the  fraud,  but  he  may  retain  them  and  set  up 
his  damages  resulting  from  the  fraud  as  a  set-off  or  counter- 
claim in  an  action  for  the  rent.*^  The  distinction  between  the 
two  lines  of  cases  is  not  a  real  one  and  they  are  by  no  means 
inharmonious.  The  true  rule  seems  to  be  this,  that  the  fact 
that  the  lease  was  executed  or  procured  by  the  landlord's  fraud 
or  misrepresentation,  does  not  confer  a  right  on  the  tenant  to 
refuse  to  pay  rent  while  he  occupies  the  premises;  but  if  he  is 
actually  damaged  by  the  fraud,  he  may  elect  whether  to  sur- 
render the  premises  to  the  landlord  and  thus  escape  all  liability 
for  future  rent,  or  he  may  remain  in  the  premises  when  he  will 

40Feret  v.  Hill,  15  C.  B.  307,  2  enbuck,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  521;   Barr 

C.  L.  R.  13CG,  23  L.  J.  C.  P.  186,  v.  Kimball,  43  Neb.  766,  62  N.  W. 

18  Jur.  1014,  2  W.  R.  493.  Rep.  196;  Bauer  v.  Taylor,  4  Neb. 

47  Lynch  v.  Sauer,  16  Misc.  Rep.  (Unof.)    701,   96   N.   W.   Rep.   268, 

1,  2,  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  666.  270;    Dennison  v.  Grove,  52  N.  J. 

48Forgotson  v.  Becker,  81  N.  Y.  Law,  144,  19  Atl.  Rep.  186;  Whit- 

S.  319;  Powell  v.  P.  C.  Linde  Co.,  ney  v.   Allaire,   4   Denio    (N.   Y.) 

60    N.    Y.    Supp.    1044;    Sisson    v.  554,  affirmed  in  1  N.  Y.  305.     See, 

Kaper  (Iowa),  75  N.  W.  Rep.  490.  also,  Holston  v.   Noble,  83  Cal.  7, 

40  Wolfe   V.   Arrott,    109    Pa.    St.  23  Pac.  Ren.  58. 
473,  1  Atl.  Rep.  333;  Myers  v.  Rosr 


PROPERTY  WHICH  IS  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEASE.  481 

continue  to  be  bound  to  pay  rent  with  the  right  to  recover  as  a 
set-off  the  actual  damages  he  may  have  suffered  through  the 
fraud  of  the  landlord.^"  For  the  performance  and  validation 
of  a  contract  which  he  had  the  power  to  rescind  absolutely  wall 
not  be  permitted  to  work  him  an  injury  as  he  may  recover  any 
damages  he  may  have  suffered  by  the  landlord  by  the  set-off 
for  the  rent  or  for  the  injury  received  by  him.^^  It  may  hap- 
pen that  in  restoring  the  leased  premises  to  the  lessor  upon  the 
rescission  of  the  lease,  it  will  be  impossible  to  restore  them  in 
precisely  the  same  condition  they  were  when  delivered  to  the 
lessee  as  none  of  the  tenants  who  were  in  the  building  when  it 
was  rented  to  the  lessee  are  in  it  when  he  vacates  it  and  when 
it  is  restored  to  the  lessor  under  the  decree  of  rescission. 
Changes  and  alteration  may  have  been  made  by  the  lessee  dur- 
ing his  occupancy,  or  by  a  receiver  who  may  have  been  appointed 
during  the  action.  And  even  though  there  may  have  been  no 
changes  or  alterations  of  this  character  and  no  repairs  by 
either  party  during  the  occupation  of  the  tenant,  there  can  never 
be  a  restoration  line  for  line  and  comer  for  corner.  The  prem- 
ises will  have  deteriorated  by  natural  wear  and  tear  and  by  the 
decay  caused  by  lapse  of  time,  use  and  exposure  to  the  ele- 
ments. There  may  have  been  a  decline  in  value  or  the  premises 
may,  for  any  number  of  reasons,  have  become  less  desirable.  So, 
the  character  of  the  purpose  for  which  they  may  be  rented 
may  have  materially  changed  them  for  the  worse.  In  respect  to 
all  these  incidents,  there  cannot  be  a  perfect  restoration  nor  does 
equity  demand  it.  If  a  rescission  is  necessary,  it  will  be  ordered 
if  the  condition  of  affairs  is  such  that  a  substantial  restoration 
can  be  made.'^ 


50  Little  V.  Dyer,  35  111.  App.  85;  Conklin     v.    White,    17    Abb.    N. 

Marcy  v.  Pierce,  14   111.  App.   91;  Cases,  315;   Kierman  v.  Terry,  26 

Respell  V.  Carwin,  72  111.  App.  623;  Oreg.  494,  38  Pac.  Rep.  671;  Bauer 

South's  Adm'x  v.  Marcum,  15  Ky.  v.  Taylor,  96  N.  W.  Rep.  268. 

Law,  339,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  844;  Milli-  bi  Irving  v.  Thomas,  18  Me.  418. 

ken  V.  Thorndike,  103  Mass.  382,  See,  also.  Hall  v.  Ryder,  152  Mass. 

389;  Hall  v.  Ryder,  152  Mass.  528,  528,  529,  25  N.  E.  Rep.  970;  Pryor 

529,  25  N.  E.  Rep.  970;   Bell  v.  Ba-  v.  Foster,  130  N.  Y.  171,  29  N.  E. 

ker,   43   Minn.   86,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  Rep.  123. 

676;  Rosenbaum  V.  Gunter.  3  B.  D.  52  Hoops   v.    Fitzgerald,   204   111. 

Smith    (N.    Y.)    203;    McCarty    v.  325,  333,  68  N.  E.  Rep.  430. 
Ely,  4  E.  D.   Smith   (N.  Y.)    375; 

31 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  ATTORNMENT  OF  THE  TENANT. 

§  312.  Attornment  defined 

313.  Payment  of  rent  as  constituting  attornment. 

314.  Tlie  necessity  for  the  landlord's  consent  to  the  attornment. 

315.  The  effect  of  the  statute  of  Anne  upon  attornment. 

316.  The  tenant's  attorn  to  a  mortgagee  or  purchaser  at  foreclosure. 

317.  The  statutory  rights  of  the  grantee  of  the  reversion. 

318.  The  grantee's  right  to  collect  rent. 

319.  The  extent  of  the  rights  of  the  grantor  after  his  conveyance. 

320.  The  obligations  of  a  grantee  to  tenants  in  possession. 

321.  The  notice  to  the  tenant  of  the  sale  of  the  reversion. 

322.  The  effect  of  a  sale  of  the  reversion  under  a  decree  or  judgment. 

§  312.  Attornment  defined.  An  attornment  is  the  acknowl- 
edgement by  a  tenant  of  a  new  landlord  on  the  alienation  of 
the  land  and  an  agreement  to  become  a  tenant  to  the  purchaser.^ 
Thus,  where  a  sale  of  the  reversion  takes  place  and  is  brought 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  tenant  and  he  by  any  language  or  con- 
duct recognizes  the  title  of  the  purchaser,  it  is  an  attornment." 
This  would  be  the  case  where  he  pays,^  or  promises  to  pay 

1  Whart.  Law  Diet.   66,  1  Bouv.  word  is  from  the  feudal  law,  where 

Law  Diet.;    Lindley  v.  Dakin,  13  it  signifies  the  transfer,  by  act  of 

Ind.  388,  389;    Freeman  v.  Moffit,  the  lord  and  consent  of  the  ten- 

119   Mo.   280,   29&,   25   S.   W.  Rep.  ant,  of  the  homage,  fealty,  etc.,  of 

87,  91;  Wilson  v.  Lyons  (Neb.),  94  the  tenant  to  a  new  lord  who  had 

N.  W.  Rep.   636,   637;    Souders  v.  acquired  the  estate.    Abbott's  Law 

Vansickle,   8  N.  J.  Law,  313,  317.  Dictionary;    Willis    v.    Moore,    59 

See,  also,  Foster  v.   Morris,  3  A.  Tex.  636.     Attornment  is  the  con- 

K.  Marsh.   (Ky.)   610,  611,  13  Am.  sent  of  a  tenant  to  the  grant  of 

Dec.  205;  Willis  v.  Moore,  59  Tex.  the  landlord;  he  must  be  a  tenant, 

636.    An  attornment  does  not  ere-  and   the   grant   assented   to   must 

ate  a  new  tenancy,  it  is  merely  a  be   that   of  his   landlord;    the   as- 

continuancy  of  the  former  tenancy  sent  of  any  stranger  is  no  attorn- 

with  a   new   landlord.     Austin   v.  ment  for  want  of  privity.     Soud- 

Ahearne,  61  N.  Y.  6.     By  attorn-  ers  v.  Vansickle,  8  N.  J.  Law,  317. 

ment  is  meant  the  act  of  recogni-  2  Thompson  v.  Chapman,  57  Ga. 

tion  of  a  new  landlord,  implying  16. 

an   engagement  to   pay   rent  and  s  Fisher  v.  Deering,  60  111.  114. 
perform   covenants   to   him.     The 


ATTORNMENT  OF  THE  TENANT.  483 

rent  *  to  the  purchaser  of  the  reversion  from  his  landlord.^  The 
distinction  between  an  attornment  and  a  new  tenancy  is  very 
clear.  Where  the  original  landlord  transfers  his  estate  in  re- 
version to  another  and  the  tenant  of  the  former  a^ees  to  hold 
of  the  latter,  it  is  an  attornment.  This  is  the  act  of  the  ten- 
ant putting-  a  person  in  the  place  of  his  former  landlord,  and 
he  continues  to  hold  of  his  new  landlord  upon  the  same  terms 
as  he  held  of  the  old.  But  where  there  is  no  attornment  but  a 
new  tenancy,  the  new  lease  may,  but  need  not  necessarily,  vary 
in  its  time,  rent  and  conditions  from  the  old  lease  according  to 
the  agreement  of  the  parties.'' 

§  313.  Payment  of  rent  as  constituting  attornment.  The 
payment  of  rent  by  a  lessee  to  a  grantee  of  the  reversion,*'^  or  to 
some  third  person  at  his  direction  with  his  own  receipt  for  the 
rent,"  is  an  acceptance  of  the  person  paying  the  rent  as  a  ten- 
ant and  constitutes  an  attornment  under  the  modern  statutes. 
This  is  so  even  though  the  rent  was  paid  under  the  threat  of  a 
suit  and  was  accompanied  by  a  protest  by  the  tenant  and  the 
denial  of  the  right  of  the  grantee  to  claim  the  money.  Nor  can 
the  lessee  when  paying  rent  destroy  the  effect  of  that  act  as 
proof  of  an  attornment  by  accompanying  the  payment  with  a 
declaration  that  he  does  not  consider  that  the  relation  of  land- 
lord exists  between  him  and  the  payee.^  So,  the  payment  of 
rent  under  a  lease  of  an  easement  in  a  party  will  by  an  heir 
of  the  lessee  after  he  had  come  into  the  possession  of  the  build- 
ing to  which  the  easement  was  an  appurtenance,  is  an  attorn- 
ment of  the  heir  to  the  lessor  and  creates  the  relation  of  land- 
lord and  tenant  between  them.    The  lessor  under  the  party  wall 

4  Hayes  V.  Lawyer,  83  111.  162.  I.    701,    36    Atl.    Rep.    719;    Hayes 

sFlagg    V.    Geltmacher,    98    111.  v.   Lawyer,   83   111.   162;    Flagg  v. 

293.  Geltmacher,    98    111.    293;    Border- 

e  Austin  v.  Ahearne,  61  N.  Y.  6.  eaux  v.  Walker,  85   111.  App.   86; 

16,  17;   Cornish  v.  Searell,  8  B.  &  Gartside  v.  Outley,  58  111.  210,  11 

C.  471,  15  E.  C.  L.  267.     See,  also.  Am.  Rep.  59;  Cummings  v.  Smith, 

Doe  V.  Edwards,   5  Ad.  &  El.  95,  114  111.  App.  35;   Hogsett  v.  Ellis, 

103,  31  E.  C.  L.  287;  Doe  v.  Boul-  17  Mich.  351;    Mason  v.  Gray,  36 

ter,  6  Ad.  &  El.  675,  33  E.  C.  L.  Vt.  308,  312. 

172;  Doe  v.  Smith,  8  Ad.  &  El.  255,  •  Winestein    v.    Ziglatski-Marks 

35  E.  C.  L.  387;   Tilford  v.  Flem-  Co.,  77  Conn.  404,  59  Atl.  Rep.  496. 
ing,  64  Pa.  St.  300.  s  McCardell  v.  Williams,  19  R.  I. 

oaMcCardell  v.  Williams,  19  R.  701,  36  Atl.  Rep.  719. 


484  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

agreement  may  recover  a  personal  judgment  for  rent  against 
the  heir  who  has  thus  attorned.® 

§  314.  The  necessity  for  the  landlord's  consent  to  the  attorn- 
ment. At  the  common  law  an  attornment  by  the  tenant  with- 
out the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the  landlord  was  void,  and  it 
in  no  wise  affected  the  right  of  the  landlord  against  the  tenant, 
or  his  remedies  to  recover  the  rent  or  to  enforce  any  covenant 
binding  upon  the  tenant. ^°  This  rule  of  the  common  law  is 
affirmed  by  statute  in  many  of  the  states.^^  In  some  instances, 
statutes  have  been  enacted  which  dispense  with  the  consent  of 
the  landlord  where  the  attornment  is  made  to  one  who  pur- 
chases at  a  sale  made  under  a  judgment  at  law  or  a  decree  in 
equity,  or  to  a  mortgagee  after  forfeiture.^^  The  common  law 
doctrine  of  attornment  is  not  enforced  in  Minnesota.^^  An  at- 
tornment without  the  consent  of  the  landlord  to  one  holding  a 
tax  title  is  not  valid,  and  the  occupation  of  the  tenant  under  a 
lease  from  the  owner  of  the  tax  title  does  not  constitute  adverse 
possession  against  the  landlord.^*  Where,  after  an  attornment 
which  is  void  because  it  was  made  without  the  consent  of  the 
landlord,  there  is  no  disclaimer  of  the  landlord's  title  by  the 
tenant  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  his  landlord  or  any  act  of 
exclusive  ownership  by  the  tenant  calculated  to  apprise  him 
that  the  tenant  is  holding  adversely  for  the  benefit  of  a  third 
person,  the  possession  of  the  tenant  is  not  adverse  to  that  of 
the  true  owner.^'^  A  tenant  who  has  attorned  to  a  purchaser  on 
an  execution  sale  when  the  execution  deed  was  found  to  be  void, 
may    state   the    claim   of   his    original    landlord   in    an    action 

»  Mackin  v.  Haven,  187  111.  480,  12  O'Donnell  v.  Mclntyre,  118  N. 

58  N.  E.  Rep.  448,  affirming  88  III.  Y.  156,  23  N.  E.  Rep.  455,  holding 

App.  434.  that  such  a  statute  does  not  apply 

10  Perkins  v.  Potts,  52  Neb.  110,  to    an     attornment    to    one    who 

71  N.  W.  Rep.  1017;  O'Donnell  v.  claims  under  a  tax  deed. 

Mclntyre,  118  N.  Y.  156,  23  N.  E.  i3  Jones  v.  Rigby,  41  Minn.  530, 

Rep.    455;    Benoist   v.   Rothschild,  43  N.  W.  Rep.  390. 

145  Mo.  399,  46  S.  W.  Rep.  1081,  i*  Kipley  v.  Sculley,  185  111.  52, 

McCartney   v.    Auer,    50   Mo.    395;  57   N.   E.   Rep.    187;    O'Donnell  v. 

Dausch  V.  Crane,  109  Mo.  323,  19  Mclntyre,  118  N.  Y.  156,  37  Hun, 

S.  W.  Rep.  61;    Pierce  v.   Rollins,  623. 

60  Mo.  App.  497.  "'•■'  Benoist  v.  Rothschild,  145  Mo. 

iiRatcliff      V.      Bollfont      Iron  397,  46  S.  W.  Rep.  1081. 
Works,  87  Ky.  559,  10  S.  W.  Rep. 
365. 


ATTORNMENT  OP  THE  TENANT.  485 

"brought  by  the  purchaser  to  recover  rent  under  the  lease.  If 
he  shall  show  that  the  deed  is  void,  the  action  to  recover  rent 
must  be  dismissed.^® 

§  315.  The  effect  of  the  statute  of  Anne  upon  attornment. 
The  act  of  attornment  by  the  tenant  to  his  new  lord  was  of  a 
jjublic  nature  being  customarily  performed  by  some  symbolic 
ceremony  m  the  presence  of  the  tenants  upon  the  estate  of  the 
former  landlord.  The  general  effect  of  this  ceremony  was  to 
express  a  renunciation  of  the  tenant's  allegiance  and  service 
to  the  former  landlord  and  his  proffer  of  service  and  allegiance 
to  him  to  whom  the  former  owner  had  conveyed  the  reversion. 
This  at  first  and  for  many  centuries  was  a  voluntary  act  upon 
the  part  of  the  tenant,  it  being  according  to  feudal  principles, 
an  absolute  right  of  a  terre  tenant  to  select  his  lord  on  account 
of  the  frequent  personal  services  he  was  bound  to  render  him, 
and  the  protection  and  aid  of  a  personal  and  feudal  character 
which  the  landlord  under  the  feudal  system  was  obligated  to 
render  to  his  tenants  when  called  upon  by  them  to  do  so.  On 
account  of  reasons  arising  out  of  the  principles  of  the  feudal 
tenure  of  land,  it  was  not  regarded  as  just  and  fair  to  the  ten- 
ant who  has  entered  in  relations  with  a  superior  lord  of  his 
own  choosing,  to  have  his  duties  and  obligations  to  this  .superior 
transferred  to  another  who  might  be  a  stranger,  and  indeed  an 
enemy,  without  the  consent  of  the  tenant.  Hence,  unless  the 
tenant  formally  attorned  to  the  party  to  whom  the  reversion 
had  been  transferred,  he  owed  him  no  duty  either  to  pay  rent, 
to  render  him  any  service  specified  in  the  lease  or  by  the  law 
of  the  land,  or  to  perform  any  of  the  covenants  of  the  lease 
whatever.  This  rule  of  the  ancient  law  formed  a  most  serious 
impediment  to  the  free  commerce  of  land,  and,  for  that  reason, 
after  the  abrogation  of  the  rules  of  the  feudal  system  had  taken 
place,  it  was  abolished  by  statute  in  England  in  the  time  of 
Anne.^^    In  some  of  the  states  the  abrogation  of  the  common  law 

16  Ross  V.  Kernan,  31  Hun,  164.  W.  R.  563.     As  to  similar  statutes 

17  Doe  d.  Agar  v.  Brown,  2  El.  in  America,  see  McDonald  v.  Han- 
&  Bl.  331,  22  L.  J.  Q.  B.  432;  Vig-  Ion,  79  Cal.  442,  443,  21  Pac.  Rep. 
ers  V.  St.  Paul's  (Dean  &  Chapter),  861  (Civil  Code,  §  1111) ;  Coker  v. 
14  Q.  B.  909,  19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  84,  14  Pearsall,  6  Ala.  542,  543;  Otis  v. 
Jur.  1017,  Ex.  Ch.  Williams  v.  McMillan,  70  Ala.  46,  53;  Doe  v. 
Hayward,  1  El.  &  El.  1040,  28  L.  J.  Clayton,  73  Ala.  359,  361;  Hous- 
Q.  B.  374,  5  Jur.    (N.  S.)    1417,  7  ton  v.  Farriss,  71  Ala.  570;  Drey- 


486  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

requirement  of  an  attornment  is  the  result  rather  of  implication 
arising  from  the  statute  than  from  an  express  enactment.  Thus 
it  has  been  held  that  a  statute  giving-  grantees,  assignees,  heirs 
and  representatives  of  lessors  the  same  remedies  or  rights  against 
tenants  as  the  lessors  by  implication  dispenses  with  an  attorn- 
ment.^* Where  an  attornment  is  no  longer  necessary  a  privity 
of  estate,  but  not  of  contract,  arises  between  the  grantee  of  the 
lessor  and  the  lessee  as  soon  as  the  grantee  acquires  the  title, 
and  the  former  can  thereafter  maintain  an  action  of  debt,  but 
not  upon  a  covenant,  against  the  lessee  under  a  lease  which  was 
outstanding  where  the  covenant  does  not  expressly  run  with 
the  land.^^ 

§  316.  The  tenant's  attorn  to  a  mortgagee  or  purchaser 
at  foreclosure.  The  act  of  a  tenant  whose  lease  is  subsequent 
to  the  mortgage  in  paying  rent  to  the  mortgagee  upon  his 
entry  on  a  breach  of  condition  is  an  attornment  by  the  tenant. 
As  soon  as  the  mortgagee  has  received  the  rent  from  a  tenant  in 
possession,  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  exists  between 
the  parties  though  prior  to  that  the  mortgagee  might  treat  the 
tenant  as  a  trespasser.^^  The  mortgagor  having  conveyed  his 
whole  interest  in  the  premises  to  the  mortgagee,  to  which  his 
subsequent  lease  is,  of  course,  subordinate,  forfeits  the  whole 

fus  V.  Hirt,   82   Cal.   621,   23  Pac.  tornment.     Duke   v.   Compton,    49 

Rep.  193;    Baldwin  v.  Walker,  21  Mo.  App.  304. 

Conn.  168;  Lindley  v.  Dakin,  13  is  Howland  v.  White,  48  111. 
Ind.  388,  389;  Barnes  v.  Northern  App.  236  (Rev.  St.  c.  80,  §  14); 
Trust  Co.,  169  111.  112,  48  N.  E.  Thomasson  v.  Wilson,  146  111.  384, 
Rep.  31;  Foster  v.  Morris,  3  A.  K.  34  N.  E.  Rep.  432;  Barnes  v.  North- 
Marsh.  (Ky.)  611;  Funk's  Lessee  ern  Trust  Co.,  169  111.  112,  48  N. 
V.  Kincaid,  5  Md.  404;  Keay  v.  E.  Rep.  31,  affirming  66  111.  App. 
Goodwin,  16  Mass.  1;  Farley  v.  282,  and  construing  Rev.  St.  c.  SO, 
Thompson,  15  Mass.  18;  Burden  v.  §  14  (2  Starr  &  C.  Ann.  St.  (2d 
Thayer,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  76;  Jones  ed.)  p.  1497;  Bordereaux  v.  Wal- 
V.  Rigby,  41  Minn.  530,  43  N.  W.  ker,  85  111.  App.  86. 
Rep.  390;  Hendrickson  v.  Beeson,  i&  State  v.  Idler,  54  N.  J.  Law, 
21  Neb.  61,  63,  31  N.  W.  Rep.  266;  467,  24  Atl.  Rep.  554. 
Gribble  v.  Toms,  71  N.  J.  Law,  20  Gartside  v.  Outley,  58  111.  210, 
338,  57  Atl.  Rep.  144,  14&;  Tilford  215.  11  Am.  Rep.  59;  Hogsett  v. 
V.  Fleming,  64  Pa.  St.  301.  But  Ellis,  17  Mich.  351;  Kimball  v. 
see  contra  where  it  was  held  that  Lockwood,  6  R.  I.  138,  139;  Mason 
a  purchaser  cannot  recover  rent  v.  Gray,  36  Vt.  308,  312;  Evans  v. 
and  possession  as  a  landlord  un-  Elliott,  9  Ad.  &  El.  159. 
less   he   avers   and   proves   an   at- 


ATTORNMENT  OF  THE  TENANT.  487 

title  at  law  by  default  in  payins:  the  debt  for  Avhicli  the  mort- 
gage is  security,  and  unless  forbidden  by  statute,  as  is  the  case 
in  some  states,  the  tenant  may  at  once  attorn  to  the  mortgagee 
without  disloyalty  to  his  landlord  ^s  he  thereby  only  recognizes 
a  title  which  his  landlord  has  created.'^  The  payment  of  rent 
by  the  tenant  to  the  mortgagee  with  or  without  a  promise  to 
pay  that  which  subsequently  accrues  is  usually  a  sufficient  at- 
tornment and  the  tenant  is  thereafter  liable  for  the  rent  to  the 
mortgagee  or  his  grantee  alone  and  cannot  be  compelled  to  pay 
it  to  the  mortgagor.--  Not  only  may  a  tenant  attorn  to  a  mort- 
gagee, but  in  some  of  the  states  it  is  by  statute  expressly  pro- 
vided that  he  may,  and  in  some  that  he  must  attorn  to  a  pur- 
chaser of  an  equity  of  redemption  on  a  sale  in  foreclosure.^^ 
The  purpose  of  these  statutes  is  first  to  secure  to  the  purchaser 
at  foreclosure,  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  property  he  has 
bought  without  the  cost  and  annoyance  of  an  action  in  eject- 
ment and  second,  to  enable  the  tenant  to  continue  his  possession 
by  attorning  to  the  new  owner.  They  ought  therefore,  to  be 
so  construed  as  to  carry  out  this  purpose.  An  attoi:nment  of  a 
tenant  to  a  mortgagee,  before  the  expiration  of  the  mortgagor's 
right  to  redeem  after  foreclosure,  is  invalid  by  statute  in  many 
of  the  states.^*  A  tenant  may  attorn  to  a  grantee  under  a  deed 
made  on  a  conveyance  at  a  tax  sale.  If  the  deed  is  regular  on 
its  face,  his  attornment  is  good  though  the  conveyance  is  void- 

21  Kimball  v.  Lockwood,  6  R.  I.  closure  may  legally  attorn  to  a 
138,  139 ;  Jones  v.  Clark.  20  Johns.  purchaser  in  a  subsequent  sale  at 
(N.  Y.)  51;  Evans  v.  Elliot,  9  Ad.  foreclosure  of  a  prior  mortgage. 
&  El.  159,  also  holding  that  an  Freeman  v.  Moffitt,  119  Mo.  280, 
attornment  does  not  relate  back  25  S.  W.  Rep.  87.  The  statutes  re- 
to  a  prior  notice  to  quit  given  by  fer  only  to  mortgages  given  by  the 
a  mortgagee  to  the  tenant,  but  landlord  or  one  claiming  under 
creates  a  privity  and  right  to  col-  him.  Pierce  v.  Rollins,  1  Mo.  App. 
lect    rent   in    the   mortgagee   only  Rep.  217. 

from  the  date  it  is  actually  made.  s-*  Mills    v.    Hamilton,    49    Iowa, 

22  Kimball  v.  Lockwood,  6  R.  I.  105;  Mills  v.  Heaton,  52  Iowa,  215, 
138,  140.  217.      Contra,    Tallman    v.    Ely,    6 

23  Freeman  v.  Moffitt.  119  Mo.  Wis.  244;  Gillett  v.  Eaton,  6  Wis. 
280.  295.  25  S.  W.  Rep.  87;  Pierce  244;  Hennessy  v.  Farrell,  20  Wis. 
v.  Rollins,  1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  217;  42.  After  such  attornment  a  for- 
Conley  v.  Schiller,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  mer  owner  who  enters  is  guilty  of 
473;  Ratcliff  v.  Belfont  Iron  Works  forcible  entry  and  detainer.  Hol- 
Co.,'  87  Ky.  559,  10  S.  W.  Rep.  36&.  den  B.  &  L.  Assn  v.  Wann,  43  Mo. 
A   lessee  of  a   purchaser   in   fore-  App.  640. 


488   •  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

able  on  extrinsic  evidence.-^  The  tenant  may  always  sliow  as 
ag-ainst  his  landlord  that  a  third  person  has  obtained  a  title 
i:!aramonnt  to  the  landlord  at  a  tax  sale  during  the  term  and 
that  he  has  attorned  to  such  third  person  when  the  latter  had 
demanded  possession  of  the  premises  under  his  tax  deed.^' 

§  317.  The  statutory  rights  of  the  grantee  of  the  reversion. 
Because  of  the  rule  of  the  conunon  law  that  a  chose  in  action 
was  not  assignable,  the  grantee  of  the  reversion  could  not  main- 
tain an  action  against  the  lessee  on  a  covenant  of  the  lease, 
though  the  covenant  might  run  with  the  land.  At  common  law 
no  one  except  a  person  who  was  a  party  or  a  privy  to  a  covenant 
could  sue  upon  it.  The  grantor  and  his  heirs,  or  personal  repre- 
sentatives could  alone  take  advantage  of  a  breach  of  covenant 
by  a  lessee.-'^  This  rule  so  far  as  it  related  to  landlords  and  ten- 
ants was  furthermore  based  upon  that  principle  or  provision  of 
the  feudal  law  which  prevented  a  lord  from  transferring  his 
lordship  without  the  consent  of  his  vassal,  it  being  considered 
upon  feudal  reasons  that  a  vassal  or  tenant  holding  under  a 
lord  had  a  vested  right  to  his  protection  of  which  he  could  not 
be  deprived  without  his  consent.  This  consent  was  indispensable 
and  was  evidenced  by  the  attornment  of  the  tenant  by  which 
the  tenant  admitted  he  was  holding  as  tenant  under  the  new 
landlord.  The  rule  was  applicable  to  all  leases,  whether  for  life 
or  for  years,  so  that  where  one  purchased  the  fee  with  a  lease 
outstanding  and  the  lessee  refused  to  attorn,  the  conveyance  was 
practically  void  as  to  him  inasmuch  as  he  could  derive  no  ad- 
vantage from  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  or  from  any  other  cove- 
nant in  the  lease.  This  very  strict  restraint  upon  the  alienation 
of  land  was  removed  by  various  English  statutes  as  the  neces- 

a.".  Sheaff    v.     Husted,    60    Kan.  a  mortgage  given  by  his  landlord, 

770,  57  Pac.  Rep.  976.  and   on   the  proper   exposition   of 

20  Jenkinson  v.  Winans,  109  the  deed,  he  must  do  so.  This 
Mich.  524,  67  N.  W.  Rep.  549.  The  right  of  the  purchaser  is  not  re- 
tenant  must  attorn  to  a  pur-  stricted  to  the  case  where  the  for- 
chaser  at  the  foreclosure  sale  or  mer  landlord  consents.  Frank  v. 
he  may  be  removed  by  a  writ  of  Nichols,  6  Mo,  App.  72,  distin- 
assistance,  though  his  lease  be  guished.  Holden  B.  &  L.  Ass'n  v. 
prior  in  date  to  a  mortgage.  Lov-  Wann,  43  Mo.  App.  640. 
ett  V.  German  Reformed  Church,  27  Co.  Litt.  215a;  Milnes  v. 
9  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  220.  The  ten-  Branch.  5  M.  &  S.  411;  Masury  v. 
ant  is  authorized  to  attorn  to  a  SoutJiworth,  9  Ohio  St.  340,  346. 
purchaser  under  the  foreclosure  of 


ATTORNMENT  OP  THE  TENANT.  489 

sity  for  transferrin <j^  land  became  greater,  the  most  important 
of  which  was  that  of  32  Henry  VIII,  c.  34,  Avhich  gave  in 
general  to  the  assignee  of  the  reversion  the  same  rights  against 
the  lessee  that  the  lessor  had  upon  all  covenants  running  with 
the  land,  while  at  the  same  time  it  gave  the  tenant  the  same 
remedies  on  such  covenants  against  the  grantee  of  the  reversion 
that  he  would  have  had  against  the  grantor.  By  this  statute 
the  privity  of  contract,  together  with  privity  of  estate,  was 
transferred  to  the  assignee  of  the  reversion  who  was  thereafter, 
as  respects  a  lessee,  in  the  same  position  as  the  lessor  was  be- 
fore his  conveyance  of  the  reversion.-^  Hence,  the  grantee  of 
a  lessor  is  entitled  under  this  statute  to  sue  the  lessee  on  all  the 
covenants  in  the  lease.  This  rule  applies  where  a  mortgagor 
makes  a  lease  and  then  assigns  his  equity  of  redemption.-^  But 
of  course,  the  assignee  of  a  reversion  is  not  entitled  under  the 
statute  to  rent  which  becomes  due  prior  to  the  assignment.^"  And 
the  statute  was  construed  to  include  only  leases  under  seal.^^  The 
English  statute  in  various  forms  has  been  re-enacted  in  almost  all 
of  the  American  commonwealths.'-  In  construing  these  statutes 
which  give  the  grantee  of  the  lessor  the  remedies  of  the  lessor,  it 
has  been  held  that  a  right  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  for  an  event 
which  occurred  prior  to  the  transfer  of  the  reversion  does  not 

28  Scaltock  V.  Heuston,  1  L.  R.  603 ;  Standen  v.  Christmas,  10  Q. 
C.  P.  Div.  106;  Masury  v.  South-  B.  135;  Smith  v.  Egginton,  43  L. 
worth,  9  Ohio  St.  340.  346;  Shelby  J.  C.  P.  140,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  145,  30 
V.  Hearne,  6  Serg.   (Tenn.)   512.  L.  T.  521. 

29  Cuthberston  v.  Irving,  4  H.  32  Woodbury  v.  Butler,  67  N.  H. 
&  N.  742,  28  L.  J.  Ex.  306,  5  Jur.  545,  38  Atl.  Rep.  379  (construing 
(N.  S.)  740,  affirmed  6  H.  &  N.  Pub.  St.  c.  246,  sec.  22);  Springer 
135,  29  L.  J.  Ex.  485,  6  Jur.  (N.  S.)  V.  Chicago  Real  Estate  Loan  & 
1211,  3  L.  T.  335.  A  right  to  ter-  Trust  Co.,  202  111.  17,  66  N.  E.  Rep. 
minate  the  lease  on  notice  to  the  850,  affirming  102  111.  App.  294 
tenant  with  a  stipulation  that  all  (construing  2  Starr  &  C.  Ann.  St. 
covenants  in  the  lease  shall  be  1896,  p.  2513);  Alworth  v.  Gor- 
binding  on  the  "legal  representa-  don,  81  Minn.  445,  84  N.  W.  Rep. 
tives"  of  the  parties  confers  the  454;  Hannigan  v.  IngersoU.  20 
right  to  terminate  the  lease  on  no-  Hun  (N.  Y.)  316;  Zink  v.  Bohn, 
tice  upon  the  landlord's  grantee.  3  N.  Y.  Supp.  4;  Wright  v.  Hardy 
Adler  V.  Lowenstein,  102  N.  Y.  (Miss.  1899),  24  So.  Rep.  697 
Supp.  492.  (Ann.  Code,  §  2539,  which  applies 

30  Flight  V.  Bentley,  7  Sim.  149,  to  estates  for  life  or  years  only, 
4  L.  J.  Ch.  262.  not  to  estates  in  fee). 

31  Brydges    v.    Lewis,    3    Q.    B. 


490  '■'  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

pass  to  the  grantee  of  the  reversion.^^  But  a  forfeiture  of  the 
lease  occurring'  after  the  conveyance  of  the  reversion  may  be  en- 
forced by  the  grantee  to  the  same  extent  as  it  could  have  been  en- 
forced by  the  lessor  had  he  continued  in  possession.^*  And  the 
right  to  possession  upon  a  forfeiture  cannot  be  defeated  by  a 
surrender  of  the  lease  by  the  original  lessee  to  the  grantor.^^ 
The  grantee  of  a  part  of  a  reversion  of  property  which  is  sub- 
ject to  an  outstanding  lease  is  the  assignee  of  the  reversion  with- 
in the  statute,  32  Henry  VIII,  c.  84,  and  he  may  under  that  stat- 
ute avail  himself  of  a  breach  of  a  condition,  but  the  grantee  of  the 
whole  reversion  in  a  part  of  the  property  is  not  such  an  as- 
signee, for  where  the  statute  speaks  of  "conferring  rights  upon 
grantees  and  assignees  of  the  reversion"  its  benefits  belong  to 
one  who  takes  an  estate  for  years  in  the  reversion,  as  well  as 
to  one  who  takes  the  whole  of  it.  Thus,  where  a  lessor  demised 
three  years  of  his  term  of  twenty-one  years  to  one  person  and 
subsequently  thereto  demised  the  balance  less  one  day,  to  an- 
other, it  was  held  that  the  second  under-tenant  was  an  assignee 
under  the  statute.^*'  The  assignee  of  a  reversion  may  lose  his 
right  to  enforce  a  condition  of  re-entry  by  his  delay  in  exercising 
it.^^  It  may  be  noted,  however,  that  the  operation  of  these  stat- 
utes in  placing  the  assignee  of  the  reversion  in  the  shoes  of  the 
assignor  and  lessor,  is  eontined  to  those  covenants  which  are 
contained  in  the  lease  and  which  run  with  the  land.  The  as- 
signee of  the  reversion  is  not  subrogated  to  any  rights  of  the 
reversioner  which  are  personal  to  him  and  collateral  to  the  lease. 
The  remedies  of  the  grantee  are  those  only  which  the  grantor 
had  under  the  lease  and  do  not  enable  the  grantee  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  a  guarantee  of  the  rent  signed  by  a  third  person  and 
which  is  contained  in  a  separate  instruments^ 

53  Small  V.  Clark,  97  Me.  304,  54       Roberts    v.    McPherson,    63    N.    J. 
Atl.  Rep.  758;    Fenn  v.  Smart,  12       Law,  352,  43  Atl.  Rpp.  1098. 
East,  444;    Bennett  v.  Herring,   3  3c  page  v.  Esty,  54  Me.  319. 

C.     B.     (N.     S.)     370;     Trask    v.  se  Co.  Litt.  215a;  Wright  v.  Bur- 
Wheeler,    7    Allen     (Mass.)     109;  roughes,  3  C.  B.  685,  4  D.  &  L.  438, 
Rice    V.    Stone,    1    Allen    (Mass.)  16  U  J.  C.  P.  6,  12  Jur.  968. 
566.  37  Gibson  v.  Doey,  2  H.  &  N.  615, 

54  Island  Coal  Co.  v.  Combs,  152  27  L.  J.  Ex.  37,  6  W.  R.  107. 
Ind.  379,  53  N.  E.  Rep.  452;   Met-  as  Harbeck      v.      Sylvester,      13 
ropolitan    Land    Co.    v.    Manning  Wend.     (N.    Y.)     608.      But    see 
(Mo.    App.),   71    S.    W.   Rep.    696;  Allen  v.  Culver,  3  Denio   (N.  Y.> 


ATTORNMENT  OF  THE  TENANT. 


491 


§  318.  The  grantees  right  to  collect  rents.  In  modern  times 
in  both  England  and  America,  by  virtue  of  the  statute  32  Henry 
VIII,  c.  34  and  similar  statutes,  a  conveyance  of  the  reversion 
by  the  owner  carries  with  it,  unless  expressly  reserved  by  the 
grantor,  the  right  to  collect  and  sue  for  all  rents  which  may 
subsequently  accrue  and  become  due  under  a  covenant  by  a 
lessee  to  pay  rent  to  the  owner  of  the  preniises.^^    A  conveyance 


284.  "It  follows  from  these  prin- 
ciples that  a  sale  by  a  lessor  of 
real  estate  during  an  unexpired 
leasehold  term,  under  which  a 
tenant  is  holding,  does  not  of  it- 
self abrogate  the  lease,  determine 
the  leasehold  estate,  or  authorize 
the  landlord  or  tenant  to  treat  the 
lease  as  at  an  end.  Its  only  effect 
is  to  substitute  the  vendee  of  the 
reversion  to  all  the  rights  of  the 
original  lessor,  and  to  transfer  to 
such  vendee  the  fealty  and  duty 
to  pay  rent  under  the  lease,  not 
then  matured,  which,  by  the  terms 
of  the  lease,  the  tenant  had  bound 
himself  to  pay  to  the  original'  les- 
sor. The  vendee  then  becomes 
the  landlord  by  operation  of  law, 
whose  title  the  tenant,  so  long  as 
he  remains  undisturbed  in  his 
possession,  may  not  dispute;  and 
the  tenant  becomes  tenant  of  the 
vendee  of  the  reversion,  whose 
right  to  the  possession  for  the  un- 
expired term  the  landlord  may 
not  gainsay  so  long  as  the  tenant 
complies  with  the  terms  of  the 
lease.  And  the  same  result  fol- 
lows when  the  sale  is  made  under 
a  mortgage  or  trust  deed,  junior 
to  the  lease,  or  under  execution, 
or  other  similar  sale  the  lien  of 
which  is  junior  to  the  lease."  By 
the  court  in  Otis  v.  McMillan,  70 
Ala.  46,  on  pp.  5o  and  54. 

S9  Hand  v.  Liles,  56  Ala.  143; 
Steed  V.  Hinson.  76  Ala.  298;  Wise 
V.   Falkner,   51   Ala.    359;    Perker- 


son  V.  Snodgrass,  85  Ala.  137, 140, 
4  So.  Rep.  752;  Otis  v.  McMillan, 
70  Ala.  46,  52;  English  v.  Key,  39 
Ala.  113;  Pope  v.  Harkins,  16  Ala. 
321;  Gibons  v.  Dillingham,  10 
Ark.  9,  50  Am.  Dec.  233;  Mahoney 
V.  Alirso.  51  Cal.  440;  Clark  v. 
Cobb.  121  Cal.  595,  54  Pac.  Rep. 
74,  77;  Peck  v.  Northrop,  17  Conn. 
217;  Winestein  v.  Ziglatzki,  77 
Conn.  404,  59  Atl.  Rep.  496;  Ken- 
nedy V.  Kennedy,  66  111.  190,  193; 
Neill  Y.  Chessen,  15  111.  App.  266; 
Disselharst  v.  Cadogan,  21  111. 
App.  179,  180;  Crosby  v.  Loop,  13 
111.  625,  627;  Sampson  v.  Grimes, 
7  Black.  (Ind.)  176;  Page  v.  Lash- 
ley,  15  Ind.  152;  Carley  v.  Lewis, 
24  Ind.  23;  Indianapolis  National 
Gas  Co.  V.  Pierce,  25  Ind.  App. 
116,  56  N.  E.  Rep.  137;  Welch  v. 
Harton,  73  Iowa,  250,  34  N.  E. 
Rep.  840;  Van  Wagner  v.  Van 
Nostrand,  19  Iowa,  422,  428; 
Breeding  v.  Taylor,  13  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  481;  Winslow  v.  Rand,  29 
Me.  362,  365;  Gale  v.  Edwards,  52 
Me.  363,  365;  Montague  v.  Gay,  17 
Mass.  439,  440;  Burden  v.  Thayer, 
3  Met.  (Mass.)  76,  80,  37  Am.  Dec. 
117;  Beal  v.  Boston  Car  Spring 
Co..  125  Mass.  157,  28  Am.  Rep. 
216;  Burton  v.  Richardson,  10 
Allen  (Mass.)  260;  Grundin  v. 
Carter.  99  Mass.  15;  Stevenson  t. 
Hancock,  72  Mo.  612,  615;  Page 
V.  Culver,  55  Mo.  App.  606;  Hend- 
rickson  v.  Beason.  21  Neb.  61,  63, 
31  N.  W.  Rep.  206;  Allen  v.  Hall, 


492  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

by  operation  of  law  or  under  a  trust  deed  or  power  of  sale  in 
a  mortgage  or  by  a  master  or  sheriff  under  a  decree  or  execu- 
tion that  is  valid  against  the  lessor,  will  be  as  efficacious  as  a 
deed  from  him  directly.  Whatever  unqualifiedly  passes  his  re- 
version will  pass  rent  thereafter  accruing.*"  Under  the  modem 
statutes  the  grantee  of  the  reversion  is  entitled  to  collect  subse- 
quently accruing  rent  from  a  tenant  in  possession  though  the 
tenant  may  not  have  attorned  to  him.*^  For  the  fact  of  an  at- 
tornment in  modem  times  at  least,  has  lost  its  ancient  impor- 
tance. Thus,  though  the  tenant  has  not  attorned  to  the  pur- 
chaser from  the  lessor,  the  latter  cannot  recover  as  against  the 
tenant  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  premises  by  the  tenant 
after  the  title  has  passed  to  the  grantee  of  the  lessor.*-  Under 
the  modern  statutes,  it  is  settled  that  the  grantee  may  sue  the 
tenant  in  his  own  name  for  rent  accruing  subsequently  to  the 
conveyance  to  him.*"  And  it  has  also  been  held  that  he  may 
sue  in  his  own  name  upon  collateral  security  for  rent.**  In 
fact,  under  the  modern  statute,  the  rights  of  the  grantee  of  the 
reversion  after  the  conveyance  to  him  of  the  fee  are  substanti- 
ally the  same  as  the  rights  of  the  grantor  so  far  as  the  covenants 
which  run  with  the  land  are  concerned.    So,  the  grantee  of  land 

66  Neb.  84,  92  N.  W.  Rep.  171;  345,  36  N.  W.  Rep.  22,  23;  Winter- 
Van  Wicklen  v.  Paulson,  14  Barb.  field  v.  Strauss,  24  Wis.  394; 
(N.  Y.)  654;  Pollock  v.  Cronise,  Leonard  v.  Burgess,  16  Wis.  41, 
12  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  363;  Ruck-  43. 

man  v.  Astor,  3  Edw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  4o  Disselharst  v.  Cadogan,  21  III. 

373;   Lewis  v.  Wilkins,  62  N.  Car.  App.  179,  180,  also  holding  that  a 

303,  307;    Kornegay  v.  Collier,   65  sale  by  an  olficer  appointed  by  the 

N.  Car.  69,  72;   Rogers  v.  McKen-  court  under  a  decree  in  partition, 

zie,  65  N.  Car.  218;  Jolly  v.  Bryan,  subject  to  the  tenant's   rights,   is 

86  N.  Car.  245;   Wilcoxin  v.  Don-  not  a  reservation  of  rent,  and  the 

elly,  90  N.  Car.  245;   Lancashire  v.  purchaser  is  entitled  to  collect  the 

Mason,    75     N.     Car.     455;     West  rents  accruing  after  the  sale. 

Shore   Mills   Co.    v.    Edwards,    24  4i  Tubb    v.    Fort,    58    Ala.    277; 

Oreg.  475,  478,  33  Pac.  Rep.  987;  Wise  v.  Falkner,  51  Ala.  359. 

Duff    V    Wilson,    69    Pa.    St.    316;  42  Blake  v.  Grammer,  3  Fed.  Cas. 

Gibbs    V.    Ross,    2    Head    (Tenn.)  No.  1,496,  4  Cranch,  C.  C.  13. 

437;  Hearne  v.  Lewis,  78  Tex.  276,  43  Springer  v.  Chicago  Real  Es- 

14    S.    W.    Rep.    572;    Maxwell    v.  tate,  etc.,  Co.,  202  111.  17,  66  N.  E. 

Urban,  22  Tex.   Civ.  App.  565,  55  Rep.  850. 

S.  W.  Rep.  1124;   Shaw  v.  Partridge,  44  Allen    v.    Culver,    3    Den.    (N. 

17  Vt.  626;  Evans  v.  Enloe,  70  Wis.  Y.)   284. 


ATTORNMENT  OF  THE  TENANT.  493 

may  maintain  an  action  against  a  tenant  whom  he  found  in  pos- 
session for  damages  to  the  land  after  the  grant  without  an  as- 
signment of  the  cause  of  action  by  the  grantor.*^  It  has  also 
been  held  that  the  statutes  are  applicable  to  an  assignment  of  a 
contract  of  sale  and  of  a  bond  for  a  deed.  The  vendee  is  en- 
titled to  the  rent  only  from  the  date  he  takes  title  to  the  de- 
mised premises,  but  if  before  that  date  he  assigns  his  contract 
his  right  to  the  subsequently  accruing  rent  passes  to  the  assignee 
and  the  latter  may  enforce  his  rights  against  a  tenant  who  is  in 
possession  of  the  premises  when  he  takes  title.  So,  the  assign- 
ment of  a  bond  for  a  deed  which  was  made  before  rent  had  ac- 
crued and  which  transfers  in  terms  all  the  right,  title  and  in- 
terest of  the  assignor,  carries  with  it  rent  which  subsequently 
accrues,  but  not  rent  which  has  accrued,  imless  an  intent  to 
pass  such  rent  be  shown  fairly.*^  The  assignee  of  the  bond 
may  sue  the  tenant  of  the  assignor  in  his  own  name  as  soon  as 
notice  of  the  assignment  has  been  given  to  the  tenant.*"  The 
statute  of  Henry  YIII,  c.  34,  is  by  its  terms  confined  to  leases 
which  are  under  seal.  Consequently  a  lessor  may,  even  though  he 
has  assigned  his  reversion,  sue  the  lessee  on  his  agreement  to  re- 
pair a  breach  thereof  happening  subsequent  to  the  assignment.** 
Hence,  it  follows  that  where  a  lease  is  not  under  seal,  the  as- 
signee of  a  reversion  does  not  acquire  the  benefit  of  the  statute, 
and  he  cannot  maintain  an  action  against  the  tenant  for  a 
breach  of  the  latter 's  covenant  to  repair.*''  Under  the  statute 
the  assignee  of  a  reversion  may  generally  enforce  the  tenant's 
covenant  to  repair  and  may  sue  him  in  his  own  name  for  a 
breach  of  the  same.^°    As  he  may  also  apparently  enforce  a  for- 

«  Shinn   v.   Guyton   &   Herring-  in  the  matter  than  the  payee  of  a 

ton   Mule  Co.,   109   Mo.   App.    557,  promissory  note  after  he  has   in- 

563,  83  S.  W.  Rep.  1015.  dorsed  it."     Lancashire  v.  Mason, 

46  Van     Driel     v.     Rosierz,     26  75    N.    Car.    455,    cited    with    ap- 

lowa,  575.  proval  in  Otis  v.  McMillan,  70  Ala, 

*7  "It  is  familiar  learning,  that  46,  53. 
fealty  and  rent  are  incident  to  the  *«  Bickford   v.    Parson,   5  C.    B. 

reversion,  and  passes  with  it;  and  921,  17  L.  J.  C.  P.  192,  12  Jur.  377. 
by   a   grant   of  the   reversion    the  ^a  Standen   v.    Christmas,    10   Q. 

assignee  is  substituted  in  place  of  B.  135,  16  L.  J.  Q.    B.  265,  11  Jur. 

the  lessor,  and  the  rent  accruing  694. 

thereafter   is  to   be   paid  to   him.  so  Martyn   v.    "Williams,    1    H.   & 

After    the    assignment   the    lessor  N.  817,  26  L.  J.  Ex.  117,  5  W.  R. 

has   no  more   interest  or  concern  351. 


494  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

feiture  arising  from  a  breach  of  a  covenant  to  repair  even  where 
lie  has  not  given  the  tenant  notice  of  the  assignment.^^  For 
this  purpose  an  attornment  is  not  necessary.  And  where  a 
tenant's  covenant  to  repair  is  for  the  benefit  of  lessors  who 
hold  as  tenants  in  common,  all  the  grantees  of  the  several  ten- 
ants in  common  must  join  in  the  action  to  recover  damages  for 
a  breach  of  recoverment.^- 

§  319.  The  extent  of  the  rights  of  the  grantor  after  his  con- 
veyance.  Usually  a  grantor  cannot  collect  rent  from  his 
former  tenants  which  has  accrued  after  his  sale  of  the  rever- 
sion unless  he  has  expressly  reserved  his  right  to  do  so.  This  he 
will  have  to  show  for  the  contrary  will  be  presumed.  And  a 
grantor  who,  without  having  a  legal  right  to  do  so,  collects 
rent  which  accrues  after  he  has  conveyed,  will  be  liable  to  his 
grantee  in  an  action  of  assumpsit  for  money  had  and  received 
to  the  use  of  the  grantee,^^  or  the  grantee  may  still  maintain  an 
action  of  debt  against  the  lessee.^*  The  lessor  may,  of  course, 
grant  the  reversion,  reserving  the  rent  to  himself  or  to  another. 
The  reservation  of  subsequently  accruing  rent  need  not  be  ex- 
pressed in  the  deed  of  conveyance  of  the  reversion.  It  may  be 
proved  by  other  evidence  either  parol  or  written.  If  the  reser- 
vation of  rent  is  contained  in  an  instrument  other  than  the  deed 
of  conveyance,  the  instruments  may  be  construed  together  in 
order  to  arrive  at  the  real  intention  of  the  parties.^^  At  the 
common  law  and  before  the  statute  of  32  Henry  VIII.  c.  34,  the 
grantor  could  have  sued  a  lessee  in  debt  for  the  rent  which  ac- 
crued before  the  grant  by  reason  of  the  estate  created  by  the  pos- 
session of  the  tenant  and  the  receipts  of  the  profits  by  him.  Since 
the  passage  of  that  statute,^*^  the  grantor  may  sue  on  the  cove- 
nants to  pay  rent  contained  in  the  existing  lease.^^  He  cannot 
after  the  title  has  passed  from  him  sue  in  assumpsit  or  for  use 

SI  Bennett  v.   Herring,   3   C.   B.  53  Van  Wagner  v.  Van  Nostrand. 

(N.  S.)   370,  6  W.  R.  37;   Scaltock  19  Iowa,  422,  428. 

T.  Harston,  45  L  J.  C.  P.  125;    1  C4  winslow  v.  Rand,  29  Me.  362, 

C.  P.  D.  106,  34  L.  T.  130,  24  W.  365. 

R.  431.  ^'"  Neill  V.  Chessen,  15  111.  App. 

G2  Thompson  v.  Hakewell,  19  C.  266,  267. 

B.   (N.  S.)   713,  35  L.  J.  C.  P.  18,  oe  Thursby    v.    Plant,    1    Saund. 

11  Jur.   (N.  S.)   732,  13  L.  T.  989,  240;    Patten    y.    Deshon,    1    Gray 

14  W.  R.  11.  (Mass.)  325,  327. 

a-  Crosby  v.  Loop,  13  111.  625. 


ATTORNMENT  OF  THE  TENANT.  495 

and  occnpation,  unless  the  tenant  has  after  the  conveyance  sur- 
rendered the  lease  to  him  and  made  new  aiTangements.'**  Under 
the  modem  statutes,  the  lessor  by  his  assignment  of  the  rever- 
sion parts  with  his  right  to  enter  for  every  breach  of  condition 
which  may  happen  after  the  assignment.  And  the  lessor  who 
fails  to  exercise  his  rights  to  forfeit  the  lease  while  he  is  the 
owner  of  the  reversion,  cannot  after  he  has  parted  with  his  re- 
version re-enter  upon  the  premises  either  for  a  past  or  present 
forfeiture,  unless  he  has  been  expressly  given  a  right  to  do  so, 
or  unless  he  acts  with  the  consent  and  by  the  authority  of  the 
new  owner.  Any  other  principle  or  rule  of  procedure  would 
result  in  great  unfairness  to  the  grantee  of  the  reversion  and 
would  be  of  no  benefit  to  the  grantor.  The  old  principle  that  a 
forfeiture  of  a  breach  of  a  condition  can  only  be  exercised  by 
the  heirs  of  the  person  who  created  the  condition  has  been 
gradually  narrowed  and  certainly  has  no  operation  to  the 
breach  of  the  condition  in  a  lease.  If  the  lessor  desires  to  take 
advantage  of  a  forfeiture  occurring  before  he  sells  the  property 
he  must  do  so  before  he  parts  with  his  title.  To  permit  him  to 
do  this  after  the  grantee  has  acquired  the  title  would  be  useless, 
for,  as  against  his  grantee,  he  is  estopped  by  his  deed  of  convey- 
ance and  any  title  which  he  may  acquire  after  he  has  given  his 
deed  would  not  enure  to  his  benefit  but  simply  to  the  benefit  of 
his  grantee.  But  the  assignment  by  the  lessor  of  his  reversion 
in  one  of  two  pieces  of  property  included  in  a  lease  will  be  con- 
fined in  its  operation  to  the  one  actually  assigned  and  will  not 
destroy  the  right  of  the  lessor  to  enter  upon  the  other  piece  for 
a  breach  of  condition.^^  And  finally  and  in  conclusion,  it  should 
be  said  that  the  right  to  collect  rents  due  at  the  date  of  the  sale, 
or  the  right  to  recover  for  use  and  occupation  prior  to  the  sale, 
does  not  pass  to  the  grantee  in  the  absence  of  an  express  agree- 
ment to  that  effect.  The  debts  created  by  this  right  belong  to 
the  lessor,  are  choses  in  action  and  hence  are  personal  prop- 
erty.«° 

58Marney   v.   Byrd,    11   Humph.  v.  Wise,  3  Watts  (Pa.)  394;   Perk- 

(Tenn.)  95,  96.  erson   v.    Snodgrass,   85   Ala.    137, 

50  Hyde  v.  Warden,  47  L.  J.  Ex.  4  So.  Rep.  732 ;  Damren  v.  Power 

121,  3  Ex.  D.  72,  37  L.  T.  567,  26  Co.,  91   Me.  334,  40  Atl.   Rep.   63; 

W.  R.  201.  Kennedy  v.  Kennedy,  66   111.   190, 

60  Burden     v.     Thayer,     3     Met.  193;    Winckleberger  v.  Katzelbur- 

(Mass.)  76;  Bank  of  Pennsylvania  ger,  77  Mo.  App.  117;    Peudill  ▼. 


496 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


§  320.  The  obligation  of  the  grantee  to  tenants  in  possession. 

A  general  grant  of  the  reversion  passesi  all  the  leases  to 
which  the  property  is  subject,  including  the  rents  reserved; 
but  the  right  of  the  grantee  is  subject  to  all  the  equities  or  just 
demands  of  the  tenants  or  other  incumbrance  of  which  the 
grantee  had  notice.®^  A  grantee  of  the  reversion  which  is  sub- 
ject to  a  lease  made  by  the  grantor  is  bound  to  take  notice  of 
all  the  rights  of  a  tenant  in  possession."^  A  grantee  of  the  re- 
version who  takes  his  conveyance  subject  to  existing  tenancies 
will  be  presumed  as  to  such  tenants  to  be  bound  to  perform  all 
covenants  which  run  with  the  land.  He  will  be  presumed  to 
have  ascertained  the  nature,  extent,  and  terms  of  the  leases 
under  which  all  tenants  hold  who  are  in  possession  when  he  re- 
ceives the  grant  of  the  reversion  in  possession  of  the  premises. 
This  is  a  presumption  of  law.  The  fact  that  he  has  actual 
knowledge  of  the  terms  of  the  lease  of  any  particular  tenant 
will  not  rebut  this  presumption  as  to  the  other  tenants.     If, 


Ells,  67  Mich.  657,  35  N.  W.  Rep. 
754;  Van  Driel  v.  Rosierz,  26 
Iowa,  575,  577.  It  results  from 
these  principles  that  a  sale  by  a 
lessor  of  real  estate  during  an  un- 
expired leasehold  term,  under 
which  a  tenant  is  holding,  does 
not  of  itself  abrogate  the  lease, 
determine  the  leasehold  estate  or 
authorize  the  landlord  or  tenant 
to  treat  the  lease  as  at  an  end. 
Its  only  effect  is  to  substitute  the 
vendee  of  the  reversion  to  all  the 
rights  of  the  original  lessor,  and 
to  transfer  to  such  vendee  the 
fealty  and  duty  to  pay  rent  under 
the  lease  not  then  matured,  which, 
by  the  terms  of  the  lease,  the  ten- 
ant had  bound  himself  to  pay  to 
the  original  lessor.  The  vendee 
then  becomes  the  landlord  by  op- 
eration of  law,  whose  title  the 
tenant,  so  long  as  he  remains  un- 
disturbed in  the  possession,  may 
not  dispute;  and  the  tenant  be- 
comes tenant  of  the  vendee  of  the 
reversion,  whose  right  to  the  pos- 


session for  the  unexpired  term 
the  landlord  may  not  gainsay  so 
long  as  the  tenant  complies  with 
the  terms  of  the  lease.  By  the 
court  in  Otis  v.  McMillan,  70  Ala. 
46,  on  p.  54. 

61  Schoellkopf  v.  Coatsworth,  66 
N.  Y.  Supp.  979,  55  App.  Div. 
331,  affirmed  in  166  N.  Y.  77,  59 
N.  E.  Rep.  710.  See,  also.  Matter 
of  Coatsworth,  160  N.  Y.  114,  54 
N.  E.  Rep.  709,  reversing  37  App. 
Div.  295,  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  753. 

«2  0tis  V.  McMillan,  70  Ala.  46; 
Stone  V.  Snell  (Neb.  1906),  109 
N.  W.  Rep.  750;  Friedlander  v. 
Ryder,  30  Neb.  783,  47  N.  W.  Rep. 
83,  9  L.  R.  A.  700;  McGlauflin  v. 
Holman,  1  Wash.  St.  239,  24  Pac. 
Rep.  239;  Schulte  v.  Schering,  2 
Wash.  St.  127,  26  Pac.  Rep.  78; 
Bailie  v.  Rodway,  27  Wis.  172; 
Maul  V.  Rider,  59  Pa.  St.  167; 
Hottenstein  v.  Lerch,  104  Pa.  St. 
454;  Rowe  v.  Ream,  105  Pa.  St. 
543;  Howell  v.  Denton  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  68  S.  W.  Rep.  1002. 


ATTORNMENT  OP  THE  TENANT.  497 

therefore,  tlie  p:rantce  collects  rent  from  a  tenant  whom  he  finds 
in  possession,  he  will  be  conclusively  presumed  to  have  affirmed 
a  voidable  lease  which  that  tenant  holds.®^  A  grantee  who  takes 
lan(J  under  lease  has  been  held  bound  by  an  agreement  between 
his  grantor  and  the  lessee  that  the  latter  should  pay  certain  rents 
due  by  the  gi^antor  which  payments  were  to  be  applied  to 
the  rent  though  the  grantee  was  ignorant  of  such  an  agreement.®* 
The  mere  possession  or  occupation  of  real  property  by  a  per- 
son without  any  other  fact  is  not  notice  to  an  intending  pur- 
chaser that  the  occupant  is  a  lessee.  .  The  possession  is  notice 
that  the  occupant  has  some  claim  of  title  adverse  to  the  grantor 
and  it  is  incumbent  on  the  purchaser  to  ascertain  the  present 
character  and  extent  of  the  claim.  He  cannot  safely  assume  he 
is  a  tenant  because  formerly  he  had  been  one  for  his  status  may 
have  been  changed  by  the  agreement  of  the  parties  or  by  opera- 
tion of  law.  The  purchaser  must  inquire  as  to  his  present  re- 
lationship to  the  property  and  a  knowledge  of  a  prior  lease 
will  not  excuse  the  failure  of  the  purchaser  to  inquire.  The 
lessor  may  have  made  a  surrender  of  the  lease,  or  he  may  have 
entered  into  a  contract  with  the  owner  to  buy  the  property  in 
which  case  he  is  a  vendee  in  possession  with  an  equitable  right 
to  enforce  the  specific  performance  of  the  contract.  For,  if  a 
tenant  during  his  tenancy  change  his  character  by  agreeing  to 
purchase  the  premises,  his  subsequent  possession  is  notice  of 
his  equitable  title  as  purchaser.®^  Or  the  prior  lease  may  have 
been  executed  by  fraud  or  duress  and  be  voidable  as  to  him,  in 
which  event,  though  the  lease  be  for  years,  he  may  turn  out  to 
be  merely  a  tenant  at  will.  In  all  such  cases,  the  purchaser 
must  diligently  inquire  as  to  the  existing  rights  of  the  person 
in  possession  for  he  may  have  some  right  of  an  equitable  char- 
es chesterman  V.  Gardner,  2  Jr.  249,  253;  Taj'lor  v.  Hibbert,  2 
Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  29,  9  Am.  Dec.  Ves.  Jr.  437;  Hanbury  v.  Litch- 
265;  Lazarus  v.  Hellman,  11  Abb.  field,  2  N.  Y.  &  K.  629. 
N.    C.    (N.    Y.)    93;    Anderson    v.  e*  Hovey    v.    Walker,    90    Mich. 

Brinser,   129   Pa.    St.   376,   404,   18       527,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  678. 
Atl.    Rep.    520,    6    L.    R.    A.    205;  es  Daniels    v.    Davison,    16    Ves. 

Rickert  v.  Snyder,  9  "Wend.  (N.  Jr.  249;  Allen  v.  Anthony,  1  Mer. 
Y.)  415;  Beebe  v.  Coleman,  8  287;  Anderson  v.  Brinser,  129  Pa. 
Page  (N.  Y.)  392;  Scott  v.  Galla-  St.  376,  404,  18  Atl.  Rep.  250, 
gher,  14  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  333;  Mc-  6  L.  R.  A.  205;  Hottenstein  v. 
Mechan  v.  Griffing,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  Lerch,  104  Pa.  St.  454;  Rowe  v. 
149;    Daniels  v.  Davison,   16  Ves.      Ream,  105  Pa.  St.  543. 

32 


498  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

acter  which  it  would  be  utterly  impossible  for  him  to  put  in 
record.*'^  A  lessee  who  takes  a  lease  of  premises,  a  part  of  which 
is  leased  to  another,  the  second  lease  being  made  expressly  sub- 
ject to  the  rights  of  the  prior  lessee  and  who  thereafter  collects 
rents  from  the  prior  lessee,  is  estopped  to  deny  the  right  of  such 
prior  lessee  to  a  renewal  under  a  cover  and  in  his  lease.  The 
collection  of  the  rent  is  an  acceptance  and  affirmance  of  the 
prior  lease  and  creates  a  presumption  that  the  second  leseee  had 
informed  himself  of  its  terms  and  contents.®^ 

§  321.  The  notice  to  the  tenant  of  the  sale  of  the  reversion. 
It  is  always  advisable  that  the  grantee  of  the  reversion  should, 
as  soon  as  possible,  give  the  tenant  notice  of  the  fact  that  he 
has  acquired  title.  This  rule  applies  to  the  grantee  who  pur- 
chases at  a  judicial  sale  as  well  as  to  one  who  purchases  under  a 
contract  with  the  owner.  "Where  the  tenant  has  no  knowledge  of 
the  conveyance  of  the  reversion  and  pays  the  grantor  the  rent 
which  accrues  subsequent  to  the  conveyance  acting  in  good  faith, 
the  grantee  cannot  recover  the  rent  from  him.**^  The  grantee 
ought  therefore,  as  soon  as  possible  to  put  his  deed  on  record 
and  also  notify  all  tenants  who  are  in  possession  of  the  premises 
at  the  date  of  the  conveyance  to  him,  that  he  has  acquired  the 
title.^^  Whether  the  recording  of  the  deed  by  the  grantee  alone 
is  sufficient  notice  to  the  tenant  of  the  sale  has  been  variously 
determined.  On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  the  record- 
ing of  the  deed  of  conveyance  covering  the  demised  premises  by 
the  grantee  is  notice  to  the  tenant  in  possession  of  the  premises 
that  the  grantee  named  in  the  deed  has  acquired  a  right  to  col- 
lect subsequent  rents.  The  courts  have  distinguished  between 
a  sale  of  the  land  and  an  assignment  of  the  rent  which  is  to  be- 
come due,  holding  that  while  the  former  is  a  transfer  of  real 
estate  and  it  is  entitled  to  be  recorded  the  latter  is  an  assign- 
ment of  a  right  of  action  of  which  actual  notice  must  be  given.'** 
In    the    former   case,    the    rents    are   a   mere    incident    of   the 

08  Anderson  v.  Brinser,  129   Pa.  eo  Farley  v.  Thompson,  15  Mass. 

St.   376,    404.   18   Atl.   Rep.    520,   6  18;    Fitchburg   Cotton   Mfg.   Corp. 

L.  R.  A.  205.  V.   Melven,  15  Mass.  26S;    Indiana 

87  Carre  Hotel  Co.  v.  Wells-  Natural  Gas  &  Oil  Co.  v.  Lee,  34 
Fargo  Co.,  128  Fed.  Rep.  587,  590,  Ind.  App.  119,  72  N.  E.  Rep.  492. 
63  C.  C.  A.  23.  70  Gray   v.   Rogers,   30   Mo.    258. 

88  Sampson  v.  Grimes,  7  Blackf. 
rind.)   173. 


ATTORNMENT  OF  THE  TENANT.  499 

land  which  is  assisned  and  a  notice  of  the  assiGfnment  or  con- 
veyance of  the  land  having  been  given  to  the  world  by  the  re- 
cording of  the  deed,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  tenant  knew  of 
the  transfer.'^^  But  the  weak  point  in  this  argument  is  that  the 
record  of  the  conveyance  of  the  reversion  is  notice  to  such  per- 
sons only  as  take  a  conveyance  subsequent  in  point  of  time  to 
the  record.  Of  course,  the  record  of  the  deed  of  the  reversion 
is  subsequent  to  the  lease  of  the  land  under  which  the  tenant 
enters  so  that  this  rule  of  notice  should  not  apply  to  him.  The 
safest  method  is  to  give  actual  notice  that  the  demised  premises 
have  been  sold  by  personally  exhibiting  the  deed,  or  a  certified 
copy  to  the  tenant  or  tenants  in  possession.  The  grantee  of  the 
reversion  should  bj^  some  proper  method  notify  all  the  tenants 
in  possession  of  the  premises  of  the  fact  that  he  has  become  the 
owner.  He  is  bound  to  inquire  and  seek  for  the  names  of  the 
tenants  on  the  premises  and  the  terms  of  their  hiring.  This  he 
should  do  by  actual  inquiry  on  the  premises  and  not  by  relying 
upon  what  the  grantor  tells  him.  If  he  neglects  to  use  diligence 
in  so  doing  and  whether  he  is  ignorant  or  not,  and  he  delays  to 
notify  the  tenant  of  the  conveyance  to  him.  he  cannot  collect 
rent  which  has  accrued  subsequently  thereto.'-  So,  a  grantee 
cannot  recover  rent  from  a  tenant  who  has  paid  his  rent  in  ad- 
vance to  his  landlord  before  the  date  upon  which  it  became  due, 
though  the  grantee  takes  his  conveyance  before  the  date  upon 
which  it  really  accrues,  and  the  tenant  has  no  notice  of  the  con- 
veyance until  after  the  time  when  the  rent  should  have  been 
paid  according  to  the  terms  of  the  lease. '^^  A  grantee  who  neg- 
lects to  infonn  himself  of  the  relations  existing  between  his  gran- 
tor and  a  tenant  as  to  the  payment  of  rent  cannot  recover  rent 
which  has  subsequently  accrued  but  which  has  been  paid  in  ad- 
vance and  before  it  became  due  by  the  tenant  to  the  former 
landlord.  But  after  the  grantee  has  by  proper  methods  noti- 
fied the  tenant  in  possession  of  the  premises,  that  the  title  has 
passed  to  him,  he  has  an  absolute  right  as  against  such  tenant 
to  recover  subsequently  accruing  rents.  A  tenant  who,  after 
a  purchase  of  the  reversion  as  shown  him,  his  deed  of  convey- 

71  Peck    V.    Northrop,    17    Conn.  -■!  Dreyfus  v.   Hirt,  82  Cal.  621, 
217,  221.                                                    23  Pac.  Rep.  193. 

72  Dreyfus  v.  Hirt,  82  Cal.  621,  23 
Pac.   Rep.    193. 


500  LAW  OP^  LANDLOED  AND  TENANT, 

anee,  pays  subsequently  accruing  rents  to  the  former  owner, 
does  so  at  the  risk  of  having  to  pay  them  again  to  the  new  land- 
lord, for  the  conduct  of  the  tenant  under  such  circumstances, 
whether  it  was  the  result  of  collusion  with  the  former  o'OTier  or 
not,  is  a  fraud  upon  the  purchaser  of  the  reversion.  When 
the  purchaser  subsequently  sues  him  for  rent  accruing  since  the 
purchase,  he  cannot  defend  the  action  by  alleging  and  proving 
that  he  had  paid  the  subsequently  accruing  rents  to  a  former 
landlord.  The  tenant  in  such  a  position  is  no  better  off  than  if 
he  has  paid  no  rent  at  all.'^*  Under  the  statute  of  4  Anne,  c. 
16,  s.  10,  which  provides  that  no  tenant  shall  be  prejudiced  by 
payment  of  rent  to  a  grantor  or  by  breach  of  any  condition  for 
non-payment  before  notice  shall  be  given  him  by  the  grantee,  a 
tenant  who,  having  paid  his  rent  in  advance,  receives  notice 
from  a  mortgagee  to  pay  the  rent  to  him  will  be  liable  to  the 
mortgagee  for  rent  which  accrues  after  the  notice  though  the 
notice  itself  did  not  state  that  the  party  giving  it  was  a  mort- 
gagee. On  the  receipt  of  such  a  notice,  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
tenant  to  seek  information  as  to  the  character  of  the  claimant 
It  is  a  general  rule  that  the  payment  of  rent  before  it  is  due  is 
rather  in  the  nature  of  a  loan  to  the  landlord  than  a  payment 
of  rent.  When  the  rent  becomes  due  it  is  converted  into  a  pay- 
ment of  rent.  If,  in  the  meantime,  rent  having  thus  been  paid 
in  advance,  the  lessor  conveys  or  mortgages  the  property,  the 
payment  in  advance  is  not  binding  on  the  mortgagee  unless  he 
fails  to  give  notice  and  where  he  gives  notice  he  may  collect  the 
rent  from  the  tenant  which  accrues  after  the  date  of  the  notice 
though  it  may  have  been  paid  in  advance  to  the  original  lessor.''^ 
§  322.  The  effect  of  a  sale  of  the  reversion  under  a  decree  or 
judgment.  The  sale  of  the  estate  of  the  lessor  by  the  sheriff 
under  an  execution,  or  by  virtue  of  a  decree  of  a  court  of  equity, 
does  not  put  an  end  to  a  term  created  by  a  lease  which  was  exe- 
cuted prior  to  the  date  upon  which  the  judgment  or  decree  be- 
came a  lien  upon  the  premises.'^"  The  purchaser  at  the  execu- 
tion sale  or  at  the  sale  under  the  decree  of  the  court,  takes  the 

74  Sullivan    v.    Lueck,    105    Mo.  C.  P.  132,   26  L.  T.   97,  20  W.  R. 

App.  199,  203,  79  S.  W.  Rep.  724.  367. 

70  DeNicholLs  v.  Saunders,  22  L.  to  Smith   v.   Aude,   46   Mo.   App. 

T.  661,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  589;  Cook  v.  631,  634. 
Guerra,  41  L.  J.  C.  P.  89,  L.  R.  7 


ATTORX-MENT  OF  THE  TENANT.  501 

property  sold  subject  to  all  leases  wliich  are  prior  to  the  lien  of 
the  judgment  or  mortgage,  and  subject  to  all  the  rights  of  ten- 
ants claiming  under  such  leases.  The  extinguishment  of  the  les- 
sor's title  by  the  sale  under  the  decree  or  execution  does  not 
in  any  way  effect  the  rights  of  tenants  or  render  void  the  lease 
as  between  the  tenant  and  the  purchaser  at  the  judicial  sale. 
The  sale  operates  merely  as  a  transfer  of  the  lessor's  title  under 
the  lease  to  the  purchaser.  The  purchaser  may  thereafter  ex- 
]iibit  his  deed  to  the  tenant  and  he  may  demand  of  the  tenant 
that  the  tenant  attorn  to  him  and  pay  him  all  rent  subsequently 
accruing  and  if  the  tenant  refuses  to  do  this,  the  purchaser  may 
oust  him.'''^  The  foreclosure  of  the  mortgage  and  the  sale  under 
foreclosure  or  a  sale  under  an  execution  on  a  judgment  where 
the  lien  of  the  mortgage  or  judgment  is  prior  to  the  execution, 
of  the  lease,  puts  an  end  to  the  term  and  exempts  the  tenant 
from  all  liability  to  the  mortgagor  or  the  execution  creditor,'* 
for  rent  accruing  subsequent  to  the  sale.  But  the  purchaser  at 
the  sale  under  the  foreclosure  or  under  the  execution  may  affirm 
a  lease  which  is  subsequent  and  subordinate  to  the  mortgage  or 
and  require  rents  to  be  paid  to  him  when  he  becomes  the  owner.''' 

■^7  Smith.  V.  Aude,   46   Mo.   App.  Oakes   v.    Aldridge,    46   Mo.   App. 

631,  634.  11. 

78  Burr  V.  Stenton,  52  Barb.  (N.  fy  Fitzgerald    v.    Beebe,    7    Ark. 

Y.)   377,  affirmed  in  43  N.  Y.  462;  310. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

THE  NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  KENT. 

o23.  Rent.     Definition  and  general  characteristics. 

321.  Various  kinds  of  rent  distinguished. 

325.  Whether  rent  may  be  reserved  out  of  personal  property. 

326.  The  payment  of  rent  as  evidence  of  tenancy. 

327.  The  certainty  of  rent. 

328.  Rent  to  become  due  on  the  happening  of  some  future  event. 

329.  Rent  payable  in  services. 

330.  Rent  payable  in  specific  articles. 

331.  The  express  covenant  to  pay  rent. 

332.  A  covenant  to  pay  rent  may  be  implied. 

333.  When  rent  is  due. 

334.  Rent  which  is  made  payable  in  advance. 

335.  The  place  for  the  payment  of  the  rent. 

336.  To  whom  rent  should  be  paid. 

337.  Rent  made  payable  to  persons  other  than  the  landlord. 

338.  Rent  payable  in  instalments. 

339.  The  tender  of  the  rent  by  the  lessee. 

340.  Apportionment  of  rent  between  successive  landlords. 

841.  Apportionment  among  the  several  assignees  of  the  lessor. 

342.  Apportionment  among  the  assignees  of  the  lessee. 

343.  The  liability  of  testamentary  trustees  for  rent. 

344.  The  payment  of  rent  by  an  under-tenant  to  the  original  lessor. 

345.  Payment  of  rent  by  note,  check  or  draft. 

346.  Receipts  for  rent.     When  conclusive  and  presumption  of  pay- 

ment therefrom. 

347.  The  application  of  rental  payments. 

348.  The  necessity  of  a  demand  for  the  payment  of  rent. 

349.  The  reduction  of  the  rent  by  the  landlord  during  the  tenn. 

350.  Increase  of  rent  on  re-hiring  or  during  the  term. 

351.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  in  an  action  to  recover  rent. 

352.  The  form  and  nature  of  the  lessor's  remedy  to  recover  rent. 

353.  Recovery  by  the  landlord  of  rent  where  the  tenant  has  never 

taken  possession. 

354.  Joinder  of  cause  of  action  for  rent. 

355.  Recoupment,  counterclaims  and  set  off,  by  a  lessee  in  an  ac- 

tion to  recover  the  rent. 

356.  Notice  to  produce  the  lease  in  an  action  to  collect  rent. 

357.  Payment  of  rent  during  occupation.    The  meaning  of  the  word 

"occupy." 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  KENT. 


503 


§  3o8.  The  appraisal  of  the  rent  on  the  renewal  of  the  lease. 

359.  The  manner  of  the  appraisal. 

360.  The  result  of  a  failure  to  fix  the  rent. 

361.  The  power  of  the  court  to  make  or  to  review  an  appraisal  of 

rent. 

362.  The  basis  of  the  action  for  use  and  occupation. 
3G3.  The  title  of  the  landlord. 

364.  The  occupation  must  be  proved. 

365.  Against  whom  action  for  use  and  occupation  can  be  maintained. 

366.  Parol  evidence  to  prove  use  and  occupation. 

367.  Defenses  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation. 

§  323.  Rent — Definition  and  general  characteristics.  Eent 
may  be  concisely  defined  as  a  right  to  a  compensation,  certain  or 
ascertainable,  either  in  money,  labor,  provisions  or  other  chat- 
tels, issuing  and  being  paid  out  of  lands  and  tenements  due  to 
their  owner  for  their  use.^     In  the  first  place,  rent,  considered 


1  Stephens  v.  Reynolds,  6  N.  Y. 
454;  Wegner  v.  Lubenow,  12  N. 
D.  95,  95  N.  W.  Rep.  442,  444; 
Parsell  v.  Stryker,  41  N.  Y.  480; 
West  Shore  Mills  Co.  v.  Edwards, 
24  Oreg.  475,  477,  33  Pac.  Rep.  987. 
Other  definitions  are  here  given. 
A  rent  is  a  compensation  paid  for 
the  use  of  land.  It  need  not  be 
in  money.  Any  chattels  or  prod- 
ucts of  the  soil  serve  the  pur- 
pose equally'  as  well.  Clarke  v. 
Cobb,  121  Cal.  595,  600,  54  Pac. 
Rep.  74;  Bloodworth  v.  Stevens, 
51  Miss.  475,  480.  It  is  the  com- 
pensation, either  in  money,  pro- 
visions, chattels  or  labor,  which 
is  received  by  the  owner  of  the 
soil,  or  the  person  entitled  to  the 
possession  of  the  premises  leased, 
for  the  use  and  occupation  thereof, 
Fisk  V.  Brayman,  21  R.  I.  195,  42 
Atl.  Rep.  878,  880.  See,  also,  to 
same  effect,  Rummel  v.  New  York, 
L.  E.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  9  N.  Y.  Supp. 
404,  407;  Tharn  v.  De  Breteuil,  83 
N.  Y.  Supp.  849,  856,  86  App.  Div. 
405;  Gugel  v.  Isaacs,  21  App.  Div. 
503,  506,  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  594.  "Rent 


is  that  which  is  to  be  paid  for  the 
use  of  land,  whether  in  money, 
labor  or  other  thing  agreed  upon. 
It  is  not  due  until  the  year  is  out 
when  the  renting  is  by  the  year, 
nor  in  arrears  until  after  it  is  due. 
If  not  in  arrears  it  passes  with 
the  sale  of  the  reversion,  without 
regard  to  the  time  of  the  year  it 
was  made,  unless  there  has  been 
some  stipulation  to  the  contrary." 
Hudson  V.  Fuller  (Tenn.),  35  S. 
W.  Rep.  .575,  576.  The  definition 
of  rent  which  can  constitute  a 
is  "a  certain  profit  issuing  yearly 
out  of  lands  and  tenements  cor- 
poreal," and  includes  every  species 
or  rent  which  can  constitute  a 
debt,  without  regard  to  the  na- 
ture of  the  contract  under  which 
it  is  reserved.  It  is  equally  rent 
whether  reserved  on  a  lease  under 
seal  or  by  parol."  Chappell  v. 
Brown,  1  Bailey  (S.  Car.)  528,  529. 
"A  rent  is  said  to  be  a  sum  of 
money  or  other  consideration  issu- 
ing yearly  out  of  lands  or  tene- 
ments. Blackstone  defines  'rent' 
or  'redditus'  as  a  compensation  or 


504.  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

as  a  compensation  for  the  use  of  land,  is  not  the  money,  goods 
or  service  which  the  tenant  renders  to  the  landlord,  but  it  is 
the  right  wliich  is  in  the  landlord  to  the  same.  In  its  original 
meaning,  rent  was  something  more  than  a  mere  right  to  sue  for 
the  value  of  the  compensation  when  due.  It  was,  and  still  is,  to 
a  certain  extent,  the  right  to  distrain,  i.  e.,  take  out  of  the  in- 
come or  profits  of  the  property,  compensation  or  return  for  its 
use.-  The  money  or  other  articles  of  value  which  the  rent  is  the 
right  to  receive,  are  sometimes  incorrectly  spoken  of  as  being 
the  rent  itself.  While  the  distinction  is  a  rather  minute  one,  yet 
it  is  important  and  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  order  to  secure 
a  clear  and  reasonable  understanding  of  what  rent  is.  For  the 
right  to  receive  rent  is  ordinarily  a  chattel  real  while  the  things 
which  consitute  visible  evidence  of  the  enforcement  of  the  right 
are  always  personal  property.  In  the  next  place,  rent  is  a 
right  to  receive  a  compensation  which  must  be  either  certain  in 
itself  or  which  is  capable  of  being  made  certain.  This  rule  ap- 
plies whether  the  rent  is  payable  in  money,  services  or  in  other 
things  of  value.^  And  it  must  also  be  something  which  is  ren- 
dered or  delivered  to  the  owner  out  of  the  profits  of  the  land 
an'd  not  out  of  the  land  itself  as  it  existed  before  the  rent  was 
created.  Thus,  the  reservation  in  the  lease  of  a  portion  of  the 
crops,  or  of  the  timber  which  is  growing  on  the  land  at  the  date 
of  its  execution,  is  not  rent.  An  agreement  by  a  tenant  to,  de- 
liver to  the  landlord  a  certain  portion  of  the  crops  to  be  raised 
on  the  land  by  the  tenant  is  rent.  And  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
rent  must  be  certain  in  its  character  an  agreement  by  the  ten- 
ant to  deliver  goods^  render  services  or  to  pay  money  without 
the  amount  or  value  being  fixed,  is  not  an  agreement  to  pay  rent 
or  a  reservation  of  rent;  nor  can  it  be  enforced  against  the 

return,  it  being  in  the  nature  of  of  being  reduced  to  a  certaintj'." 

an  acknowledgment  given  for  the  Wegner  v.  Lubenow,  12  N.  D.  95, 

possession   of  some   corporeal    in-  95  N.  W.  Rep.  442,  445.     See,  also, 

heritance;  and  it  is  defined  to  be  a  Peck  v.  Northrop,  17  Conn.  217. 
yearly  profit  issuing  out  of  lands.  2  Van  Rensselear  v.  Read,  26  N. 

It  must  be  a  profit,  but  it  is  not  Y.  558,  564;  Pollock  v.  Farmers'  L. 

necessary    that    it    should    be    in  &  T.  Co.,  157  U.  S.  429,  580,  158  U. 

money;   for  spurs,  capons,  horses,  S.  601. 

corn,   and  other   matters  are   fre-  3  Keneage    v.    Elliot,    9    Watts 

quently  rendered   for  rent.     Thia  (Pa.)  258;  Cornell  v.  Lamb,  2  Cow. 

profit  must  be  certain,  or  capable  (N.  Y.)  652. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  505 

tenant.*  Rents  are  distinguishable  from  annuities  by  the  fol- 
lowing characteristics:  A  rent  is  payable  out  of  the  income  of 
land.  That  is  to  say,  a  rent  when  it  is  directed  to  be  paid  to  a 
third  part}^  as  a  rent  must  necessarily  be  paid  out  of  the  income 
and  profits  of  lands  and  tenements.  Annuities  like  rents  are 
certain  in  their  amounts  and  are  payable  at  fixed  periods,  but 
their  pajTnent  is  charged  upon  persons  who  are  to  make  them 
and  not  upon  any  piece  of  property.  It  may  be  said,  however,  in 
this  connection  as  will  be  subsequently  explained  at  length,  that 
the  theory  that  rent  was  always  payable  out  of  lauds  and  tene- 
ments ha,s  been  rather  extensively  modified  in  modern  times. 
The  common  law  authorities  adhere  closely  to  the  principle  that 
rent  is  payable  only  out  of  the  profits  of  real  property  because 
there  could  be  no  distress  unless  there  was  a  rent.  And  the 
courts  were  not  inclined  to  extend  the  remedy  by  distress  to  the 
hiring  of  chattels.^  And  besides  this  there  was  the  considera- 
tion that,  inasmuch  as  rent  and  a  distress  always  went  to- 
gether, the  common  law  courts,  recognizing  their  inability  to 
enforce  a  distress  in  the  case  of  the  hiring  of  a  chattel  the 
use  of  which  perhaps  produced  no  visible  or  tangible  results 
as  would  be  the  case  where  land  was  rented,  refused  to  recog- 
nize "rent"  as  a  proper  word  to  use  in  connection  with  the 
hiring  of  personal  chattels.  And  while  in  theory  perhaps,  most 
of  the  modern  cases  still  insist  that  rent  must  issue  out  of  the 
income  of  land,  yet,  in  practice,  rent  is  reserved  for  the  use 
of  all  sorts  of  interests  in  both  real  and  personal  property,  in- 
cluding articles  of  personal  property  such  as  furniture  and 
other  utensils  of  domestic  use  which  are  supplied  to  the  ten- 
ants of  furnished  apartments.*     Calling  the  compensation  for 

4  Walsh  V.  Lonsdale,  L.  R.  21  Ch.  e  Eastman  v.  Anderson.  119  Mass. 
Div.  9;  Smith  v.  Fyler,  2  Hill  (N.  226;  Mickle  v.  Miles,  31  Pa.  St 
Y.)  648;  Commonwealth  v.  Cont-  20;  Vetter's  Appeal,  99  Pa.  St.  52; 
ner,  18  Pa.  St.  439,  447;  Ocean  Newman  v.  Anderson,  5  Bos.  &  P. 
Grove  Camp  Meeting  Ass'n  v.  San-  224,  5  Co.  116b;  Gilberts'  Rents, 
ders,  67  N.  J.  L.  1,  50  Atl.  Rep.  187.  "By  the  ancient  writers  it 
449;  Cross  v.  Tome,  14  Md.  247;  is  said  every  rent  must  be  re- 
McFarlane  v.  Williams,  107  111.  33;  served  out  of  lands  and  tenements 
Butcher  v.  Culver,  24  Minn.  584;  which  are  manurable  and  upon 
Co.  Litt.  96a.  which  the  lessor  may  distrain.     It 

5  Co.  Litt.  213;  2  Black.  Comm.  may  be  reserved  out  of  a  remain- 
p.  42;  3  Kent's  Comm.  p.  460.  der  or  reversion  or  a  conveyance 


506  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

the  enjayment  of  the  demised  premises  by  any  other  name  than 
rent  does  not  deprive  it  of  its  character  as  such.  Thus,  where 
the  Compensation  is  styled  an  assessment  in  the  lease  o£ 
camp  meetinf?  grounds  and  its  precise  amount  is  not  to  exceed 
a  stated  maximum  to  be  fixed  annually  by  the  lessor,  it  is  still 
rent  within  the  statute.'^ 

§  324.  Various  kinds  of  rent  distinguished.  By  the  common 
law  authorities  rents  were  divided  into  three  classes,  i.  e.,  rent 
service,  rent  charge,  and  rent  seck.^  A  rent  service  is  a  rent 
reserved  upon  the  granting  of  land  where  the  reversion  contin- 
ues in  the  grantor.  It  was  so  called  because  it  always  involved 
an  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  to  give  some  corporeal 
services  to  the  landlord;  as  where  the  tenant  held  the  land  by 
fealty,  and  the  payment  of  five  shillings ;  or  where  he  held  by  the 
service  of  ploughing  the  lord's  land  and  paid  five  shillings  rent. 
Its  other  characteristics  are  that  it  always  arises  by  the  express 
reservation  of  rent;  that  it  continues  the  reversion  in  the  land- 
lord and  that  arrears  of  rent  may  be  recovered  at  common  law 
by  distress.''  This  was  the  most  common  form  of  rent  in  very 
early  times.  The  landlord  could,  however,  only  distrain  for  the 
rent  while  he  OTvued  the  reversion  and  the  right  to  the  rent  with 
the  incidental  right  to  distrain  passed  with  the  reversion. ^°  A 
rent  charge  is  the  right  to  collect  a  certain  rent  at  specified  pe- 
riods out  of  the  profits  of  land  granted,  and  was  usually  secured 
by  a  distress  which  was  expressly  created  by  the  instrument 
creating  the  rent  charge.  In  creating  a  rent  charge  the  owner 
either  parts  with  his  whole  interest  in  the  fee  reserving  to  him- 
self the  payment  of  a  rent  charge  either  in  money  or  some  other 
valuable  thing;  or  it  is  created  by  the  owner  of  the  land  grant- 
ing a  right  to  collect  the  rent  charge  out  of  the  issues  and  profits 

to  uses  where  the  use  is  executed  ^  Ocean     Grove    Camp     Meeting 

by   the  statute.     It  cannot  be  re-  Ass'n  v.  Sanders,  67  N.  J.  Law,  1, 

.served  out  of  an  incorporeal  here-  50  Atl.  Rep.  449. 

ditanient,  as  out  of  a  riRht  of  com-  «  Co.  Litt.  213;  Bacon's  Abb.  tit. 

mon,  advowson,  franchise  title  or  Rent;    3   Kent's   Com.    460;    2   Bl. 

carody.      If    land    and    an    incor-  Com.  42. 

poreal  thing  be  demised  together,  «2  Bl.   Com  42;    3  Kent's  Com. 

rendering     rent,     it     shall     issue  461. 

wholly  out  of  the  land  in  point  of  lo  Co.  Litt.  142a,  148a. 

remedy  of  distress."    Co.  Litt.  47a, 

142a;   Com.  Dig.  Rent  (B,  3J. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OP  RENT.  507 

of  the  land  to  some  third  pei'son.  In  both  these  cases  the  land 
must  be  expressly  charged  with  a  right  to  collect  rent  by  a  dis- 
tress for  in  the  absence  of  such  an  express  charge  the  right  to  a 
distress  does  not  exist  in  a  rent  charge.  This  species  of  rent, 
Avhich  is  called  a  rent  charge  because  the  land  is  charged  with 
the  payment  of  the  rent  and  with  the  right  to  collect  it  by  dis- 
tress is  created  solely  by  the  operation  of  the  deed  creating  it 
and  not  by  the  operation  of  law.  A  rent  seek  or  barren  rent  is 
a  rent  or  a  right  to  collect  a  certain  profit  at  specified  periods 
out  of  the  income  of  land,  but  without  any  right  of  distraining 
for  such  rent  either  at  common  law.  or  by  an}'  express  stipula- 
tion in  the  lease.  It  could  be  created  by  deed  where  the  right  to 
a  distress  was  omitted  or  it  could  be  created  in  the  same  way  as 
the  rent  service.^^  A  fee  farm  rent  is  a  rent  charge  reserved 
in  a  grant  of  land  in  fee.  This  name  is  based  on  the  perpe- 
tuity of  the  rent  or  services  and  not  upon  its  amount.^- 
This  form  of  rent  was  at  one  time  common  in  some  of 
the  eastern  states  and  is  still  recognized  in  IMaryland  and 
Pennsylvania,  where  large  quantities  of  land  are  held  by  ten- 
ants on  perpetual  leases.  Rents  of  assize  were  in  England 
the  established  rents  of  ancient  tenants  paid  in  a  fixed  amount 
of  money  or  a  certain  quantity  of  the  products  of  the  land. 
They  were  called  rents  assize  because  they  had  been  assized, 
that  is,  ascertained  or  made  certain  to  distinguish  them  from 
variable  rents  that  rose  and  fell  according  to  the  circumstances.^* 
A  quit  rent  was  a  rent  resei'\'ed,  payable  yearly  either  in  money 
or  in  sennces  and  by  which  the  tenant  was  quit  of  all  other  sei'v- 
ice  to  the  landlord.  What  was  technically  known  as  old  rent 
was  such  yearly  rent  as  had  always  been  paid.     Improved  rent 

11  People  V.  Haskins,  7  Wend.  portioned.  IngersoU  v.  Sargeant, 
(N.  Y.)    43;   Ciithbert  v.  Kuhn,  3       1  Whart.  (Pa.)   337. 

Whart.  (Pa.)  357;  Co.  Litt.  218.  "The  difference  between  rents- 

12  The  Governors  of  Christ's  seek  and  rents  assized,  fee  farm 
Hospital  v.  Hattold,  2  M.  &  G.  712;  rent,  etc.,  was  abolished  in  Eng- 
Co.  Litt.  143b;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  land  by  the  statute  IV,  4  Geo.  2, 
Chadwick,  23  N.  Y.  32.  In  Penn-  c.  28,  and  by  that  statute  a  right 
sylvania,  however,  a  ground  rent  of  distress  was  given  in  the  case 
is  said  to  be  a  rent  service  and  of  rent-seek  and  rent  assized  as 
not  a  rent  charge.  Hence  if  a  re-  well  as  in  the  case  of  rents  ex- 
lease  of  a  part  of  the  land  from  piessly  reserved. 

the  rent  is  made,  the  rent  is  ap- 


508 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


is  the  rent  advanced  on  the  old  rent.  A  fine  or  premium  paid 
by  the  lessee  to  the  lessor  at  the  time  of  taking  or  renewing  a 
lease,  is  in  the  nature  of  an  advanced  payment  of  rent,  and  is 
considered  as  an  improved  rent.  Rack  rent  is  a  payment  of 
rent  which  is  presumed  to  be  of  the  full  value  of  the  premises  or 
nearly  so.^*  A  net  rent  is  a  sum  to  be  paid  to  the  landlord  clear 
of  all  deductions/^ 


n  Co.  Litt.  295. 

15  Bennett  v.  Womack,  7  B.  &  C. 
627,  1  M.  &  Ry.  644,  3  Car.  &  P. 
96,  6  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  175,  31 
R.  R.  270,  holding  that  under  an 
agreement  for  a  "net  rent"  the 
tenant  must  pay  taxes  and  rates. 
Rent  service  is  the  most  ancient 
species  of  rent  known  to  the  com- 
mon law.  It  had  its  origin  when 
in  England  the  villeins  or  serfs 
who  had  cultivated  the  land  of  the 
lords  of  manors  began  to  he  eman- 
cipated. The  land  which  they  had 
cultivated  up  to  that  time  as  serfs 
of  the  lords  was  parceled  out  to 
them  and  to  their  families,  for 
their  support;  and,  as  might  be  ex- 
pected, they  were  required  to  ren- 
der a  portion  at  least  of  the  same 
or  similar  service  which  they  had 
rendered  prior  to  their  emancipa- 
tion. In  some  cases  the  emanci- 
pated serf  was  bound  in  return 
for  the  use  of  the  land  for  his  sup- 
port to  deliver  to  his  lord  a  cer- 
tain quantity  of  the  crops  raised 
upon  it,  while  in  other  cases  he 
was  required  to  perform  certain 
stipulated  services  for  him.  The 
ownership  of  the  land  remained 
where  it  had  been  before  the  cre- 
ation of  this  new  relation,  and  the 
newly  created  tenant  acquired 
only  a  portion  of  the  owner's  in- 
terest, which  might  be  for  a  term 
of  years,  for  the  life  of  the  tenant, 
or  for  the  life  of  some  other  per- 


son, but  always  upon  the  express 
condition  that  he  should  render 
some  equivalent  to  the  lord  for  its 
use  and  for  the  support  which  he 
derived  from  it  for  himself  and 
family.  The  right  of  the  landlord 
to  the  receipt  of  this  service  or 
provision  was  known  as  rent  serv- 
ice, and  this  species  of  rent  was 
for  centuries  almost  the  only  kind 
existing  in  England.  It  was  the 
most  widely  recognized  form  of 
paying  rent  in  England,  and  at 
one  time  even  was  prevalent  and 
well  recognized  in  the  eastern  sec- 
tion of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica. With  the  substitution  of  the 
payment  of  money  in  place  of  the 
actual  products  of  the  land,  the 
form  of  rent  service  has  continued 
down  to  the  present  time.  With 
one  exception,  however,  most  of 
the  feudal  incidents  of  rent  serv- 
ice, such  as  distress  and  attorn- 
ment, have  been  abolished  by  stat- 
ute in  the  United  States.  That  ex- 
ception is  the  estoppel  of  the  ten- 
ant to  deny  the  title  of  his  land- 
lord, which  was  unquestionably 
based  upon  the  fealty  of  the  an- 
cient tenant  to  the  lord  of  whom 
he  held  his  land;  and  to  whom  he 
was  bound  to  render  certain  speci- 
fied services,  the  most  important 
of  which  in  many  cases  would  be 
to  aid  that  lord  in  defending  by 
force  the  title  of  the  land  of  which, 
with  others,  he  was  a  tenant. 


KATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  509 

§  325.  Whether  rent  may  be  reserved  out  of  personal  prop- 
erty. According  to  the  definition  above  given,  it  seems  abso- 
lutely necessarj'  that  a  rent  shall  issue  out  of  land  or  some  cor- 
poreal thing,  or  in  other  words  that  it  shall  come  from  some  in- 
heritance whereunto  the  owner  or  grantee  of  the  rent  may  have 
recourse  to  distress.  Some  of  the  authorities  have  held  that  a 
rent  may  be  reser\-ed  out  of  personal  chattels  while  others  have 
denied  this  proposition,  basing  their  denial  upon  the  rule  that 
chattels  are  of  such  a  nature  that  no  distress  can  be  had  for  a 
default  in  the  payment  of  the  rent  for  them.^^  Thus,  it  was  said 
that  a  rent  cannot  issue  out  of  a  right  of  common,  for  as  a  com- 
mon was  really  granted  for  the  benefit  of  every  one  of  the  ten- 
ants, and  as  the  right  of  common  which  every  tenant  thus  has 
runs  through  the  whole  common,  and  no  particular  tenant  has 
a  right  to  one  part  more  than  another,  it  follows  that  no  distress 
can  be  taken  therefor.  The  same  rule  was  applied  to  a  warren 
or  right  of  hunting,^'  and  also  to  a  piscary  or  right  of  fishing,^^ 
and  in  England  a  reservation  of  rent  upon  a  lease  of  tithes  was 
not  good  for  the  reason  that  there  was  no  place  upon  which  the 
distress  could  be  taken. ^^  A  great  deal  of  unnecessary  and  ob- 
solete learning  may  be  found  in  the  books  of  the  ancient  writers 
on  these  questions.  Most  of  it  has  no  application  to  the  present 
time  or  to  the  condition  of  things  in  the  United  States  by  reason 
of  the  fact  that  in  nearly  eveiy  state  of  the  union,  the  right  of 
distress  for  rent  has  been  abolished  so  that  calling  a  payment 
rent,  whether  for  the  use  of  a  chattel  or  for  the  use  of  land,  does 
not  entitle  the  payee  to  distrain.  Hence,  if  a  chattel  interest  be 
leased  the  payment  is  still  rent  in  the  modern  acceptation  of  the 
term  though  no  distress  can  be  levied,  and  there  can  be  no  ques- 
tion that  at  the  present  day  a  reservation  of  rent  for  a  lease  of 
a  fishing  privilege  in  a  stream,  or  for  a  lease  of  a  hunting  privi- 
lege on  land,  or  for  the  use  of  the  water  of  a  stream,  or  for  the 
use  of  pasture  for  cattle  on  land  would  be  rent,  though  the  lease 
is  a  mere  license  to  enter  on  the  land  and  not  to  use  the  land 
itself.     But,  in  England  down  to  comparatively  recent  times 

16  Bacon's    Abr.    tit.    Rent    (A)  is  Co.  Litt.  144. 

P.    8;     6    Bacon's    Abr.    tit.    Rent  lo  Jewel's    Case,    5    Co.    3;    Cro. 

(B)    8.  Jac.  Ill,  173. 

17  Nov,  60;   3  Leon,  1. 


510 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


where  land  and  personal  chattels  such  as  a  ship  or  farm  imple- 
ments and  a  house  and  its  furniture  were  leased,  the  theory  con- 
tinued to  be  that  the  rent  agreed  to  be  paid  issued  only  out  of 
the  house  and  the  land,  and  the  lessor  was  confined,  in  bringing 
an  action  on  the  covenant  to  pay  rent,  to  state  that  it  was 
simply  and  solely  a  demise  of  the  land.-"  If  the  lessee  is  evicted 
from  the  land  but  retains  the  chattels  there  was  anciently  no 
apportionment  of  the  rent.^^  But  it  has  also  been  held  that 
where  a  landlord's  assignees  in  bankruptcy  leased  a  furnished 
house  to  a  prior  tenant  at  an  entire  rent  and  subsequently  the 
mortgagee  of  the  house  compelled  the  tenant  to  pay  rent  to  him 
the  rent  for  the  furnished  house  should  be  apportioned  and  the 
assignee  in  bankruptcy  could  recover  for  the  rent  for  the  use  of 
the  furniture.-^ 


20  Salmon  v.  Matthews,  8  M.  & 
W.  827;  Collins  v.  Harding,  Cro. 
Eliz.  607;  Spencer's  Case,  5  Rep. 
16;  Walsh  v.  Pemberton,  Selw.  N. 
P.  613.  Inasmuch  as  rent  issues 
out  of  real  and  not  out  of  personal 
property,  proof  of  a  lease  of  real 
property  is  not  a  variance  under 
an  allegation  of  a,  lease  of  a  house 
and  the  furniture  and  utensils  in 
it.  Farewell  v.  Dickenson,  6  B.  & 
C.  251.  "It  must  occur  constantly 
that  the  value  of  demised  premises 
is  increased  by  the  goods  upon  the 
premises,  and  yet  the  rent  reserved 
still  continues  to  issue  out  of  the 
house  or  land,  and  not  out  of  the 
goods,  for  rent  cannot  issue  out 
of  goods."  By  the  court  in  New- 
man v.  Anderton,  2  W.  R.  224. 

21  Emott  v.  Cole,  Cro.  Eliz.  255. 

22  Salmon  v.  Matthews,  8  M.  & 
W.  827,  11  L.  J.  Ex.  59.  For  a 
case  where  personal  chattels  were 
leased  for  a  term  of  seventeen 
years,  see  .Tones  v.  Wingfield,  3  M. 
&  S.  846,  10  Bing.  308.  By  statute 
as  well  as  by  usage  in  this  com- 
monwealth, the  word  "rent"  may 
include  the  compensation  to  be 
paid  for  the  occupation  of  land  by 


a  tenant,  whether  he  holds  under 
a  written  lease,  at  will,  or  at  suf- 
ferance, and  whether  the  amount 
to  be  paid  has  been  defined  by  the 
agreement  of  the  parties,  or  has 
been  left  indefinite.  Kites  v. 
Church,  142  Mass.  589.  In  Com- 
monwealth V.  Contner,  18  Pa.  St. 
447,  the  court,  by  Black,  C.  J., 
said:  "Now  a  sum  of  money  pay- 
able periodically  for  the  use  of 
chattels  is  not  rent  in  any  legal 
sense  of  the  word.  It  cannot  be 
distrained  for;  and  unless  it  can, 
it  is  not  demandable  out  of  the 
proceeds  of  a  sheriff's  sale.  For 
this  right  comes  in  place  of  a  dis- 
tress by  the  plain  words  of  the 
statute.  Rent  must  not  only  issue 
out  of  the  land,  but  it  must  be 
fixed,  definite,  and  certain  in 
amount,  whether  payable  ■  in 
money,  chattels  or  labor.  If,  there- 
fore, a  lease  so  mixes  the  real  and 
personal  property  together  that  it 
cannot  be  determined  how  much 
of  what  is  called  the  rent  is  to  be 
paid  for  the  chattels,  and  how 
much  is  the  profit  of  the  land, 
there  can  be  no  distress  for  non- 
payment of  it.    Rent  signifies  a  re- 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  BENT, 


511 


§  326.  The  payment  of  rent  as  evidence  of  tenancy.     The 

receipt  and  payment  of  rent  are  only  prima  facie  proof  of  the 
existence  of  a  tenancy.  A  presumption  that  a  tenancy  exists 
may  be  overcome  by  showing  that  the  money  was  paid  for  some 
other  consideration  than  as  rent  under  an  existing  lease,-^  as 
for  example  that  it  was  paid  for  rent  due  under  a  former  lease,^* 
or  that  it  was  paid  by  the  tenant  under  an  order  of  the  court  or 
in  order  to  prevent  a  distress.-^  So  the  fact  may  be  shown  to  re- 
but an  existence  of  a  tenancy,  that  the  sum  actually  paid  was 
only  a  small  portion  of  the  actual  rental  value  of  the  premises. 
Whether  the  money  was  actually  paid  for  rent  or  not,  where 
the  evidence  is  disputed  is  for  the  jury  to  determine. ="  The 
fact  that  the  money  was  paid  as  rent  does  not  establish  any  par- 
ticular term  or  holding,  and  if  the  beginning  of  the  tenancy  or 
its  length  is  in  question  these  facts  must  be  shown  by  other  evi- 
dence." "Where  money  is  paid  for  rent  and  a  receipt  is  given  for 
it  dated  on  a  particular  day,  the  receipt  is  prima  facie  evidence 
of  the  beginning  of  a  tenancy  upon  that  day,  or  upon  some  pre- 
vious day.     So  if  rent  is  payable  by  the  lease  quarterly,  semi- 


turn  or  compensation,  and  a  cer- 
tain profit  issuing  yearly  out  of 
lands  and  tenements  corporeal. 
It  must  be  a  profit,  though  it  need 
not  be  in  money.  It  must  be  cer- 
tain, or  that  which  may  be  re- 
duced to  a  certainty  by  either 
party.  It  must  issue  yearly, 
though  it  need  not  issue  every 
successive  year,  but  may  be  re- 
served every  second,  third  or 
fourth  year,  etc.  It  must  issue 
out  of  the  thing  granted  (it  must 
issue  out  of  lands  and  tenements 
corporeal) ;  therefore,  a  rent  can- 
not bo  reserved  out  of  an  advow- 
son,  or  the  lil\:e.  But  a  grant  of 
such  a  sum  may  operate  as  a  per- 
sonal contract,  and  oblige  the 
grantor  to  pay  the  money,  or  sub- 
ject him  to  an  action  of  debt.  Co. 
Litt.  47." 

23  Phillips  V.  Mosely.  1  Car.  &  P. 
262;  Den  v.  Rawlins,  10  East,  261; 
Right  v.  Bawden,  3  id.  460;  Doe  d. 


Lord  V.  Crago,  6  C.  B.  90,  17  L.  J. 
C.  P.  263,  12  Jur.  705;  Hurley  v. 
Hanrahan,  15  W.  R.  990;  Attorney 
General  v.  Stephens,  6  De  G.,  M. 
&  G.  Ill,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  888,  2  Jur. 
(N.  S.)  61,  4  W.  R.  191;  Cox  v. 
Knight,  18  C.  B.  645,  25  L.  J.  C.  P. 
314;  Harden  v.  Hesketh,  28  L.  J. 
Ex.  137,  4  H.  &  M.  175,  7  W.  R. 
186. 

24  Den  V.  Rawlins,  10  East,  261; 
Right  V.  Bawden,  3  id.  460. 

25  Strahan  v.  Smith,  4  Bing.  96. 
12  Moore,  289,  5  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  C.  P. 
95. 

2"  Doe  y.  Wilkinson,  3  Bar.  & 
Cres.  413. 

27  Phillips  V.  Mosely,  1  Car.  & 
P.  262,  in  which  case  it  was  said 
that  the  mere  fact  that  the  money 
was  paid  as  rent  would  be  as  good 
evidence  of  a  lease  for  twenty-one 
years  as  it  would  be  of  a  lease 
from  year  to  year. 


512  LAW  OF  L^VNDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

annually  or  otherwise,  at  certain  stated  or  uniform  elates  the  pre- 
sumption from  the  payment  of  rent  on  those  dates  is  that  the 
holding  is  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  lease.-*  The  payment  of 
the  rent  also  raises  a  presumption  against  the  tenant  that  the 
person  receiving  it  has  a  good  title  to  the  rent  which  is  conclu- 
sive where  the  rent  is  paid  to  the  person  from  whom  possession 
was  taken  as  the  tenant  is  not  permitted  to  dispute  the  land- 
lord's title.  If  the  rent  is  claimed  by  a  person  other  than  the 
one  from  whom  possession  was  taken,  his  title  to  the  rent  may  be 
disputed. "'' 

§  327.  The  certainty  of  rent.  The  rent  of  the  land  in  what- 
ever way  it  is  paid  by  the  tenant  must  be  certain  in  its  amount, 
or  capable  of  being  reduced  to  certainty  by  computation.  If  tlie 
rent  is  susceptible  of  being  reduced  to  a  certainty  by  computa- 
tion, it  is  sufficiently  certain.  Thus,  where  rent  was  to  consist 
of  the  delivery  of  one  bale  of  cotton  for  each  acre  cultivated  by 
the  tenant,  it  was  held  that  though  the  value  of  the  cotton  was 
not  fixed,  yet  the  rent  was  sufficiently  certain  as  the  value  of 
the  bale  of  cotton  could  be  readily  ascertained.^"  The  fact  that 
the  amount  of  rent  is  not  definitely  stated  in  the  lease,  and  that 
it  has  to  be  computed  in  order  to  ascerain  how  much  is  payable, 
does  no  prevent  its  collection.  The  rule  applies  in  this  case  as 
in  others  that  those  things  are  certain  which  may  be  made  so. 
Thus,  rent  may  be  made  to  vary  according  to  the  value  of  the 
land.  An  agreement  to  pay  rent  on  the  lands  comprised  in  a 
farm  at  a  certain  percentage  on  their  value  includes  all  the  land 
comprised  in  the  farm  whether  cultivatable  or  not,  but  not  land 
in  the  farm  occupied  by  a  railroad  for  a  roadbed  and  right  of 
way.^^  So  where  rent  is  raised  in  proportion  to  the  increased 
income  from  the  premises  which  the  tenant  uses  for  the  purpose 
of  supplying  steam  power  to  other  houses  in  the  same  block,  tlie 
rent  is  varied  according  to  the  amount  to  which  the  income  is 
increased.  In  such  a  case  gross  income  and  not  net  income  is 
meant.^^     A  mathematical   error  in   calculating   or  a  clerical 

28  Sandhill  v.  Franklin,  L.  R.  10  so  Brooks     v.    Cunningham,     49 
C.  B.  342.  Miss.  108. 

29  Rodgers  v.  Pitcher,  6  Taunt.  3i  Williams   v.    Glover,    66    Ala. 
208;   Cornish  v.  Searell,  8  B.  &  C.  189,  193. 

471;  Cox  V.  Knight,  18  C.  B.  645.  32  Hardy    v.    Briggs,    14    Allen 

(Mass.)   473. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  513 

en^or  in  stating  in  the  lease  the  amount  of  the  quarterly  install- 
ment of  rent  may  be  disregarded.  The  covenant  to  pay  a  fixed 
sum  as  yearly  rent  controls  the  statement  of  the  installments 
and  where  the  total  amount  of  the  quarterly  payments  falls 
short  of,  or  exceeds  the  yearly  rent,  the  court  will  assume  that 
the  latter  is  the  correct  amount.^^  An  agreement  to  pay  a  cer- 
tain named  sum  for  rent,  subject  to  any  error  in  the  figuring 
thereto  attached  is  not  void  for  vagueness  and  indefiniteness. 
The  sum  named  is  certain  and  will  control  unless  a  mistake  in 
the  figuring  is  shown.  This  may  always  be  done  by  parol  evi- 
dence where  the  rental  amount  is  the  result  of  an  arithmetical 
calculation  though  it  is  not  stipulated  for  in  the  lease.  The  lease 
is  not  void  for  uncertainty  if  it  give  sufficient  data  by  which  the 
amount  of  rent  due  can  be  found  though  it  has  to  be  worked 
out  by  calculation.  It  may  also  be  sufficient  to  state  a  gross 
sum  as  rent  assumed  to  be  the  result  of  such  a  calculation  which 
will  be  presumed  to  be  correct  until  the  contrary  is  proved.^* 
§  328.  Rent  lo  become  due  on  the  happening  of  some  future 
event.  It  is  always  competent  for  the  parties  to  a  lease  to 
stipulate  therein  that  money  rent  shall  become  due  and  payable 
upon  the  happening  of  some  particular  event  in  the  future.  A 
contingent  event  may  be  selected  by  the  parties,  and  if  such  an 
event  does  not  happen,  the  rent  does  not  become  due.  Thus, 
rent  may  be  made  to  become  due  and  payable  when  certain  build- 
ings are  erected  on  the  premises,  and  are  complete  whether  they 
are  to  be  erected  by  the  landlord  or  by  the  tenant,  or  when  the 
crops  mature,  and  are  ready  to  be  gathered,  or  when  the  tenant's 
income  and  profits  from  his  use  of  the  premises  shall  amount 
to  a  certain  sum.  In  all  these  cases  the  happening  of  the  con- 
tingency upon  which  the  rent  is  to  become  due  and  payable,  is  a 
condition  precedent  to  any  liability  for  rent  on  the  part  of  the 
tenant.  Thus,  no  rent  is  due  by  the  tenant  under  an  agreement 
by  the  landlord  to  erect  additional  buildings,  the  tenant  to  pay 
as  rent  a  certain  percentage  of  the  cost  of  such  buildings  until 
the  buildings  are  complete,  and  the  landlord  has  notified  the 
tenant  of  the  cost  of  the  buildings.^°  A  lease  which  provides  that 

.  33  Smith   V.   Blake,   88   Me.   241,  an  Weed    v.    Crocker,    13    Gray 

247,  33  Atl.  Rep.  992.  (Mass.)  219,  221. 

34  McFarlane    v.    Williams,    103 
111.  33,  43. 

33 


514  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

the  payment  of  the  rent  shall  not  begin  until  the  landlord  has 
completed  a  certain  building  on  the  premises,  is  not  void  for 
want  of  mutuality  because  it  does  not  expressly  provide  that  the 
landlord  shall  complete  the  building.  The  time  for  the  com- 
pletion of  the  building,  not  being  of  the  essence  of  the  lease 
may  be  fixed  by  a  subsequent  agreement,^"  and  the  fact  that  the 
landlord  has  not  expressly  agreed  to  complete  the  building,  is 
immaterial  as  under  such  a  lease,  the  completion  of  the  building 
by  him  would  be  regarded  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the 
payment  of  rent.  In  case  a  sum  specified  as  rent  is  to  be  due 
and  payable  on  the  non-happening  of  a  partieiJar  event,  the 
burden  of  proving  that  the  event  has  not  happened  is  upon 
the  landlord  claiming  the  payment  of  the  rent.  This  view  is  in 
accordance  with  the  well  settled  rule  that  where  proof  of  the 
negative  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  a  right  the  party  claim- 
ing the  right  has  the  burden  of  proving  the  negative.^^ 

§  329.  Rent  payable  in  services.  Rent  may  be  made  payable 
by  the  lease,  in  services  to  be  rendered  to  the  landlord  by  the 
tenant  a^s  well  as  in  money  or  in  merchandise.  Thus,  an  agree- 
ment with  the  owner  by  the  occupant  of  land  to  live  on  it,  and 
to  keep  oif  trespassers,  to  fence  the  land,  construct  irrigation 
ditches,  to  plant  trees  or  to  erect  buildings  with  material  fur- 
nished by  the  owner,^"  is  an  agreement  to  pay  rent  and  consti- 
tutes the  occupant  a  tenant  of  the  owner.^''  So  also  rent  may  be 
paid  in  the  furnishing  of  maintenance  and  support  by  the  ten- 
ant for  the  landlord,  and  in  all  these  cases  where  rent  is  payable 
in  services  the  same  rules  apply  as  where  rent  is  payable  in 
money,  for  if  there  be  a  default  in  the  rendition  of  such  services, 
the  landlord  may  pursue  the  same  remedy  for  the  recovery  of 
possession  as  though  the  rent  was  payable  in  money  only.*°  So 
also  services  rendered  in  cleaning  a  church,'*^  or  in  shearing 

so  Hammond  v.  Barton,  93  Wis.  39  For  other  cases  where  rent  is 

183,  67  N.  W.  Rep.  412.  payable  wholly  or  in  part  in  serv- 

37  City   of   New   Albany    v.    En-      ices  rendered,  see  §  326. 

ders,  143  Ind.  192,  42  N.  E.  Rep.  -io  Gilpin  v.  Adams,  14  Colo.  512, 

683;    Mississenewa  M.   Co.   v.  An-  24  Pac.  Rep.  506. 

drews,  22  Ind.  App.  .523,  54  N.  E.  41  Burns    v.    Cooper,    31    Pa.   St. 

Rep.  146.  426;    Edney  v.   Benham,   7   Q.   B. 

38  Shaw  V.  Hall,  79  Mich.  86,  44  796. 
N.  W.  Rep.  422. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  BENT.  515 

sheep,*-  or  in  carrj-ing  coals  for  the  landlord,*^  reserved  in  the 
lease  as  compensation  for  the  use  of  the  premises,  have  been  held 
to  be  a  sufficient  reservation  of  rent.  AYhere  land  is  leased  by  an 
aged  person  upon  the  consideration  that  the  lessee  will  support 
the  lessor  and  his  wife  the  court  may  imply  that  the  furnishing 
of  maintenance  and  support  by  the  lessee,  is  a  condition  upon 
which  a  possession  must  be  based.  If  the  main  purpose  of  the 
use  and  possession  of  the  land  were  the  support  of  the  lessor,  a 
condition  may  be  read  into  the  lease,  though  there  is  no  ex- 
press agreement  that  the  lessee  should  forfeit  his  possession  in 
case  he  failed  to  support  the  lessor.  But  the  fact  that  there  is 
a  clause  of  re-entry  and  forfeiture  upon  the  failure  of  the  lessee 
to  fulfill  his  agreement,  is  conclusive  that  the  lease  was  made 
upon  condition,  and  that  the  agreement  for  support  was  not 
merely  a  covenant.** 

§  330.  Rent  payable  in  specific  articles.  Eent  may  be  made 
payable  by  the  delivery  of  specific  articles  by  the  tenant  to  the 
landlord.*^  Thus,  a  store-keeper,  or  manufacturer  who  occupies 
a  store,  warehouse  or  factory  as  a  tenant,  may  by  special  agree- 
ment be  obliged  to  pay  his  rent  in  particular  articles  of  mer- 
chandise dealt  in  or  manufactured  by  him.  So,  also  it  may  be 
arranged  that  these  articles  shall  be  selected  by  the  landlord, 
the  lease  specifying  the  limit  of  value  to  which  the  gross 
amount  selected  must  be  confined.  But  the  most  common  in- 
stance of  rent  being  paid  in  specific  articles  of  merchandise 
occurs  where  the  owner  of  farm  land,  and  a  tenant  occupying 
such  land  for  the  purpose  of  cultivating  it.  agree  that  the  rent 
for  the  land  shall  be  paid  by  the  tenant  delivering  to  the  land- 
lord a  certain  proportionate  share  of  all  the  crops  produced  by 
him  on  the  land  during  the  term.  Where  rent  is  payable  in  spe- 
cific articles,  the  price  of  which  is  fixed  by  the  lease,  the  rent 
is  extinguished  by  the  tender  of  the  articles  on  the  day  fixed  for 
payment  whether  the  price  or  value  of  the  articles  is  more  or  less 
upon  the  day  when  they  are  tendered  than  on  the  day  when  the 
lease  was  made.*^  All  that  the  landlord  can  recover  in  money 
upon  the  failure  of  the  tenant  to  deliver  the  articles  in  payment 

42  Co.  Litt.  96.  45  Pace  v.  Goodson    (Ga.   1906), 

43  Doe  V.  Morse,  1  B.  &  Ad.  365.       56  S.  E.  Rep.  363. 
*i  GansoQ  v.  Baldwin,  93  Mich. 

217. 


516  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

of  the  rent,  is  tlie  value  mentioned  in  the  lease,  though  the  value 
of  the  property  upon  the  day  when  they  should  have  been  de- 
livered was  greater  than  that  mentioned  in  the  lease. ^'^  If,  how- 
ever, rent  is  to  be  paid  in  chattels,  the  value  of  which  is  not 
specitied  in  the  lease  the  landlord  may  upon  the  failure  of  the 
tenant  to  deliver  the  chattels,  recover  in  money  their  market 
value  as  it  existed  on  the  day  fixed  for  the  payment.^^  Rent 
which  is  payable  in  crops  is  due  and  payable  within  a  reason- 
able time  after  the  crops  have  matured.*^  It  is  due  when  the 
crops  or  any  portion  of  them  are  fit  for  the  market  though  they 
may  not  have  been  harvested  by  the  lessee.  Rent  payable  in 
crops  must  be  paid  when  oats  are  in  stack,  com  is  reaped  and 
the  tenant  has  gathered  in  and  is  feeding  the  corn.  It  need  not 
be  that  the  crops  are  actually  ready  for  market  for  if  this  were 
so  the  tenant  might  delay  the  payment  of  rent  indefinitely  by 
failing  to  harvest  and  prepare  the  crops  for  sale.^°  Where  rent 
is  payable  in  specific  articles  raised  or  manufactured  on  the 
land  a  division  and  a  delivery  of  the  landlord's  share  is  neces- 
sary to  vest  the  title  to  the  personal  chattels  in  the  landlord,  as 
against  creditors  of  the  tenant.^^  Any  act  intended  to  and  whicii 
does  enable  the  lessor  to  acquire  possession  of  or  dominion  over 
the  thing  to  be  paid  is  a  sufficient  delivery  to  divest  the  tenant's 
title.*^  "Where  rent  is  payable  in  chattels  or  services  absolutely, 
the  tenant  has  no  right  without  the  landlord's  consent  to  an 
option  to  pay  the  rent  in  money.  Thus,  where  rent  was  payable 
half  in  money  and  half  in  board,  it  was  not  optional  with  the 
tenant  to  pay  all  the  rent  in  money  or  board  as  was  most  con- 
venient for  him,  but  he  was  compelled  to  pay  his  rent  half  in 
board  just  as  far  and  to  the  same  extent  as  the  landlord  was 
obliged  to  receive  half  the  rent  in  board.^^    A  right  in  the  lessor 

"HeyM'ood  v.  Heywood,  42  Mo.  135,  136;  Burns  v.  Cooper,  31  Pa. 

299.  St.  426,  427;    In  re  Wait,  7  Pick. 

■•THeywood  v.  Heywood,  42  Mo.  (Mass.)  100,  105,  19  Am.  Dec.  262. 

299.  •'■•2  Burns    v.    Cooper,    31    Pa.    St. 

*8  Heywood  v.  Heywood,  42  Mo.  426,  427. 

299;    Brooks    v.    Cunningham,    49  cs  Evans  v.  Morris,  6  Mich.  369, 

Miss.  108.  which   also   held   that  the   tenant 

4!)  Toler  V.   Seabrook,  39  Ga.  14.  was  not  bound  by  this  lease  to  call 

r-o  Hull  V.  Stogdeel,  67  Iowa,  251,  on  the  landlord  and  demand  that 

253,  25  N.  W.  Rep.  156.  he  should  send  him  boarders,  but 

61  Davis    V.    Hamilton,    71    Ind.  that   the    landlord   must   call    for 


NATURE  AND  INCmENTS  OP  RENT.  517 

to  elect  "uhetlier  he  shall  take  the  rent  in  specific  articles  or  in 
money  terminates  with  the  death  of  the  lessee.  The  lessor  has 
no  title  to  or  interest  in  the  personal  property  until  he  elects  to 
take  it  and  it  is  delivered  to  him.  The  interest  not  being  a 
present  one  the  power  to  elect  is  not  a  power  coupled  with  an  in- 
terest. Until  the  lessor  elects  the  personal  property  is  subject 
to  the  claims  of  the  creditors  of  the  lessee  and,  on  his  death,  the 
personal  property  is  assets  in  the  hands  of  the  tenant's  personal 
representative.  Its  character  thereafter  is  fixed  and  the  lessor 
can  no  longer  claim  it  in  specie  for  the  payment  of  the  rent.^* 
An  agreement  for  the  commutation  of  rent  which  is  payable  in 
specific  articles  is  not  to  be  conclusively  presumed  from  a  contin- 
ued coui-se  of  dealing  which  consists  of  paying  and  receiving  a 
stated  sum  of  money  in  lieu  of  rent.  Though  it  appears  that 
the  amount  of  money  paid  a?  rent  was  about  equal  to  the  value 
of  the  articles  to  be  delivered  as  rent  there  is  no  presumption 
that  the  parties  intended  the  payment  and  receipt  of  the  money 
to  be  a  commutation  of  the  payment  of  the  rent  in  specific  arti- 
cles. It  may  be  assumed  with  equal  reason  that  neither  of  the 
parties  meant  to  waive  the  right  to  insist  upon  the  future  pay- 
ment of  rent  on  the  terms  of  the  lease  but  that  the  payment  in 
money  instead  of  in  personal  property  was  merely  to  suit  the 
temporary  convenience  of  the  parties.  But  after  such  a  course 
of  dealing  carried  on  for  many  years,  the  lessor  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  insist  upon  the  original  terms  of  the  lease  as  to  the 
mode  of  payment  and  declare  a  forfeiture  upon  the  failure  of 
the  lessee  to  comply  with  such  terms  on  short  notice  where  the 
articles  in  which  the  rent  was  to  be  paid  were  difficult  for  the 
lessee  to  procure  because  of  the  fact  that  they  had  to  be  imported. 
The  lessee  must  be  given  ample  time  under  the  circumstances  to 
procure  the  articles  with  which  he  is  bound  to  pay  the  rent.^' 
An  agreement  by  a  lessee  to  pay  to  the  lessor  a  specified  share 
of  the  profits  made  upon  the  premises  is  an  agreement  to  pay 
rent.  The  lessee  is  bound  to  do  his  outmost  to  make  a  profit  on 
the  use  of  the  land  and,  in  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary, 
in  an  action  between  him  and  his  lessor  it  will  be  presumed  that 

that  portion  of  the  rent  payable  in  s*  In    re  Wait,   7   Pick.    (Mass.) 

board  within  the  year  as  the  rent       100,  105,  19  Am.  Dec.  262. 
fell  due.  53  Lilley  v.  Associates,  101  Mass. 

432,  435'. 


518  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

he. has  done  so.^®  AVhere  under  a  lease  of  this  character  the 
landlord  sues  for  his  share  of  the  profits  the  burden  of  proof  is 
on  the  lessor  to  show  what  the  profits  are.  If  through  the  negli- 
gence of  the  lessee,  or  through  his  failure  to  cultivate  the 
land  there  are  no  profits  he  is  liable  to  pay  the  lessor  what  the 
use  of  the  land  would  be  reasonably  worth. 

§  331.  The  express  covenant  to  pay  rent.  Inasmuch  as  the 
liability  of  a  tenant  to  pay  rent  which  is  raised  by  implication  in 
the  absence  of  an  express  covenant,  ceases  to  exist  as  soon  as  the 
tenant  assigns  his  lease  and  surrenders  the  possession,  which  he 
may  do  to  a  beggar  or  insolvent  person  without  his  landlord's  con- 
sent,^'' it  is  very  desirable  for  the  protection  of  the  landlord  that 
the  tenant  should  expressly  covenant  to  pay  rent.  The  tenant 
M'ho  does  covenant  is  bound  by  the  covenant  until  the  end  of  his 
term,  unless  he  is  sooner  released  by  the  landlord,  irrespective  of 
the  fact  that  he  decides  not  to  enter  into  possession,^^  or  the  fact 
that  after  an  entry  he  assigns  his  lease  and  surrenders  the  prem- 
ises. In  the  latter  case,  as  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  runs  with 
the  land,  the  landlord  has  a  double  security,  for  he  may  first 
proceed  against  the  assignee  by  reason  of  the  privity  of  estate 
existing  with  him,  or  against  the  original  tenant  and  assignor 
upon  the  latter 's  covenant  to  pay  rent.  For  the  covenant  to  pay 
rent  is  a  covenant  running  with  the  land  and  is  biding  on  the 
assignee  of  either  party  though  not  expressly  so  stated. °^ 

§  332.  A  covenant  to  pay  rent  may  be  implied.  Beside  the 
reservation  of  rent  in  the  lease,  an  express  covenant  by  the 
lessee  to  pay  rent  is  usually  inserted.  In  all  cases  where  the 
latter  is  absent  from  the  lease  a  covenant  on  the  part  of  the 
lessee  to  pay  rent  will  be  implied.  He  will  be  presumed  to  have 
bound  himself  by  the  act  of  taking  possession  and  continuing 

cc  Spring     Brook     Ry.     Co.     v.  917;    Main   v.   Feathers,    21    Barb. 

Lehigh  Coal  &  Navigation  Co.,  181  (N.  Y.)    646;    Dolph  v.   V^hite,  12 

Pa.  St.  294,  37  All.  Rep.  525.  N.  Y.  296;   Sandwith  v.  De  Silver, 

57  Taylor  v.  Shum,  1  Bos.  &  Pul.  1  Browne  (Pa.)  221;  Bradford  Oil 

21;  Onslow  v.  Carrie,  2  Madd.  330.  Co.  v.  Blair,  113  Pa.  St.  83,  4  Atl. 

ssTully  V.   Dunn,   42   Ala.    262;  Rep.  218,  57  Am.  Dec.  442;  Fennell 

McGlynn  v.  Brock,  111  Mass.  219.  v.  Guffey,  139  Pa.  St.  341,  20  Atl. 

sn  Salisbury  v.    Shirley,    66   Cal.  Rep.  1048;    Shaw  v.  Partridge,  17 

223,    5   Pac.   Rep.    104;    Carley   v.  Vt.   626;    Croade  v.   Ingraham.  13 

Lewis,  24  Ind.  23;    Trask  v.   Gra-  Pick.    (Mass.)    33,  35 
ham,  47  Minn.  571,  50  N.  W.  Rep. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  519 

therein  to  pay  the  landlord  what  the  use  and  possession  of  the 
premises  are  reasonably  worth.  A  covenant  to  pay  rent  will  be 
implied  on  the  part  of  a  lessee  by  his  receiving  and  accepting 
a  lease  by  deed  poll  reserving  rent,®°  without  any  covenant  to 
paj'  rent  even  though  the  lessee  does  not  go  into  possession.^* 
The  acceptance  by  the  lessee  of  an  instrument  which  gives  him 
an  absolute  right  to  an  immediate  possession  creates  the  implied 
promise  to  pay  rent  for  what  he  has  a  right  to  enjoy.  This  prom- 
ise is  not  within  the  Statute  of  Frauds.^^  In  all  these  eases  of  an 
implied  promise  to  pay  rent  the  landlord  may  maintain  an 
action  of  assumpsit  against  the  tenant  for  the  rent.  Unless 
therefore  the  landlord  in  suing  relies  upon  an  express  agree- 
ment by  the  tenant  to  pay  rent,  it  is  not  necessary  for  him  to 
prove  one,  nor  is  it  necessary  for  him  to  prove  even  a  particular 
reservation  of  rent,  in  the  lease,  or  that  the  occupant  has  ever 
paid  him  rent.  All  that  the  landlord  must  prove  is  that  the 
occupant  was  in  possession  with  his  permission  or,  in  other 
words,  that  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  existed  between 
him  and  the  occupant.  If  this  fact  appears  the  law  will  permit 
the  landlord  to  recover  for  the  use  and  occupation  under  the 
fiction  that  the  occupant  has  promised  to  pay  the  owner  what 
such  use  and  occupation  were  reasonably  worth.*'^  But  a  prom- 
ise by  an  occupant  of  land  to  pay  rent  is  not  infen^ed  from  oc- 

copike      V.      Brown,      7      Cush.  v.  O'Donnell,  173  Mass.  398,  53  N. 

(Mass.)   133.  E.  Rep.  882;  Knox  v.  Bailey,  4  Mo. 

ciKabley      v.      Worcester      Gas  App.  581;  Wilkinson  v.  Wilkinson, 

Light  Co.,  102  Mass.  392.  62  Mo.  App.  249,  1  Mo.  App.  Rep. 

62  Providence  Christian  Union  v.  523 ;  Sweesey  v.  Durnall,  23  Neb. 
Eliot,  13  R.  I.  74,  75;  Goodwin  v.  531,  37  N.  W.  Rep.  459;  Welcome 
Gilbert,  9  Mass.  510;  Sage  v.  Wil-  v.  Labonte,  63  N.  H.  124;  Cham- 
cox,  6  Conn.  81;  Allen  v.  Pryor,  3  bers  v.  Ross,  25  N.  J.  Law,  293; 
A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky)  305.  An  agree-  Seaman  v.  Ward,  1  Hilt  (N.  Y.)  2; 
ment  to  take  premises  "at  and  Scranton  v.  Booth,  29  Barb.  (N. 
under  at  rent  specified"  is  an  Y.)  171;  Coit  v.  Planer,  30  N.  Y. 
agreement  to  pay  rent  for  which  Super.  Ct.  413,  4  Abb.  Prac.  (N. 
assumpsit  will  lie.  Doe  d.  Rains  Y.)  Rep.  140;  Lynch  v.  Onondaga 
V.  Keller,  4  Car.  &  P.  3.  Salt    Co.,    64   Barb.    (N.  Y.)    558; 

63  Jackson  V.  Mowry,  30  Ga.  143;  Heidelbach  v.  Slader,  1  Handy 
Littleton  v.  Wynn,  31  Ga.  "583;  (Ohio)  456;  Sterrett  v.  Wright,  27 
Crouch  V.  Birles,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  Pa.  St.  259;  Cobb  v.  Kidd,  8  Fed. 
(Ky.)  255.  23  Am.  Dec.  404;  Oakes  Rep.  695.  696;  Carpenter  v.  United 
V.  Oakes,  16  111.  106;  Fanning  v.  States,  17  Wall.  (U.  S.)  489,  493. 
Stimpson,   13    Iowa,   42;    Appleton 


520  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

cupation  alone.®*  It  must  also  appear  that  the  person  in  pos- 
session was  occupying  as  a  tenant  and  not  in  some  other  capacity. 
For  if  he  is  a  licensee,*'^  or  a  trespasser,  or  a  vendee  in  possession 
under  his  contract  to  purchase,'^*'  or  a  public  official  holding  pos- 
session after  his  tei-m  has  expired,''^  or  a  caretaker,^^  or  if,  in 
express  terms,  he  repudiates  the  relation  of  tenant  to  the  owner 
there  is  no  implied  liability  to  pay  rent.  It  is  often  important 
to  distinguish  where  a  lease  is  assigned  by  a  lessee  between  a 
lease  where  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  is  an  express  covenant,  and 
a  lease  in  which  a  covenant  to  pay  rent  is  only  implied.  If  the 
covenant  is  express  a  privity  of  contract  arises  between  the 
lessor  and  the  lessee  which  endures  during  the  term  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  surrender  no  matter  who  may  be  in  possession  of  the 
premises  themselves.  If,  however,  the  covenant  to  payment  is 
implied  the  tenant  is  liable  only  by  reason  of  his  privity  of  es- 
tate with  the  landlord  w^hich  liability  ends  on  his  assig-nment  of 
the  term  to  another  and  the  entry  of  the  assignee  upon  the  prem- 
ises, with  the  acceptance  of  rent  from  him  by  the  lessor.*'^  The 
words  "yielding  and  paying"  rent  contained  in  most  leases  have 
from  the  earliest  times  furnished  an  opportunity  for  much  dis- 
cussion as  to  whether  they  did  or  did  not  constitute  an  express 
covenant  to  pay  rent.  There  can  be  no  question  that  a  lessee 
going  into  possession  under  a  lease  which  contains  these  words 
will  be  liable  on  an  implied  promise  to  pay  the  rent  to  the  lessor 
for,  if  he  enjoys  the  possession  of  the  premises,  he  will  be  con- 
clusively presumed  to  have  promised  to  pay  for  it.^"  But  the 
question  is  very  different  when  after  an  assignment  of  the  ori- 

64  Bank    v.    Getchett,    59    N.    H.  gill,  97   Mich.  44S,  56  N.  W.  Rep. 

281,  285;  Welcome  v.  Labontee,  63  849. 

N.  H.  124,  125;   Middleton's  Ex'rs  es  Middleton's    Ex'rs    v.    Middle- 

V.    Middleton,    35    N.    J.    Eq.    141;  ton,  35  N.  J.  Eq.  141. 

Mitchell  V.  Pendleton,  21  Ohio  St.  69  Fanning  v.  Stinson,  13  Iowa, 

664,  666.  42,  48;  Kempton  v.  Walker,  9  Vt. 

63  Strickland  v.  Hudson,  55  Miss.  191,  199;  Marsh  v.  Brace,  Cro.  Jac. 

235.  334;    Beach  v.  Gray,  2  Denio    (N. 

66  Miles  V.  Elkins,  10  Ind.  329;  Y.)  84;  Seaman  v.  Ward,  1  Hilt. 
Lapham  v.  Norton,  71  Me.  83;  Lit-  (N.  Y.)  52;  Pitcher  v.  Tovey,  4 
tie  V.  Pearson,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  Mod.  71;  Treackle  v.  Coke,  1  Vern. 
301,  19  Am.  Dec.  289.  Contra,  165;  Staines  v.  Morris,  1  V.  & 
Gould     V.     Thompson,     4     Mete.  B.  11. 

(Mass.)   224.  to  KimptOn  v.  Walker,  9  Vt.  191, 

67  Cass   County   Sup'rs   r.   Cow-      199. 


NATURE  AND  INCmENTS  OF  RENT.  521 

ginal  lease  by  the  lessee  the  lessor  attempts  to  make  him  pay 
rent  in  the  first  instance  which  has  accrued  while  the  assignee 
and  not  the  original  lessee  was  in  possession.  The  ancient  com- 
mon law  authorities  are  very  contradictory  on  the  question 
whether  "yielding  and  paying  a  certain  rent"  is  or  is  not  an  ex- 
press covenant  to  pay  rent,'^  which  creates  a  privity  of  contract 
between  the  lessor  and  the  lessee.  The  modern  view  is  that  only 
an  implied  covenant  is  created  by  these  words  and  that  conse- 
quently the  obligation  to  pay  rent  continues  incumbent  upon  the 
lessee  only  while  he  is  in  the  actual  occupation  and  terminates 
upon  his  assignment  of  the  lease  and  the  entry  of  another."^  It 
has  also  been  held  that  a  covenant  to  pay  rent  generally  during 
the  term,  but  not  promising  in  express  words  to  pay  it  to  the 
lessor  or  to  any  other  particular  person,  is  an  implied  covenant 
which  though  running  with  the  land  is  no  longer  binding 
on  an  assignor  of  the  term  after  the  lessor  has  accepted  rent 
from  the  assignee.'^  No  form  of  language  is  required  to  con- 
stitute a  covenant  reserving  rent.  Any  words  which  indicate 
that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  parties  that  rent  should  be  paid 
is  usually  sufficient.  But  the  reservation  of  rent  should  be  cer- 
tain both  as  to  the  land  and  as  to  the  time  of  payment,  or  should 

TiKimpton  v.  Walker,  9  Vt.  191,  that  by   acceptance   of   the   lease, 

199.  the  lessee  becomes  liable  for  the 

72  "The  difficulty  seems  to  have  rent;   but  it  is  impossible  for  me 

arisen  from  the  indefinite  use  of  to    distinguish    the    origin    of   his 

the  terms   'express'   and   'implied'  liability  from  an  ordinary  case  of 

as  having  reference  to  the  thing  an   implied  assumpsit,  where  the 

to  be  done,  on  the  one  hand,  or  obligation    arises,    not    from    ex- 

the   act   of   assuming   the    obliga-  press  undertaking  but  from  volun- 

tion  on  the  other.     Thus,  the  ex-  tarily    assuming    a     relation,     to 

pression      'yielding     and     paying  which    the    law    attaches    certain 

rent,'    expresses   the    thing   to    be  liabilities.       Indeed,     remove     the 

done,  and,  in  that  sense,  the  con-  seal    from    the    lease    in   question, 

tract  is   express.     Yet  the  words  and  we  have  a  case  for  assumpsit 

are  introduced,  in  form,  as  a  con-  for  use  and  occupation;  replace  the 

dition  of  the  demise  and  are  sus-  seal  and  the  action  must  be  cove- 

ceptible    of    such    a    construction.  nant,  but  the  covenant  in  one  case 

Still     the    question    whether    the  is  as  much  implied  as  the  promise 

lessee   incurs  a  personal   liability  in  the  other."   Kimpton  v.  Walker, 

to   be  enforced   by   action,   is   not  9  Vt.  191,  on  p.  200. 

necessarily  involved  in  the  phrase-  ^s  Fanning  v.  Stimson,  13  Iowa, 

ology,  but  is  left  to  legal  construe-  42,  49. 
tion    or    implication.      It   is   true. 


522  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

be  of  a  character  that  the  amount  and  date  of  paj-ment  can  be 
ascertained.  If  rent  is  made  payable  annually  or  quarterly  and 
the  particular  date  is  not  stated  upon  which  it  shall  be  paid,  the 
reservation  is  valid  as  the  law  will  presume  that  the  rent  was  to 
be  paid  on  the  last  day  of  the  rental  period.  So,  if  it  is  left  op- 
tional with  th.e  tenant  whether  he  shall  pay  the  rent  yearly, 
semi-annually  or  quarterly,  the  landlord  by  receiving  the  rent 
yearly,  places  a  construction  upon  the  language  of  the  lease  and 
cannot  thereafter  claim  to  receive  it  quarterly,  unless  with  the 
consent  of  the  tenant.'^* 

§  333.  When  rent  is  due.  In  the  absence  of  a  special  agree- 
ment by  a  tenant  to  pay  his  rent  in  advance,  and  if  there  be  no 
statutory  enactment  requiring  it  to  be  paid  in  advance,  rent  is 
not  payable  until  after  the  possession  and  occupation  of  the  de- 
mised premises  have  been  enjoyed  by  the  tenant.  Thus,  where 
there  is  no  express  agreement  that  yearly  or  monthly  rent  shall 
be  paid  in  advance,  the  rent  is  not  due  until  the  end  of  the  rental 
period.''^  So,  also,  yearly  rent  which  is  payable  quarterly,  is 
paid  at  the  end  and  not  at  the  beginning  of  the  quarter  in  the 
absence  of  a  special  agreement  in  the  lease  by  the  tenant  to  that 
effect.'^    The  rent  is  payable  at  the  end  of  the  year  or  quarter, 

74Mallam    v.    Arden.    10    Bing.  born,   23   Pick.    (Mass.)    295,    29D; 

299.     An  agreement  for  the  pay-  Ostner  v.  Lynn,  57  Mo.  App.  187; 

ment  of  the  rent  at  so  much  per  Hilsendegen  v.  Scherck,  55  Mich. 

year  usually  makes   rent  payable  468;    Ridgley  v.   Stillwell,   27  Mo. 

yearly  unless  there  is  other  Ian-  128,  134;  Duryee  v.  Turner,  20  Mo. 

guage  in  the  lease  by  which  this  App.   34;    Kistler   v.   McBride,   65 

presumption   is   rebutted.     Collett  N.  J.  Law,  553,  555;  Goldsmith  v. 

V.  Curling,  10  Q.  B.  785,  16  L.  J.  Schroeder,  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  558,  562; 

Q.  B.  390,  11  Jur.  890.  Liebe  v.  Nicolai,  30  Oreg.  364,  371, 

'BMcFarlane    v.    Williams,    107  48  Pac.  Rep.  172;  Gibbs  v.  Ross,  2 

111.  33,   42;    Dixon  v.   Niccolls,  39  Head  (Tenn.)  437,  440;  Donaldson 

111.    372,    386,    89    Am.    Dec.    312;  v.    Smith,    1    Ashm.     (Pa.)     197; 

Dauchy  Iron  Works  v.  McKim  Gas-  Menough's  Appeal,   5   Watts  &   S. 

ket  &  Mfg.   Co.,  85  111.  App.  584;  (Pa.)    432;    Boyd   v.    McCombs,    4 

Stowman   v.   Landis,    5    Ind.    430;  Pa.  St.  146;  Gray  v.  Chamberlain, 

Raymond  v.  Thomas,  24  Ind.  476;  4  C.  &  P.  260;   Doe  d.  Mitchell  v. 

Cowan  V.  Henika,  19  Ind.  App.  45,  Weller,    1    Jur.    622;    Coomber    v. 

48   N.   E.    Rep.   809;    Indianapolis,  Howard,  1  C.  B.  440. 
etc.,   Co.  V.   First  Nat.   Bank,   134  76  Wood    v.    Partridge,   11    Mass. 

Ind.  127,  132,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  679;  488;    Cotton    Mfg.    Corporation   v. 

Castleman  v.  Du  Val,  89  Md.  657,  Melven,   15   Mass.  268;    Vegely  v. 

43  Atl.  Rep.  821;  Boardman  v.  Os-  Robinson,   20  Mo.  App.   199;    Gar- 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  523 

even  if  payable  in  a  share  of  crops  raised  on  the  land/''  or  in 
merchandise."^  Though  a  tenant  may  abandon  the  premises  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  a  rental  period  and  notify  his  landlord 
he  will  repudiate  the  lease,  the  landlord  cannot  sue  for  rent  un- 
til it  falls  due  under  the  lease.'®  This  rule  is  the  logical  outcome 
and  result  of  the  principle  that  rent  is  payable  and  is  to  be 
paid  by  the  tenant  out  of  the  profits  and  proceeds  of  the  land 
and  that  it  cannot  therefore  be  paid  until  the  profits  have  been 
gathered  and  realized  by  the  tenant.  Hence  it  also  follows  that 
if  the  tenant  shall  be  ousted  by  an  eviction  before  the  rent  is 
due  the  obligation  to  pay  rent  is  at  an  end  for  the  consideration 
or  thing  of  value  for  which  the  rent  was  promised  to  be  paid 
has  failed.®"  Hence  a  covenant  to  pay  rent  upon  a  day.  men- 
tioned therein  creates  no  debt  or  legal  obligation  to  pay  the 
rent  or  any  right  on  the  part  of  the  lessor  to  demand  payment 
or  to  sue  until  the  day  named  for  payment  has  arrived.*^  The 
rent  may  therefore  never  become  due  at  all  for  the  lessee  may, 
before  the  date  specified,  surrender  possession  to  the  lessor,  or  the 
term  may  be  merged,  or  the  lessee  may  be  evicted  and,  in  either 
case,  he  will  be  absolved  from  the  performance  of  his  covenant 
to  pay  rent.®^  In  a  lease  which  merely  provides  that  it  is  for 
the  term  of  eleven  months,  the  rent  to  be  payable  on  the  twen- 

vey   V.    Dobyns,    8    Mo.    213,    215;  paid  in  instalments  on  the  first  of 

Schenck  v.  Vannest,  4  N.  J.  Law,  each   month   does   not  mean   that 

329;     Leo     Wolf    v.     Merritt,     21  the  rent  is  to  be  paid  in  advance 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  331.  unless  it  is  so  stated  in  the  lease, 

77  Menough's  Appeal,  5  Watts  &  but  on  the  first  of  each  month  the 
S.  (Pa.)  432;  Boyd  v.  McComb,  4  rent  which  has  accrued  for  the 
Pa.  St.  146;  Sharpless'  Estate,  8  preceding  month  must  be  paid. 
Lane.  Bar.  (Pa.)  125;  King  v.  Goldsmith  v.  Schroeder,  87  N.  Y. 
Bosserman,    13    Super.    Ct.     (Pa.)  Supp.  558,  562. 

480.  '^0  Wood   V.    Partridge,   11   Mass. 

78  Duryee  V.  Turner,  20  Mo.  App.  488,  493;  Bordman  v.  Osborn,  23 
34;   Ostner  v.  Lynn,  57  Mo.  App.      Pick.  (Mass.)  295. 

187.     A  provision  that  rent  shall  «i  The  lessee  has  the  whole  of 

be    paid    quarterly    in    equal    pay-  the   day  on  which   rent  falls  due 

ments   on  the  requires   that  to  make  pajTnent.    Dalton  v.  Lau- 

the    rent   be    paid    at   the   end    of  dahn,   27    Mich.    529;    Sherlock   v. 

each  quarter.     Holt  v.  Nixon    (C.  Thayer,  4  Mich.  355. 

C.  A.),  141  Fed.  Rep.  952.  S2  Wood  v.   Partridge,   11   Mass. 

79Nicholes  v.  Swift,  118  Ga.  922,  480,  493;  Russell  v.  Fabyan,  28  N. 

45  S.  E.  Rep.  708.     A  provision  in  H.  543,  545 
a  lease  that  anual   rent  shall   be 


524  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

tieth  day  of  each  and  every  month  without  using  the  words  "in 
advance"  the  installments  of  rent  are  due  and  payable  on  the 
twentieth  day  which  occurs  at  the  end,  instead  of  at  the  begin- 
ning of  each  month.^^  So  a  lease  which  requires  rent  to  be  paid 
in  "monthly  payments"  the  first  payment  to  be  made  on  the 
first  day  of  the  term,  does  not  require  that  all  payments  shall 
be  in  advance  on  the  first  day  of  each  month;  and  payments 
of  rent  subsequent  to  the  first  payment  need  not  be  in  advance.^* 
Neither  the  time  of  payment,  nor  the  right  to  sue  for  rent  which 
is  due  on  a  day  specified  is  postponed  by  a  stipulation  that  the 
landlord  may  enter,^^  or  may  distrain  ^'^  after  a  period  of  default 
subsequent  thereto. 

§  334.  Rent  which  is  made  payable  in  advance.  It  is  well 
settled  both  in  England  ® '  and  in  the  United  States  ^*  that  rent 
may  legally  be  made  payable  in  advance.  Rent  will  never  be 
presumed  to  be  payable  in  advance  without  some  evidence  of  in- 
tention by  the  parties  that  it  shall  be  so.  It  is,  however,  not 
necessary  that  the  lease  shall  expressly  provide  that  the  rent 
shall  be  paid  in  advance,  if  it  appears  from  the  language  of  the 
instrument,  and  the  conduct  of  the  parties,  that  it  was  their  in- 
tention that  rent  shall  be  paid  in  advance.*'*  The  time  fixed  for 
the  payment  of  the  rent  may  always  be  determined  from  a  con- 
sideration of  the  conduct  and  dealings  of  the  parties  to  the 
lease,  contemporaneous  with  or  subsequent  to  its  execution, 
where  the  lease  is  silent,  ambiguous  or  uncertain.""  Under  an 
tigreement  for  a  lease  "all  conditions  and  covenant  to  be  the 
usual  ones,"  rent  is  not  to  be  made  payable  in  advance.*^  A 
stipulation  in  a  lease  that  if  a  lessee  shall  become  embarrassed, 
or  shall  make  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors,  or 
shall  be  sold  out  at  a  sheriff's  sale,  the  whole  rent  for  the  bal- 
ance of  the  term  shall  become  due  and  payable  in  advance,  is 

83  Castleman  v.  Du  Val,  89  Md.  st  Bulkley  v.  Taylor,  2  T.  R.  COO; 
657,  659,  43  Atl.  Rep.  821.  Harrison  v.  Barry,  7  Price,  690. 

84  Liebe  v.  Nicolai,  30  Oreg.  364,  ss  Giles  v.  Comstock,  4  N.  Y.  270, 
370,  48  Pac.  Rep.  172.  272,    53   Am.    Dec.    374. 

sr.  Rowe   V.   Williams,    97    Mass.  so  Ellis  v.  Rice,  195  Pa.  St.  42. 

1C3,  165.  ""  Gore  v.  Lloyd,  12  M.  &  W.  463, 

so  Van   Rensselaer   v.   Jewett.   5      13  L.  J.  Ex.  366.     See,  also,  Allen 
Denio,  121,  128,  131,  2  N.  Y.  136,      v.  Bates,  3  L.  J.  Ex.  39. 
148.  01  Arcade  Realty  Co.  v.  Tunney, 

101  N.  Y.  Supi).  593. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  525 

not  against  public  policj^,  and  will  be  sustained  in  disbursing  the 
proceeds  of  the  sheriff's  sale  of  the  tenant's  property  to  the  ex- 
tent of  giving  the  landlord  priority  for  one  year's  rent,  at  least.^- 
In  determining  whether  rent  is  or  is  not  payable  in  advance  it 
is  not  indispensable  that  the  words  "in  advance"  shall  be  used.^^ 
ITius  the  rent  is  payable  in  advance  in  a  lease  which  provides 
that  the  first  payment  shall  be  made  on  the  first  day  of  a  month 
some  time  after  the  date  of  the  lease  and  that  the  yearly  rent 
shall  be  paid  in  monthly  installments  of  an  equal  amount  com- 
mencing on  the  date  mentioned.^*  A  provision  that  the  rent 
shall  be  payable  in  equal  quarterly  installments  commencing 
from  the  25th  day  of  March  then  instant,  means  that  the  first 
quarter's  rent  is  payable  on  that  date  and  the  future  rent  is  pay- 
able in  advance."^  A  provision  in  a  lease  for  years  that  the 
lessee  should,  on  his  taking  possession  of  the  premises  pay  the 
amount  of  a  quarter's  rent  which  should  be  allowed  him  for  the 
last  quarter  on  the  determination  of  the  tenancy,  is  in  its  effect 
a  stipulation  for  the  payment  of  all  rent  in  advance.^®  A  receipt 
showing  that  rent  has  been  paid  in  advance  may  in  some  cases 
be  suflScient  proof  of  a  promise  to  pay  rent  in  advance,  even 
where  the  written  lease  is  void  and  the  tenant  is  in  from  year  to 
year.^^  But  a  receipt  showing  that  a  particular  installment  of 
the  rent  has  been  paid  in  advance,  while  it  is  usually  strong 
evidence  of  an  agreement  to  pay  rent  in  advance  is  never  conclu- 
sive on  the  tenant.  The  provision  that  rent  is  to  be  paid  in  ad- 
vance should  be  inserted  in  the  lease,  where  the  lease  is  in  writ- 
ing. A  promise  to  pay  in  advance  made  during  the  term,  on  a 
separate  consideration  is  nudum  pactum  and  unenforcible.®* 
Though  evidenced  by  a  writing  an  action  of  covenant  or  of  debt 
may  be  maintained  for  rent  which  is  by  the  lease  payable  in  ad- 

92  Piatt  V.  Johnson,  168  Pa.  St.  by  construction  for  the  word 
47.  "from." 

93  Sickels    V.    Shaw,    76    N.    Y.  se  Finch  v.  Miller,  5  C.  B.  428. 
Supp.  319.                                                        97  Lee  v.  Smith,  9  Ex.  662,  664, 

94  Ellis  V.  Rice,  195  Pa.  St.  42,  2  C.  L.  R.  1079,  23  L.  J.  Ex.  198, 
45  Atl.  Rep.  655.  2  W.  R.  377,  hinting  also  that  the 

95  Hopldns  V.  Helmore,  3  N.  &  void  lease  may  be  referred  to  in 
P.  453,  8  A.  &  E.  463,  1  W.  W.  &  order  to  ascertain  how  the  rent 
H.  386,  7  L.  J.  Q.  B.  195,  2  Jur  was  to  be  paid. 

856.    The  word  "on"  is  substituted  ^  Hasbrouck  v.  Winkler,  48  N. 

J.  Law,  431,  6  Atl.  Rep.  22. 


'526  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

vance  as  soon  as  it  is  payable,  and  so  too  rent  payable  in  ad- 
vance may  be  distrained  for  at  once  on  accrual.®''  But  the  lessor 
cannot  at  once  recover  for  use  and  occupation  where  the  lessee 
fails  to  pay  rent  payable  in  advance.^  He  must  sue  on  the  cove- 
nant to  pay  rent  or  he  must  sue  in  assumpsit  if  there  be  no  ex- 
press covenant.  The  landlord  cannot  recover  for  use  and  occu- 
pation until  after  the  use  and  ijccupation  has  been  enjoyed.  The 
tenant  who  abandons  the  premises  on  the  first  day  of  the  month, 
if  the  rent  for  the  month  is  payable  in  advance,  is  not  relieved 
from  the  payment  of  the  rent  by  the  landlord's  subsequent  ac- 
ceptance of  the  surrender,  before  the  expiration  of  the  lease.- 
So  where  rent  is  payable  monthly  in  advance  the  landlord  can 
recover  a  full  month 's  rent  though  the  tenant  has  been  ousted  for 
nonpayment  of  rent  before  the  end  of  the  period.^  So,  where 
a  lease  provided  that  the  rent  should  be  paid  in  installments  in 
advance  with  a  privilege  in  the  landlord  to  re-enter  for  breach 
of  covenant  without  prejudice  to  any  right  which  he  might  have, 
and  the  landlord  re-enter  on  the  failure  of  the  tenant  to  pay 
rent,  and  also  sued  for  the  rent  payable  in  advance  the  landlord 
was  entitled  to  a  judgment  for  the  whole  amount  of  the  install- 
ment which  was  payable.*  But  while  the  tenant  whose  rent  is 
payable  in  advance  cannot  claim  an  abatement  in  the  amount  be- 
cause of  the  fact  that  he  is  deprived  of  the  use  of  his  premises 
without  the  fault  of  his  landlord,  yet  if  having  paid  his  rent  in 
advance  he  is  subsequently  evicted  by  his  landlord  during  the 
the  period  for  which  he  has  paid,  he  may  recover  as  part  of  the 
damages  for  such  eviction,  the  amount  which  he  has  paid  for 
the  time  he  had  been  out  of  possession.  A  tenant  who  has  paid  his 
rent  in  advance  as  required  by  the  terms  of  his  lease  may,  when 

09  Russell   V.  Doty,  4   Cow.    (N.  Cases  (N.  Y.)  315,  3  How.  Pr.  (N. 

Y.)    576,    571;    Conway    v.    Stark-  S.)  507. 

weather,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.)  113,116,  3  McNulty    v.    Duffy,    59    N.    Y. 

2     Bac.    Abr.     tit.     Distress     (c).  Supp.    592;     Bernstein    v.    Heine- 

Where  rent  is  payable  in  advance,  mann,  51  N.  Y.  Supp.  467;   Kahn 

the  landlord  may  distrain  at  any  v.  Rosenheim,  68  N.  Y.  Supp.  856; 

time  between   the   commencement  Stern  v.  Murphy,  102  N.  Y.  Supp. 

of  tlie  rental  period  and  its  end.  797. 

Witty  V.  Williams,  12  W.  R.  755.  4  Ellis   v.   Rowbotham,    69    Law. 

1  Angell  V.  Randall,  16  L.  T.  4S9.  J.  Q.  B.  379;    (1900)    1  Q.  B.  740, 

aConklin  v.  Wliite,  17  Abb.  New  82  Law  T.  (N.  S.)   191,  48  Weekly 

Rep.  423. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  527 

he  is  evicted  during  the  rental  period,  recover  the  rent  for  that 
portion  of  the  term  during  which  he  has  not  enjoyed  the  pos- 
session of  the  premises.  In  such  an  action  however  the  tenant 
may  recover  the  rent  which  the  landlord  may  have  received 
from  another  tenant  to  whom  the  landlord  may  have  leased  the 
premises  after  the  action  has  begun.^  After  a  lease  is  declared 
to  be  void  the  liability  of  the  tenant  who  has  surrendered  pos- 
session to  pay  rent,  in  advance  is  at  an  end.  If  he  has  given 
notes  in  advance  for  the  payment  of  the  rent  the  collection  of 
the  notes  cannot  be  enforced  by  the  landlord  ®  as  the  considera- 
tion has  failed.  If  the  proper  application  is  made  in  an  action 
in  which  the  lease  is  declared  void  the  court,  acting  upon  equi- 
table principles  will  order  the  notes  for  rent  to  be  delivered  up 
and  cancelled,  and  may  enjoin  the  landlord  from  negotiating  the 
same  and  punish  him  for  contempt  for  his  disobedience  to  its 
mandate.  Where  the  rent  is  payable  in  advance  the  tenant  has 
until  the  last  minute  of  the  day  on  which  the  rent  falls  due  to 
make  payment  so  that  an  action  begun  on  that  day  is  prema- 
ture.'^ If  by  a  lease  with  a  privilege  of  a  renewal  the  rent  is  made 
payable  in  advance  and  the  lease  is  renewed,  the  rent  in  the  new 
lease  will  also  be  payable  in  advance  in  the  absence  of  a  pro- 
vision to  the  contrary.^  The  landlord  will  always  be  limited  in 
his  recovery  in  an  action  for  rent  to  the  rent  which  is  due  at  the 
beginning  of  the  action.^  Hence  if  an  installment  of  the  rent 
falls  due  pending  the  action  it  cannot  be  included  in  a  judgment 
which  is  rendered  in  the  action.  A  tenant,  whose  rent  is  payable 
in  advance,  cannot  recover  money  deposited  by  him  with  the 
landlord  as  security  for  the  rent  which  is  in  amount  exactly 
equal  to  a  month's  rent,  where  he  has  not  paid  his  rent  in  ad- 
vance though  the  landlord  has.  in  consequence  of  the  failure  to 
pay  rent  in  advance,  evicted  him  during  the  month  and  resumed 
possession  of  the  premises.^'' 

§  335.  The  place  for  the  payment  of  the  rent.     The  tenant 
must  seek  out  the  landlord  and  must  pay  or  tender  him  the 

5  Stautz    V.     Protzman,     84     111.  s  stose  v.  Heissler,  120  111.  433, 
App.  434.  11  N.  E.  Rep.  IGl. 

6  Crockett    v.    Althouse,    35    Mo.  »  Stanley  v.  Turner,  68  Vt.  315, 
App.  404.  35  Atl.  Rep.  321. 

7  Mack  V.  Burt.  5  Hun    (N.  Y.)  lo  Core  v.  Greenwald,  102  N.  Y. 
28;     Insurance    Co.    v.    Myers,    4  Supp.  752, 

Lane.  Bar.   (Pa.)   151. 


528  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

rent  where  the  tenant  has  covenanted  to  pay  rent  on  a  day  cer- 
tain and  the  place  of  payment  is  not  specifically  mentioned.^^ 
This  rule  is  based  upon  the  theory  that  the  covenant  of  the  lessee 
to  pay  rent  is  a  personal  covenant  which  must  be  performed  per- 
sonally by  the  covenantor.  But  in  the  United  States  it  has  been 
repeatedly  held  that  in  the  absence  of  an  express  provision  in 
the  lease  to  the  contrary  rent  is  payable  by  the  tenant  on  the 
land,^-  though  the  rent  be  payable  not  in  money  but  in  specific 
articles  alone/~^  or  in  money  or  in  specific  articles  at  the  election 
of  the  landlord.^^  AVhere  the  rent  is  payable  at  either  one  of  two 
places  both  within  the  same  county  according-  as  the  lessor  may 
direct,  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  lessor  to  prove  that  he  directed 
the  lessee  to  pay  it  at  either  place.  If  the  lessor  fails  to  direct 
where  the  rent  shall  be  paid  the  lessee  may  protect  himself  by  a 
payment  or  tender  of  the  rent  at  either  place. ^*  If  rent  is  pay- 
able at  some  place  in  a  city  mentioned  in  the  lease  as  the  lessor 
may  direct,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  lessee  to  ascertain  where  the 
lessor  desires  the  rent  to  be  paid.  The  lessor  need  not  prove  in 
an  action  against  the  tenant  on  the  covenant  to  pay  rent,  that  he 
has  directed  the  tenant  where  it  shall  be  paid ;  though  if  he  has 
not  done  so  a  tender  of  the  rent  at  any  place  in  the  city  where 
the  lessor  could  be  found  would  be  sufficient  ;^^  or,  perhaps  the 
rent  would  then  be  properly  payable  upon  the  land.^^ 

11  Haldane  v.  Johnson,  8  Ex.  11  N.  Y.  80,  rent  was  payable  in 
689,  22  L.  J.  Ex.  264,  17  Jur.  937.  wheat,  hens  and  "in  two  days'  rid- 

12  Livingston  v.  Miller,  8  N.  Y.  ing"  to  be  delivered  in  Albany 
283,  289,  11  N.  Y.  80,  91;  Walter  while  the  farms  for  which  the  rent 
v.  Dewey,  16  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  222;  was  payable  were  located  many 
Hinter  v.  Le  Conte,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  miles  from  that  city.  Under  such 
728;  Hugh  v.  Lillibridge,  8  D.  R.  circumstances  where  the  rent  con- 
(Pa.)  358,  22  Pa.  C.  C.  18.5.  sists  of  ponderous  articles  expen- 

12a  Fordyce  v.  Hathorn,  57  Mo.  sive  to  move  about  and  care  for, 

120.  it  would  seem  but  fair  and  just  to 

13  Walter  v.  Dewey,  16  Johns.  permit  a  tenant  to  make  a  tender 
(N.  Y.)   222.  or   to   hold   himself   ready  to   de- 

14  Livingstone  v.  Miller,  11  N.  Y.  liver  such  articles  on  the  land 
80,  85.  where  the  landlord  neglects  to  in- 

15  Lush  V.  Druse,  4  Wend.  (N.  dicate  in  what  particular  portion 
Y.)   313.  of  a  market  town  fifty  miles  away 

icRemsen.v.  Conklin,  18  Johns.  he  will  be  ready  to  receive  the  ar- 

(N.  Y.)   448.     In  this  case  and  in  tides  on  the  rent  day.     See  opin- 

Lush  V.  Druse,  4  Wend.    (N.  Y.)  ion  of  Selden,  J.,  in  Livingstone  v. 

313,  and  in  Livingstone  v.  Miller,  Miller,   11   N.   Y.   80,  on   i)ages   87 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  529 

§  336.  To  whom  rent  should  be  paid.  The  tenant  must  pay 
his  rent  to  the  landlord  or  to  some  person  who  is  directly  and  ex- 
pressly authorized  by  the  landlord  to  receive  it.  Equity  will 
not  relieve  a  tenant  from  his  own  error  in  p'aying  his  rent  to  a 
person  not  entitled  to  receive  it.  The  tenant  cannot  maintain  a 
bill  to  set  off  his  erroneous  payment  against  his  landlord.^' 
Under  the  general  rule  that  the  right  to  the  payment  of  the 
rent  follows  the  reversion,  and  that  the  right  to  collect  it  passes 
to  the  person  who  takes  the  reversion  if  a  lessor  owning  the  fee 
reserves  rent  to  himself  and  his  wife,  the  reservation  is  good  as 
long  as  the  lessor  lives,  but  upon  his  death,  the  wife  being  a 
stranger  to  the  title,  ceases  to  have  any  interest  in  the  rent.^^ 
At  the  common  laAv  and  by  the  ancient  authorities  a  reservation 
of  rent  to  the  heirs  of  the  lessor  during  his  life  was  invalid  as 
rent,  and  could  not  be  distrained  for,  and  doubtless  even  in  mod- 
ern times,  under  modern  rules  would  be  unenforcible  as  a  con- 
tract because  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  persons  to  whom  it  was  to 
be  paid.^^  On  the  other  hand,  a  reservation  of  rent  to  the  heirs 
of  the  lessor  contained  in  a  lease  that  was  not  to  go  into  effect 
until  the  death  of  the  lessor,  would  be  good  and  valid  for  the 
reason  that  on  his  death  the  reversion  would  pass  to  them,  and 
they  would  be  entitled  to  collect  the  rent  by  operation  of  law 
aside  from  the  terms  of  the  lease.-'*  The  rent  however  it  be 
reserved  follows  the  reversion.    So  where  one  seized  in  fee  leases 

to  92.     Some  of  the  English  cases  distinction  is  of  little  importance 

have    made    a    distinction    as    to  and  is  only  recognized  in  the  case 

the  necessity  for  the  payment  of  cited.    The  question  as  to  the  place 

the   rent   on   the   land   between   a  of  the  payment  of  rent  arises  only 

lease    in    which    the    rent    is    re-  where  the  non-payment  results  in 

served     generally,     and     a     lease  a  forfeiture  on  a  breach  of  condi- 

where  the  lessee  covenants  to  pay  tion,  or  where  the  question  of  a 

the  rent  without  mentioning  a  par-  valid  tender  of  the  rent  arises  in 

ticular  place  where  he  shall  pay  an  action  of  debt  or  covenant  to 

it;  in  the  latter  case  the  covenant  recover  the  amount  due. 

has  been   regarded   as  a  personal  i7  Pratt  v.   Keith,   33   L.    J.   Ch. 

covenant  to  pay  a  sum  of  money  592,  10  Jur.   (N.  S.)   305,  10  L.  T. 

on  a  day  certain  and  the  obliga-  15,  12  W.  R.  394,  3  N.  R.  264. 

tion  is  on  the  covenantor  to  seek  is  Co.  Litt.  99b,  213b;  Whitlock's 

out  the   person   to  whom   he  has  Case,  8  Coke,  69b. 

promised  to  pay  the  money  wher-  is  Co.  Litt.   99b,  213b;    Gates  v. 

ever  he  may  be  in  order  to  pay  or  Frithe,  2  Rolle's  Abr.  447. 

to   tender   him    the   money.      Hal-  20  Co.  Litt.   99b,   213b;    Gates  v. 

dane  v.  Johnson,  8  Exch.  6S9.    The  Frithe,  2  Rolle's  Abr.  447. 
34 


530  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

for  years  reserving-  rent  during  the  term  to  the  lessor,  his  execu- 
tors, administrators,  and  assigns,  and  the  lessee  agrees  to  pay 
it,  the  heir  or  devisee  of  the  reversion  on  the  death  of  the  lessor 
is  entitled  to  the  rent  and  may  maintain  an  action  on  the  cove- 
nant accordingly.^^  Where  a  person  owning  the  fee  settles  land 
on  himself  for  life,  remainders  to  others,  reserving  to  himself 
a  power  to  lease  which  he  subsequently  exercises  reserving 
rent  to  himself,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  the  remaindermen  and 
not  the  heirs  shall  have  the  rent.'^  The  same  rule  applies 
where  the  owner  of  the  fee  settles  a  life  estate  on  another,  re- 
mainder to  others  with  a  power  to  lease  in  the  life  tenant.^^  The 
principles  upon  which  this  construction  is  had  is  that  the  lease 
though  executed  by  a  life  tenant  must  be  regarded  in  theory  as 
emanating  from  the  person  who  created  the  power  to  lease  and 
that  the  remaindermen  were  in  fact  the  assigns  of  the  grantor 
or  devisor  although  not  of  the  person  i.  e.  the  life  tenant  who  exe- 
cuted the  lease.  As  to  the  heirs  of  the  life  tenant  they  are  not 
considered  in  relation  to  the  reservation  of  rent  at  all  as  they 
would  never  have  any  interest  in  the  land.  Even  though  the 
life  tenant  in  executing  the  lease  under  the  power  reserved  rent 
to  himself  and  his  heirs  it  is  not  material.  A  payment  made  to 
a  person  who  is  not  entitled  to  receive  the  rent  on  behalf  of  the 
landlord,  does  not  discharge  the  rent.-*  Thus,  a  tenant  who  pays 
his  rent  in  advance  to  a  receiver  in  a  foreclosure  proceeding 
must  pay  the  rent  to  the  purchaser  at  the  sale.-^  It  is  the  duty 
of  the  tenant  to  ascertain  whether  the  person  to  whom  he  pays 
his  rent  is  his  landlord,  oT  is  duly  authorized  as  his  agent  for  the 
fact  that  he  pays  it  to  one  who  is  not  his  landlord,  will  not  pre- 
vent the  latter  from  subsequently  recovering  it.  A  payment  of 
rent  to  the  agent  of  the  landlord  duly  authorized  to  collect  it,  is 

21  Sacheverell  v.  Froggatt,  2  W.  316;  Isherwood  v.  Oldknow,  3  M 
Saund.  367a,  371,  2  Leu.  13,  T.  &  Sel.  382;  Berry  v.  White,  Bridg 
Raym.    213,    1    Vent.    148,    160,    2      man,  82. 

Keble,  798,  819,  833,  839.    See,  also,  24  Williams    v.    Bartholemew,    1 

Brook  V.  Biggs,  5  L.  J.  C.  P.  143,  Bos.  &  Pul.  326. 

2  Bing.  (N.  C.)  572.  25  American   Mortg.   Co.   v.  Mer- 

22  Greenaway  v.  Hart,  14  C.  B.  rick  Const.  Co.,  100  N.  Y.  Supp. 
340,  2  C.  L.  R.  370,  23  L.  J.  C.  P.  561,  50  Misc.  Rep.  464,  holding  also 
115,  18  .Tur.  449,  2  W.  R.  702.  the  purchaser  cannot  obtain  such 

23  Whitlock's  Case.  8  Co.  Rep.  rents  by  an  application  in  surplus 
69b,    70b;     Hotley    v.    Scot,    Lofft,  proceedings. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  531 

sufficient  and  a  tender  of  the  rent  to  such  agent  will  also  be 
sufficient.-^  The  agency  to  receive  the  rent  thus  created  may  be 
revoked  at  any  time  by  the  landlord,  provided  the  agency  is  not 
coupled  with  an  interest,  but  where  a  person  has  been  regularly 
receiving  rents  as  agent  of  a  landlord,  and  giving  receipts  there- 
for, the  notice  of  the  revocation  should  be  brought  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  tenant,  and  if  this  be  not  done  the  subsequent  pay- 
ment by  the  tenant  to  the  agent  will  be  binding  on  the  landlord. 
Where  rent  has  been  customarily  paid  in  advance  by  the  tenant, 
the  tenant  who  has  paid  in  advance  is  not  liable  for  that  rent  to 
the  grantee  of  the  lessor,  though  the  latter  has  no  notice  of  such 
payment,  and  the  lease  does  not  provide  for  advance  payments.-^ 
But  the  general  rule  undoubtedly  is  that  the  voluntary  payment 
of  rent  by  the  tenant  before  it  is  due,  does  not  operate  to  dis- 
charge his  liability,  and  if,  before  the  rent  is  actually  due,  the 
landlord  transfers  the  premises,  his  grantee  may  recover  from 
the  tenant  rent  accruing  subsequently  to  the  sale,  though  the 
tenant  has  in  fact  paid  it  to  the  former  owner.^*  The  payment 
of  the  rent  not  yet  due  by  the  tenant  to  the  lessor  who  has  mort- 
gaged the  premises  after  making  the  lease  is  not  good  as  against 
the  mortgagee  who  has  notified  the  lessee  before  the  rent  became 
due  that  it  must  be  paid  to  him.-"  So  it  has  also  been  held  that 
if  there  be  a  clause  for  re-entry  for  non-payment  of  rent,  rent 
paid  before  the  day  when  it  was  due  under  the  terms  of  the 
lease,  will  not  avoid  a  forfeiture  if  proper  steps  to  enforce  it 
had  been  taken.^**  The  same  rule  which  renders  the  tenant  liable 
to  a  purchaser  for  rent  paid  in  advance  applies  to  the  rights  of 
a  purchaser  at  an  execution  sale.  Thus  where  a  tenant  accepted 
drafts  on  him  by  his  landlord  in  anticipation  of  rent  which  was 
not  due  at  the  time  of  the  acceptance  of  the  drafts,  the  tenant 
was  compelled  to  pay  the  rent  which  subsequently  accrued  to  a 
purchaser  at  a  sheriff's  sale,  though  the  drafts  accepted  by  the 
tenant  covered  rent  paid  in  advance  for  a  period  which  had  not 
expired  at  the  date  of  the  payment.^^    All  this  is  technical  and  is 

26  Goodland  v.  Blewelt,  1  Camp.  20  De  Nicols  v.   Saunders.  39  L. 
477.  J.  C.  P.  297,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  589,  22 

27  Stone    V.    Patterson,    19    Pick.  L^  T.  661,  18  W.  R.  1106. 
(Mass.)  476.  30  Cromwell    v.     Andrews,    Cro. 

28  William  Clun's  Case.  10  Coke,  Eliz.  15. 

127b.  31  Martin  v.  Martin,  7  Md.   368. 


532  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

based  on  strict  common  law  principles  for  in  equity  an  ad- 
vanced payment  made  before  the  time  fixed  in  the  lease,  will  be 
considered;  and,  if  all  the  parties  are  before  the  court,  the  mat- 
ter will  be  adjusted  according  to  fairness  and  equity,  and  if  the 
rights  of  the  parties  permit  the  payment  in  advance  will  be  re- 
garded as  a  discharge  of  the  debt  for  rent.^^ 

§  337.  Rent  made  payable  to  persons  other  than  the  land- 
lord. Where  the  payment  of  rent  is  specially  reserved  by  a 
covenant,  it  may  be  reserved  directly  to  the  person  entitled  to 
the  fee.  While  it  is  competent  and  proper  for  rent  to  be  re- 
served and  made  payable  by  the  lease  to  persons  other  than  the 
landlord,  such  reservation  does  not  in  strictness  of  language 
create  rent,  and  the  person  to  whom  this  reservation  is  made 
cannot  maintain  a  distress  though  such  person,  however,  may 
maintain  an  action  of  debt  against  the  tenant  for  the  rent,^^  and 
in  modern  times  he  may  sue  the  tenant  for  rent  on  the  covenant 
without  proving  any  express  assignment  of  the  rent  to  him.^* 
Such  leases  come  under  the  general  rule  of  the  law  of  con- 
tracts that  where  one  by  an  unsealed  contract  makes  a  promise 
to  another  for  the  benefit  of  a  third  person,  the  latter  may  re- 
cover against  the  promisor  though  no  consideration  has  moved 
from  him.^^     This  rule  is  confined  in  its  operation  to  contracts 

32  Rockingham   v.   Penrice,  1   S.      After  the  period  agreed  on  has  ex- 
W.  Rep.  346.  pired  the  tenant  is  under  no  obli- 

33  Gilbert  on  Rents,  24.  gation,  either  express  or  implied, 
3*  Toan  V.  Pine,  60  Mich.  385,  27       to  pay  his  rent  to  the  third  per- 

N.  W.  Rep.  557;  Frontin  v.  SmalL,  son  and  he  may  thereafter  pay  his 

2  Ld.  Raym.  1418;  During  v.  Far-  rent  to  his  landlord  where  he  re- 

rington,  1  Mod.  113.     If  the  lessee  mains    in    possession.      Hodges    t. 

undertakes  to  pay  an  annual  sum  Waters,   124   Ga.   229,   1   L.  R.   A. 

by  his  deed,  such  undertaking  con-  (N.  S.)  1181,  52  S.  E.  Rep.  IGl. 

stitutes  a  right  to  it,  and  the  law  ss  Hendrick  v.  Lindsay,  93  U.  S. 

in  all  cases  gives  a  remedy  ade-  143,  23  Law  Ed.  855;  Thompson  v. 

quate  to  the  right.    A  tenant  who  Dearborn,  107  111.  87;  Carnahan  v. 

has   expressly   agreed   to  pay  the  Tousey,  93   Ind.  561;    Carnegie  v. 

rent  to  a  third  person  for  a  period  Marrison,    2    Met.     (Mass.)     381; 

which  is  specified  in  the  lease  or  Cubberly  v.  Cubberly,  33  N.  J.  Eq. 

some     other    agreement    will     be  82;  Lawrence  v.  Fox,  20  N.  Y.  2G8; 

bound  to  do  so.     The  promise  if  Barker  v.  Bradley,  42  N.  Y.  316; 

it  is  based  upon  a  sufDcient  con-  Little    v.    Banks,    85    N.    Y.    258; 

sideration  may  be  enforced  by  the  Litchfield  v.  Flint,  104  N.  Y.  543, 

third   person    against  the   tenant.  11    N.    E.   Rep.    58;    Schneider   v- 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  533 

not  under  seal.  For  a  contract  nnder  seal  cannot  generally  be 
sued  on  by  a  person  for  whose  benefit  it  was  made  unless  be  is 
a  party  thereto.^®  The  payment  of  the  rent  to  a  stranger  with- 
out the  consent  or  request  of  the  landlord  does  not  bind  the  land- 
lord.^^  But  where  a  landlord  has  by  his  written  order  to  pay 
rent  to  athird  person  acknowledged  that  such  person  is  en- 
titled to  receive  the  rent  and  the  tenant,  relying  upon  such  con- 
duct, has  actually  paid  the  rent  to  the  third  person,  the  landlord 
is  estopped  to  recover  the  rent  from  the  tenant. ^^  If  the  land- 
lord directs  a  tenant  to  pay  rent  to  some  third  person  to  whom 
the  landlord  is  indebted  and  the  tenant,  for  any  reason,  fails  to 
do  so,  the  landlord  may  recover  the  rent  from  the  tenant.  Thus, 
where  by  the  terms  of  a  lease  the  lessee  is  to  pay  the  rent  in 
discharge  of  the  lessor's  debts  to  certain  creditors  of  the  lessor 
who  are  named,  and  the  lessor  directs  him  to  do  so  and  he  fails 
either  to  pay  the  rent  to  the  creditors  or  to  promise  them  pay- 
ment, and  they  do  not  accept  this  provision  as  a  discharge  of 
their  debts,  the  title  to  the  rent  remains  in  the  lessor  and  the 
lessee  is  his  debtor  for  the  full  amount  of  rent  unpaid.^^  But 
where  a  tenant  by  the  implied  consent  of  his  landlord,  pays  the 
rent  to  a  third  party  with  whom  the  landlord  is  in  litigation  over 
the  title  to  the  rent,  the  landlord  is  thereafter  precluded  from 
recovering  from  his  tenant  the  rent  so  paid.**"  An  agreement  by 
a  landlord  that  the  tenant  may  retain  a  certain  portion  of  each 
year's  rent  until  a  debt  due  from  the  landlord  to  the  tenant  is 
paid  which  is  contained  in  a  writing  separate  from  the  lease, 
may  be  pleaded  at  law  in  an  action  against  the  landlord  on  the 
debt  as  a  release  pro  tanto.  This,  however,  is  only  for  conveni- 
ence as  the  agreement  is  not  a  release.  And  where  the  tenant 
having  made  such  an  agreement,  specifically  bequeathes  his  term, 
his  bequest  does  not  carry  to  the  legatee  of  the  term  the  benefit 
of  the  agreement  but  that  passes  to  the  executors  of  the  tenant 

White,   12  Oreg.  503,  8   Pac.   Rep.  '■''  Gibbons  v.  Hamilton,  33  How. 

652.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  83,  86. 

8«  Millard    v.    Baldwin,    3    Gray  ^^  Winterink     v.     Maynard,     47 

(Mass.)  484;  Crowell  v.  Currier,  27  Iowa,  366. 

N.  J.  Eq.  152.     Contra,  Rogers  v.  •«'  Burt   v.   Hurlbut,   16   Vt.   292, 

Gosnell,    51    Mo.    466;    Bassett    v.  293. 

Hughes,  43  Wis.  319.  •»«>  Winterink     r.     Maynard,     47 

Iowa,  366. 


534  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

who  may  interpose  it  as  a  set-off  in  any  action  brought  against 
them  on  the  covenant  of  their  testator  to  pay  rent.^^ 

§  338.  Rent  payable  in  instalments.  Instahnents  of  rent 
may  be  recovered  as  they  fall  due,  or  the  landlord  may  let  the 
instalments  accumulate  and  sue  for  several  in  the  aggregate  or 
he  may  sue  for  each  instalment  as  it  falls  due.  He  is  not  re- 
quired to  wait  for  any  particular  time  to  sue.*^  The  general 
rule  of  the  law  of  contracts  that  where  money  is  to  be  paid  in 
instalments,  some  of  which  are  due  after  something  has  been 
done  and  others  are  due  before  a  thing  has  been  done,  the  doing 
of  the  latter  by  the  payee  is  not  a  condition  precedent  to  the 
payment  of  the  money,  is  applicable  to  a  case  where  rent  is 
payable  in  instalments  and  the  lessor  has  expressly  covenanted 
to  perform  some  act  under  the  lease  which  either  expressly  or 
of  necessity  may  or  must  be  done  after  the  payment  of  an  in- 
stalment of  rent.  A  lessor  may  sue  at  once  for  an  instalment 
of  rent  which  is  due  on  the  first  or  any  other  day  of  the  month 
and  the  lessee  cannot  defeat  a  recovery  bj^  showing  that  the  les- 
sor had  agreed  to  furnish  heat  or  steam  power  or  to  repair  or 
to  improve  during  that  month.  He  cannot  make  the  lessor  wait 
for  the  rent  until  the  month  is  ended,  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether  the  lessor  will  perform  his  covenant,  for  M'here  the  rent 
is  expressly  payable  in  advance,  the  lessee  is  conclusively  pre- 
cluded from  claiming  that  the  performance  of  any  act  which  is 
to  be  done  thereafter  is  a  condition  precedent  to  his  liability 
for  the  payment  of  the  rent  in  advance.*^  A  judgment  in  an  ac- 
tion to  recover  one  instalment  of  rent,  though  it  shall  dismiss 
the  action  upon  the  merits,  is  not  of  necessity  a  bar  to  a  subse- 
quent action  to  recover  another  instalment  Avhicli  falls  due  there- 

41  Ledger  v.   Stanton,  2  John.  &  Racke  v.  Anheuser  Biisch  Brewing 

H.    689,    9    W.    R.    848.      Where    a  Ass'n    (Tex.),  42   S.  W.   Rep.  774. 

lease    of   a    husband's   lands    pro-  The     instalments     carry     interest 

vided  that  the  rent  accruing  after  from  the  dates  upon  which   they 

his   death  should  be   paid  to   his  fall  due.    Lane  v.  Ruhl,  103  Mich, 

wife  for  her  support,  such  provi-  38,  45,  CI  N.  W.  Rep.  347. 
sion  was  invalid  as  an  attempted  ■•3  Hurliman    v.    Seckendorf,    10 

testamentary    devise,   so    that   the  Misc.  Rep.  549,  550,  31  N.  Y.  Supp. 

wife  was  not  entitled  to  the  rent  443,  444;   Trenkman  v.  Schneider, 

so  accruing.     Murray  v.  Cazipr,  23  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  770,  772,  26  Misc. 

Ind.  App.  600,  53  N.  E.  Rep.  476.  Rep.  695,  reversing  51  N.  Y.  Supp. 

"2  Consolidated    Coal    Co.    of   St.  232,  23  Misc.  Rep.  336. 
Louis   V.   Peers,   39    111.   App.   453; 


XATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  535 

after.  The  prior  judgment  may  be  a  bar  if  it  dismisses  the  ac- 
tion upon  a  defence  which  can  properly  and  legally  be  pleaded 
in  an  action  on  a  subsequent  instalment.  This  would  be  the  case 
where  the  first  action  was  dismissed  upon  the  ments  because 
of  the  absolute  invalidity  of  the  lease  and  particularly  if  the 
validity  of  the  lease  were  the  only  material  issue  in  the  first 
action.**  The  tenant  can  then  in  the  subsequent  action  for  an 
instalment  thereafter  accruing,  plead  that  the  lease  has  been 
pronounced  invalid  in  the  prior  action,  and  that  he  has  sur- 
rendered it,  and  no  recovery  can  be  had  against  him.  If,  how- 
ever, the  defence  in  the  first  action  was  one  that  did  not  go 
to  defeat  the  whole  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  the  judgment  in  favor 
of  the  tenant  in  an  action  for  the  first  instalment  cannot  be 
pleaded  in  the  subsequent  action.  For  example  if  the  first 
action  were  defeated  because  the  court  was  satisfied  that  there 
had  been  a  surrender  by  the  tenant  and  an  acceptance  by  the 
landlord,  the  judgment  therein  would  be  a  bar  to  an  action  on 
a  subsequent  instalment,  but  the  defense  of  payment  or  of  a 
preach  of  some  covenant  might  be  a  good  defense  in  one  action 
and  yet  amount  to  nothing  as  to  an  action  on  some  subsequent 
instalment.*^  But,  if  the  first  action  for  an  instalment  was  de- 
feated upon  a  ground  of  defense  which  denied  the  right  of  ac- 
tion and  a  trial  was  had  upon  the  merits  of  that  defense,  a  judg- 
ment dismissing  the  first  action  could  be  pleaded  in  bar  to  any 
subsequent  action  brought  for  a  subsequent  instalment  payable 
under  the  same  lease.*®  A  judgment  in  an  action  for  an  instal- 
ment of  rent  does  not  bar  an  action  brought  thereafter  to  recover 
prior  instalments,  when  the  latter  action  was  pending  at  the  time 
the  action  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered  was  commenced, 
though  it  was  discontinued  before  the  judgment  in  that  action 
was  rendered.*^    A  judgment  by  default  in  an  action  for  rent,  the 

44Dolan  V.  Scott,  25  Wash.  214,  mond  Plate  Glass  Co.    (Ind.  App. 

65  Pac.  Rep.  190.                     *  1906),  77  N.  E.  Rep.  412. 

*5  The  rule  that  in  an  action  for  *<"'  Danziger  v.  Williams,  91  Pa. 
an  instalment  of  rent  due  a  jiidg-  St.  234;  Burdick  v.  Cameron,  42 
ment  that  a  lease  is  valid  or  other-  N.  Y.  Supp.  78;  McClung  v.  Con- 
wise  is  conclusive  in  an  action  for  diet  (Minn.),  6  N.  W.  Rep.  399. 
a  subsequent  instalment  does  not  ^^  Kieley  v.  Kahn,  98  N.  Y.  Supp. 
apply  to  a  lease  under  which  tho  774.  In  an  action  for  rent  a  prior 
tenancy  may  he  terminated  at  the  judgment  and  record  for  rent  un- 
end  of  any  year.    Snowhill  v.  Dia-  der  the  same  lease  is  not  conclu- 


536  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

record  in  wbicli  action  does  not  show  the  nature  of  the  tenancy, 
whether  by  the  year  or  by  the  month,  that  not  being  necessary 
to  be  shown  in  the  action  is  not  res  adjudicuta  in  a  subsequent 
action  or  summaiy  proceeding  by  the  landlord  to  dispossess 
the  tenant.*^  A  judgment  for  one  instalment  of  rent  due  on  a 
lease  for  a  year  is  res  adjudicata  to  all  defenses  which  might 
have  been  urged  in  the  action.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the 
tenant  in  an  action  to  recover  a  subsequent  instalment  cannot 
urge  an  eviction  or  a  trespass  which  might  have  been  properly 
urged  in  the  prior  action.*® 

§  339.  The  tender  of  the  rent  by  the  lessee.  If  the  rent  is 
payable  on  a  day  certain,  the  tenant  is  bound  to  make  a  tender 
on  the  precise  day,^°  If,  having  made  a  legal  and  proper  ten- 
der the  landlord  refuses  to  accept  the  tenant  is  discharged  from 
the  consequences  of  a  failure  to  pay  his  rent.  The  landlord 
cannot  then  recover  the  possession  of  the  premises  for  non-pay- 
ment of  the  rent.  A  mere  offer  to  pay  the  rent  is  not  a  tender. 
The  tenant  must  actually  produce  the  money  and  hand  it  to  the 
landlord  or  place  it  where  he  can  easily  receive  it  unless  the  land- 
lord by  some  act  or  declaration  on  his  part  shall  conclusively 
show  that  he  does  not  mean  to  accept  it.^^  The  production  of  the 
money  is  dispensed  with  in  a  case  where  the  tenant  comes  to  the 
landlord  with  a  voucher  in  his  hand  to  pay  the  rent,  and  the  land- 
lord on  its  being  read  to  him  declines  to  take  i"  and  states  that  it 
will  be  unnecessary  to  produce  the  money."    The  tenant  must 

sive  as  to  the  length  of  the  term  637;  Currie  v.  White,  45  N.  Y.  822, 

where   the   judgment   and    record  833;   Finch  v.  Brooli,  1  Bing.   (N. 

do  not  indicate  the  nature  of  the  C.)     259;     Thomas    v.    Evans,    10 

controversy.     Dickey  v.  Heim,  48  East,  101. 

Mo.  App.  114.  ^2  Weetmoreland    Cambria    Nat. 

48  Rothstein  v.   Steinbugler,   102  Gas  Co.  v.  De  Witt,  130  Pa.  St.  235. 

N.  Y.  Supp.  470.  18  Atl.  Rep.  724.     An  oiler  by  the 

40  pierson  v.  Hughes,  102  N.  Y.  tenant  to  deliver  to  the  landlord 

Supp.  528.  sufficient  merchandise  to  pay  the 

50  Dewey  v.  Humphrey,  5  Pick.  rent  was  held  good  in  Browne  v. 
(Mass.)  187.  Unless  the  day  is  Clarke,  35  La.  Ann.  290.  The  ten- 
Sunday  when  he  may  legally  ten-  der  of  certain  articles  in  which 
der  the  rent  on  the  next  day.  rent  is  to  be  paid  on  the  rent  day 
Warne  v.  Wagoner  (N.  J.  Ch.  is  a  good  tender,  though  their 
1888),  15  Atl.  Rep.  307.  real  value  then  was  greater  or  le!>3 

51  Hornby  v.  Cramer,  12  How.  than  their  price  which  was  speci- 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  Rep.  490,  494;  Bake-  fied  in  the  lease.  Heywood  v.  Hey- 
»ian  V.  Pooler,  14  Wend.    (N.  Y.)  wood,  42  Me.  229,  66  Am.  Dec.  277. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  BENT.  637 

tender  the  amount  of  rent  due  in  lawful  money.  An  offer  of  a 
cheek  or  an  offer  to  draw  a  check  in  payment  of  the  rent  is  not 
sufficient.^^  A  tender  ought  to  be  made  directly  to  the  landlord 
in  person  though  it  may  be  a  valid  tender  if  it  is  made  to  an 
agent  of  the  landlord  who  is  authorized  to  receive  the  rent.^*  The 
tender  must  be  absolute  and  asking  for  a  receipt  will  invalidate 
it  as  a  tender.^^  A  tender  of  rent  with  the  words  "here  is  your 
quarter's  rent"  is  a  good  tender  as  it  does  not  require  the  land- 
lord to  make  any  admission  of  the  amount  due  as  a  condition  of 
its  receipt  by  him.^®  An  absolute  refusal  by  a  landlord  to  re- 
ceive the  rent  tendered  is  a  waiver  of  the  tender.^^  If  the  land- 
lord refuses  to  receive  the  rent  upon  a  ground  specified,  he  can- 
not subsequently  raise  any  other  objection  which  had  he  then 
stated  it,  might  have  been  obviated  by  the  tenant.^^  The  rent 
having  been  tendered  and  refused  as  not  having  been  tendered 
in  time,  the  objection  cannot  afterwards  be  made  that  it  was  not 
tendered  in  money .^*  The  tender  of  course  does  not  pay  the 
debt  but  merely  stops  the  running  of  interest  and  saves  the  ten- 
ant from  the  consequences  of  a  forfeiture  which  may  result  from 
the  non-payment  of  the  rent.  A  tender  of  a  sum  of  money, 
w^hich  is  less  than  the  rent  demanded  by  the  landlord  upon  the 
condition  that  a  receipt  in  full  for  rent  shall  be  given  or  that  it 
shall  be  accepted  in  full  pa^^ment  of  all  rent  due,  is  not  a  valid 
tender.  If  the  tenant  shall  insist  upon  a  receipt  in  full  the  ten- 
der may  be  refused  as  insufficient  and  invalid  and  the  landlord 
may  then  insist  upon  the  unconditional  pajnnent  of  the  sum  he 
demands.®"  A  tender  by  the  tenant  of  the  rent  which  is  due  with 

53  Hague  V.  Powers,  2&  How.  Pr.  v.  Miller,  5  C.  B.  428,  435;   Sutton 

(N.  Y.)    17,  30  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    42;  v.  Hawkins,  8  Car.  &  P.  259. 

Bank,  etc.,  v.  Trumbull,   35   How.  ss  Jones   v.   Bridgman,   39   L.  T. 

Pr.   (N.  Y.)    8,  4  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)  500. 

Rep.  83,  53  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  450.  s-  Stone  v.  Sprague,  20  Barb.  (N. 

e^Hargous  v.  Labens,  3   Sandf.  Y.)    509,  515;   Dana  v.  Fiedler,  1 

(N.  Y.)    313;  Wilmot  v.  Smitb,  3  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.)  463;  Slinger- 

Car.  &  P.   453;    Kirton  v.  Braitb-  land  r.   Morse,   8   Johns.    (N.  Y.) 

waite,  1   Mee.  &  Wei.   310;    Bing-  474,    476;     Everett    v.    Saltus,    15 

ham  V.  Allport,  1  N.  &  M.  398.  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  474. 

65  Roosevelt      v.      Bull's      Head  ss  Hull  v.  Peters.  7  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

Bank,  45  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    579,  583;  331,  7  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  S.)   244. 

Griffith  V.  Hodges,  1  Car.  &  P.  419;  59  Duffy  v.  O'Donovan,  46  N.  Y. 

Glascott  V.  Day,  5  Esp.  48;   Finch  223. 

•w  Thayer  v.  Brackett,  12  Mass. 


538  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

interest  ®^  and  costs  to  the  date  of  the  tender,  when  made  pending^ 
a  dispossessory  action  which  is  based  upon  the  default  of  the  ten- 
ant in  the  payment  of  rent,  will  defeat  the  action.  If  the  tender 
is  not  accepted  by  the  landlord  the  money  should  be  paid  into 
court  at  once  and  if  this  be  done  pending  the  action  and  before 
answer,  it  will  stop  the  running  of  costs  in  case  the  landlord 
refuses  to  accept  the  money  and  the  judgment  is  rendered  in  his 
favor.  The  general  rules  applicable  to  a  tender  pending  an  ac- 
tion will  be  recognized  in  the  case  of  a  tender  of  rent  made  by  a 
tenant  who  is  being  sued  in  a  possessory  action,  subject  to  the 
provisions  of  the  local  statutes.  The  plea  of  tender  must 
show  that  interest  on  the  rent  was  included  in  the  amount  ten- 
dered and  that  the  tenant  had  the  money  in  court.**"  It  is  the 
duty  of  the  tenant  to  seek  the  landlord  in  order  to  pay  or  to  ten- 
der the  rent.  He  will  be  allowed  a  reasonable  time  to  find  him 
where  he  has  frequently  attempted  to  see  him  and  the  landlord 
has  intentionally  avoided  him.*'^  A  tender  or  offer  of  payment 
of  the  rent  may  extinguish  the  tenant's  liability.  A  statute 
which  provides  that  where  a  tender  is  refused,  the  money  may  be 
deposited  in  the  name  of  the  creditor  in  a  bank,  notice  of  the  de- 
posit given  to  him,  will  be  strictly  construed.  The  mere  de- 
posit of  rent  in  the  bank  after  it  is  demanded  by  the  landlord, 
and  a  refusal  and  neglect  to  pay  are  not  a  fulfilment  of  the  re- 
quirements of  the  statute,  unless  it  is  proved  that  the  money  was 
offered  to  the  landlord,  or  that  he  was  notified  of  the  deposit  or 
having  knowledge  of  it  acquiesced  in  it.*** 

§  340.  Apportionment  of  rent  between  successive  landlords. 
In  the  absence  of  an  express  agreement,  or  a  statute  permitting 
apportionment,  there  is  no  apportionment  of  rent,  which  by  the 

450,  452;  Loring  v.  Cooke,  3  Pick.  C2  Ralph  v.  Lomer,  3  Wash.  St. 

(Mass.)  48,  51;  Brooklyn  Bank  v.  401,  28  Pac.  Rep.  760. 

De  Graw,  23  Wend.    (N.  Y.)    342;  63  Young  v.  Ellis,  91  Va.  297,  21 

Hepburn  v.  Auld,  1  Cranch  (U.  S.)  S.  E.  Rep.  480. 

321;    Griffith  v.   Hodges,  1  Car.  &  64  Owen  v.  Herzikoff   (Cal.  App. 

P.  420;   Jennings  v.  Magor,  6  Car.  1906),  84  Pac.  Rep.  274.     In  Illi- 

&  P.  237;  Peacock  v.  Dickenson,  2  nois  a  tender  of  the  rent  to  the 

Car.  &  P.  51;  Chenimant  v.  Thorn-  landlord  or  his  agent  within  the 

ton,  2  Car.  &  P.  50.  five  days  provided  by  the  statutoiy 

61  Ralph  V.  Lomer,  3  Wash.  St.  notice  to  quit  will  defeat  the  for- 

401,  28  Pac.  Rep.  401.  foiture    of    the    lease.      Lasher    v. 

6ia  George  v.  Mahoney,  62  Minn.  Graves,  124  111.  App.  646. 
370,  64  N.  W.  Rep.  911. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  539 

terms  of  the  lease  is  payable  at  certain  intervals.  Annual  or 
quarterly  payments  of  rent  are  not,  at  common  law.  apportion- 
able  between  the  parties  where  the  reversion  is  transferred  by  a 
lessor  between  the  days  for  the  payment  of  the  rent.  There  is 
no  apportionment  as  respects  time  and  the  right  to  collect  the 
next  annual  or  quarterly  payment  of  rent  which  becomes  due 
passes  to  the  grantee  of  the  reversion."^  To  apportion  the  rent 
would,  it  has  been  said,  expose  a  tenant  to  several  processes  of 
distress  for  a  thing  which  was  originally  entire  and  he  ought  not 
to  be  compelled  to  pay  rent  in  different  parcels  and  to  several 
landlords  when  he  contracted  to  pay  one  entire  sum  as  rent  to 
one  person."*'  Hence  if  a  tenant  for  life  or  any  tenant  who  has  a 
terminable  estate  dies  but  one  day  before  the  rent  reserv.  T.  in 
a  lease  by  him  becomes  due  the  rent  was  lost  at  common  law  for 
there  is  none  who  can  collect  it  after  his  death.  The  executor  of 
the  lessor  could  have  no  action  on  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  as  it 
was  not  broken  during  the  life  of  the  lessor  and  as  the  covenant  to 
pay  rent  runs  with  the  land  the  executor  could  have  no  action  for 
a  breach  after  the  death  of  the  lessor.  The  executor  of  the  life 
tenant  cannot  sue  for  use  and  occupation  for  there  was  a  lease 
between  the  parties.  Nor  on  the  other  hand  could  the  reversioner 
or  remainderman  recover  the  rent  which  accrued  during  the  life 
of  the  life  tenant  so  that  under  such  circumstances  the  lessee 

65  English  V.  Key,  39  Ala.   113;  Dec.    493;    Russell    v.    Fabyan,    28 

Clarke   v.   Cobb,   121   Cal.   595,   54  N.  H.  543,  545;   Marshall  v.  Mose- 

Pac.  Rep.  74,  77;  Peck  v.  Northrop,  ley,  21  N.  Y.  280;   Mayor  of  New 

17  Conn.  217;  Sampson  v.  Grimes,  York  v.  Ketchum,  67  How.  Pr.  (N. 

3  Har.  (Del.)  82;  Breeding  v.  Tay-  Y^)  161,  166;  Van  Wicklen  v.  Paul- 

lor,  13  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  477;  Robin-  sen,  14  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  654;  Zule  v. 

son.  V.  Deering,  56  Me.  357;   Cam-  Zule,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  76,  35  Am. 

eron  v.  Little,  62  Me.  550;  Ander-  Dec.  600;    Bank  v.  Wise,  3  Watts 

son  V.  Bobbins,  82  Me.  422,  425,  19  (Pa.)  394;  William  Clun's  Case,  10 

Atl.  Rep.  910,  8  L.  R.  A.  568;  Mar-  Coke,  127,  Cro.  Jac.  310;  Paget  v. 

tin  V.  Martin,  7  Md.  368,  61  Am.  Gee,    Ambl.    198;    Burns'    Justice, 

Dec.   364;    Earle   v.   Kingsbury,   3  Distress,  sec.   18;   Jenner  v.  Mor- 

Cush.   (Mass.)   206,  208;  Dexter  v.  gan,  1  P.  Wms.  392;    Edwards  v. 

Phillips,    121    Mass.    178,    23    Am.  Countess  of  Warwick,  2  P.  Wms. 

Rep.  261;    Adams  v.  Bigelow,  128  176;     Hawkins    v.    Kelly,    8    Ves. 

Mass.  365;   Emmes  v.  Feeley,  132  "308;      Countess     of    Plymouth    v. 

Mass.  346;   Fitchburg  Man.  Co.  v.  Throgmorton,  1  Salk.  65;  Birch  v. 

Melvin,    15    Mass.    268;    Wood    v.  Wright,  1  T.  R.  378. 

Partridge.  11  Mass.  493;   Perry  v.  cc  Stewart   v.    Perkins,    3    Oreg. 

Aldrich,  13  N.  H.  343,  350,  38  Am.  508,  511. 


540  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

paid  no  rent.^  The  rule  of  the  common  law  holding  against 
an  apportionment  of  the  rent  though  in  many  cases  working 
injustice  to  the  ownei-s  of  reversions  was  scrupulously  followed 
in  equity.^^  It  has,  however,  been  abrogated  by  express  stat- 
utes in  almost  every  state  in  the  Union.  These  statutes  though 
in  derogation  of  the  common  law  are  usually  construed  liber- 
ally with  a  view  to  the  peculiar  exigencies  of  modem  life  and 
present  conditions.  They  are  not  retroactive  and  generally  apply 
only  to  leases  which  are  executed  subsequent  to  their  passage.®^ 
The  English  statute  '^°  applies  to  cases  in  which  the  interest  of 
the  person  interested  in  the  rents  is  terminated  by  his  death,  or 
by  the  death  of  another  person,  but  it  does  not  apply  to  the  case 
of  a  tenant  in  fee  nor  does  it  provide  for  the  apportionment  of 
rent  between  the  real  and  personal  representatives  of  such  per- 
sons whose  interest  is  not  terminated  at  his  death. '^^  Money  which 
is  paid  as  rent  will  be  apportioned  after  the  death  of  the  lessor 
though  by  his  death  the  lease  became  void  and  the  tenants  are  sim- 
ply tenants  at  will  or  at  sufferance.  This  principle  is  applicable 
as  regards  the  executor  of  a  life  tenant  who  has  made  a  lease  for 
years  which  is  terminated  by  his  death,'^^  or  to  a  lease  by  a  tenant 
in  tail.'^^  Where  the  lessor  owns  land  in  fee  and  land  for  life,  and 
he  leases  both  lands  for  a  term  at  an  entire  rent  and  the  lease  of 
the  land  which  he  holds  for  life,  is  void  on  his  death  because  he 
had  no  power  to  make  it  though  not  for  the  land  which  he  held  in 
fee,  the  rent  may  be  apportioned.^*  A  lease  in  which  an  option  to 
purchase   during  the  term  is  conferred  upon  the  lessee,  is  a 

8T  At  common   law,   if  a  tenant  «;>  Mayor   v.   Ketchum,   67   How. 

for    life    died    before   the    day   on  Pr.   (N.  Y.)   161,  167. 

■which  the  rent  became  due,  where  704  and  5  Will.  4,  c.  22,  §  2. 

the  lease  determined  by  the  death  71  Brown  v.  Amyot,  3  Hare,  173, 

of  the  tenant  for  life,  his  execu-  13  L.  J.  Ch.  232,  approved  in  Beer 

tors  could  not  claim  an  apportion-  v.  Beer,  12  C.  B.  60,  21  L.  J.  C.  P. 

ment  of  the  rent,  nor  could  the  re-  124,  16  Jur.  223. 

mainderman  or  reversioner  claim  72  Hawkins  v.  Kelly,  8  Ves.  308. 

that  part  of  it  which  accrued  dur-  73  Whitfield     v.     Pindar,     cited 

ing  the  life  of  the  tenant  for  life.  Hawkins    v.    Kelly,    8    Ves.    308; 

Com.  Dig.  Rent,  3  Cruise,  350.  Strafford  v.  Wentworth,  9  Mod.  21, 

68  Mayor      of      New     York      v.  Pre.  Ch.  555,  1  P.  Wms.  180;  Rock- 

Ketchum,    67    How.    Pr.    (N.    Y.)  ingham  v.  Penrlce.  1  P.  Wms.  179. 

161,  167.  '*  Doe  d.  Vaughan  v.  Meyler,  2 

M.  &  S.  276,  15  R.  R.  244. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  EENT.  54:1 

lease  which  is  dependent  as  to  its  duration  upon  a  contingency. 
If  the  lessee  exercises  the  option  the  lease  is  at  an  end.  Where 
he  does  so  during  a  rental  period,  he  remains  liable  for  the  rent 
for  that  portion  of  the  period  which  has  expired,  where  a  stat- 
ute provides  that  where  land  is  held  by  a  person  under  a  lease 
which  terminates  upon  a  contingency^  the  landlord  may  recover 
a  part  of  the  rent  in  proportion  to  the  time  which  has  expired.'^^ 
§  341.  Apportionment  among  the  several  assignees  of  the 
lessor.  Where  a  tract  of  land  while  it  is  under  lease  is  severed 
and  divided  by  the  lessor  conveying  a  part  thereof  to  a  third 
person,  or  all  of  it  to  several  grantees,  the  rent  which  becomes 
due  under  the  lease  will  be  apportioned  among  the  several 
owners.  The  right  of  the  owner  thus  to  divide  his  land  and  to 
sell  it  without  the  consent  of  the  tenant  in  modem  times  at 
least,  is  absolute. ''''  The  apportionment  of  rents  between  sep- 
arate parcels  of  a  land  which  are  leased  at  an  entire  rent,  when 
they  are  separately  conveyed,  should  be  determined  by  their 
respective  value  and  not  by  their  respective  size.' '  In  an  Eng- 
lish case  it  has  been  held  that  an  agreement  by  which  the  owner 
of  two  houses  which  are  leased  at  an  entire  rent  in  conveying, 
one  of  them  apportions  the  rent  with  the  grantee  of  the  house 

T5  Withington    v.     Nichols,     187  145;  Van  Rensselaer's  Ex'r  v.  Gal- 
Mass.  575,  73  N.  E.  Rep.  855.  lup,    5    Denio    (N.   Y.)    454;    Van 

T6  Crosby   v.    Loop,    13    111.    625,  Rensselaer    v.    Bradley,    3    Denio 

627;  Anderson  v.  Robbins,  82  Me.  (N.  Y.)    135,  141;    Nellis  v.  Loth- 

422,  425,  19  Atl.  Rep.  910,  8  L.  R.  rop,  22  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  121,  34  Am. 

A.  568;  Worthington  v.  Cooke,  56  Dec.    285;    Reed   v.   Ward,   22   Pa. 

Md.  51,  54;  Emmes  v.  Feeley,  132  St.   144,   149;    Linton  v.    Hart,   25 

Mass.    346;    Newall   v.   Wright,    3  Pa.  St.  193,  196,  64  Am.  Dec.  691; 

Mass.  138,  3  Am.  Dec.  98;  Keay  v.  Salmon  v.  Mathews,  8  Mee.  &  Wei. 

Goodwin,  16  Mass.  1;  Montague  v.  825;  Moodle  v.  Garnance,  3  Bulst. 

Gay,    17    Mass.    439;     Cheairs    v.  153;    West   v.    Lassels,    Cro.    Eliz. 

Coats,    77   Miss.    846,    850,    28    So.  851;    Bliss   v.   Collins,    5    Barn.   & 

Rep.  728;   Boston  &  Worcester  R.  Aid.    876;    Rivis  v.   Watson,   5  M. 

R.     Corp.     V.     Ripley,     13     Allen  &  W.   255;    Ehrman  v.   Mayer,   57 

(Mass.)    421;   Earle  v.  Kingsbury,  Md.  612;  Church  v.  Seeley,  110  N. 

3  Cush.    (Mass.)    206,  209;    Biddle  Y.    457;     Ards    v.    Watkins,    Cro. 

V.  Hussman,  23  Mo.  597,  598,  602;  Eliz.  637,  651;  Campbell's  Case,  1 

Farley  v.  Craig,  11  N.  J.  Law,  2C2,  Roll.  Abr.  237;  Moody  v.  Garnon, 

273;    Rj-^erson  v.  Quackenbush,  26  3  Bulst.  153. 

N.  J.  Law,  236;   Gribble  v.  Toms,  tt  O'Connor  v.  O'Connor,   19  W. 

70  N.  J.  Law,  522,  57  Atl.  Rep.  144,  R.  90. 


542  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

conveyed  but  to  which  the  lessee  is  not  a  party,  is  not  binding 
on  the  lessee  inasmuch  as  he  was  not  a  party  to  it/*  Elsewhere 
it  has  been  held  that  the  consent  of  the  tenant  may  be  dispensed 
with  in  making  the  apportionment,  though  in  no  case  can  the 
rent  as  apportioned  among  the  several  lessors  exceed  in  amount 
the  sum  total  of  the  rent  which  is  mentioned  in  the  original 
lease."^  Hence  a  reversioner  may  subdivide  his  land  and  sell  it 
in  parts  to  many  persons  and  a  tenant  of  the  whole  must  divide 
his  rent  and  pay  to  each  grantee  his  due  proportion  of  the 
same.  So,  in  case  the  lessor  shall  die  and  his  land  descend  to 
two  or  more  heirs  as  tenants  in  conmion,  the  lessee  must  pay 
to  each  heir  that  proportionate  part  to  which  he  is  entitled  as 
an  heir  but  no  more.^"  This  involves  no  hardship  to  the.  tenant 
for,  though  each  new  owner  of  the  reversion  may  sue  him  and 
distrain  separately  for  the  portion  of  the  rent  due  him,  the  ten- 
ant msiy  avoid  this  by  paying  his  rent  promptly.  If  the  tenant 
cannot  agree  with  the  several  heirs  or  reversioners  upon  the 
apportionment  it  may  be  made  by  the  court  or  jury  according 
to  the  values  and  not  according  to  the  size  of  the  several  por- 
tions. "Where  rent  is  apportionable  on  a  sale  of  a  jiart  of  the 
land  by  the  lessor,  an  action  by  him  need  not  be  limited  to  the 
part  he  owns  but  he  may  sue  for  the  whole  and  he  may  recover 
as  much  as  the  jury  find  him  entitled  to  and  he  will  be  barred 
of  the  residue  by  the  payment. ^^ 

'» Bliss  V.   Collins,   5   B.  &  Aid.  si  "Apportionment,       in       cases 

876,  1  D.  &  R.  291,  24  R.  R.  601.  where  it  is  permitted,   is  for  the 

Ts  The  eviction  of  a  tenant  by  a  benefit  of  the  owners  of  the  rent 

grantee  of  his  landlord  from  that  or  the  reversioners.    Ordinarily  it 

portion  of  the  premises  which  has  is  against  the  interest  of  tenants, 

been    conveyed    by    the    landlord,  and  the  omission  to  apportion  is 

does  not  prevent  the  landlord  from  not   a   matter   of   which   they  can 

recovering  the  rent  from  the  ten-  complain.      If  the  several   owners 

ant  for  that  portion  of  the  prem-  of  a  lease  are  disposed  to  treat  it 

ises  which  the  landlord  still  owns  as  an  entire  contract,  the  tenant 

and     the     tenant     still     occupies.  cannot   object   and   insist  that   it 

Gribble  v.  Toms  (N.  J.  Law,  1904),  shall  be  divided  into  several  con- 

57  Atl.  Rep.  144.  tracts,  unless  something  has  trans- 

«o  Reed  V.  Ward,  22  Pa.  St.  144,  pired  to  relieve  the  tenant  from  a 

149;     Bank     of    Pennsylvania     v.  just    liability    to    pay    the    whole 

Wise,  3  Watts  (Pa.)  404;   Salmon  rent.    This  general  principle  is  de- 

V.  Mathews,  8  M.  &  W.  827;   Bos-  ducible  from   the  cases   upon   the 

ton  &  Worcester  R.  Co.  v.  Riley,  subject."     People  ex  rel.   Grissler 

13  Allen    (Mass.)    421.  v.  Dudley,  58  N.  Y.  323.  333.     An 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OP  RENT. 


543 


§  342.  Apportionment  among  the  assignees   of  the  lessee. 

Where  a  lessee  subdivides  his  terra  and  assigns  all  of  it  thus 
subdivided  to  two  or  more  assignees  as  tenants  in  common,  and 
not  as  joint  tenants,  the  liability  to  pay  rent  will  be  apportioned 
among  the  assignees  according  to  the  value  of  their  respective 
interests.  Each  assignee  must  then  pay  the  lessor  only  so  much 
of  the  rent  reserved  by  the  lease  as  his  share  bears  to  the  lessee's 
whole  interest  in  the  premises.*^  The  proportion  of  the  rent 
which  the  various  assignees  must  pay  is  to  be  determined  by  the 
relative  values  of  the  shares  which  each  assignee  has  the  right 
to  occupy,  as  compared  with  the  whole.  If  there  is  no  proof 
of  the  relative  value  of  the  various  parts  of  the  premises,  they 
will  be  presumed  to  be  equally  valuable  and  the  rent  will  be 
apportioned  among  the  assignees  according  to  the  quantity  of 
the  land  each  takes.^^  The  lessor  may  sue  each  of  the  assignees 
in  debt  or  covenant  for  his  share  ^*  of  the  rent  where  the  as- 
signees take  as  tenants  in  common.  The  landlord  need  not  join 
all  the  assignees  as  defendants.  In  conclusion  it  may  be  said 
that  though  rent  is  payable  in  money  it  may  be  apportioned 
among  the  assignees.®^ 


among  the  grantees  of  the  land- 
lord occurs  where  the  service  or 
proceeds  of  the  rent  are  not  ca- 
exception  to  the  rule  stated  in  the 
text  by  which  rent  is  apportioned 
pable  of  being  divided,  as  when, 
for  example,  the  tenant  is  to  de- 
liver to  the  landlord  a  horse,  for 
the  use  of  the  land  on  the  first  day 
of  each  month.  In  such  case  if 
the  landlord  shall  buy  back  a  por- 
tion of  the  leased  premises  or 
shall  distribute  his  reversion 
among  several  or  let  it  be  dis- 
tributed by  operation  of  law  the 
rent  ceases.  While  if  the  tenant 
shall  sell  or  assign  a  certain  por- 
tion to  strangers  the  rent  is  mul- 
tiplied to  the  several  assignees  of 
the  tenant  who  are  obligated  to 
deliver  a  horse  to  the  landlord  on 
the  first  day  of  each  month.  Litt. 
222,  1  Inst.  149a,  b;  Gilbert,  Rents. 


165-167;  Talbot's  Case,  8  Co.  Rep. 
102b,  104. 

82  Babcock  v.  Scoville,  56  111. 
461;  Daniels  v.  Richardson,  22 
Pick.  (Mass.)  565;  Pingrey  v. 
Watkins,  15  Vt.  479;  Van  Rens- 
selaer V.  Bradley,  3  Denio  (N.  Y.) 
135,  141,  45  Am.  Dec.  451;  Astor 
V.  Miller,  2  Paige  Ch.   (N.  Y.)   78. 

S3  Van  Rensselaer's  Ex'rs  v.  Gal- 
lup, 5  Denio  (N.  Y.)  454.  465;  Van 
Rensselaer  v.  Jones,  2  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  643.  See,  also.  Main  v.  Davis, 
32  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  461,  and  St.  Louis 
Public  Schools  v.  Boatmen's  Ins. 
&  Trust  Co.,  5  Mo.  App.  91. 

^^  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Bradley,  3 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  135,  45  Am.  Dec. 
451;  Van  Rensselaer's  Ex'rs  v. 
Gallup.  5  Denio  (N.  Y.)  454,  464; 
Merceron  v.  Dawson,  5  B.  &  C. 
479. 

^'>  An   entire  rent  service  being 


544  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  343.  The  liability  of  testamentary  trustees  for  rent.  Trus- 
tees to  whom  a  testator  has  devised  his  leasehold  estates  in  trust 
to  permit  certain  persons  to  enjoy  them  for  life,  are  liable  on 
the  covenants  to  repair  and  to  pay  rent.  The  beneficiaries  of  the 
trust  are  not  liable  on  the  covenants  to  the  lessor  unless  the  will 
expressly  declares  that  they  shall  take  it  subject  to  pajnnent  of 
the  rent  and  to  the  performance  of  covenants  to  repair  by  them. 
And  where  the  testator  has  left  successive  life  estates  in  lease- 
holds, and  has  devised  all  the  remainder  of  his  personal  estate 
to  the  trustees  for  the  purposes  of  his  will,  it  has  been  conclu- 
sively presumed  that  he  intended  the  trustees  to  stand  in  his 
place  so  far  as  any  liability  for  the  performance  of  the  covenants 
in  the  leases  is  concerned.*^ 

§  344.  The  payment  of  rent  by  an  under-tenant  to  the  orig- 
inal lessor.  A  person  who  having  no  interest  in  a  leasehold, 
pays  taxes  and  rent  on  the  same,  cannot  recover  against  the 
lessee  the  money  paid  by  him  unless  the  payment  was  made  to 
protect  his  own  rights,  or  unless  some  fraud  was  practiced  upon 
him  by  the  lessee. ^^  There  being  neither  privity  of  contract 
nor  of  estate  between  under-tenants  and  the  original  lessor,  the 
latter  cannot  recover  rent,  nor  for  use  and  occupation,  from  the 
under-tenants  while  the  first  lessee  is  in  possession.  But  an 
under-tenant  who  is  in  danger  of  being  ousted  because  of  the 
default  of  his  lessor  in  the  payment  of  rent  or  because  of  a 
breach  of  any  covenant  in  the  original  lease  may  pay  his  rent 
to  the  original  lessor  and  deduct  the  amount  thus  paid  by  him 
from  what  he  owes  his  immediate  lessor.  Where  the  original 
lessor  has  an  immediate  right  to  enter  for  the  default  of  the 
intermediate  lessee,  the  sub-lessee  need  not  wait  for  the  rent  to 
be  distrained  for  or  even  demanded  or  for  a  suit  to  be  threat- 
ened or  begun  against  him.^^     An  under-tenant  who  to  protect 

indivisible    is    not    apportionable  1  Ch.  61,  3  R.  27,  67  L.  T.  702,  41 

among  the  assignees  of  the  lessee  W.  R.  87. 

and  on  an  assignment  to  several  st  sire    v.    Long    Acre     Square 

each  must  render  the  same  serv-  Bldg.  Co.,  50  Misc.  Rep.  29,  100  N. 

ice.    Van  Rensselaer  v.  Bradley,  3  Y.  Supp.  307. 

Denio  (N.  Y.)   135,  143.  ss  Peck  v.  Ingersoll,  7  N.  Y.  528, 

86  Re    Courtier:    Coles   v.    Cour-  529;    Lageman   v.   Kloppenburg,   2 

tier,  55  L.  T.  Rep.  (N.  S.)  574,  34  E.  D.  Smith   (N.  Y.)   126;  Kidney 

Ch.  Dlv.  136;  Baring,  In  re:  Jeune  v.  Rohrback,  3  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  574; 

V.  Baring,  62  L.  J.  Ch.  50;    (1893)  Collins  v.  Whilklin,  3  Phila.   (Pa.) 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  EENT.  545 

his  own  possession  or  to  avoid  a  distress,  pays  the  rent  due  by 
his  lessor  to  the  original  lessor  may  plead  such  payment  in  an 
action  brought  against  him  by  his  lessor  to  recover  rent  due 
under  the  sublease.  His  payment  of  the  ground,  rent  is  no  more 
voluntary  where  he  may  be  ousted  or  distrained  for  the  rent 
due  by  his  lessor  than  if  he  had  paid  it  on  the  demand  of  a 
highwayman.  So,  if  the  under-tenant  is  in  danger  of  a  dis- 
tress or  an  ouster,  the  fact  that  he  is  granted  a  little  time  in 
which  to  pay  does  not  render  his  payment  voluntary.^^  He 
may  pay  at  once.  If  he  pays  the  head  lessor  more  than  he 
owes  his  own  lessor,  the  under-tenant  may  recover  from  the 
latter  in  assumpsit.®^  Such  payments  by  an  under-tenant 
will  operate  not  only  as  a  discharge  of  the  rent  which  has 
accrued  but  also  a^  a  discharge  in  toto  or  pro  tanto  of  rent 
which  is  accruing,®^  and  his  lessor  cannot  thereafter  either  by 
distress  or  otherwise  compel  him  to  pay  him  the  rent.  The  same 
principles  are  applicable  to  the  payment  of  an  annuity  by  the 
tenant  which  was  granted  out  of  the  lands  before  they  were 
demised  to  the  tenant,®"  and  to  the  payment  of  the  interest  due 
on  a  mortgage  which  was  paid  by  the  tenant  at  the  request  of 
the  landlord,**^  and  to  the  payment  of  the  principal  due  on  a 
mortgage  which  was  prior  to  the  lease  and  which  the  tenant 
paid  to  protect  his  possession.®*  And  the  subtenant  may  inter- 
pose the  same  defense  of  payment  to  the  original  lessor  against 
the  assignee  of  a  non-negotiable  note  which  he  has  given  his 
lessor  for  the  rent  as  he  could  against  his  lessor,  though  the 

102;  Waddilove  v.  Barnett,  2  Bing.  E.  37,  21  R.  R.  569,  holding  also 

N.  C.  543;  Brook  v.  Biggs,  2  Bing.  that  the  tenant  should  not  plead 

(N.  C.)   572.  his  payments  as  a  cross  demand, 

89  Sapsford  v.  Fletcher,  1  T.  R.  but  that  he  should  plead  them  as 
511;   Dyer  v.  Bowley,  2  Bing.  94;  payments  of  the  rent. 

Sapsford  v.  Fletcher,  1  T.  R.  511;  9i  Carter  v.  Carter,  5  Bing.  406, 

Carter  v.  Carter,  51  Bing.   406,  2  2  M.  &  P.  723,  7  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  C.  P. 

M.   &  P.  723,  7  L.  J.    (O.  S.)   141,  141,  30  R.  R.  677. 

30  R.  R.  677;  Taylor  v.  Zamira,  1  02  Taylor    v.    Zamira,    2    Marsh. 

Brod.  &  B.  37,  21  R.  R.  569;  Dyer  220,  6  Taunt.  524,  16  R.  R.  668. 

V.  Bowley,  9  Moore,  196,  2  Bing.  93  Dyer  v.  Bowley,  9  Moore,  196, 

94;    Johnson  v.  Jones,  1  P.  &  D.  2  Bing.  94. 

651,  9  A,  &  E.  809,  813,  8  L.  J.  Q.  B.  »*  Johnson  v.   Jones,   1   P.   &  D. 

124;  Nash  v.  Grey,  2  F.  &  F.  391.  651,  9  A.  &  E.   809.   S13,   8   L.  J. 

90  Peck  V.  Ingersoll,  7  N.  Y.  528,  Q.  B.  124. 
529;   Taylor  v.  Zamira,  1  Brod.  & 

35 


546 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


note  was  assigned  before  it  became  due.^^  But  a  subtenant  who 
agrees  to  pay  his  rent  to  the  original  lessor  cannot,  where  he  is 
sued  by  his  own  lessor,  set  off  a  debt  due  him  from  his  lessor. 
His  duty  is  to  pay  the  original  lessor  against  whom  he  could  not 
recoup  his  lessor's  debt  and  having  failed  to  do  so  he  cannot 
take  advantage  of  his  own  wrong.^'^  Where  under-lessees  hold 
separate  portions  of  premises  at  distinct  rents,  the  whole  of  the 
premises  being  held  under  one  original  lease  at  an  entire  rent, 
and  one  of  the  under-lessees,  under  threat  of  a  distress  by  the 
owner  of  the  reversion  in  the  original  lease,  pays  the  whole  rent, 
an  action  is  not  maintainable  by  him  to  recover  from  the  other, 
under-lessee,  as  money  paid  to  his  use,  the  proportion  of  the 
rent  due  from  him.®^  In  the  absence  of  a  special  agreement, 
the  rent  cannot  be  apportioned  between  them.'^^ 

§  345.  Payment  of  rent  by  note,  check  or  draft.    Under  the 
general  rule  to  constitute  payment,  there  must  be  the  delivery 


95  Thompsou  V.  Commercial 
Guano  Co.,  93  Ga.  282,  20  S.  E. 
Rep.  309. 

s6  Brett  V.  Sayle,  60  Miss.  192. 

»T  Hunter  v.  Hunt,  1  C.  B.  300. 

88  Graves  v.  Porter,  11  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  592.  "In  support  of  this 
position  the  defendant  relied  on 
the  cases  of  Sapsford  v.  Fletcher, 
Taylor  v.  Zamira  and  Carter  v. 
Carter.  Those  cases  establish  the 
proposition,  that  a  tenant  who  has 
been  compelled  by  a  superior  land- 
lord or  other  incumbrances  hav- 
ing a  title  paramount  to  that  of 
bis  immediate  landlord,  to  pay 
sums  due  for  ground  rent  or  other 
charges,  may  treat  such  payment 
as  having  been  made  in  satisfac- 
tion or  part  satisfaction  of  rent 
due  to  his  immediate  landlord,  and 
may  plead  them  as  far  as  they  ex- 
tend in  bar  of  an  avowry  for  rent 
in  arrear.  The  principles  upon 
which  these  cases  rest  is  this: 
The  immediate  landlord  is  bound 
to  protect  his  tenant  from  all  para- 
mount   claims;    and    when    there- 


fore the  tenant  is  compelled,  in 
order  to  protect  himself  in  the 
enjoyment  of  the  land  in  respect 
of  which  his  rent  is  payable,  to 
make  payments  which  ought,  as 
between  himself  and  his  landlord, 
to  have  been  made  by  Ihe  latter, 
he  is  considered  as  having  been 
authorized  by  the  landlord  so  to 
apply  his  rent  due  or  accruing  due. 
All  such  payments,  if  incapable  of 
being  treated  as  actual  payments 
of  rent,  would  certainly  give  the 
tenant  a  right  of  action  against 
his  landlord  as  for  money  paid  to 
his  use,  and  so  would,  in  an  ac- 
tion of  debt  for  rent,  form  a  legiti- 
mate subject  of  set-off.  And 
though  in  replevin  a  general  set 
off  cannot  be  pleaded,  yet  the 
courts  have  given  to  the  tenant 
the  benefit  of  a  set-off  as  to  pay- 
ments of  this  description,  by  hold- 
ing them  to  be  in  fact  payments 
of  the  rent  itself  or  of  part  of  it." 
Graham  v.  Alsopp,  3  Ex.  186,  18 
L.  J.  Ex.  85. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  547 

of  2noney  or  of  some  other  valuable  thing  by  the  debtor  to  the 
creditor  with  the  intention  and  purpose  of  extinguishing  the 
debt,  and  the  creditor  must  accept  and  receive  it  for  that  pur- 
pose. If  the  intention  to  extinguish  the  debt  be  not  present  in 
the  transaction,  there  is  no  payment.  Thus,  the  receipt  by  a 
creditor  of  a  promissory  note  for  his  debt  is  not  payment  unless 
it  is  received  with  that  intention,  and  the  effect  of  such  a  trans- 
action is  merely  to  suspend  the  right  of  action  until  the  note 
becomes  due.®"  The  same  rule  applies  to  the  acceptance  of  a 
check  by  the  creditor  even  where  he  gives  a  receipt  for  it,  and 
he  may  thereafter  sue  on  the  original  debt  if  the  check  be  not 
paid.^  These  general  principles  regulating  the  law  of  payment 
are  applicable  to  the  payment  of  rent  by  the  tenant  to  his  land- 
lord. The  taking  of  a  note  by  the  landlord,  whether  it  is  that 
of  the  tenant  or  of  some  third  person,-  or  the  acceptance  by  the 
tenant  of  a  draft  drawn  on  him  by  the  landlord/  is  not  neces- 
sarily payment  of  the  rent  unless  it  is  in  fact  so  agreed  to  be 
by  the  parties.  The  same  rule  applies  to  the  giving  of  a  check 
for  rent  by  the  tenant  to  his  landlord  though  the  landlord  has 
given  his  receipt  in  full  for  the  rent  when  he  took  the  note, 
draft  or  check.  If  it  is  not  paid  at  maturity,  the  tenant  still 
owes  him  the  rent,  and  the  landlord  still  retains  the  same  rem- 
edies to  recover  rent  from  the  tenant  by  a  suit  at  law,  or  by  dis- 
tress or  lien  or  otherwise  as  he  would  have  had  if  no  note,  draft 
or  check  had  been  given.*    The  landlord  may,  however,  elect  to 

»9  Putnam    v.    Lewis,    8    Johns.  9  N.  Y.  463,  10  N.  Y.  599,  reversing 

(N.  Y.)  389;  Burdick  v.  Green,  15  12    Barb.    (N.    Y.)    209;    Sweet   v. 

Johns.    (N.  Y.)    247;    Raymond  v.  Titus,  4  Hun  (N.  Y.)  639,  67  Barb. 

Merchant,    3    Cow.    (N.    Y.)    147;  (N.  Y.)  327. 

Reed    v.   Van    Nostrand,    1    Wend.  2  In    re    Bowne,    3    Fed.    Cases, 

(N.  Y.)  424;  Central  City  Bank  v.  1741;    Kerper  v.  Booth,  10  W.   N. 

Dana,  32  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  296;  Meyer  C.   (Pa.)   79;   Kendig  v.  Kendig,  3 

V.  Huneke,  55  N.  Y.  412,  reversing  Pitts.   Rep.    (Pa.)    287;    SutlifE    v. 

65  Barb.  304.  Atwood,    15    Ohio    St.    186;    Josse 

1  Olcott    V.    Rathbone,    5    Wend.  v    Schultz,    13   Fed.   Cas.    7,551,   1 

(N.  Y.)    490;    Kobbi  v.  Underbill,  Cranch    C.    C.    135;    Wolgamot   v. 

3  Sand.  Ch.    (N.  Y.)   277;   Turner  Brunner,  4  Har.  &  McH.  (Md.)  89. 

v.  Bank  of  Fox  Lake.  3  Keyes  (N.  3  Arguelles  v.  Wood,  1  Fed.  Cas. 

Y.)  425,  4  Abb.  Dec.   (N.  Y.)   434;  520,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  579. 

Bradford    v.    Fox,    38   N.    Y.    289;  4  Edwards  v.  Derrickson,  28  N. 

East   River   Bank   v.    Kennedy,    9  J.  Law,  39;    Holmes  v.  De  Camp, 

Bos.   (N.  Y.)    543;   Pratt  v.  Foote,  1   Johns.    (N.   Y.)    33;    Burden   v. 


54S  LAW  OP  LANDLOED  AND  TENANT. 

proceed  either  on  tlie  tenant's  obligation  to  pay  rent  or  he  may 
sue  on  the  cheek,  note  or  draft  which  has  been  given  him.  If 
he  subsequently  sues  upon  the  covenant  of  the  lease  to  pay 
renty  he  must  surrender  the  note  and  he  cannot  recover  on  the 
covenant  unless  he  shall  do  so.^  So,  the  acceptance  by  a  lessor 
of  a  bond  for  the  rent  due  on  a  written  lease  is  not  necessarily 
payment.  If  the  bond  be  not  paid  the  landlord  may  then  bring 
assumpsit  for  use  and  occupation  though  he  has  received  the 
bond.  He  need  not  sue  on  the  bond.  He  must,  however,  de- 
liver the  bond  up  to  be  cancelled.®  But  where  one  of  two  joint 
lessees  under  a  parol  lease  executed  his  individual  bond  for  the 
rent  to  the  lessor  and  it  was  accepted  by  the  latter,  it  will 
operate  as  payment  and  extinguish  the  liabilities  of  both  les- 
sees on  the  parol  lease  under  the  universal  rule  that  a  writing 
under  seal  will  supersede  and  destroy  a  parol  agreement.  The 
lessor  no  longer  has  any  remedy  under  the  parol  lease  which  is 
merged  in  the  bond  but  he  must  sue  on  the  bond  and  the  obligor 
thereon,  as  soon  as  he  has  been  compelled  to  pay  the  bond,  may 
recover  in  an  action  for  contribution  from  his  co-tenant  under  the 
lease  the  portion  of  the  rent  which  the  latter  would  have  had  to 
pay  under  the  lease.'' 

Halton,  4  Bing.  454;  In  re  Bowne,  transaction  was  a  discount  of  the 

12  N.  B.  R.  529,  1  N.  Y.  Wkly.  Dig.  bill   by  the  agent  for  the  tenant, 

100.  or  an  advance  of  the  rent  by  the 

5  Smith  V.  Dayton,  94  Iowa,  102,  agent  to  the  landlord,  was  for  the 

62  N.  W.  Rep.  650.  jury.    Parrot  v.  Anderson,  7  Exch. 

eCarnell  v.  Lamb,  20  Johns.  (N.  93;   Griffith  v.  Chichester,  7  Exch. 

Y.)  207.  95.     So  a  judgment  obtained  on  a 

7  Howell  V.  Webb,  2  Ark.  360,  promissory  note  given  by  one  of 
364.  The  giving  of  a  note  for  three  persons  as  his  share  of  the 
rent  in  arrears  by  the  tenant  will  joint  rent,  is  not  a  merger  of  the 
not  prevent  the  landlord  from  landlord's  cause  of  action,  where 
distraining  thereafter  if  the  note  he  subsequently  sues  the  co-ten- 
is  not  paid.  Harris  v.  Shipway,  ants  of  the  person  whose  note  he 
Bull  N.  P.  182.  So  where  the  ten-  has  taken  for  the  rent.  The  note 
ant  gave  the  landlord's  agent  a  under  such  circumstances  is  a 
bill  of  exchange  which  the  latter  mere  collateral  security  and  not  a 
indorsed  and  paid  the  rent  to  his  satisfaction  of  the  debt,  and  if  the 
principal,  crediting  it  In  his  ac-  maker  does  not  pay  it,  the  land- 
counts  as  if  the  tenant  had  paid  lord  can  maintain  an  action 
the  rent,  it  was  held  where  the  against  the  other  tenants  jointly 
l?ndlord  subsequently  distrained  liable  with  him.  As  it  is  stated 
that    the    question    whether    this  in  the  text  the  rule  would  be  dif- 


NATURE.  ANT)  INCmENTS  OF  RENT.  549 

§  346.  Receipts  for  rent — When  conclusive  and  presumption 
of  payment  therefrom.  A  receipt  for  money  paid  which  con- 
tains within  it  no  terms  of  contract  is  mere  prima  facie  proof 
of  payment,  and  its  terms  may  be  varied  or  contradicted  by 
parol  evidence.*  Thus,  it  may  be  proved  even  by  the  landlord 
himself  that  he  did  not  receive  the  money  stated  to  have  been 
paid  in  the  receipt  either  wholly  or  in  part,  or,  where  the  re- 
ceipt states  that  money  was  paid,  the  landlord  may  show  that 
the  rent  was  paid  by  a  note  or  a  check.^  These  facts  may  be 
shown  by  parol  although  the  receipt  expressly  states  that  it  was 
in  full  for  all  the  rent  to  date.^°  In  so  far,  however,  as  the  re- 
ceipt for  rent  is  a  contract  of  lease,  it  cannot  be  varied  or  con- 
tradicted by  parol  evidence  tending  to  show  that  a  different  con- 
tract was  made  by  the  parties.  That  is  to  say,  so  far  as  the 
writing  is  both  a  receipt  for  rent  and  a  lease  of  the  premises,  it 
may  be  contradicted  or  explained  so  far  as  it  recites  the  pay- 
ment of  rent;  but  that  part  of  it  that  is  contractual  cannot  be 
contradicted  or  varied  by  parol  evidence,  except  to  show  facts, 
circumstances  or  defenses  which  may  be  shown  by  parol  in  the 
case  of  other  contracts.^^  The  rule  that  a  receipt  may  not  be 
varied  so  far  as  it  is  a  contract,  is  of  particular  value  in  the 
case  of  receipts  for  rent,  owing  to  an  almost  universal  custom 
where  tenancies  are  for  short  periods,  as  by  the  month  or  week, 
of  embodying  in  the  receipts  the  terms  of  a  contract  which,  if 
they  were  not  in  the  receipt  would  amount  to  a  lease.  A  re- 
ceipt for  rent  for  a  particular  month  or  year,  is  prima  facie 
evidence  that  all  rent  which  has  accrued  prior  to  that  month 

ferent  if  a  bond  or  instrument  un-  lo  Jones  v.  Ricketts,  7  Md.  108; 

der  seal  had   been   given.     Drake  Gibson  v.  Hanna,  12  Mo.  162;  Burn- 

V.  Mitchell,  3  East,  251.  ham  v.  Ayer,  35  N.  H.  351;    Hor- 

sAbrams  v.  Taylor,  24  111.  102;  ton's     Appeal,     38     Pa.     St.     294; 

Gulick  V.  Conover,  15  N.  J.  Law,  Smith  v.  Schulenberg,  34  Wis.  41. 

420;    Danziger    v.    Hoyt,    46    Hun  n  Wayland    v.    Moseley,    5    Ala. 

(N.  Y.)  270;  Barclay  v.  Morrison,  4f^0;  Henry  v.  Henry,  11  Ind.  236; 

16    S.    &   R.    (Pa.)    129;    Paige   v.  Thompson    v.    Williams,    30    Kan. 

Perno,  10  Vt.  491.  414.     The  rules  stated  in  the  text 

ft  Wildrick  V.  Swain,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  are    sustained   by   many  cases   on 

167;   Dorman  v.  Wilson,  39  N.  J.  contracts    generally    which    it    is 

Law,    474;     Johnson    v.    Weed,    9  impracticable  to  cite  in  the  notes. 

.Johns.    (N.  Y.)    310,   60  Am.  Dec.  The  cases  cited  in  this  note  and 

279;  Buswell  v.  Pioneer,  37  N.  Y.  the  preceeding  note  are  not  cases 

312.  of  receipts  for  rent. 


550  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

or  year,  has  been  paid.^^  This  presumption,  however,  of  the 
payment  of  past  rent  may  be  rebutted  by  parol  even  where  the 
receipt  is  in  full,  by  showing  that  rent  prior  thereto  is  still  un- 
paid. The  presumption  is  recognized  where  the  rent  is  payable 
to  two  or  more  persons  to  the  same  extent  as  where  it  is  pay- 
able to  one  only.^^  A  receipt  in  full  for  rent  may  be  shown  to 
have  been  given  under  a  mistake  of  fact.  Such  a  receipt  given 
under  the  mistaken  belief  that  rent  was  paj^able  at  the  end  of 
the  year  is  not  a  bar  to  an  action  for  rent  when  it  is  shown  that 
rent  is  payable  in  advance.^*  A  receipt  in  full  cancelling  a 
lease  may  be  set  aside  if  procured  by  fraud.  But  a  receipt  will 
not  be  set  aside,  though  it  amounts  to  a  written  surrender  of  the 
lease,  merely  because  the  lessor,  believing  it  was  a  receipt  only, 
signed  it  without  reading  it.  nothing  having  been  done  to  pre- 
vent him  from  doing  so,  and  no  fraud  having  been  practiced  up- 
on him.^^  An  alteration  in  the  landlord's  receipts  for  rent 
of  the  names  of  tenants  does  not  raise  any  presumption  of  a 
change  of  tenants  or  of  a  transfer  of  a  tenant's  right  unless  made 
in  connection  with  the  knowledge  and  assent  of  all  parties.^" 
In  an  action  of  ejectment  for  the  non-payment  of  rent,  if  the 
tenancy  is  denied  and  there  is  no  evidence  of  any  receipts  for 
rent  or  effort  to  prove  any,  a  subpoena  to  the  tenant  to  produce 
receipts  with  proof  of  service  is  not  admissible  in  evidence,  as 
the  effect  of  the  recital  of  such  a  number  of  receipts  in  the  no- 
tice might  have  been  prejudicial  to  the  defendants  where  the 
existence  of  none  of  them  was  actually  proven. ^'^     In  the  case 

12  Brewer     v.     Knapp,     1     Pick.  i5  Jenkins  v.  Clyde  Coal  Co.,  82 

(Mass.)    332,  336;    Ottens  v.  Fred  Iowa,  618,  622,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  970. 

Krug  Brewing  Co.,  58  Neb.  331,  78  In  Barr  v.  Chandler,  47  N.  J.  Eq. 

N.  W.  Rep.  622,  623;   Patterson  v.  532,  20  Atl.  Rep.  733,  a  writing  as 

O'Hara,  2  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.)  58;  follows.  "Received  of  (the  tenant) 

Decker   v.    Livingston,    15    Johns.  his  right,  title  and  interest  in  the 

(N.  Y.)    479,  483;   Jenkins  v.  Cal-  elevator  now  placed  in  our  house 

vert,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  216,  13  Fed.  in  consideration  of  $200  rent  due 

Cases,     7,2G3;      Saving     Fund     v.  on  the  property,"  was  held  a  sale 

Marks,  3  Phila.  (Pa.)  278,  15  L.  I.  and  not  a  security  for  the  rent. 
357.  isBourke  v.  Bourke,  Ir.  8  C.  L. 

1-  Decker      v.      Livingston,      15  221. 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  479,  483.  "Jones  v.  Reilly,  174  N.  Y.  97, 

n  Congregational  Soc.  of  Sharon  66  N.   E.  Rep.   649,  rvg.  74   N.  Y. 

v.  Rix  (Vt.  1889),  17  Atl.  Rep.  719.  Supp.  243,  68  App.  Div.  116. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT. 


551 


of  perpetual  ground  rents  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant 
once  having  been  proved  to  exist,  the  mere  fact  that  the  landlord 
has  not  demanded  rent  from  the  occupant  raises  no  presumption 
that  the  rent  has  been  paid.  In  the  case  of  such  rents  and  leases 
a  release  of  the  right  to  demand  or  to  receive  rents  must  be  by- 
deed.  If  a  sealed  lease  is  proved  creating  a  perpetual  ground 
rent,  it  can  only  be  released  by  an  instrument  of  equal  solem- 
nity. And  the  laxity  or  failure  of  the  landlord  to  demand  rent 
raises  no  presumption  that  he  has  released  or  extingniished  his 
right  to  demand  it.^^ 

§  347.  The  application  of  rental  payments.  The  application 
of  payments  is  the  appropriation  of  a  payment  to  some  par- 
ticular debt  of  two  or  more  or  the  determination  to  which  of 
several  demands  a  general  payment  made  by  a  debtor  to  his 
creditor  shall  be  applied.  Any  general  discussion  of  this  topic 
is  obviously  out  of  place  in  this  treatise  inasmuch  as  it  prop- 
erly belongs  to  the  general  law  of  contracts,  but  the  question 
may  often  arise  between  landlord  and  tenant  and  in  view  of  this 
fact  it  may  be  well  to  consider  some  general  principles.  It 
is  a  general  rule  of  law  too  well  established  to  be  disputed  that 
where  a  payment  is  made  by  a  tenant  to  his  landlord,  the  tenant 
has  a  right  to  prescribe  in  what  manner  it  shall  be  applied  to 
the  paj^ment  of  any  indebtedness  he  may  owe  the  landlord.^* 
This  principle  is  based  upon  the  fact  that  the  money  paid  by 
the  tenant  is  his  own  money  until  he  pays  it  and  that  on  parting 
with  the  ownership  he  has  the  absolute  right  to  annex  to  its  re- 
ceipt any  condition  he  may  desire.  Where  the  tenant  owes  rent 
for  several  rental  periods  he  may  apply  a  payment  to  any  rental 
period  at  his  election  or  as  between  rent  and  other  claims  held 
against  him  by  his  landlord,  as  for  example,  for  goods  sold  and 
delivered,  the  tenant  may  apply  his  payment  either  to  the  rent 
or  to  the  other  claims.  So,  the  tenant  may  apply  the  payment 
to  a  debt  which  is  secured  by  a  lien  in  preference  to  another 
debt  due  the  landlord  which  is  not  secured  by  a  lien.  Where  the 
tenant  does  not  apply  the  payment  made  by  him  the  landlord 


i«  Ehrman  v.  Mayer,  57  Md.  612 
Wahl  V.  Barroll.  8  Gill  (Md.)  288 
Campbell  v.  Shipley,  41  Md.  81 
WorthingUui  v.  Lee,   61   Md.   530 


Smith  V.  Heldman,  93  Md.  343,  48 
All.  Rep.  946. 

19  Collender   v.   Smith,   20   Misc. 
Rep.  612. 


552  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

may  do  so.-"  But  the  right  of  the  landlord  to  apply  pajonents 
i.s  not  unlimited  so  that  he  may  have  the  right  to  apply  the  pay- 
ments by  his  tenant  in  such  a  way  as  to  work  injustice  to  the 
tenant  or  to  a  third  person.  Thus,  the  landlord  cannot  apply 
a  payment  to  rent  which  is  not  matured  in  preference  over  rent 
which  has  matured.^^  Nor  can  the  landlord  apply  payments  to 
a  claim  which  he  holds  against  the  tenant  the  validity  of  which 
the  latter  disputes,  in  preference  to  a  claim  for  rent  which  is 
not  contested  by  the  tenant.^-  And  where  the  landlord  has  a 
claim  against  the  tenant  for  rent  which  is  liquidated  and  not 
disputed  and  for  a  breach  of  covenant  under  the  lease  which 
is  disputed,  he  cannot  prefer  the  latter  over  the  former  in  ap- 
plying payments  of  money  by  the  tenant.^^  Nor  can  the  land- 
lord apply  the  payment  by  his  tenant  to  a  claim  against  the 
tenant  based  on  an  immoral  or  illegal  consideration.^*  Where 
there  has  been  no  application  of  payments  by  either  party  to 
the  lease,  and  the  tenant  owes  the  landlord  rent  for  several 
rental  periods,  the  law  will  apply  payments  made  by  the  ten- 
ant to  the  landlord  to  rents  which  have  accrued  rather  than  to 
those  which  are  not  due,  and  as  between  rents  which  have  ac- 
crued the  money  will  be  applied  to  the  extinguishment  of  rents 
which  have  first  accrued. ^^  The  appropriation  by  a  landlord 
of  a  payment  to  a  particular  rental  period  may  be  implied  by 
the  court  from  circumstances  where  there  is  no  express  direc- 
tion by  the  tenant.-®  And  payments  which  were  made  by  the 
tenant  to  the  landlord  to  whom  the  tenant  owes  not  only  rent 
but  other  unsecured  debts  in  the  absence  of  an  application  by 
either  party,  will  be  applied  by  the  court  to  the  debts  which  are 
unsecured,  particularly  where  the  landlord  has  distrained  for 
the  rent.^^    The  landlord  may  apply  money  paid  to  him  as  rent 

zoCollender   v.   Smith.   20   Misc.  24    Greene  r.  Tyler,  39   Pa.   St. 

Rep.  612.  36S. 

21  Stamford  Bank  v.  Benedict,  15  25  Hunter  v.  Osterhoudt,  11 
Conn.  437;  Wetherell  v.  .Toy.  40  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  33;  Reed  v.  Ward, 
Me.  325;  Ricliardson  v.  Codding-  22  Pa.  St.  144;  Purdy's  Appeal,  23 
ton,  49  Mich.   1;    Effinger  v.  Hen-  Pa.  St.  97. 

derson,    33    Miss.    449;    Cloney    v.  20  Mitchell  v.  Dall,  2  Har.  &  G. 

Richardson,  34  Mo.  370.  (Md.)   159;  Taylor  v.  Sandford,  7 

22  stone  V.  Talbot,  4  Wis.  442.  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  207. 

23  Scott  V.  Fisher,  4  T.  B.  Hon.  2t  Garrett's  Appeal,  100  Pa.  St. 
(Ky.)   387.  &97. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  EENT,  553 

by  an  assi^ee  of  the  lease  after  the  assignment  to  rents  which 
have  accrued  prior  to  the  assignment,  in  the  absence  of  an  ap- 
plication of  the  rent  by  the  assignee.-^  A  landlord  to  whom 
a  part  of  the  crops  of  land  held  by  two  tenants  jointly  is  paid 
as  rent,  cannot,  without  the  consent  of  both  lessees,  apply  the  pay- 
ment to  the  individual  debt  of  one  leaving  the  rent  unpaid.  A 
tenant  who  is  subsequently  thereto  sued  by  the  landlord  for  the 
rent  may  have  such  payment  applied  to  the  rent.-® 

§  348.  The  necessity  of  a  demand  for  the  payment  of  rent. 
The  question  of  a  demand  by  the  landlord  for  the  payment  of 
rent  arises  in  two  classes  of  cases.  It  may  arise  where  the  non- 
payment of  rent  causes  a  forfeiture  for  which  the  landlord  has 
a  right  to  re-enter  upon  the  premises  and  in  all  such  cases  a  de- 
mand by  the  landlord  made  in  accordance  with  the  requirements 
of  the  lease  at  the  proper  place,  and  on  the  day  when  it  is  due, 
cannot  be  dispensed  with.^**  The  other  class  of  cases  is  where 
the  question  of  a  demand  arises  in  an  action  by  the  landlord 
upon  an  express  covenant  to  pay  rent  or  where  he  sues  for  use 
and  occupation.  Where  the  landlord  sues  for  use  and  occupa- 
tion, in  the  absence  of  statute  dispensing  with  a  demand,  he  must 
allege  and  prove  that  a  demand  has  been  made  for  the  rent.^^ 
If  a  demand  is  necessary  it  must  usually  be  made  on  the  land,'^ 
but,  where  the  place  for  the  payment  of  the  rent  is  not  mentioned 
in  the  lease,  and  it  has  been  the  practice  of  the  parties  to  pay 
the  rent  at  some  other  place  than  on  the  land,  a  demand  for  the 
payment  of  the  rent  on  the  premises  is  not  necessary.^^  In  the 
absence  of  statute,  a  demand  for  the  payment  of  rent  in  order  to 
permit  the  lessor  to  take  advantage  of  a  forfeiture  created  by  a 
default  in  the  payment  of  the  rent,  must  be  personal,  but  where 
the  demand  for  the  rent  is  simply  a  condition  precedent  to  an 
action  at  law,  a  written  demand  by  mail  may  suffice,  though  a 

28  CoUender   v.    Smith,   20   Misc.  statute.       Cockerline     v.     Fisher 

Rep.  612,  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  1130.  (Mich.),    103    N.    W.    Rep.    522; 

20  Kahler    v.    Hanson,    53    Iowa,  George  A.  Fuller  Co.  v.  Manhattan 

398,  6  N.  W.  Rep.  57.  Construction  Co.,   88  N.  Y.   Supp. 

3/5  Godwin  v.  Harris   (Neb.),  98  1049. 

N.  "W.  Rep.  439,  440.  32  Fordyce   r.    Hathorn.    57    Mo. 

31  In  many  of  the  states  a  formal  120. 

demand  for  the  rent  on  the  prem-  »3  Lund  v.  Ozanne  (N.  Mex.),  84 

ises   has   been   dispensed  with   by  Pac.  Rep.  710. 


554  LAW  OF  L.\JSrDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

personal  demand  is  always  advisable.^*  No  demand  for  the 
I'ent  by  the  lessor  is  necessary  to  be  alleged  or  proved  where  rent 
is  payable  under  a  covenant  on  a  particular  day,  whether  it  be 
payable  in  money  ^^  or  in  labor  or  personal  property.^^  So  where 
a  lessee  has  accepted  an  order  drawn  on  him  by  his  lessor  for 
the  rent  a  third  party  may  sue  thereon  without  making  a  prior 
demand  for  its  payment.^'  The  parties  to  the  lease  may  by  ex- 
press stipulation  in  the  lease  waive  a  demand  for  the  payment 
of  the  rent.^®  Inasmuch  as  the  presentation  and  collection  of 
rent  is  merely  a  ministerial  duty  it  may  be  delegated  to  agents 
having  charge  of  the  premises.  It  follows  therefore  that  a  de- 
mand by  an  agent  or  subagent  is  equivalent  to  a  demand  by  the 
lessor.^®  The  demand  must  be  made  before  the  action  to  recover 
the  rent  is  begun.  Any  time  before  service  of  process  is  suffi- 
cient. *° 

§  349,  The  reduction  of  the  rent  by  the  landlord  during  the 
term.  In  order  that  an  agreement  to  reduce  the  rent  payable 
under  a  written  lease,  made  during  the  term,  shall  be  valid  and 
shall  operate  as  a  modification  of  the  lease,  it  must  possess  all 
the  requisites  of  a  valid  contract.  There  must  be  a  valid  con- 
sideration by  the  tenant  for  the  promise  to  reduce  the  rent  by 

3*  Folsom   V.    Cook,    115   Pa.    St.  Mining   Co.,    64   Mich.    172,    31   N. 

539,  9  Atl.  Rep.  93.  W.  Rep.  100.     No  demand  is  nec- 

35  Clark    V.    Charter,    128    Mass.  essary    in    New    York.      Gruhn    v. 

483,    484;    McMurphy   v.    Minot,   4  Gudebrod  Bros.  Co.,  21  Misc.  Rep. 

N.  H.  251;    Bumham  v.  Dunklee,  628,  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  714.     See,  also, 

34  N.  H.  334;  Remsen  v.  Conklin,  Martin  v.  Rector,  118  N.  Y.  476,  23 

18  Johns.    (N.  Y.)    447;    Collis  v.  N.  E.  Rep.  893,  as  to  necessity  of 

Alburtis,  9  Civ.  Pro.  Rep.   (N.  Y.)  demand   in  ejectment  against  the 

80.  tenant. 

3e  Packer     v.     Cockayne,     3     G.  ^g  Neiner  v.   Altemeyer,   68   Mo. 

Greene   (Iowa)    111.  App.    243.     In   Henderson   v.    Cor- 

37  Burnham  v.  Dunklee,  34  N.  H.  bondale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  140  U> 
334,  344.  S.  25,  11  Sup.  Ct.  691,  which  was 

38  Shanfelter  v.  Homer,  81  Md.  a  proceeding  to  forfeit  a  lease  for 
621,  32  Atl.  Rep.  184,  where  the  non-payment  of  rent,  a  demand  by 
lease  provided  that  if  the  rent  fell  letter,  though  shown  to  have  been 
in  arrear  for  a  certain  period  the  probably  received  by  the  tenant, 
tenancy  was  at  once  to  terminate  was  held  insufficient  where  no  rea- 
without  further  notice.  Lewis  v.  son  was  proved  why  personal  serv- 
Hughes,  12  Colo.  208,  20  Pac.  Rep.  ice  of  the  demand  was  not  made. 
621;  Ingalls  v.  Bissot  (Ind.  App.),  4o  Stanley  v.  Turner,  68  Vt.  315, 
57  N.  E.  Rep.  723;  Pendill  v.  Union  35  Atl.  Rep.  321. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  555 

the  landlord,  and  the  agreement  must  be  definite  as  respects  tne 
reduced  rent  which  is  to  be  paid.  If  the  lease  is  in  writing,  the 
agreement  to  reduce  the  rent  must  be  in  writing,  unless  the  cir- 
cumstances are  such  that  the  court  may  reasonably  infer  from 
the  conduct  of  the  parties  that  a  modification  in  writing  was 
waived  by  the  landlord.  It  has  been  held  that  the  amount  of 
rent  which  is  payable  under  a  lease  under  seal  cannot  be  reduced 
or  increased  by  parol,  and  the  same  rule  would  doubtless  apply 
in  modern  times  at  least  to  all  written  leases.*^  A  modification 
or  reduction  of  the  rent  alone  without  consideration  is  not  a 
surrender  of  the  lease,  and  must  be  based  on  an  independent 
consideration.'*^  If,  however,  the  parties  orally  agree  to  reduce 
the  rent  in  a  written  lease  not  under  seal,  and  the  landlord  ac- 
cepts an  installment  of  the  rent  at  a  reduced  rate,  the  reduction 
is  binding  on  him,  and  he  cannot  thereafter  allege  that  the  re- 
duction is  not  binding  on  him.^^  Various  promises  on  the  part 
of  the  landlord  may  constitute  a  good  consideration  for  the  re- 
duction of  the  rent  payable  by  the  tenant.  Thus  if  the  lessor 
offers  to  reduce  the  amount  of  the  rent  which  the  lessee  has  to 
pay,  or  offers  to  release  the  lessee  from  the  payment  of  an  in- 
stallment of  rent  which  has  become  due,^*  or  offers  to  receive  pay- 
ment of  the  rent  in  a  different  mode  from  that  originally  stipu- 
lated for  which  may  result  in  a  loss  to  him  or  a  benefit  to  the 
tenant.*^  and  in  accepting  this  offer  the  lessee  continues  to  use 
and  to  occupy  the  land,  the  modification  is  based  on  a  good  con- 
sideration, which  on  the  part  of  the  lessor  is  the  reduction  of 
rent,  and  on  the  part  of  the  lessee,  the  use  and  possession  of  the 

11  Barnett  v.  Barnes,  73  111.  216,  43  Nicoll  v.  Burke,   8  Abb.  New 

217;  Hume  Bros.  v.  Taylor,  63  111.  Cases  (N.  Y.)  213. 

43;      Wharton     v.     Anderson,     28  ■«•»  Copper  v.  Fretnaransky,  16  N. 

Minn.    301,    9    N.    W.    Rep.    860;  Y.    Supp.   866;    Hanson   v.    Hellen 

Smith  V.  Kerr,  33  Hun,  567.  (Me.  1886),  6  Atl.  Rep.  837;    Ten 

42  Coe  V.  Hobby,   72   N.   Y.   141,  Eyck  v.  Sleeper,  65  Minn.  413,  67 

28  Am.  Rep.  120,  affirming  7  Hun,  N.  W.  Rep.  1026. 

157;    McMaster   v.   Kohner,   44   N.  45  RajTnond     v.     Krauskopf,     87 

Y.  Supp.  Ct.  (12  Jones  &  S.)  253;  Iowa,  602,  605,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  432, 

Taylor  v.  Winters,  6  Phila.  126,  5  where,  owing  to  bad  crops  on  the 

Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  438,  23  Leg.  farm   leased,   a   lessor  agreed   he 

Int.  125;  Rohrheimer  v.  Hoffman,  would    take   one-half   the   crop   as 

103  Pa.  St.  409;  Crowley  v.  Vitty,  rent   instead    of   a  fixed    quantity 

7  Ex.  319,  21  L.  J.  Ex.  135.  agreed  upon. 


556  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

land.**  So  an  agreement  by  the  tenant  to  remain  in  the  prem- 
ises after  they  have  been  repaired  after  a  fire,  is  a  good  consider- 
ation for  an  agreement  by  the  landlord  to  apportion  the  rent, 
and  then  to  remit  the  rent  for  the  period,  during  which  the 
premises  were  uninhabitable.*^  So,  too,  an  agreement  by  the  ten- 
ant to  make  additions  to  and  alterations  in  the  leased  building, 
which  he  was  not  bound  to  do  by  the  lease,  if  it  is  executed  by 
him,  is  a  good  consideration  for  a  promise  on  the  part  of  the 
landlord  to  reduce  the  rent  for  the  balance  of  the  tenant's  occu- 
pation.*^ The  fact  that  a  tenant,  after  he  has  threatened  to 
abandon  the  premises  during  the  term,  continues  in  possession 
upon  the  promise  of  the  landlord  to  reduce  the  rent  for  the  bal- 
ance of  the  term  is  not  alone  a  sufficient  consideration  for  the 
landlord's  promise  to  reduce  the  rent.  The  tenant  has  not 
agreed  to  do  anything  which  he  was  not  bound  to  do  under  the 
lease.  A  different  rule  applies  where  the  term  is  at  an  end. 
A  parol  agreement  by  a  landlord  at  the  request  of  a  tenant, 
under  a  lease  under  seal  changing  the  time  for  the  payment  of 
rent  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  month  is  valid.  The 
fact  that  the  tenant  held  over  for  another  term  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  written  lease  is  a  good  consideration  for  the  land- 
lord's agreement.*^  And  it  has  been  held  that  under  some  cir- 
cumstances the  remaining  in  possession  of  a  tenant  who  was 
about  to  move  may  be  a  good  consideration  for  the  landlord's 
promise  to  reduce  the  rent  if  the  lease  is  in  parol.  Thus  the 
waiver  by  a  lessee  of  a  right  which  has  accrued  to  him  during  the 
term  to  sue  his  lessor  for  damages  for  an  eviction  is  a  good  con- 
sideration for  a  new  agreement  modifying  the  lease.  So  under 
such  circumstances  remaining  in  the  house  being  a  detriment  to 
the  lessee  would  be  a  good  consideration.^"  But  in  all  cases  of  a 
modification  of  the  terms  of  a  written  lease  under  seal  or  other- 
wise by  an  oral  agreement  it  must  be  shown  that  the  latter  was 
wholly  executed  by  the  parties  to  it.^^    For  if  the  reduced  rent 

*e  Evans  v.  Lincoln  Co.,  204  Pa.  48  Natelson   v.   Reich,    99   N.    Y. 

St.  448,  54  Atl.  Rep.  321.  Supp.  327. 

47  Ireland    v.    Hyde,    69    N.    Y.  *o  Wilgus   v.  "Whitehead,   89   Pa. 

Supp.  889.     As  to  what  will  con-  St.  131,  134. 

stitute  a  new  lease  by  the  reduc-  no  White  v.  Walker,  38   111.  422, 

tion  of  rent,  see  Watson  v.  Waud,  435. 

8  Ex.  335,  22  L.  J.  Ex.  161,  1  W.  R.  oi  Smith  v.  Kerr,  108  N.  Y.  31; 

133.  McKenzie  v.   Harrison,   120  N.   Y. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  557 

orally  stipulated  for  by  the  parties  is  paid,  and  accepted  by  the 
landlord,   the   ag-reement  reducing   the   rent   is   executed,   and 
hence  becomes  binding  on  the  parties.^^     And  on  the  other  hand, 
where  the  tenant  fails  in  the  performance  of  his  agreement, 
either  by  wholly  omitting  to  pay  the  reduced  rent,  or  by  refusing 
to  pay  it  in  the  manner  agreed  upon,  the  rights  of  the  landlord 
under  the  lease  to  collect  former  rent  are  revived.^^    Accordingly 
where  a  landlord  voluntarily  reduced  the  rent  for  the  first  year 
of  the  term  of  a  lease  for  ten  years  upon  the  express  agreement 
of  the  tenant,  that  the  latter  would  continue  in  possession  as 
agreed,  and  carry  out  the  terms  of  the  lease,  and  the  tenant 
paid  two  years  rent  as  reduced  and  subsequently  abandoned  the 
premises  without  the  consent  of  the  landlord,  the  latter  may 
maintain  an  action  against  the  tenant,  to  recover  the  amount  of 
rent  which  he  has  remitted.'*    A  reduction  of  rent  based  partly 
upon  the  fact  that  the  lessees  who  were  merchants  were  in  fail- 
ing circumstances  and  on  the  fact  that  the  lessor  who  was  sup- 
plying them  with  goods  had  an  interest  in  seeing  the  lessee  suc- 
ceed is  on  a  sufficient  consideration.^'^    r^j^^  agreement  to  reduce 
the  rent  must  be  definite  and  certain  both  as  to  amount  and 
time.    An  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  landlord  in  consequence 
of  a  loss  in  the  value  of  the  premises  to  reduce  the  rent  without 
expressly  stating  the  amount  to  which  it  was  to  be  reduced,  is 
not  enforcible  by  reason  of  its  uncertainty.^''     So  an  agreement 
by  the  landlord  to  reduce  the  rent,  nothing  being  ^aid  by  him 
as  to  the  period  during  which  the  reduction  was  to  apply,  may 
be  revoked  by  him  at  any  time  on  notice  to  the  tenant." 

260,  263,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  458,  8  L.  ner  in  his  business  and  borrow  a 

R.  A.  257.  large  sum  of  money  if  the  lessor 

52  Bowman  v.  Wright  (Neb.),  91  will  reduce  the  rent  in  a  written 
N.  W.  Rep.  580.  lease  under  seal  and  an  actual  per- 

53  Smith  V.  Hartogg,  15  Rep.  641.       formance    by    the    lessee    of    his 
•'-*  Brown  v.  Cairns,  63  Kan.  584,       agreement  with  his  continuance  in 

66  Pac.  Rep.  1033.  business  for  three  years  under  it 

sBJaffray     v.     Greenbaum,     64  are  a  good  consideration  for  the 

Iowa,  492,  20  N.  W.  Rep.  775.  lessor's    promise;    the   latter    can- 

56  Smith  V.  Ankrim,  13  S.  &  R.  not  recover  the  rent  except  as  it 
(Pa.)  39.  has    been    reduced.      Hastings    v. 

57  Rohrheimer  v.  Hofman,  103  Lovejoy,  140  Mass.  261,  2  N.  E. 
Pa.  St.  409.  An  oral  agreement  Rep.  776,  54  Am.  Rep.  772.  "It 
before  the  expiration  of  a  lease  was  an  old  maxim  of  the  common 
by  which  a  lessee  is  to  take  a  part-  law  that  an  obligor  would  only  be 


558  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  350.  Increase  of  rent  on  re-hiring  or  during  the  term.  A 
parol  demand  by  the  landlord  for  increased  rent  during  the  term, 
and  a  parol  promise  to  pay  by  the  tenant  where  the  term  is  cre- 
ated by  a  written  lease,  are  not  enforcible  unless  there  is  an  actual 
surrender  of  the  existing  term.  To  permit  the  covenant  to  pay 
rent  in  a  written  lease  to  be  varied  by  a  subsequent  parol  agree- 
ment, would  violate  a  cardinal  rule  of  evidence  which  protects 
the  writings  to  which  parties  have  committed  their  intentions 
from  being  annulled,  contradicted  or  varied  by  subsequent 
agreements  in  parol.  An  increase  of  rent  coming  at  the  end  of 
the  term  is  upon  a  different  basis,  for  if  the  term  under  a  writ- 
ten lease  is  surrendered  or  expires  by  natural  lapse  of  time,  no 
rule  of  law  prevents  the  making  of  a  new  contract  of  lease  at  an 
increase  or  at  a  reduced  rental.  If  the  landlord  notifies  the  ten- 
ant that  his  rent  is  to  be  increased  and  the  tenant  without  objec- 
tion continues  to  occupy  the  premises  without  having  expressly 
refused  to  pay  the  increased  rent,  it  will  be  presumed  that  he 
has  accepted  a  new  lease  at  the  increased  rate  of  rent  which  the 
landlord  had  notified  him  he  would  have  to  pay.^^  But,  the 
tenant  is  not  always  bound  by  mere  casual  remarks  made  by  his 
landlord  in  regard  to  the  increased  rent.  Thus,  an  oral  notice 
to  a  tenant  from  year  to  year  of  an  increase  of  rent  for  a  future 
year  does  not  necessarily  make  him  liable  for  increased  rent  by 
his  holding  over  after  having  received  such  notice."''^ 

§  351.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  in  an  action  to  re- 
cover rent.  At  the  common  law,  the  distinction  was -made  in 
determining  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  between  transitory 
actions,  and  those  which  were  not  so.     At  the  common  law  an 

released  by  an   instrument  of  as  bond  and  which  all  courts  hold  to 

high  dignity  as  that  by  which  he  be  a  release  and  discharge  of  the 

v.as    bound,    being    obligated    by  bond.     So  with  a  debt  secured  by 

seal,  he  could  be  released  only  by  mortgage,   a  release  of  such  debt 

an  instrument  under  seal.     Tech-  need  not  be  under  seal."     By  the 

nically    this   may   be   the    rule    in  court  in  White  v.  Walker,  38  111. 

modern  times,  but  practically,  it  is  422,  434. 

not  enforced.    Of  how  frequent  oc-  "'«  Columbia  Brewing  Co.  v.  Mil- 

currence  is   it,   that    in   an   action  ler    (Mo.    App.),    101    S.    W.    Rep. 

of    debt    upon    a    bond    or    other  711;    Adriance  v.   Hafkemeyer,  39 

sealed  instrument,  the  defendant.  Mo.   134;    Hunt  v.   Bailey,  39   Mo. 

under  a   plea  of  payment,   proves  257. 

by  parol  the  actual  receipt  by  the  '    su  Witte    v.    Witte,    6    Mo.    App. 

obligee,  of  the  money  due  on  the  488. 


NATURE  xVND  INCIDENTS  OF  KENT.  559 

action  on  covenant  or  debt  for  rent,  or  for  use  and  occupation 
being  based  upon  privity  of  contract  between  the  lessor  and  lessee 
is  transitory  and  need  not  be  brought  in  the  jurisdiction  where 
the  land  is  located.'^*'  The  contrary  is  the  rule  when  the  action 
is  based  upon  privity  of  estate  e.  g.  where  the  assignee  of  the 
lessee  is  sued  for  rent  by  the  lessor.**^  Hence  under  such  circum- 
stances the  action  against  the  assignee  of  the  lessee  must  be 
brought  in  the  jurisdiction  where  the  land  demised  is  located. 
Under  the  modern  statutes  regulating  procedure  which  have 
been  enacted  in  the  various  states  of  the  Union,  this  distinction 
no  longer  exists,  and  the  action  against  the  assignee  of  the  lessee 
being  a  personal  action,  may  be  brought  in  any  court  having 
jurisdiction  of  the  defendant.  Under  exceptional  circumstances 
rent  may  be  recovered  in  equity.  Thus,  where  a  written  lease  is 
lost,  the  lessor  may  proceed  in  equity  and  have  the  lease  estab- 
lished as  a  lost  instrument,  and  then  equity,  having  assumed  ju- 
risdiction for  this  purpose,  will  proceed  to  give  him  judgment 
for  his  rent  on  the  covenant  of  the  teuant.*'- 

§  352.  The  form  and  nature  of  the  lessor's  remedy  to  re- 
cover rent.  There  are  two  ways  in  which  a  lessee  becomes 
liable  to  pay  rent.  One  is  by  his  express  covenant  to  pay  or  by 
privity  of  contract.  The  other  way  exists  in  the  absence  of  an 
express  contract  when  he  is  liable  by  implication  or  by  privity 
of  estate.  Where  he  is  liable  by  privity  of  estate  only  if  h^ 
parts  with  his  estate  the  privity  being  destroyed,  he  is  no  longer 
liable.  Where  he  is  liable  by  privity  of  contract  as  where  he  has 
covenanted  to  pay,  he  continues  liable  so  long  as  the  contract  is 
not  discharged  and  is  liable  therefore  during  the  whole  term 
though  he  has  quit  possession  before  the  end  of  the  term.*'^  At 
common  law  an  action  of  debt  was  proper  to  recover  rent  for  an 
agreed  sum  where  there  was  a  promise  to  pay  is  in  a  sealed  or 
unsealed  instrument  or  by  word  of  mouth.^*     The  action  may 

60  Gray  v.  Johnson,  14  N.  H.  414,  62  Lawrence  v.  Hammett,  3  J.  J. 
419;   King  v.  Eraser,  6  East,  348;       Marsh.  (Ky.)  287. 

Bulwer's  Case,  7  Rep.  1;  Davies  V.  cs  "WTietstone    v.    McCartney,    32 

Edwards,  3  Maule  &  Sel.  380;  Kirt-  Mo.  App.  430;  Jones  v.  Barnes,  45 

land  V.  Pounsett,  1  Taunt.  570.  Mo.  App.  590;  Quinette  v.  Carpen- 

61  Bracket  v.  Alvord,  5  Cow.  (N.  ter,  35  Mo.  502. 

Y.)  18;  Henwood  V.  Cheeseman,  3  64  Walker's    Case,     3     Co.     22a; 

Serg.  &  R.    (Pa.)    500;   University      Rowland  v.  Coffin,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 
of  Vermont  v.  Joslyn,  21  Vt.  52.  52,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)   125;  Pyerson 


560  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AJSTD  TENANT. 

be  maintained  against  the  assignee  of  tlie  lessee.®^  If  the  lease 
was  under  seal  and  contained  a  covenant  to  pay  rent  the  proper 
action  was  one  on  this  covenant.^®  Where  there  was  no  express 
promise  to  pay  rent  an  action  on  the  case  or  in  assumpsit  for 
use  and  occupation  was  maintainable  to  recover  the  rent  upon 
the  theory  of  an  implied  promise  to  pay  on  the  part  of  the  ten- 
ant.®^ The  lessor  in  bringing  his  action  in  assumpsit  for  use 
and  occupation  was  however  liable  to  be  nonsuited  by  the  lessee 
proving  an  express  demise  with  a  parol  or  written  promise  by 
him  to  pay  rent  the  nonsuit  being  based  solely  upon  the  fact 
that  the  existence  of  such  promise  showed  that  the  lessor  had 
mistaken  the  form  of  his  remedy  as  he  ought  to  have  sued  in 
debt  or  on  covenant.''®  For  at  common  law  an  action  of  assump- 
sit for  use  and  occupation  will  not  lie  in  the  case  of  a  lease 
under  seal.*'^  To  remedy  this  the  statute  11  George  II,  ch.  19, 
§  14,  was  enacted  by  which  this  action  for  use  and  occupation  was 
recognized,  confirmed  and  extended  in  its  operation  so  that,  by 
the  terms  of  the  statute  the  landlord  could  recover  notwith- 
standing proof  by  the  tenant  that  he  had  been  in  possession 
under  an  express  demise.  The  statute  has  been  re-enacted  in 
very  many  of  the  States. '°    Hence  in  more  recent  times  wherever 

V.  Quackenbush,  26  N.  J.  L.  236;  67  Eppes'  Ex'rs  v.  Cole,  4  H.  & 

Trapnall  v.  Merrick,  21  Ark.  503;  M.   168;    Dartnal  v.   Morgan,   Cro. 

Codman  v.  Jenkins,  14  Mass.  93;  Jac.   598;    How  v.  Norton,  1  Lev. 

Blume    V.    McClurken,    10    Watts  598. 

(Pa.)   380;  Norton  v.  Vultee,  1  N.  ««  Wise  v.  Decker,  30  Fed.  Cas. 

Y.    Super.   Ct.   Rep.   427;    McKeon  No.   17,906,   1   Cranch,   C.   C.   171; 

V.  Whitney,  3  Denio  (N.  Y.)   452;  Oswald   v.    Godbold,    20   Ala.    811; 

Lanning  v.  Howell,  2  N.  J.  Law,  Gage  v.  Smith,   14  Me.  466;    Cod- 

256;  Allen  v.  Bryan,  5  B.  &  C.  512,  man     v.     Jenkins,     14    Mass.    93; 

4  L.  J.  (O.  S.)   210,  29  R.  R.  30.7;  Smiley  v.   McLauthlin,   138  Mass. 

Varley  v.  Leigh,  2  Ex.  446,  17  L.  363;    Kiersted  v.  Orange  &  A.  R. 

J.  Ex.  289.  Co.,  69  N.  Y.  343,  346,  25  Am.  Rep. 

65  McKeon  v.  Whitney,  3  Denio  199. 

(N.  Y.)  452.  «9  Smiley     v.     McLauthlin,     138 

seThursby    v.    Plant,    1    Saund.  Mass.  363;    Kiersted  v.  Orange  & 

237;    Ellis  v.  Rowbotham    (1900),  A.  R.  Co.,  69  N.  Y.  343,  346,  25  Am. 

IQ.  B.  740;  Cross  v.  United  States,  Rep.  199;   Codman  v.  Jenkins,  14 

81  U.  S.  479;   Kiersted  v.  O.  &  A.  Mass.  93. 

R.  Co.,  09  N.  Y.  343;   Greenleaf  v.  to  Gosharn  v.  Stewart,  15  W.  Va. 

Allen,  127  Mass.  248;   U.  P.  R.  Co.  657,  661. 
V.  C,  R.  L  &  P.  R.  Co.,  164  El.  88; 
Brown  v.  Cairns,  63  Kan.  693. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  561 

such  statutes  are  to  be  found  an  action  of  assumpsit  will  lie  for 
rent,  though  there  be  an  express  demise  provided  it  be  not  by 
deed.^^  Where  parties  have  mutual  dealings,  and  rent  from  one 
of  them  to  the  other  is  part  of  the  accoimt,  it  may  be  recovered 
in  an  action  of  account/^ 

§  353.  Recovery  by  the  landlord  of  rent  where  the  tenant 
has  never  taken  possession.  A  tenant  who,  by  no  fault  or  mis- 
conduct on  the  part  of  the  landlord  has  never  taken  possession, 
is  liable  on  his  covenant  to  pay  rent  as  for  the  breach  of  an  exec- 
utory contract.  If  the  lessor  has  not  prevented  the  actual  en- 
joyment of  the  premises  and  there  is  an  absolute  covenant  on 
the  part  of  the  lessee  to  pay  rent,  an  action  on  the  covenant  may 
be  maintained  by  the  landlord  although  the  lessee  has  never 
entered  upon  the  premises."  If  the  tenant  is  kept  out  of  pos- 
session by  the  landlord  the  latter  has  no  action  on  the  covenant 
of  the  lessee  to  pay  rent.  And  the  landlord  must  show  where  he 
sues  on  the  covenant  for  rent  and  cannot  show  that  the  tenant 
was  in  possession,  that  he  was  ready  at  all  times  to  give  posses- 
sion, that  at  the  commencement  of  the  term  the  premises  were 
prepared  and  ready  for  occupancy,  that  at  the  commencement 
of  the  term  he  either  tendered  possession  or  that  the  tender  was 
either  expressly  or  by  conduct  waived  by  the  tenant.'^*  The  land- 
lord must  also  show  that  he  has  made  reasonable  efforts'  to  se- 
cure another  tenant   for  the  premises  after  his  tender  of  pos- 

71  Burnham  v.  Best,  10  B.  Mon.  (N.  Y.)  240;  Collyer  v.  Collyer,  113 
(Ky.)  227,  228;  Patterson  v.  Stod-  N.  Y.  442,  448;  Codman  v.  Jen- 
dard,  47  Me.  355,  356.  74  Am.  Dec.  kins,  14  Mass.  93;  Kline  v.  Jacobs, 
490;  Swem  v.  Sharretts,  48  Md.  68  Pa.  St.  57,  where  the  relation 
408;  Sibley  v.  Brown,  4  Pick.  of  landlord  and  tenant  is  proved 
(Mass.)  137;  Abeel  v.  Radcliffe,  to  exist  and  a  return  for  the  use 
13  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  297,  7  Am.  Dec.  of  the  land  is  implied  but  no  defl- 
377;  Heidelbach  v.  Slader,  1  nite  amount  has  been  fixed  or 
Handy    (Ohio)     456;     Gosharn    v.  agreed  upon. 

Stewart,  15  W.  Va.  657,  661.     Con-  7?.  Tully   v.   Dunn,    42   Ala.    262; 

tra,  Beecher  v.  Duffield,  97  Mich.  Union   Pacific  R.   Co.   v.   Chicago, 

423,  56  N.  W.  Rep.  777.     Compare  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  164   111.  88,  45 

Burch  V.  Harrell,  93  Ga.  719,  721,  N.  E.  Rep.  488,  495;   McGunnagle 

20  S.  E.  Rep.  212.  v.  Thornton,  10  S.  &  R.   (Pa.)   10, 

72  Nedvidek    v.    Meyer,    46    Mo.  11. 

600.    See,  also,  as  to  assumpsit  for  '*  La    Farge    v.     Mansfield,    31 

rent,  Gibson  v.  Kirk,  1  Q.  B.  850,       Barb.  (X.  Y.)  345,  347. 
856;    Osgood  v.  Dewey,  13  Johns. 


562  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

session  was  refused  by  his  tenant/^  If  the  landlord  secures  an- 
other tenant  before  the  expiration  of  the  term,  the  court  will 
allow  the  tenant  whom  he  is  suing-  for  the  rent  on  his  covenant, 
credit  for  the  amount  which  the  landlord  has  received.  In  an 
axjtion  for  rent  based  upon  a  covenant  to  pay  rent  where  the 
tenant  has  not  gone  into  possession  the  measure  of  damages  is 
the  amount  of  rent  due  less  any  advance  payment  made  unless 
it  is  shown  that  the  landlord  occupied  or  derived  some  benefit 
from  the  premises  after  the  tenant  informed  him  that  he  would 
not  go  into  possession.'** 

§  354.  Joinder  of  cause  of  action  for  rent.  The  lessor  in 
suing  on  a  covenant  to  pay  rent,  whether  express  or  implied, 
may  join  therewith  any  cause  of  action  arising  on  a  breach  of 
contract  by  his  tenant.  The  lessor  may  join  a  cause  of  action  for 
rent  with  one  based  on  a  breach  of  covenant  against  waste,'^  or 
with  one  based  on  the  breach  of  a  covenant  by  the  tenant  to  re- 
pair or  to  make  improvements.  The  landlord  may  join  an  action 
for  rent  with  an  action  for  a  breach  of  covenant  or  contract 
which  is  not  embraced  in  the  lease.  Under  a  statute  permitting 
the  joinder  of  causes  of  action  arising  out  of  contract,  a  cause  of 
action  for  rent  and  one  for  money  paid  by  mistake,  are  properly 
joined." 

§  355.  Recoupment,  counterclaim  and  set  off,  by  a  lessee  in 
an  action  to  recover  the  rent.  It  is  not  every  injury  by  the 
lessor  to  the  rights  of  the  lessee  to  the  possession  and  enjoyment 
of  the  premises  which  will  bar  a  recovery  of  the  rent  by  the 
lessor.  The  lessor's  conduct  which  is  the  basis  of  the  lessee's  de- 
fense must  be  such  as  will  have  deprived  the  lessee  of  the  pos- 
session of  the  premises  in  whole  or  in  part.''"  In  other  words  in 
order  that  the  lessee  shall  be  exempted  from  his  liability  to  the 
lessor  for  rent  there  must  have  been  an  eviction  wholly  or  in  part 
depriving  the  lessee  of  his  possession,  or  some  act  on  the  part 
of  the  lessor  by  which  the  lessee  has  lost  his  possession.  The  ten- 
ant cannot  retain  posession  of  the  premises  and  at  the  same  time 

75  La  Farge  v.  Mansfield,  31  ^7  Carter  v.  George,  30  Kan.  451, 
Barb.    (N.  Y.)   345,  349.     And  see,       1  Pac.  Rep.  58. 

also,  Sausser  v.  Steinmetz,  88  Pa.  ^s  Olmstead    v.     Dauphiny,     104 

St.  324,  327;    Harger  v.  Edwards,  Cal.  635,  38  Pac.  Rep.  505. 

4  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    256,  260.  to  News  Co.  v.  Browne,   103   111. 

76  Segal  V.  Ensler,  16  Misc.  Rep.  317;  Edgerton  v.  Page.  20  N.  Y. 
43,  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  694.  284. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT. 


563 


repudiate  the  landlord's  claim  for  the  rent  which  is.  the  consid- 
eration for  the  possession,  lie  must  elect  whether,  in  view  of 
the  landlord's  acts  and  the  consequences  of  such  acts  on  his  pos- 
session, he  will  abandon  his  possession  and  claim  an  eviction  or 
whether  he  will  remain  in  possession  and  pay  rent.^°  It  does  not 
follow,  however,  that  a  lessee  by  remaining  in  possession  after 
the  lessor  has  committed  an  act  which  would  have  justified  the 
lessee  in  abandoning  possession  is  absolutely  and  universally 
without  remedy.  In  an  action  brought  by  the  landlord  to  re- 
cover for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  the  tenant  may 
usually  recover  damages  for  the  breach  of  any  covenant  con- 
tained in  the  lease  and  which  is  binding  upon  the  iandlord.^^ 


90  "If,  however,  the  tenant 
naakes  no  surrender  of  the  posses- 
sion, but  continues  to  occupy  the 
premises  after  the  commission  of 
the  acts  which  would  justify  him 
in  abandoning  them,  he  will  be 
deemed  to  have  waived  his  right 
to  abandon,  and  he  cannot  sustain 
a  plea  of  eviction  by  showing  that 
there  were  circumstances  that 
would  have  justified  him  in  leav- 
ing the  premises;  hence  it  has 
been  held  there  cannot  be  a  con- 
structive eviction  without  a  sur- 
render of  possession.  It  would  be 
unjust  to  permit  the  tenant  to  re- 
main in  possession  and  then  es- 
cape the  payment  of  rent  by  plead- 
ing a  state  of  facts  which,  though 
conferring  the  right  to  abandon, 
had  been  unaccompanied  by  the 
exercise  of  that  right."  By  Magru- 
der,  J.,  in  Keating  v.  Springer,  146 
111.  481,  34  N.  B.  Rep.  805,  808,  37 
Am.  St.  Rep.  175,  22  L.  R.  A.  544, 
citing  cases. 

81  Vandegrift  v.  Abbott,  75  Ala. 
487;  Hurton  v.  Miller,  84  Ala.  537, 
4  So.  Rep.  370;  Trathen  v.  Kipp, 
15  Colo.  App.  426,  62  Pac.  Rep. 
962;  Hylan  v.  Jockey  Club  Wine, 
Liquor  &  Cigar  Co.,  9  Colo.  App. 
299,    48    Pac.   Rep.    671;    Lewis    v. 


Chisolm,  68  Ga.  40;  Stewart  v. 
Lanier  House,  75  Ga.  582;  McAles- 
ter  V.  Landers,  70  Cal.  79,  11  Pac. 
Rep.  505;  Mitchell  v.  Plant,  31 
111.  App.  148;  Harmony  Co.  v. 
Ranch,  62  111.  App.  97;  Pepper  v. 
Rowley,  73  111.  262;  Watson  v. 
Hun  toon,  4  111.  App.  294;  Lunn  v. 
Gage,  37  111.  19,  87  Am.  Dec.  233; 
Reno  V.  Mendenhall,  58  111.  App. 
87;  Pickens  v.  Bozell,  11  Ind.  275; 
Block  V.  Ebner,  54  Ind.  544,  548; 
Smith  V.  Hall,  11  Me.  295;  Eddy 
V.  Coffin,  149  Mass.  463,  21  N.  E. 
Rep.  870;  Holbrook  v.  Young,  108 
Mass.  83,  86;  Hovey  v.  Walker,  90 
Mich.  527,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  678; 
Long  v.  Geriet,  57  Minn.  278,  280, 
59  N.  W.  Rep.  194;  Goebel  v. 
Hough,  26  Minn.  252,  255,  2  N.  W. 
Rep.  847;  Bloodwarth  v.  Stevens, 
51  Miss.  475,  479;  Kiernan  v.  Ger- 
main, 61  Miss.  498,  503,  504;  Green 
v.  Bell.  3  Mo.  App.  291,  295;  Craw- 
ford V.  Armstrong,  58  Mo.  App. 
214;  Hunter  v.  Reiley,  43  N.  J. 
Law,  480;  Nichols  v.  Dusenbury, 
2  N.  Y.  283,  288;  Myers  v.  Burns, 
33  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  401;  Kelsey  v. 
Ward,  16  Abb.  Prac.  (TST.  Y.)  98; 
Cook  V.  Soule,  45  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
340;  City  of  New  York  v.  Mabie, 
13    N.    Y.    151,   64    Am.    Dec.    538; 


564  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

Let  US  take  for  example  a  breach  of  a  covenant  by  tbe  lessor 
which  consists  of  aJi  act  equivalent  to  an  eviction.  The  lessee 
may  waive  the  eviction,  continue  in  possession  and  plead  the 
wrongful  act  of  the  lessor  by  way  of  recoupment,  or  counter- 
claim as  it  is  termed  in  some  jurisdictions,  either  as  a  complete 
defense  or  pro  tanto  to  the  lessor's  claim  for  rent.^^ 

This  is  the  almost  universal  rule  in  the  United  States  by  stat- 
ute. And  that  it  is  based  upon  fairness  and  reason  may  readily 
be  seen  when  we  consider  that,  inasmuch  as  the  object  of  an  ac- 
tion for  rent  is  to  ascertain  how  much  the  lessee  ought  to  pay  for 
his  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  premises,  if  the  lessor  by  his  con- 
duct has  impaired  the  value  of  such  enjoyment  the  lessee  ought 
not  to  pay  as  much  as  if  the  lessor  had  in  no  wise  impaired  the 
enjoyment  of  the  lessee.  In  an  action  for  rent  under  a  lease  pro- 
viding for  its  payment  monthly  in  advance,  where  the  defense 
was  that  a  covenant  to  supply  steam  had  not  been  performed,  the 
performance  of  the  covenant  was  not  a  condition  precedent  to  the 
defendant 's  liability  for  rent  which  plaintiff  must  prove  in  order 
to  recover.^^  The  tenant  is  not  bound  to  recoup  the  damages 
which  he  has  received.  He  may  do  this  at  his  election  or  he 
may  bring  a  separate  action  against  his  landlord  for  any  dam- 
ages which  he  has  received  by  reason  of  the  breach  by  the  land- 
lord of  an  independent  covenant.     The  fact  that  the  tenant  has 

Darwin  v.  Potter,  5  Denio  (N.  Y.)  Rowley,  73   111.  262;    La  Farge  v. 

306;    Moffat   v.    Strong,   22    N.    Y.  Mansfield,  31   Barb.    (N.  Y.)    345; 

Super.  Ct.  Rep.  57;   Ludlow  v.  Mc-  Hunter   v.   Reiley,   43   N.   J.   Law, 

Carthy,  5  App.  Div.  517,  38  N.  Y.  480;  Horton  v.  Miller,  84  Ala.  537, 

Supp.  1075;    Jeffers  v.  Bantley,  47  4  So.  Rep.  370;  Abrams  v.  Watson, 

Hun  (N.  Y.)  90;   Hirsch  v.  Olmes-  59  Ala.  524;   Pickens  v.  Bozell,  11 

dahl,  78  N.  Y.  Supp.  832;    Ely  v.  Ind.  275;   Holbrook  v.  Young,  108 

Spiero,  51  N.  Y.  Supp.  124;   Lewis  Mass.  83;    Crane  v.   Hardaman,   4 

V.  Culbertson,  11  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  59;  E.  D.  Smith   (N.  Y.)   339;   City  of 

Depuy    V.    Silver,    1    Clark    (Pa.)  New  York  v.  Mabie,  13  N.  Y.  151, 

S88;   Philips  v.  Monges,  4  Whart.  64  Am.  Dec.  538,  reversing  9  N.  Y. 

(Pa.)  226;  Prescott  v.  Otterstatter.  Super.  Ct.  401;  Shallies  v.  Wilcox, 

85   Pa.    St.    534;    New  York   &   T.  4  Thomp.  &  C.    (N.  Y.)    591;    Mc- 

Land  Co.  v.  Cruger   (Tex.),  27  S.  Kesson    v.    Mendenhall,    64    N.    C. 

W.  Rep.  212.  286;    Rogers   v.    McKenzie,    73    N. 

82  Keating  v.    Springer,   146   111.  Car.  487;   Lewis  v.  Culbertson,  11 

481,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  805,  808,  37  Am.  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  59. 
St.  Rep.  175,  22  L.  R.  A.  544;   Lind-  «'i  Trenknian  v.  Schneider.  56  N. 

ley  V.  Miller,  67  111.  244;  Lynch  v.  Y.  Supp.  770,  26  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  695. 
Baldwin,    69    111.    210;     Pepper    v. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  565 

paid  his  rent  for  nearly  the  entire  tenn  will  not  prevent  him 
from  setting  up  his  counterclaim  for  damages  for  the  entire 
term.®*  In  an  action  by  the  landlord  to  recover  rent  the  tenant 
may  set  off  damages  sustained  by  him  by  reason  of  the  landlord's 
breach  of  a  covenant  to  repair,^^  or  by  reason  of  an  agreement 
contained  in  the  lease  that  the  tenant  should  be  remunerated  by 
the  landlord  for  certain  work  performed  during  the  term.®" 
The  tenant  cannot  recoup  damages  for  trespass  not  amounting  to 
an  eviction,  in  an  action  to  recover  rent.  The  reason  of  this 
is  that  the  right  to  recoup  depends  upon  the  fact  that  the  dam- 
ages which  are  to  be  set  off  must  have  arisen  from,  or  sprung  out 
of  the  contract  or  transaction  upon  which  the  plaintiff  sues. 
An  action  for  rent  is  either  on  a  covenant  or  on  an  implied 
promise  to  pay  it  while  a  trespass  is  a  tort  independent  of  the 
engagement  to  pay  rent  and  having  no  essential  connection 
with  it."  So  a  cause  of  action  for  the  conversion  by  the  landlord 
of  the  personal  property  of  the  tenant  left  on  the  premises  after 
the  tenant's  removal  or  consisting  of  fixtures  for  the  removal  of 
which  no  provision  is  inserted  in  the  lease  cannot  be  set-off 
against  a  claim  for  rent.^®    A  tenant  who  alleges  that  his  land- 

84  McAlester  v.  Landers,  70  Cal.  out  of   another   part  of  the  same 

79,  11  Pac.  Rep.  505.  contract,  the  subject  of  plaintiff's 

83  Reno    V.    Mendenhall,    58    111.  suit.     *     *     *     Xor  is  the  right  at 

App.    87;    Jeffers    v.    Bantley,    47  all   affected  by  the   fact  that   the 

Hun,  90.  damages  are  unliquidated."  Blood- 

80  Crawford    v.     Armstrong,     58  worth    v.    Stevens,    51    Miss.    475, 

Mo.  App.  214.     "According  to  the  479. 

earlier      practice,      such      defense  «"  Bartlett     v.     Farrington,     120 

could  not  be  made.    But  it  is  now  Mass.    284;    Willis    v.    Branch,    94 

well  settled  that  the  tenant  need  N.  Car.  142;  Levy  v.  Bend,  1  E.  D. 

not  sue  in  a  cross-action,  and  may  Smith     (N.    Y.)     169;     Drake    v. 

set  up  his  damages  in  extinguish-  Cockroft,  4  E.  D.   Smith    (N.  Y.) 

ment  or  reduction  of  the  demand  34,  10  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  377,  1  Abb. 

of  the  landlord  in  his  action.   This  Prac.    (N.   Y.)    203;    City  of  New 

right  of  recoupment  arises  where  York   v.   Mabie,   13   N.  Y.   151,   64 

the  cross-demand  grows  out  of  the  Am.  Dec.  538;  Hulme  v.  Brown,  3 

same      contract     or      transaction.  Heisk  (Tenn.)  679.     Contra.  .Tohn- 

Whenever    the    contract    contains  son  v.  Aldridge,  93  Ala.  77,  9  So. 

mutual  stipulations,  the  defendant  Rep.  513. 

may  rely  upon  some  breach  of  the  «s  City  of  New  York  v.   Parker 

covenant    or    engagement    in    his  Vein  S.  S.  Co.,  21  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 

favor,    and    the    damages    accrued  300;   Ludlow  v.  McCarthy,  5  App. 

therefrom,    as    a    total    or    partial  Dlv.  517,  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  1075. 
satisfaction  of  the  demand  arising 


566  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

lord  has  broken  an  agreement  or  covenant  in  the  lease  cannot 
where  his  landlord  has  sued  for  the  rent,  maintain  a  suit  for 
specific  performance  of  the  covenant  and  in  that  action  enjoin 
the  collection  of  the  rent.  He  may  and  indeed  must  interpose 
the  breach  of  the  landlord's  covenant  as  a  counterclaim  and  set 
off  his  damages  sustained  thereby  against  the  rent  which  is  due.^* 

§  356,  Notice  to  produce  the  lease  in  an  action  to  collect 
rent.  In  an  action  for  rent,  if  either  party  desires  to  prove 
a  lease  in  the  possession  of  the  other,  he  must  give  the  other 
seasonable  notice  to  produce  it  before  he  can  give  secondary 
evidence  of  his  contents.  Such  notice  is  not  necessary  where  it 
would  be  ineffective,  as,  for  example,  where  the  opposite  party 
has  sworn  positively  that  he  has  not  the  paper,  does  not  know 
where  it  is,  or  has  lost  it,  or  otherwise  testifies  to  facts  that 
show  that  it  is  not  in  his  possession  or  under  his  control. 
Whether  the  paper  was  or  was  not  lost  and  the  suificiency  of  the 
preliminaiy  proof  to  admit  secondary^  evidence  of  its  contents, 
is  for  the  court.  The  degree  of  diligence  to  be  used  in  the 
search  depends  upon  what  value  is  attached  to  the  lease  by  the 
party  from  whose  possession  it  was  lost.  In  the  case  of  a  mere 
agreement  for  a  lease  not  signed  by  either  party  very  little 
care  would  be  expected  in  preserving  it  and  evidence  of  slight 
diligence  in  searching  would  be  enough  to  admit  secondary  evi- 
dence of  its  contents."** 

§  357.  Payment  of  rent  during-  occupation.  The  meaning  of 
the  word  "occupy."  The  word  "occupy"  when  employed  in  a 
lease  generally  means  more  than  merely  an  actual  use  of  the 
premises  as  a  place  of  residence  or  a  place  to  store  goods.  This 
word  in  its  primary  sense  means  to  possess  and  implies  a  per- 
manent tenure  for  a  more  or  less  lengthy  period.  Of  course  its 
meaning  may  vaiy  according  to  the  subject  matter  in  connection 
with  which  it  is  used,®^  Thus  a  iright  to  live  in,  inhabit,  dwell 
in  and  "occupy  premises"  with  appurtenances,  for  the  term  of 
a  person's  natural  life,  creates  a  life  estate  in  the  premises  in 
such  person,"^  And  a  guarantee  that  a  person  shall  pay  another 
rent  so  long  as  the  latter  shall  "oecu])y"  the  premises  leased  to 

«'•>  Douglas  V,  Chesebrough  Build-  »i  Regina   v.  Inhabitants   of   St. 

ing  Co.,  67  N.  Y.  Supp.  755.  Nicholas,  5  Barn.  &  Add.  227. 

'•>"  Union  Banking  Co.  v.  Git-  »-  Rex  v.  Inhabitants  of  Eating- 
tings,  45  Md.  181,  195.  ton,  4  T.  R.  ISl. 


KATL'KE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  567 

Him  covers  the  period  included  in  the  lease  and  not  merely  the 
period  the  lessee  is  in  actual  occupation.^^  And  where  a  lease 
provided  that  at  the  end  of  a  certain  period  either  party  to  it 
might  terminate  it  on  giving  three  months'  notice  and  that,  if  no 
notice  was  given  the  lease  should  run  on  until  determined  by 
notice  and  that  the  tenant  should  pay  rent  "so  long  as  he 
should  occupy"  the  same,  the  meaning  of  the  lease  is  that  the 
tenant  shall  pay  rent  for  the  term  of  the  lease  though  he  may 
abandon  the  demised  land  before  the  term  expires  without 
notice."* 

§  357a.  The  collection  of  the  rent  by  an  agent.  An  agent  who 
collects  rent  must  have  been  expressly  authorized  to  do  so  before 
any  receipt  given  by  him  for  rent  received  by  him  is  binding 
upon  his  principal.  The  fact  that  he  had  been  authoinzed  by 
the  landlord  to  execute  a  lease  as  his  agent  does  not  confer  upon 
him  power  to  collect  and  give  receipts  for  rent  falling  due  under 
the  lease  which  he  has  executed.  This  however  may  be  a  circum- 
stance which,  connected  with  other  facts  and  circumstances,  may 
raise  a  presumption  in  the  minds  of  the  jury  that  a  special  au- 
thority to  collect  rents  has  either  expressly  or  by  necessary  im- 
plication been  conferred  upon  him  by  the  landlord."^ 

§  358.  The  appraisal  of  the  rent  on  the  renewal  of  the  lease. 
Provisions  for  the  fixing  of  the  rent  by  an  appraisal  on  the  re- 
newal of  the  lease  are  customary  in  leases  providing  for  a  re- 
newal. Where  the  property  is  located  in  a  city  under  circum- 
stances with  are  likely  to  result  in  an  increased  valuation  of  the 
premises  and  the  lease  is  for  a  long  term,  as  for  example,  twenty- 
one  years,  a  provision  for  re-adjustment  of  the  rent  on  the  ter- 
mination of  the  term  by  a'  competent  appraisal  is  indispensable 
as  both  parties  are  equally  interested  in  having  the  rent  re-ad- 
justed from  time  to  time  on  a  fair  basis.  The  landlord  particu- 
larly should  provide  in  granting  a  lease  for  a  long  term  with  a 
privilege  of  a  renewal  for  another  long  term  that  the  rent  shall 
be  re-appraised  at  the  end  of  each  term.  Usually,  the  appraisal 
is  a  condition  precedent  to  the  renewal  of  the  lease.  Both  parties 
should  attempt  with  fairness  and  equity  to  each  other  to  carry 
out  the  intention  of  the  lease  that  an  appraisal  should  be  had. 

93  Morrow  v.  Brady,  12  R.  I.  131.  Thompson   v.   Elliott,    73    111.    221, 

fl^Lane   v.  Nelson,  31  Atl.  Rep.  223;  Cooley  v.  Willard,  34  111.  68; 

864,  866,  167  Pa.  St.  602.  Hefflin    v.    Campbell,    5    Tex.    Civ. 

85  Smith  V.  Hall,  19  111.  App.  17;  App.  106,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  595. 


568  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

Neither  party  will  be  permitted  to  suffer  by  an  unreasonable  re- 
fusal of  the  other  party  to  have  an  appraisal.  The  subject  is 
peculiarly  within  the  jurisdiction  of  equity  and  as  is  pointed  out 
in  the  subsequent  paragraphs  a  court  of  equity  will  not  hesi- 
tate to  assume  control  of  the  matter  and  deal  out  justice  be- 
tween the  parties. 

§  359.  The  manner  of  the  appraisal.  It  will  be  implied 
though  not  stated  in  a  stipulation  for  an  appraisal  of  the  rate 
of  rent  by  two  appraisers  selected  by  the  parties  both  of  whom 
are  to  select  a  third  that  only  disinterested  and  impartial  per- 
sons shall  be  selected.  An  award  made  by  appraisers  one  of 
whom  is  intimately  connected  in  business  and  social  relations 
with  one  of  the  parties  to  the  lease  will  for  that  reason  be  set 
aside  by  the  court.''®  If  this  were  not  the  rule  it  would  result  in 
the  i)arties  each  choosing  his  o"\\ti  agent  as  an  appraiser  and  the 
appraisal  or  arbitration  would  then  be  merely  an  argument  be- 
tween the  parties  through  the  mouths  of  their  agents  leaving 
the  real  appraisal  to  be  made  by  the  umpire  alone.  An  appraisal 
of  rent  according  to  the  value  of  the  premises  upon  a  renewal 
of  a  lease  must  be  made  according  to  the  mode  pointed  out  in  the 
provision  of  the  lease  which  requires  and  permits  an  appraisal. 
An  appraisal  or  written  determination  of  rent  required  by  the 
lease  to  be  made  by  a  specified  number  of  appraisers  is  invalid 
if  it  is  made  by  a  smaller  number.  The  power  to  appraise  being 
of  a  private  and  personal  nature  and  expressly  delegated  to  a 
particular  number  of  persons  must.be  exercised  by  all  of  them. 
Thus  if  it  is  provided  that  an  appraisal  shall  be  made  by  three 
persons  an  appraisal  signed  by  two  only  is  invalid."^  If  however 
the  stipulation  is  to  appraise  the  rent  by  two  appraisers  or  arbi- 
trators and  in  case  they  cannot  agree  tlien  they  are  to  call  in  a 
third  and  their  award  shall  be  final ;  it  will  be  implied  that  the 
parties  had  in  mind  an  award  by  the  majority  and  such  an  award 
or  appraisal  signed  by  two  will  be  valid.'"*^     The  parties  to  the 

"0  Pool    V.    Hennessy,    39    Iowa,  os  Hobson      v.      McArthur,      16 

192,  18  Am.  Rep.  44.  Peters  (U.  S.)  182;  Quay  v.  West- 

»7  Lowe   V.    Brown,   22    Ohio    St.  cott,  60  Pa.  St.  163,  166.    All  three 

463,  466;   Cope  v.  Gilbert,  4  Denio  must    act,     however,     though     an 

(N.  Y.)   347,  348;  Green  v.  Miller,  award  or  appraisal  signed  by  two 

6    .Johns.     (N.    y.)     39;     Stose    v.  is  binding.     Stose  v.  Heissler,  120 

Heissler,  120  111.  433,  11  N.  E.  Rep.  111.  433,  11  N.  E.  Rep.  161,  60  Am. 

161,  60  Am.  Rep.  563.  Rep.  563. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  O&J 

lease  have  the  right  to  appear  before  the  persons  who  are  chosen 
by  them  as  appraisers  to  ascertain  the  rent.  If  the  appraif^ers 
are  expressly  appointed  to  ascertain  the  rent,  and  the  manner  in 
which  they  are  to  ascertain  it  is  not  prescribed  in  the  lease  it  may 
safely  and  fairly  be  presumed  that  they  are  to  do  so  by  a  consid- 
eration of  the  facts  which  the  parties  shall  place  before  them.  The 
right  to  produce  evidence  before  those  who  are  to  ascertain  the 
rental  value  may  be  waived  and  the  ascertainment  of  the  rent  m^y 
be  left  to  the  knowledge  and  judgment  of  the  appraisers  alone. 
Proof  that  the  parties  have  waived  their  rights  to  produce  evi- 
dence before  the  appraisers  must  be  satisfactory  to  the  court.  A 
tvaiver  of  this  right  will  not  imply  a  waiver  of  the  right  of  the 
parties  to  appear  before  the  umpire  who  has  been  selected  by  the 
appraisers  when  they  found  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  agree. 
Hence  all  parties  are  entitled  to  notice  of  all  proceedings  before 
either  appraisers  or  umpire  and  an  award  without  such  notice  is 
invalid.^® 

§  360.  The  result  of  a  failure  to  fix  the  rent.  A  landlord, 
who  by  withdrawing  an  arbitrator  appointed  by  him  prevents 
the  fixing  of  rent  on  a  renewal  lease  cannot  oust  the  tenant  in 
summary  proceedings  for  non-payment  of  rent.  A  court  of 
equity  will  intervene  and  stay  such  a  proceedings  by  injunction 
in  all  cases  where  the  tenant  is  precluded  from  interposing  an 
equitable  defense  in  a  summary  proceedings.  The  court  of 
equity  on  a  proper  application  having  acquired  jurisdiction  will 
also  decree  a  specific  performance  of  the  covenant  for  a  new 
lease  and  will  fix  the  rent  at  such  a  rate  as  it  shall  find  to  be 
just  and  proper  on  all  the  proof.^  Or  the  court  may  direct  that 
the  tenant  shall  pay  rent  while  holding  over  at  the  rate  specified 
in  the  former  lease.-  Or  the  landlord  may  recover  a  reasonable 
sum  for  u.se  and  occupation  from  a  tenant  holding  over  after  a 
failure  to  arbitrate  or  appraise  the  rent.^  A  landlord  who  has 
done  all  he  is  required  to  do  under  a  stipulation  providing  that 

09  Brown  v.  Lyddy,  11  Hun   (N.  tice  of  it.     Norton  v.  Gale,  95  111. 

Y.)  451,  456;  Day  v.  Hammond,  57  533,  35  Am.  Rep.  173. 

N.  Y.   479;  Worthington  v.  Hewes,  i  Graham    v.    James,    30    N.    Y. 

19  Ohio  St.  66.    On  the  other  hand,  Super.  Ct.   (7  Rob.)  Rep.  468.  473. 

it  has  been  held  in  one  case  that  -  Holsman  v.  Abrahams,  9  N.  Y. 

inasmuch  as  an  appraisal  of  rent  Super.  Ct.  Rep.  435,  437. 

is  not  an  arbitration,   the  parties  "  Stose  v.  Heissler,  120  111.  433, 

of  the  lease  are  not  entitled  to  no-  11  N.  E.  Rep.  101,  60  Am.  Rep.  503. 


570  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

rent  shall  be  determined  by  appraisers  and  who  has  failed,  with- 
out fault  on  his  part  to  secure  an  appraisal  may  sue  for  and  re- 
cover a  reasonable  sum  for  the  use  and  value  of  the  premises.  If 
one  attempt  to  secure  an  appraisal  fails  and  no  further  at- 
tempts are  required  to  be  made  by  the  lease  there  is  neither 
reason  nor  justice  in  refusing  to  permit  him  to  recover  for  the 
use  of  the  premises  so  long  as  the  tenant  continues  in  possession.* 
And  this  being  so  if  the  appraisal  has  failed  through  no  fault  of 
the  tenant  he  will  be  treated  as  a  tenant  holding  over  after  the 
lease  has  expired  and  liable  to  pay  rent  only  at  the  rate  named 
in  the  lease.  If  this  is  objectionable  to  the  landlord  he  must 
serve  notice  to  quit  or  apply  for  a  judicial  appraisal  of  the  rent 
for  a  new  term. 

§  361.  The  power  of  the  court  to  make  or  to  review  an  ap- 
praisal of  rent.  In  a  proper  case  a  court  of  equity  will  re- 
view and  correct  an  appraisal  of  the  rent  to  be  paid  which  is 
alleged  to  be  based  upon  the  value  of  the  premises  as  determined 
by  the  appraisers.^  So,  if  through  no  fault  of  the  tenant  a^n  ap- 
praisal has  not  been  made,  a  court  of  equity  will,  on  his  appli- 
cation, make  an  appraisal  of  the  rent  based  upon  the  value  of  the 
premises.*  So,  if  after  an  ineffectual  attempt  at  an  appraisal 
one  of  the  parties  refuses  to  proceed  any  further  in  an  attempt 
to  secure  another  appraisal,  the  court  may  itself  appraise  the 
rent  and  appoint  a  referee  or  master  to  do  it.  The  party  who  is 
asking  for  the  appraisal  by  the  court  must  show  that  he  has 
done  all  that  could  be  reasonably  required  of  him  for  if  one 
party  refuses  to  comply  with  the  terms  of  the  lease  requir- 
ing an  appraisal  the  other  party  should  not  be  prevented 
from  having  the  benefit  of  the  appraisal."  And  while 
the  court  will  make  the  appraisal  itself  it  will  not  compel  ap- 
praisers to  act  or  decree  a  specific  performance  of  an  agreement 
to  name  persons  to  appraise  rent,®  and  the  court  will  not  appraise 
the  rental  value  before  the  time  when,  according  to  the  terms  of 
the  lease,  it  was  to  bo  determined  by  an  appraisal.     And  in  all 

4Heissler  v.  Stosc,  131  111.  393.  c  Tobey  Furniture  Co.  v.  Rowe, 

39G,   23  N.  E.  Rep.   347,  affirming  18  111.  App.  293;  Piggot  v.  Mason, 

33  111.  App.  39;    Stose  v.  Heissler,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.)   412. 

120  111.  433.  '  Lowe  v.  Brown,  22  Ohio,  463, 

r.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.   Society  467. 

for  Relief  of  Orphans,  56  Fed.  Rep.  s  Young  v.   Wrightson,  11   Ohio 

753.  Dec.  104. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT  571 

cases  the  parties  will  have  a  reasonable  time  to  secure  the  apprais- 
al of  the  rent  unless  time  is  expressly  made  of  the  essence  of  the 
contract.®  An  award  or  an  appraisal  of  the  rent  which  is  to  be 
paid  in  the  future  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  honestly  and 
fairly  made  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  fraud.  The  proof  of 
iraud  which  will  be  sufficient  to  set  aside  an  appraisal  must  be 
fairly  convincing.  The  appraisal  ought  not  to  be  set  aside  if  it 
has  been  honestly  made  merely  because  the  appraisers  have 
erred  in  their  inferences  from  the  proof  before  them,  in  their 
misunderstanding  or  ignorance  of  the  law,  or  in  proceeding  upon 
an  erroneous  theory  of  the  value  of  the  land.  To  permit  an 
award  or  appraisal  to  be  set  aside  which  was  not  conformable  to 
what  the  court  might  have  determined  had  it  been  the  arbitrator 
would  render  appraisals  and  arbitrations  not  only  useless  but 
vexatious  in  the  extreme  and  open  also  the  door  for  litigation 
without  end.  For  a  material  mistake  particularly  if  it  be  mu- 
tual the  court  will  set  aside  an  award  or  an  appraisal  but  not  for 
every  mistake  influencing  the  result  of  the  appraisal.  The  mis- 
take must  be  such  a  mistake  as  has  prevented  the  appraisers 
from  applying  those  rules  and  theories  to  the  appraisal  which 
they  intended  to  employ.  Their  mistake  mu.st  be  such  a  one  as 
prevented  them  from  making  an  appraisal  which  was  the  result 
of  the  exercise  of  their  own  reason  and  judgment.  The  mere 
adoption  of  an  erroneous  theory  of  the  value  of  the  property,  if 
properly  applied  to  the  facts,  though  resulting  in  an  erroneous 
result  does  not  invalidate  an  award  which  was  honestly  made  for 
this  is  a  risk  the  parties  take  when  they  agree  to  an  appraisal 
and  which  they  must  therefore  abide  by.^^    A  clause  stipulating 

9  Spann  v.  Eagle  Machine  Works,  21,  37  Atl.  Rep.  304)  the  court  said: 
87  Ind.  474.  "This     case     presents     two     ques- 

10  Goddard  v.  King,  40  Minn.  tions  for  decision:  (1)  Whether 
164,  167,  41  N.  W.  Rep.  659;  Dan-  the  court,  by  a  master  or  other- 
iels  V.  Willis,  7  Minn.  295;  Fred-  wise,  can  appraise  the  rent  pay- 
rikan  v.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  62  N.  Y.  able  to  the  complainants  if  the 
392,  400;  Perkins  v.  Giles,  50  N.  arbitration  provided  for  in  the 
Y.  228;  Tyler  v.  Dyer,  13  Me.  41;  lease  has  failed;  and  (2)  Whether, 
Hazeltine  v.  Smith,  3  Vt.  535;  Elli-  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  arbitration 
cott  V.  Coffin,  106  Mass.  365;  Car-  has  failed.  In  answer  to  the  first 
ter  V.  Carter,  109  Mass.  306;  Bos-  question,  we  think  it  is  clear  that 
ton  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Gray,  6  the  court  has  jurisdiction  to  do. 
Met.  (Mass.)  131.  In  a  very  late  either  directly  or  by  its  master, 
case  (Grosvenor  v.  Flint,  20  R.  I.  what  the  appraisors  or  arbitrators 


572  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

for  an  arbitration  of  disputes  arising  between  the  parties  to  the 
lease  and  providing  that  an  award  which  is  the  outcome  of  an 
arbitration  shall  be  final  does  not  limit  the  right  of  action  to  the 
amount  which  may  be  found  due  or  in  any  way  make  the  right 
to  sue  for  damages,  conditional  or  dependent  upon  a  submission 
or  an  offer  to  submit  to  arbitration.  A  failure  to  arbitrate  a  dis- 
pute is  no  bar  to  an  action  for  damages  upon  other  covenants  in 
the  lease.^^ 

§  362,  The  basis  of  the  action  for  use  and  occuptaion.  The 
action  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  premises  is  based  on  an 
implied  contract.  It  is  based  upon  privity  of  contract  not  on 
privity  of  estate  and  the  plaintiff  must  therefore  prove  a  con- 
tract express  or  implied  to  pay  either  an  agreed  compensation 
for  the  use  of  the  land  or  such  sum  as  the  use  is  reasonably 
worth.  The  action  for  use  and  occupation  cannot  therefore  be 
maintained  unless  it  appears  that  the  relation  of  landlord  and 
tenant  existed  between  the  parties.  And  when  one  person  occu- 
pies land  of  another  without  any  agreement,  and  it  is  not  shown 
that  the  occupant  is  a  trespasser,  or  that  the  relation  of  landlord 
and  tenant  does  not  exist,  it  will  be  presumed  that  he  is  in  oc- 
cupation as  a  tenant.^-  An  action  for  use  and  occupation  can- 
could  have  done  under  said  provi-  not  be  determined  in  the  manner 
sion  of  the  lease,  if  it  is  shown  provided  for  in  the  lease,  by  rea- 
that  the  arbitration  has  in  fact  son  of  the  refusal  of  one  party  to 
failed.  And  refusal  to  agree  to  a  the  contract  to  do  what  in  equity 
third  man  constitutes  such  failure.  it  ought  to  do,  the  court  will  de- 
Brock  V.  Dwelling  House  Insur-  termine  it  upon  the  application 
ance  Co.,  61  N.  W.  67,  26  L.  R.  A.       of  the  other. 

623,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  562;  Niagara  iiRowe    v.    Williams,    97    Mass. 

Fire  Insurance  Co.  v.  Bishop,  154  163,  165;  Dunsdale  v.  Robertson, 
111.  9,  39  N.  E.  Rep.  1102,  45  Am.  2  Jones  &  Lat.  58;  Scott  v.  Liver- 
St.  Rep.  105;  Brown  v.  Harper,  pool,  3  De  Gex  &  .T.  334;  Elliott  v. 
54  Iowa,  546,  6  N.  W.  Rep.  747;  Royal  Exch.  Insurance  Co.,  L.  R. 
Watson  V.  Duke  of  Northumber-  2  Exch.  237;  Tobey  v.  County  of 
land,  11  Ves.  Jr.  Ii"j3.  The  cove-  Bristol,  3  Story  (U.  S.)  819;  Nute 
nant  to  appraise  the  rent  does  not  v.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co.,  6  Gray 
stand  alone,  but  is  merely  a  sub-  (Mass.)  182;  Gray  v.  Wilson,  4 
sidiary  part  of  the  lease  in  ques-  Watts  (Pa.)  39;  Hill  v.  Moore,  40 
tion.     That  is  to  say,  the  manner       Me.  515. 

of  determining  the  amount  of  rent  i-'Byrd  v.  Chase,   10   Ark.   802; 

to  be  paid  is  a  matter  of  form  Murphy  v,  Hopcraft,  142  Cal.  43, 
rather  than  of  substance.  And  if  75  Pac.  Rep.  567;  Littleton  v. 
it  appears  that  this  question  can-       Wynn,    31    Ga.    583;     Lathrop    v. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT. 


573 


not  be  maintained  by  the  agent  of  the  o-^Tier  suing  in  his  own 
name/^  unless  the  occupant  has  dealt  with  him  as  the  owner  of 
the  premises  and  the  identity  of  the  real  owner  has  not  been 
disclosed  to  the  occupant/*  The  ow^ner  of  land  who  has  agreed 
to  lease  iron  ore  in  the  land  for  a  term  at  a  certain  rent  may 
where  no  lease  is  executed  maintain  an  action  for  use  and  occu- 


Standard  Oil  Co.,  83  Ga.  307,  9  S. 
E.  Rep.  1041;  Oakes  v.  Oakes,  16 
111.  106;  Webb  v.  Weaver.  79  111. 
App.  657;  Curtis  v.  Hollenbeck,  92 
111.  App.  34;  Hill  v.  Coal  Valley 
Co.,  103  111.  App.  41;  Nance  v. 
Alexander,  49  Ind.  516;  Cambridge 
Lodge,  etc.  v.  Routh,  163  Ind.  1, 
71  N.  E.  Rep.  148,  150;  Tinder  v. 
Davis,  88  Ind.  99,  101;  Kieth  v. 
Paulk,  55  Iowa,  260,  7  N.  W.  Rep. 
588;  Fanning  v.  Stimpson,  13 
Iowa,  42;  Crouch  v.  Briles,  7  J.  J. 
Marsh.  (Ky.)  255,  23  Am.  Dec. 
404;  Burdin  v.  Ordway,  88  Me. 
375,  34  Atl.  Rep.  375;  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  Co.  V.  Ross,  26  Ky.  Law  R.  1251, 
83  N.  E.  Rep.  635;  Appleton  v. 
O'Donnell,  173  Mass.  398,  53  N. 
E.  Rep.  882;  Carver  v.  Palmer,  33 
Mich.  342,  344;  Boston  v.  Binney, 
11  Pick.  (Mass.)  1,  22  Am.  Dec. 
353;  Cass  Co.  Sup'rs  v.  Cowgill, 
97  Mich.  448,  450,  56  N.  W.  Rep. 
849;  Strickland  v.  Hudson,  55 
Miss.  235,  241;  Knox  v.  Baily,  4 
Mo.  App.  581;  Cohen  v.  Kyler,  27 
Mo.  122;  Edmondson  v.  Kite,  43 
Mo.  176;  Aull  Savings  Bank  v. 
Aull,  80  Mo.  199;  McLaughlin  v. 
Dunn,  45  Mo.  App.  645;  Rosen- 
berg V.  Sprechie  (Neb.  1905),  103 
N.  W.  Rep.  1045;  Janouch  v.  Pence 
(Neb.  1903),  93  N.  W.  Rep.  217; 
Skinner  v.  Skinner,  38  Neb.  756, 
57  N.  W.  Rep.  534;  Durrell  v. 
Emery,  64  N.  H.  223,  9  Atl  Rep. 
97;  Dixon  v.  Ahern,  19  Neb.  422, 
14  Pac.  Rep.  598;  Sweesey  v.  Dur- 
nall,  23  Neb.   531,   37  N.   W.  Rep. 


523;  Welcome  v.  Labonte,  63  N. 
H.  124;  Pendergast  v.  Young,  21 
N.  H.  234,  235;  Chambers  v.  Ross, 
25  N.  J.  Law,  293;  Collyer  v.  Coll- 
yer,  113  N.  Y.  442,  21  N.  E.  Rep. 
114;  Lynch  v.  Onondaga  Salt  Co., 
64  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  558;  Ettlinger 
V.  Degnon-McLean  Cons.  Co.,  42 
Misc.  Rep.  215,  216,  85  N.  Y.  Supp. 
394;  Biglow  v.  Biglow,  75  App. 
Div.  98,  100,  77  N.  Y.  Supp.  716; 
Lamb  v.  Lamb,  146  N.  Y.  317;  Van 
Arsdale  v.  Buck,  81  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1017;  Isaac  v.  Minkofsky,  29  Misc. 
Rep.  347,  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  506;  Pres- 
ton V.  Hawley,  130  N.  Y.  296,  34 
N.  E.  Rep.  906;  Mitchell  v.  Pen- 
dleton, 21  Ohio  St.  664;  Heidel- 
bach  V.  Slader,  1  Handy  (Ohio) 
456;  Pott  V.  Lesher,  1  Yeates  (Pa.) 
576;  Brolasky  v.  Ferguson,  48  Pa. 
St.  434,  22  L.  I.  28;  McClosky  v. 
Miller,  72  Pa.  St.  151,  20  Pitts.  L. 
J.  163;  Hen  wood  v.  Cheeseman,  3 
S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  500;  Bressler's  Ap- 
peal, 2  York  (Pa.)  57;  Seitzinger 
V.  Alspach,  42  L.  I.  68;  Blake  v. 
Preston,  67  Vt.  613,  32  Atl.  Rep. 
491;  Lazarus  v.-  Phelps,  152  U.  S. 
81,  14  S.  Ct.  477;  Adsit  v.  Kauf- 
man, 121  Fed.  Rep.  355;  Cobb  v. 
Kidd,  8  Fed.  Rep.  695,  696;  Car- 
penter V.  United  States.  17  Wall. 
(U.  S.)   489,  495. 

13  Evans  v.  Evans,  3  A.  &  E.  132, 
137,  1  H.  &  W.  239. 

14  Fisher  v.  Marsh,  6  B.  &  S.  411, 
34  L.  .L  Q.  B.  177,  11  .Tur.  (N.  S.) 
795,  12  L.  T.  604,  13  W.  R.  834. 


574  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

pation  against  the  person  who  has  entered  and  occupied  the 
land.  For  the  agreement  is  meant  to  create  more  than  a  mere 
license  and  an  occupant  under  it  is  a  tenant  at  will.^°  A  lessee 
who  demises  the  land  to  another  by  parol  at  a  weekly  rental  for 
the  whole  tenn  created  by  a  written  lease  many  maintain  use 
and  occupation.  Here  the  parties  evidently  meant  that  this 
transaction  should  constitute  a  sublease  and  not  merely  an 
assignment  of  the  term.  This  construction .  is  fortified  by  the 
consideration  that  if  this  be  regarded  as  an  assignment  of  a 
term  it  will  be  invalid  as  not  having  been  in  writing.^®  One  who 
pending  an  executory  contract  for  a  lease  takes  the  attornments 
of  undertenants  in  possession  and  receives  rent  from  them 
places  himself  in  the  place  of  the  original  lessor.  The  occupation 
of  the  undertenants  is  his  occupation  and  his  receipts  of  rent 
from  them  is  satisfactory  proof  of  his  occupation  of  the  whole 
premises  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation  against  him  by  the 
original  landlord.^'^  So  where  several  persons  rent  premises  to  be 
used  as  a  synagogue  in  which  seats  are  rented  the  proceeds  of 
which  are  applied  in  part  to  the  payment  of  rent  and  in  part 
for  general  religious  purposes  the  lessees  may  maintain  an  action 
for  use  and  occupation  against  one  who  occupies  a  seat.^®  A  ten- 
ant whose  term  has  expired  may  thereafter  maintain  use  and 
occupation  against  his  undertenant  for  such  period  as  the  latter 
holds  over  after  the  expiration  of  the  term  provided  he  himself 
pays  his  rent  for  that  period  to  his  own  landlord.^^  One  to 
whom  a  landlord  has  granted  annuities  payable  out  of  the  rents 
and  profits  of  the  land  may  maintain  an  action  for  use  and  oc- 
cupation against  a  tenant  who  was  in  possession  at  the  time  the 
annuity  was  granted  for  all  rents  for  the  period  from  the  date 
the  tenant  was  notified  of  the  annuity  down  to  the  date  he  was 
ousted  for  nonpayment  of  rent.-**  Only  one  who  has  the  legal 
title  to  the  land  can  maintain  an  action  for  use  and  occupation.^"^ 

15  Jones  V.  Reynolds,  4  A.  &  E.  lo  Levi  v.  Lewis,  6  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 

805,  6  N.  &  M.  441.  766,  28  L.  J.  C.  P.  304,  5  Jur.    (N. 

10  Pollock  V.  Stacy,  9  Q.  B.  1033,  S.)  1048,  affirmed  in  9  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 

1035,  16  L.  J.  Q.  B.  132,  11  Jur.  267.  872,  30  L.  J.  C.  P.  141,  7  Jur.  (N. 

I'Neale  v.    Swind   or    Sweeney,  S.)  759,  9  W.  R.  388. 

2  C.  &  J.  377,  4  Tyr.  464,  1  L.  J.  20  Birch  v.  Wright,  1  T.  R.  378, 

Ex.  118.  384,  1  R.  R.  223. 

"*  Israel    v.    Simmons,    2    Stark  21  Grady   v.    Ibach,   94  Ala.    152, 

356.  155,  10  So.  Rep.  287. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OP  RENT.  575 

Tlie  beneficiary  under  a  trust  cannot  maintain  such  an  action  22 
nor  can  a  mortgag-ee  not  in  possession  maintain  it.^^  A  grantee 
of  the  reversion  may  maintain  an  action  against  the  tenant  of 
his  grantor.  =^*  He  may  recover  for  the  subsequent  occupation 
where  the  tenant  with  notice  of  the  conveyance  paid  over  the 
rent  to  the  prior  landlord.^^  It  has  been  held  that  where  a 
town  or  city  appropriates  land  for  public  use  or  takes  land  by 
mistake  believing  it  to  be  its  own  the  owner  can  recover  in  an 
action  for  use  and  occupation.^a  So  the  owner  can  recover  for 
use  and  occupation  against  an  assig-nee  of  the  lessee,"  but  an 
action  for  use  and  occupation  cannot  be  maintained  where  one 
who  is  in  the  relation  of  child  to  the  owner  occupies  the  land. 
There  is  no  implication  of  any  contract  to  pay  rent  where  the 
relationship  between  the  owner  and  the  occupant  is  that  of  pa- 
rent and  child.  The  relationship  of  father-in-law  and  son-in- 
law  or  of  uncle  and  niece  does  not  rebut  the  presumption  of  a 
contract  to  pay  rent.^* 

§  363.  The  title  of  the  landlord.  The  plaintiff  in  an  action 
for  the  value  of  the  use  and  occupation  of  premises  need  neither 
allee  nor  prove  a  valid  title  in  himeslf.  He  must  allege  that 
he  is  the  owner  and  the  occupant  having  received  the  benefit  of 
the  premises  is  thereafter  estopped  to  deny  the  landlord's  title.^^ 
The  validity  of  the  landlord's  title  cannot  be  denied.  The  oc- 
cupant cannot  escape  paying  the  claim  of  the  o^^Tier  where  he 
has  used  the  premises  by  the  defense  that  the  owner's  title  is  not 
good.^*'    Nor  can  the  conveyance  under  which  the  owner  held  be 

22  Grady  v.   Ibach,   94   Ala.    152,  27  Weaver    v.    Southern    Oregon 
155,  10  So.  Rep.  287.  Co.,  31  Oreg.  14,  48  Pac.  Rep.  167. 

23  Turner  v.  Cameron's,  etc.,  Ry.,  2s  Thompson's    Estate,     1     Kulp 
5  Ex.  932,  20  L.  J.  Ex.  71.  (Pa.)    235;    Sterrett  v.  Wright,  27 

24  Birch  V.  Wright,  1  T.  R.  378,  Pa.  St.  259. 

1  R.  R.  228;   Lumley  v.  Hodgson,  29  Lewis  v.  Willis,  1  Wils.   314; 

16  East,  99,  14  R.  R.  315;   Rennie  Curtis  v.  Spitty,  1  Ring.    (N.  C.) 

V.  Robinson,  7  Moore,  539,  1  Ring.  17;  Hull  v.  Vaughan,  6  Price    157 

147,  1  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  C.  P.  30,  25  R.  so  Sampson  v.    Schaeffer,   s'  Cal. 

^   ^^"^^  196;    Broughton   v.   Smart,  59   III. 

25  Lumley  v.  Hudson,  16  East,  440:  Codman  v.  Jenkins,  14  Mass. 
99,  14  R.  R.  315.  93;    Hill   v.  Boutell,   3   N.   H.   502; 

26  Beardsley  v.  Town  of  Nash-  North  Haverhill  Water  Co.  v  Met^ 
ville,  64  Ark.  240,  41  S.  W.  Rep.  calf,  63  N.  H.  427;  Carpenter  v. 
853;  McCardell  v.  Miller,  22  R.  I.  Stillwell,  3  Abb.  Prac.  Rep.  (N.  Y.) 
96.  46  Atl.  Rep.  184.  459;  Blumberg  v.  McNear,  1  Wash. 


570 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


impeached  upon  the  ground  that  it  was  made  for  the  purpose  of 
defrauding  the  creditors  of  the  grantor.^^ 

§  364.  Occupation  must  be  proved.  The  landlord  must  in  an 
action  for  use  and  occupation  usually  show  an  actual  occupation 
of  the  premises.  This  has  been  so  determined  under  the  English 
statute  which  entitles  the  landlord  to  recover  a  reasonable  sat- 
isfaction for  the  use  and  occupation  of  premises  which  have  been 
occupied  or  held  under  a  demise.  The  remedy  given  by  the  stat- 
ute is  not  identical  with  an  action  on  a  covenant  to  pay  rent. 
Hence  the  action  given  by  the  statute  depends  either  on  a.n  act- 
ual occupation  or  on  an  occupation  which  the  tenant  might  have 
had  if  he  had  not  voluntarily  abandoned  the  premises.^-  Both  at 
the  common  law  and  vmder  the  English  and  American  statutes 
in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege 
or  to  prove  that  the  defendant  has  been  or  is  in  the  manual  oc- 
cupation of  the  premises,  for  which  a  recovery  is  sought.  It  is 
sufficient  to  show  that  the  landlord  has  actually  conferred  the 
power  to  occupy  and  enjoy.^^     Sending  a  woman  to  clean  a 


T.  141;  Vernam  v.  Smith,  15  N.  Y. 
327.  329;  Cooke  v.  Loxley,  5  T.  R. 
4;  Phipps  V.  Schulorpe,  1  B.  &  Al. 
50;  Fleming  v.  Gooding,  10  Bing. 
549;  Dolby  v.  lies,  11  Ad.  &  El. 
335. 

31  Balch  T.  Patten,  45  Me.  41,  71 
Am.  Dec.  526. 

32  Naish  V.  Tatlock,  2  H.  Black. 
319,  320,  3  R.  R.  384,  388;  White- 
head V.  Clifford,  5  Taunt.  518; 
Richardson  v.  Hall,  1  B.  &  B.  50, 
3  Moore,  307;  Nation  v.  Tozer,  1 
C.  M.  &  R.  172,  4  Tyr.  561;  How 
V.  Kennett,  3  Ad.  &  E.  659,  5  N. 
&  M.  1;  Town  of  D'Henrick,  13 
C.  B.  892,  1  C.  L.  R.  335,  17  Jur. 
1102;  Standen  v.  Christmas,  10 
Q.  B.  135,  16  L.  .7.  Q.  B.  265,  11 
Jur.  694;  Lowe  v.  Ross,  5  Ex.  553, 
555,  19  L.  J.  Ex.  318;  Edge  v. 
Strafford,  1  C.  &  J.  391;  Dawes  v. 
Dowling,  31  L.  T.  05,  22  W.  R.  770. 
Contra,  Pinero  v.  Judson,  3  M.  & 
P.  497,  6  Bing.  206,  8  L.  .1.  (O.  S.) 
C.  P.  19,  31  R.  R.  388;    Clarke  v. 


Webb,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  29,  4  Tyr.  673, 
3  L.  J.  Ex.,  300;  Woolley  v.  Nat- 
ling,  7  Carr.  &  P.  610;  How  v.  Ken- 
nett, 3  A.  &  E.  659,  667,  5  N.  &  M. 
1,  1  H.  &  W.  391,  4  L.  J.  K.  B.  220. 
A  tenant  who  agrees  to  take  fur- 
nished rooms,  but  who  does  not 
enter,  is  not  liable  for  use  and 
occupation.  Edge  v.  Strafford,  1 
C.  &  J.  391,  1  Tyr.  293,  9  L.  J.  (O. 
S.)    Ex.  101. 

33  Little  V.  Martin,  3  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  219;  Peatherstonhaugh  v. 
Bradshaw,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  134; 
Westlake  v.  De  Graw,  25  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  669;  Hall  v.  Western 
Trans.  Co.,  34  N.  Y.  284,  285; 
Sherwood  v.  Gardner,  2  City  Ct. 
Rep.  (N.  Y.)  64;  Smith  v.  Genet, 
2  City  Ct.  Rep.  (N.  Y.)  88;  Jones 
V.  Reynolds,  7  Car  &  P.  325;  Wool- 
ley  V.  Watling,  1  Car.  &  P.  610; 
Gibson  v.  Carmthorpe,  1  Dowl.  & 
Ry.  205;  Baker  v.  Holtzapffel,  4 
Taunt.  45;  Izon  v.  Gutne,  5  Bing. 
501 ;  Pinero  v.  Judson,  6  Bing.  20G; 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  01''  RENT. 


0/  t 


house  rented  and  workmen  to  paper  the  rooms,^*  or  the  putting 
up  of  a  to-let  sign  by  one  who  has  agreed  to  become  a  tenant 
from  a  certain  date  is  sufficient  occupation  to  sustain  an  action. •^'^ 
An  occupation  by  an  undertenant  or  by  a  person  whom  the  de- 
fendant permits  to  remain  in  the  premises  as  a  care  taker 
will  support  an  action  for  use  and  occupation  against  the 
original  tenant.^"  The  accidental  retention  of  the  key  of  the 
premises  by  a  tenant  who  has  quitted  possession  and  removed 
his  goods  is  no  evidence  of  occupation  which  will  render  the 
tenant  liable  in  an  action  for  the  reasonable  value  of  the  use 
and  occupation  of  the  premises."'  An  action  for  use  and  occu- 
pation may  be  maintained  against  two  or  more  persons  who  have 
become  jointly  liable  to  a  landlord  on  parol  demise  though  the 
occupation  is  by  one  of  them  only.^*  A  tenant  who  enters  on  the 
possession  of  premises  at  a  yearly  rent  with  an  agreement  that 
no  rent  is  to  be  paid  until  the  premises  are  repaired  and  who 
quits  possession  because  the  premises  are  not  repaired  is  liable 
for  use  and  occupation. ^^  Where  land  is  leased  by  an  instru- 
ment not  under  seal  for  mining  purposes  an  action  for  use  and 
occupation  may  be  maintained  if  the  defendant  has  ever  taken 


Waring  v.  King,  8  M.  &  W.  571; 
Smith  V.  Faust,  2  Man.  &  G.  841. 

34  Smith  V.  Faust,  2  Man.  &  G. 
841,  3  Scott,  172. 

35  Sullivan  v.  Jones,  3  Car.  &  P. 
579. 

36  Bull  V.  Sibbs,  8  T.  R.  327; 
Waring  v.  King,  8  M.  &  W.  571,  11 
L.  J.  Ex.  49;  Ibbs  v.  Richardson, 
1  P.  &  D.  618,  9  A.  &  B.  849,  8  L. 
J.  Q.  B.  126,  3  Jur.  102. 

37  Gray  v.  Bompass,  11  C.  B.  (N. 
S.)   520,  5  L.  T.  841. 

38  Glen  V.  Dungey,  4  Ex.  61,  64, 
18  L.  J.  Eq.  359;  Christy  v.  Tan- 
cred,  7  M.  &  W.  127,  10  L.  J.  Ex. 
228,  4  Jur.  1064;  Christy  v.  Tan- 
cred,  9  M.  &  W.  438,  11  L.  J.  Ex. 
109. 

39  Smith  V.  Eldridge,  15  C.  B. 
236,  2  C.  L.  R.  855.  "The  truth  is 
that  the  occupation  of  land  by  a 
person  bound  to  pay  some  remu- 


neration for  it,  without  the  amount 
or  time  of  payment  being  fixed, 
was  and  is  now  of  rare  occurrence. 
When  it  does  occur  the  implied 
contract  is  raised  by  law  from  the 
fact  that  land  belonging  to  the 
plaintiff  has  been  occupied  by  the 
defendant  by  the  plaintiff's  per- 
mission, the  obligation  is  co-ex- 
tensive with  and  measured  by  the 
enjoyment.  As  soon  as  the  occu- 
pation ceases,  the  implied  contract 
ceases,  and,  as  no  express  time  is 
limited,  the  remuneration  must 
necessarily  accrue  from  day  to 
day.  This  state  of  things  is  prima 
facie  supposed  to  exist  in  all  ac- 
tions for  use  and  occupation,  at 
least  so  far  as  regards  time  of  pay- 
ment." By  Lord  Denman,  C.  J., 
in  Gibson  v.  Kirk,  2  G.  &  D.  252, 
on  p.  255. 


O  (  b  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

possession ;  and  if  lie  lias  taken  possession,  he  is  liable  for  all  sub- 
sequent rent  until  the  determination  of  the  tenancy,  whether  he 
has  continued  to  work  for  minerals  or  not;  but  if  the  defendant 
merely  caused  holes  to  be  dug  on  the  land,  and  had  them  im- 
mediately filled  up  merely  to  ascertain  if  there  were  any  ore  in 
the  land  this  would  not  be  a  taking  of  possession.*"  The  pay- 
ment of  rent  by  an  occupant  of  premises  or  the  suffering  of  a  dis- 
tress for  rent  due  by  him  is  a  sufficient  recognition  of  the  title 
of  the  landlord  and  of  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  to 
support  an  action  for  use  and  occupation.  This  is  the  rule 
though  the  occupant  who  pays  the  rent  came  into  possession 
under  the  grantor  of  him  to  whom  he  pays  rent.*^ 

§  365.  Against  whom  action  for  use  and  occupation  can  be 
maintained.  The  action  may  be  maintained  against  any  one 
who  stands  in  the  relation  of  tenant  to  the  owner.  He  may 
maintain  the  action  against  an  occupant  who  continues  in  pos- 
session after  he  has  been  told  that  he  will  have  to  pay  rent,*^ 
though  he  refuses  to  pay,*^  against  a  person  who  encloses  a  por- 
tion of  the  land  with  his  own  land,**  against  a  person  who,  hav- 
ing a  mortgage  on  a  stock  of  goods  in  a  leased  store,  takes  pos- 
session of  it  and  sells  the  s-dine  at  retail,*^  or  against  a  tenant 
at  sufferance.*®  The  action  may  be  maintained  against  a  per- 
son who  purchases  the  stock  of  a  prior  tenant  and  who  enters 
and  offers  to  pay  rent  though  the  prior  term  has  not  been  sur- 
rendered by  the  tenant.*'^  A  corporation  which  has  occupied 
and  iLsed  land  for  corporate  purposes  may  be  sued  for  use  and 
occupation  though  there  be  no  lease  under  seal,-*^  but  only  the 
value  of  the  actual  occupation  can  be  recovered.*"  A  corpora- 
te Jones  V.  Reypolds,  7  Car.  &  P.  *-'  Hatch  v.  Van  Dervoort,  54  N. 
335.                                                                   J.  511,  34  Atl.  Rep.  938. 

41  Panton  v.  Jones,  3  Camp.  372,  4o  Williams    v.    Ladew,    171    Pa. 
14  R.  R.  757;  Dolby  v.  lies,  11  A.       St.  369,  33  Atl.  Rep.  329. 

&  E.  335,  3  P.  &  D.  287,  9  L.  J.  Q.  47  Phipps  v.   Sculthorpe,  1  B.  & 

B.  51,  4  Jur.  432.  Aid.  50,  18  R.  R.   426.     See,  also, 

42  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomp-  Hyde  v.  Moakes,  5  Car.  &  P.  42. 
son,  161  III.  159,  162,  5  N.  E.  Rep.  48  Lowe   v.  L.   &  N.   W.   Ry.,    IS 
117;  Griffin  v.  Knisely,  75  111.  411;  Q.  B.  632,   21  L.   J.  Q.  B.  :'.(;i,   17 
Higgins  V.  Halligan,  46  111.  173.  Jur.  375. 

43  Gillespie     v.     Hendreu      (Mo.  *!>  Fiuley  v.   Bristol   &   E.x.   Ry., 
App.),  73  S.  W.  Rep.  361.  17  Ex.  409,  7  Parlw.  Case,  449,  21 

44  Abbey  v.   Shiner,   5  Tex.  Civ.  L.  J.  Ex.  117. 
App.  287,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  OL 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  579 

lion  may  sue  for  use  and  occupation  persons  who  have  occupied 
its  land  as  tenants.^"  An  entrj-  by  one  of  two  executors  of  a 
tenant  for  years  is  not  the  entry  of  both  so  as  to  make  them 
both  liable  as  individuals  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupa- 
tion.^^ The  executor  who  enters  is  liable  personally  for  use  and 
occupation  and  not  as  representing  his  estate.  °-  An  action  can- 
not be  maintained  against  one  who  holds  lands  adversely,"  nor  by 
a  vendor  against  a  vendee  where  the  contract  of  sale  is  re- 
scinded,^* nor,  against  one  who  by  mistake  encloses  land  which  is 
not  his  own  and  grazes  his  stock  upon  it  though  on  premises  of 
the  owner.^^  So,  also,  a  person  whom  the  lessee  takes  into  his 
house  as  a  housekeeper  ^"  or  who  lives  with  the  lessee  and  shares 
the  expense  of  the  family.^"  or  who  occupies  a  store  jointly  under 
a  contract  which  does  not  make  him  a  partner  of  the  lessee,^^ 
is  not  liable  to  the  lessor  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  prem- 
ises. And  in  any  case  where  the  occupant  proves  that  he  ex- 
pressly repudiated  any  tenancy,  an  action  will  not  be  main- 
tained.^® An  assignee  in  bankruptcy  is  not  liable  for  use  and 
occupation  in  a  case  where  the  bankrupt  was  the  tenant  of  a 
store  unless  the  assignee  in  bankruptcy  actually  takes  the  lease 
as  assignee  and  enters  into  possession  under  the  lease.  In  such 
case  where  the  assignee  in  bankruptcy  finds  a  lease  and  a  stock 
of  goods  in  leased  premises  among  the  assets  coming  into  his  pos- 
session and  he  enters  the  store,  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury 
whether  he  enters  the  premises  as  a  tenant  or  merely  for  the 
purpose  of  removing  and  selling  the  goods.  Upon  this  ques- 
tio*n  the  acts  and  statements  of  the  assignee  and  tlie  length  of 

50  Stafford  Corporation  v.  Til,  4  H.  53,  5  Atl.  Rep.  903;  Biglow  v. 
Bing.  75,  12  Moore,  260,  5  L.  J.  Eiglow,  77  N.  Y.  S.  716;  Abbey  v. 
Q.  B.  77,  29  R.  R.  511.  Shiner.   5  Tex.   Civ.   App.   2S7,   24 

51  Nation  v.  Tozer,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  S.  W.  Rep.  91. 

172,  4  Tyr.  561,  3  L.  J.  Ex.  234.  o4  Belger  v.  Sanchez  (Cal.  1902), 

•-;;  Nixon  v.  Quinn,  Ir.  R.  2  C.  L.  70  Pac.  Rep.  738. 

247.  '-■'  Abbey  v.   Shiner,  5  Tex.  Civ. 

o3  Allen  V.  :\Iacon,  D.  &  S.  R.  Co.   .   App.  287,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  91. 

(Ga.),  33   S.  E.  Rep.  696;   Emery  ss  Tinder  v.  Dan's,  SS  Ind.  99. 

V.  Emery,  87  Me.  281,  32  Atl.  Rep.  07  Austin  v.  Thomson.  45  N.  H. 

900;    Roxbury  v.   Huston,   39    Me.  113. 

312;  Goddard  v.  Hall,  55  Me.  579;  &«  Carver    v.    Palmer,    33    Mich. 

Boston  V.  Binney,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  342. 

1,   9,   22   Am.   Dec.   353;    Swift   v.  -"Blake  v.   Preston,  67  Vt.  613, 

New   Durham   Lumber  Co.,  64  N.  32  Atl.  Rep.  491. 


580  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

time  he  remains  in  the  premises  and  the  use  he  makes  of  them 
are  relevant.  If  he  uses  the  premises  as  a  place  to  sell  the  goods 
it  may  be  fairly  inferred  that  he  accepts  the  assignment  of  the 
lease.  But  merely  selling  the  goods  in  the  premises  for  a  few 
days  is  not  a  sufficient  occupation  of  them  to  furnish  a  basis 
for  an  action  of  use  and  occupation  though  perhaps  an  action 
in  assumpsit  for  debt  would  lie.^°  A  landlord  cannot  maintain 
use  and  occupation  for  a  year's  rent  against  the  assignees  of  a 
bankrupt  tenant  from  year  to  year  where  he  becomes  bankrupt 
in  the  middle  of  the  year  and  the  assignee  enters  and  retains 
possession  for  the  remainder  of  the  year.  This  is  not  to  say 
that  the  landlord  may  not  sue  and  recover  rent  on  a  lease  under 
such  circumstances  where  the  assignee  has  not  promptly  dis- 
claimed. But  inasmuch  as  the  action  for  use  and  occupation  is 
based  solely  on  the  occupation  of  the  person  sued,  the  landlord 
cannot  compel  an  assignee  to  pay  for  any  use  and  occupation 
except  by  himself  in  the  absence  of  an  express  agreement  on  the 
part  of  the  assignee  in  bankruptcy  to  pay  the  reasonable  value 
of  the  lessee's  use  and  occupation  before  the  assignment.®^  Nor 
will  an  action  for  use  and  occupation  be  maintainable  against 
an  assignee  in  bankruptcy  for  an  increased  rent  M'hich  the  bank- 
rupt had  agreed  to  pay  his  landlord  in  consideration  of  im- 
provements executed  by  the  landlord.*^-  The  question  of  what 
the  premises  are  reasonably  worth  is  always  for  the  jury.  Evi- 
dence may  be  received  by  them  showing  what  rent  had  been 
formerly  paid  for  it  either  by  the  defendant  or  some  prior  ten- 
ant though  they  are  not  thereby  bound  to  infer  that  the  reason- 
able value  of  the  premises  is  precisely  what  they  have  been  leascnl 
for."^  The  jury  may  give  the  landlord  a  larger  sum  for  the 
continued  occupation  than  for  the  original  occupation,  if  there 
are  circumstances  to  show  that  such  increased  rent  was  expected 
by  the  landlord. 

§  366.  Parol  evidence  to  prove  use  and  occupation.  The  re- 
lation of  landlord  and  tenant  as  well  as  the  occupation  of  the 
premises  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation  may  be  proved  by 

60  How  V.  Kennett,  3  A.  &  E.  659,  62  Lambert  v.  Norris,  2  M.  &  W. 
667,  5  N.  &  M.  1,  1  H.  &  W.  391,  4       333,  6  L.  J.  Ex.  109. 

L.  J.  K.  B.  220.  63  Thetford  Corporation  v.  Tyler, 

61  Naish  V.  Tatlock,  2  H.  Bl.  320,  8  Q.  B.  95,  15  L.  J.  Q.  B.  33.  10  Jur. 
3   R.   R.   384.  68. 


NATURE  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  RENT.  581 

jiarol.*"*  Some  cases  have  held  that  such  evidence  is  not  ad- 
missible to  prove  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  if  there 
be  a  lease  in  writing,^^  but  it  has  also  been  held  that  parol 
evidence  would  be  received  in  an  action  for  use  and  occu- 
pation though  there  was  a  written  agreement."®  This  rule 
simply  amounts  to  this,  that  where  the  landlord  sues  for  use 
and  occupation  and  has  no  written  lease  signed  by  the  occupant 
he  may  prove  his  case  by  parol  evidence  and  he  will  not  be  dis- 
missed merely  because  the  occupant  shall  subsequently  prove  a 
written  lease  signed  by  the  landlord.®^  Thus,  the  production  of 
a  written  lease  under  seal  and  executed  by  the  landlord  but 
never  delivered  to  the  tenant  because  the  latter  had  failed  to 
l)ay  a  certain  sum  of  money  upon  the  payment  of  Avhich  he 
was  to  receive  his  lease  does  not  defeat  an  action  for  use  and 
occupation.®*  In  an  action  for  use  and  occupation,  a  lease  void 
under  the  statute  of  frauds,  though  not  admissible  or  necessary 
to  prove  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant,  may  be  consulted 
to  calculate  the  amount  of  rent  due  on  it  and  thus  be  a.  guide  to 
fix  the  value  of  the  use  and  occupation.®®  But  the  rent  fixed 
in  the  void  lease  or  other  writing  while  it  must  be  given  to  the 
jury  to  aid  them  in  determining  value,  is  by  no  means  conclusive 
on  them  as  regards  this  question,'"  or  that  such  an  under- 
standing was  not  repudiated  by  the  tenant.'^ 

64  Gibbon  v.  Kirk,  1  Q.  B.  850,  1  986,  26  L.  J.  Q.  B.  36,  3  Jur.  (N. 
G.  &  D.  252,  253,  10  L.  J.  K.  B.  297,       S.)   212,  5  W.  R.  47. 

6    Jur.    99,    following    Wilkins    v.  «9  De  Medina  v.  Poison,  Holt,  N. 

Wingate,   6   Term   Rep.    62;    King  P.  47. 

V.  Fraser,  6  East,  348.     See,  also,  '« Tomlinson    v.    Day,    5    Moore, 

Egler    V.    Marsden,    5    Taunt.    25;  558,  2  Br.  &  B.  680,  23  R.  R.  541. 

Beverly  v.  Lincoln  Gas  Co.,  6  Ad.  "^  Elgar   v.   "Watson,   Car.    &   M. 

.&  E.  839,  2  N.  &  P.  283.  494.     It   is   a  general   rule    in   all 

65  Rex  V.  Rawdon,  3  M.  &  Ry.  actions  brought  on  an  implied  or 
426,  8  B.  &  C.  708,  7  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  oral  contract  that  after  the  plain- 
K.  B.  84;  Brewer  v.  Palmer,  3  Esp.  tiff  has  proved  a  contract  by  oral 
213;  Turner  v.  Power,  7  B.  &  C.  evidence,  without  an  objection, 
625,  M.  &  M.  131,  6  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  that  there  is  a  writing  in  existence 
K.  B.  122.  he    should    not    be    nonsuited    be- 

«c  Watson  v.  King,  3  C.  B.  608,  cause    the    defendant    produces    a 

609;  Tyrwhitt  v.  Lambert,  3  P.  &  written    contract,    particularly    if 

D.  676,  10^  A.  &  E.  470;   Elliot  v.  for  any  reasons,  as,  for  example, 

Rogers,  4  Esp.  59.  it  being  unstamped,  it  was  not  ad- 

«7  Elliott  V.  Rogers,  4  Esp.  59.  missible   in    evidence.     Fielder   v. 

68  Gudgen  v.  Besset,  6  El.  &  Bl.  Ray,  3  M.  &■  P.  659,  6  Ring.  332,  4 


582  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  367.  Defenses  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation.  The 
occupant  may  show  that  he  was  holding  adversely  to  the  owner. 
It  is  relevant  for  him  to  prove  all  facts  which  would  rebut  the 
presumption  that  an  agreement  or  contract  to  pay  rent  existed. 
He  may  also  show  that  he  never  had  the  occupation  or  that  he 
was  deprived  of  it.'^  Thus,  he  may  prove  tliat  by  the  failure  of 
the  landlord  to  repair  according  to  agreement,  he  has  been  de- 
prived of  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  premises.'^  But  the 
occupant  of  the  premises  cannot  defeat  the  recovery  of  the  value 
of  their  use  by  proving  that  if  he  had  not  occupied  them  they 
would  have  been  vacant.'* 

§  368.  Pleading  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation.  A 
declaration  or  complaint  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation 
should  set  forth  the  title  of  the  landlord,  the  possession  of  the 
tenant,  the  letting  by  the  former  to  the  latter,  the  occupation 
for  a  period  specified  and  allege  the  reasonable  value  of  such 
occupation.''^  The  complaint  need  not  allege  the  particulars  of 
the  occupation  by  the  defendant.'"  A  complaint  which  does  not 
allege  an  agreement  to  pay  the  rent  express  or  implied  is  de- 
fective." 

Car.  &  P.  61,  8  L.  J.    (0.   S.)    65,  74  Newberg  v.   Cowan,   62   Miss. 

31  R.  R.  429;  Doe  d.  Wood  v.  Mor-  570. 

ris,  12  East,  237;   Reed  v.  Deere,  "s  Thompson   v.    Fox,    45    N.   Y. 

7  B.  &  C.  266,  2  Car.  &  P.  624,  31  Rupp.  1046,  20  Misc.  Rep.  421. 

R.  R.  190,  193;   Stevens  v.  Pinney,  tg  wilkins   v.   Wingate,   6   T.   R. 

8  Taunt.  327.  62;    King  v.    Fraser,   6   East,   348, 
T2Lockwood    V.     Lockwood,     22       354;  Davies  v.  Edwards,  3  M.  &  S. 

Conn.  425,  429;  How  v.  Kennet,  3  380;  Gibson  v.  Kirk,  1  G.  &  D.  252, 

A.  &  E.  659,  30  E.  C.  L.  175;  Rich-  255. 

ardson  v.  Hall,  1  B.  &  B.  50,  5  E.  7-  Indianapolis,  D.  &  W.  Ry.  Co. 

C.  L.  14.  V.  First  Nat.  Bank  (Ind.  Sup.),  33 

'■■i  Potter  V.  Truitt,  3  Har.  (Del.)  N.  E.  Rep.  679. 
331. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  SECURITY  FOR  THE  RENT. 

§  369.    Deposit  by  the  lessee  as  a  security  for  payment  of  rent. 

370.  Tlie  tenant's  riglit  to  the  return  of  his  deposit. 

371.  Deposit  made  by  a  tenant  with  landlord  on  contract  to  make  a 

lease. 

372.  The  general  rule  as  to  liquidated  damages. 

373.  Chattel  mortgage  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  rent. 

374.  Construction  of  an  agreement  to  give  security. 

375.  When  the  principal  and  surety  on  a  lease  may  be  sued  jointly. 

376.  General  rule  as  to  the  liability  of  the  guarantor. 

377.  Surety's  liability  upon  a  renewal  of  lease. 

378.  The  discharge  or  release  of  the  surety. 

§  369.  Deposit  by  the  lessee  as  a  security  for  payment  of 
rent.  Money  which  has  been  deposited  by  the  tenant  in  the 
hands  of  the  landlord,  or  of  some  other  person,  and  which  by 
the  express  terms  of  the  lease  is  described  as  a  deposit  as  secu- 
rity for  rent  or  for  the  performance  of  some  other  covenant  of 
the  lease  will,  as  a  rule,  be  regarded  b}"  the  courts  as  a  penalty 
merely  and  not  liquidated  damages.  It  is  always  immaterial 
that  it  is  called  liquidated  damages  or  that  it  is  provided  that 
the  deposit  shall  be  forfeited  as  liquidated  damages.^  Particu- 
larly is  this  true  when  the  onty  breach  of  covenant  by  the  lessee 
is  a  breach  of  the  covenant  to  pay  rent  and  the  deposit  is  out 
of  all  proportion  to  the  rent  due.  It  is  by  no  means  difficult  to 
ascertain  the  legal  damages  suffered  by  the  lessor  where  the 
lessee  neglects  to  refuses  to  pay  rent  and  for  that  reason  is  dis- 
possessed. The  presumption  in  such  cases  is  that  the  lessor  re- 
sumed the  possession  of  the  premises  and  has  re-let  them  and 
if  he  has  done  this  it  is  difficult  to  see  any  fairness  in  the  prop- 

1  D'Appuzo  V.  Albright,  76  N.  Y.  vided  for  in  a  lease  for  the  breach 

Supp.    654;    Bernstein    v.    Heine-  of  a  provision  are  greatly   in  ex- 

mann,  23  Misc.  Rep.  464,  51  N.  Y.  cess   of  the  actual   damages,   they 

Supp.  467;  Carson  v.  Arvantes,  10  will  be  disregarded.     Sharpless  v. 

Colo.  App.  382,  50  Pac.  Rep.  1080.  Murphy,  7  Del.  Co.   (Pa.)  22. 
Where  the  liquidated  damages  pro- 


584  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TEN.VNT. 

osition  that  he  can  receive  the  rent  after  his  lessee  has  vacated 
the  premises  and  at  the  same  time  retain  a  large  sum  of  money 
as  damao:es  which  sum  may  be  three  or  four  times  the  actual 
damages.  At  the  most  the  deposit  will  be  regarded  as  security 
only  and  if  the  lessor  elects  not  to  accept  a  surrender  he  may 
exhaust  the  deposit  by  applying  it  to  arrears  of  rent  as  it  falls 
due.  This,  however,  is  the  most  favorable  construction  that  the 
court  will  put  upon  the  matter  and  on  the  other  hand,  if  the 
lessor  assumes  possession  and  the  loss  of  rent  is  readily  ascer- 
tainable and  particularly  if  the  loss  be  small,  will  treat  the  de- 
posit as  a  penalty  only  and  will  consider  that  the  lessor  has 
waived  any  claim  he  might  have  to  it,  either  as  liquidated  dam- 
ages or  as  security  for  the  rent  by  his  action  in  re-entering  upon 
the  premises.-  Where  it  is  covenanted  in  the  lease  that  a  sum 
paid  to  the  landlord  by  the  tenant  may  be  retained  by  the  former 
in  case  the  tenant  is  dispossesssed  from  the  premises  by  due 
process  of  law^,  the  sum  thus  to  be  retained  is  presumptively 
liquidated  damages  and  not  a  penalty.  The  money  deposited 
under  such  circumstances  is  to  be  retained  not  merely  upon  a 
failure  by  the  tenant  to  pay  any  one  instalment  of  rent  as  it 
becomes  due,  but  to  reimburse  the  landlord  for  the  loss  of  all 
subsequently  accruing  instalments  of  rent,  and  such  being  the 
case,  it  is  not  material  whether  the  sum  mentioned  is  in  the 
opinion  of  the  court  too  great  or  too  small.^  It  is  permissible 
for  the  parties  to  fix  upon  an  amount  as  liquidated  damages  for 
a  breach  of  the  lease  by  the  tenant  and  to  require  him  to  deposit 
such  sum  in  the  hands  of  the  landlord.  In  the  absence  of  an 
express  stipulation  to  that  effect  and  having  in  view  the  fact 
that  the  damages  for  a  breach  of  contract  to  pay  rent  are  easy 
of  computation  and  ascertainment,  the  deposit  will  be  regarded 
as  a  penalty  and  the  balance  thereof,  after  deducting  the  rent 
due,  belongs  to  the  tenant,"*  who  may  maintain  an  action  to  re- 

2  Caesar  v.  Robinson,  174  N.  Y.  3  Longobardi     v.     Yuliano,      33 

492,  498,  67  N.  E.  Rep.  58,  revers-  Misc.  Rep.  472,  67  N.  Y.  Supp.  902. 

ing    71    App.    Div.    180,    75    N.    Y.  *  Chaude  v.   Shepard,  122  N.  Y. 

Supp.  544;  Chaude  v.  Shepard,  122  397,  400,  25  N.  B.  Rep.  358;   Scott 

N.  Y.  397;    Scott  v.  Montells,  109  v.  Montells,  109  N.  Y.  1;   Kahn  v. 

N.   Y.    1,    14   N.   Y.    S.   R.   21,    28;  Tobias,  16  Misc.  Rep.  83,  37  N.  Y. 

Weekly.   Dig.   159,   15   N.   E.   Rep.  Supp.  G32. 

720.  ' 


SECURITY   FOR   THE   RENT. 


585 


cover  the  same.'  "Where,  however,  a  tenant  is  dispossessed  for 
not  paying  rent,  the  amount  of  which  is  the  same  as  the  amount 
which  he  has  on  deposit  for  security,  he  cannot  recover  any 
part  of  the  deposit.*^ 

§  370.  The  tenant's  right  to  the  return  of  his  deposit.  A 
landlord  to  whom  money  or  personal  property  is  delivered  by 
the  tenant  to  be  held  by  the  landlord  as  security  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  rent  or  the  performance  of  covenants,  is  entitled 
to  its  absolute  possession  during  the  term,  and  he  may  maintain 


s  The  failure  to  pay  rent  does 
not  operate  as  a  forfeiture.  If  the 
deposit  is  for  indemnity  the  land- 
lord is  not  confined  to  it  for  a  rem- 
edy. If  it  is  deposited  only  as  se- 
curity for  rent,  the  landlord  must 
plead  as  a  counterclaim  any  cause 
of  action  he  may  have  against  the 
tenant  for  the  breach  of  any  other 
covenant  in  an  action  by  the  ten- 
ant against  him  to  recover  the 
deposit.  Scott  v.  Montells,  14  N.  Y. 
S.  R.  21,  109  X.  Y.  1,  4,  15  N.  E. 
Rep.  720,  28  Weekly  Dig.  159. 

c  Sang  Shing  v.  Sire,  15  Misc. 
Rep.  139,  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  466.  But 
see  and  compare  Rosenquist  v. 
Canary,  15  Misc.  Rep.  148,  36  N. 
Y.  Supp.  979.  It  was  provided  that 
a  lessor  might,  in  case  of  a  va- 
cancy "during  the  term,"  enter  and 
relet  the  premises  with  a  deposit 
to  meet  any  deficiency  occurring 
by  reason  thereof.  The  ousting  of 
the  tenant  for  non-payment  of  rent 
is  a  vacancy  "during  the  term," 
and  a  deficiency  having  occurred 
thereby,  the  landlord  is  entitled 
to  recover  the  deposit.  Baldwin 
V.  Thibaudeau,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  532. 
28  Abb.  New  Cases,  14,  43  N.  Y. 
St.  Rep.  157.  In  Pennsylvania  a 
lessor  may,  under  the  act  of  March 
25,  1825,  §  2,  compel  a  tenant  to 
give  security  or  to  vacate.  The 
tenant  must  give  security  before 


proceedings  to  oust  him  have  be- 
gun. Ward  V.  Wandell,  10  Pa.  St. 
98.  A  subtenant  in  possession  by 
right  or  by  the  landlord's  consent 
may  tender  the  security  for  rent 
to  protect  himself,  but  a  subtenant 
in  possession  when  the  lease  for- 
bids subletting  has  no  right  to  do 
so,  nor  can  he  compel  the  original 
lessor  to  accept  it.  Shermer  v. 
Paciells,  161  Pa.  St.  69,  28  Atl. 
Rep.  995,  34  W.  N.  C.  252.  "The 
circumstance  that  the  deposit  is 
described  in  the  lease  as  liquidated 
damages  for  a  breach  of  the  agree- 
ment is  not  at  all  conclusive.  The 
character  of  the  deposit,  whether 
liquidated  damages  or  a  penalty, 
depends  upon  the  intention  of  the 
parties  as  disclosed  by  the  situa- 
tion and  by  the  terms  of  the  in- 
strument. The  deposit  is  not  nec- 
essarily to  be  regarded  as  liqui- 
dated damages,  although  it  is  ex- 
pressly so  stated  in  the  instru- 
ment. Whether  it  is  that  or  a 
penalty  depends  upon  the  nature 
of  the  transaction  and  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties.  This  has  been 
frequently  held  in  the  case  of  an 
ordinary  lease,  and  where  the 
amount  was  largely  out  of  propor- 
tion to  the  damages  suffered  by 
the  breach  of  the  lease  "  By  the 
court  in  Caesar  v.  Robinson,  174 
N.  Y.   492,  on   page  496,  67  N.  E. 


586  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

an  action  to  recover  possession  against  any  person.'  A  tenant 
Avho  has  paid  all  rent  due  and  who  has  properly  performed  all 
the  covenants  and  conditions  of  the  lease  on  his  part  is  en- 
titled to  have  his  deposit  returned  and  may  sue  and  recover 
the  same  upon  implied  contract  or  upon  the  principle  of  a 
conversion  of  the  same  by  the  landlord  after  a  demand  and 
refusal  to  pay.  This  he  may  do  as  soon  as  the  lease  is  ter- 
minated, whether  by  the  natural  expiration  of  the  term  by 
the  efflux  of  time  or  by  a  surrender  or  a  rescission.  The  land- 
lord may  show  in  such  an  action  that  the  tenant  has  failed 
to  pay  the  rent  or  other  charges  as  they  have  accrued  and  he 
may  obtain  judgment  for  the  amount  which  the  tenant  is  in. 
arrears.  If  the  tenant  has  failed  to  pay  rent  he  has  no  standing 
to  demand  that  a  deposit  to  secure  rent  for  the  last  two  months 
of  the  term  shall  be  applied  to  other  months  for  which  rent  is 
due.  '  Nor  can  he  resist  a  dispossess  proceedings  upon  such 
grounds.^  A  tenant  who  has  deposited  money  with  his  landlord 
as  security  in  case  of  his  failure  to  perform,  and  particularly  in 
case  of  his  default  in  paying  the  last  three  months  of  rent  re- 
served, may,  where  he  is  in  default  before  the  three  last  months 
and  the  lease  is  surrendered,  recover  from  the  lessor  the  amount 
of  deposit  in  excess  of  the  rent  which  is  due  and  the  taxes  which 
the  tenant  has  agreed  to  pay.^ 

Rep.    582,   reversing  71   App.    Div.  money    deposited    was    concerned. 

180,  75  N.  Y.  Supp.  544.  the  parties  were  merely  debtor  and 

7  Chamblee  v.  McKenzie,  31  Ark.  creditor,  and  that  the  tenant 
155.  could  not,  while  continuing  to  re- 

8  Rosenquist  v.  Canary,  15  Misc.  main  in  the  premises,  refuse  to 
Rep.  148,  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  979.  pay  his  rent  and  ask  to  have  the 

9  Hecklan  v.  Hauser,  71  N.  J.  deposit  applied  to  the  rent  merely 
Law,  478,  59  Atl.  Rep.  18.  A  ten-  because  the  landlord  was  a  bank- 
ant,  as  security  that  he  would  rupt  and  the  demised  premises 
faithfully  perform  all  the  cove-  were  threatened  with  a  foreclo- 
nants  of  the  lease,  deposited  a  sum  sure  suit,  on  a  mortgage  which 
of  money  in  the  hands  of  his  land-  antedated  the  lease.  The  principle 
lord,  on  which  the  latter  was  to  laid  down  in  this  decision  as  above 
pay  interest.  The  money  thus  de-  set  forth  is  manifestly  unjust  to 
posited  was  to  be  applied  to  pay  the  tenant  in  taking  his  special 
the  rent  for  the  last  six  months  deposit  and  applying  it  to  the 
of  the  term.  On  the  bankruptcy  debts  of  the  bankrupt  landlord, 
of  the  landlord   during  the  term  In  re  Banner,  149  Fed.  Rep.  936. 

it   was   held   that,   so    far  as   the 


SECURITY    FOR    THE   RENT,  5S7 

§  371.  Deposit  made  by  a  tenant  with  landlord  on  contract 
to  make  a  lease.     The  question  whether  a  sum  of  money  is  a 
penalty  or  is  liquidated  damages  frequently  arises  when  parties 
enter  into  an  agreement  to  make  a  lea.se,  and  the  tenant  deposits 
with  or  pays  to  the  landlord  a  certain  sum  of  money  to  he  ap- 
plied to  the  rent  as  soon  as  the  formal  lease  is  executed.     If, 
through  the  fault  of  the  prospective  tenant  and  without  any 
fault  on  the  part  of  the  landlord,  the  future  lease  is  not  exe- 
cuted, the  deposit  is  forfeited  and  becomes  the  property  of  the 
landlord  if  it  was  not  a  penalty  but  liquidated  damages.     If. 
on  the  other  hand,  the  lease  is  not  executed  through  the  fault 
of  the  landlord,  the  tenant  may  recover  his  deposit  in  an  action 
at  law.     The  question  whether  the  landlord  is  limited  in  his 
damages  for  a  failure  of  the  tenant  to  make  the  lease  to  the 
amount  deposited  with  him  by  the  tenant  frequently  arises  and 
is  only  to  be  answered  after  it  has  been  detennined  whether  the 
deposit  is  a  penalty  or  liquidated  damages.     If  the  deposit  is 
liquidated  damages,  then  the  landlord  is  limited  to  the  recovery 
of  that  amount  and  he  cannot  recover  further  damages  for  the 
failure  of  the  tenant  to  execute  the  lease.     Thus,  where  a  tenant 
who  had  agreed  to  take  a  lease  and  had  deposited  a  sum  of 
money  with  the  owner  of  the  premises  to  show  his  good  faith, 
fails  to   execute  a  lease,   the   extent   of  the   owner's   recovery 
for  a  breach  of  contract  to  take  the  lea.se  was  the  sum  deposited 
which  was  in  fact  liquidated  damages.^"     So,  generally  a  de- 
posit to  secure  the  fulfillment  of  the  depositor's  agreement  to 
take  a  lease  and  which  is  not  a  penalty  for  a  refusal  to  take 
it,  can  be  retained  only  in  case  of  damages  actually  resulting 
from  the  refusal  to  take  the  lease.    In  the  absence  of  an  allega- 
tion and  proof  of  actual  damages,  there  is  no  presumption  that 
any  damages  were  received  as  the  result  of  the  refusal  to  ac- 
cept the  lease,  and  where  damages  are  not  shown,  the  depositor 
is  entitled  to  the  return  of  his  deposit.^^    For  if  from  the  terms 
of  the  agreement  to  execute  a  lease,  it  is  clear  that  the  deposit 
was  to  be  liquidated  damages,  the  landlord  cannot  retain  it  un- 
less he   proves  that   he   has   been    damaged.      In    determining 
whether  a  deposit  is  liquidated  damages  or  a  penalty,  the  fol- 
lowing consideration  must  be  kept  in  view.     ^Vhere  the  subject 

i"SchlumT)f  V.  Sasake,  38  Wash.  n  Weinberg   v.    Greenberger,    93 

278,  80  Pac.  Rep.  457.  N.  Y.  Supp.  530. 


588  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

matter  of  a  contract  is  such  that  the  damages  for  its  breach  may 
readily  be  computed  by  the  application  of  well  established  and 
definite  rules,  the  courts  will  usually  treat  the  deposit  as  a  pen- 
alty especially  if  there  shall  be  a  great  difference  between  the 
amount  of  the  deposit  and  the  amount  which  the  party  who 
has  agreed  to  execute  the  lease  will  lose  by  the  failure  of  the 
prospective  lessee  to  accept  it.  If  one  who  has  agreed  to  lease 
premises  from  their  owner  refuses  to  do  so  when  called  upon  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  owner  to  at  once  proceed  to  lease  the  property 
and  the  measure  of  his  damages  is  the  loss  which  he  incurs  in 
case  he  has  to  accept  a  lease  at  a  lower  rent  from  some  other 
person  than  the  prospective  lessee  under  the  agreement  has 
agreed  to  pay  him.  He  will  not  be  prevented  from  recovering 
this  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  lessee  has  deposited  a  merely 
nominal  sum  as  security  that  he  will  take  the  lease. 

§  372.  The  general  rule  as  to  liquidated  damages.  The  par- 
ties to  a  lease  or  to  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease  may  agree  upon 
and  insert  in  the  lease  or  agreement  any  sum  as  compensation 
for  a  breach  of  the  covenants  of  the  lease  or  for  a  failure  to 
make  the  lease,  and  the  courts  will  be  bound  by  this  agreement 
for  liquidated  damages  where  the  sum  does  not  exceed  the  ac- 
tual damages  suffered.  But  on  the  other  hand,  where  the  sum 
named  is  manifestly  above  the  damages  which  have  been  suf- 
fered, and  the  damages  are  such  as  can  readily  be  proved  at 
law,  such  sum  though  it  is  expressly  inserted  in  the  contract  and 
is  called  liquidated  damages  by  the  parties  to  it,  will  be  regarded 
by  the  law  as  a  penalty  merely  to  insure  prompt  payment  or 
performance.  If  it  shall  appear  from  the  evidence  that  all  at- 
tempts to  get  at  the  actual  and  certain  amount  of  the  damages 
would  be  in  vain,  the  courts  will  incline  to  accept  the  estimate 
of  damages  which  the  parties  themselves  have  agreed  upon,  but 
if  a  strict  construction  of  the  clause  fixing  the  damages  would 
work  injustice  or  an  absurdity,  the  use  of  the  term  liquidated 
damages  will  not  prevent  an  inquiry  by  the  court  into  the  actual 
damages  sustained.^-  Upon  the  general  principles  of  the  law 
of  contract,  the  court  will  be  guided  in  its  inquiry  whether  the 

12  Consolidated  Coal  Co.  of  St.  4G9,  5  Sandf.  192;  Colwell  v.  Law- 
Louis,  150  111.  344,  37  N.  E.  Rep.  lence,  38  N.  Y.  71;  Little  v.  Banks, 
937;  Cotheal  v.  Talmage,  9  N.  Y.  85  N.  Y.  258;  Chaude  v.  Shepard, 
551;    Bagley  v.    Peddie,    16   N.    Y.  122  N.  Y.  397,  401. 


SECURITY  FOR   THE   RENT. 


589 


sum  named  is  liquidated  damages  by  the  language  used  by  the 
parties  as  evidence  of  their  intention  and  aJso  by  the  facts  and 
circumstances  of  the  case.  The  use  of  the  words  penalty  or 
liquidated  damages  is  not  of  course  controlling,  though  it 
may  be  considered.  The  ease  and  difficulty  of  ascertaining  the 
damages,  the  size  and  amount  of  the  deposit  as  compared  with 
the  loss  which  will  be  incurred,  and  the  facility  with  which  a 
new  lessee  may  be  secured  by  the  owner,  must  all  be  taken  into 
consideration.^^ 

§  373.  Chattel  mortguge  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  rent. 
The  tenant  may,  in  order  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  rent  to 
the  landlord,  execute  a  chattel  mortgage  to  the  latter,  condi- 


13  The  importance  of  distin- 
guishing between  a  forfeiture  and 
liquidated  damages  lies  in  the  fol- 
lowing particulars:  If  the  amount 
is  a  penalty,  the  damages  only  can 
be  collected,  and  although  judg- 
ment be  given  for  the  penalty,  an 
execution  can  issue  only  for  the 
amount  assessed  by  the  jury.  On 
the  other  hand,  where  the  damages 
are  expressly  liquidated  by  the 
lease,  it  constitutes  a  debt  which 
may  be  recovered  in  an  action  at 
law  upon  mere  proof  of  the  con- 
tract and  of  the  breach  without 
any  actual  proof  of  the  real  dam- 
ages which  have  been  sustained, 
if  the  damages  have  been  pleaded 
as  liquidated.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, if  the  jury  shall  find  in 
favor  of  the  plaintiff,  they  must 
render  a  verdict  for  the  whole  sum 
stipulated  as  damages  though  it 
may  be  too  large  in  proportion. 
They  cannot  find  for  the  plaintiff 
in  the  actual  amount  of  damages 
sustained.  As  to  set  off  of  a  coun- 
terclaim, if  the  amount  is  a  mere 
penalty,  it  cannot  be  set  off.  On 
the  other  hand,  liquidated  dam- 
ages may  always  be  set  off  in  an 
action  brought  on  a  covenant  in 
the   lease.     Where    the   action    is 


brought  for  liquidated  damages,  it 
may  be  stayed  by  a  tender  of  the 
exact  amount  with  interest  and 
costs  accompanied  by  a  payment 
into  court.  So  where  the  action  is 
for  unliquidated  damages,  the  de- 
fendant may  pay  into  court  a  sum 
of  money  which  he  claims  to  be 
sufficient  to  meet  the  damages  in- 
curred by  the  plaintiff,  and  if  the 
plaintiff  fails  to  recover  a  greater 
sum,  he  cannot  recover  costs.  In 
an  action  to  enforce  a  penalty 
which  is  usually  of  an  equitable 
nature,  the  payment  of  the  pen- 
alty in  court  does  not  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  express  statute,  pre- 
vent the  enforcement  of  a  forfeit- 
ure. The  defendant's  remedy  in 
such  cases  is  an  equitable  one.  So, 
also,  though  a  court  of  equity  will, 
where  the  circumstances  require 
it,  grant  relief  against  a  forfeiture 
arising  from  an  enforcement  of  a 
penalty,  it  will  not  restrain  an  ac- 
tion to  recover  liquidated  dam- 
ages. Nor  will  it  restrain  the  ten- 
ant from  doing  an  act  during  the 
term  upon  the  land  which  he  may 
do  at  the  risk  of  paying  liquidated 
damages.  In  conclusion,  it  should 
be  said,  an  increase  in  rent, 
though  not  in  the  nature  of  liqui- 


590  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

tioned  to  be  void  if  the  rent  is  promptly  and  fully  paid.  The 
general  rules  applicable  to  the  subject  of  chattel  mortgages  are 
applicable  to  the  case.  Thus,  the  assignee  of  the  mortgage 
stands  in  the  place  and  stead  of  his  assignor,  the  lessor,  and 
where  the  lessor  is  also  the  mortgagor  of  the  premises,  the  as- 
signee takes  the  chattel  mortgage  subject  to  the  rights  of  the 
mortgagee  of  the  realty  and  to  a  foreclosure  action  then  pend- 
ing. Where,  pending  a  foreclosure,  a  person  talces  a  lease  from 
the  mortgagor,  securing  the  rent  by  a  chattel  mortgage  which  is 
subsequently  assigned,  the  assignee  though  no  party,  to  the  fore- 
closure, takes  subject  to  all  the  equities  and  infirmities  produced 
by  the  final  decree  in  foreclosure.  He  is  not  bound  by  pro- 
ceedings to  appoint  a  receiver  or  to  compel  the  tenant  to  pay 
the  rent  to  such  receiver  unless  he  shall  have  notice  to  which  he 
is  entitled.  The  court  will  examine  the  equities  of  the  several 
claimants  to  the  rents  during  the  pendency  of  the  foreclosure 
proceedings.  If  the  plaintiff  in  foreclosure  has  neglected  to 
include  the  rents  in  his  security,  he  has  no  equitable  claim  as 
against  the  chattel  mortgagee  (the  owner  of  the  equity)  or  his 
assignee.  All  that  the  mortgagee  is  entitled  to  is  the  immediate 
possession  of  the  premises  as  security  for  his  debt  from  the  date 
a  receiver  is  appointed  but  he  has  no  right  to  any  possession  as 
to  rents  accruing  before  that  time.^*  The  fact  that  a  landlord, 
holding  a  mortgage  on  his  tenant's  chattels  as  security  for  the 
rent,  takes  possession  of  them  on  their  abandonment  by  the 
tenant  does  not  work  a  satisfaction  of  the  debt.^'  He  may  sue 
and  recover  the  balance  due  in  an  action  either  of  debt  or  cove- 
nant. A  mortgage  given  by  the  tenant  on  his  future  crops  to 
secure  the  rent  during  the  term  is  valid.  Any  property  which 
may  be  sold  may  also  be  mortgaged.  If  the  crops  are  to  be 
grown  upon  the  land  and  the  tenant  is  in  actual  possession  of 
it,  the  future  crops  are  then  an  accretion  and  addition  to  the 
land  which  may  reasonably  be  expected  to  come  into  existence 
during  the  term  and  hence  they  may  be  mortgaged. ^^     On  the 

dated  damages,  may  be  distrained  Supp.   813.     See,  also,  same  case, 

for,   but  a   penalty   can  never  be  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  1029,  16  Daly   (N. 

distrained  for.  Y.)  349,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  494,  30  N. 

I*  Zeiter  v.  Bowman,  6  Barb.  (N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  432. 

Y.)    133.  1"  Jones  V.  Webster,  48  Ala.  109, 

"Lathers    v.    Hunt,    13    N.    Y.  112. 


SECURITY   FOR   THE    RENT.  591 

other  hand,  if  the  tenant  though  he  may  mortgage  his  own  crops 
which  will  be  the  result  of  his  own  labor,  shall  attempt  to  secure 
his  rent  by  a  mortgage  on  a  crop  raised  by  another,  though  upon 
the  same  land,  the  mortgage  will  be  unenforceable  for  the  mort- 
gagor has  no  title  and  may  never  have  one.  Lessees  interested 
as  co-partners  in  the  tilling  of  the  premises  and  who  are  to 
receive  a  share  of  the  future  crop  are  bound  by  a  mortgage  by 
one^  of  their  number  of  the  future  crop  as  security  for  rent, 
though  it  be  not  recorded.^" 

§  374.  Construction  of  an  agreement  to  give  security.  An 
agreement  that  a  tenant  shall  give  sufficient  security  for  rent 
is  satisfied  by  either  personal  security  or  security  upon  real  es- 
tate so  long  as  it  is  adequate.  The  fact  that  real  estate  given 
as  security  is  incumbered  is  not  alone  conclusive  that  it  is  in- 
sufficient. It  may  on  the  contrary,  be  abundantly  adequate. 
The  tenant  is  not  bound  to  execute  and  tendc  a  mortgage  if 
the  landlord  refuses  to  accept  real  estate  offered  as  security. 
The  law  does  not  require  the  performance  of  a  useless  ceremony. 
Nor  is  the  tenant  bound  to  give  the  landlord  under  such  cir- 
cumstances "any  more  explicit  information  as  to  the  nature  and 
value  of  the  property.  The  tenant  has  the  whole  of  the  day 
on  which  the  lease  is  to  commence  to  furnish  the  security  and 
though  he  may  have  refused  or  declined  to  furnish  it  in  the 
earlier  part  of  the  day,  he  may  change  his  mind  and  do  so  sub- 
sequently during  the  day.^* 

§  375.  "When  the  principal  and  the  surety  on  a  lease  may 
be  sued  jointly.  A  person  who  in  the  character  of  a  surety 
joins  in  the  execution  of  the  lease  and  agrees  to  pay  the  rent  in 
ease  the  lessee  does  not  is  primarily  liable  and  may,  and  indeed 
must,  be  joined  as  a  defendant  in  an  action  by  the  lessor  for  the 
rent.^**  Thus,  where  a  lease  is  signed  by  A  whose  name  is  in 
after  the  name  of  the  latter  there  are  the  words  "as  security 
for  A,"  both  may  be  joined  -"  in  an  action.  The  liability  of  the 
principal  and  surety  must  be  created  by  the  same  instrument  in 
order  that  they  may  be  joined  as  defendants.-^     A  person  who 

17  Jones  V.  "Webster,  48  Ala.  ,109,  Reeves,  48  Pa.  St.  472;  Carman  v. 

112.  Plass,  23  N.  Y.  286,  287. 

isHard  v.  Brown,  18  Vt.  S7,  97.  20  Decker  v.  Gaylord,  8  Hun  (IT. 

i9McLott    V.    Savery,    11    Iowa,  Y.)  110. 

323,   325;    City  of  Philadelphia  v.  21  Carman  v.  Pla.s.<?,  23  N.  Y.  286. 


592  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

by  an  independent  writing  executed  after  the  lease  lias  been 
signed.^^  or  by  an  indorsement  upon  the  lease,'^  becomes  a 
surety  for  the  lessee,  is  not  within  the  rule  and  cannot  be  joined 
with  his  principal  in  an  action  brought  against  the  tenant  to 
recover  the  rent. 

§  376.  General  rule  as  to  the  liability  of  the  guarantor.  In 
the  case  of  a  guarantee  of  the  payment  of  rent  under  seal,  a 
consideration  need  not  be  expressed  but  will  be  presumed  from 
the  fact  of  a  seal  being  attached.^*  The  consideration  for  a 
guarantee  of  rent  need  not  proceed  from  the  lessor  to  the  guar- 
antor. The  acceptance  of  the  lessee  and  his  entry  into  posses- 
sion by  the  permission  of  the  lessor  will  ordinarily  be  a  sufficient 
consideration.  So,  an  agreement  by  a  lessee  who  occupies  the 
demised  premises  as  a  saloon  that  he  will  sell  the  beer  manufac- 
tured and  sold  by  the  guarantor  is  a  sufficient  consideration  for 
the  contract  of  guaranty.-^  If  there  is  no  express  requirement 
in  the  guarantee  that  the  lessor  shall  first  obtain  judgment 
against  the  lessee  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  guarantor  be- 
ing called  upon  to  pay,  none  can  be  implied.  The  failure  of  the 
lessee  to  pay  the  rent  when  it  accrues  is  a  breach  of  covenant 
and  the  lessor  may  at  once  proceed  against  the  guarantor.  It 
is  the  duty  of  the  guarantor  to  ascertain  whether  the  lessee  has 
kept  his  covenants  with  the  lessor  and  to  know  whether  he  has 
paid  rent  and  the  lessor  is  not  for  this  reason  required  to  give 

22  Tourtelott  v.  Junkin,  4  Blackf.  its  beer  alone,  and  receives  the 
(Ind.)  483;  Phalen  v.  Dinger,  4  E.  benefit  of  the  contract,  it  is  es- 
D.  Smith  (N.  Y.)  379.  topped,  as  against  the  lessor,  from 

23  Virden  v.  Ellsworth,  15  Ind.  asserting  that  its  contract  was 
144.  Contra,  as  to  a  surety  by  in-  ultra  vires.  A  guarantor  who 
dorsement  on  the  lease  where  the  guarantees  a  saloonkeeper's  lease 
statute  expressly  provides  that  on  an  agreement  of  the  latter  to 
persons  "severally  liable  on  the  sell  his  beer,  with  a  provision  in 
same  instrument,  including  sure-  the  lease  that  it  will  not  be  as- 
ties  on  the  same  instrument,"  may  signed  by  the  lessee  without  the 
be  sued  together.  Lucy  v.  Willcins,  consent  of  the  guarantor,  or  that 
33  Minn.  21,  21  N.  W.  Rep.  849.  the  premises  will  not  be  used  for 

24  Roth  V.  Adams,  185  Mass.  341,  anything  but  saloon  purposes,  has 
70  N.  E.  Rep.  445.  a   beneficial    interest  in   the   lease 

25  Standard  Brewery  v.  Kelly,  66  and  it  cannot  be  surrendered  wi th- 
ill.   App.    267,    holding   also   that  out  his  consent.     St.  Louis  Brew- 

,  where   a  brewing  company   guar-      ing  Ass'n  v.  Kaltenbach,  108  Mo. 
antees  the  lease  of  a  saloonkeeper       App.  637,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  151. 
on  consideration  that  he  will  soil 


SECURITY  FOR   THE   RENT,  593 

notice  to  the  guarantor  of  the  default  of  the  lessee  in  the  pay- 
ment of  the  rent  as  a  condition  precedent  to  bringing  an  action 
against  the  guarantor.^^  A  lessee  who  has  assigned  the  lease 
and  has  guaranteed  the  payment  of  the  rent  by  the  assignee  is 
not  entitled  to  notice  of  the  default  of  the  latter.^^  If,  however, 
it  is  stipulated  in  the  contract  of  guarantee  that  a  demand  for 
the  rent  shall  be  first  made  upon  the  tenant  a  demand  and  a 
refusal  of  the  tenant  to  pay  must  be  proved  as  a  part  of  the 
plaintiff's  case.^^  If  after  the  surety  or  guarantor  has  entered 
into  his  contract,  the  terms  of  the  lease  are  altered  by  an  agree- 
ment between  the  landlord  and  the  tenant  without  the  consent 
of  the  surety  or  guarantor,  the  liability  of  the  latter  is  then  at 
an  end  for  the  reason  that  the  covenants  of  the  lease  are  no 
longer  binding  on  the  tenant,  he  having  been  released  by  the 
making  of  a  new  cotnract.-^  The  change  or  alteration  of  the 
lease  does  not,  however,  defeat  the  liability  of  the  surety  or 
guarantor  as  to  rent  or  breaches  of  covenants  in  the  lease  which 
have  accrued  before  the  damage  was  made.  Nor  is  the  surety 
released  from  his  liability  to  pay  accrued  rent  by  the  fact  that 
the  landlord  accepts  a  surrender  of  the  premises  and  expressly 
releases  the  tenant  from  the  payment  of  subsequent  rent.^° 

§  377.  Surety's  liability  upon  a  renewal  of  lease.  The  lia- 
bility of  one  who  has  guaranteed  the  payment  of  rent  on  a  lease 
which  provides  for  a  renewal  at  the  option  of  the  lessee  con- 
tinues during  the  new  term  which  the  lessee  elects  to  take  if  it 
is  merely  an  extension  or  continuance  of  the  old  term.  Thus, 
if  the  lease  be  for  one  year  with  an  option  to  extend  it  for  four 
years  and  the  lessee  executes  the  option  by  remaining  in  posses- 
sion and  paying  rent  or  by  giving  notice  to  the  lessor  where  a 
notice  is  required  by  the  lease,  the  liability  of  the  guarantor  con- 
tinues down  to  the  end  of  the  second  or  extended  term.  The 
surety  cannot  thereafter  relieve  himself  of  liability  on  the  new 
term  by  notice  to  the  lessor  that  he  will  not  be  liable. ^^     The 

26  Roth     V.     Adams,    185     Mass.  2s  Folsom    v.    Squire,    70    N.    J. 

341,  70  N.  E.  Rep.  445.     See,  also,  Law,  430,  60  Atl.  Rep.  1102. 

Hayes  v.    Kyle.    8    Allen    (Mass.)  29  People  v.  Vilas,  36  N.  Y.  457; 

300,    301;     Welch    v.    Walsh,    177  Grant  v.  Smith.  46  N.  Y.  93. 

Mass.  555.  59  N.  E.  Rep.  440.  so  Kingsbury  v.  Westfall,  61  N. 

27Giergen    v.    Schmidt,    69     111.  Y.  361. 

App.  53S.  31  Shand   v.   McCloskey,    27    Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  Rep.  260, 
38 


594  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

surety  is  bound  to  ascertain  the  rights  and  privile<?es  of  the 
parties  to  the  lease  which  he  has  guaranteed.  The  option  in  the 
tenant  to  have  an  extension  if  he  shall  so  elect  being  in  the 
original  lease  with  which  it  will  be  presumed  the  surety  is  fam- 
iliar, he  will  be  bound  not  only  during  the  original  term  but 
also  during  any  possible  term  for  which  the  lease  is  extended. 
If  the  lease  upon  which  he  is  surety  instead  of  providing  for 
an  extension  requires  the  execution  of  a  new  lease  upon  the  re- 
quest or  demand  of  the  tenant,  the  surety  will  not  necessarily  be 
bound  to  see  to  the  performance  of  the  stipulations  by  the  lessee 
under  the  new  lease  unless  he  expressly  agrees  to  do  so.  The 
termination  of  the  original  lease  and  the  execution  of  a  new 
one  by  the  jjarties  will  be  regarded  in  law  as  a  surrender  of  the 
former  lease  by  which  the  liabilities  of  the  parties  under  the  old 
lease  are  absolutely  terminated. 

§  378.  The  discharge  or  release  of  the  surety.  Under  gen- 
eral principles  of  the  law  of  contract,  a  surety  for  the  payment 
of  the  rent  or  the  performance  of  other  covenants  by  the  tenant 
will  be  discharged  from  all  liability  under  circumstances  where 
the  tenant  is  discharged.  The  payment  by  the  tenant  of  the 
rent  discharges  the  surety,  but  where  the  payment  is  made  in 
the  shape  of  a  note  by  the  tenant,  it  is  no  discharge  of  the  surety 
unless  the  note  is  paid  at  maturity  where  it  is  not  expressly 
agreed  that  the  note  is  to  be  accepted  in  payment.^-  Thus,  even 
the  giving  of  a  note  by  the  tenant  which  is  secured  by  a  chattel 
mortgage  is  not  a  payment. ^^  The  surrender  of  the  premises 
by  the  lessee  and  their  acceptance  by  the  lessor  will  at  once 
terminate  the  liability  of  a  person  who  has  agreed  to  guarantee 
the  payment  of  the  rent.  So,  also,  the  lessee  is  entitled  on  a 
surrender  or  rescission  of  the  lease  to  be  repaid  by  the  lessor 
the  amount  of  money  deposited  by  him  as  security  for  the  pay- 
ment of  rent  or  for  the  performance  of  the  stipulations  of  the 
lease,  if  he  is  not  in  default,  or  if  he  is  in  default  such  an 

32  Kendig    v.    Kendig.    ?,    Pitts.  landlord  accepting  a  draft  drawn 

287;  Woodbridge  v.  Richardson,  2  on  a  third  person,  and  it  was  held 

T.  C.   (N.  Y.)   418.  that  this  was  not  a  pajTiient  un- 

83  In  a  case  where  the   defend-  less  it  was  mutually  understood  to 

ant  was  sued  on  his  guarantee  to  be  a  payment  by  all  the  parties  to 

pay  the  rent,  it  was  claimed  that  the  lease.   Bernham  v.  Hubbard,  36 

the   tenant    was    released    by    the  Conn.  539. 


SECURITY   FOR   THE   RENT.  595 

amount  of  the  deposit  as  he  may  be  entitled  after  deducting  the 
rent  then  due  and  in  arrears.^*  Where  a  lessee  sublet  and  va- 
cated the  premises  leaving-  a  deposit  in  the  hands  of  the  lessor, 
the  lessee  is  entitled  to  the  return  of  his  deposit  upon  the  lessor 
subsequently  accepting  a  surrender  from  the  subtenant.^^  In 
the  action  against  one  who  has  guaranteed  the  payment  of  the 
rent,  it  is  a  good  defense  to  show  that  the  tenant  has  assigned 
his  lease  with  the  consent  of  the  landlord  and  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  guarantor.  For  it  is  a  general  rule  of  the  law  of 
guarantee  that  if  the  person  who  is  guaranteed  releases  the 
principal  debtor,  the  guarantor  is  also  released.  Hence,  if  the 
landlord  consents  to  the  assignment  of  the  lease  and  accepts  the 
assignee  as  his  tenant  and  it  is  clear  that  the  landlord  intended 
thereby  to  release  the  tenant  from  his  liability  to  pay  rent,  and 
this  was  done  without  the  knowledge  of  the  guarantor,  it  is  a 
good  defense  in  an  action  by  the  landlord  against  the  guarantor; 
and  a  judgment  for  the  rent  taken  by  the  landlord  against  the 
tenant  after  the  latter  had  assigned  his  lease  does  not  preclude 
the  guarantor  in  an  action  brought  against  him  from  showing 
all  the  facts  relating  to  the  assignment  of  the  lease  by  the  ten- 
ant.^*' The  surety  is  not  released  if  the  tenant  abandons  the 
premises  without  a  sufficient  legal  cause  even  though  the  lessor 
by  his  own  motion  or  at  the  request  of  the  surety,  rents  them  to 
some  other  person.^^  Where  the  lease  provides  that  the  landlord 
may  re-let  the  premises  if  they  become  vacant  and  apply  the 
proceeds  of  the  re-letting  to  the  former  tenant's  indebtedness, 
and  a  surety,  on  learning  that  the  tenant  cannot  pay  the  rent, 
informs  the  landlord  that  he  must  re-let  the  premises  and  he 
does  so,  and  the  original  tenant  removed  and  the  new  tenant 
agrees  to  pay  rent,  it  was  held  that  this  not  being  a  surrender, 
the  former  tenant  and  his  surety  were  still  liable. ^^  So,  the 
mere  fact  that  a  landlord  finds  a  stranger  in  possession  of  the 
premises  before  the  term  has  expired  and  receives  the  rent  from 
him,  does  not  release  the  surety,  particularly  where  the  lessor 

34  Kahn  v.  Tobias,  16  Misc.  Rep.  3^  McKensie   v.   Farrel,   4   Bosw. 
83,  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  632.  (N.  Y.)   192. 

35  Carson  v.  Arvantes,   10   Colo.  -"s  Ogden  v.  Rowe,  3  E.  D.  Smith. 
App.  382,  50  Pac.  Rep.  1080.  (N.  Y.)   312. 

36  Fleck  V.  Fieldman,  104  N.  Y. 
Supp.  366. 


596  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

had  not  been  notified  that  the  lessee  had  assigned  or  sublet,  the 
premises.^^  If  there  is  evidence  of  a  surrender  either  express 
or  in  contemplation  of  law,  the  surety  is  released  from  rent  sub- 
sequently accruing,  but  not  for  rent  which  had  accrued  prior 
to  the  surrender.  Thus  where  a  landlord  accepted  the  posses- 
sion of  the  premises  from  the  sub-tenant,  receiving  from  him 
goods  which  he  agreed  to  sell  and  to  accept  the  proceeds  in  re- 
lease and  discharge  of  the  rent  which  might  be  due  him  from 
the  original  lessee  up  to  the  surrender,  the  surety  would  be 
discharged,  and  tlie  original  lessee  may  at  once  recover  a  deposit 
made  by  him  as  security  for  the  rent  as  his  liability  for  future 
rent  is  at  an  end.*°  The  eviction  of  the  tenant  by  the  landlord 
or  by  a  paramount  title  inasmuch  as  it  puts  an  end  to  the  rights 
and  liabilities  of  the  parties  to  the  lease,  releases  the  surety  of 
the  tenant  from  all  liability  which  would  accrue  after  the  date 
of  the  eviction.  It  must  appear,  however,  that  there  was  an  ac- 
tual ouster  of  the  tenant  for  anything  short  of  this,  though  con- 
sisting of  a  trespass  or  an  interference  with  the  convenience  and 
-enjoyment  of  the  premises  by  the  tenant,  will  not  release  the 
surety.  So,  a  surety  cannot  set  up  in  an  action  brought  against 
him  by  the  landlord  the  fact  that  the  buildings  were  destroyed 
by  fire,  where  the  landlord  has  covenanted  to  rebuild  them.*'^ 
But  it  is  likely  where  the  matter  is  regulated  by  the  modern  stat- 
utes which  provide  that  a  destruction  of  the  premises  shall  put 
an  end  to  the  lease,  that  where  the  premises  are  totally  destroyed 
by  fire  or  other  casualty,  so  that  the  liability  for  rent  on  the 
part  of  the  tenant  is  at  an  end,  the  surety  would  also  be  re- 
leased. Anything  which  releases  a  surety  from  his  liability 
for  a  tenant  will  also  entitle  the  tenant  to  the  repayment  of 
money  deposited  by  him  as  security  for  rent.  So,  a  surety  is 
discharged  where  during  the  term,  the  lessor  sells  a  portion  of 
the  premises  with  the  consent  of  the  lessee,^^  and  where  the 
tenant  is  evicted  from  the  premises  during  the  term  because  they 
are  sold,  the  lessor  must  refund  money  which  has  been  deposited 

39  Wood   V.   Welz,    40   App.   Div.       firming  10  Colo.  App.  382,  50  Pac. 
202,  57  N.  Y.  Supp.  1121,  affirmed       Rep.  1080. 

in   1C7   N.  y.   570,   60   N.  E.    Rep.  »i  Kingsbury  v.   Westfall,   61  N. 

1122.  Y.  359. 

40  Carson   v.    Arvantes,  10  Colo.  42  stern  v.  Sawyer,  78  Vt.  5,  61 
App.    382,    59    Pac.    Rep.  737,    af-  All.  Rep.  36. 


SECURITY   FOR   THE   RENT. 


597 


by  the  tenant  for  the  faithful  performance  of  the  covenants  of 
his  lease.*'  The  surety  is  bound  only  during  the  term  actually 
named  in  the  lease.  If  the  tenant  holds  over,  the  surety  is  not 
bound  for  the  rent  beyond  the  first  year,  though  the  lease  is 
for  one  year,  ' '  with  the  privilege  of  the  lessee  to  retain  the  house 
as  long  as  he  may  wish."  **  The  contrary  is  the  rule  where  the 
lease  is  for  one  year  certain,  "and  for  another  year  if  the  ten- 
ant holds  over."  The  surety  continues  liable  after  the  onvj 
year  term  and  during  all  the  second  year  in  case  the  tenant  de- 
sires to  hold  over.*^  The  liability  of  one  who  guarantees  the  pay- 
jnent  of  rent  by  a  tenant  under  a  lease  with  a  privilege  of  a 
renewal  is  co-extensive  with  the  longest  possible  term  which 
may  be  created  by  a  renewal.*" 


43  Degnario  v.  Sire,  34  Misc. 
Rep.  163,  68  N.  Y.  Supp.  789.  The 
issuance  of  a  warrant  in  a  sum- 
mary proceeding  to  secure  posses- 
sion when  it  terminates  the  lia- 
bilities of  the  parties  to  one  an- 
other under  the  lease  releases  the 
guarantor  and  enables  the  tenant 
to  obtain  the  return  of  his  de- 
posit. A  deposit  as  security  for 
the  payment  of  rent  does  not  be- 
come the  property  of  the  lessor 
after  he  h..s  ousted  the  lessee  in 
summary  proceedings.  Yannuzzi 
V.  Grape,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  819.  The 
parties  may,  however,  by  their  ex- 
press words  used  in  the  lease  pro- 
vide that  a  deposit  may  be  for- 
feited as  liquidated  damages  if  the 
lessee  is  ousted  by  legal  proceed- 
ings and  if  such  be  the  case  and 
the  lessee  is  ousted  in  summary 
proceedings  for  the  non-payment 
of  rent  which  does  not  equal  the 
deposit,  the  lessee  cannot  recover 
the  balance.  Longobardi  v.  Yul- 
iano,  33  Misc.  Rep.  472,  67  N.  Y. 
Supp.  902.  So  where  the.  lessor 
has  an  option  under  the  lease  to 


dispossess  the  lessee  or  to  resort 
to  a  deposit  for  reimbursement 
with  a  right  to  re-enter  on  de- 
fault in  the  payment  of  rent,  the 
issuance  of  a  warrant  in  sum- 
mary proceedings  before  the  end 
of  the  term  does  not  entitle  the 
tenant  to  recover  the  deposit.  An- 
zolone  V.  Paskusz,  96  App.  Div. 
188,  89  N.  Y.  Supp.  203. 

4*  Brewer  v.  Thorp,  35  Ala.  9. 

45  Coe  v.  Hodges,  71  Pa.  St.  383. 

46Heffron  v.  Treber  (S.  D. 
1907),  110  N.  W.  Rep.  781.  Also 
holding  that  in  a  case  where  a 
tenant  had  the  privilege  of  a  re- 
newal for  two  years  his  holding 
over  without  any  new  agreement 
would  be  presumed  to  be  an  elec- 
tion on  his  part  to  renew  the 
lease  for  two  years  and  not  a 
mere  holding  over  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  landlord  by  which 
otherwise  he  would  under  a  state 
statute  be  a  tenant  for  one  year 
only.  The  guarantor  of  the  pay- 
ment of  the  rent  continued  liable 
for  the  renewal  term  of  two 
years. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

THE  COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE. 

379.  Definitions  and  general  conditions. 

380.  The  language  by  which  a  covenant  is  created. 

381.  The  construction  of  covenants  in  leases. 

382.  What  are  the  usual  and  proper  covenants 

383.  Whether  covenants  are  joint  or  several. 

384.  Dependent  and  independent  covenants. 
38-5.  The  enforcements  of  negative  covenants. 

386.  The  liability  of  the  parties  to  a  covenant  and  of  their  assignee-. 

387.  Covenants  running  with  the  land. 

888.  The  liability  of  the  personal  representatives  of  the  covenantor. 

389.  Covenants  and  conditions  distinguished. 

390.  Whether  conditions  are  subsequent  or  precedent. 

391.  The  construction  of  a  provision  for  a  forfeiture. 

392.  The  enforcement  of  a  forfeiture  after  a  tenant  has   oecome  a 

vendee. 

393.  The  necessity  for  the  notice  of  a  forfeiture. 

394.  The  effect  of  a  forfeiture  upon  the  lease. 

395.  The  effect  in  general  of  failure  to  pay  rent. 

396.  The  necessity  for  a  demand  by  the  lessor  in  order  to  work  a  for- 

feiture. 

397.  Waiver  of  the  demand  for  the  rent. 

398.  The  entry  of  the  landlord  for  the  purpose  of  reletting. 

399.  Demand  for  payment  of  the  rent;  when  and  how  made  by  the 

landlord. 

400.  Who  may  exercise  the  right  to  re-enter. 

401.  The  lessee  cannot  take  advantage  of  a  forfeiture. 

402.  The  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  by  the  lessor. 

403.  The  rent  received  after  a  forfeiture. 

404.  The  payment  of  the  rent  to  a  landlord  after  an  action  of  eject- 

ment or  other  action  by  a  landlord  for  the  possession. 

405.  Waiver  may  be  implied  from  other  facts  than  the  acceptance 

of  the  rent. 

406.  When  the  payment  of  subsequent  rent   does  not  waive   a  for- 

feiture. 

407.  Waiver  by  silence  and  delay. 

408.  The  waiver  of  a  continuous  breach  of  a  condition. 

409.  A  forfeiture  caused  by  a  breach  of  a  covenant  to  repair. 

410.  The  effect  of  a  tender  of  rent. 

411.  Relief  against   forfeiture  at  common   law. 

412.  Equitable  relief  against  forfeiture. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  590 

§  379.  Definitions  and  general  considerations.     Before  con- 
sidering  in    detail    tlie    chara-ter   of    the    particular   covenants 
which  are  either  expressed  or  implied  in  a  lease,   it  may  be 
proper  to  consider  some,  at  least,  of  the  rules  regulating  cove- 
nants in  general.     A  covenant  may  be  defined  as  an  agreement 
between  two  or  more  persons  in  writing   and  under  seal   by 
which   either  party   stipulates   that   certain   facts   are   true,   or 
promises  to  perform  or  give  something  to  the  other  party  or  to 
abstain  from  the  doing  of  some  certain  act.^    Such  an  agreement 
when  expressed,  may  be  couched  in  any  sort  of  language  which 
shows  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  it  for  the  law  prescribes  no 
special    form    of    words    necessary    to    constitute    a    covenant.^ 
Thus  it  is  not  necessary  that  a  stipulation  which  is  alleged  to 
be  a  covenant  shall  contain  that  word  or  any  other  particular 
word,  if  it  is  possible  to  gather  the  intent  of  the  parties  that  it 
shall  bind  them  from   the  language  which  they  have  used  in 
any   part   of  the   writing.^      Covenants   are   divided   into   those 
which  are  express  and  those  which  are  implied,  but  this  division 
has  relation  to  the  formal  expression  of  the  intent  by  the  par- 
ties rather  than  to  the  intent  itself.*     An  express  covenant  is 
one  which  is  expressly  stated  to  be  such  in  the  language  which 
the  parties  themselves  have  used.     An  implied  covenant  is  one 
which  is  created  by  construction  from  the  implication  contained 
in  the  use  of  particular  words,  which  in  themselves  do  not  con- 
stitute   an    express   covenant.      Thus,    as   examples    of    implied 
covenants  contained  in  the  lease,  we  may  instance  the  implied 
covenant  on  the  part  of  the  lessor  that  the  lessee  shall  be  se- 
cured in  the  quiet  possession  of  the  premises  and  the  implied 

1  Bouv.  Law  Diet.  Taylor  v.  Preston,  79  Pa.  St.  436; 

2  Wright  V.  Tuttle,  4  Day  Mitchell  v.  Hazen,  4  Conn.  495, 
(Conn.)  313;  Kendal  v.  Talbot,  2  508,  10  Am.  Dec.  169;  Randel  v. 
Bibb  (Ky.)  614;  Yocum  v.  Barnes,  Chesapeake  &  D.  Canal  Co.,  1  Har. 
8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  496,  497;  Hoi-  (Del.)  233;  Levering  v.  Lovering, 
linsworth  v.  Johnson,  48  Mich.  13  N.  H.  513;  Midgett  v.  Brooks, 
140,  11  N.  W.  Rep.  843;  Vincent  12  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  145,  55  Am.' 
V.  Crane,  10  Det.  Leg.  N.  653,  97  Dec.  405. 

N.    W.    Rep.    34,    35 ;    Fletcher    v.  3  Newcomb  v.   Presbrey,    9  Met. 

Chamberlin,  61  N.  H.  438;  Hallett  (Mass.)  406,  410. 

V.  Wylie,  3  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   44,  48,  4  As  to  the  definition  of  a  cove- 

3  Am.  Dec.  457;  Bull  v.  Follett,  5  nant    in    a    lease,    see    Brooks    v. 

Cow.    (N.   Y.)    170,  171;    Campbell  Drysdale,  3  C.  P.  D.  52,  37  L.  T. 

V.    Schrum,    3    Watts     (Pa.)     60;  467,  26  W.  R.  331. 


600  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

covenant  to  pay  rent  on  the  part  of  the  lessee,  both  of  which  are 
conclusively  presumed  to  be  contained  in  eveiy  lease  and  in 
theory  to  arise  from  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  created 
by  the  lease,  though  there  be  not  one  word  in  the  lease  expressive 
of  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  landlord  to  guarantee  posses- 
sentative  if  the  latter  is  named  in  the  covenant  but  which  do 
the  landlord.  Another  division  of  covenants  is  into  those  which 
are  personal  and  those  which  are  real.  Personal  covenants  are 
those  which  bind  only  the  covenantor  and  his  personal  repre- 
sentative if  the  latter  are  named  in  the  covenant  but  which  do 
not  pass  with  the  transfer  of  the  special  matter  to  which  they 
relate.  Such  covenants,  it  may  be  said  in  passing,  are  broken 
if  at  all,  as  soon  as  they  are  made  and  an  action  may  be  main- 
tained by  the  covenantee  to  recover  damages  at  once.  A  real 
covenant  is  one  that  in  ordinary  language  is  said  to  run  with 
the  land.  In  other  words,  it  is  one  so  related  to  the  land  that 
the  owner  of  the  land  or  of  an  interest  in  the  land  is  by  the  fact 
of  ownership  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  covenant,  though  he 
has  not  been  named  in  it.  He  may,  therefore,  bring  an  action 
to  enforce  the  covenant  as  soon  as  it  is  broken,  though  he  was 
not  a  party  to  the  deed  or  writing  in  which  it  was  contained. 
Covenants  are  also  divided  into  those  which  are  independent  and 
those  ^vhich  are  dependent.  "Where  the  duty  to  perform  one's 
covenant  depends  upon  performance  by  the  other  party  of  an- 
other covenant,  the  covenants  are  dependent  and  the  party  who 
would  take  advantage  of  the  breach  of  the  other  to  perform  his 
covenant,  must  himself  perform  what  he  is  bound  to  do  before 
he  can  maintain  his  action.  Thus,  where  two  acts  are  to  be 
done  by  the  parties  respectively  at  the  same  time,  neither  can 
maintain  an  action  against  the  other  without  showing  either 
that  he  has  performed  his  own  covenant  or  that  he  has  offered 
the  other  to  perform  his  covenant  and  has  been  prevented  by 
the  latter  from  doing  so.'^  Independent  covenants  are  those  by 
which  the  parties  are  bound  to  do  different  things  at  different 
times.  The  doing  of  one  of  these  things  by  eitlicr  is  not  a  con- 
dition precedent  to  his  right  to  recover  damages  for  a  failure 

ePordage  v.  Cole.  1  Saund.  320;  R.   Co.,   12   Oieg.   488,  491,   8   Pac. 

Manuel  v.  Campbell,  3   Ark.   324;  Rep.    544;    Cassell  v.   Cooke,   8    S. 

Harrison  v.  Taylor,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  &  R.  (Pa.)  268,  11  Am.  Dec.  610. 
(Ky.)  1G8;  Powell  v.  D.  S.  &  G.  R. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE. 


601 


on  the  part  of  the  other  party  to  keep  his  covenant.'  Covenants 
are  independent  or  dependent  according  to  the  fair  intention 
of  the  parties  as  it  manifests  itself  upon  the  language  employed 
by  them." 


6  Houston  V.  Spniance,  4  Harr. 
(Del.)  117;  Morrison  v.  Galloway, 
2  Har.  &  J.  (Md.J  461;  Benson  v. 
Hobbs,  4  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  285; 
Davis  V.  Wiley,  4  111.  234;  Good- 
win V.  Holbrook,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
377;  McCullough  v.  Cox,  6  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  386,  390;  Obermyer  v. 
Nichols,  6  Binn.  (Pa.)  159,  6  Am. 
Dec.  439;  McCrelish  v.  Church- 
nan,  4  Rawle  (Pa.)  26;  Lowber  v. 
Bangs,  2  Wall.  (U.  S.)  728,  17  L. 
ed.  768. 

"  A  covenant  to  pay  rent  and  a 
covenant  by  the  lessor  to  make 
alterations  and  repairs  during  the 
tei-m  are  independent.  Thompson- 
Houston  Electric  Co.  v.  Durant 
Land  Imp.  Co.,  144  N.  Y.  34,  39  N. 
E.  Rep.  7.  The  lessee's  covenant 
to  pay  taxes  and  the  lessor's  cove- 
nant to  permit  the  lessee  to  re- 
move improvements  are  independ- 
ent. The  covenant  to  allow  the 
lessee  to  remove  his  improve- 
ments may  be  enforced  in  equity, 
though  the  lessee  has  not  paid 
the  taxes.  Strohmeyer  v.  Zeppen- 
feld,  28  Mo.  App.  268.  In  McCul- 
lough V.  Cox,  6  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  386, 
on  page  390,  the  court  said:  "The 
first  question  to  be  considered  is, 
whether  the  covenants  on  the 
part  of  the  plaintiff,  which  are 
contained  in  these  instruments, 
are  conditions  precedent.  This 
must  depend  upon  the  intention 
of  the  parties,  as  it  is  to  be  col- 
lected from  the  instrument  in 
which  the  covenants  are  con- 
tained. Porter  v.  Shepard,  6 
T.  R.  668;  Glazebrook  v.  Wood- 
row,  8  T.  R.  366,  371;   Retchie  v. 


Atkinson,  10  East,  29.S;  Havelock 
V.  Geddes,  10  East,  559.  There 
is  also  another  rule  of  construc- 
tion which  has  been  adopted  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
whether  covenants  are  conditions 
precedent  or  not,  and  that  is,  that 
where  mutual  covenants  go  to  the 
whole  consideration  on  both  sides, 
they  are  mutual  conditions,  the 
one  precedent  to  the  other,  but 
where  the  covenarits  go  only  to  a 
part  of  the  consideration,  then  a 
remedy  lies  on  the  covenants,  to 
recover  damages  for  a  breach  of 
it,  but  it  is  not  a  condition  pre- 
cedent." So  in  Davis  v.  Wiley,  4 
111.  234,  the  court  said:  "When 
covenants  are  independent,  per- 
formance need  not  be  averred,  but 
otherwise  when  they  are  depend- 
ent. It  is  then  essential  that  the 
plaintiff  should  aver  performance, 
or  an  offer  to  perform  his  part  of 
the  covenant.  In  the  classification 
of  covenants,  some  of  the  old  cases 
proceeded  upon  distinctions  ex- 
tremely nice  and  technical,  but 
the  governing  rule  to  be  deduced 
from  modern  authorities,  is  that 
covenants  are  to  be  construed  to 
be  dependent  or  independent,  ac- 
cording to  the  intention  of  the 
parties,  and  the  good  sense  of  the 
case,  and  that  technical  words 
should  give  way  to  such  inten- 
tion. Luna  V.  Gage,  37  111.  27. 
According  then  to  this  rule  the 
covenants  of  the  parties  in  this 
case  must  be  understood  as  mu- 
tual and  dependent.  Although  the 
time  for  the  payment  of  the  money 
is  fixed  by  the  articles  of  agree- 


602  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  380.  The  language  by  which  a  covenant  is  created.  Cov- 
enants may  be  created  by  very  informal  language.  Any  words 
in  a  deed  or  contract  under  seal  which  show  an  agreement 
on  the  part  of  either  party  to  do  or  not  to  do  a  certain  thing 
amount  to  a  covenant.  For  the  law  requires  no  particular 
form  of  the  words  in  order  to  constitute  a  covenant  in  a 
lease.  If  it  clearly  appears  from  the  language  of  a  lease  under 
seal  that  either  one  of  the  parties  has  agreed  to  do  or  to  ab- 
stain from  doing  a  particular  thing,  it  will  be  a  covenant.  The 
words  "covenant"  and  "agree"  are  proper  and  are  usually 
employed  in  leases  but  they  be  may  be  dispensed  with  and  their 
use  does  not  of  necessity  create  a  covenant  if  it  appears  that 
the  minds  of  the  parties  did  not  meet  upon  the  act  which  was 
to  be  performed  by  either  of  them.^  Thus,  for  illustration,  a 
provision  that  "the  lessee  shall  repair  the  buildings  demised  as 
often  as  necessary  and  shall  leave  them  repaired  at  the  end  of 
the  term"  is  a  covenant  by  the  lessee  to  repair  and  leave  in 
repair."  So,  there  need  not  be  an  express  promise  on  the  part 
of  the  covenantor.  The  mere  statement  that  he  has  agreed  or 
For  it  is  very  well  settled  that  a  mere  recital  in  a  lease  or  a  state- 
ment in  a  lease  that  it  has  been  agreed  that  the  landlord  shall 
furnish  lumber  with  which  the  tenant  is  to  repair  is  a  cove- 
nant on  the  part  of  the  landlord  to  furnish  the  lumber.''^ 
For  it  is  very  well  stated  that  a  mere  reital  in  a  lease  or  a  state- 
ment that  something  has  been  agreed  upon  or  an  exception  con- 
tained in  a  covenant  by  one  party  to  the  lease  may  amount  to  a 
covenant.^^  If  either  party  to  the  lease  shall  covenant  to  do  a 
certain  thing  and  in  the  covenant  shall  insert  an  excep- 
tion the  exception  may  amount  to  a  covenant  not  to   do  the 

ment,  yet  it   is   evident   from   tlae  »  Bret  v.  Cumberland,  Cro.  Jac. 

general   tenor   of   the   instrument,  399. 

as  well  as  from  some  of  its  stipu-  lo  Holder  v.  Taylor,  Brownl.  23, 

lations,  that  the  time  of  payment  ii  Sampson  v.  Easterby,  9  B.  & 

■was    fixed    in    anticipation    of   the  C.  505;    Say  v.  Mattram,  19  Com. 

prior  performance  of  the  labor."  Bench  (N.  S.)  479;  Farrall  v.  Hil- 

«  St.    Albans    v.    Ellis,    16    East,  ditch,  5  Com.  Bench   (N.  S.)   840; 

352,   354;    Mollis   v.   Carr,   2   Mod.  St.  Albans  v.  Ellis,  16  East,  352; 

87;    Comyn's    Digest,    tit.    "Cove-  Horry  v.   Frost,  10  Rich.    (S.  C.) 

cant;"     Lunt   v.    Norris,   1    Burr.  Eq.  109;  Penn  v.  Preston,  2  Rawle 

290;   Hill  v.  Carr,  1  Ch.  Cas.  294;  (Pa.)     14;     Lowell    v.    Hilton.    11 

Bret  V.  Cumberland,  Cro.  Jac.  399.  Gray    (Mass.)    407;    Huff  v.   Nick- 

erson,  27  Me.  106. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  603 

thing  excepted.  Thus,  a  covenant  by  a  tenant  of  a  farm  to  plow 
and  sow  all  the  land  excepting-  a  certain  tract  constituted  an  im- 
plied covenant  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  not  to  plow  and  sow  the 
tract  excepted.^-  The  doctrine  of  implied  covenants  from  re- 
citals or  statements  in  the  lease  has  been  greatly  extended.  Thus, 
a  recital  by  the  landlord  that  he  is  possessed  of  a  certain  inter- 
est in  the  demised  premises  implies  a  covenant  on  his  part  that 
he  is  possessed  of  such  an  interest. ^^  And  where  the  tenant 
agrees  to  repair  premises  "the  same  having  been  previously  put 
in  good  repair"  it  was  held  that  the  language  quoted  constituted 
and  implied  an  absolute  covenant  on  the  part  of  the  landlord 
to  repair  which  he  must  perform  before  the  tenant  would  have 
to  repair.^*  So  where  a  tenant  expressly  covenanted  that  he 
would  fold  his  flock  of  sheep  which  he  should  keep  upon  the 
premises  upon  such  parts  thereof  as  the  same  had  been  usually 
folded  a  covenant  on  his  part  was  implied  to  keep  a  flock  of 
sheep  upon  the  premises.^^  So,  a  covenant  by  the  tenant  that 
he  will  from  time  to  time  supply  the  landlord  with  certain  arti- 
cles to  be  manufactured  on  the  premises  raises  an  implied  cove- 
nant on  the  part  of  the  tenant  to  manufacture  such  articles 
on  the  premises.  The  tenant  cannot  refuse  to  furnish  the  arti- 
cles or  escape  his  liability  for  a  failure  to  do  so  by  showing  that 
no  such  articles  were  manufactured  on  the  premises.^® 

12  St.  Albans  v.  Ellis,  16  East,  argument  in  the  latter  case;  and 
352.  upon    consideration,    they    do    not 

13  Severn's  Case,  1  Leon.  122;  appear  to  us  to  support  the  propo- 
Aspdin  V.  Austin,  5  Q.  B.  S7l,  683.  sition  for  which  the  plaintiff  con- 

14  Connock  v.  Jones,  3  Exch.  tends  to  the  extent  to  which  it  is 
233.  necessary  for  him  to  carry  it.     It 

15  Webb  V.  Plummer,  2  B.  &  Aid.  will  be  found  in  those  cases  that 
746,  749,  751.  where  words   of   recital   or   refer- 

16  Earl  of  Shrewsbury  v.  Gould,  ence  manifested  a  cleaa*  inten- 
2  B.  &  Aid.  487.  The  rule  that  tion  that  the  parties  should  do 
covenants  may  be  impliea  from  certain  acts,  the  courts  have  from 
recitals  has  been  limited.  Thus  these  inferred  a  covenant  to  do 
commenting  on  the  cases  of  Samp-  such  acts,  and  sustained  actions 
son  V.  Easterly,  9  B.  &  C.  505,  af-  of  covenant  for  the  non-perform- 
firmed  6  Bing.  644,  and  Saltorm  ance,  as  if  the  instruments  had 
V.  Houston,  1  Bing  433,  the  court  contained  express  covenants  to  per- 
in  Aspdin  v.  Austin,  5  Q.  B.  671,  form  them.  But  it  is  a  manifest 
on  page  683,  said:  "We  have  ex-  extension  of  that  principle  to 
amined  these  and  several  earlier  hold,  where  parties  have  ex- 
cases    which    were    cited    in    the  pressly  covenanted  to  perform  cer- 


604 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD   AND   TENANT. 


§  381.  The  construction  of  covenants  in  leases.  It  is  a  uni- 
form rule  that  all  covenants  in  leases  must  be  construed  as 
nearly  as  possible  according  to  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  be 
gathered  from  the  whole  context  of  the  lease  and  according  to 
the  reasonable  sense  of  the  words  to  be  used  by  them.^^  The  at- 
tempt of  the  court  should  be  to  support  the  lease  rather  than  to 
make  it  void  for  uncertainty.  The  lease  ought  to  be  so  construed 
that  every  word  in  it  will  be  effective  if  possible  and  for  this 
purpose  all  the  words  of  the  lease  should  be  read  by  the  court  in 
order  to  ascertain  the  general  intention.  The  terms  of  the  cove- 
nant ought  to  be  understood  in  their  plain,  ordinary  and  popu- 
lar sense,  unless  they  possess  in  respect  to  the  subject  matter  of 
the  lease  a  peculiar  and  particular  sense  which  differs  from  the 
popular  sense.^^  Technical  words,  however,  are  to  be  construed 
as  they  are  understood  by  persons  conversant  with  the  particu- 
lar subject  to  which  they  relate,  unless  from  the  context  it  is 
very  clear  that  the  parties  to  the  lease  used  such  words  in  a 
different  and  popular  sense. ^°     In  construing  a  covenant  in  a 


tain  acts,  they  must  be  held  to 
have  impliedly  covenanted  for 
every  act  convenient  or  even  nec- 
essary for  the  perfect  performance 
of  the  express  contract.  Where 
parties  have  entered  into  written 
engagements  with  express  stipula- 
tions, it  is  manifestly  not  desir- 
able to  extend  them  by  any  impli- 
cations, the  presumption  is,  that 
having  expressed  some,  they  have 
expressed  all  the  conditions  by 
which  they  intend  to  be  bound 
under   the    instrument." 

17  Vaughn  v.  Matlock,  23  Ark. 
9;  Watchman  v.  Crook,  5  Gill.  & 
J.  239,  255;  Quackenboss  v.  Lan- 
sing, 6  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  49,  50;  Mar- 
vin v.  Stone,  2  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  781; 
Dunn  V.  Dunn,  3  Colo.  510;  Davis 
V.  Lyman,  6  Conn.  249;  Howard 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  Water-Lot  Co.,  39  Ga. 
574;  Wadlington  v.  Hill,  18  Miss. 
560;  Whalen  v.  Kauffman,  19 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  97;  Clark  v.  De- 
voe,  124  N.  Y.  120;   2G  N.  E.  Rep. 


275;  Shoenberger's  Ex'rs  v.  Hay, 
40  Pa.  St.  132;  Halloway  v.  Lacy, 
23  Tenn.  468;  James  v.  Adams,  64 
Tex.  193. 

18  Rogers  V.  Dansworth,  9  N.  J. 
Eq.  289;  Morrison  v.  Galloway 
(Md.),  2  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  461; 
Benson  v.  Hobbs  (Md.),  4  Har.  & 
J.  285;  Goodwin  v.  Holbrooke,  4 
AVend.  (N.  Y.)  377;  Obermyer  v. 
Nichols,  6  Binn.  (Pa.)  159,  161, 
6  Am.  Dec.  439;  Lowber  v.  Bangs, 
69  U.  S.  728,  17  L.  ed.  768;  Hous- 
ton V.  Spruance  (Del.),  4  Har. 
117;  McCullough  v.  Cox  (N.  Y.), 
6  Barb.  386;  Lord  Ellenborough 
in  Robertson  v.  French,  4  East, 
i:^.0,  on  page  137;  Mallan  v.  May, 
13  Mee.  &  Wei.  511;  Scott  v.  Bour- 
dillion,  5  Bos.  &  Pul.  213. 

19  Davis  V.  Willey,  4  111.  234; 
Lunn  V.  Gage,  37  111.  19,  87  Am. 
Dec.  233;  McCrelish  v.  Church- 
man, 4  Rawle  (Pa.)  26;  T..ee  v. 
Mosley,  1  You.  &  C.  607;  Sander- 
son V.  Dobson,  1  Exch.  145. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  605 

lease  by  indenture  the  ^vords  of  the  covenant  are  to  be  regarded 
as  the  words  of  the  party  to  whom,  they  properly  belong  or  if 
the  words  properly  belong  to  both,  as  the  words  of  both  parties. 
In  the  absence  of  an  express  limitation  to  one  party  the  cove- 
nant in  the  lease  by  indenture  will  be  obligatory  on  both  parties 
or  on  either  according  to  the  circumstances  and  the  language  of 
the  covenant  will  be  construed  as  the  language  of  both,  or  either 
though  it  is  expressly  stated  to  be  the  covenant  of  one  only. 
Doubtful  words  in  the  covenant  will  be  applied  to  him  to  whom 
they  most  properly  belong  according  to  the  whole  intention  of 
the  parties.  They  are  not  taken  more  strongly  p^ainst  one  or 
more  beneficially  to  the  other  as  in  the  case  of  covenants  in  a 
deed-poll.-"  A  general  covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment  in  a  lease 
is  not  affected  by  a  subsequent  covenant  of  the  landlord  to  de- 
fend the  lessee 's  title,  unless  the  covenants  are  inconsistent,  or  it 
expressly  appears  that  it  was  intended  that  the  second  covenant 
should  limit  the  first. -^  In  the  case  of  a  lease  for  a  long  term 
of  business  property  in  a  rapidly  growing  section  in  which 
there  are  old  buildings  at  the  date  of  the  lease  with  a  provision 
that  the  lessee  shall  erect  a  substantial  business  building  thereon, 
it  may  be  clearly  inferred  that  the  principal  intent  of  the  lessor 
was  to  procure  the  prompt  erection  of  such  a  building.  This 
appears  under  the  circumstances  of  the  parties  and  from  the 
manifest  improvement  and  advantage  to  the  owner  which  would 
result  from  the  placing  of  the  building  on  his  property.  Hence, 
a  stipulation  that  there  shall  be  a  forfeiture  upon  a  default  in 
the  payment  of  rent  or  in  the  performance  of  any  of  the  cove- 
nants or  agreements  on  the  part  of  the  lessee  to  be  performed,  is 
not  confined  in  its  operation  to  a  default  in  the  payment  of  rent, 
but  includes  any  default  in  the  performance  of  the  covenant  to 
build  as  this  was  clearly  the  intent  of  the  parties.  Upon  the  fail- 
ure of  the  lessee  to  perform  this  covenant  to  build,  the  lease  is 
forfeited. ^^  In  construing  the  implied  covenants  of  warranty 
and  of  quiet  enjoyment  in  a  lease  for  a  term  of  years  they  have 
been  held  to  expire  with  the  term.  If  a  lessor's  estate  shaU  ex- 
pire during  the  term  and  the  lessee  is  thereupon  evicted  by  a 

20  Beckwith  v.  Howard.   6   R.  T.  22  Lindeke  v.  Associates   Realty 
J,  9;   Shepard's  Touchstone,  52.           Co.   (C.  C.  A.),  146  Fed.  Rep  630. 

21  Sheets  v.  Jozner,  11  Ind.  App 
209,  38  N.  E.  Rep.  830. 


(306 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD   x\ND   TENANT. 


title  paramount,  no  action  can  be  maintained  by  the  lessee  or  his 
assignee  against  the  lessor  for  the  breach  of  the  implied  cove- 
nant of  qniet  enjoyment  or  of  title  as  such  covenants  terminate 
vnih  the  expiration  of  the  lessor's  estate.-^  Hence  if  a  tenant 
for  life  makes  a  lease  for  years  and  dies  before  its  expiration  and 
the  remaindermen  evict  the  lessee  of  the  life  tenant  no  action  on 
the  implied  covenant  will  lie  against  the  lessor's  representative.-* 
§  382.  What  are  the  usual  and  proper  covenants.  In  con- 
struinsr  an  agreement  to  execute  a  lease  which  shall  contain  the 


23Baynes  v.  Lloyd    (1895),  2  Q. 
B.  610,  14  Reports,  678. 

24  McClowry  v.  Croghan's  Adm'r, 
31  Pa.  St.  22,  24;  Gervis  v.  Peade, 
Cro.  Eliz.  615;  Swan  v.  Strans- 
cham,  3  Dyer,  267a;  Adams  v.  Gib- 
ney.  4  M.  &  P.  491,  6  Bing.  656.  In 
Adams  v.  Gibney,  6  Bing.  656, 
where  a  person  took  a  lease  from 
a  life  tenant  without  any  express 
covenant  of  quiet  enjoyment  it 
•was  held  that  the  lessee  from  the 
life  tenant  could  not  upon  his 
eviction  by  the  remainderman  on 
the  death  of  the  life  tenant  main- 
tain covenant  against  the  execu- 
tor of  the  life  tenant.  In  this 
case  the  court  said  that  the  exec- 
utors were  not  charged  with  a 
covenant  in  law  because  a  cove- 
nant in  law  or  as  we  would  say 
an  implied  covenant  ends  and  de- 
termines with  the  estate  and  in- 
terest of  the  lessor.  For  a  cove- 
nant in  law  should  not  extend  to 
make  one  do  more  than  he  can 
which  was  to  warrant  possession 
as  long  as  he  lived  and  no  longer. 
"A  covenant  is  simply  a  contract 
of  a  special  nature,  and  the  pri- 
mary rule  for  the  interpretation 
thereof  is  to  gather  the  intention 
of  the  parties  from  their  words 
by  reading  not  simply  a  single 
clause  in  the  instrument,  but  the 
entire  context  and  where  the 
meaning  is  doubtful,  by  consider- 


ing such  surrounding  circum- 
stances as  they  are  presumed  to 
have  considered  when  their  minds 
met."  Clark  v.  Devoe,  124  N.  Y. 
120,  124.  We  may  say  in  limine, 
that  whatever  may  have  been  the 
principles  contained  in  the  more 
ancient  decisions  upon  the  legal 
effect  and  operation  of  contracts 
of  a  similar  description,  the  strong 
leaning  of  the  courts  in  more 
modern  times  has  been  to  disin- 
cumber  themselves  from  the  fet- 
ters of  technical  rules  and  to  give 
such  a  rational  interpretation  to 
the  contract  as  will  carry  the  in- 
tention of  the  parties  into  full 
and  complete  operation.  In  8th 
Term  Reports,  371,  Grose,  Justice, 
says:  "The  question  is  whether 
these  covenants  be  dependent  or 
independent  and  that  must  be  col- 
lected from  the  apparent  intention 
of  the  parties  to  the  contract. 
There  is  certainly  some  confusion 
in  the  books  on  this  subject,  some 
of  the  older  cases  leaning  to  con- 
strue covenants  of  this  sort  to  be 
independent,  contrary  to  the  real 
sense  of  the  parties  and  the  true 
justice  of  the  case.  But  the  later 
authorities  convey  more  just  sen- 
timents and  the  case  of  Kingston 
V.  Preston  was  the  first  strong 
authority  in  which  they  prevailed 
in  operation  to  the  former."  Watch- 
man V.   Crook.  5  G.  &.J.  (Md.)  255. 


covt:nants  of  the  lease. 


607 


*' usual  and  proper  covenants"  it  often  becomes  indispensable  to 
ascertain  the  meaning  of  these  words.  What  in  a  particular  case 
shall  be  regarded  as  a  usual  and  proper  covenant  depends  al- 
ways upon  the  circumstances  including-  the  character  of  the 
premises  leased  and  the  use  to  which  it  is  to  be  put  by  the 
lessee.  A  covenant  on  the  part  of  the  lessee  to  pay  rent  and 
a  covenant  on  the  part  of  the  lessor  to  deliver  and  defend  the 
lessee's  possession  of  the  premises  would  undoubtedly  be  usual 
covenants  inasmuch  as  they  are  implied  in  every  lease.  A  cove- 
nant by  the  lessee  not  to  assign  is  not  a  usual  covenant  within  the 
meaning  of  an  agreement  to  execute  a  lease  containing  the  usual 
covenants.-'  In  England  it  has  also  been  determined  that  a 
covenant  by  the  lessee  to  pay  all  taxes  is  a  usual  and  common 
covenant,-*'  though  the  contrarj^  would  be  the  rule  in  the  United 
States.  But  covenants  restricting  the  tenant's  use  of  the  prem- 
ises which  are  in  restraint  of  trade  are  not  at  least  in  a  locality 
where  trade  is  carried  on,  usual  or  common  covenants  which  a 
lessee  is  bound  to  have  inserted  in  his  lease.-'  Nor  is  a  landlord 
entitled,  as  a  matter  of  law,  to  have  a  proviso  for  a  re-entry 


25  Hampshire  v.  Wickens,  47  L. 
J.  Ch.  243,  7  Cli.  Div.  555,  38  L.  T. 
408,  26  W.  R.  491;  Buckland  v. 
Papillon,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  477,  12  Jur. 
(N.  S.)  155,  36  L.  J.  Ch.  81,  L.  R. 
2  Ch.  67,  12  Jur.  (N.  S.)  992,  15 
L.  T.  378,  15  W.  R.  92;  Vere  v. 
Lovenden,  12  Ves.  179,  10  R.  R. 
77;  Jones  v.  Jones,  10  R.  R.  186; 
Browne  v.  Raban,  15  Ves.  528; 
Ex  parte  Lucas,  3  Deac.  &  C.  144, 
1  Mont.  &  Ayr.  93;  Blacker  v. 
Mathers,  6  Bro.  P.  C.  334;  Hen- 
derson V.  Hay,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  632; 
Lander  v.  Bagley's  Contract,  61 
L.  J.  Ch.  707;  (1892)  3  Ch.  41,  67 
L.  T.  521.  Contra,  Morgan  v. 
Slaughter,  1  Esp.  8,  5  R.  R.   715. 

26  Bennett  v.  Womack,  7  B.  & 
C.  627,  1  M.  &  Ry.  644,  3  Car.  & 
P.  96,  6  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  175,  31 
R.  R.  270. 

2T  Wilbraham  v.  Livesy,  18 
Beav.  206,  2  W.  R.  281;  Propert 
V.  Parker,  3  iMylne  &  K.  280;  Van 


V.  Corpe,  3  Myl.  &  K.  269,  276,  6 
L.  J.  Ch.  208,  1  Jur.  101,  149;  Hay- 
ward  V.  Parke,  16  C.  B.  295,  24  L. 
J.  C.  P.  217,  1  Jur.  (N.  S.)  781; 
Doe  d.  Bute  (Marquis)  v.  Guest, 
15  Mee.  &  W.  160.  If  an  agree- 
ment for  a  lease  contain  no  stipu- 
lation as  to  covenants  the  party 
agreeing  to  take  the  lease,  has  a 
right  to  a  lease,  containing  only 
usual  covenants,  and  a  restric- 
tion against  particular  trades,  not 
being  a  usual  covenant  cannot  be 
introduced  in  the  lease.  Propert 
V.  Parker,  3  My.  &  K.  280.  In  Van 
V.  Corpe,  3  My.  &  K.  269,  276,  the 
master  of  the  rolls  said:  "I  con- 
sider it  to  be  perfectly  clear  that 
the  common  and  usual  covenants 
between  landlord  and  tenant  will 
not  extend  to  covenants  in  re- 
straint of  trade  and  I  consider 
that  a  provision  against  carrying 
on  a  school  should  not  be  ex- 
tended." 


608  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

upon  a  breach  of  any  of  the  conditions  or  covenants  by  the 
leasee,  inserted  in  the  lease  as  a  common  and  usual  provision,  ex- 
cept that  a  proviso  for  re-entry  on  nonpayment  is  usual  and 
so  may  be  insisted  on  by  the  landlord  where  a  lease  is  to  contain 
the  usual  covenants.-^  A  power  of  re-entry  in  a  lease,  if  the 
lessee  or  his  assigns  become  bankrupt,  or  make  a  composition 
with  creditors,  or  if  execution  should  issue  against  either  of 
them,  is  unusual,  and  an  intended  assignee  is  not  bound  to  ac- 
cept a  lease  containing  such  a  covenant  ~°  Avhere  he  has  agreed 
to  take  an  assignment  of  a  lease  containing  only  the  usual  cove- 
nants.^" 

§  383.  Whether  covenants  are  joint  or  several.  The  an- 
swer to  the  question  whether  covenants  are  to  be  considered  as 
joint  or  several  depends  wholly  upon  the  intention  of  the  parties 
to  be  ascertained  upon  a  construction  of  the  express- language  of 
the  covenant  in  connection  with  all  the  lease.  Where  it  is  appar- 
ent from  all  the  lease  that  the  interest  of  the  parties  to  the  cove- 
nant is  joint  the  covenant  will  be  treated  as  a  joint  covenant.^^ 
On  the  other  hand  if  the  enterest  of  the  parties  to  the  covenant 
is  severable  it  does  not  follow  that  the  covenant  will  be  construed 
as  a  several  covenant  but  it  may  be  construed  as  joint  or  several 

2s  Hodgkinson    v.    Crowe,    44    L.  arrived,  just  as  a  mortgagor  can 

.T.   Ch.   680,   L.   R.   10   Ch.    622,   33  redeem  his  estate,  thougli  the  time 

L.   T.    388,    23    W.    R.    885;    In    re  fixed  by  the  mortgage  deed  for  re- 

Anderton   &  Milner,   59  L.   J.   Ch.  demption  has  passed;    so  that  the 

765,  45  Ch.  Div.  476,  63  L.  T.  332,  proviso    only    operates    as    a    pen- 

39  W.  R.  44.    As  to  power  of  entry  alty.      A    clause    of    re-entry    for 

on     bankruptcy     of     the     lessee.  breach     of     covenants     generally, 

Haines  v.   Burnett,   27   Beav.    500,  where,  as  there  are  no  means  of 

29   L.  J.  Ch.   289,   5   Jur.    (N.   S.)  ascertaining    the    compensation    a 

1279,  1  L.  T.  18,  8  W.  R.  130.  court    of    equity    cannot    relieve, 

2»  Hyde  v.  Warden,  47  L.  J.  Ex.  stands     on     a     different    footing." 

121,  3  Ex.  D.  72,  37  L.  T.  567,  26  Hodgkinson  v.  Crowe,  33  L.  T.  (N. 

W.  R.  201.  S.)    288,    L.    R.    10    Ch.    App.    622, 

30  "A    clause     for     re-entry     for  quoted  and  approved  in  Anderton 

non-payment  of  rent  is  always  in-  and    Milner's    Contract,    63    L.    T. 

serted     without     any     opposition  (N.  S.)  334. 

from  anybody.     It  has  never  been  si  Bradburne  v.  Botfield,  14  Mee. 

disputed    by    any    tenant    because  &    Wei.    559,    572;    Hopkinson    v. 

both    at   law    and    in    equity    the  Lee,  6  Q.  B.  964;   Foley  v.  Adden- 

lessee    can    be    relieved    from    the  brooke,  4  Q.  B.  197,  207;  Pugh  v. 

forfeiture  by  payment  of  the  rent  Stringfield,    3    Com.    Bench,     (N. 

after  the  pciicd  of  forfeiture  has  S.)  Q. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  609 

accoicling  to  circumstances  and  the  manifest  interest  of  the  par- 
ties. The  tendency  of  the  courts  is  to  regard  all  covenants  and 
contracts  as  several  rather  than  as  joint  covenants  or  contracts. 
Unless  it  is  very  clear  that  the  parties  to  the  covenant  in  a  lease 
meant  that  their  liability  under  the  covenant  should  be  joint  the 
court  will  be  inclined  to  regard  it  as  a  several  covenant.  Xever- 
the  less,  if  the  covenant  is  expressly  joint  it  will  be  so  construed 
though  it  is  apparent  that  the  interests  of  the  parties  are  sev- 
eral.^2  The  general  rules  of  partnership  liability  apply  to  leases 
executed  by  a  firm  either  as  lessees  or  lessors.  Thus,  where  a 
lease  is  executed  by  a  finn  composed  of  several  members  its  cove- 
nants are  both  joint  and  several,  and  each  member  of  the  firm 
is  liable  individually  thereon  as  well  as  jointly.^^  And  in  the 
case  of  an  alleged  breach  of  the  covenant  in  a  lease  by  joint 
obligors  the  act  of  either  of  them  may  be  proved  to  show  a  breach 
of  the  covenant  although  the  parties  whose  acts  are  proved 
have  neither  been  sensed  with  the  summons  nor  appeared  in 
action.^*  AVhere  the  covenants  and  conditions  in  a  lease  are 
entire  in  their  nature,  embracing  the  whole  premises  which  is 
included  in  the  lease  and  by  its  term  the  covenants  are  expressly 
applicable  to  the  premises  as  to  one  undivided  parcel  of  land  the 
mere  severance  of  the  land  among  two  or  more  lessees  as  co- 
tenants  and  the  receipt  from  each  of  such  co-tenants  for  their 
convenience  of  the  proportion  of  rent  due  from  each  will  bring 
about  no  change  in  the  scope  and  effect  of  covenants  or  condi- 
tions entered  into  by  them.  There  is  no  severance  in  the  case 
of  entire  covenants  binding  upon  a  lessee  unless  the  title  to  the 
reversion  or  the  right  to  receive  the  rents  has  been  severed  so  as 
to  be  vested  in  several  persons.  If  therefore  a  lessee  assigns  his 
term  as  to  a  portion  of  the  premises  it  will  be  his  duty  to  see  to 
it  that  his  assignee  fulfills  all  conditions  and  covenants  involving 
a  forfeiture  for  if  either  assignor  or  assignee  is  guilty  of  any 
act  which  is  a  breach  of  condition  the  whole  term  is  gone.^' 

32  James    v.    Emery,    2    Moore,  ss  Dunn  v.  Jeffery,  36  Kan.  408, 

195;    Sorsbie   v.  Park,   12    Mee.   &  411,  13  Pac.  Rep.  7S1. 

Wei.    146;    Wilkinson    v.    Hull,    1  S4  Edesheimer    v.    Quackenbush, 

Bing.   New   Cases,   713;    Harcourt  68  Hun,  427,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  75. 

V.  WjTuan,  3  Exch.  817;   Foley  v.  sn  Clarke  v.  Cummings,  5  Barb. 

Addenbrooke,  4  Q.  B.  197;  City  of  (N.    Y.)     339,     356;     Jackson     v. 

Philadelphia  v.  Reeves,  48  Pa.  St.  Brousen,    7    Johns.    (N.    Y.)     227. 

472.  The  result  of  the  cases  appears  to 

39 


610  LAW  OP   LANDLORD   AND   TENANT. 

§  384.  Dependent  and  independent  covenants.  The  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  always  determines  whether  covenants  in  a 
lease  which  are  mutually  made  by  the  lessor  and  the  lessee  are 
dependent  or  independent.  This  must  be  determined  by  a 
reasonable  construction  of  the  lease.  The  courts  usually  lean  to 
a  construction  which  will  make  covenants  in  a  lease  independent 
rather  than  dependent,  especially  where  some  benefit  has  been 
received  by  the  covenantor.  A  covenant  which  goes  only  to  a 
part  of  the  consideration  on  both  sides,  and  a  breach  of  which 
may  be  compensated  by  damages  is  usually  accepted  by  the 
courts  as  an  independent  covenant.  Where  covenants  are  in- 
dependent each  party  may  sue  on  the  covenant  of  the  other 
without  reference  to  whether  he  has  or  has  not  performed  his 
own  covenant.  If  covenants  are  dependent  the  performance  by 
each  party  of  his  own  covenant  is  a  condition  precedent  to  his 
right  to  recover  on  or  to  enforce  the  covenant  of  the  other  party. 
A  covenant  on  the  part  of  the  lessor  to  repair  or  to  make  im- 
provements is  usually  independent  of  the  lessee's  covenant  to 
pay  rent.  So  the  covenant  of  the  lessee  to  pay  rent  and  of  the 
lessor  to  board  the  lessee  are  likewise  independent.  But  the 
covenant  of  the  lessee  to  pay  rent  and  of  the  lessor  to  give  pos- 
session are  dependent  though,  if  a  lessee  enters  into  possession 
of  a  part  of  the  premises,  he  will  be  considered  to  have  waived 
the  full  performance  of  the  covenant  to  give  possession,  and  the 
lessor  will  be  entitled  to  rent  pro  rata}^  In  determining  whether 

be  this,  that  where  the  legal  in-  to  C.  and  covenanted  with  them 
terest  and  cause  of  action  of  the  and  each  of  them  that  he  had  good 
covenantees  are  several,  they  title  each  might  maintain  an  ac- 
should  sue  separately,  though  the  tion  for  his  particular  damage  by 
covenant  be  joint  in  terms;  but  a  breach  of  that  covenant.  On 
the  several  interest  and  the  sev-  the  other  hand,  it  appears  from 
eral  ground  of  action  must  dis-  several  cases,  that  if  the  cause  of 
tinctly  appear,  as  in  the  case  of  action  be  joint  the  action  should 
covenants  to  pay  separate  rents  to  be  joint,  though  the  interest  be 
tenants  in  common  upon  demises  several."  Foley  v.  Addenbrooke,  4 
by  them;  as  in  the  case  from  Q.  B.  197,  208.  See,  also,  Coryton 
Slingsby's  Case,  5  Rep.  18b,  to  the  v.  Litherbye,  2  Saund.  115;  Mar- 
case  of  Eccleston  y.  Clipsham,  2  tin  v.  Crompe,  1  Ld.  Ray.  340. 
Saund.  115,  where  a  man  by  in-  m  Lincoln  Trust  Co.  v.  Nathan, 
denture  demised  Blackacre  to  175  Mo.  32,  47,  74  S.  W.  Rep  1007. 
A.  Whiteacre  to  B.  and  Greenacre 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  611 

covenants  are  independent  or  dependent,  certain  rules  have  been 
laid  down  to  enable  the  courts  to  reach  the  intention  and  mean- 
ing- of  the  parties,  when  the  instrument  in  its  terms  is  vague 
and  obscure.  Thus:  (1.)  If  a  day  be  appointed  for  the  pay- 
ment of  money  or  a  part  of  it,  or  for  doing  any  other  act,  and 
the  day  is  to  happen  or  many  happen,  before  the  thing  which  is 
the  consideration  of  the  payment  of  the  money  or  other  act,  is 
to  be  performed,  an  actio(n  may  be  brought  for  the  money,  or 
for  not  doing  such  other  act  before  performance;  for  it  appears 
that  the  party  relied  upon  his  remedy  and  did  not  intend  to 
make  the  performance  a  condition  precedent  and  so  it  is  where 
no  time  is  fixed  for  the  performance  of  that  which  is  the  con- 
sideration of  the  money  or  other  act.  (2.)  When  a  covenant 
goes  only  to  part  of  the  consideration  on  both  sides,  and  a  breach 
of  such  covenant  may  be  compensated  or  paid  for  in  damages, 
it  is  an  independent  covenant,  and  an  action  may  be  maintained 
for  a  breach  of  the  covenant  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  with- 
out averring  performance  in  the  complaint  or  declaration.^^ 

§  385.  The  enforcements  of  negative  covenants.  Under  a 
lease  which  provides  that  a  lessor  may  re-enter  if  the  lessee  fails 
to  perform  or  to  observe  any  covenant  which  is  to  be  performed 
by  him  the  right  to  re-enter  arises  upon  the  breach  of  a  negative 
covenant  a^  well  as  upon  the  breach  of  an  affirmative  covenant. 
The  act  of  the  lessee  in  doing  what  he  has  covenanted  not  to  do 
is  a  failure  to  perform  his  covenant ;  and  he  may  be  as  much  in 
default  by  doing  something  he  has  covenanted  not  to  do  as  by 
failure  to  do  something  he  has  agreed  to  do.  Thus  a  proviso  for 
a  forfeiture  and  a  re-entry  expressly  declared  upon  the  breach 
of  any  covenant  to  be  performed  is  not  restricted  to  breaches  of 
affirmative  covenants  as  for  example  the  covenant  to  pay  rent 
and  taxes  and  the  covenant  to  keep  the  premises  in  repair  but  is 
extended  to  negative  covenants;  as  for  example  covenants  re- 
stricting the  purpose  for  which  the  premises  may  be  used  by  the 
lessees  and  covenants  prohibiting  an  assignment  or  underletting 
by  the  lessee  without  the  consent  of  the  lessor.^*  This  rule  or 
principle  of  construction  has  been  often  applied  by  the  courts 

37  Bryan    v.    Fisher,    3    Blackf.      J.  K.  B.  &39    (1904),  1  K.  B.  698, 
(Ind.)  316,  319.  90  Law  T.  624,  52  Wkly.  Rep.  615, 

38  Harman    v.    Ainslie,    73    Law      20  Times  Law  R.  359. 


612  LAW   OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

to  covenants  by  the  lessee  not  to  assign  or  to  sublet  without  the 
consent  of  the  lessor,^''  to  a  covenant  by  the  lessee  not  to  use  or 
occupy  the  demised  premises  for  any  unlawful  purpose/"  and 
to  a  covenant  by  the  lessee  not  to  charge  or  incumber  the  prem- 
ises by  mortgaging  the  same.*^  AVhere  either  a  lessor  or  a  lessee 
covenants  that  he  will  not  during  the  term  do  some  particular 
thing  a  negative  covenant  is  created  which  will  be  enforcible  in 
equity  by  the  covenantee  according  to  the  ordinary  rules  of  equit- 
able relief  by  an  injunction.  Thus  it  must  appear  that  the  cove- 
nantee will  suffer  irreparable  injury  by  the  breach  of  the  nega- 
tive covenant  for  which  he  is  without  a  plain  and  adequate  rem- 
edy at  law.  If  by  an  action  at  law  he  can  recover  pecuniary 
damages  for  the  breach  of  the  covenant  which  will  fully  com- 
pensate him  for  the  injury  which  he  has  received,  equity  will  not 
interfere  by  an  injunction  to  compel  the  performance  of  a 
negative  covenant.  And  equity  will  not  hy  injunction  prevent 
the  breach  of  a  negative  covenant  unless  the  meaning  of  the 
covenant  is  explicit  and  the  intention  of  the  parties  is  clearly 
expressed  in  it.^-  On  the  other  hand  if  the  covenantee  has  no 
adequate  remedy  at  law  and  the  breach  of  the  negative  covenant 
will  work  him  a  substantial  injury  an  injunction  will  issue  to 
prevent  the  expected  breach  of  the  negative  covenant  by  the 
covenantor.*^ 

S9  West  Shore  R.  Co.  v.  Wenner.  Co.    v.   Western    Union    Telegraph 

79  N.  J.  L.  233,  57  AtL  Rep.  408,  Co.,  155  111.  335,  349,  affirming  51 

affirmed  in  60  Atl.  Rep.  408.  111.  App.  62. 

40  Wheeler  v.  Earle,  5  Cush.  «  Jn  Croft  v.  Lumley,  6  H.  L.  C. 
(Mass.)  31,  51  Am.  Dec.  41.  672,    the    covenant   was    that    the 

41  Croft  V.  Lumley,  6  H.  L.  lessee  would  not  charge  or  incum- 
Ca.ses,  672.  See  contra  Doe  v.  ber  the  premises  by  mortgage  or 
Stevens,  3  B.  &  Ad.  299.  A  pro-  granting  any  rent  charges  or  by 
vision  for  a  re-entry  "In  case  the  any  other  incumbrances  whatever 
lessees  shall  fail  in  the  observ-  with  a  right  of  re-entry  if  the 
ance  or  performance  of  any  or  lessee  should  make  default  of  or 
either  of  the  covenants  and  agree-  in  the  performance  of  any  cove- 
ments  on  his  or  their  parts,"  etc.,  nant  which  on  his  part  are  or 
applies  only  to  a  breach  of  an  ought  to  be  performed,  observed 
affirmative  and  not  a  negative  cov-  and  kept.  Nine  judges  being  sum- 
enant.  West  v.  Dobb,  10  B.  &  S.  moned  to  present  their  opinions  to 
987,  39  L.  J.  Q.  B.  190,  L.  R.  5  Q.  the  house,  one  of  the  questions 
B.  460,  23  L.  T.  76,  18  W.  R.  1167.  propounded  to  them  was  whether 

42  Thruston  v.  Minke,  32  Md.  a  breach  of  the  covenant  above 
487,   497;    Postal   Telegraph   Cable  mentioned  gave  the  lessor  a  right 


COVENANTS  OP  THE  LEASE.  613 

§  386.  The  liability  of  the  parties  to  a  covenant  and  of  their 
assignee.  A  distinction  is.  made  between  the  liability  of  a 
lessee  on  his  personal  covenant  and  the  liability  of  his  assignee 
on  the  same  .covenant.  The  lessee  who  has  personally  cove- 
nanted in  his  lease  to  do  a  certain  thing  for  his  lessor  is  bound 
to  the  lessor  by  privity  of  contract,  as  well  as  by  privity  of  es- 
tate. He  continues  to  be  bound  by  privity  of  contract  until  the 
lease  is  terminated,  surrendered  or  cancelled  but  he  is  only 
bound  by  privity  of  estate  until  he  assigns  the  lease.  The  assign- 
ment destroys  the  privity  of  estate  though  he  is  still  bound  on 
his  covenant  and  he  may  be  sued  by  the  lessor  on  his  covenant 
at  any  time  notwithstanding  the  assignment.  But  the  assignee 
of  a  lease  stands  only  in  privity  of  estate  to  the  lessor  while 
he  is  in  possession.  Strictly  speaking,  the  assignee  cannot  be 
sued  by  the  lessor  upon  any  covenant  of  the  lease  because  there 
is  no  privity  of  contract  between  him  and  his  lessor,  but  by  one 
of  these  numerous  fictions  of  law  which  have  been  invented  in 
the  course  of  centuries  of  judicial  legislation  to  enable  justice  to 
be  done  between  man  and  man  an  assignee  while  in  possession 
is  said  to  be  liable  oai  certain  covenants  which  are  stated  "to  run 
with  the  land."  As  a  matter  of  fact  he  is  not  liable  on  the  cove- 
nant at  all.  Any  liability  the  assignee  of  the  lessee  may  have, 
is  only  incumbent  upon  him  because  of  the  equitable  principle 
that  he  who  enjoys  the  benefits  of  an  existing  condition  of  affaii*s 
cannot  shift  its  duties.  After  the  assignment  the  assignee  has 
the  sole  right  of  possession  under  the  lease,  and  having  this 
right,  he  must  accept  the  accompanying  duty  or  duties.  The 
right  of  possession  and  the  enjoyment  of  possession  impose 
upon  him  the  obligation  to  return  their  equivalent.  Hence,  he 
must  do  for  the  landlord  everything  that  his  assignor  had 
agreed  to  do  as  an  equivalent  of  the  enjoyment  of  the  premises. 

to  re-enter,  and  unanimously  they  Bramwell   said:    "Default   in   pei> 

answered  in  the  affirmative.     Mr.  formance  of  covenants  to  be  per- 

Baron    Watson     said:     "It    is    a  formed,    observed    and    kept    ap- 

proper   rule  of   construction   that  plied  to  covenants  not  to  do  some 

the  subject  and  intent  of  the  cove-  thing  as  well  as  to  covenants  to 

nant  must   be   looked   at  as   well  do  something."   Mr.  Baron  Martin 

as  the  words  used,"  and  "the  pro-  said:   "The  abiding  by  a  covenant 

viso   for   re-entry  would  apply  to  is  the  performance  of  it;  the  noa- 

and  embrace  negative  as  well  as  abiding  is  a  nou-performance." 
positive    covenants."      Mr.    Baron 


€14  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

This  class  of  covenants  which  are  by  a  fiction  said  to  run  with 
the  land  comprise  all  those  which  involve  the  doing  of  some- 
thing to  or  about  the  land  itself.  They  are  very  numerous  and 
include  almost  every  conceivable  covenant  which  can  be  in- 
serted in  a  lease.  It  is  not  necessary  where  by  its  nature  a 
covenant  runs  with  the  land  that  it  shall  contain  the  word  "as- 
sig-nee  "  or  "  assigns. ' '  In  the  next  section  the  topic  of  covenants 
which  ran  with  the  land  will  be  considered  in  detail. 

§  387.  Covenants  running  with  the  land.  Covenants  are 
classified  into  real  covenants  and  personal  covenants.  Real  cove- 
nants are  those  which  are  annexed  to  the  estate  and  which  are 
incidents  of  its  ownership  and  enjoymeait  irrespective  of  the  fact 
tliat  the  original  parties  to  the  covenant  are  no  longer  in  pos- 
session thereof.  Such  covenants  are  usually  to  be  performed 
upon  the  land  and  are  therefore  said  to  run  with  the  land.  A 
personal  covenant  is  one  which  in  the  absence  of  express  lan- 
guage making  it  obligatory  upon  the  assignees  or  grantees  of  the 
parties  binds  only  those  persons  who  are  parties  to  it.  In  deter- 
mining whether  a  covenant '  does  or  does  not  run  with  the  land, 
it  is  important  to  ascertain  whether  the  subject  matter  of  the 
covenant  was  or  was  not  in  existence  when  the  covenant  was 
made.  In  some  cases  the  fact  of  the  non-existence  of  the  subject 
matter  may  be  controlling.  Thus  if  the  subject  matter  to  be 
build  a  wall  or  a  house  on  the  land  on  a  future  day  during  the 
term  it  will  be  a  personal  covenant  in  the  absence  of  an  express 
agreement  that  the  covenant  shall  run  with  the  land.**  This  in- 
tent may  most  appropriately  be  shown  by  making  the  covenant 
binding  upon  the  "assigns"  of  the  parties  in  so  many  words  or 
in  any  language  which  has  an  equivalent  meaning.  For  the  law 
does  not  require  any  particular  form  of  words  to  constitute  a 
covenant  which  shall  run  with  the  land.*^  Inasmuch  therefore  as 

41  Thompson  V.  Rose,  8  Cow.  (N.  Hansen  v.  Meyer,  81  111.  321.  If 
Y.)  263.  the  covenant  by  reason  of  its  char- 
ts Trill  V.  Eastman,  3  Met.  acter  runs  with  the  land  the  word 
(Mass.)  121,  124;  Savage  v.  Ma-  "assigns"  is  not  required  in  it. 
son,  3  Cush.  (Mass.)  .500,  505;  Heidon  v.  Wright,  6  Ohio  Dec. 
Masury  v.  Southworth,  9  Ohio  St.  31 5,  4  Ohio  N.  P.  Rep.  235;  Heidon 
340,  352;  Williams  v.  Burrell,  1  v.  Wright,  60  Ohio  St.  609,  af- 
Com.  Bench,  402,  430;  Great  Nat.  firming  Wright  v.  Heidon,  6  Ohio 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Harrison,  12  Com.  Dec.  151,  4  Ohio  N.  P.  Rep.  124, 
Bench,  576,  609;  Bream  v.  Dick-  In  Spencer's  Case,  5  Coke,  16b, 
enson,    2    Humph.     (Tenn.)     12C;  which  is  a  leading  case  upon  cove- 


COX'ENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE. 


615 


the  subject  matter  and  general  purpose  of  the  covenant  rather 
than  its  form  and  language  detennine  -whether  or  not  the  cove- 
nant does  or  does  not  run  with  the  land  we  may  instance  certain 
covenants  which  have  been  held  to  run  with  the  land.  Covenants 
to  pay  rent,*°  to  repair,*^  to  renew  by  the  lessor/^'  a  covenant  by 


nants  which  run  with  the  land, 
it  was  said:  "Where  the  cove- 
nant extends  to  a  thing  in  esse, 
parcel  of  the  demise,  the  thing  to 
be  done  by  the  force  of  the  cove- 
nant is  quo  dammodo  annexed 
and  appurtenant  to  the  thing  de- 
mised, and  shall  go  with  the  land, 
and  shall  bind  the  assignee,  l.- 
though  he  be  not  bound  by  ex- 
press words;  but  where  the  cove- 
nant extends  to  a  thing  which  is 
not  in  being  at  the  time  of  the 
demise  made,  it  cannot  be  appur- 
tenant or  annexed  to  the  thing 
which  hath  no  being;  as  if  the 
lessee  covenants  to  repair  the 
houses  demised  to  him  during  the 
term,  that  is  parcel  of  the  con- 
tract, and  extends  to  the  support 
of  the  thing  demised,  and  there- 
fore is  quo  dammodo  annexed,  or 
appurtenant  to  the  house,  and 
shall  bind  the  assignee,  although 
he  be  not  bound  expressly  by  the 
covenant;  but  in  the  case  at  bar, 
the  covenant  concerns  a  thing 
which  was  not  in  esse  at  the  time 
of  the  demise  made,  but  to  be 
newly  built  after,  and  therefore 
shall  bind  the  covenantor,  his  ex- 
ecutors or  administrators,  and  not 
the  assignee,  for  the  law  will  not 
annex  a  covenant  to  a  thing  which 
has  ho  being."  *  *  *  "If  the 
lessee  had  covenanted  for  him  and 
his  assigns,  that  they  would  make 
a  new  wall  upon  some  part  of  the 
land  demised,  that  forasmuch  as 
it  is  to  be  done  upon  the  land  de- 
mised that  it  should  bind  the  as- 
signee; for  although  the  covenant 
doth  extend  to  a  thing  to  be  newly 


made,  yet  it  is  to  be  made  upon 
the  thing  demised,  and  the  as- 
signee is  to  take  the  benefit  of  it, 
and  therefore  it  shall  bind  the 
assignee  by  expres  words.  *  *  * 
But  although  the  covenant  be  for 
him  and  his  assigns  yet  if  the 
thing  to  be  done  be  merely  col- 
lateral to  the  land,  and  doth  not 
touch  or  concern  the  thing  de- 
mised in  any  sort,  there  the  as- 
signee shall  not  be  charged." 

46  Salisbury  v.  Shirley,  66  Cal. 
223,  5  Pac.  Rep.  104,  106;  Webster 
V.  Nichols,  104  111.  160;  Saxton  v. 
Storage  Co.,  129  111.  318,  21  N.  E. 
Rep.  920;  Carley  v.  Lewis,  24 
Ind.  23;  Trask  v.  Graham,  47 
Minn.  571,  50  N.  W.  Rep.  917; 
Smith  V.  Harrison,  42  Ohio  St. 
180;  Bradford  Oil  Co.  v.  Blair,  113  ' 
Pa.  St.  83,  4  Atl.  Rep.  218,  57  Am. 
Rep.  442;  Fennell  v.  Guffey,  139 
Pa.  St.  341,  20  Atl.  Rep.  1048; 
Shaw  v.  Partridge,  17  Vt.  626. 

*'  Hayes  v.  New  York  Gold  Min- 
ing Co.,  2  Colo.  273;  Harris  v.  Gos- 
lin,  3  Harr.  (Del.)  338;  Norman 
V.  Wells,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  136; 
Meyers  v.  Burns,  33  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
401;  Lehmaier  v.  Jones,  91  N..  Y. 
Supp.  687;  Demarest  v.  Willard, 
8  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  206;  Allen  v.  Cul- 
ver, 3  Denio  (N.  Y.)  284;  Shelby 
V.  Heme,  6  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  513, 
514;  Pollard  v.  Shaafer,  1  Dall. 
(Pa.)  210,  1  Am.  Rep.  239,  1  Law. 
ed.  104;  Spencer's  Case,  5  Coke, 
17b. 

48  Callan  v.  McDaniel,  72  Ala. 
96;  Sutherland  v.  Goodnow,  108 
111.  528,  48  Am.  Dec.  560;  Eich- 
horn  V.  Peterson,  16  111.  App.  601; 


616 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


the  lessee  to  surrender  with  all  improvements,*"  and  in  tenant- 
able  condition/"  by  the  lessee  to  pay  taxes,^^  or  to  pay  all  charges 
cind  expenses  except  taxes,^^  covenants  by  the  lessee  restricting 
him  to  a  particular  use  of  the  premivses.^^  by  a  lessor  not  to  lease 
a  portion  of  the  premises  for  a  purpose  which  will  compete 
with  the  business  of  the  lessee,"*  by  a  lessor  to  pay  for  im- 
provements made  by  the  lessee,^^  by  a  lessee  not  to  sell  any 
goods  on  the  premises  except  those  purchased  of  the  lessor,'" 
by  a  lessee  to  vacate  on  thirty  days  notice,^"  by  the  lessee  cov- 
enant to  build  houses  on  the  land,^^  run  with  the  land,  A 
stipulation  by  which  the  lessor,  a  corporation,  reserved  the 
right   to   terminate  the   lease   at   any   time   it   might   sell   the 


Massy  v.  Mead,  2  La.  157;  McOlin- 
tock  V.  Joyner,  77  Miss.  678,  27 
So.  Rep.  837;  Blackmore  v.  Board- 
man,  28  Mo.  4'20;  Wilkinson  v. 
Pettit,  47  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  230;  Pig- 
got  V.  Mason,  1  Paige  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 
412,  414;  Downing  v.  Jones,  11 
Daly  (N.  Y.)  245;  Barclay  v. 
Steamboat  Co.,  6  Phila.  558;  Roe 
V.  Hayley,  12  East,  469;  Brooke  v. 
Buckley,   2  Ves.   Jr.   498. 

49  Coburn  v.  Goodall,  72  Cal.  498, 
14  Pac.  Rep.  190,  1  Am.  St.  Rep. 
75;  Allen  v.  Culver,  3  Denio  (N. 
Y.)   284. 

50  Shelby  v.  Hearn,  6  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  512;  Strode  v.  Seaton,  2 
C.  M.  &  R.  730;  Demarest  v.  Wil- 
lard,  8  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  206;  Myers 
V.  Burns,  33  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  401; 
Harris  v.  Goslin,  3  Harr.  (Del.) 
340;  Payne  v.  Haine,  16  M.  &  W. 
541. 

51  Salisbury  v.  Shirley,  66  Cal. 
223,  5  Pac.  Rep.  104,  106;  Ellis  v. 
Bardbury,  75  Cal.  234;  Worthing- 
ton  V.  Cook,  52  Ind.  394;  Trask 
V.  Graham,  47  Minn.  571,  50  N.  W. 
Rep.  917;  Post  v.  Kearney,  2  N.  Y. 
394;  Borgman  v.  Spellmire,  4 
Ohio  N.  P.  416,  7  Ohio  Dec.  344, 
347;  Sutliff  v.  Atwood.  ir,  Ohio  St. 
186;    West   Virginia,    etc.,    Co.    v. 


Mclntire,  44  W.  Va.  210,  28  S.  E. 
Rep.   696. 

.--,2  Torrey  v.  Wallace,  3  Cush. 
(Mass.)   442. 

53  Wheeler  v.  Earle,  5  Cush. 
(Mass.)  31,  51  Am.  Dec.  41;  De 
Forest  v.  Byrne,  1  Hilton  (N.  Y.) 
43;  Trustees  v.  Cowen,  4  Paige 
(N.  Y.)  510;  Spencer  v.  Stevens, 
18  Misc.  Rep.  112,  41  N.  Y.  Supp. 
39;  Wright  v.  Heidorn,  6  Ohio 
Dec.  151,  4  Ohio  N.  P.  (N.  S.)  124; 
Granite  Building  Corp.  v.  Greene, 
25  R.  I.  586,  57  AtL  Rep.  649; 
Cockson  v.  Cock,  Cro.  Jac.  125. 

54  Postal  Telegraph  Cable  Co.  v. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  155 
III.  335,  40  N.  E.  Rep.  &87;  Nor- 
man V.  Wells,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
136. 

55  Coatsworth  v.  Schoellkopf,  75 
N.  Y.  Supp.  753;  Hollywood  v. 
First  Parish  in  Brockton,  192 
Mass.  269,  78  N.  E.  Rep.  124;  Fred- 
erick V.  Callahan,  40  Iowa,  311; 
Stockett  V.  Howard,  34  Md.  121. 

56  White  V.  Southard  Hotel  Co. 
(1897),  1  Ch.  767. 

5T  Hadley  v.  Burners,  97  Mo. 
App.  314,  71  S.  W.  Rep.  451. 

58  Garnhart  v.  Finney,  40  Mo. 
449. 


CO\TEXANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  617 

property  by  giving-  sixty   days  notice   of  the   sale   constitutes 
a  covenant  running-  with  the  land  and  authorizes  its  grantee 
to    so    terminate    the    lease    though    the    word    assigns    shall 
not  be  in  the  stipulation.^^    So,  also  a  covenant  by  the  lessor  to 
supply  water,''"  or  a  covenant  by  the  lessee  and  his  executors 
and  assigns  not  to  assign  without  the  written  consent  of  the 
lessor,"  or  by  the  lessee  to-  yield  up  in  good  repair,®-  or  a  cove- 
nant by  a  lessee  to  reside  on  the  premises,*''  or  to  use  the  house 
as  a  dwelling  house  only,^*  runs  with  the  land.   Covenants  in 
a  lease  to  raise  a  dam  to  a  certain  height,  and  keep  it  and  a  farm 
in  good  repair,  and  to  supply  a  certain  quantity  of  water  to  the 
tenant,  run  with  the  land.''^    A  covenant  on  the  part  of  the  lessor 
to  sell  and  convey  the  property  to  the  lessee  runs  with  the  land."'' 
AVhere  a  covenant  runs  with  the  reversion  any  person  who  takes 
the  reversion  must  take  it  with  the  burden  of  the  covenant.    The 
■covenant  is  as  it  were  a  charge  upon  the  reversion  so  that  where 
rhe  laud  is  specifically  devised  by  the  lessor  the  devisee  is  liable 
for  the  performance  of  a  covenant  which  runs  with  the  land. 
But  where  the  covenant  does  not  run  with  the  land  as  for  ex- 
ample, where  it  is  a  personal  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  land- 
lord to  do  something  as  a  preparation  to  the  occupancy  of  the 
land  by  the  tenant  the  performance  of  such  a  covenant  is  not 
binding  on  the  devisee  but  must  be  attended  to  by  the  executor. 
If  the  covenant  was  an  incident  ta  the  relation  of  the  landlord 
cind  tenant  so  that  it  might  be  said  to  run  with  the  land,  the  dev- 
isee must  perform  it;  but  if  the  covenant  is  a  mere  personal 
covenant  of  the  lessor  it  is  more  properly  performed  by  his  exec- 
utor and  the  damages  if  any  are  recovered  against  the  executor 
should  first  be  paid  out  of  the  testator's  personal  property."    A 

59  McClung     V.     McPherson,     47  (N.   S.)    5,  9  L,.  T.  434,  12  W.  R. 

Oreg.  731,  81  Pac.  Rep.  567.  119. 

eojourdain    v.    Wilson,    4    B.    &  en  Noonan  v.  Orton,  27  Wis.  300; 

Aid.  266,  23  R.  R.  268.  Noonan  v.  Orton,  4  Wis.  335;  Noo- 

61  Williams  v.  Earle,  9  B.  &  S.  nan  v.  Orton,  21  Wis.  283;  Noonan 
740,  37  L.  J.  Q.  B.  231,  L.  R.  3  Q.  v.  Orton,  31  Wis.  265;  Orton  v. 
B.  739,  19  L.  T.  238,  16  W.  R.  1041.  Noonan,  27  Wis.  272. 

62  Martyn  v.  Clue,  18  Q.  B.  661,  eo  Maughtin  v.  Perry,  85  Md. 
22  L.  J.  Q.  B.  147.  352. 

63  Tatem  v.  Chaplin,  2  H.  Bl.  6-  Eccles  v.  Mills,  67  L.  J.  P.  C. 
133,  3  R.  R.  360.  25;    (1898)  A.  C.  360,  78  L.  T.  206. 

64  Wilkinson  v.  Rogers,   10  Jur.  46    W.    R.    398.      "The    covenant 


618 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


covenant  for  quiet  enjoj^ment  by  the  lessee  runs  with  the  land 
and  may  be  enforced  by  an  assignee  of  an  assignor  of  the  lessee 
who  has  covenanted  for  quiet  enjoyment  with  the  first  assignee. ®® 


must  run  with  tlie  land — must  be 
so  connected  with,  be  attached  to, 
and  inhere  in  the  land,  that  the 
assignee  of  the  reversion  or  the 
assignee  of  the  lease,  as  the  case 
niay  be,  would  have  a  right  to  the 
advantage  of  it,  or  be  bound  to 
perform  it.  Such  is  the  general 
principle;  but  whether  a  covenant, 
so  runs  with  the  land,  must  de- 
pend, in  the  first  place,  upon  the 
nature  and  character  of  the  par- 
ticular covenant  and  of  the  estate 
demised,  so  connected  with  the 
respective  rights  of  lessor  and 
lessee  in  reference  to  the  subject 
matter  of  the  covenant;  and,  in 
the  next  place,  upon  the  intent  of 
the  parties  in  the  creation  of  the 
estate,  as  shown  by  the  language 
of  the  instrument  creating  it,  con- 
strued with  reference  to  the  rela- 
tive position  of  the  parties  and  to 
the  subject-matter  to  which  their 
contract  and  conveyance  is  to  be 
applied.  The  nature  and  charac- 
ter of  the  covenant  may  be  such 
tliat  it  may  run  with  the  land; 
and  yet,  if  it  be  clearly  the  agree- 
ment of  the  parties  that  it  shall 
not  so  run,  it  would  not  be  an- 
nexed, in  despite  of  the  agreement 
so  expressed.  And,  on  the  con- 
trary, however,  clearly  and 
strongly  expresed  may  be  the  in- 
tent and  agreement  of  the  par- 
ties, that  the  covenant  shall  run 
with  the  land,  yet  if  it  be  of  such 
a  character  that  the  law  does  not 
permit  it  to  be  attached  it  cannot 
be  attached  by  the  agreement  of 
the  parties  and  the  assignee  would 
take  the  estate  clear  of  any  such 
covenant."     By  the  court  in  Mas- 


ury  V.  Southworth,  9  Ohio  St.  340, 
348.  "As  the  law  discourages  per- 
petuities, it  does  not  favor  cove- 
nants for  continued  renewals; 
but,  when  they  are  clearly  made, 
their  binding  obligation  is  recog- 
nized and  will  be  enforced.  The 
covenant  for  renewal  is  only  an 
incident  to  the  lease,  and  as  it 
cannot  be  passed  without  the  prin- 
cipal, the  conveyance  of  the  prin- 
cipal by  a  proper  description  will 
necessarily  carry  the  incident. 
They  are  inseparable  and  a  right 
of  action  cannot  exist  in  favor  of 
a  person  claiming  the  benefit  of 
the  covenant  without  any  right  to 
the  possession  of  the  leasehold; 
but  the  covenant  being  annexed 
to  the  estate  runs  with  it,  and 
cannot  be  retained  by  itself  or  as- 
signed or  severed  so  as  to  give 
an  independent  cause  of  action. 
A  sale  of  the  lease  under  execu- 
tion will  pass  to  the  purchaser  all 
the  covenants  that  run  with  it  as 
effectually  as  if  he  had  received 
a  conveyance  from  the  lessee;  for, 
as  the  purchaser,  after  he  ac- 
quires possession,  is  bound  to  pay 
the  rent,  and  in  that  way  assumes 
the  burdens  of  the  lease,  he  has 
the  right  to  take  advantage  of  the 
covenants  that  touch  and  con- 
cern the  thing  demised,  which  en- 
hance the  value  of  the  estate."  By 
the  court,  Richardson,  J.,  in  Black- 
more  V.  Boardman,  28  Mo.  420,  on 
page  426. 

C8  Lewis  V.  Campbell,  8  Taunt. 
715,  3  Moore,  35,  R.  R.  516,  fol- 
lowing Noke  V,  Awder,  Cro.  Eliz. 
:^73,   436. 


CO\T<:XANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  619 

§  388.  The  liability  of  the  personal  representatives  of  the 
covenantor.  Where  the  covenant  is  not  expressly  made  obliga- 
tory on  the  personal  representatives  of  the  parties  to  a  lease  it 
M'ill  be  presumed  that  they  are  bound.  The  presumption  always 
is  that  a  person  in  contracting  means  to  bind  his  personal  repre- 
sentatives in  case  of  his  death  prior  to  performance,  unless  the 
contract  actually  calls  for  the  doing  of  something  which  involves 
some  pei-sonal  quality  or  characteristic  which  the  covenantor 
alone  possesses  as  would  be  the  case  where  the  deceased  party 
had  agreed  to  write  a  book  or  to  paint  a  picture.  It  is  obvious 
that  the  covenants  usually  contained  in  a  lease  are  not  usually 
embraced  within  the  exception.  This  presumption  may  be  ex- 
cluded by  the  language  of  the  contract  even  in  ordinary  cases 
where  an  adequate  performance  may  be  made  by  the  representa- 
tive. Thus  if  one  purchase  land  or  contract  to  erect  a  house  on 
land  of  another  person  and  shall  die  before  the  contract  is  per- 
formed his  executor  or  administrator  may  be  compelled  to  buy 
the  land  or  furnish  the  house."^  Hence  from  this  it  follows  that 
a  covenant  by  the  lessor  to  rebuild  in  case  the  premises  which 
were  demised  shall  be  destroyed  by  fire  or  other  unavoidable 
casualty  is  binding  on  his  executor  or  administrator  although 
personal  representatives  are  not  mentioned  in  it/°  and  though 
the  testator  and  lessor  had  devised  the  premises  to  other  persons 
in  his  will.  If  the  devisee  shall  refuse  to  permit  the  buildings  to 
be  rebuilt  the  estate  is  liable  in  damages  for  it  is  the  act  of  the 
testator  in  devising  the  premises  which  prevents  the  executor 
from  performing  the  covenant  to  rebuild.  And  the  covenant  to 
rebuild  is  still  enforeible  against  the  executor  though  the  land 
descends  to  the  heir  and  if  the  heir  refuses  to  fulfill  the  covenant 
on  which  he  is  liable  inasmuch  as  it  runs  with  the  land,  the  exec- 
utor is  still  liable  as  such  but  never  personally  and  must  pay 
damages  for  breach  of  the  covenant  only  to  the  extent  that  he 
has  assets  of  the  estate. 

§  389.  Covenants  and  conditions  distingfuished.  In  the  con- 
struction and  interpretation  of  written  leases  the  inclination  of 
the  courts  is  generally  to  construe  an  ambiguous  stipulation 
whose  character  is  doubtful  as  a  covenant  rather  than  as  a  condi- 

C9  Tilney  v.  Norris,  1  Ld.  Raym.  to  Chamberlin  v.  Dunlop,  12G  N. 

553;      Quick      v.     Ludborrow,      3       Y.  4,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  966,  affirming 
Bulst.   3.  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  125. 


620  LAW   OF  LANDLORD   AND   TENANT. 

tion.  A  clause  in  a  lease  will  not  be  reg-arded  as  a  condition  if  it 
can  le^timately  be  construed  as  a  covenant.  If  the  intention  of 
the  parties  to  create  a  condition  is  not  evidenced  by  apt  words  the 
court  may  treat  the  stipulation  as  a  covenant. '^^  But  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  whatever  it  may  be  when  it  is  ascertained  will 
always  control  and  where  the  intention  is  clear  the  stipulation  or 
provision  though  in  form  it  shall  be  a  covenant,  must  be  taken 
to  be  a  conditioiii  if  that  was  apparently  the  intention  of  the 
parties.  Thus  generally  if  there  is  a  power  of  entry  reserved  to 
the  lessor  for  the  breach  of  any  particular  covenant  or  upon 
the  breach  of  any  and  all  covenants  of  the  lease  the  clause 
though  in  form  it  is  a  covenant  will  be  regarded  as  a  condition 
and  enforced  accordingly.'-  So  where  there  is  no  provision  for  a 
forfeiture,  or  for  a  termination  of  the  lease  and  re-entry  upon 
the  non-payment  of  rent  the  payment  of  rent  is  a  condition  the 
breach  of  which  will  operate  as  a  forfeiture.'^^  The  landlord 
may  under  such  circumstances  either  enforce  a  forfeiture  or 
permit  the  tenant  to  remain  in  possession  and  recover  the  rent 
due  in  an  action  on  the  covenant  to  pay  rent.  For  a  stipulation 
in  a  lease  may  be  a  covenant  in  express  terms  as  well  as  a  con- 
dition and  available  to  the  landlord  as  both.  If  one  make  a  lease 
for  years  by  an  indenture,  provided  always  it  is  covenanted 
and  agreed  between  the  parties  that  the  lessee  shall  not  alien,  this 
is  both  a  covenant  and  a  condition.^*  So  a  demise  provided  always 
that  the  tenant  pays  rent  or  does  not  assign  which  the  tenant  also 
expressly  covenants  and  agrees  to  do  is  both  a  condition  and  a 
covenant."^      The  importance  of  the  distinction  between  a  cove^ 

71  Vanatta   v.   Brewer,   32    N.   J.  fied,  create  a  lease  upon  condition 

Eq.  268,  270;   Gould  v.  Bugbee,  6  on    breach    of   which    lessor   may 

Gray  (Mass.)  371,  375.  enter.     Jackson   v.  Allen,  3   Cow. 

72Kew   V.  Trainor,  50  111.   App.  (N.  Y.)    220. 
629,  affirmed  in  150  111.  150,  37  N.  ^s  Harrington  v.  Wise,  Cro.  Eliz. 

E.  Rep.  22;   Wheeler  v.  Dascomb,  486;    Doe  d.  Henniker  v.  Watt,  8 

3  Gush.  (Mass.)  285,  289;  Vanatta  E.  &  C.  308,  315,  1  M.  &  Ry.  694, 

V.  Brewer,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  268,  270.  6  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  185.     "A  con- 

""i  Beal  V.  Bass,   86   Me.   325,   2»  dition     subsequent     is     a     contin- 

Atl.  Rep.  1088.   But  compare  Gran-  gency    named    on    the    happening 

dall  V.  Sorg,  99  111.  App.  22.  of  which  a  grant  may  be  defeated, 

74  Verplanck      v.      Wright,      23  such  as  the  failure  to  pay  money. 

Wend.    (N.  Y.)    506,  509.     "These  erect   buildings,   or  do  any  other 

presents  are  upon  condition"  that  required  act,  a  failure  to  do  which 

the  lessee   shall   do  an   act  speci-  authorizes  the   grantor's  re-entry. 


COVEXANTS  OF  THE  LEASE. 


621 


na.nt  and  a  condition  lies  in  the  rnle  that  a  breach  of  a  covenant 
in  a  lease  in  tlie  absence  of  a  stipulation  that  a  breach  shall  have 
such  an  effect  does  not  work  a  forfeiture  or  determine  the  term. 
For  where  a  term  is  created  by  a  lease  in  express  words  it  cannot 
be  shortened  or  defeated  except  by  words  as  strong  and  express 
as  those  by  which  it  has  been  created."*'  So  the  fact  that  a  lease 
provides  for  a  forfeiture  on  the  breach  of  certain  covenants  by 


A  conditional  limitation,  an  ex- 
ample of  which  is  a  grant  to  one 
so  long  as  he  occupies  the  prem- 
ises, or  to  a  widow  during  widow- 
hood differs  from  it  only  in  form, 
and  the  fact  that  re-entry  is  not 
necessary  to  terminate  the  grant. 
The  law  regards  conditions  with 
the  same  disfavor  it  does  forfeit- 
ure; and  for  similar  reasons.  A 
clause  will  not  therefore  be 
treated  as  a  condition  if  it  can  be 
construed  as  a  covenant  without 
violence  to  its  terms.  If  the  pur- 
pose to  create  a  condition  is  in 
unequivocal  language  as  the  courts 
have  frequently  said  in  'apt 
terms,'  such  as  "upon  condition,' 
'provide  nevertheless,'  'so  long 
as,'  'during,'  etc.,  the  clause  will 
be  treated  as  a  covenant  simply. 
The  provision  under  consideration 
does  not  contain  such  language. 
The  terms,  'this  lease  shall  not 
be  sold,  assigned,  or  transferred, 
without  the  written  consent  of  the 
party  of  the  first  part,'  conveyed 
no  suggestion  even  that  the  lease 
may  be  lost  by  such  transfer. 
They  express  simply  an  agree- 
ment by  the  lessee,  who  alone 
could  make  the  transfer,  that  he 
will  not  do  it.  If  the  lessor  was 
not  satisfied  with  the  remedy 
which  the  law  affords  for  breaches 
of  such  agreements  he  should 
have  stipulated  for  another  by 
adding  terms  of  condition  or  for- 
feiture.    That  he  knew  very  well 


how  to  do  this,  and  had  it  in 
mind,  as  respects  breaches  of 
other  provisions  of  the  lease,  is 
shown  by  the  'following  clause: 
'A  failure  to  pay  the  money  after 
demand  made,  or  put  down  the 
well  as  hereinafter  stipulated, 
shall  forfeit  this  lease  within  one 
year  from  the  date  hereof.'  The 
inference  is  strong,  therefore,  that 
he  did  not  contemplate  similar 
consequences  as  the  result  of  a 
transfer."  Hague  v.  Ahrens,  53 
Fed.  Rep.  58,  page  60. 

■-6  Vanatta   v.    Brewer,   32   N.    J. 
E!q.  269,   270;    Phillips  v.   Tucker, 

3  Ind.  132,  135;  Texas  &  P.  Coal 
Co.  V.  Lawson,  10  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
491,  31  S.  W.  Rep.  843;  Gould  v. 
Bugbee,  6  Gray  (Mass.)  371,  375; 
Beal  V.  Bass,  86  Me.  325,  29  Atl. 
Rep.  1088;  Wilson  v.  Philips,  2 
Bing.  13;  Rudd  v.  Golding,  6 
Mov.  231;  Darke  v.  Bowditch,  8 
Q,   B.   973,  978;    Raines  v.  Keller, 

4  C.  &  P.  3.  The  words  in  an 
agreement  for  a  lease:  "The  said 
tenant  hereby  agrees  that  he  will 
not  underlet  the  said  premises 
without  the  consent  in  writing  of 
the  landlord,"  do  not  create  a  con- 
dition. But  a  provision  that  it  is 
"stipulated  and  conditioned"  that 
the  tenant  shall  not  assign,  cre- 
ates a  condition  for  the  breach  of 
which  a  lessor  may  re-enter.  Doe 
d.  Henniker  v.  Wall,  8  B.  &  C.  308, 
1  M.  &  R.  694. 


622 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


the  lessee  but  omits  to  provide  for  a  forfeiture  upon  the  breach 
of  other  agreement  raises  a  veiy  strong  presumption  that  the 
agreements  for  which  no  forfeiture  is  provided  are  covenants 
and  not  conditions.  Thus  where  the  lease  contains  a  covenant 
not  to  assign  and  an  express  provision  for  forfeiture  upon  the 
breach  of  certain  other  covenants  contained  in  the  lease  is  al- 
most conclusive  that  the  provision  forbidding  an  assignment 
without  the  consent  of  the  lessor  was  a  covenant  and  not  a  condi- 
tion and  there  will  therefore  exist  no  right  of  re-entry  in  the 
lessor  upon  the  lessee's  breach  of  this  agreement  not  to  assign.'^'^ 
A  stipulation  that  a  tenant  shall  surrender  the  premises  when- 
ever some  certain  event  therein  described  shall  happen  or  a  cer- 
tain contingency  shall  arise,  is  not  a  condition  which  upon  re- 
entry terminates  the  lease  unless  a  forfeiture  is  in  terms  pro- 
vided. It  is  a  covenant  whose  breach  does  not  terminate  the 
lease  but  only  gives  to  the  lessor  an  action  for  damages  against 
the  lessee  for  the  breach  of  the  covenant. '^^     The  landlord  can- 


77  Doe  V.  Gordon,  4  M.  &  S.  265; 
Crawley  v.  Price,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B. 
302;  Shaw  v.  Coffin,  14  C.  B.  (N. 
S.)  372;  Den  v.  Post,  25  N.  J. 
Law,  285;  Spear  v.  Fuller,  8  N. 
H.  174;  Wlieeler  v.  Dascomb,  3 
Cusli.  (Mass.)  295;  Harris  v.  Oil 
Co.,  57  Ohio  St.  118,  48  N.  B.  Rep. 
502.  "In  my  judgment,  in  order 
to  work  a  forfeiture  of  property, 
the  acts  which  are  to  effect  the 
forfeiture  or  affect  the  property 
should  be  expressed  in  language 
so  clear,  express  and  intelligible, 
as  to  leave  no  room  or  reason  for 
doubt  in  the.  mind  of  the  judge 
who  is  called  upon  to  decide  the 
question,  that  the  act  in  question 
does,  according  to  a  fair  and  rea- 
sonable construction  of  the  lan- 
guage used  and  the  understanding 
and  intelligence  of  the  parties  to 
the  contract,  amount  to  a  forfeit- 
ure. Indeed,  as  has  been  justly 
observed  by  the  learned  counsel 
for  the  defendant,  it  would  be 
highly    inconvenient    and    unjust 


that  persons  who  may  have  in- 
vested, it  may  be,  their  whole  for- 
tune, in  taking  and  setting  up  a 
public  house,  should  by  reason  of 
the  uncertainty  or  ambiguity  of 
the  language  of  the  lease  be  kept 
in  perpetual  dread  of  the  risk  of 
a  forfeiture  which  might  be  their 
ruin."  By  Kelly,  C.  B.,  in  Wooler 
V.  Knott,  45  L.  J.  Ex.  313,  1  Ex.  D. 
124,  34  L.  T.  362,  24  W.  R.  615,  af- 
firmed in  45  L.  J.  Ex.  884,  1  Ex.  D. 
265,  35  L.  T.  121,  24  W.  R.  1004, 
where  a  lease  contained  a  proviso 
for  re-entry  if  the  lessee  of  a  pub- 
lic house  should  do  or  suffer  to 
be  done  any  act  which  might  af- 
fect or  lessen  or  make  void  either 
or  any  of  the  licenses. 

78  Bergland  v.  Frawley,  72  Wis. 
559,  562,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  372,  373. 
See,  also,  Dennison  v.  Read,  3 
Dana  (Ky.)  586;  Kew  v.  Trainor, 
150  111.  150,  155,  37  N.  E.  Rep.  223, 
affirming  50  111.  App.  629;  Chip- 
man  V.  Emeric,  5  Cal.  49,  63  Am. 
Dec.  80;  In  re  Pcnnewell,  119  Fed. 


COVENANTS  OP  THE  LEASE.  623 

not  on  a  breach  of  such  an  agreement  enter  and  expel  the  ten- 
ant as  for  a  forfeiture.  So  an  agreement  by  which  a  lessee,  on 
the  request  of  the  lessor  is  to  surrender  any  part  of  the  demised 
premises  and,  in  consideration  for  this  the  lessor  agrees  to  make 
a  proportional  abatement  of  the  rent  is  a  covenant  and  not  a 
condition.  Here  something  is  to  be  done  by  both  parties  for  the 
breach  of  which  either  may  recover  damages  but  unless  there 
be  an  express  provision  for  a  forfeiture  the  term  still  continues, 
after  the  covenant  shall  have  been  broken.'^^  So,  too,  as  a  gener- 
al rule  a  stipulation  by  the  lessee  that  he  will  in  consideration,  of 
a  sum  of  money  to  be  paid  by  the  lessor  vacate  the  premises  on 
the  sale  of  the  same  by  the  lessor  and  upon  the  demand  of  the 
latter  is  not  a  condition  or  limitation,  where  there  is  no  forfei- 
ture expressly  and  in  terms  provided  for  a  failure  to  quit  and  the 
lessor  has  therefore  no  right  of  re-entry  ^°  upon  the  refusal 
of  the  lessee  to  surrender  possession  but  can  only  recover  dam- 
ages after  he  has  demanded  possession.  A  provision  by  which 
the  lessor  received  the  right  to  sell  the  demised  premises  at  any 
time  during  the  term  and  the  lessee  in  consideration  of  such 
sale  agrees  for  himself  and  his  heirs  to  surrender  and  deliver 
possession  at  once  to  the  lessor  and  release  any  further  claim  on 
the  demised  premises  means  that  a  sale  was  to  terminate  the 
lease  ipso  factoP- 

§  390.  Whether  conditions  are  subsequent  or  precedent. 
The  determination  of  a  condition  in  a  lease  as  subsequent  or  pre- 

Rep.    139;    Hague    v.    Ahrens,    53  I   do   not   think  this   is   so.     The 

Fed.  Rep.   58,  61,  3  C.  C.  A.  426,  lessor    reserves   the    right   to   sell 

3  U.  S.  App.  231.  and   the   lessee   agrees   to   surren- 

79  Wheeler  v.  Dascomb,  3  Cush.  der  possession  at  once  upon  sale. 
(Mass.)  285,  289;  Wilson  v.  Phil-  The  lessee  could  not  be  compelled 
lips,  2  Ring.  13.  See,  also,  Van-  by  a  new  owner  to  hold  it  against 
atta  V.  Dascomb,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  268,  his  agreement  and  if  the  occupa- 
271.  tion  continues   after   the   sale,    it 

80  Sloan  V.  Cantwell,  5  Cold.  would  be  by  virtue  of  a  new  agree- 
(Tenn.)  571,  577;  Dennison  v.  ment  between  the  parties  and  not 
Read,  3  Dana  (Ky.)  586;  Berg-  by  virtue  of  the  lease.  The  par- 
land  V.  Frawley,  72  Wis.  559,  561,  ties  must  have  meant  that  a  sale, 
40  N.  W.  Rep.  372,  1  Washb.  R.  ipso  facto,  was  to  terminate  the 
Pro.  Ch.  10,  sec.  3,  cl.  8.  lease,    and    the    lessor's    covenant 

81  Baxter  v.  City  of  Providence  signified  his  assent  to  this;  other- 
(R.  I.),  40  Atl.  Rep.  423.  The  wise  no  adequate  force  can  be 
court  said:   "The  objection  is  that  given  to  it." 

it    is    not    mutual    in    its    terms. 


624  LAW  OF  landIjOrd  and  tenant. 

cedent  depends  wholly  on  the  intention  of  the  parties.  This  in- 
tention is  to  be  ascertained  from  the  express  language  of  the 
condition  as  contained  in  the  lease  itself,  construed  with  the 
other  portions  of  the  lease,  and  in  the  light  of  the  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case  particular  significance  being  attached  ta 
the  use  of  the  building,  the  length  of  the  term,  and  the  way  in 
which  the  rent  is  payable.*^  Where  the  construction  is  doubtful 
the  condition  will  be  construed  to  be  a  condition  subsequent 
rather  than  a  condition  precedent.  Subject  to  these  rules  it  may 
be  said  that  if  the  act  on  the  part  of  lessee  does  not  necessarily 
precede  the  vesting  of  the  lease  in  him.  but  may  accompany  it, 
or  follow  it,  or  may  be  done  after  the  vesting  with  the  same 
effect  as  before  the  vesting,  the  condition  is  subsequent  and  not 
precedent.  Hence,  where  a  term  is  created  by  express  words  and 
the  lessee  is  required  in  the  lease  to  do  something  in  reference 
to  the  premises  the  condition  is  a  condition  subsequent.  The 
creation  of  a  fixed  term  which  is  to  begin  on  a  date  named  in 
the  lease  raises  a  presumption  that  the  doing  of  the  act  by  the 
lessee  which  is  made  a  condition  shall  be  performed  subsequently 
to  the  vesting.  And  the  presumption  that  a  condition  contained 
in  the  lease  is  a  condition  subsequent  is  greatly  strengthened 
by  the  fact  that  there  is  a  clause  of  forfeiture  in  the  lease  for 
if  the  interest  is  not  vested  in  the  lessee  and  was  not  to  vest  in 
him  until  he  performed  the  condition  then  the  clause  of  forfei- 
ture would  be  unnecessary  and  useless.®^ 

«2  Frank  v.   Stratford-Handcock,  lease.     No  day  was  named  wlien 

13  Wyom.  37,  77  Pac.  Rep.  134.  the  rent  was  to  be  paid  so  that 

83  In  South  Congregational  Meet-  presumptively    it   would    begin    to 

ing-House,  etc.,  v.  Hilton,  11  Gray  run    from    the    date   of   the    lease. 

(Mass.)    407,    a    condition    that   a  The  time  within  which  the  lessee 

lessee  should  build  a  new  front  to  would   have   to    do    the   thing   he 

the  premises  with  glass  of  a  speci-  agreed  to  do  is  not  fixed  so  that 

fied  quality,  was  held  not  to  be  a  he  would  have  a  reasonable  time 

condition    precedent   to    the   vest-  to  perform  it.    A  compliance  with 

ing  of  the  term  in  the  lessee  upon  the  condition  may  extend  beyond 

the  following  considerations.    The  the  time  beyond  tlie  day  he  would 

words  "do  lease,  demise  and  let"  have  to  pay  rent.     The  act  to  be 

import  a  term  to  begin  presently,  done  implies  of  necessity  that  the 

not    in    the    future    on    a    contin-  lessee   is   to  be   in  exclusive  pos- 

gency.     This  term  was  fixed  and  session   and  control  of  the  prem- 

was  to  begin  on  a  date  specified  ises  when  he  fulfills  the  condition, 

subsequent    to    the    date    of    the  and  it  is  unreasonable  to  suppose 


COVENANTS  OP  THE  LEASE.  625 

§  391.  The  construction  of  a  provision  for  a  forfeiture.  A 
clause  in  the  lease  providing  for  a  re-entrj-  upon  the  breach  of 
any  covenant  in  the  lease  will  be  strictly  construed  in  favor  of 
the  tenant.^*  Unless  the  intention  of  the  parties  is  reasonably 
clear  upon  the  language  of  the  lease  that  a  provision  for  a  for- 
feiture upon  a  breach  of  covenant  was  intended,  the  clause  will 
not  he  given  that  effect.  Nothing  will  be  implied  in  this  regard 
for  the  purpose  of  raising  a  provision  foo-  a  forfeiture.  The 
court  will  presume,  in  the  absence  of  clear  language  to  the  con- 
trary, that  the  parties  did  not  mean  to  create  a  forfeiture  for 
breaches  of  covenant  in  the  lease.  Where  there  may  reasonably 
be  two  constructions  placed  upon  the  language  employed  in  the 
lease,  the  court  will  prefer  the  constiiietion  which  avoids  the 
creation  of  a  forfeiture.  An  illustration  of  this  may  be  found 
in  a  case  where  it  was  held  that  a  provision  for  re-entry  on  the 
commission  of  waste  to  an  amount  specified  meant  waste  pro- 
ducing an  injury  to  the  reversion  and  unless  it  appears  that 
the  reversion  was  injured  to  that  amount  there  is  no  forfei- 
ture.^® A  proviso  that  a  lessor  may  re-enter  if  the  tenant  shall 
make  default  in  the  performance  of  any  covenants  for  thirty 
days  after  notice  is  applicable  to  affirmative  covenants.  Thus, 
it  cannot  be  assumed  that  the  landlord  was  to  give  the  tenant 
thirty  days'  notice  not  to  do  a  certain  act  or  number  of  acts 
which  would  be  a  breach  of  negative  covenants.     Thus,  if  the 

a  party  would  enter  into  a  condi-  be   construed    to   be   either   prece- 

tion     precedent    by     which    after  dent  or  subsequent,   according  to 

making  extensive  repairs  he  might  the   fair   intention    of   the   parties 

by   a   slight   omission   lose   all   he  to   be    collected    from    the    instru- 

had   put   into   the   building.     The  ment,    and    that    technical    words 

insertion  of  a  clause  of  forfeiture  (if    there    be    any    to    encounter 

seems  to  imply  that  the  term  must  such     intention,     and     there    are 

vest,    for    forfeitures    implies    the  none    in    this    case),    should    give 

taking  away  or  loss  of  something  way  to  that  intention."    Approved 

in    possession.      Hence   the    lessor  in  Roberts  v.  Brett,  11  H.  L.  Cases, 

was  held  bound  to  show  an  entry  354. 

for  a   breach    of   condition   before  s<  Doe    d.    Polk    v.    Marchetti,    1 

he    could    maintain    an    action    to  B.  &  A.  715,  720,  9  L.  J.   (O.  S.) 

recover  the  premises.     In  constru-  K.   B.   126;    Toleman  v.  Portbury, 

ing  a  lease  in  Porter  v.  Sheppard,  39  L.  J.  Q.  B.  136,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B. 

6  T.  R.  665,  3  R.  R.  305,  Lord  Ken-  288,  22  L.  T.  33,  18  W.  R.  579. 

yon  said:   "It  has  frequently  been  ks  Doe  d.  Darlington  v.  Bond,  5 

paid,  and  common  sense  seems  to  B.  &  C.  855,  8  D.  &  R.  738,  5  L.  J. 

justify   it,   that  conditions   are  to  (O.  S.)  68,  29  R.  R.  436. 
40 


626  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

tenant  has  covenanted  not  to  build,  or  not  to  make  alterations 
in  the  premises,  it  can  hardly  be  reasonably  conceived  that  he 
can  escape  the  forfeiture  arising  from  his  breach  of  such  a  cove- 
nant merely  because  his  landlord  has  not  given  him  thirty  days' 
notice  not  to  raise  or  lower  the  walls,  or  not  to  vary  the  original 
plan  of  the  premises  or  not  to  permit  new  buildings  to  be  erected 
or  not  to  allow  openings  or  windows  to  be  made.  To  require 
notice  in  such  case  would  be  to  require  the  landlord  to  give  the 
tenant  a  continuous  series  of  notices.  It  is  very  different  where 
the  tenant  is  to  do  something  as  to  repair  or  pay  money  and  not 
merely  to  refrain  from  doing  something.  In  such  case  a  no- 
tice may  be  reasonably  required  both  to  secure  the  performance 
of  the  act  by  the  tenant  within  a  reasonable  time  and  also  to 
benefit  him  by  giving  liim  a  short  time  in  which  to  perform.^" 
A  proviso  for  re-entry  in  case  the  lessee  shall  not  well  and  truly 
perform  and  keep  all  covenants,  conditions  and  agreements,  is 
wide  enough  to  include  negative  as  well  as  affirmative  covenants 
as  for  example,  a  covenant  noit  to  carry  on  a  particular  trade 
or  business  on  the  premises  or  not  to  assign  or  sublet  without 
the  written  consent  of  the  lessor.*^ 

8«  Doe   d.   Polk   V.   Marclietti,    1  dition.     Here,  first,  the  agreement 

B.  &  Ad.  715,  9  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  purports  to  be  in  consideration  of 

126.  the    rent   and   conditions    therein- 

«7Tiinms    v.    Baker,    49    L.    T.  after    mentioned;     and    then    the 

106.    See,  also.  Croft  v.  Lumley,  6  words  'it  is  stipulated'  occur  more 

H.  L.  Cas.  672,  27  L.  J.  Q.  B.  321,  than   once:    and  then   in   the  last 

4  Jur.    (N.  S.)    903,  6  W.  R.  523.  sentence   of  the   instrument  come 

"A  party  who  demises  land  by  an  the  words  *it  is  lastly  stipulated 

instrument  not  under  seal  may  in-  and   conditioned   that   the   tenant 

troduce   a  condition   into   it,   pro-  shall  not  assign,  transfer,  under- 

vided  he  use  apt  and  appropriate  let,  or  part  with  any  part  of  the 

words     for    that     purpose.       The  lands,  otherwise  than  to  his  wife 

words  'provided  always,'  sub  con-  and   children.'     These   words   are 

ditione,  ita  quod,  used  in  a  con-  clearly  introduced  into  the  instru- 

veyance   of   real   estate  by   them-  raent  on  the  part  of  the  lessor  for 

selves  make  the  conveyance  con-  they  are  for  his  benefit.   The  word 

ditional.   But,  in  a  lease  for  years,  'conditioned'   is  fairly  a  word  of 

no  precise  form  of  words  is  nee-  condition.   It  is  said  that  the  word 

essary  to  make  a  condition.     It  is  'stipulated'   and   the   word   'condi- 

sufficient    if    it    appear    that    the  tioned,'  being  used  together  have 

words  used  were  intended  to  have  the  same   meaning  and   import  a 

the  effect  of  creating  a  condition.  covenant    and    not    a    condition; 

They  must  be  words  of  the  land-  but  there  are  several  authorities 

lord  for  he  must  impose  th*  con-  which  show  that,  if  words  both  of 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  627 

§  392.  The  enforcement  of  a  forfeiture  after  a  tenant  has 
become  a  vendee.     Where  a  tenant  has  an  option  to  purchase 
the  demised  premises,   it  may  become  necessary  to  determine 
whether  a  forfeiture  taking  place  before  he  has  exercised  his 
option  to  buy  may  be  thereafter  enforced  by  the  landlord.     If 
the  performance  of  all  conditions  and  covenants  by  the  tenant 
was  a  condition  precedent  to  his  valid  exercise  of  the  option  by 
him   the   forfeiture   may   thereafter   be   enforced    particularly 
if  the  landlord  was  ignorant  of  the  fact  of  forfeiture  when  the 
option  to  purchase  was  exercised  by  the  tenant.    But  where  this 
is  not  the  case  or  where  the  landlord  has  acquiesced  in  the  exer- 
cise of  the  option  by  language  or  conduct  amounting  to  an  estop- 
pel a  different  question  arises.    A  tenant  who  has  an  option  to 
purchase  the  demised  premises  after  he  has  exercised  his  option 
by  giving  the  landlord  a  proper  notice  or  by  some  other  unequiv- 
ocal act  which  is  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  his  landlord  is 
in  a  vastly  different  position  as  regards  his  landlord  from  what 
he  was  before  he  exercised  his  option.     He  is  then  a  vendee  in 
pos.session  and  his  former  landlord  has  become  the  vendor.     The 
former  tenant  in  his  new  capacity  of  vendee  is  in  equity  the 
real  owner  though  the  legal  title  to  the  fee  is  still  in  the  land- 
lord.    The  vendor  or  former  landlord  is  regarded  in  equity  as 
a  trustee  for  his  former  tenant,  the  present  vendee.     Of  course 
the  vendor  is  not  a  mere  dormant  trustee  but  one  having  a  very- 
substantial  and  personal  interest  in  the  property  with  a  right 
to  protect  this  interest.     His  right,  however,  is  not  an  absolute 
right  such  as  he  had  when  he  was  a  landlord,  but  a  limited  right 
as  a  vendor.    He  can  protect  his  rights  as  a  vendor  but  he  may 
not,  in  so  doing,  encroach  upon  any  of  the  rights  of  his  former 
tenant  as  a  vendee.     He  can  do  nothing  either  as  a  landlord  or 
as  a  vendor  which  will  destroy  any  rights  which  the  former 
tenant  has  acquired  by  becoming  a  vendee.     He   cannot,   for 
example,  after  the  tenant  has  become  a  vendee,  enforce  a  for- 
feiture which  he  might  have  enforced  while  the  tenant  was  such, 
particularly  if  the  performance  of  the  condition  on  which  the 

covenant  and   condition   are   used  'conditioned'    import    a    condition, 
in  the  same  instrumeut,  they  both  it  must   also   operate."     By   Bay- 
shall  operate.     If  the  word  'stipu-  ley,  J.,  in  Doe  d.  Henniker  v.  Wall, 
lated'   import  a  covenant,   it  will  S  B.  &  C.  308,  1  M.  &  R.  694. 
operate  as  such;   and  if  the  word 


628  LAW  OF  LANDLORD   AND   TENANT. 

forfeiture  is  based  was  not  a  condition  precedent  to  the  exercise 
of  the  option  to  purchase.*^ 

§  393.  The  necessity  for  a  notice  of  a  forfeiture.  If  the  lease 
requires  that  a  notice  of  forfeiture  shall  be  given  by  the  lessor 
prior  to  re-entry  for  a  breach  of  covenant  an  entry  without 
the  notice  may  be  invalid.  If  nothing  is  said  in  the  lease  as  to 
the  necessity  of  a  written  notice  of  forfeiture  the  mere  act  of 
taking  possession  is  all  the  notice  which  is  required.^®  If  no- 
tice be  required  and  the  lessors  are  tenants  in  common,  all  must 
give  notice.  A  notice  of  forfeiture  by  one  will  only  effect  his 
share.^'*  The  rule  would  likely  be  otherwise  with  joint  ten- 
ants where  notice  by  one  would  be  sufficient  to  bind  all.  If  the 
lessees  are  tenants  in  common  apparently  upon  general  prin- 
ciples, all  ought  to  be  notified  of  a  forfeiture.  But  where  they 
hold  jointly  notice  to  one  is  notice  to  all.  Where  an  English 
statute  required  that  a  landlord  must  notify  his  tenant  of  the 
breach  of  a  condition  or  covenant  under  which  the  landlord 
claims  a  forfeiture,  it  was  held  that  notice  of  forfeiture  based 
on  breach  of  a  covenant  to  repair  must  specify  all  the  particu- 
lars in  which  the  repairs  are  required  and  must  point  out  to 
the  tenant  exactly  what  he  will  have  to  do  in  order  to  fulfill  his 
covenant.®^  So,  also,  a  notice  which  gives  in  detail  a  list  of  re- 
pairs which  may  be  required  according  to  the  condition  of  each 
house  where  the  same  may  be  necessary,  and  which  does  not 
tell  the  tenant  precisely  what  repairs  are  to  be  done,  but  tells 
him  what  may  have  to  be  done  leaving  it  for  the  tenant  to  as- 
certain which  of  the  several  houses  comprised  in  the  lease  and 
in  what  part  of  each  house  the  repairs  are  necessary^  is  suffi- 
cient.®^ 


ssRafferty  v.  Schofield,  66  L.  J.  so  Updegraff    v.    Lesem     (Colo. 

Ch.  448;   (1897)  1  Ch.  937,  76  L.  T.  App.  1900),  62  Pac.  Rep.  342. 

648,  45  W.  R.  460,  citing  Sliaw  v.  9i  Fletcher   v.    Nokes,    76    L.    T. 

Foster,  27  L.  T.  281,  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  Rep.    107;    (1897)    1   Ch.   271;    Re 

321.     In  this  case  the  tenant  was  Sorle,   78   L.   T.   Rep.  384;    (1898) 

in  default  on  a  covenant  or  con-  1    Ch.   652.     The   court   says   that 

dition  when  he  exercised  his  op-  the  tenant  must  have  full  notice 

tion  to  purchase.  of  what  he  is  required  to  do.   Ren- 

80  Metropolitan      Land      Co.      v.  ton  v.  Barnett,  77  L.  T.  Rep.  645; 

Manning,    98    Mo.    App.    248,    257,  (1898)  1  Q.  B.  27G. 

71  S.  W.  Rep.  696.  »2  Matthews  v.   Usher,    68   L.    J. 

Q.  B.  988,  81  L.  T.  542. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  629 

§  394.  The  eiiect  of  a  forfeiture  upon  the  lease.  The  mere 
forfeiture  otf  a  lease  by  the  default  of  a  tenant  to  perform  a 
covenant  or  condition  of  the  lease  has  no  effect  alone  upon  the 
lease  except  to  give  the  lessor  a  right  to  enter  for  the  default. 
Indeed,  it  may  be  said  that  the  breach  of  a  condition  of  a  lease 
by  the  lessee  does  not  work  a  forfeiture  without  some  act  on 
the  part  of  the  lessor  claiming  it.''^  But  the  entry  of  the  land- 
lord upon  the  premises  with  the  intention  of  taking  possession 
for  a  breach  of  condition  or  of  a  covenant  terminates  the  lease. 
At  the  common  law  by  an  entry  after  condition  broken,  the  lease 
is  put  an  end  to.  The  lessor  is  then  in  possession  as  of  his  for- 
mer estate.  His  entry  is  the  equivalent  of  a  surrender  and  he 
cannot  thereafter  collect  the  rent  subsequently  accruing.^* 
Rent  as  such  will  no  longer  accrue  under  the  lease.  The  liabil- 
ity of  the  lessee  to  pay  rent  rests  solely  upon  his  covenant  to 
pay  and  as  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  is  extin- 
guished by  the  re-entry  of  the  landlord,  the  rent  cai?  no  longer 
accrue.^^  The  re-entry,  however,  does  not  preclude  the  landlord 
from  suing  for  and  recovering  arrears  of  rent  which  may  have 
accrued  prior  to  the  re-entry.®^  Thus,  for  example,  an  action 
lies  for  rent  accrued  prior  to  re-entry  for  a  forfeiture  though 
by  the  express  terms  of  the  lease,  the  lessor  on  such  re-entry 
takes  the  premises  as  though  such  lease  had  never  been 
made.^^    After  a  re-entry  by  a  landlord  for  a  forfeiture  which 

93  Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grace  13.3;  Jennings  v.  Bond,  14  Ind. 
&  Hyde  Co.,  112  Fed.  Rep.  279,  App.  282,  42  N.  E.  Rep.  957;  Brig- 
286,  50  C.  C.  A.  239,  holding  that  ham  Young  Trust  Co.  v.  Wagener, 
a  lessor  who  enters  for  other  rea-  13  Utah,  236,  44  Pac.  Rep.  1030: 
sons  cannot  justify  his  entry  by  Mattice  v.  Lord,  30  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
assigning  a  breach  of  a  covenant  382. 

which   he   had   not   in   fact   acted  os  Hall  v.  Gould,  13  N.  Y.  127; 

upon  at  the  time  of  the  entry.   The  McCready   v.    Lindenborn,    172    N. 

lessor    must    determine    the    ten-  Y.    400,    406,    65   N.    E.    Rep.    208; 

ant's  right  of  possession  by  entry  Vogel  v.  Piper,  89  N.  Y.  Supp.  431, 

or  notice  of  a  suit  for  the  posses-  432;  In  re  Hevenor,  144  N.  Y.  271, 

sion.     Small  v.  Clark,  97  Me.  304,  39  N.  E.  Rep.  393. 

54  Atl.  Rep.  758.  'J"  Harding    v.    Austin,    93    App. 

94  Fell  V.  Dentzel  (Del.),  42  Atl.  Div.  564,  87  N.  Y.  Supp.  887,  888. 
Rep.  439;  Wilson  v.  Goldstein,  152  s"  Hartsharne  v.  Watson,  4 
Pa.  St.  524,  31  W.  N.  Cases,  448,  Ring.  (N.  C.)  178,  5  Scott,  506,  6 
25  Atl.  Rep  493;  Mackubin  v.  D.  P.  C.  404.  1  Am.  15,  7  L.  J. 
Whitcroft,  4   Har.  &  McH.    (m3.)  C.  P.  138,  2  Jur.  155 


630  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

has  tlie  effect  and  operation  of  a  surrender  the  landlord  cannot 
recover  for  the  subsequent  breach  of  any  covenant.  Thereafter 
the  tenant  is  under  no  O'bligation  to  repair  on  his  express  cove- 
nant to  do  so.  Nor  can  he  maintain  an  action  on  any  covenant 
Avhich  runs  with  the  land  where  the  breach  is  subsequent  to  his 
entry  for  condition  broken.  But  after  his  entry  he  may  treat 
as  trespassers  all  persons  whom  he  finds  in  possession,  as,  for 
example,  an  assignee  of  the  tenant  or  a  subtenant.  The  lease 
is  absolutely  at  an  end  by  the  entry  of  the  landlord  and,  while 
the  landlord  cannot  collect  any  rent  subsequently  accruing,  the 
tenant  is  also  precluded  from  enforcing  any  rights  which  the 
lease  may  have  conferred  upon  him.  An  option  which  he  may 
have  had  under  the  lease  to  purchase  the  premises  is  terminated 
by  the  entry  of  the  landlord  upon  the  tenant's  default®*  in  all 
cases  where  the  performance  of  all  covenants  and  conditions  by 
the  tenant  was  a  condition  precedent  to  the  enforcement  of  an 
option  to  purchase  the  premises  vested  in  him.  But  a  tenant 
who  has  given  his  landlord  notice  of  his  intention  to  exercise 
his  option  to  purchase  before  the  latter  has  entered  for  a  for- 
feiture thereby  becomes  a  vendee  in  possession  and  is  not  de- 
prived of  any  right  as  such  by  a  subsequent  entry  by  the 
landlord.  A  re-entry  by  the  landlord,  not  for  a  breach  of  a 
condition  but  under  his  statutory  right  to  regain  his  posses- 
sion on  the  tenant's  failure  to  pay  rent  after  an  action  to  re- 
cover possession  under  the  statute  does  not  deprive  him  of 
his  rights  under  the  lease.  The  right  of  the  lessor  to  re-enter 
upon  a  breach  by  the  lessee  of  a  covenant  to  pay  rent  or  of  any 
other  covenant  and  to  relet  the  premises  as  an  agent  of  the  les- 
see, holding  the  lessee  liable  for  any  deficiency,  is  not  destroyed 
by  a  re-entry  by  the  lessor  under  a  warrant  in  summary  pro- 
ceedings and  an  action  thereon  may  thereafter  be  maintained.®^ 
But  generally  an  entry  by  a  landlord  for  some  particular  breach 
of  covenant  is  a  waiver  of  his  right  to  enter  for  the  breach  of 
any  and  every  other  covenant  or  condition  in  the  lease.  The 
parties  to  the  lease  may  stipulate  by  proper  language  that  a 
re-entry  by  the  landlord  shall  not  work  a  forfeiture  of  the 
right  of  the  landlord  to  collect  future  rents.     So,  where  it  is 

»8  Ober  V.  Brooks,  162  Mass.  102,      Rep.  1119,  affirming  82  N.  Y.  Supp. 
38  N.  E.  Rep.  429.  891,  8-1  App.  Div.  360. 

90  Baylies   v.   Ingram,   73   N.   E. 


CO^'ENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE 


631 


Stipulated  in  the  lease  that  a  re-entry-  upon  a  breach  of  a 
covenant  or  condition  shall  not  woi-k  a  forfeiture  of  the  rents 
to  be  paid  during  the  full  term;  and  the  lea^e  is  not  expressly 
declared  to  be  terminable  upon  a  breach  of  covenant,  a  lessor 
who  has  re-entered  by  virtue  of  a  writ  of  restitution  may  col- 
lect rent  for  the  whole  term  named  in  the  lease,  giving  the  ten- 
ant credit  for  any  rent  the  landlord  may  have  received  from 
others  after  his  entry  upon  the  premises.^  So,  also,  an  actual 
re-entry  or  its  modem  equivalent,  an  action  of  ejectment  by  the 
landlord  being,  in  effect,  a  surrender,  deprives  the  sub-tenants 
of  all  rights  they  may  have  had  under  their  leases  and  also  re- 
lieves them  of  all  liability  to  pay  their  rent  to  their  landlord.^ 
The  subtenants  are  thereafter  trespassers  as  far  as  the  original 
landlord  is  concerned,  and  he  may  either  oust  them  by  appro- 
priate proceedings  at  law,  or  convert  them  into  his  tenants  by  an 
express  agreement  or  by  permitting  them  to  remain  in  posses- 
sion and  pay  rent.^ 


1  Grommes  v.  St.  Paul  Trust 
Co.,  147  111.  634,  35  N.  E.  Rep. 
820,  affirming  47  111.  App.  568. 

2  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Smith,  45  L. 
J.  Ch.  235,  2  Ch.  D.  235,  34  L.  T. 
267,  24  W.  R.  443,  47  L.  J.  Ch.  97, 
3  App.  Cas.  165,  37  L.  T.  645,  26 
W.  R.  130. 

3  In  New  York  a  provision  that 
a  lessor  may  on  the  failure  of  the 
lessee  to  pay  rent  enter  upon  the 
premises,  remove  all  persons 
therefrom  and  enjoy  the  former 
estate  therein  construed  in  con- 
nection with  a  provision  that  the 
lessor  may,  at  his  option  let  them 
and  hold  the  lessee  for  any  defi- 
ciency means  a  common-law  entry. 
No  rights  would  accrue  to  the 
lessor  on  this  covenant  after  his 
entry  unless  he  entered  by  a  com- 
mon-law action  of  ejectment.  No 
liability  for  future  rent  attaches 
to  the  tenant  under  such  a  lease 
where  the  entry  by  the  landlord 
is  brought  about  by  an  entry  after 
a  judgment  in  summary  proceed- 


ings.    The  action  of  the  landlord 
in  procuring  and   issuing  a  war- 
rant in  summary  proceedings  puts 
an   end  to  the   lease  for  all  pur- 
poses.   But  this  rule  was  regarded 
as   very   technical    and   met   with 
strong  dissent.     Michaels  v.  Fishel, 
169   N.  Y.  381,  62  N.  E.  Rep.  425. 
In  McCready  v.  Lindenborn,  172  N. 
Y.  400,  65  N.  E.  Rep.  208,  the  land- 
lord re-entered  pursuant  to  a  cov- 
enant  the  tenant  to  pay  any  de- 
ficiency   by    the    tenant    and    the 
court   holding   that   such   a   cove- 
nant   survived    a    re-entry    said: 
"The  right  of  action  upon  the  cov- 
enant   broken    prior    to    re-entry 
survived  that  act,  and   the  plain- 
tiff  was   at   least   entitled    to    re- 
cover rent,  as  such,  for  the  month 
named."     And    again:     "One    un- 
broken covenant  survived  re-entry 
because  it  provided  expressly  for 
that    contingency    by    authorizing 
the   lessor  to   relet   the  premises, 
and    requiring   the   lessee    to    pay 
any    deficiency    in    equal    monthly 


632  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  395.  The  effect  in  general  of  failure  to  pay  rent.  In  tlie 
absence  of  a  statutory  provision  to  that  effect,  or  of  some  ex- 
press provision  for  a  forfeiture  in  the  lease,  a  failure  on  the 
part  of  the  tenant  to  pay  rent  does  not  work  a  forfeiture  of  his 
rig-lit  to  possession.  This  rule,  it  is  said,  is  too  clear  to  need 
support  from  any  authority.*  Hence,  where  by  an  agreement  it 
is  stipulated  that  a  sublease  is  to  be  made  containing  an  abstract 
of  covenants  in  the  original  lease  and  the  agreement  also  pro- 
vides that  the  undertenant  shall  not  sublet  without  consent,  the 
undertenant  holds  under  the  agreement  which  incorporates  the 
covenants  of  the  original  lease  with  the  proviso  for  re-entry 
which  in  that  instrument  is  attached  to  them  but  the  agreement 
cannot  be  read  as  applying  a  proviso  for  re-entry  to  the  new 
clause  agreeing  not  to  underlet  without  consent.^  It  is  very 
common  and  well  nigh  universal  to  provide  by  an  express  stipu- 
lation that  a  failure  to  pay  rent  shall  work  a  forfeiture  of  the 
term.  A  provision  that  any  breach  of  any  covenant  or  condi- 
tion of  the  lease  shall  work  a  forfeiture  applies  to  a  covenant  to 
pay  rent.®  A  provision  in  the  lease  that  a  breach  of  any  cove- 
nant therein  shall  operate  as  a  forfeiture,  or  shall  confer  a  right 
to  re-enter  upon  tlie  landlord,  or  shall  render  the  lease  void  will 
usually  have  the  same  effect.  In  very  many  of  the  states  statutes 
have  been  enacted  which  in  effect  provide  that  the  lease  shall 
be  forfeited  by  the  tenant  upon  his  refusal  or  failure  to  pay 
rent.  It  is  seldom,  however,  that  the  forfeiture  is  expressly  de- 
payments  as  the  amount  thereof  Sanders  (N.  J.  1903),  54  Atl.  Rep. 
should,  from  month  to  month,  be  448;  De  Lancey  v.  Ga  Nun,  12 
ascertained  by  deducting  from  the  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  120;  Ewing  v.  Miles, 
rents  reserved  the  rents  received.  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  19,  27,  33  S.  W. 
By  the  express  contract  of  the  par-  Rep.  235;  Judson  v.  Gurley,  52 
ties,  a  separate  and  independent  Tex.  226;  Crawley  v.  Pfice,  L.  R. 
ascertained  by  deducting  from  the  10  Q.  B.  302,  33  L.  T.  203,  23  W. 
covenant  every  month  when  there  R.  874;  Shaw  v.  Coffin,  14  C.  B. 
was    a    deficiency    ascertained    in       (N.   S.)    372. 

the  manner  provided."  •'■'  Crawley  v.  Price,  L.  R.  10  Q. 

4  Bucker    v.    Warren,    41     Ark.       B.  302,  33  L.  T.  203,  23  W.  R.  874. 
532;    Brown's  Adm'r  v.  Bragg,  22  o  Chapman  v.  Kirby,  49  111.  211; 

Ind.  122,  123;  Beal  v.  Bass,  86  Me.  Bacon  v.  Western  Furniture  Co., 
325,  335,  29  Atl.  Rep.  1088;  Ver-  53  Ind.  229,  230;  Faylor  v.  Brice, 
mont  V.  Society,  etc.,  28  Fed.  7  Ind.  App.  551,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  833; 
Cases,  16,919,  1  Paine,  652;  Bart-  Wilson  v.  Jones,  1  Bush  (Ky.) 
lett  V.  Greenleaf,  11  Gray  (Mass.)  173;  Gould  v.  Bugby,  6  Gray 
98;    Ocean   Grove   C.   M.   Ass'n   v.       (Mass.)  371. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE,  633 

clared  by  the  statute.  These  statutes  confer  upon  the  landlord 
a  remedy  for  the  recovery  of  the  possession  of  the  premises 
upon  the  failure  of  the  tenant  to  pay  the  rent.  The  proceedings 
taken  in  accordance  v^ith  their  provisions  are  usually  of  a 
summary  nature  and  they  are  intended  to  give  the  landlord  a 
remedy  for  the  recovery  of  the  premises  which  shall  be  more 
expeditious  and  less  expensive  than  an  action  of  ejectment.  If 
the  lease  contains  an  express  declaration  of  forfeiture  on  a 
breach,  the  institution  by  the  landlord  of  a  summary  proceed- 
ings under  one  of  these  statutes  is  usually  regarded  as  a  re-entry 
on  his  part.  If  there  is  no  forfeiture  declared  by  the  lease,  nev- 
ertheless the  lease  is  forfeited  by  the  operation  of  the  statute  as 
soon  as  the  landlord  has  put  into  operation  the  remedy  which 
is  conferred  upon  him. 

§  396.  The  necessity  for  a  demand  by  the  lessor  in  order  to 
work  a  forfeiture.  The  lease  may  be  forfeited  by  the  tenant 
for  a  breach  of  a  covenant  or  condition  and  he  may  thereafter 
be  ousted  from  the  premises  by  an  action  of  ejectment  or  other 
judicial  proceeding  according  to  the  statute.  The  landlord  can- 
not, however,  either  at  common  law  or  under  the  statutes,  as 
a  general  rule,  summarily  eject  the  tenant  on  the  occurrence  of 
a  forfeiture  and  assume  possession  without  a  demand  or  at 
least  some  notice  to  the  tenant  with  an  opportunity  for  the 
tenant  to  be  heard  in  court. "^  A  mere  taking  possession  of  the 
premises  after  a  forfeiture  when  they  are  deserted  by  the  tenant 
is  not  sufficient  and  a  re-entry  made  by  the  landlord  in  such  a 
manner  is  of  no  effect.^  A  provision  for  a  forfeiture  of  the 
lease  upon  the  failure  of  the  tenant  to  pay  rent  cannot  be  en- 
forced on  the  default  of  the  tenant  unless  the  landlord  shall 
prove  that  a  demand  for  the  payment  of  the  rent  has  been  made 
by  him.'*     The  same  rule  is  applicable  to  a  forfeiture  which  is 

"!  Murphy    v.    Century    Building  feiture    for    the    nonp.Vnient    of 

Co.,  90  Mo.  App.  621.  rent,  there  must  be  proof  of  a  de- 

«  Robey  v.  Prout,  7  D.  C.  81,  af-  mand  of  the  precise  sum  due,  at 

firmed    in    15    Wall.    (U.    S.)    471,  a    convenient   time   before    sunset 

475,  476.     In  which  case  the  court  on  the  day  when  the  rent  is  due, 

said,     quoting     from     Connor     v.  upon  the  land  in  the  most  notori- 

Bradley,  1  How.   (U.  S.)   217:   "It  ous   place  of   it,   though  there   be 

is  a   settled   rule  at  the  common  no  person  on  the  land  to  pay." 

law  that  where  a  right  of  re  entry  »  Sauer  v.  Meyer,  87  Cal.  34,  25 

is  claimed  on  the  ground  of  for-  Pac.  Rep.  153;   Robey  v.  Prout,  7 


G34 


LAW  or  LAJSTDLOBD  AND  TENANT, 


based  upon  the  breach  by  the  tenant  of  any  other  covenant  or 
condition  binding  upon  him.^°  The  landlord  must  demand  that 
the  tenant  shall  perform  the  condition  or  covenant  which  is 
obligatory  on  him  by  the  lease  before  he  can  bring  ejectment.^^ 
It  is  competent  for  the  parties  to  a  lease  to  waive  the  right  to 
have  a  demand  made  by  the  lessor  upon  the  lessee  as  a  prereq- 
uisite for  a  forfeiture.  This  would  be  the  construction  of  a 
provision  for  re-entry  upon  the  failure  of  the  lessee  to  pay  rent 
' '  without  any  notice  whatever. ' '  "  But  a  waiver  of  a  demand 
by  the  tenant  must  be  made  in  express  language  for  it  can  only 
be  implied  from  such  circumstances  as  will  furnish  clear 
and  convincing  proof  of  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  tenant 
to  waive  his  right  to  a  demand  of  the  performance  of  the  con- 
dition or  covenant.  A  demand  is  not  necessary  as  a  basis  to  en- 
force a  forfeiture  where  the  landlord  is  in  possession  with  the 
consent  of  the  tenant  and  there  is  no  clause  providing  for  a  re- 
entry.^' 

D.  C.  81,  affirmed  15  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
472,  475;  Rowland  v.  White,  48 
111.  App.  236;  Taylor  v.  Brice,  7 
Ind.  App.  551,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  833; 
Cole  V.  Jolinson,  120  Iowa,  667, 
94  N.  W.  Rep.  1113;  Chandler  v. 
McGinnins,  8  Kan.  App.  421,  55 
Pac.  Rep.  103;  Murphy  v.  Cen- 
tury Building  Co.,  90  Mo.  App. 
621;  Haynes  v.  Union  Investment 
Co.,  35  Neb.  766,  53  N.  W,  Rep. 
97;  Cannon  v.  Wilbur,  30  Neb. 
777,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  85;  Godwin  v. 
Harris  (Neb.  1904),  98  N.  W.  Rep. 
439;  Eichenlaub  v.  Neil,  3  Ohio 
Dec.  365,  10  Ohio  Cir.  Ct  Rep. 
427;  Westmoreland  v.  Cambria 
National  Gas  Co.,  130  Pa.  St.  235, 
18  Atl.  Rep.  724,  25  W.  N.  Cases, 
103;  Parks  v.  Hays,  92  Tenn.  161, 
163,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  3;  Henderson 
V.  Carbondale  Coal  &  Coke  Co., 
140  U.  S.  25,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  691; 
Kansas  City  Elev.  Co.  v.  Union 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  17  Fed.  Rep.  200,  202; 
Fleming  v.  Fleming  Hotel  Co.,  70 
N.  J.  Eq.  509,  61  Atl.  Rep.  157; 
Carpenter  v.  Wilson,  100  Md.   13, 


59   Atl.   Rep.    186;    Mactier  v.   Os- 
born,  146  Mass.  399,  15  N.  E.  Rep. 
641. 
loDurkee  v.  Carr,  38  Oreg.  189, 

63  Pac.  Rep.  117.  Where  rent  is 
payable  in  instalments  and  the 
lessor  consents  that  an  amount 
due  for  several  months  shall 
stand  until  a  subsequent  date, 
ejectment  cannot  be  maintained 
until  a  demand  has  been  made 
after  the  date  has  been  passed 
and  the  tenant  is  in  default.  Sauer 
V.  Meyer,  87  Cal.  34,  25  Pac.  Rep. 
153. 

11  Molineux  v.  Molineux,  Cro. 
Jac.  144;  Doe  d.  Foster  v.  Wand- 
lass,  7  T  R.  117;  Acocks  v.  Phil- 
lips, 5  Hon.  183;  Barr  v.  Glover, 
10  Ir.  Com.  L.  Rep.  113;  West  v. 
Davis,  7  East,  363;  Dixon  v.  Roe, 
7  C.  B.  134;  Smith  and  Bustard's 
Case,  1  Leon,  141,  Co.  Litt.  202a, 
1  Wm.  Saunders,  287. 

12  Pendill  v.  Union  Mining  Co., 

64  Mich.  172,  31  N.  W.  Rep.  100. 
i3Guffey   V.   Hukill,   34   W.   Va. 

49,  11  S.  E.  Rep.  754,  holding  that 


COVENANTS  OP  THE  LEASE.  635 

§  397.  Waiver  of  the  demand  for  the  rent.  The  parties  to 
the  lea.se  may  expressly  or  by  necessary  implication  waive  a 
demand  for  the  rent.^*  The  requirement  of  the  law  that  a  de- 
mand for  the  rent  must  be  made  upon  the  premises  may  be 
waived  by  a  stipulation  in  the  lease  making  the  rent  payable  at 
some  other  place.  It  is  competent  for  the  parties  to  the  lease  to 
agree  in  express  language  that  no  demand  for  the  rent  shall  be 
required  and  that  the  landlord  may  at  once,  on  the  failure  of 
the  tenant  to  pay  the  rent,  re-enter  upon  the  demised  premises.^^ 
Waivers  of  the  right  of  the  tenant  to  have  a  demand  made  upon 
him  for  the  rent  are  not  favored  and  are  never  created  by  im- 
plication.^^ A  provision  that  if  the  lessee  shall  neglect  to  pay 
the  rent  the  lease  shall  thereupon  expire  and  terminate,  and  that 
the  lessor  may  thereupon  re-enter  upon  the  premises  does  not 
dispense  with  a  demand  for  the  rent.''  For  the  phrase  "expire 
and  terminate"  means  expire  and  terminate  at  the  lessor's  op- 
tion being  equivalent  in  meaning  to  the  stipulation  that  a  lease 
shall  be  void  in  case  the  lessee  fails  to  keep  his  covenants  which 
is  generally  held  to  mean  voidable  at  the  option  of  the  lessor.^' 
The  tenant  may  waive  the  demand  of  rent  on  the  premises  or 
at  any  particular  place  by  promising  or  by  giving  the  landlord 
to  understand  that  he  will  pay  it  at  some  other  place.  If  the 
landlord,  by  reason  of  the  tenant's  promise  to  pay  the  rent  at 
some  place  specified  other  than  the  place  named  in  the  lease, 
absents  himself  from  the  latter  place  as  a  result  of  which  the 
landlord  does  not  demand  the  rent  on  the  day  named,  the  con- 
duct of  the  tenant  is  a  waiver  of  the  demand.^^ 

■where  the  lessor  remained  in  pos-  without  giving  six  months'  notice 

session    an    execution    of    a    new  to  quit. 

lease  to  another  party  was  a  suffi-  "  Norris   v.   Marrill,    43    N.   H. 

cient  declaration  of  forfeiture.     In  213. 

reference    to    a    condition    in    an  is  Lewis    v.    Hughes,    12    Colo. 

agreement  for  a  lease  under  which  208,  20  Pac.  Rep.  621. 

the  tenant  entered  and  by  which  le  Gaskill  v.  Trainor,  3  Cal.  334. 

he  was  to  have  a  lease  on  certain  i^  Bowman    v.    Foot,    29    Conn. 

repairs  being  made   by    aim,   see  331,  338. 

Hayne  v.  Cumming,  16  C.  B.    (N.  is  Bowman    v.    Foot,    29    Conn. 

S.)    421,  10   Jur.    (N.   S.)    773,   10  331,  338;    Jones  v.  Carter,  15   M. 

L.  T.  341,  in  which  It  was  held  &  W.   718;    Jackson   v.   Harrison, 

that  the  landlord  might  re-enter  at  17  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   66. 

once    on    a    breach    of    condition  is  Fisher  v.  Smith,  48  111.  184. 


636  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

§  398.  The  entry  of  landlord  for  the  purpose  of  a  reletting. 
At  common  law,  if  a  lessee  broke  a  covenant  of  the  lease,  cither 
the  covenant  to  pay  rent  or  some  other  covenant,  and  if  the  les- 
sor had  the  right  to  re-enter  for  a  breach  of  a  covenant,  the 
lessor  might  take  either  of  two  courses.  He  might  abstain  from 
a  re-entry,  in  which  case  the  lessee  remained  liable  on  his  cove- 
nant to  pay  rent  until  the  end  of  the  term,  or,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  might  re-enter  and  resume  the  possession,  in  which 
case  it  was  a  surrender  and  the  lessee's  liability  to  pay  rent  was 
at  an  end.  If  the  lessor  did  not  re-enter,  he  retained  all  his 
rights  against  the  lessee,  but  risked  losing  the  rent  for  his  prop- 
erty by  reason  of  the  lessee 's  possible  insolvency.  If  he  re-entered 
he  gained  the  right  to  seek  a  solvent  tenant,  but  ran  the  risk  of 
losing  the  rent  of  the  premises  by  reason  of  his  inability  to  find 
one.  Hence,  in  order  to  enable  the  landlord  to  retain  his  hold 
upon  his  former  tenant  while  at  the  same  time  he  should  enjoy 
the  opportunity  of  securing  a  new  one  it  became  common  to  in- 
sert a  proviso  in  the  lease  to  the  effect  that  the  landlord  may  re- 
enter the  premises  upon  the  failure  of  the  tenant  to  pay  rent 
and  may  re-let  them  on  the  tenant's  account  with  the  right  to 
hold  the  tenant  liable  for  any  deficiency  in  the  amount  received 
as  rent  during  the  remainder  of  the  term.  Usually  a  provision 
that  a  landlord  may  re-enter  the  premises  and  may  re-let  them 
for  the  benefit  of  the  lessee  will  be  strictly  construed  in  favor 
of  the  tenant.  In  case  the  landlord  re-enters  in  a  case  where  he 
has  no  right  to  re-enter  and  to  relet,  his  re-entry  will  be  taken 
as  the  acceptance  of  a  surrender  and  will  discharge  the  tenant 
from  all  future  liability  under  the  lease,^*^  if  the  tenant  so  elects. 
On  the  other  hand  under  such  circumstances,  the  tenant  may 
treat  an  illegal  entry  and  a  re-letting  by  the  landlord  as  an  evic- 
tion and  he  may  recover  his  damages  from  the  landlord  for  the 
loss  of  the  term.-^    A  covenant  that  a  lessor  may  on  the  breach 

20  Burhans   v.    Monier,    38   App.  cause  the  tenant  does  not  reside 

Div.  466,  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  632.  there.     Thus  premises  which  were 

21 A    landlord    who    under    the  leased  for  a  lodging-house  are  not 

lease  has  the  right  to  enter  on  the  vacant  merely  because  the  keeper 

premises    in    case   they   shall    be-  of  the  house  lives  elsewhere,  if  the 

come  vacant  is  guilty  of  an  evic-  house  is  occupied  by  the  lodgers, 

tion  where  he  enters  without  the  Burhans  v.  Monier,  38  App.  Div. 

premises  being  vacant.    The  prem-  466. 
ises    are    not    vacant    merely    be- 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASH. 


637 


of  any  covenant  in  the  lease,  re-enter  on  the  premises  and  at  his 
discretion  re-let  them  at  the  risk  of  the  lessee  who  shall  be  liable 
for  the  ensuing  loss  of  rent,  if  any,  which  shall  thereby  be  sus- 
tained by  the  lessor,  requires  that  the  lessor  shall  re-let  or  at- 
tempt to  re-let  the  premises  after  his  re-entry  before  he  can 
hold  the  lessee  liable  under  the  covenant.  A  mere  re-entry  alone 
is  not  sufficient  for  it  puts  an  end  to  the  lease  with  all  its  cove- 
nants. The  lessor  must  attempt  honestly  and  in  good  faith  to 
secure  a  new  tenant  for  the  premises  and  if  he  is  then  unsux;- 
cessful,  his  former  tenant  continues  liable." 

§  399.  Demand  for  payment  of  the  rent— v^hen  and  how 
made.  The  demand  for  rent  by  the  landlord  in  order  to  con- 
stitute a  proper  basis  for  a  forfeiture  must,  at  common  law, 


22  "A  covenant  like  that  here  in 
question,  not  uncommon  in  Massa- 
chusetts, has  for  its  object  to  give 
the  lessor  some  of  the  advantages 
which  result  from  both  the  courses 
before  described.  The  lessor  is 
permitted  to  seek  a  solvent  tenant 
without  letting  go  his  hold  upon 
the  old  one.  The  covenant  does 
not  compel  the  lessor  to  relet  or 
to  attempt  to  relet  if  he  does  not 
wish  to  do  so.  He  need  not  avail 
himself  of  the  covenant.  He  may 
still  abstain  from  re-entry  and  so 
hold  the  lessee  liable  for  rent  eo 
nomine.  He  may  still  re-enter, 
and  thereafter  may  use  the  prem- 
ises as  he  sees  fit,  or  may  leave 
them  wholly  unused.  The  lessee 
cannot  complain  of  either  action. 
By  the  first  he  is  left  in  posses- 
sion of  the  premises,  by  the  sec- 
ond he  is  relieved  from  his  lia- 
bility, under  the  covenant,  to  pay 
rent.  On  the  other  hand,  the  les- 
sor may  avail  himself  of  the  cove- 
nant. He  may  reenter  and  may 
exercise  his  discretion  to  relet  the 
premises  at  the  risk  of  the  lessee. 
The  exercise  of  this  discretion  is 
manifested  by  a  reletting  or  by  an 
attempt  to   relet.     If  there   is  an 


actual  reletting,  the  covenant  be- 
comes operative  and  the  original 
lessee  is  liable  for  the  deficiency 
of  rent,  at  any  rate  if  the  relet- 
ting is  honestly  and  reasonably 
made.  If  an  honest  and  reason- 
able attempt  to  relet  is  made  with- 
out success,  then  also  the  lessee 
is  liable;  the  lessor  need  not  go 
through  the  form  of  a  reletting. 
But  if  the  lessor  does  not  relet, 
and  makes  no  attempt  to  relet,  he 
has  not  exercised  the  discretion 
nor  has  he  made  the  election  given 
him  by  the  covenant,  and,  as  we 
hold,  it  is  only  upon  the  exercise 
of  the  lessor's  discretion  to  relet 
that  the  covenant  imposes  a  lia- 
bility upon  the  lessee.  The  re- 
entry has  terminated  the  lessor's 
right  to  recover  rent  eo  nomine, 
and  the  right  given  by  the  cove- 
nant to  recover  the  difference  be- 
tween the  old  rent  and  the  new 
does  not  arise  until  the  election 
to  relet  has  been  made  by  the 
lessor."  By  the  court  in  Weeks  v. 
International  Trust  Co.,  125  Fed. 
Rep.  370,  375,  citing  W^ay  v.  Reed. 
6  Allen  (Mass.)  364;  Bowditch  v. 
Raymond,  146  Mass.  109,  15  N.  E. 
Rep.  285. 


638 


LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


state  that  it  is  a  demand  for  the  precise  and  specific  amount  of 
rent  then  due,  must  be  made  of  the  tenant  or  person  who  may- 
be found  in  possession,  must  be  made  upon  the  premises  where 
no  other  place  of  payment  is  expressly  mentioned  in  the  lease, 
and  must  be  made  at  a  reasonable  time  before  sunset  of  the  day 
upon  which  the  rent  becomes  due.^^  The  demand  for  the  rent 
must  be  made  on  the  lessee  or  the  occupant  in  person.  The  serv- 
ice of  a  written  demand  by  mail  may  not  be  sufficient  where  it 
does  not  appear  that  the  lessee  ever  received  it  or  that  there 
was  any  good  or  sufficient  reason  why  the  demand  was  not 
served  on  him  personally.^*  The  demand  must  be  made  on  the 
day  the  rent  falls  due  at  a  reasonable  time  before  sunset.^^  The 
demand  must  be  made  upon  the  premises^®  and  if  there  be  a 
dwelling  house  there,  the  demand  must  be  made  at  the  front 


23  Bacon  v.  Western  Furniture 
Co.,  53  Ind.  229,  230;  Academy  of 
Music  V.  Hackett,  2  Hilt.  (N.  Y.) 
217;  CMpman  v.  Emeric,  3  Cal. 
273;  Gaskill  v.  Trainer,  3  Cal.  334; 
Gage  V.  Bates,  40  Cal.  384;  Mc- 
Glynn  v.  Moore,  25  Cal.  384;  Bow- 
man V.  Foot,  29  Conn.  331,  342; 
Camp  V.  Scott,  47  Conn.  366,  375; 
Chapman  v.  Wright,  20  111.  120; 
Jenkins  v.  Jenkins,  63  Ind.  415, 
422,  30  Am.  Rep.  229;  Chapman  v. 
Hainey,  100  Mass.  353;  Blackman 
V.  Welsh,  44  Mo.  41;  Haynes  v. 
Union  Inv.  Co.,  35  Neb.  766,  53  N. 
W.  Rep.  979;  Jones  v.  Reed,  15 
N.  H.  68;  Jewett  v.  Berry,  20  N. 
H.  36;  McQueston  v.  Morgan,  34 
N.  H.  400;  Remsen  v.  Conklin,  18 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  447;  Boyd's  Les- 
see V.  Talbot,  12  Ohio,  212;  Smith 
V.  Whitbeck,  13  Ohio  St.  471;  Wil- 
cox V.  Cartwright,  1  Sack.  Leg. 
Rec.  (Pa.)  130;  Follin  v.  Coogan, 
12  Rich.  (S.  Car.)  Law,  44;  Wil- 
lard  V.  Benton,  57  Vt.  286;  Prout 
V.  Roby,  15  Wall.  (U.  S.)  471,  476; 
Connor  v.  Bradley,  l  How.  (U.  S.) 
23  7;  Henderson  v.  Carbondale 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  140  U.  S.  25,  33, 
n  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  691,  35  Law.  ed. 


332;  Bishop  v.  Trustees  of  Bed- 
ford Charity,  28  Law  Jour.  215; 
Dixon  V.  Roe,  7  C.  B.  134;  Forster 
V.  Wandlass,  7  T.  R.  117;  Smith 
&  Bustard's  Case,  1  Leon.  141. 

24  Henderson  v.  Carbondale  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.,  140  U.  S.  25,  33,  11 
Sup.  Ct.  691,  35  Law.  efl.  332. 

25  Phillips  V.  Tucker,  3  Ind.  132 ; 
Meni  v.  Rathbone,  21  Ind.  454; 
Jenkins  v.  Jenkins,  63  Ind.  415, 
422,  30  Am.  Rep.  229;  Faylor  v. 
Brice,  7  Ind.  App.  551,  34  N.  E. 
Rep.  833;  Sperry  v.  Sperry,  8  N. 
H,  477;  Remsen  v.  Conklin,  18 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  447;  New  York 
Academy  v.  Hackett,  2  Hilt.  (N. 
Y.)  217;  Jackson  v.  Harrison,  17 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  66;  Co.  Litt.  202a; 
Jones  V.  Reed,  15  N.  H.  68;  Smith 
V.  Whitbeck,  13  Ohio  St.  471. 

20  McGlynn  v.  Moore,  25  Cal. 
384;  Bowman  v.  Foot,  29  Conn. 
331,  342;  Camp  v.  Scott,  47  Conn. 
366,  375;  Smith  v.  Whitbeck,  13 
Ohio  St.  471. 

27  McGlynn  v.  Moore,  25  Cal. 
384;  Burroughs'  Case,  4  Coke,  73; 
Buskin  &  Edmund's  Case,  Cro. 
Eliz.  415;  Co.  Litt.  201b,  202a. 


COVENxVA^TS  OF  THE  LE.iSE 


639 


door  Of  s.ch  house.-  The  demand  must  correctly  state  the  name 
of  the  person  by  whom  the  lease  was  given  -  and  must  be  for 
the  precise  sum  of  rent  which  is  due.^s 

§  400,  Who  may  exercise  the  right  to  re-enter.  At  the  com- 
mon law  no  one  but  the  grantor  or  his  heirs  coidd  re-enter  for  a 
br  ach  of  a  condition.  The  right  to  re-enter  for  a  condition 
broken  was  not  assignable  so  that  no  grantee  or  assignee  of  the 

:Z7T  T'tf ''  "'^'"'^"^  ''  ^^^  ^^^^^^  ''  «^^  --<^ition  by 
a  re-entiy.3o    The  reason  of  this  was  said  to  be  in  order  to  dis 

courage  maintenance,  the  suppression  of  right  and  the  stirring 
up  of  lawsuits.     By  statute,  however,^!  all  grantees  of  the  re- 
version, their  executors,  heirs,  successors  and  assigns  were  de- 
creed to  have  the  same  advantage  against  the  lessees,  their  exe- 
cutors, administrators  or  assigns,  by  entr,  for  non-payment  of 
rent  or  for  doing  waste  or  other  forfeiture,  with  the  same  rem. 
^^^7^^t^o/  for  a  condition  in  the  lease  as  the  lessors  or  grant- 
ors had  before  them.     This  act,  it  was  held,  applied  only  to 
leases  m  writing  and  under  the  seal.33     The  words  "other  for- 
feiture    m  the  statute,  although  general  in  their  meaning    do 
not  include  every  breach  of  a  condition  but  only  breachS  of 
those  conditions  which  are  incident  to  the  reversion,  as  the  pay- 
ment of  rent,  or  for  the  benefit  of  the  estate,  as  for  not  w  Jin. 
It  or  keeping  the  premises  in  good  repair.     So,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  breach  of  a  condition  not  to  assign  without  a  license 
trom  the  lessor  is  a  breach  of  a  collateral  condition  which  is 
not  within  the  statute.-    This  statute,  however,  and  the  similar 
statutes  which  have  been  based  upon  it  in  the  various  states  by 
which  the  right  of  a  lessor  to  enforce  a  condition  by  re-entry  is 
conferred  upon  his  grantee,  do  not  make  what  was  before  their 
passage  a  mere  chose  in  action  an  estate  in  the  land  ^*    Hence 
such  right  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  is  not  an  estate  or  interest  in 

28  Henderson  v.  Carbondale  Coal  a.  standen  v.  Chrismas.  10  L   J 

Ct.  691.  35  L.  ed.  332.  c.  B.  920,  930;   Brydges  v    Lewis 

29Wildman    v.    Taylor,    4    Ben.  3  L.  J.  Q  B   ^^^3^"^^-^^  ^-  ^«^^^' 

42,  29  Fed.  Cas.  No.  17.654;   Gage  33  Lucas  y.  How,   Sir  T    Raym 

V.    Bates,    40    Cal.    384;    Smith    v.  250;   Collins  v.  Sillye    Styles   2^-' 

Whitbeck,   13  Ohio  St.   471.  Pennant's  Case,  3  Colie   64     '        ' 

corvee  ^405^    '"    "^^"^    ''''■      /*  ^^^^^^     ^     ^^^^^^     storage 
3^32  Hen    Vin.  c.  34 


640  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

the  land  which  can  be  sold,  alienated  or  conveyed  as  such.  It 
is  not  necessarily  an  incident  of  the  reversion,  or  a  part  of  it, 
for  the  grantor  when  he  re-enters  is  not  in  possession  by  reason 
of  any  rights  of  ownership  which  he  had  as  owner  of  the  re- 
version but  he  is  in  possession  by  reason  of  the  forfeiture.^'^ 
Hence,  because  of  this  rule,  it  has  been  held  that  a  lessor  who  had 
demised  his  whole  interest  subject  to  a  right  to  re-enter  on 
breach  of  condition,  may  himself  enter  on  condition  broken, 
though  he  had  no  reversion.^**  In  other  words,  at  common  law 
a  stranger  to  the  lease  cannot  enter  for  a  breach  of  condition. 
Thus,  a  beneficiary  of  a  trust  though  he  joins  in  the  lease  and 
a  power  of  re-entry  is  reserved  to  him  in  it  in  express  words 
cannot  maintain  ejectment  in  his  own  right  against  a  lessee  for 
a  breach  of  condition.  The  execution  of  the  lease  by  the  bene- 
ficiary is  merely  formal  and  as  a  confirmation  of  the  execution 
of  a  power  in  the  trustees.  Nor  does  it  matter  that  the  benefi- 
ciary who  is  named  in  the  lease  is  to  receive  the  rents  which  may 
accrue  thereunder  and  the  sole  trustee  dies  leaving  no  one  who 
has  a  legal  title  to  the  premises.  The  power  to  re-enter  can  un- 
der these  circumstances  be  exercised  by  a  trustee  only  and  while 
the  common  law  will  make  no  allowance  for  the  peculiar  circum- 
stances in  which  the  beneficiary  finds  himself,  i.  e.,  unable  to 
collect  the  rents  and  at  the  same  time  unable  to  oust  a  non-rent 
paying  tenant,  a  court  of  equity  will,  on  proper  application, 
appoint  a  new  trustee  to  act  for  the  benefit  of  the  cestui  que 
trust  in  this  emergency. ^'^  In  some  cases  of  leases  of  land  for 
mining  purposes  where  a  forfeiture  has  occurred  by  a  failure  on 
the  part  of  the  lessee  to  develop  the  land,  it  has  been  held  that 
a  grantee  of  the  lessor  or  the  heirs  of  such  grantee  may  enforce 
the  forfeiture  and  enter  for  condition  broken.^^  An  assignee 
of  a  part  of  the  reversion  who  takes  an  estate  as  a  tenant  for 
years,  or  life,  in  all  the  lands  assigned  may  be,  so  far  as  the  les- 
see is  concerned,  a  grantee  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute, 

35  Southard  v.   Railroad  Co.,   26      mant,  9  Ex.  635,  23  L.  J.  Ex.  135, 
N.  J.  Law,  21;  Webster  v.  Cooper,      18  Jur.  335,  2  W.  R.  276. 

14  How.   (U.  S.)   501.  37  Doe   d.   Barker  v.   Goldsmith, 

36  Doe  d.   Freeman  v.  Bateman,       2  C.  &  J.  674,  2  Tyr.  710,  1  L.  J. 
2  B.  &  Aid.  168,  20  R.  R  399     On       Eq.  25G. 

the  question  whether  the  right  of  38  island    Coal    Co.    v.    Coombs, 

a  lessor  to  re  enter  for  forfeiture       152    Ind.   379,   390,   53   N.   E.   Rep. 

15  assignable,    see    Hunt    v    Rem-      452,  456. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  641 

and  he  may  consequently  have  the  advantage  of  the  condition 
broken  during  his  term.^^  But  an  assignee  of  the  reversion  in 
a  part  of  the  land  is  not  a  grantee  within  the  statute.  For  the 
condition  being  an  entire  condition  cannot  be  apportioned  by 
the  lessor  without  he  consent  of  the  lessee,  and  an  attempt  to 
apportion  it  without  the  consent  of  the  lessee  will  destroy  it. 
§  401.  The  lessee  cannot  take  advantage  of  a  forfeiture. 
Inasmuch  as  the  landlord  alone  has  an  absolute  right  to  elect 
whether  he  shall  enforce  a  forfeiture  or  whether  he  shall  waive 
it,  the  tenant  cannot  base  a  refusal  to  pay  rent  upon  the  fact 
that  the  lease  has  been  forfeited  by  his  default.  The  lease  is 
not  absolutely  void  upon  the  forfeiture  or  default  of  the  tenant 
but  is  voidable  merely  and  is  still  enforcible  by  the  landlord  as 
a  valid  lease  if  he  shall  elect  to  enforce  it.*°  The  lessee  cannot 
himself  take  advantage  of  a  forfeiture  so  that  by  failing  to  pay 
rent  he  can  put  an  end  to  the  lease  and  thus  release  himself  and 
his  sureties  if  there  be  any,  from  liability  for  the  nonpayment 
of  future  instalments  of  rent.  A  forfeiture  being  for  the  benefit 
of  the  lessor  and  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  lessee  may  be  waived 
by  the  lessor  alone."  So,  an  assignee  of  a  lessee  cannot  refuse  to 
pay  rent  to  the  original  lessor  upon  the  ground  that  the  lease 

39  Co.  Litt.  215a;  Attoe  v.  Hem-  165,  36  Atl.  Rep.  216;  Liggett  v. 
mings,  2  Bulst.  281;  Kidwelly  v.  Shira,  159  Pa.  St.  350,  28  Atl.  Rep, 
Brand,  Plow,- 71,  72;  Isherwood  v.  218,  33  W.  N.  Cases,  553;  Wills  v. 
Oldknow.  2  M.  &  S.  283;  Wright  Gas  Co.,  130  Pa.  St.  222,  18  Atl. 
V.  Burroughs,  3  C.  B.  685.  Rep.  721;  Ray  v.  Gas.  Co.,  138  Pa. 

40  Evans  v.  Consumers'  Gas  Co.  St.  576,  20  Atl.  Rep.  1065;  Ogden 
(Ind.),  29  N.  E.  Rep.  398;  Ed-  v.  Hatry,  145  Pa.  St.  640,  23  Atl. 
monds  v.  Mounsey,  15  Ind.  App.  Rep.  334;  Phillips  v.  Vandergrift, 
399,  44  N.  E.  Rep.  196;  Chicago  146  Pa.  St.  347,  23  Atl.  Rep.  347; 
Attachment  Co.  v.  Davis  Sewing  Jones  v.  Western  Pennsylvania 
Machine  Co.  (111.),  25  N.  E.  Rep.  Gas  Co.,  146  Pa.  St.  204,  211,  23 
669;  Proctor  v.  Keith,  12  B.  Mon.  Atl.  Rep.  386,  29  W.  N.  Cases,  266; 
(Ky.)  252,  254;  Morrison  v.  Morris  v.  De  Wolf,  11  Tex.  Civ. 
Smith,  90  Md.  76,  44  Atl.  Rep.  App.  701,  33  S.  W.  Rep.  556; 
1031;  In  re  Assignment  of  Dick-  Brady  v.  Nagle  (Tex.),  29  S.  W. 
iuKon  Co.:  Welch  v.  Flitterling,  72  Rep.  943. 

Minn.    483,    75   N.    W.    Rep.    731;  "English  v.  Yates,  205  Pa.  St. 

Creveling  v.   West  End   Iron   Co.,  106,   54  Atl.   Rep.   503;    Gibson   v. 

51  N.  J.  Law,  34,  16  Atl.  Rep.  184;  Oliver,    158    Pa.    St.    277,    27    Atl. 

Smith  V.  Miller,  49  N.  J.  Law,  521,  Rep.  961;  Cochran  v.  Pew,  159  Pa. 

13  Atl.  Rep.  39;   Mathews  v.  Peo-  St.  184,  28  Atl.  Rep.  219,  33  W.  N. 

pie's   Nat.    Gas.    Co.,    179    Pa.    St.  C.  547. 
41 


G42 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


was  forfeited  and  that  the  assignment  to  him  is  void  because  it 
was  provided  by  a  stipulation  in  the  lease  that  it  should 
not  be  assigned  without  the  consent  of  the  lessor.*-  A  pro- 
vision that,  upon  the  non-performance  of  a  condition  by  the  les- 
see, the  lease  shall  be  null  and  void  means  only  that  it  shall  be 
null  and  void  at  the  election  of  the  lessor.  The  lessee  cannot  in- 
validate the  lease  and  deprive  the  lessor  of  his  rights  under  it 
by  a  default  in  the  performance  of  a  covenant  as  by  a  failure  to 
pay  his  rent  when  it  is  due.*^  So,  too,  in  the  case  of  leases  for 
mining  purposes  or  to  enable  the  lessee  to  work  land  for  mineral 
oil,  where  it  is  provided  that  the  lessee  must  begin  mining  or 
drilling  on  or  before  a  certain  date  and  it  is  also  provided  that 
the  term  shall  be  forfeited  in  case  he  shall  not  do  so,  the  lessee 
can  neither  refuse  to  perform  nor  escape  the  consequences  of  a 
default  in  performing  by  his  failure  to  begin  operation.    Under 


*2  Chicago  Attachment  Co.  v. 
Davis  Sewing  Machine  Co.  (111.), 
25  N.  E.  Rep.  669;  Dickinson's 
Assignment,  72  Minn.  483,  75  N. 
W.  Rep.  731. 

43  Morrison  v.  Smith,  90  Md.  76, 
44  Atl.  Rep.  1031;  Creveling  v. 
West  End  Iron  Co.,  51  N.  J.  Law, 
34,  16  Atl.  Rep.  184  (in  which  case 
the  land  was  on  forfeiture  to  go 
to  the  lessor  "as  though  the  lease 
had  never  been  made.").  See, 
also,  to  same  effect,  Smith  v.  Mil- 
ler, 49  N.  J.  Law,  521,  13  Atl.  Rep. 
39;  Leggett  v.  Shira,  159  Pa.  St. 
350,  28  Atl.  Rep.  218,  33  W.  N. 
Cases,  553.  A  clause  in  a  lease 
stating  that  it  shall  be  void  on  a 
breach  of  a  condition  by  the  les- 
see means  only  that  it  is  voidable 
at  the  option  of  the  lessor  even 
in  a  case  where  the  condition  was 
imposed  on  the  lessee  by  a  stat- 
ute. Doe  V.  Bancks,  4  B.  &  A.  401 ; 
Roberts  v.  Daver,  4  B.  &  A.  664; 
Davenport  v.  Regina,  47  L.  J.  P. 
0.  8,  3  App.  Cases,  115,  37  L.  T. 
727.  In  Hartshorne  v.  Watson,  4 
Bing.  N.  C.  178,  there  was  a  provi- 
sion that  on  a  failure  to  pay  rent 


the  lessor  was  to  have  possession 
again  as  if  the  lease  had  never 
been  made.  In  Arnsby  v.  Wood- 
ward, 6  Barn.  &  C.  519,  the  lease 
provided  that  on  a  default  in  the 
payment  of  the  rent,  or  if  any 
covenant  in  the  lease  should  be 
broken,  the  lease  was  to  be  void. 
Id  Rede  v.  Farr,  6  Maule  &  S.  121, 
the  condition  was  similar.  In  Doe 
v.  Banckes,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  401,  a 
proviso  in  the  lease  was  that  if 
the  lessee  should  fail  to  work  the 
mine  demised  the  lease  should  be 
void.  In  all  these  cases  the  lease 
was  held  to  be  voidable  only  at 
the  option  of  the  lessor,  and  not 
absolutely  void  upon  a  breach  of 
condition.  A  proviso  that  on  a 
certain  event  the  lessor  may  re- 
enter and  have  the  premises  "as 
if  the  lease  had  never  been  made" 
does  not  render  the  lease  void  ab 
i7)itio  on  entry,  but  only  avoids 
the  lease  from  the  date  of  entry. 
Hartshorne  v.  Watson,  4  Bing.  N. 
C.  178,  5  Scott,  506,  6  D.  P.  C. 
404,  1  Arn.  15.  7  L.  J.  C.  P.  138, 
2  Jur.  155. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE. 


6i3 


such  circumstances  if  it  is  stipulated  that  the  lessee  shaJl  pay  a 
certain  fixed  monthly  rental,  the  payments  to  begin  on  his  re- 
fusal or  failure  to  begin  operations  the  lessor  may  waive  the  for- 
feiture and  recover  the  rent  which  the  lessee  has  agreed  to  pay.*^ 
This  is  time  though  it  is. expressly  stipulated  in  a  mining  or  oil 
lease  that  upon  the  failure  of  the  lessee  to  begin  operations  the 
lease  shall  be  "null  and  void"  and  also  that  all  rights  and  obli- 
gations thereunder  shall  cease  "with  like  effect  as  though  the 
agreement  had  never  been  made. "  «  The  rule  seems  firmly  estab- 
lished by  all  the  decisions  both  in  England  and  America  that  how- 
ever absolute  and  certain  the  words  of  forfeiture  may  be,  even 
though  they  shall  expressly  declare  the  lease  null  and  void  or  at 
an  end,  they  will  be  always  construed  as  meaning  that  it  is  void- 
able merely  and  this  at  the  option  of  the  lessor.  They  will  be 
considered  as  having  no  other  object  than  to  enable  the  lessor  to 
treat  the  lease  as  void  or  not  at  his  election  unless  an  election  to 
do  this  be  in  express  terms  given  to  the  lessee  as  well.^«  A  su- 
rety for  the  payment  of  the  rent  by  the  lessee  cannot  defeat 
the  right  of  the  lessor  to  recover  against  him  on  the  failure  of 
the  lessee  to  pay  rent  due  subsequent  to  a  forfeiture  by  show- 


**  Mathews  v.  People's  National 
Gas  Co.,  179  Pa.  St.  165,  36  Atl. 
Rep.  216. 

45  0gden  V.  Hater,  145  Pa.  St. 
640,  23  Atl.  Rep.  334,  following 
Wills  V.  Gas  Co.,  130  Pa.  St.  222, 
18  Atl.  Rep.  721;  Ray  v.  Gas  Co., 
138  Pa.  St.  576,  20  Atl.  Rep.  1065. 
And  see,  also,  Phillips  v.  Vander- 
grift,  146  Pa.  St.  357,  23  Atl.  Rep. 
347.  The  construction  of  the  pro- 
vision that  a  lease  shall  be  null 
and  void  on  the  default  of  the 
lessee  to  perform  a  covenant  in  it 
cannot  be  varied  by  showing  the 
uniform  custom  of  the  parties  in 
construing  other  similar  provi- 
sions. Jones  V.  V^^estern  Pennsyl- 
vania Gas  Co.,  146  Pa.  St.  204,  211, 
23  Atl.  Rep.  286,  29  W.  N.  Cases, 
266. 

4-6  "The  legal  effect  of  a  clause  in 
a  gas  or  oil  lease  that  "a  failure 


to  complete  such  well  or  to  pay 
such  rental  shall  render  this  lease 
null  and  void,  and  it  can  only  be 
renewed  by  mutual  consent,"  is 
that  the  forfeiture  is  for  the  ben- 
efit of  the  lessor  only  and  is  at 
his  option.  Such  an  effect  can  be 
changed  only  by  an  express  stipu- 
lation that  the  lease  shall  be  void- 
able at  the  election  of  either  party 
or  of  the  lessee.  If  a  lease  is  to 
become  "null  and  void"  it  is  not 
made  any  more  so  by  a  provision 
that  it  "shall  be  of  no  effect  be- 
tween the  parties,"  or  "can  only 
be  renewed  by  mutual  consent," 
or  other  cumulative  phrases  of 
the  same  meanmg.  The  legal  ef- 
fect of  such  a  clause  always  is 
that  the  forfeiture  is  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  lessor  at  his  option." 
Jones  v.  West.  Penn.  Gas  Co.,  146 
Pa.  St.  204,  211,  23  Atl.  Rep.  386. 


644 


LAW   OF  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 


ing  that  a  forfeiture  lias  accrued  unless  lie  can  also  show  that 
the  lessor  has  enforced  the  forfeiture  by  a  re-entry  and  that  the 
relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  and  the  consequent  liability 
of  the  latter  for  rent  has  thus  been  terminated.*^ 

§  402.  The  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  by  the  lessor.  The  right 
of  re-entry  upon  the  breach  of  a  condition  being  clearly  for  the 
benefit  of  the  lessor  exclusively  may  be  waived  by  him.**     The 


47  Clark  V.  Jones,  1  Denio  (N. 
Y.)  516,  43  Am.  Dec.  706.  A  provi- 
sion that  a  lease  shall  be  void  on 
the  occurrence  of  a  certain  event 
means  that  it  shall  be  voidable  at 
the  option  of  the  lessor  only,  and 
he  may  waive  the  breach.  Armsby 
V.  Woodward,  6  B.  &  C.  519,  9  D. 
&  R.  536,  5  L.  J.  (0.  S.)  K.  B.  199; 
Doe  d.  Nash  v.  Birch,  1  M.  &  W. 
402,  5  L.  J.  Ex.  185;  Reid  v.  Par- 
sons, 2  Chit.  247;  Doe  d.  Green  v. 
Baker,  2  Moore,  189,  8  Taunt.  241, 
19  R.  R.  502. 

48Dahm  v.  Barlow,  93  Ala.  120, 
9  So.  Rep.  598;  Randal  v,  Tatum, 
98  Cal.  390,  33  Pac.  Rep.  433,  435; 
Willoughby  v.   Lawrence,   116   111. 

II,  22,  4  N.  E.  Rep.  356;  Webster 
v.  Nichols,  104  111.  160,  172;  Sex- 
ton  V.   Chicago    Storage   Co.,    129 

III.  318,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  920,  16  Am. 
St.  Rep.  274;  Chicago  Attachment 
Co.  V.  Davis  Sewing  Machine  Co. 
(111.  1889),  25  N.  E.  Rep.  669,  af- 
firming 33  111.  App.  362;  Springer 
V.  Chicago  R.  E.  Loan  Co.,  202  111. 
17,  26,  66  N.  E.  Rep.  850,  affirming 
102  111.  App.  294;  Channel  v.  Mer- 
vifield,  206  111.  279,  283,  69  N.  W. 
Rep.  32,  reversing  106  111.  App. 
243;  Colton  v.  Gorham,  72  Iowa, 
324,  325,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  76;  Reid 
V.  Weissner  &  Sons  Brewing  Co., 
88  Md.  234,  40  Atl.  Rep.  877;  Mor- 
rison V.  Smith,  90  Md.  76,  44  Atl. 
Rep.  1031;  O'Keefe  v.  Kennedy,  3 
Cush.  (Mass.)  325;  Porter  r.  Mer- 
rill,   124    Mass.    534;    Chalmers   v. 


Smith,  152  Mass.  &61,  26  N.  E. 
Rep.  95;  Shattuck  v.  Lovejoy,  8 
Gray  (Mass.)  204;  Tyler's  Estate 
V.  Gresler,  74  Mo.  App.  543;  B. 
Roth  Tool  Co.  V.  Champion  Spring 
Co.,  93  Mo.  App.  530,  67  S.  W.  Rep. 
967;  Hynes  v.  Ecker,  34  Mo.  App. 
650;  In  re  Assignment  of  Dickin- 
son Co.,  Welch  v.  Fitterling,  72 
Minn.  483,  75  N.  W.  Rep.  731,  732; 
Fleming  v.  Fleming  Hotel  Co.,  70 
N.  J.  Eq.  509,  61  Atl.  Rep.  157; 
Heeter  v.  Eckstein,  50  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  Rep.  445;  McMurray  v. 
Harway,  56  N.  Y.  337,  342;  Jones 
V.  Daly,  175  N.  Y.  529,  67  N.  E.  Rep. 
1083;  Stuyvesant  v.  Davis,  9  Paige 
Ch.  (N  Y.)  427,  430;  Weisbrod  v. 
Dembowsky,  25  Misc.  Rep.  485,  55 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1;  Clark  v.  Greenfield, 
34  N.  Y.  Supp.  1,  13  Misc.  Rep. 
124;  Holman  v.  De  Lin-River  Fin- 
ley  Co.,  30  Oreg.  428,  47  Pac.  Rep. 
708;  Garcewich  v.  Woods,  73  N.  Y. 
Supp.  154;  English  v.  Yates,  205 
Pa.  St.  106,  54  Atl.  Rep.  503;  Gal- 
ley V.  Kellerman,  123  Pa.  St.  491, 
16  Atl.  Rep.  474;  Wills  v.  Mann. 
Natural  Gas  Co.,  130  Pa.  St.  222, 
18  Atl.  Rep.  721,  5  L.  R.  A.  603; 
Ray  V.  West.  Penn.  Natural  Gas 
Co.,  138  Pa.  St.  076,  20  Atl.  Rep. 
3  065,  27  W.  N.  Cases,  230;  Ogden 
V.  Hatry,  145  Pa.  St.  640,  23  Atl. 
Rep.  334;  Jones  v.  West.  Penn. 
Nat.  Gas  Co.,  146  Pa.  St.  204,  211, 
23  Atl.  Rep.  386;  Phillips  v.  Van- 
dergrift,  146  Pa.  St.  347;  Leather- 
man  V.  Oliver,  151  Pa.  St.  646,  650, 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE. 


645 


waiver  must  be  entire  and  relate  to  all  the  premises.  Tlie  land- 
lord cannot  enforce  the  forfeiture  as  to  a  part  of  the  premises 
and  waive  it  as  to  another  part.*^  According  to  a  rule  of  law 
laid  down  in  a  case  decided  in  England  in  the  reign  of  Queen 
Elizabeth,^''  where  a  forfeiture  which  has  been  incurred  by  a 
lessee  is  absolutely  waived  by  the  lessor  it  is  gone  forever.  It 
cannot  thereafter  be  enforced  by  the  lessor  or  any  other  person. 
And  though  this  rule  has  met  with  considerable  criticism  in  the 
courts,  it  has  usually  been  strictly  adhered  to  by  them  and  is 
still  good  law  in  most  of  the  states  of  the  Union  at  the  present 
time.  So,  for  example,  where  a  lease  which  is  not  assignable 
without  the  written  consent  of  the  lessor  has  been  assigned  and 
the  lessor  has  waived  the  forfeiture  by  accepting  the  assignee 
as  his  tenant  he  cannot  take  advantage  of  a  subsequent  assign- 
ment by  this  assignee  and  declare  a  forfeiture  of  the  lease  on 
that  account.^^     What  language  or  conduct  on  the  part  of  the 


25  Atl.  Rep.  309;  Westmore,  etc.. 
Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  De  Witt,  130 
Pa.  St.  235,  18  Atl.  Rep.  724,  5  L. 
R.  A.  731;  Bartley  v.  Phillips,  179 
Pa.  St.  175,  36  Atl.  Rep.  217; 
Granite  Building  Corporation  v. 
Greene,  25  R.  I.  586,  57  Atl.  Rep. 
649 ;  Wildey  Lodge,  etc.  v.  City  of 
Paris  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1903),  73 
S.  W.  Rep.  69;  Graham  v.  Wo- 
mack,  82  Mo.  App.  618;  Mack  v. 
Dailey,  67  Vt.  90,  91;  Denton  v. 
Taylor,  90  Va.  219,  225,  17  S.  E. 
Rep.  944;  Gomber  v.  Hacket,  6 
Wis.  323;  Armbsy  v.  Woodward, 
6  Barn.  &  C.  519;  Rede  v.  Farr,  6 
Maule  &  Sel.  121;  Warner  v.  Coch- 
rane, 128  Fed.  Rep.  553. 

49  Ocean  Grove  Land  Ass'n  v. 
Berthall,  62  N.  J.  Law,  88,  40  Atl. 
Rep.  779,  in  which  it  was  said 
that  the  landlord  could  not  select 
a  portion  of  the  premises,  large  or 
small,  as  he  might  see  fit,  and  en- 
force a  forfeiture  by  an  entry 
upon  that,  leaving  the  tenant  in 
possession  of  the  remainder.  The 
landlord  ought  to  enforce  the  for- 


feiture against  the  whole  of  the 
demised  premises  or  waive  it  al- 
together. 

50  Dumpor's  Case,  4  Coke,  119b. 

51  Reid  v.  Weissner  &  Sons 
Brewing  Co.,  88  Md.  234,  40  Atl. 
Rep.  877;  Smith  v.  Clark,  97  Me. 
304,  54  Atl.  Rep.  758;  Chipman  v. 
Emeric,  5  Cal.  49,  63  Am.  Dec.  80; 
Pennock  v.  Lyons,  118  Mass.  92; 
Siefke  v.  Koch,  31  How  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  383,  384;  Dakin  v.  Williams, 
21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  457,  following 
Dumpor's  Case,  4  Coke,  119.  The 
covenant  prohibiting  an  assign- 
ment was,  as  is  conceded  by  and 
alleged  in  the  declaration,  unqual- 
ifiedly waived  when  the  assign- 
ment was  made  by  Miller;  and 
having  been  thus  waived  without 
the  superaddition  of  a  restriction 
on  subsequent  assignments,  it  was 
gone  forever,  and  therefore  was 
not  binding  on  the  brewing  com- 
pany. This  principle  was  an- 
nounced as  early  as  the  reign  of 
Elizabeth  in  Dumpor's  Case. 
Later   decisions   have  carried   the 


646  LAW   OF  LANDLORD   AND   TENANT. 

lessor  will  in  any  particular  case  constitute  a  waiver  of  a  for- 
feiture will  usually  depend  upon  the  facts  and  circumstances 
of  the  case.  In  all  cases  where  no  conflict  appears  in  the  proof 
of  the  language  or  the  conduct  of  the  parties,  the  question  is 
one  of  law  but  where  the  evidence  on  these  points  is  conflicting 
it  is  for  the  jury  or  the  chancellor  to  determine  from  all  the 
facts  if  there  has  been  a  waiver  ^-  of  the  forfeiture  by  the  land- 
lord. The  general  rule  is  that  forfeitures  in  leases  are  favored 
neither  in  law  nor  in  equity  and  after  a  forfeiture  has  occurred 
and  has  been  declared,  generally  any  subsequent  act  by  a  party 
who  is  entitled  to  take  advantage  of  the  forfeiture  done  with  a 
knowledge  of  the  facts  which  is  inconsistent  with  an  intention 
on  his  part  to  take  advantage  of  the  forfeiture  may  be  taken 
in  law  as  a  waiver  of  the  forfeiture. ^^ 

§  403.  The  rent  received  after  a  forfeiture.  The  receipt  of 
rent  by  the  landlord  accruing  after  the  breach  of  covenant  or 
condition  has  occurred  is  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  arising  thereby 
by  reason  of  the  failure  of  the  tenant  to  pay  rent  if  for  any 
other  reason  if  the  landlord  when  receiving  the  rent  knew 
that  a  forfeiture  had  occurred.  But  the  receipt  of  rent  is  never 
a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  where  the  rent  was  received  by  the  land- 
lord in  ignorance  that  a  forfeiture  had  occurred.'*     The  money 

decision  further  than  is  applied  low,  93  Ala.  120,  9  So.  Rep.  598; 
in  Dumpor's  Case,  for  it  is  held  Randal  v.  Tatum,  98  Cal.  390,  33 
that  whether  the  license  to  assign  Pac.  Rep.  433,  435;  Silva  v.  Camp- 
be  general,  as  in  Dumpor's  Case,  bell,  84  Cal.  420,  24  Pac.  Rep.  316; 
or  particular  as  to  one  particular  Frazier  v.  Caruthers,  44  111.  App. 
person,  subject  to  the  performance  Gl;  Robbins  v.  Conway,  92  111. 
of  the  covenants  in  the  original  App.  173;  North  Chicago  St.  R. 
lease,  still  the  condition  is  gone  Co.  v.  Le  Grand  Co.,  95  111.  App. 
in  both  instances,  and  the  as-  435;  Bacon  v.  Western  Furniture 
signee  may  assign  without  license.  Co.,  53  Ind.  229,  231;  Cleve  v. 
Brummell  v.  Macpherson,  14  Ves.  Mazzoni,  19  Ky.  Law  Rep.  2001, 
173;  Reid  v.  Weissner  &  Sons  45  S.  W.  Rep.  88;  Morrison  v. 
Brewing  Co.,  88  Md.  234,  40  Atl.  Smith,  90  Md.  76,  44  Atl.  Rep. 
Rep.  877.  1031;    Collins    v.    Canty,    6    Cush. 

52  Jones  V.  Daly,  175  N.  Y.  520,  (Mass.)  415;  Barber  v.  Stone,  104 
67  N.  E.  Rep.  1083,  affirming  76  Mich.  90,  G2  N.  W.  Rep.  139;  Garn- 
N.  Y.  Supp.  725,  73  App.  Div.  220.  hart  v.   Finney,   40  Mo.   449,   460; 

53  Channel  v.  Merrifield,  106  111.  Stover  v.  Hazelbaker,  42  Neb.  393, 
App.  243.  60    N.    W.    Rep.    597;    Jackson    v. 

54  Brooks  V.  Rodgers,  99  Ala.  Brownson,  7  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  227, 
433,  12  So.  Rep.  61;  Dahm  v.  Bar-  235;   Lewis  v.  Ocean  Nav.  &  Pier 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE. 


647 


paid  must  be  paid  as  rent.  If  it  is  paid  by  the  tenant  not  as  rent 
accruing  after  forfeiture  but  as  damages  for  detaining  or  tres 
passing  on  the  land,  its  receipt  by  the  lessor  is  no  waiver.^^  So, 
also,  distraining  for  rent  which  accrues  after  forfeiture  is  an  ab- 
solute waiver  of  a  forfeiture.^^  A  waiver  takes  place  where  the 
tenant  after  a  forfeiture  releases  to  the  landlord  a  portion  of 
the  premises  to  be  credited  on  account  of  rent  which  has  accr?ied. 


Co.,  125  N.  Y.  341,  affirming  2  N. 
Y.  Supp.  911;  Michel  v.  O'Brien. 
6  Misc.  Rep.  408,  27  N.  Y.  Supp. 
173;  Koehler  v.  Brady,  144  N.  Y. 
135,  38  N.  E.  Rep.  978,  affirming 
78  Hun,  443,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  388; 
Chase  v.  Knickerbocker  Phosphate 
Co.,  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  220,  224,  32 
App.  Div.  400,  87  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 
22a;  Mack  v  Dailey,  67  Vt.  90,  30 
Atl.  Rep.  686;  Pettygrove  v.  Roths- 
child, 2  Wash.  St.  6,  25  Pac.  Rep. 
907;  Hukill  v.  Myers,  36  W.  Va. 
639,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  151;  Gomber  v. 
Kackett,  6  Wis.  323,  324;  Jacob  v. 
Down,  69  Law  J.  Ch.  493,  (1900) 
2  Ch.  156,  83  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  191, 
48  Weeky  Rep.  441,  64  J.  P.  552; 
Roe  d.  Gregson  v.  Harrison.  2  T. 
R.  425;  Mathews  v.  Whetton,  Cro. 
Car.  233;  Goodright  v.  Cordwent, 
6  T.  R.  219;  Doe  v.  Rees,  4  Bing. 
(N.  C.)  384;  Goodright  v.  Davids, 
Cowp.  804;  Green's  Case,  Cro. 
Eliz.  3;  Doe  d.  Bryan  v.  Bancks, 
4  B.  &  Aid.  401,  Gow.  220,  23  R. 
R.  318;  Arnsby  v.  Woodward,  6 
B.  &  C.  319,  9  D.  &  R.  536,  5  L.  J. 
(O.  S.)  K.  B.  199;  Walrond  v. 
Hawkins,  44  L.  J.  C.  P.  116,  L.  R. 
10  C.  P.  342,  32  L.  T.  119,  23  W. 
R.  390;  Roe  d.  Gregson  v.  Harri- 
son, 2  T.  R.  425,  1  R.  R.  513;  Good- 
right  d.  Walter  v.  Davids,  Cowp. 
803;  Doe  d.  Cheney  v.  Batten. 
Cowp.  243,  9  East,  314,  n,  9  R.  R. 
570,  n.;  Hume  v.  Kent,  1  Ball  & 
B.  554.    The  breach  of  a  covenant 


against  assignment  by  the  lessee 
without  the  consent  of  the  lessor 
may  be  waived  by  the  acceptance 
of  rent  from  the  assignee.  Web- 
ster v.  Nichols,  104  111.  160;  Ran- 
dal V.  Tatum,  98  Cal.  390,  33  Pac. 
Rep.  433,  435;  Carpenter  v.  Pocas- 
set  Mfg.  Co.,  180  Mass.  130,  61  N. 
E.  Rep.  816.  Contra,  Boardman  v. 
Davidson,  7  Abb.  Prac.  (N.  S.) 
439.  The  acceptance  of  a  month's 
rent  from  an  assignee  for  the  ben- 
efit of  the  creditors  of  the  lessee, 
before  the  assignee  has  elected 
whether  he  would  or  would  not 
accept  the  term,  is  not  a  waiver. 
The  Medinah  Temple  Co.  v.  Cur- 
rey,  162  111.  441.  44  N.  E.  Rep.  839. 
Until  the  assignee  has  made  his 
election  to  accept  or  refuse  the 
lease  the  lessor  has  the  right  to 
deal  with  him  as  to  the  use  of  the 
property  without  reference  to  the 
lease.  The  fact  that  the  lessor 
arranged  to  receive  some  compen- 
sation for  the  use  of  the  premises 
from  him  without  declaring  it  to 
be  rent  under  the  lease  in  no  way 
proved  a  waiver  of  the  forfeiture. 
The  question  is  one  of  intention. 

55  Goodright  d.  Charter  v.  Card- 
went,  6  T.  R.  219. 

5G  Pennant's  Case,  3  Coke,  64, 
64a :  Chase  v.  Knickerbocker  Phos- 
phate Co.,  32  App.  Div.  400,  53  N. 
Y.  Supp.  220,  87  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 
220;  Blyth  v.  Dennett,  13  Com.  B. 
178,  18L 


G48  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

It  is  not  material  that  ^'^  the  distraint  was  unsuccessful  in  se- 
curing payment  of  the  amount  of  rent  due,^^  because  sufficient 
goods  are  not  found  upon  the  premises.°^  But  a  distress  and 
continuing  in  possession,  though  it  may  be  a  waiver  of  an  exist- 
ing forfeiture,  is  not  a  waiver  of  any  right  which  subsequently 
accrues  to  the  landlord.^"  So,  too,  an  absolute  and  unqualified 
demand  for  rent  subsequently  accruing  will  be  a  waiver  of  the 
forfeiture,®^  when  made  by  the  landlord  or  his  agent  duly  au- 
thorized. Thus,  if  the  landlord  gives  notice  to  quit  and  there- 
upon begins  an  action  to  cancel  the  lease  as  forfeited,  his  sub- 
sequent receipt  of  subsequent  rent  will  be  a  waiver  of  all  his 
rights  to  a  cancellation  of  the  lease.®^  Nor  need  the  rent  be  paid 
in  money  in  order  that  its  receipt  shall  be  a  waiver.  The  accep- 
tance of  property  or  services  from  the  tenant  after  a  forfeiture 
has  occurred  is  equally  with  the  payment  of  rent  in  money  a 
waiver  of  a  forfeiture.®^  The  rent  which  is  received  in  order  .to 
be  material  as  a  waiver  must  be  rent  which  accrues  subsequently 
to  the  forfeiture.  The  receipt  of  rent  which  has  accrued  before 
the  demand  or  which  has  become  due  before  the  service  of  a  no- 
tice to  quit  will  not  operate  as  a  waiver.®*  If  the  rent  is  payable 

5T  Brooks    V.    Rodgers,    99    Ala.  1031;   Hukill  v.  Myers,  36  W.  Va. 

433,  12  So.  Rep.  61.  639,  647,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  151;  Carra- 

5B  Browning's  Case,  Plowd.  133.  her  v.  Bell,  7  Wash.   81,  34   Pac. 

59  Camp  V.  Scott,  47  Conn.  366,  Rep.  469.  "The  receipt  of  rent 
371.  after   a   breach   of   covenant   does 

60  Doe  d.  Taylor  v.  Johnson,  1  not  operate  as  a  waiver,  unless 
Stark.  411,  18  R.  R.  791.  See,  also,  the  rent  received  accrued  subse- 
Zouch  d.  "Ward  v.  Willingale,  1  quently  to  the  act  which  works 
H.  Bl.  311,  2  R.  R.  770;  Doe  d.  the  forfeiture."  Bleecker  v.  Smith, 
Flower  v.  Peck,  1  B.  &  Ad.  428,  9  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  530;  Williams 
L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  60.  V.  Vanderbilt,   145    111.  238,  34  N. 

61  Camp  V.  Scott,  47  Conn.  366,  E.  Rep.  476,  21  L.  R.  A.  489.  This 
371;  Doe  d.  Nash  v.  Birch,  1  Mee.  rule  is  sustained  by  the  weight 
&  Wei.  402,  408;  Blyth  v.  Dennett,  of  authority,  though  there  are  a 
13  C.  B.  178,  22  Law  .J.  C.  P.  79.  few  cases  which  do  not  recognize 

62  Dahm  v.  Barlow,  93  Ala.  120,  it.  See  Mack  v.  Dailey,  67  Vt.  90, 
9  So.  Rep.  598.  30    Atl.    Rep.    686.      See,    also,    as 

63  Frazier  v.  Caruthers,  44  111.  sustaining  the  text,  Price  v.  War- 
App.  61.  wood,  4  H.  &  N.  512,  28  L.  J.  Ex. 

64  Silva  V.  Campbell,  84  Cal.  420,  329,  5  Jur.  (N.  S.)  472,  7  W.  R. 
24  Pac.  Rep.  316;  Robbins  v.  Con-  506;  BrJlSges  v.  Longman,  24  Beav. 
way,  92  111.  App.  173;  Morrison  v.  27,  30. 

Smith,    90    Md.    76,    44    Atl.    Rep. 


COVENANTS  OP  THE  LEASE.  649 

in  monthly  installments  in  advance,  the  landlord  waives  by  ac- 
cepting rent  in  advance,  his  right  to  insist  upon  a  forfeiture  for 
a  part  of  the  period  covered  by  the  payment.^^  Where  the  con- 
duct of  the  tenant  constitutes  a  continuing  ground  of  forfeiture 
the  acceptance  of  rent  by  the  landlord  after  a  forfeiture  has 
occurred  is  not  a  waiver.  This  would  be  the  case  where  the  de- 
fault of  the  tenant  consisted  of  the  use  of  the  premises  for  a 
purpose  forbidden  by  the  terms  of  the  lease.*^'  Though  the  re- 
ceipt of  rent  may  be  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  created  in  the  past 
by  a  failure  to  pay  rent,  the  tenant  is  not  relieved  from  paying 
rent  promptly  in  the  future.  The  condition  or  covenant  is  one 
of  a  continuing  nature.  The  default  of  the  tenant  and  his  re- 
fusal to  pay  after  a  waiver  by  the  landlord  revives  the  forfeiture 
and  enables  the  landlord  to  recover  possession  upon  a  new  breach 
of  the  condition."  The  acceptance  of  rent  by  the  landlord  with 
knowledge  that  a  forfeiture  had  been  incurred  by  the  tenant  is 
a  waiver  only  of  such  breaches  of  covenant  creating  a  forfeiture 
which  have  occurred  prior  to  the  receipt  of  the  rent  and  does 
not  deprive  him  of  his  right  to  declare  and  enforce  a  forfeiture 
for  a  breach  of  condition  occurring  subsequently  where  each  act 
of  the  tenant  constitutes  a  continuing  breach  of  covenant.*'^    The 

65  Barber  v.  Stone,  104  Mich.  breach  of  condition  and  all  the 
90,  92,  93,  62  N.  W.  Rep.  139.  In  circumstances,  demanded  and  re- 
this  case  a  landlord  accepted  rent  ceived  from  the  lessee,  under  the 
which  had  accrued  for  a  month  contract  of  the  lease,  rents  which 
past  and  a  portion  of  that  which  accrued  subsequently  to  the  breach, 
was  payable  monthly  in  advance,  this  was  a  clear  recognition  that 
and  the  court  held  that  by  accept-  the  relation  of  landlord  and  ten- 
ing  a  portion  of  the  rent,  though  ant  continued  for  the  time  for 
for  future  occupation,  after  he  had  which  the  rent  was  paid  and  re- 
served a  notice  of  forfeiture,  he  ceived.  A  lessor  cannot  be  per- 
had  waived  the  forfeiture  at  least  mitted  to  get  the  benefit  of  his 
for  the  period  for  which  rent  had  contract  of  lease  after  breach  of 
been  paid.  condition  for  the  purpose  of  col- 
es Mulligan  v.  HoUingsworth,  99  lecting  rents  which  subsequently 
Fed.  Rep.  216.  accrued,  and,  after  collecting  the 
GT  Gluck  V.  Elkan,  36  Minn.  80,  rents,  then  hold  the  lessee  to  be  a 
30  N.  W.  Rep.  446.  trespasser  on  the  land  during  the 
68  Granite  Building  Ass'n  v.  same  period  for  which  he  collected 
Greene,  25  R.  I.  48,  54  Atl.  Rep.  rents  under  the  contract  of  lease. 
792.  "If,  after  the  brtach  of  the  The  receipt  of  the  rents  under 
condition  of  the  lease,  the  lessor,  such  circumstances  is  an  affirma- 
with    a    full    knowledge    of    the  tion  that  the  contract  of  lease  was 


650  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND   TENANT. 

acceptance  by  a  lessor  of  rent  after  a  breach  of  a  condition  will 
revive  the  lease  and  waive  a  forfeiture  though  the  lease  ex- 
pressly declares  that  it  shall  become  null  and  void  or  that  the 
term  shall  at  once  cease  and  determine.  In  law  the  lease  is 
void  but  equity  will  not  so  regard  it.  Equity  wull  not  distin- 
guish, in  determining  whether  a  forfeiture  has  been  waived, 
between  a  lease  which  is  expressly  void  on  a  breach  of  condition 
and  one  which  only  gives  a  power  of  re-entry.  For  they  are 
practically  the  same  except  that  in  the  former  the  consequences 
of  an  entry  for  a  breach  of  condition  precedes  the  provision 
for  a  re-entry  while  in  the  latter  the  consequences  are  not  men- 
tioned but  obviously  result  from  the  re-entry.*'^ 

§  404.  The  payment  of  the  rent  to  a  landlord  after  an  action 
of  ejectment  or  other  action  by  a  landlord  for  the  possession. 
The  action  of  the  landlord  in  bringing  ejectment  or  similar  pro- 
ceedings to  recover  possession  against  his  tenant  for  a  forfeiture 
is  in  its  effect  an  election  on  the  part  of  the  landlord  to  treat 
the  lease  as  void.  Thereafter  the  lease  is  void  and  cannot  be 
revived  by  any  action  of  the  parties  though  a  new  lease  can  of 
course  be  made.  The  beginning  of  an  action  of  ejectment  is 
equivalent  in  theory  and  is  a  substitute  in  modem  times  at  least 
for  an  actual  physical  entry  by  the  landlord  on  the  land  and 
his  actual  ouster  of  the  tenant  and  is  in  law  operative  in  every 
respect  as  a  surrender  of  the  lease. '°  It  follows  from  this  rule 
that  the  receipt  of  rent  by  the  landlord  from  the  tenant  after 
an  action  of  ejectment  has  been  begun  cannot  be  pleaded  by  the 
tenant  as  &  waiver  by  the  landlord  of  his  right  to  enforce  the  for- 
feiture and  as  a  defense  in  the  action  of  ejectment.  The  accept- 
still  in  force  and  subsisting  up  to  man,  J.,  in  Brooks  v.  Rodgers,  9& 
the  time  for  which  rent  was  col-  Ala.  433,  12  So.  Rep.  61. 
Ifccted,  and  that  the  lessee  was  not  69  Rede  v.  Farr,  6  M.  &  S.  121; 

a  trespasser  during  that  time  for       Bowser  v.  Colby,  1  Hare,  109,  11 
which  he  paid  rent.     If  the  lessor      L.  J.  Ch.  132,  5  Jur.  1106;  Arnsby 
receives    rent  only    for    the    time      v.  Woodward,  6  Bar.  &  Ores.  519. 
prior  to  the  breach  of  the  condi-  '?o  Whether    the    commencement 

tion,  and  if  the  rent  is  received  of  an  action  by  the  lessor  to  re- 
without  notice  or  knowledge  of  cover  the  possession  on  a  breach 
the  breach,  payment  under  such  of  a  covenant  will,  without  actual 
circumstances  will  not  be  a  waiver  entry,  determine  the  lease,  see 
of  his  right  to  elect  to  declare  the  Dyke,  Ex  parte  Morrish,  in  re,  22 
estate  of  the  lessee  forfeited  and  Ch.  D.  410,  48  L.  T,  303. 
of  the  right  to  re-enter."    By  Cole- 


CO\^NANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  651 

ance  of  rent  by  the  landlord  after  he  has  begun  an  action  of 
ejectment  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  is  not  a  waiver  of  the  forfei- 
ture/^ though  the  rent  had  accrued  prior  to  the  forfeiture.  The 
conduct  of  the  landlord  in  bringing-  ejectment  is  from  the  ten- 
ant's point  of  view  an  eviction  and  from  the  landlord's  point 
of  view  the  acceptance  of  a  surrender.  And  a  landlord  who 
has  brought  an  action  of  ejectment  against  his  tenant  for  a 
forfeiture  does  not  waive  the  forfeiture  by  subsequently  thereto 
distraining  for  the  rent'-  which  was  due  when  the  forfeiture 
was  incurred.  So,  also,  if  after  the  ejectment  has  been  com- 
menced the  parties  shall  actually  make  a  new  lease,  or  shall  enter 
into  an  agreement  to  make  a  new  lease,  whether  upon  the  terms 
of  the  old  lease  or  otherwise  and  rent  is  paid  under  such  circum- 
stances, it  is  a  good  defense  for  the  tenant  not  as  a  waiver  of 
the  landlord's  rights  but  as  showing  him  in  legal  possession  un- 
der a  new  arrangement.^^  These  rules  which  are  applicable  to 
the  common  law  action  of  ejectment  are  also  applicable  to  the  va- 
rious actions  and  proceedings  which  have  been  created  by  statute 
to  enable  the  landlord  to  regain  the  possession  of  the  premises 
on  the  tenant's  default.  The  acceptance  of  rent  by  the  land- 
lord after  the  rendition  of  a  judgment  in  his  favor  in  a  posses- 
sory action  is  not  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  though  the  rent  paid 
was  due  prior  to  the  commencement  of  the  action.'*  Where  the 
landlord  has  had  judgment  awarded  him  in  a  possessory  action 
from  which  the  tenant  has  appealed  and  given  a  bond  to  stay 
execution  upon  condition  that  he  pay  the  rent  during  his  occu- 
pancy, the  receipt  of  the  rent  by  the  landlord  after  the  judg- 

■1  Doe  d.  Marecraft  v.  Meux,  1  text  that  the  service  by  a  lessor 

Car.  &  P.  346,  7  D.  &  R.  98,  4  B.  &  upon  the  lessee  of  a  declaration  in 

C.  606,  4  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K.  B.  4,  28  ejectment  for  a  forfeiture  operates 

R.  R.  426;  Jones  v.  Carter,  15  Mee.  as  a  final  election  by  the  lessor  to 

&  Wei.  718;  Grimwood  v.  Moss,  27  terminate  the  lease  and  he  cannot 

L.  T.  268,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  360;  Tole-  thereafter,  though  there  has  been 

man  v.  Portbury,  24  L.  T.  24,  L.  R.  no  judgment  in  the  ejectment,  sue 

6  Q.  B.  245.  for  rent  subsequently  accruing  or 

72  Grimwood  v.  Moss,  41  L.  J.  C.  on  covenants  broken  after  the  dec- 
P.  239.  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  360,  27  L.  T.  laration.  Jones  v.  Carter,  15  M. 
268,  20  W.  R.  972.  &  w.  718. 

73  Evans  v.  Wyatt,  43  L.  T.  176,  -*  Carter  Publishing  Co.  v.  Den- 
44  J.  P.  767,  citing  Marecroft  v.  nett,  11  S.  D.  956,  78  N.  W.  Rep. 
Meux,  4  B.  &  C.  606,  7  D.  &  R.  98.  956. 

It   follows    from    the   rule   of   the 


652  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

meut  is  not  of  course  a  waiver  of  any  rights  to  which  the  land- 
lord may  be  entitled."  The  same  rule  applies  to  the  receipt  of 
rent  from  a  tenant  who  has  appealed  from  a  judgment  of  resti- 
tution when  the  rent  is  paid  after  the  appeal  has  been  decided 
against  the  tenant.'*'  And  where  a  tenant,  after  a  possessory 
action  has  been  decided  against  him,  appeals  and  for  any  reason 
is  granted  a  stay  upon  condition  that  he  shall  pay  rent,  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  rent  subsequently  accruing  is  never  a  waiver  of 
a  forfeiture.  In  all  such  cases  if  the  tenant  remains  in  posses- 
sion the  court  may  apply  the  payments  of  rent  to  the  debt  due 
before  the  action  was  begun,  as  the  acceptance  of  rent  is  purely 
a  matter  of  favor  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that  the  tenant  ia 
paying  for  his  present  use  and  occupation  of  the  premises.'''^ 
Under  such  circumstances,  the  payment  of  the  rent  is  made  by 
reason  of  the  undertaking  given  by  the  tenant  or  it  is  made  by 
order  of  the  court,  and  the  lessor  has  no  option  except  to  take  it 
or  let  it  remain  in  court  and  if  he  does  the  latter  it  will  remain 
as  his  property.  So,  the  occupation  by  the  tenant  is  not  by  the 
will  of  the  landlord  but  it  is  against  his  consent.  The  occupation 
is  not  to  be  referred  to  the  lease  but  to  the  situation  created  by  the 
appeal  and  the  undertaking  given  to  stay  the  execution.  Thus 
the  payment  and  the  receipt  of  rent  pending  the  appeal  are  re- 
ferable to  the  situation  and  not  to  the  will  of  the  landlord.  The 
law  does  not  and  cannot  intend  the  absurd  conclusion  that  the 
landlord  must  forego  all  rents  during  the  pendency  of  the  ap- 
peal while  the  tenant  is  in  possession  under  penalty  of  forfeiting 
all  his  rights  in  the  action.'^^  Inasmuch  as  the  receipt  of  rent  by 
the  landlord  is  construed  to  be  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  because 
it  evinces  his  intention  that  the  tenant  shall  remain  in  possession 
and  as  the  landlord  cannot  at  the  same  time  treat  the  lease  as 
valid  by  receiving  rent  under  it  and  invalid  by  ousting  the  ten- 
ant it  follows  that  the  waiver  must  always  be  the  result  of  a 
choice  by  the  landlord.  If  there  is  no  choice  or  option  to  receive 
or  to  refuse  the  rent,  there  is  no  waiver  by  the  landlord  receiving 
the  rent.     It  follows  from  those  iniles  and  principles  that  the 

TO  Palmer  v.  City  Livery  Co.,  98  tt  Chiera  v.  McDonald,  121  Mich. 

Wis.  33,  73  N.  W.  Rep.  559.  54,  79  N.  W.  Rep.  908. 

76  Hopkins   v.    Holland,    84   Md.  78  Palmer    v.    The    City    Livery 

84,  35  Atl.  Rep.  11.  Co.,  98  Wis.  33,  35,  73  N.  W.  Rep. 

559. 


COVENANTS  OP  THE  LEASE.  653 

institution  of  an  action  of  ejectment  or  similar  possessory 
action  by  the  landlord  should  not  alone  prevent  him  from  main- 
taining an  action  for  rent  subsequently  accruing,  or,  at  least 
for  the  reasonable  value  of  the  use  and  occupation,  where  a 
tenant  is  permitted  to  remain  in  the  possession  by  the  order  of 
the  court.  In  some  states  the  matter  is  regulated  by  the  local 
statutes  which  should  invariably  be  consulted. 

§  405.  A  waiver  may  be  implied  from  other  facts  than  the 
acceptance  of  the  rent.  Any  action  on  the  part  of  the  landlord 
in  dealing  with  the  property  demised  after  a  forfeiture  has  oc- 
curred from  which  it  may  fairly  be  implied  that  it  is  his  inten- 
tion to  permit  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  to  continue 
will  be  considered  by  the  courts,  especially  the  court  of  equity, 
as  a  waiver.  The  landlord  may  waive  his  right  of  entry  by 
making  a  new  lease  with  the  tenant  with  a  full  knowledge  of 
the  tenant's  default."  So,  too,  if  after  a  forfeiture  has  occurred 
and  the  landlord  has  begun  an  action  to  oust  the  tenant,  he  sues 
for  the  rent  asserting  in  his  pleading  in  the  second  action  that 
the  d>efendant  is  still  his  tenant,  he  waives  the  benefit  of  the 
forfeiture.^''  The  silence  of  the  landlord  when  the  tenant  offers 
to  pay  the  rent  which  is  past  due  by  crediting  it  on  a  note  pay- 
able by  the  landlord,  and  which  was  in  the  ownership  and  pos- 
session of  the  tenant  is  a  waiver  of  the  forfeiture.  In  this  case 
the  note  was  larger  in  amount  than  the  rent  and  was  not  due. 
The  failure  of  the  landlord  to  object  to  this  mode  of  paying  the 
rent  will  estop  him  from  subsequently  asserting  a  forfeiture  for 
the  tenant  had  a  right  to  infer,  from  the  failure  of  the  landlord 
to  object,  that  his  proposition  was  satisfactory  to  the  landlord. 
The  latter  might  have  objected  because  the  tender  was  not  in 
cash,  or  because  the  note  was  not  yet  due,  but  he  had  no  right 
to  give  the  tenant  the  impression  that  he  would  receive  the  rent 
in  this  manner  and  then  insist  on  a  forfeiture.^^  The  circum- 
stance that  a  lessor  either  by  his  silence  or  conduct  leads  or  in- 
duces his  lessee  to  believe  that  he  will  not  hold  the  lessee  to  a 
prompt  and  strict  performance  of  the  covenant  to  pay  the  rent, 
will  appeal  to  the  conscience  of  the  court  of  equity.     He  may 

'8  Felton  V.  Strong,  37  111.  App.  si  Johnson   v.   Douglass,   73   Mo. 

58.  168,  171, 

80  Nagel  V.  League,  70  Mo.  App. 
487. 


654  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

therefore  with  fairness  be  subsequently  denied  the  right  to  en- 
force a  forfeiture  which  is  based  on  a  breach  of  covenant  which 
he  has  been  himself  instrumental  in  producing.^-  In  determin- 
ing whether  an  election  has  been  made  between  enforcing 
and  waiving  a  forfeiture  the  cases  hold  that  where  there  has 
been  a  forfeiture  and  there  has  been  an  election  to  enter  or  not, 
if  the  landlord  either  by  word  or  by  act  determines  that  the 
lease  shall  continue  in  existence  and  he  communicates  that  de- 
termination to  the  tenant,  he  has  in  fact  elected  that  the  tenant 
shall  continue  to  be  such  and  that  the  tenancy  shall  continue. 
And  having  elected  he  cannot  retrace  his  steps. ^^  What  con- 
duct by  a  landlord  aside  from  the  receipt  of  rent  shall  constitute 
a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  depends  on  the  circumstances  of  each 
case.  A  notice  to  quit  served  on  a  specific  breach  of  one  cove- 
nant or  condition  is  a  waiver  of  every  other  brea>ch  of  covenant 
or  condition  which  has  occurred  prior  to  the  service  of  the  no- 
tice to  quit.**  So,  also,  an  oral  consent  that  the  tenant  shall 
make  alterations  is  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  incurred  by  making 
repairs  and  alterations  withoiut  the  written  consent  of  the  land- 
lord.^^  And  the  consent  of  the  lessor  given  to  the  assignment  of 
a  written,  lease  is  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  which  is  based  upon 
the  assignor's  breach  of  a  covenant  to  use  the  premises  for  a 
particular  purpose  and  in  a  particular  manner.^^  So,  as  a 
general  rule  after  knowledge  has  come  to  the  landlord  that  a 
lease  has  been  assigned  by  the  tenant  in  breach  of  a  covenant  not 
to  assign  without  his  consent,  if  he  shall  conduct  a  correspond- 
ence with  the  assignee  and  treat  him  as  his  tenant,  he  will  be 
regarded  as  having  waived  the  forfeiture  attached  to  the  cove- 
nant not  to  assign  without  consent.  Under  such  circumstances 
the  failure  of  the  landlord  to  object  to  the  assignment  in  time 
and  his  silence  until  the  lessee  relying  upon  his  silence  has  lost 
his  rights  under  the  lease,  will  thereafter  estop  the  landlord  to 
deny  he  has  assented  to  the  assignment  or  that  he  has  waived 
his  right  to  re-enter.^^     And  as  a  general  proposition,  any  act 

82Thropp  V.  Field,  26  N.  J,  Eq.  85  Moses  v.  Loomis,  156  111.  392, 

82,  84.  40  N.  E.  Rep.  952. 

83  Ward  V.  Day,  4  Best  &  Smith,  se  Deaton  v.  Taylor,  90  Va.  219, 
3?7;  Green's  Case,  Cro.  Eliz.  3.  17  S.  E.  Rep.  944. 

84  Brooks    V.    Rodgers,    99    Ala.  87  Warner  v.  Cochrane,  128  Fed. 
433,  12  So.  Rep.  61.  Rep.  553. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  655 

on  the  part  of  the  landlord  whieh  will  constitute  a  waiver  o'l  a 
forfeiture  incurred  by  reason  of  the  non-payment  of  rent  will 
effect  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  caused  for  any  other  reason.  In 
all  such  cases  the  fact  that  the  lease  under  a  clause  of  which 
the  forfeiture  was  incurred  is  in  writing  and  under  seal  is  not 
material  though  the  waiver  is  implied  from  the  circumstances 
only.  The  waiver  is  based  on  an  estoppel  arising  from  the  con- 
duct or  language  of  the  landlord.^ 

§  406.  When  the  payment  of  subsequent  rent  does  not  waive 
a  forfeiture.  Under  particular  circumstances  the  acceptance 
of  subsequently  accrued  rent  by  the  landlord  after  a  forfeiture 
has  been  incurred  may  not  be  a  waiver  of  the  forfeiture.  The 
parties  may  stipulate  when  the  rent  is  received  that  its  accept- 
ance by  the  landlord  sJiall  be  without  prejudice  to  his  right  to 
declare  a  prior  forfeiture.  And  the  receipt  of  rent  by  the  land- 
lord accompanied  by  an  express  agreement  that  no  breach  of 
covenant  or  condition  is  w^aived  thereby  in  no  way  affects  the 
right  of  the  landlord  to  enter  for  a  prior  forfeiture.^*  There 
must,  however,  be  an  express  agreement  between  the  parties  to 
the  lease  that  the  subsequent  payment  of  the  rent  shall  not 
operate  as  a  waiver  of  the  forfeiture.  AVhen  money  is  paid  and 
received  as  rent  a  mere  protest  by  the  landlord  that  it  is  ac- 
cepted conditionally  and  without  prejudice  to  his  right  to  insist 
upon  a  prior  forfeiture  cannot  countervail  the  effect  of  such  re- 
ceipt of  the  rent  by  the  landlord.*^**  The  tenant  has  an  absolute 
right  to  say  in  making  a  payment  to  his  landlord  in  what  char- 
acter he  pays  or  offers  to  pay  the  money.  If  he  states  in  making 
a  payment  that  he  is  paying  rent,  the  landlord  must  either  re- 
fuse to  accept  the  money  absolutely  or  he  must  accept  it  in  the 
character  in  which  it  is  offered  to  him.  His  mere  statement  that 
he  does  not  accept  the  money  as  rent  will  not  deprive  the  money 
of  the  character  which  has  been  affixed  to  it  by  the  tenant. 
Where,  after  several  forfeitures  had  occurred  and  the  lessee 
tendered  rent  which  the  lessor  refused  to  take  except  on  the 
terms  that  it  should  be  taken  not  as  rent  but  for  use  and  occu- 
pation subsequent  to  the  forfeiture  to  which  condition  the  lessee 

88  Moses  V.  Loomis,  156  111.  392,  oo  Davenport  v.  Reg.,  47  L.  J. 
395,  40  N.  E.  Rep.  952.  P.  C.  8,  3  App.  Cases,  115,  37  L.  T. 

89  Miller  v.  Prescott,  163  Mass.  727;  Strong  v.  Stringer,  61  L.  T. 
12,  13,  39  N.  E.  Rep.  409.  470. 


656  LiAW  OF  l»a.ndijOrd  and  tenant. 

refused  to  accede  whereupon  the  lessor  took  the  money  declaring- 
he  would  and  did  not  take  it  as  rent,  the  court  held  there  was  a 
waiver.  For  in  law  and  under  such  circumstances  the  nature 
of  the  payment  of  money  must  be  determined  according  to  the 
intent  of  the  person  paying  it  and  if  the  landlord  accept  the 
money  no  protest  on  his  part  can  operate  to  prevent  the  legal 
effect  of  the  pa^Tnent  of  money  as  rent  on  the  part  of  the  les- 
see.°^  On  the  other  hand,  the  tenant  cannot,  by  paying  a  part 
of  the  rent  which  was  due,  compel  the  landlord  to  waive  a  for- 
feiture by  stating  that  the  acceptance  by  the  landlord  of  ther 
sum  which  has  been  paid  shall  operate  as  a  waiver  of  a  forfei- 
ture. The  acceptance  of  the  whole  sum  due  as  rent  will  be  in 
law  a  waiver  but  this  effect  will  not  arise  from  partial  pay- 
"ment  without  the  consent  of  the  landlord.  But  the  declaration 
by  the  tenant  that  money  is  paid  as  rent  must  be  unequivocal 
and  must  be  brought  to  the  personal  knowledge  of  the  landlord. 
The  tenant  in  default  for  non-payment  of  the  rent  for  several 
months  cannot,  by  sending  a  check  to  his  landlord  for  one 
month's  rent,  upon  which  words  are  noted  in  a  very  abbreviated 
form  stating  that  the  check  is  in  payment  of  rent  to  the  day  of 
its  date  and  of  its  mailing,  procure  a  waiver  of  the  forfeiture 
though  the  check  is  received  and  deposited  by  the  agent  of  the 
landlord  in  the  usual  course  of  business.®^ 

§  407.  Waiver  by  silence  and  delay.  Whether  a  landlord 
has  or  has  not  waived  a  forfeiture  is  purely  a  question  of  his 
intention.  Usually  his  intention  is  to  be  inferred  from  his  ac- 
tions and  where  circumstances  occur  which  entitle  a  landlord  to 
take  advantage  of  a  forfeiture  and  he  does  acts  which  show  he 
means  to  waive  the  forfeiture  the  landlord  cannot  take  advan- 
tage of  the  forfeiture  though  his  acts  were  illegal  or  were  such 
as  he  was  not  entitled  to  do.  Thus  the  levy  of  a  distress  may 
under  some  circumstances  be  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  though 
the  distress  was  illegal."^  Generally  where  it  is  covenanted  that 
the  term  shall  become  "null  and  void"  at  the  option  of  the  les- 
sor on  a  breach  of  the  condition,  he  must  usually  do  some  act 

81  Croft  V.  Lumley,  5  El.  &  Bl.      gage  &  Trust  Co.  (Neb.),  96  N.  W. 
G48,  25  L.  J.  Q.  B.  223,  2  Jur.   (N.       Rep.  1051. 
S.)  275,  4  W.  R.  357.  »•■'  Ward  v.  Day,  5  B.  &  S.  359,  33 

u^  Cochran  v  Philadelphia  Mort-      L.  J.  Q.  B.  254,   10  L..  T.   578,   12 

W.  R.  829. 


COVENANTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  657 

declaring  or  e^aiming  the  forfeiture.®*  Such  a  covenant  means 
only  that  the  lease  is  voidable  at  the  option  of  the  lessor  and  not 
that  it  is  absolutely  void.  Mere  delay  to  a«t  or  silent  acquies- 
cense  upon  the  part  of  the  landlord,  even  after  he  has  knowledge 
of  an  act  or  failure  to  act  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  which  would 
give  him  the  right  to  declare  a  forfeiture  will  hardly,  taken 
alone,  constitute  a  waiver  of  the  right  of  the  landlord  to  re- 
enter.^^  It  is  a  question  of  fact.  The  extent  of  the  delay  which 
will  operate  as  a  forfeiture  is  a  question  for  the  chancellor  to 
determine.  In  determining  this  a  court  of  equity  will  consider 
the  circumstances  of  each  case.  A  delaj^  of  twenty-three  days 
in  declaring  a  lease  forfeited  for  the  non-payment  of  rent  has 
been  held  not  to  be  a  waiver.®"  A  long  delay  by  the  lessor  in 
asserting  his  rights  particularly  if  the  rights  of  third  persons 
have  intervened  may  be  sufficient  in  equity  to  constitute  a 
waiver  of  a  forfeiture.®'  Thus  the  delay  of  a  lessor  for  five 
months  after  a  failure  on  the  part  of  the  lessee  to  pay  rent  of  a 
farm,  without  any  intimation  that  he  would  enforce  a  forfeiture, 
the  lessee  cultivating  the  farm  in  the  meantime  according  to  his 
agreement  under  the  lease  may  be  shown  to  prove  a  waiver  but 
this  is  not  conclusive  unless  the  tenant  can  show  all  the  legal  ele- 
ments of  an  estoppel.®^  But  delay  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  in 
connection  with  conduct  on  his  part  suggestive  of  an  intention 
by  the  landlord  to  waive  the  forfeiture  may  particularly  where 
the  rights  of  third  parties  have  attached,  constitute  a  waiver. 
If  the  conduct  of  the  landlord  towards  the  tenant  in  regard  to 
the  use  which  the  latter  makes  of  the  premises  or  as  regards  any 
action  which  the  tenant  is  bound  to  perform,  under  the  lease  to 
prevent  a  forfeiture  is  of  such  a  character  as  to  induce  a  cautious 
and  reasonable  man  to  infer  that  the  landlord  is  satisfied  that 
the  tenant  is  fulfilling  his  covenants  and  conditions,  a  forfeiture 
will  be  waived  thereby.®®  Thus  a  mere  standing  by  of  the  land- 
lord and  seeing  a  tenant  making  alterations  which  are  in  breacn 

94  Walker  v.  Engler,  30  Mo.  130.  se  Williams    v.    Vanderbilt,    145 

95  Lindsey    v.    Lindsey,    45    Ind.  111.  238,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  476. 
552,567;  Island  Coal  Co.  v.  Combs,  97  Drake   v.    Lacoe,    157    Pa.    St. 
152    Ind.   379,   391,   53   N.   E.   Rep.  17,  27  Atl.  Rep.  538. 

452;    Jackson   v.  Crysler,   1  John.  ss  Morrison  v.  Smith,  90  Md.  76, 

Cas.   (N.  Y.)  125,  127;   Cochran  v.  44  Atl.  Rep.  1031. 

Philadelphia,  etc.,  Co.  (Neb.  1905),  99  Doe  d.  Knight  v.  Rowe,  2  Car. 

96  N.  W.  Rep.  1051,  1053.  &  P.  240,  R.  &  M.  343. 


// 


42 


658  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

of  his  covenant  is  not  a  waiver.^  But  it  has  also  t)een  held  that 
for  the  landlord  to  permit  a  tenant  to  remain  in  possession  and 
to  expend  his  money  in  building,  after  an  eviction  by  the  land- 
lord for  non-payment  of  rent,  is  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture.^  A 
landlord  does  not  waive  a  forfeiture  by  a  mere  acquiescence  in 
a  continuing  breach  of  a  condition,  as  for  example,  in  case  of 
a  breach  of  a  covenant  not  to  use  the  premises  for  a  particular 
trade.^  A  forfeiture  arising  from  the  tenant's  failure  to  build 
houses  on  the  land  demised  within  a  period  which  is  specified 
in  the  lease  is  no^t  waived  by  the  landlord  permitting  the  tenant 
to  employ  workmen  to  complete  the  houses  for  a  short  time  after 
the  forfeiture  has  occurred.*  A  landlord  who  after  a  forfeiture 
comes  to  his  loiowledge  advises  a  stranger  to  purchase  the  ten- 
ant's interest  in  the  lease  is  estopped  thereby  to  enforce  a  forfei- 
ture caused  by  the  tenant  against  the  stranger  after  the  laitter 
has  purchased  the  tenant's  interest  relying  on  the  advice  of  the 
landlord."^  The  rights  of  an  innocent  third  party  who  has  parted 
with  value  in  reliance  on  the  landlord's  statements  cannot  be 
prejudiced  by  conduct  or  language  of  the  lessor  in  such  an  un- 
fair manner.®  Where  a  person  has  leased  the  use  of  water  from 
a  canal  owned  by  the  state,  the  failure  of  the  lessor  to  collect 
rent  or  declare  a  forfeiture  for  non-payment  of  rent  does  not 
prevent  the  lessee  from  continuing  the  use  of  the  water  until  he 
is  evicted.  Under  such  circumstances  the  state  may  by  delay 
lose  its  right  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  which  has  been  created  by  a 
failure  to  pay  rent  particularly  where  the  delay  of  the  state  to 
collect  the  rent  has  continued  for  very  many  years  and  property 
rights  of  third  persons  have  attached  to  the  use  of  the  water  be- 
cause af  a  belief  that  the  lessee's  rights  are  unimpaired,^     An 

1  Perry  v.  Davis,  3  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  may  waive  a  forfeiture  by  affirm- 

769.  ing  the  continuance  of  an  estate 

*  Hume  V.  Kent,  1  Ball.  &  B.  after  a  condition  broken,  but  these 
554.  are  acts  done   by  the  grantor  or 

« Doe    d.    Sheppard   v.    Allen,   3  lessor   after   a    forfeiture   accrued 

Taunt.  78,  12  R.  R.  579.  and  for  his  benefit.     No  parol  as- 

*  Doe  d.  Kensington  v.  Brindley,  sent  will  amount  to  such  a  waiver." 
12  Moore,  37,  5  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  C.  .Jackson  v.  Crysler,  1  Johns.  Ca. 
P.  3.  (N.   Y.)    125,   127. 

B  Doe  d.  Sore  v.  Eykins,  1  Car.  7  People   v.   Freeman,    110   App. 

&  P.  154,  R.  &  M.  29.  Div.  605,  97  N.  Y.  S.  343. 

0  "In  some  cases  particular  acts 


COVEN-VNTS  OF  THE  LEASE.  659 

entry  by  the  landlord  for  a  forfeiture  by  a  breach  of  any  spe- 
cially designated  condition  is  a  waiver  of  his  right  to  enter  for  a 
breach  of  any  other  condition  of  which  he  has  knowledge  when 
he  enters.* 

§  408.  The  waiver  of  a  continuous  breach,  of  a  condition. 
The  rule  that  the  acceptance  of  rent  by  a  landlord  waives  a  for- 
feiture does  not  apply  to  rent  which  is  accepted  during  a  con- 
tinuous breach  of  a  covenant.  The  reason  of  this  is  that  though 
the  receipt  of  rent  may  be  a  waiver  of  a  past  forfeiture,  it  does 
not  and  cannot  waive  that  which  is  in  the  future,  and,  where  the 
breach  of  the  covenant  or  the  condition  is  continuo-us,  new 
breaches  are  occurring  daily,  and  on  these  the  prior  payment  of 
rent  will  have  no  effect.  Hence  it  is  a  general  rule  that  the 
acceptance  of  rent  accruing  after  a  breach  of  condition  where 
the  condition  was  of  a  continuing  nature  waives  a  forfeiture  only 
as  to  past  breaches  of  such  condition.  It  does  not  preclude  the 
landlord  from  taking  advantage  of  a  forfeiture  resulting  from 
a  subsequent  breach  of  the  same  condition.^  Thus  an  action  of 
ejectment  may  be  supported  in  respect  to  a  continuing  breach 
of  a  covenant  against  the  using  of  rooms  for  a  prohibited  pur- 
pose though  the  rent  has  been  accepted  with  a  knowledge  of 
the  original  breach.^"  In  other  words,  the  fact  that  a  landlord 
receives  rent  with  the  knowledge  that  his  tenant  has  begun  to 

*  "An     entry     made     for     other  able  to  point  out,  and  upon  which 

breaches  of  condition  and  without  the  lessor  did  not  in  fact  exercise 

knowledge  of  this  breach  cannot  its  option."    Boston  El.  R.  Y.  Cow. 

be  regarded  as  an  exercise  by  the  v.    Grace  &   Hyde,   112    Fed.    Rep. 

lessor   of   the   option   to   take   ad-  279,  p.  286. 

rantage  of  this  breach.    The  entry  »  Gluck  v.   Elkan,   36   Minn.   80, 

in    this    case    was,    upon    the   evi-  81,   30  N.   W.   Rep.  446;    Block  v. 

dence,    manifestly    for    breach    of  Ebner,    54    Ind.    544;    Farwell    v. 

the  condition  requiring  a  continu-  Easton,  63  Mo.  446;   Doe  v.  Glad- 

ous    exhibition,    while    the    order  win,  6  Q.  B.  953,  51  E.  C.  L.  953; 

permitted.      There    was    no    evi-  Doe  v.  Woodbridge,  9  Barn.  &  C. 

dence  tending  to  show  an  exercise  376. 

by  the  lessor  of  the  option  to  take  lo  Doe  d.  Ambler  v.  Woodbridge, 

advantage  of  a  breach  of  the  con-  1  M.  &  Ry.  376.  7  L.  J.  (O.  S.)  K. 

dition     against     subletting.       The  B.  263,  28  R.  R.  426;  Doe  d.  Baker 

lessor    after    entry,    however,    en-  v.  Jones,  »  Ex.   498,  19  L.  J.  Ex. 

tered  for  other  reasons,  and  should  405;  Doe  d.  Muston  v.  Gladwin,  6 

not  be  permitted  to  mend  its  hold  Q.  B.  953,  14  L.  J.  Q.  B.  189,  9  Jur. 

by  assigning  other  breaches  which  508. 
the  ingenuity  of  counsel   may  be 


€60  LAW  OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

use  the  premises  for  a  purpose  prohibited  by  the  lease  and  that 
he  has  continued  to  use  them  for  that  purpose  down  to  the  time' 
the  landlord  receives  the  rent  does  not  prevent  the  landlord  from 
subsquently  Dusting  him  if  subsequently  he  persists  in  the  foi'- 
bidden  use.     This  doctrine,  however,  must  be  taken  with  some 
qualifications.     In  reference  to  a  waiver  by  the  landlord  of  a 
continuing  breach  there  may  be  a  distinction  made  between  a 
case  of  something  which  is  to  be  done  by  the  tenant  and  which 
remains  undone  by  him  and  the  doing  of  which  may  with  reason 
be  postponed  and  a  case  of  something  which  the  tenant  is  for- 
bidden to  do  by  the  lease  and  which  he  does  and  continues  to 
do.    A  good  example  of  this  distinction  may  be  seen  in  the  case 
of  a  breach  by  the  lessor  of  a  covenant  to  rep;\ir  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  breach  by  the  tenant  of  a  covenant  by  him  to  use 
the  premises  for  a  particular  purpose  on  the  other.     Of  neces- 
sity there  ought  to  be  a  distinction  for  the  reason  that  otherwise 
the  landlord  may  be  afforded  an  almost  unlimited  opportunity 
to  take  advantage  of  his  tenant.    Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  covenant 
bj  the  tenant  not  to  use  the  premises  for  a  particular  purpose, 
the  landlord  might,  with  a  full  knowledge  that  the  thing  had 
been  done  which  the  tenant  was  forbidden  to  do  and  upon  the 
doing  of  which  a  forfeiture  was  to  accrue,  continue  to  receive 
rent  so  long  as  it  suited  his  purpose  and  then  when  it  suited 
him  to  oust  the  tenant,  turn  him  out  at  a  period  when  the  ten- 
ant 's  possession  was  most  valuable  to  him.    This  course  of  action 
the    landlord    should    not    be    permitted    to    follow    upon    his 
contention  that  this  use  of  premises  by  the  tenant  works  a  con- 
tinuing forfeiture  of  which  the  receipt  of  rent  is  not  a  waiver. 
The  case  of  a  forfeiture  because  of  the  tenant's  failure  to  re- 
pair generally  during  the  terra,  is  on  a  different  basis.    No  one 
can  say  at  what  exact  moment  repairs  are  necessary.     The  ten- 
ant must  have  a  reasonable  time  to  make  them  and  ordinarily 
he  may  make  them  at  any  time  during  the  term  before  a  for- 
feiture is  declared  and  thus  preserve  his  term.     Hence  it  is  not 
at  all  unfair  to  call  such  a  breach  a  continuous  one  and  to  per- 
mit a  landlord  to  enfo.rce  it  though  he  may  have  received  rent 
during  the  time  the  premises  were  out  of  repair.^^    "Whether  a 
breach  is  or  is  not  a  continuous  breach  depends  upon  the  nature 

11  Griffin  v.  Tomkins,  42  L.  T.  359,  44  J.  P.  457. 


COVENANTS   OP    THE   LEASE.  661 

of  the  covenant  and  particularly  upon  the  language  used  by  the 
parties  in  framing  it.  Thus,  to  illustrate  the  breach  of  a  cove- 
nant by  the  tenant  to  erect  certain  buildings  within  a  fixed  time 
is  not  a  continuing  breach  and  hence  may  be  waived  by  the  land- 
lord subsequently  receiving  rent.^-  This  is  true  also  of  a  cove- 
nant  "forthwith"  to  put  the  premises  into  good  and  tenantable 
repair.^^  But  where  the  tenant  covenants  that  he  will  build  cer- 
tain houses  on  the  property  and  also  that  he  will  keep  the  prem- 
ises so  to  be  erected  at  all  times  in  good  repair,  it  was  held  that 
th^  covenant  to  repair  bound  the  tenant  to  erect  the  buildings 
within  the  period  prescribed  and  that  if  he  failed  to  do  this  the 
breach  of  the  covenant  would  be  a  continuing  breach.^* 

§  409.  A  forfeiture  caused  by  a  breach  of  a  covenant  to  re- 
pair. What  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  landlord  shall  amount 
to  a  waiver  of  a  breach  of  a  covenant  or  condition  to  repair  de- 
pends usually  on  the  facts  of  each  case  and  particularly  on  the 
language  of  the  covenant  to  repair.  A  failure  to  repair  under 
a  general  covenant  to  repair  or  to  keep  in  repair  which  means 
during  the  whole  term,  is  a  continuing  breach  and  the  delay  of 
the  landlord  in  enforcing  a  forfeiture  which  is  occasioned  there- 
by or  his  making  some  repairs  himself  is  not  usually  a  waiver 
of  a  forfeiture  for  the  covenant  is  continuously  broken  eyery 
day  the  premises  are  left  in  bad  repair  or  condition  by  the  ten- 

12  Jacob  V.  Down,  69  L.  J.  Ch.  repairs  them,  then  the  receipt  of 
493,  (1900)  2  Ch.  156,  83  L.  T.  rent  waives  the  previous  forfeit- 
191,  48  W.  R.  441,  64  J.  P.  552.  ure.      But    where    the    matter    is 

13  Coward  v.  Gregory,  15  L.  T.  plainly  a  continuing  breach,  the 
Rep.  279,  L.  Rep.  2  C.  P.  153.  only  question  is  whether  when  the 

14  Jacob  V.  Down,  69  L.  J.  Ch.  party  seeks  to  enter,  the  prem- 
493;  (1900)  2  Ch.  156,  S3  L.  T.  ises  have  been  an  unreasonable 
191,  48  W.  R.  441,  64  J.  P.  552.  In  time  out  of  repair  and  so  con- 
Doe  d.  Baker  v.  Jones,  5  Exch.  tinue."  A  landlord  who  has  a 
498,  on  page  504,  Alderson,  B.,  right  of  re-entry  on  the  breach  of 
says:  "The  receipt  of  rent  is  a  a  covenant  not  to  underlet,  does 
waiver  of  all  forfeitures,  which  not  by  waiving  his  re-entry  on  one 
are,  so  to  speak,  single  and  com-  underletting  lose  his  right  to  re- 
plete, and  are  not  in  the  nature  enter  on  a  subsequent  underlet- 
of  continuing  forfeitures.  So  with  ting.  Nor,  by  waiving  his  right 
respect  to  continuing  forfeiture,  to  re-enter  on  a  breach  of  a  cove- 
where  the  lessee  is  bound  from  nant  to  rei)air,  does  he  waive  his 
time  to  time  to  keep  the  premises  right  to  reenter  on  subsequent 
in  repair,  and  he  omits  for  an  un-  want  of  repairs.  Doe  d.  Boscawen 
reasonable    time,    but    afterwards  v.  Bliss,  4  Taunt.  735. 


662  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

ant.  Thus  the  action  of  the  landlord  allowmg  a  tenant  a  little 
further  time  to  repair  after  he  is  in  default  after  a  notice  by 
his  landlord  to  repair  does  not  waive  a  forfeiture/"  which  was 
created  by  the  tenant's  failure  to  repair  on  the  notice  given  him 
by  his  landlord.  But  a  landlord  after  extending  his  tenant's 
time  to  repair  cannot  subsequently  disregard  the  extension  he 
has  given  him  and  begin  proceedings  to  procure  the  benefit  of 
the  forfeiture  until  the  period  of  the  extension  has  elapsed. 
Thus,  a  landlord  who,  finding  the  premises  out  of  repair,  gives 
his  tenant  three  months'  notice  to  repair  cannot  maintain 
an  action  of  ejectment  for  a  breach  by  the  tenant  of  a  cove- 
nant to  repair  on  such  notice  until  the  three  mouths'  notice 
is  up.^^  And  the  giving  of  such  a  notice  to  repair  is  equiva- 
Icait  to  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  incurred  by  the  tenant  by  his 
breach  of  a  general  covenant  to  repair  without  notice.  A 
landlord  cannot  enforce  a  forfeiture  and,  at  the  same  time,  make 
the  repairs  and  recover  their  value  from  the  tenant.  If  he,  when 
premises  are  permitted  by  the  tenant  to  remain  out  of  repair 
shall  enter  therein  and  make  the  repairs  and  then  sue  the  ten- 
ant for  the  costs  of  the  repairs  he  waives  a  forfeiture  created  by 
the  lease  on  the  failure  of  the  tenant  to  keep  in  good  repair.^^ 
Generally  a  demand  for  rent  while  the  premises  are  in  bad  re- 
pair does  not  waive  a  forfeiture  based  on  their  condition  for  the 
reason  that  a  breach  of  a  covenant  to  repair  is  a  continuous 
breach  of  covenant.  A  forfeiture  which  has  accrued  under  a 
covenant  to  repair  is  not  waived  by  the  landlord  suing  for  rent 
after  he  has  notified  the  tenant  to  repair  which  the  tenant  has 
declined  to  do.^^  So,  even  the  payment  of  the  rent  by  the  ten- 
ant during  the  period  the  premises  are  in  a  state  of  bad  repair 
does  not  constitute  a  waiver  by  the  landlord  of  his  right  to  en- 
force a  forfeiture.  "Where  compensation  can  readily  be  made  to 
a  landlord  whose  tenant  has  forfeited  his  estate  by  a  breach  of 
his  covenant  to  repair  a  Court  of  Equity  will  readily  grant  re- 
lief.    In  some  cases  relief  will  be  granted  where  the  tenant  has 

15  Doe  d.  Rankin  v.  Brindley,  1  I'Doe  d.  Rutzen  v.  Lewis,  5  A. 
N.  &  M.  1,  4  B.  &  Ad.  84,  2  L.  J.  &  E.  277,  289,  6  N.  &  M.  764,  2 
K.  B.  7.      '  H.  &  W.  162,  5  L.  J.  K.  B.  217. 

16  Doe  d.  Morecraft  v.  Meux,  7  is  Penton  v.  Barnett,  67  L.  J. 
D.  &  R.  98,  4  B.  &  C.  606,  1  Car.  Q.  B.  11,  46  W.  R.  33. 

&  P.  346,  4  L.  J.   (0.  S.)   K.  B.  4, 
28  R.  R.  426. 


COVENANTS   OF    THE   LEASE.  663 

not  been  the  victim  of  accident  or  mistake  and  where  his  omis- 
sion to  repair  was  entirely  voluntary.^^  This  rule  however  is  not 
without  an  exception  and,  in  one  case,  the  court  refused  to 
recognize  even  an  accidental  neglect  to  perform  a  covenant  to 
repair,  as  an  excuse.^"  A  proviso  for  re-entry  if  a  lessee  "shall 
do  or  cause  to  be  done  any  act,  matter,  or  thing  contrary  to  and 
in  breach  of  any  of  the  covenants,"  does  not  apply  to  a  breach 
of  a  covenant  to  repair,  the  omission  to  repair  not  being  an  act 
done.-^ 

§  410,  The  effect  of  a  tender  of  rent.  The  tender  of  the  rent 
on  the  day  when  it  is  due  at  any  time  during  the  day  down  to 
sunset  will  prevent  a  forfeiture.  The  tender  of  the  rent  within 
a  reasonable  time  after  it  is  due  will,  in  equity,  if  the  rent  is  re- 
fused also  prevent  a  forfeiture.^^  A  tender  may  be  valid  and 
effective  even  though  it  is  made  after  an  action  to  enforce  a  for- 
feiture has  been  begun.  Even  a  court  of  common  law  may,  and 
usually  will  stay  proceedings  begun  and  pending  in  it  on  the 
part  of  the  landlord  in  such  an  action  where  the  non-payment 
of  rent  was  due  to  accident  or  mistake  on  the  part  of  the  tenant 
upon  his  paying  into  court  the  amount  of  the  rent  with  interest 
and  costs  to  the  date  of  payment.^^  So  a  forfeiture  may  be 
avoided  by  the  tenant  tendering  and  paying  into  court  the 
amount  of  the  rent  in  an  action  to  recover  the  rent  and  also 
the  possession  of  the  premises  and  the  action  for  the  possession 
will  thereupon  be  dismissed.^*    But  where  a  judgment  of  restitu- 

19  Hannam  v.  South  London  Wa-  Lewis  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  69  Mo. 
terworks  Co.,  2  Mer.  65;  Hill  v.  695,  affirming  3  Mo.  App.  582; 
Barclay,  16  Ves.  402,  18  Ves.  56,  Jones  v.  Reed,  15  N.  H.  68;  Hor- 
11  R.  R.  147;  Sanders  v.  Pope,  12  ton  v.  New  York  Central  &  H.  R. 
Ves.  282;  Hack  v.  Leonard,  9  Mod.  R.  Co.,  12  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  30; 
91.    But  see  19  Ves.  141.  Planters'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Diggs,  8  Baxt. 

20  Gregory  v.  Wilson,  9  Hare,  (Tenn.)  563;  North  Chicago  St. 
683,  16  Jur.  304.  R.  Co.  v.  Le  Grand  Co.,  95  111.  App. 

21  Doe  d.  Abdy  v.  Stevens,  3  B.  435.  See  as  to  tender  after  notice 
&  Ad.  299,  1  L.  J.  K.  B.  101.  to   quit,  Dakota   Hot  Springs   Co. 

22Chapman  V.  Kirby,  49  111.  211;  v.  Young,  9   S.  D.  577,  70  N.   W. 

Burnes  v.  McCubbin,  3  Kan.   221,  Rep.  842. 

87    Am.    Dec.    468;     Hodgkins    v.  23  Atkins    v.    Chilson,    11    Met. 

Price,    137    Mass.    13;     Tuttle    v.  (Mass.)   2. 

Bean,  13  Met.    (Mass.)    275;    City  24  Nagel  v.  League,  70  Mo.  App. 

of   Carondelet  v.   Wolfert,   39   Mo.  490. 
305;  Holmes  v.  Ginon,  44  Mo.  164; 


664  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

tion  has  been  rendered  in  favor  of  the  landlord  the  tenant  can- 
not, by  taking  an  appeal,  making  a  tender  of  rent  and  paying 
the  money  into  court  while  the  appeal  is  pending  escape  the  pen- 
alty of  the  judgment  of  restitution.-^ 

§  411.  Relief  against  forfeiture  at  common  law.  A  court 
of  law  may  in  modern  times  at  least  as  well  as  a  court  of  equity 
relieve  against  a  forfeiture  which  has  been  incurred  by  the  ten- 
ant by  the  non-payment  of  the  rent  by  him.  Both  in  England 
and  in  the  United  States  the  common  law  courts  have  for  a  long 
period  thougl  to  a  limited  extent  recognized  and  admitted  equi- 
table defenses  without  turning  the  party  over  to  a  court  of 
equity  and  at  the  present  time  their  inclination  and  power  to  re- 
ceive equitable  defenses  are  unquestionably  greater  than  they 
have  ever  been.  But  the  courts  of  law  will  not  usually  apply 
or  enforce  equitable  remedies  though  they  may  receive  and  con- 
sider equitable  defenses.  In  the  case  of  the  forfeiture  of  a  lease 
the  court  of  law  cannot  enjoin  the  lessor  from  making  an  actual 
entry  or  from  prosecuting  ejectment  or  other  action  to  oust  the 
tenant  or  otherwise  to  enforce  the  forfeiture.  What  it  cannot 
do  directly  however  it  may  do  indirectly.  It  may  prevent  a 
lessor  from  enforcing  a  forfeiture  for  the  non-payment  of  rent 
by  an  ejectment  by  compelling  him  to  receive  the  rent  which, 
is  due  him,  on  penalty  of  having  his  action  dismissed  when  the 
tenant  makes  a  proper  tender.  Thus  in  an  action  of  ejectment  for 
non-payment  of  rent  a  court  of  common  law,  on  the  payment 
into  court  by  the  lessee  of  the  rent  which  is  due  with  all  costs 
and  interest,  will  stay  all  proceedings  and  will  require  the  plain- 
tiff to  accept  the  money  paid  in  and  permit  the  tenant  to  re- 
main.^® And  a  waiver  of  a  forfeiture  is  a  good  defense  both  at 
law   and  in   equity.^^ 

25  Walter  Commission  Co.  v.  Gil-  clear   proof   of  the   circumstances 

leland,  98  Mo.  App.  584,  73  S.  W.  and  show  he  is  entitled  to  make 

Rep.  295,  296.  such  a  declaration.     A  forfeiture 

20  Atkins    v.    Chilson,    11    Met.  is  a  harsh  and  usually  an  unfair 

(Mass.)   112, 119;   Archer  v.  Snapp,  way  of  terminating  a  contract  and 

Andr.  341.  not      infrequently     works      great 

27  Bridges  v.  Ijongman,  24  Beav.  hardships.     Hence,  he  who  insists 

27,   30.     "Forfeitures   are   not   re-  upon   making   a   declaration   of  a 

garded    by    the    courts   with    any  forfeiture,  cannot  complain   if  he 

special  favor.     The  party  who  in-  is  held  to  walk  strictly  within  the 

sists  upon  a  forfeiture  must  make  limits  of  the  authority  which  gives 


COVENANTS   OF   THE   LEASE.  665 

§  412.  Equitable  relief  against  forfeiture.  The  common  law 
rules  regulating  forfeitures  are  based  largely  upon  the  principles 
of  the  feudal  system  and,  for  this  reason  they  very  early 
came  to  be  regarded  as  inapplicable  to  the  social  and  commercial 
conditions  of  the  times.  Consequently  it  is  said  that  the  courts 
in  modern  times  at  least  do  not  favor  the  creation  or  the  enforce- 
ment of  forfeitures  in  the  case  of  leases  or  other  instruments. 
If  their  enforcement  is  sought,  particularly  in  a  court  of  equity> 
the  effect  and  operation  of  the  covenant  by  which  it  is  claimed  a 
forfeiture  has  been  created  will  be  strictly  limited.  For  forfei- 
tures are  not  favored  in  equity.-*  Thus  where  a  lessor  by  his  ac- 
quiescence in  his  tenant's  delay  in  paying  the  rent  has  induced 
his  tenant  to  believe  that  a  strict  perfonnance  of  his  covenant  to 
pay  rent  at  the  times  specified  in  the  elase  will  not  be  required  of 
him,  equity  will  not  permit  the  landlord  to  enforce  a  forfeiture, 
where  under  the  circumstances  it  would  be  inequitable,  and  full 
compensation  can  be  made  to  the  landlord  for  the  consequences 
of  the  tenants  default  ^^  in  paying  rent.  As  a  rule,  which  is  sup- 
ported by  many  authorities  and  is  based  upon  sound  principles 
of  justice,  where  there  has  been  a  breach  by  a  tenant  of  a  covenant 

the    right."     Palmer    v.    Ford.    70  Gale  v.  Oil  Run  Petroleum  Co.,  6 

111.  369,  on  page  377.  W.  Va.  200;    Hukill  v.   Myers,   36 

28Randol  V.  Scott,  110  Cal.  590,  W.  Va.  639,  647.  15  S.  E.  Rep.  151. 

42  Pac    Rep.  976,  977;  Wheeler  v.  "We  are  now  in  a  court  of  equity. 

Earle,  5  Cush.   (Mass.)    31,  34,  51  Courts   of   equity   were  originally 

Am.   Dec.   41;    Grummett  v.   Gin-  founded,  among  other  purposes,  to 

grass.  77  Mich.  369,  43  N.  W.  Rep.  relieve    against    the    hardness    of 

999;    Miller   v.   Havens,   51   Mich.  courts  of  common  law,  and  notably 

482'  485,  16  N.  W.  Rep.  865;   Liv-  to  relieve  against  forfeiture,  even 

ingston  'v.  Tompkins,  4  Johns.  Ch.  when  it  clearly  exists;   and  very 

(N  Y.)  415;  Burnes  v.  McCubbin,  safely  it  can  be  said  that  equity 

3  Kan.  221;' Phillips  v.  Tucker,  3  looks  with   disfavor  upon  forfeit- 

Ind    132,  135;   Marshall  v.  Vicks-  ures,  and  will  not  be  quick,  active 

burg  82  U   S.  146,  149,  21  Law.  ed.  or  alert  to  see  or  declare  or  en- 

121- '  Doe  v.   Stevens,  3  B.  &  Ad.  force  them."     Hukill  v.  Myers,  36 

299-    Doe  v.  Hogg.  4  Dowl.  &  R.  W.  Va.  639,  645,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  151. 

226-    Doe   v.   Godwin,   4   M.   &   S.  Hence  a  court  of  equity  will  seize 

265-  Doe  v.  Bond.  5  B.  &  C.  855;  hold  of  circumstances  such  as  the 

Horton  v.  New  York  Central  &  H.  laches  of  the  person  endeavoring 

Riv.  R.  R.  Co..  12  Abb.  New  Cases  to     enforce    the    forfeiture    upon 

(N.Y.)    30;    Duffield  v.   Hue.  129  v.^hich  to  excuse  the  forfeiture. 

Pa.  St.  94.  18  Atl.  Rep.  566;  White  2;.  Thropp  v.  Field,  26  N.  J.  Eq. 

v.  McMurray,  2  Brewst.  (Pa.)   485;  82. 


666  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

to  pay  rent  equity  will  relieve  against  the  forfeiture  incurred 
thereby  upon  payment  of  the  rent  which  is  in  arrears  and  inter- 
est, even  though  failure  to  pay  the  rent  has  been  wilful  upon  the 
part  of  the  lessee.  Equity  will  grant  relief  against  a  forfeiture 
for  the  non-payment  of  the  rent  on  the  date  it  was  due  for  com- 
pensation can  readily  be  made  to  the  lessor  and  be  placed  in  statu 
quo.^°  The  payment  of  interest  by  the  lessee  to  the  lessor  on  the 
rent  from  the  date  it  was  payable  will  be  a  sufficient  compensation 
to  the  lessor  for  his  damages  as  he  will  thereby  be  placed  in  the 
same  position  as  if  he  has  received  his  rent  promptly.  In  equity 
general  stipulations  for  re-entry  by  the  landlord  for  the  non-pay- 
ment of  the  rent  are  considered  as  merely  intended  to  secure  the 
payment  of  the  rent  and  not  as  designed  to  cause  a  forfeiture  if 
the  tenant  acts  in  good  faith  and  promptly  pays  the  rent  though 
after  it  is  due  when  it  is  demanded  or  pays  it  at  least  before  the 
landlord  shall  have  suffered  a  loss  or  unreasonable  inconvenience 
from  the  delay  or  default  of  the  tenant.^^  It  does  not  seem  t» 
be  material  in  the  case  of  a  default  in  the  performance  of  a 
covenant  to  pay  rent  that  the  default  was  intentional.  If  a  col- 
lateral covenant  has  been  broken  as,  for  example,  to  repair  or  to 
insure  the  premises ;  and  the  breach  was  the  result  of  accident  or 
mistake  on  the  part  of  the  lessee,  or  of  fraud  or  surprise  on  the 
part  of  the  lessor,  and  if  the  lessee  can  by  a  money  compensation 
or  otherwise  put  the  lessor  in  the  same  position  he  would  have 
been  in  ease  the  breach  had  not  occurred  the  forfeiture  will  be 
relieved  against.'^  But  in  all  cases  of  the  breach  of  covenants 
other  than  a  covenant  to  pay  rent  no  relief  against  forfeiture 

»o  Abrams    v.    Watson,    59    Ala.  22 ;  Bowser  v.  Colby,  1  Hare,  109, 

524;  Wilson  v.  Jones,  1  Bush  (Ky.)  11  L.  J.  Ch.  132,  5  Jur.  1106. 

173;    Atkins   v.    Chilson,    11   Met.  si  Wilson  v.  Jones,  1  Bush  (Ky.) 

(Mass.)    112,   119;    Mactier  v.  Os-  173,  174. 

born,  146  Mass.  399,  402,  15  N.  E.  32  Mactier  v.  Osborn,  146  Mass. 

Rep.  641,  644,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  323;  399,   402,   15  N.   E.  Rep.   641;    At- 

Thropp  V.  Field,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  82,  kins  v.  Chilson,  11  Met.    (Mass.> 

84;  Baxter  v.  Lansing,  7  Paige  Ch.  112;  Carpenter  v.  Wilson,  100  Md. 

(N.  Y.)  350;  Gamer  v.  Hannah,  6  13,    59   Atl.  Rep.   186;    Livingston 

Duer   (N.  Y.)    262;    Planters'  Ins.  v.  Tompkins,  4  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

Co.  V.  Diggs,  8  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  563;  415,  431;   Henry  v.  Tupper,  29  Vt. 

Hagan  v.  Buck,  44  Vt.  285,  291,  8  358;  Sanders  v.  Pope,  12  Ves.  282; 

Am.  Rep.  368;  Donnelly  v.  Eastes,  Hukill   v.  Myers,   36   W.   Va.   639, 

94   Wis.   390,   397,   69   N.   W.   Rep.  647,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  651.    Relief  from 

157;  Descarlett  v.  Dennett,  9  Mod.  a  forfeiture  may  be  granted  where 


COVENANTS   OP    THE   LEASE.  667 

will  usually  be  granted  by  a  court  of  equity  unless  the  covenan- 
tor can  sbow  that  the  breacli  by  him  was  occasioned  by  his  ex- 
cusable accident  or  mistake  or  by  surprise  or  by  the  fraud  of  the 
covenantee.'^  A  court  of  equity  in  determining  whether  to  grant 
a  lessee  relief  against  a  forfeiture  of  the  lease  will  carefully  ex- 
amine into  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  If  the  court  is 
asked  to  relieve  a  lessee  against  a  forfeiture  for  non-payment  of 
rent,  the  court  will  examine  all  the  circumstances  in  order  to  as- 
certain if  other  covenants  have  been  broken  by  the  lessee.  If 
other  covenants  have  been  broken  and  a  forfeiture  created  there- 
by for  which  under  the  circumstances  no  relief  can  be  had  in 
equity,  the  court  will  not  grant  any  relief  as  regards  the  breach 
of  the  covenant  or  condition  to  pay  rent  as  this  relief  would  be 
of  no  avail  to  the  tenant  in  view  of  the  other  broken  covenants.** 
So  where  the  court  is  asked  to  relieve  against  a  forfeiture  of  a 
lease  to  mine,  because  of  the  failure  of  the  lessee  to  pay  royalties, 
it  will  consider  all  the  other  particulars  if  any  in  which  the 
lease  has  been  broken  by  the  lessee  as,  for  example,  his  failure  to 
furnish  periodical  statements  of  the  quantity  of  ore  mined,  and 
his  acts  of  waste,  together  with  the  fact  that  he  is  insolvent  and 
therefore  unable  to  pay  the  rent  and  the  fact  that  the  property 
is  likely  to  be  injured  and  destroyed  by  dissatisfied  and  dis- 

the  forfeiture  arises  from  the  non-  accident  or  by  mistalie  of  the  in- 
payment of  taxes  by  a  tenant.  surance' brokers,  they  (the  insur- 
Webb  V.  King,  21  App.  D.  C.  141.  anoe  policies)  were  renewed  In  a 
S3  Peachey  v.  Somerset,  1  Stra.  form  which  does  not  fairly  meet 
447;  Hill  v.  Barclay,  18  Ves.  56,  the  requirements  of  the  covenant. 
63;  Bracebridge  v.  Bulkley,  2  This  was  not  wilful  or  voluntary 
Price,  200;  Elliott  v.  Turner,  13  on  the  part  of  the  tenant.  It  was 
Sim.  477,  483,  485;  Eaton  v.  Lyon,  not  an  accidental  forgetfulness  to 

3  Ves.  690,  692,  693;  Gregory  v.  renew  the  policies.  The  property 
Wilson,  9  Hare,  683;  Descarlet  v.  had  been  all  the  time  insured.  It 
Dennett,  9  Mod.  22;  Rolfe  v.  Har-  was  an  occurrence  not  anticipated 
ris,  2  Price,  206,  n.;  Reynolds  v.  by  the  tenant  and  not  known  to 
Pitts,  19  Ves.  134;  White  v.  War-  her  until  the  demandant  claimed 
ner,  2  Mer.  459;  Green  v.  Bridges,  to  enforce  a  forfeiture.     The  les- 

4  Sim.  96;  Thompson  v.  Guyon,  5  sors  have  not  been  injured  by  the 
Sim.  65;  Nokes  v.  Gibbon,  3  Drew.  accident  and  can  now  be  put  in 
681.  In  a  case  where  there  was  statu  quo."  Mactier  v.  Osborn,  146 
alleged  a  breach  by  a  tenant  of  Mass.  399,  402,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  641. 
his  covenant  to  keep  the  prem-  34  Nokes  v.  Gibbon,  3  Drew.  693; 
ises  Insured,  the  court  said:    "By  Bowser  v.  Colby,  1  Hare,  109. 


668"  LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 

affected  workmen. ^^  The  court  will  consider  the  conduct  of  the 
lessee  who  asks  to  be  relieved  from  a  forfeiture  of  a  covenant 
other  than  that  to  pay  rent.  The  conduct  of  the  lessee  must  be 
considered  in  order  to  ascertain  if  his  breach  of  the  covenant 
was  intentional  or  was  inadvertent.  And  where  relief  is  de- 
manded from  a  forfeiture  which  is  based  upon  the  failure  of  the 
lessee  for  a  few  months  to  prosecute  the  work  of  fitting  up  the 
premises  for  occupation,  the  court  will  take  into  consideration 
the  fact  that  during  the  period  of  the  delay  the  lessee  was  prepar- 
ing to  have  the  work  done,  that  he  was  in  fact  ready  to  proceed 
at  the  date  the  lessors  entered,  that  the  lessor  had  neither  made  a 
demand  for  greater  haste,  nor  any  complaint  to  the  lessee  of  the 
delay;  also  that  the  delay  was  not  wilful  or  in  bad  faith  and 
that  no  injury  had  resulted  to  the  lessor  by  reason  of  the  delay. ^^ 
A  statute  creating  a  forfeiture  in  the  case  of  its  violation  by  a 
lessee  will  be  strictly  construed  in  his  favor.  If  a  statute  pro- 
vides that  a  lessee  of  public  lands  from  the  state  for  a  particu- 
lar use  and  purpose  shall  forfeit  his  lease  if  he  shall  divert  the 
land  demised  to  him  from  such  use  and  purpose  does  not  require 
a  forfeiture  by  the  use  of  a  portion  of  the  land  for  another  pur- 

35  Sunday    Lake    Mining   Co.    v.  common  law  provided  in  tliis  class 

Wakefield,  72  Wis.  204,  39   N.  W.  of  contracts  that  it  was  the  duty 

Rep.  136.  of  the  court  to  see  that  no  injus- 

30  Lundin  v.  Schoeffel,  167  Mass.  tice  was  done.  It  is  reasonable, 
465,  45  N.  E.  Rep.  933.  "As  a  it  is  natural,  that  when  a  contract 
proposition  pervading  this  doc-  puts  it  into  the  power  of  one  man 
trine  of  the  right  of  re-entry  by  to  say  that  under  certain  contin- 
the  forfeiture  of  a  lease  of  land,  gencies,  of  which  he  is  to  be  the 
it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  power  judge,  he  shall  enter  upon  the 
to  be  exercised  is  a  very  strong  house  or  home  or  property  of  an- 
power,  and  it  is  one  which  is  ex-  other,  and  eject  him  instantly, 
ercised  without  the  judgment  of  a  and  take  possession,  it  is  reason- 
court  of  justice  or  of  any  body  able,  it  is  proper,  that  the  con- 
else  but  the  party  who  exercises  tract  and  the  acts  which  justify 
it.  The  party  determines  for  him-  such  a  course  of  conduct  shall  be 
self  whether  he  has  the  right  of  construed  rigidly  against  the  ex- 
reentry,  without  any  resort  to  a  ercise  of  the  right.  A  court  of 
court  of  justice.  This  is  always  equity,  when  necessary,  when  this 
a  harsh  power.  It  has  always  been  power  has  been  exercised,  will 
considered  that  it  was  necessary  come  in  and  afford  relief."  By 
to  restrain  it  to  the  most  technical  Miller,  J.,  in  Kansas  City  Elevator 
limits  of  the  terms  and  conditions  Co.  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  17  Fed. 
upon  which  the  right  is  to  be  ex-  Rep.  200,  on  page  201. 
ercised.     Hence,  it  is  that  the  old 


COVENANTS   OF   TIIB   LEASE. 


669 


pose  which  in  no  way  interferes  with  hut  rather  is  auxiliary  to 
the  use  of  the  premises  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  leased." 
Equity  will  not  relieve  against  the  forgetfulness  of  the  lessee  in 
executing  an  underlease  without  the  consent  in  writing  of  his 
landlord  which  was  required  under'  the  terms  of  the  lease,  even 
though  no  damage  has  been  sustained  by  the  landlord  and  the 
under  tenant  was  a  respectable  and  responsible  person.  Forget- 
fulness on  the  part  of  the  lessee  or  his  agent  by  reason  of  which 
the  procuring  of  the  necessary  consent  is  entirely  omitted  is 
neither  accident  nor  mistake  which  will  give  the  court  of  equity 
jurisdiction.^^  Though  a  court  of  equity  is  generally  unwilling 
to  enforce  a  forfeiture,  it  may  do  so-  under  certain  circumstances 
where  the  enforcement  of  a  forfeiture  asked  as  an  affirmative 
relief  is  more  consistent  with  right  and  justice,  than  to  refuse  it. 
A  forfeiture  will  usually  be  enforced  unless  there  are  some  ele- 
ments of  accident  or  mistake  appearing  in  the  proofs,  and  the 
party  against  whom  it  is  to  be  enforced  can  be  compelled  to  pay 


37  Equity  will  grant  relief 
against  a  forfeiture  for  the  non- 
payment of  the  rent,  even  after 
a  judgment  against  the  tenant  in 
forcible  detainer  (Abrams  v.  Wat- 
son, 59  Ala.  524),  and  after  the 
landlord  has  entered  and  received 
an  attornment  from  the  sub-ten- 
ants (Wilson  V.  Jones,  1  Bush 
(Ky.)  173),  and  also  where  the 
property  is  situated  in  another 
state  so  that  the  court  cannot  re- 
store possession  to  the  lessor. 
Sunday  Lake  Mining  Co.  v.  Wake- 
field, 72  Wis.  204,  39  N.  W.  Rep. 
136. 

38  Barrow  v.  Isaacs,  60  L.  J.  Q. 
B.  179,  (1891)  1  Q.  B.  417,  64  L.  T. 
686,  39  W.  R.  338,  55  J.  P.  517. 
"Nevertheless,  it  is  obvious  that 
there  has  been  a  breach  of  the 
covenant.  Upon  the  breach  the 
right  of  re-entry  vested.  At  law, 
therefore,  the  plaintiff  has  the 
right  to  reenter;  that  is  to  say 
he  has  the  right  to  get  rid  of  a 
long  lease  of  great  advantage  to 


the  lessees.  I  do  not  know  what 
his  motives  are  for  insisting  on 
his  right,  but  he  does  insist. 
There  must,  of  course,  be  some 
motive  for  his  doing  so.  He  has, 
however,  the  legal  right,  and  the 
question,  therefore,  is  whether 
where  it  is  clear  that  there  is  no 
real  ground  for  objecting  to  the 
subdemlse,  and  that  the  omission 
to  ask  the  lessor's  consent  has 
had  no  effect  at  all  and  done  no 
harm  at  all,  equity  will  relieve 
against  a  forfeiture  incurred, 
though  subletting  without  such 
consent.  Under  which  of  the 
grounds  that  courts  of  equity  have 
recognized  can  the  relief  that  is 
sought  in  this  case  be  brought? 
Equity  will  relieve  against  fraud, 
against  accident  and  against  mis- 
take; and  I  think  you  must  add 
that  equity  will  only  relieve  where 
there  can  be  complete  compensa- 
tion, or  where  there  has  been 
nothing  for  which  compensation 
can  be   required.     In  the  present 


670 


LAW  OP  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 


compensation.^"  The  lessee  may  have  relief  from  the  conse- 
quences of  a  forfeiture  caused  by  the  negligence  of  his  agent  as 
well  as  by  his  own  negligence.*" 


case,  there  has  clearly  not  been, 
any  fraud,  nor  can  it  be  said  that 
there  has  been  any  accident.  Can 
this  case  be  brought  under  the 
head  of  mistalie?  After  looking 
through  all  the  cases  I  cannot  find 
any  definition  of  what  mistake  is. 
Is  merei  forgetfulness  mistake? 
Using  the  word  mistake  in  its  or- 
dinary meaning  in  the  English 
language  I  think,  that  forgetful- 
ness is  not  mistake.  Forgetful- 
ness is  not  the  thinking  that  one 
thing  is  in  existence  when  in  fact 
something  else  is.  It  is  the  ab- 
sence of  thought  as  to  the  thing — 
the  mental  state  in  which  the  par- 


ticular thing  has  passed  out  of  the 
mind  altogether.  On  that  ground 
I  should  come  to  the  conclusion 
very  unwillingly  myself,  that  this 
case  was  not  one  of  those  in  which 
a  court  of  equity  could  grant  re- 
lief." Barrow  v.  Isaacs,  60  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  179,  (1891)  1  Q.  B.  417,  64 
L.  T.  686,  39  W.  R.  338,  56  J.  P. 
517. 

39  Brewster  v.  Lanyon  Zinc  Co., 
72  C.  C.  App.  213,  140  Fed.  Rep. 
801. 

*o  Barrow  v.  Isaacs,  60  L.  J.  Q. 
B.  179,  (1891)  1  Q.  B.  417,  64  L.  T. 
686,  39  W.  R.  338,  55  J.  P.  517. 


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